2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
);
65 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL
*s
,
66 PACKET
*cipher_suites
,
68 **skp
, int sslv2format
,
72 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
73 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
74 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
75 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
77 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
78 * (transition not allowed)
80 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
82 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
85 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
86 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
90 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
91 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
92 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
94 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
98 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
99 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
100 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
101 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
105 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
106 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
113 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
114 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
115 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
119 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
120 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
126 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
127 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
128 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
134 /* No valid transition found */
135 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
136 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_READ_TRANSITION
,
137 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
142 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
143 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
144 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
145 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
147 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
148 * (transition not allowed)
150 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
152 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
154 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
155 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
160 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
166 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
167 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
168 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
173 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
175 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
176 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
178 * 2) If we did request one then
179 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
181 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
182 * list if we requested a certificate)
184 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
185 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
186 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
187 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
188 && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
190 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
191 * not going to accept it because we require a client
194 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
,
195 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
196 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
,
197 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
200 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
204 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
207 } else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
208 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
209 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
216 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
217 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
222 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
224 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
225 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
226 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
227 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
228 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
231 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| st
->no_cert_verify
) {
232 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
234 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
235 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
236 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
237 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
239 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
243 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
244 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
250 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
251 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
252 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
257 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
259 if (s
->s3
->npn_seen
) {
260 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
) {
261 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
;
266 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
267 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
276 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
277 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
278 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
284 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
285 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
286 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
293 /* No valid transition found */
294 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
295 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
300 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
302 * Valid return values are:
306 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
308 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
311 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
312 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
313 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
314 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
315 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
318 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)
320 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
324 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
325 || ((alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
))
326 && s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
)
327 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
328 || (alg_k
& (SSL_PSK
& (SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)))
330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
331 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
332 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
342 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
344 * Valid return values are:
348 static int send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
351 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
352 s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
354 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
355 * during re-negotiation:
357 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
== 0 ||
358 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
))
360 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
361 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
364 && (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
366 * ... except when the application insists on
367 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
370 || (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
371 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
372 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
374 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
377 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aPSK
)) {
385 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
386 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
389 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
391 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
394 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
395 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
399 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
400 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
403 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
405 /* Shouldn't happen */
406 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
408 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
409 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
410 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
412 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
413 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
414 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
416 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
418 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
419 else if (send_certificate_request(s
))
420 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
422 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
424 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
426 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
427 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
428 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
431 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
;
432 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
434 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
:
435 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
436 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
438 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
439 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
441 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
443 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
444 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
446 * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
447 * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
450 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
451 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
453 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
454 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
455 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
461 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
462 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
464 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
466 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
469 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
470 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
474 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s
);
476 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
478 /* Shouldn't happen */
479 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
482 if (st
->request_state
== TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
) {
483 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
484 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
;
485 st
->request_state
= TLS_ST_BEFORE
;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
488 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
489 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
490 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
491 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
496 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
497 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
499 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
500 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
501 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
502 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
504 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
505 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->d1
->cookie_verified
506 && (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
))
507 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
509 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
510 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
512 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
513 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
515 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
517 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
)
518 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
520 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
522 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
523 /* normal PSK or SRP */
524 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
&
525 (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
526 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
527 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
528 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
529 } else if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
530 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
532 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
535 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
538 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
) {
539 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
;
540 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
544 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
545 if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
546 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
547 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
551 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
552 if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
553 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
554 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
558 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
559 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
560 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
562 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
563 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
565 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
567 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
568 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
569 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
570 } else if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
571 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
573 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
577 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
578 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
579 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
581 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
582 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
583 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
585 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
587 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
589 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
590 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
591 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
596 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
597 * the server to the client.
599 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
601 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
603 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
605 /* No pre work to be done */
608 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
611 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
614 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
616 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
617 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
618 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
623 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
624 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
626 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
627 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
633 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
634 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
635 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
636 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
638 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
640 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
641 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
643 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
644 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
645 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
647 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 0);
648 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
650 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
651 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
657 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
658 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
659 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
660 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
663 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
665 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
666 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
667 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
668 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
672 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
675 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1);
678 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
682 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
683 * server to the client.
685 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
687 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
691 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
693 /* No post work to be done */
696 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
697 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
699 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
700 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
705 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
706 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
708 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
709 if (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
&& !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
710 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
714 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
715 * treat like it was the first packet
720 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
721 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
722 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
723 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
724 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
727 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
730 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
731 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
733 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
734 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
735 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
737 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
741 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
742 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
746 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
747 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
748 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
749 * something clever in the record layer for this.
751 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
752 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
753 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
754 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
)
755 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
756 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
|SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
))
761 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
762 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
763 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->hit
) {
765 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
768 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
772 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
773 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
775 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
780 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
783 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
784 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
788 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
789 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
791 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
792 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
794 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
797 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
801 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
802 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
803 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
804 &s
->session
->master_key_length
)
805 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
806 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
811 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
812 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && statem_flush(s
) != 1)
817 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
821 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
824 * Valid return values are:
828 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
829 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
831 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
833 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
835 /* Shouldn't happen */
838 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
840 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
842 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
843 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
846 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
847 *confunc
= dtls_construct_hello_verify_request
;
848 *mt
= DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
851 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
852 /* No construction function needed */
854 *mt
= SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
857 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
858 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_hello
;
859 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
863 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_certificate
;
864 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
867 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
:
868 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
869 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
873 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
874 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_key_exchange
;
875 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
878 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
879 *confunc
= tls_construct_certificate_request
;
880 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
883 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
884 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_done
;
885 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
888 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
889 *confunc
= tls_construct_new_session_ticket
;
890 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
893 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
894 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_status
;
895 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
898 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
899 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
900 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
903 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
904 *confunc
= tls_construct_encrypted_extensions
;
905 *mt
= SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
913 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
914 * calculated as follows:
916 * 2 + # client_version
917 * 32 + # only valid length for random
918 * 1 + # length of session_id
919 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
920 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
921 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
922 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
923 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
924 * 2 + # length of extensions
925 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
927 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
929 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
930 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
933 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
934 * reading. Excludes the message header.
936 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
938 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
940 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
942 /* Shouldn't happen */
945 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
946 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
949 return s
->max_cert_list
;
951 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
952 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
954 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
955 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
957 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
958 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
959 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH
;
962 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
963 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
965 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
966 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
971 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
973 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
975 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
977 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
979 /* Shouldn't happen */
980 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
982 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
983 return tls_process_client_hello(s
, pkt
);
986 return tls_process_client_certificate(s
, pkt
);
988 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
989 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
991 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
992 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
994 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
995 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
996 return tls_process_next_proto(s
, pkt
);
999 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
1000 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
1002 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
1003 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
1008 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1011 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1013 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1015 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1017 /* Shouldn't happen */
1020 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1021 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s
, wst
);
1023 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1024 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s
, wst
);
1026 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
1027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1028 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
1029 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
1030 /* Are we renegotiating? */
1031 && s
->renegotiate
&& BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
1032 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
1033 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1034 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
1035 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
1036 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
1039 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
1042 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1044 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1047 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1048 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
1050 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
1052 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
1054 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
1055 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
)) {
1056 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
) {
1058 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1061 ret
= SSL3_AL_FATAL
;
1062 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
1064 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
, al
);
1071 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned char *cookie
,
1074 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1075 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, DTLS1_VERSION
)
1076 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, cookie
, cookie_len
))
1082 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1084 unsigned int cookie_leni
;
1085 if (s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb
== NULL
||
1086 s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1087 &cookie_leni
) == 0 ||
1088 cookie_leni
> 255) {
1089 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
,
1090 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE
);
1093 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_leni
;
1095 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1096 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1106 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1107 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1108 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1113 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1114 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1115 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1116 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1118 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL
*s
, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
)
1120 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock
[] = {
1121 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1122 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1123 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1124 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1125 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1126 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1128 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1129 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1130 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1131 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1132 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1133 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1134 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1135 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1136 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1137 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1138 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1139 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1140 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1142 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1143 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
= 18;
1148 tmppkt
= hello
->extensions
;
1150 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt
, 2)
1151 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt
, &type
)
1152 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt
, &sni
)) {
1156 if (type
!= TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
)
1159 ext_len
= TLS1_get_client_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
?
1160 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock
) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
;
1162 s
->s3
->is_probably_safari
= PACKET_equal(&tmppkt
, kSafariExtensionsBlock
,
1165 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1167 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1169 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1173 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1175 SSL_COMP
*comp
= NULL
;
1177 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= NULL
;
1179 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1180 PACKET session_id
, compression
, extensions
, cookie
;
1181 static const unsigned char null_compression
= 0;
1182 CLIENTHELLO_MSG clienthello
;
1184 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1185 if (s
->renegotiate
== 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
1190 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
1191 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
1194 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1196 memset(&clienthello
, 0, sizeof(clienthello
));
1197 clienthello
.isv2
= RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
);
1198 PACKET_null_init(&cookie
);
1200 if (clienthello
.isv2
) {
1204 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1205 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1206 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1207 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1209 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1210 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1212 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1213 * 7-8 session_id_length
1214 * 9-10 challenge_length
1218 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &mt
)
1219 || mt
!= SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
1221 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1222 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1223 * in the first place
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1230 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &clienthello
.legacy_version
)) {
1231 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1236 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1237 if (clienthello
.isv2
) {
1239 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1240 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1241 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1243 unsigned int ciphersuite_len
, session_id_len
, challenge_len
;
1246 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ciphersuite_len
)
1247 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &session_id_len
)
1248 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &challenge_len
)) {
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1250 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1251 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1255 if (session_id_len
> SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
) {
1256 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1261 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &clienthello
.ciphersuites
,
1263 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
.session_id
, session_id_len
)
1264 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &challenge
, challenge_len
)
1265 /* No extensions. */
1266 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1268 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1269 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1272 clienthello
.session_id_len
= session_id_len
;
1274 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1275 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello.random) because that is the limit
1276 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1277 * sizeof(clienthello.random) does.
1279 challenge_len
= challenge_len
> SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1280 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
: challenge_len
;
1281 memset(clienthello
.random
, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1282 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge
,
1283 clienthello
.random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-
1284 challenge_len
, challenge_len
)
1285 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1286 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression
, &null_compression
, 1)) {
1287 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1288 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1292 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
.extensions
);
1294 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1295 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
.random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)
1296 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)
1297 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id
, clienthello
.session_id
,
1298 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
,
1299 &clienthello
.session_id_len
)) {
1300 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1301 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1305 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1306 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookie
)) {
1307 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1311 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie
, clienthello
.dtls_cookie
,
1312 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH
,
1313 &clienthello
.dtls_cookie_len
)) {
1314 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1315 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1319 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1320 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1321 * So check cookie length...
1323 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1324 if (clienthello
.dtls_cookie_len
== 0)
1329 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
.ciphersuites
)) {
1330 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1331 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1335 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1336 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1341 /* Could be empty. */
1342 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1343 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
.extensions
);
1345 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
.extensions
)) {
1346 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1347 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1353 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression
, clienthello
.compressions
,
1354 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE
,
1355 &clienthello
.compressions_len
)) {
1356 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1361 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1362 extensions
= clienthello
.extensions
;
1363 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1364 &clienthello
.pre_proc_exts
, &al
)) {
1365 /* SSLerr already been called */
1369 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1371 /* Set up the client_random */
1372 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
, clienthello
.random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1374 /* Choose the version */
1376 if (clienthello
.isv2
) {
1377 if (clienthello
.legacy_version
== SSL2_VERSION
1378 || (clienthello
.legacy_version
& 0xff00)
1379 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
<< 8)) {
1381 * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
1388 s
->client_version
= clienthello
.legacy_version
;
1391 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1392 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1394 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1395 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, &clienthello
);
1396 } else if (s
->method
->version
!= DTLS_ANY_VERSION
&&
1397 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello
.legacy_version
, s
->version
)) {
1398 protverr
= SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1405 if ((!s
->enc_write_ctx
&& !s
->write_hash
)) {
1406 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1407 s
->version
= s
->client_version
= clienthello
.legacy_version
;
1409 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1413 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1414 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1415 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1416 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
) {
1417 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, clienthello
.dtls_cookie
,
1418 clienthello
.dtls_cookie_len
) == 0) {
1419 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1420 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1421 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1423 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1425 /* default verification */
1426 } else if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
!= clienthello
.dtls_cookie_len
1427 || memcmp(clienthello
.dtls_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1428 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) {
1429 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1430 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1433 s
->d1
->cookie_verified
= 1;
1435 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1436 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, &clienthello
);
1437 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1438 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1439 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1440 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1448 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1449 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret
,
1451 clienthello
.pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0, &al
)) {
1452 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1457 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1458 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1460 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1461 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1462 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1463 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1464 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1465 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1466 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1467 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1468 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1469 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1472 if (clienthello
.isv2
||
1474 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
1475 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1478 i
= ssl_get_prev_session(s
, &clienthello
, &al
);
1480 /* previous session */
1482 } else if (i
== -1) {
1486 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1491 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
, &clienthello
.ciphersuites
, &ciphers
,
1492 clienthello
.isv2
, &al
) == NULL
) {
1496 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1499 id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1502 fprintf(stderr
, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
));
1504 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
1505 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
1507 fprintf(stderr
, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1508 i
, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1517 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1520 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1521 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1522 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1527 for (loop
= 0; loop
< clienthello
.compressions_len
; loop
++) {
1528 if (clienthello
.compressions
[loop
] == 0)
1532 if (loop
>= clienthello
.compressions_len
) {
1534 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1540 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
)
1541 ssl_check_for_safari(s
, &clienthello
);
1542 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1544 /* TLS extensions */
1545 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1546 clienthello
.pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0, &al
)) {
1547 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1552 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1553 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1554 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1555 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1559 pos
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1560 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0) {
1565 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1566 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1568 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1569 * backwards compat reasons
1571 int master_key_length
;
1573 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1574 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1575 &master_key_length
, ciphers
,
1577 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1578 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1579 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1581 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1582 s
->session
->verify_result
= X509_V_OK
;
1586 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1588 pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,
1593 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
) {
1594 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1599 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
;
1600 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1601 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1602 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1603 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1608 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1609 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1610 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1612 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= NULL
;
1613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1614 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1615 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1616 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1618 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1619 /* Can't disable compression */
1620 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1622 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1625 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1626 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++) {
1627 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1628 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
) {
1629 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1633 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
) {
1634 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1635 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1638 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1639 for (k
= 0; k
< clienthello
.compressions_len
; k
++) {
1640 if (clienthello
.compressions
[k
] == comp_id
)
1643 if (k
>= clienthello
.compressions_len
) {
1644 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1646 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1651 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
1652 /* See if we have a match */
1653 int m
, nn
, v
, done
= 0;
1656 nn
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1657 for (m
= 0; m
< nn
; m
++) {
1658 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1660 for (o
= 0; o
< clienthello
.compressions_len
; o
++) {
1661 if (v
== clienthello
.compressions
[o
]) {
1670 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1676 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1677 * using compression.
1679 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1680 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1686 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1690 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1691 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
1693 s
->session
->compress_meth
= (comp
== NULL
) ? 0 : comp
->id
;
1695 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1696 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1697 if (ciphers
== NULL
) {
1698 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1699 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1703 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s
)) {
1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1709 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1710 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
.pre_proc_exts
);
1711 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1713 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1715 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1717 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1718 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
.pre_proc_exts
);
1720 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1724 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1725 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
1727 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
1729 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
1732 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1733 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
1734 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
1735 * influence which certificate is sent
1737 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
&& s
->ctx
!= NULL
1738 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
1740 CERT_PKEY
*certpkey
= ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
1742 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1743 if (certpkey
!= NULL
) {
1745 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1746 * et al can pick it up.
1748 s
->cert
->key
= certpkey
;
1749 ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
1751 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1752 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
:
1753 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
1755 /* status request response should be sent */
1756 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
:
1757 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
)
1758 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 1;
1760 /* something bad happened */
1761 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
1763 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1772 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1774 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1775 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
;
1777 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
1779 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1780 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
1781 int rv
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
1783 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1784 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1785 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
1789 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
1792 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1795 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1797 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
1798 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1799 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1802 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
1803 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1804 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1805 s
->session
->not_resumable
=
1806 s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
, ((cipher
->algorithm_mkey
1807 & (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
))
1809 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
1810 /* do not send a session ticket */
1811 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1813 /* Session-id reuse */
1814 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
1817 if (!(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
1818 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
1819 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1825 * we now have the following setup.
1827 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1828 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1829 * compression - basically ignored right now
1830 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1831 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1832 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1833 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1837 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
1838 * certificate callbacks etc above.
1840 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s
, &al
)) {
1841 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1842 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1848 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1849 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
1851 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
, &al
)) < 0) {
1853 * callback indicates further work to be done
1855 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
1858 if (ret
!= SSL_ERROR_NONE
) {
1860 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1861 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1863 if (al
!= TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
)
1864 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1865 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1868 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
1874 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
1876 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1877 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1881 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1883 int compm
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1887 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
1888 version
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
: s
->version
;
1889 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, version
)
1891 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1892 * tls_process_client_hello()
1894 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1895 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1900 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1901 * back in the server hello:
1902 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1903 * we send back the old session ID.
1904 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1905 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1906 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1907 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1909 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1910 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1911 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1912 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1915 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
1916 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1918 s
->session
->session_id_length
= 0;
1920 sl
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1921 if (sl
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
1922 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1926 /* set up the compression method */
1927 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1930 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1933 compm
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1936 if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
1937 && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->session
->session_id
, sl
))
1938 || !s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, pkt
, &len
)
1939 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
1940 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, compm
))
1941 || !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
1943 ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1944 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
,
1946 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1952 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1956 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1958 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
1959 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
1960 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1967 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1969 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1970 EVP_PKEY
*pkdh
= NULL
;
1972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1973 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1974 size_t encodedlen
= 0;
1978 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1979 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, i
;
1982 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1983 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
1984 size_t paramlen
, paramoffset
;
1986 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, ¶moffset
)) {
1987 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1991 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
1992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1996 type
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1998 r
[0] = r
[1] = r
[2] = r
[3] = NULL
;
1999 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2000 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2001 if (type
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2003 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2004 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2005 if (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2006 CERT
*cert
= s
->cert
;
2008 EVP_PKEY
*pkdhp
= NULL
;
2011 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
) {
2012 DH
*dhp
= ssl_get_auto_dh(s
);
2013 pkdh
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2014 if (pkdh
== NULL
|| dhp
== NULL
) {
2016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2017 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2020 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh
, dhp
);
2023 pkdhp
= cert
->dh_tmp
;
2025 if ((pkdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
2026 DH
*dhp
= s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
, 0, 1024);
2027 pkdh
= ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp
);
2029 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2030 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2035 if (pkdhp
== NULL
) {
2036 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2037 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2038 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2041 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
2042 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp
), 0, pkdhp
)) {
2043 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2045 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2048 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2050 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2054 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp
);
2056 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2057 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2061 dh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2063 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2066 DH_get0_pqg(dh
, &r
[0], NULL
, &r
[1]);
2067 DH_get0_key(dh
, &r
[2], NULL
);
2070 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2071 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2074 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2075 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2076 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2080 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2081 nid
= tls1_shared_group(s
, -2);
2082 curve_id
= tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid
);
2083 if (curve_id
== 0) {
2084 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2085 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
2088 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id
);
2089 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2090 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2091 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2095 /* Encode the public key. */
2096 encodedlen
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
,
2098 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
2099 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2104 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2105 * can set these to NULLs
2112 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2113 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2114 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2115 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
2116 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
2117 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) || (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
)) {
2118 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2119 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
2122 r
[0] = s
->srp_ctx
.N
;
2123 r
[1] = s
->srp_ctx
.g
;
2124 r
[2] = s
->srp_ctx
.s
;
2125 r
[3] = s
->srp_ctx
.B
;
2129 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2130 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2131 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
2135 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
2136 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)) {
2137 if ((pkey
= ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
, s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, &md
))
2139 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2146 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2147 if (type
& SSL_PSK
) {
2148 size_t len
= (s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2149 ? 0 : strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
);
2152 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2153 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2155 if (len
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2156 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
,
2158 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2159 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2165 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
2166 unsigned char *binval
;
2169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2170 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
2171 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
);
2174 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
);
2177 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2178 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2184 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2185 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2188 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
))) {
2189 size_t len
= BN_num_bytes(r
[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r
[2]);
2192 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &binval
)) {
2193 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2194 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2197 memset(binval
, 0, len
);
2201 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]), &binval
)
2202 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2203 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2204 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2208 BN_bn2bin(r
[i
], binval
);
2211 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2212 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2214 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2215 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2216 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2219 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
)
2220 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)
2221 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, curve_id
)
2222 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encodedlen
)) {
2223 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2224 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2227 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2228 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2235 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2236 * points to the space at the end.
2239 unsigned char *sigbytes1
, *sigbytes2
;
2243 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2244 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, ¶mlen
)) {
2245 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2246 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2249 /* send signature algorithm */
2250 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2251 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(s
, pkt
, pkey
, md
, &ispss
)) {
2252 /* Should never happen */
2253 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2254 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2259 fprintf(stderr
, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2262 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2263 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2264 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2267 siglen
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2268 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes1
)
2269 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2270 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2271 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2275 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
,
2276 RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2277 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2278 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2283 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
2284 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2285 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
2286 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2287 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx
,
2288 s
->init_buf
->data
+ paramoffset
,
2290 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx
, sigbytes1
, &siglen
) <= 0
2291 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes2
)
2292 || sigbytes1
!= sigbytes2
) {
2293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2294 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2298 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2299 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2300 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2301 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
2306 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2309 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2311 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2312 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2315 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2317 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2321 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2324 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
= NULL
;
2326 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2327 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
2328 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
, pkt
)
2329 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2330 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2334 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2335 const uint16_t *psigs
;
2336 size_t nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &psigs
);
2338 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
2339 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, pkt
, psigs
, nl
)
2340 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2341 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2342 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2347 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2348 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2349 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2353 sk
= SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2355 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++) {
2356 unsigned char *namebytes
;
2357 X509_NAME
*name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
, i
);
2361 || (namelen
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
)) < 0
2362 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, namelen
,
2364 || i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &namebytes
) != namelen
) {
2365 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2366 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2371 /* else no CA names */
2373 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2374 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2378 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 1;
2382 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2386 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2389 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2391 PACKET psk_identity
;
2393 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity
)) {
2394 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2395 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2398 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2399 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2403 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
) {
2404 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2405 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2409 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity
, &s
->session
->psk_identity
)) {
2410 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2411 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2415 psklen
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity
,
2418 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2419 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2420 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2422 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2424 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2426 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2428 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2432 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2433 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2434 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2436 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
== NULL
) {
2437 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2438 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2442 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2446 /* Should never happen */
2447 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2453 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2456 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2458 unsigned char decrypt_good
, version_good
;
2459 size_t j
, padding_len
;
2460 PACKET enc_premaster
;
2462 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt
= NULL
;
2465 rsa
= EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
);
2467 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2468 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2472 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2473 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2474 enc_premaster
= *pkt
;
2476 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &enc_premaster
)
2477 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2478 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2479 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2485 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2486 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2487 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2488 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2490 if (RSA_size(rsa
) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2491 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2492 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL
);
2496 rsa_decrypt
= OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa
));
2497 if (rsa_decrypt
== NULL
) {
2498 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2499 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2504 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2505 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2506 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2507 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2508 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2511 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret
, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
)) <= 0)
2515 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2516 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2518 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2519 decrypt_len
= (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster
),
2520 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster
),
2521 rsa_decrypt
, rsa
, RSA_NO_PADDING
);
2522 if (decrypt_len
< 0)
2525 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2528 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2529 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2530 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2532 if (decrypt_len
< 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2533 *al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2538 padding_len
= decrypt_len
- SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2539 decrypt_good
= constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt
[0], 0) &
2540 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt
[1], 2);
2541 for (j
= 2; j
< padding_len
- 1; j
++) {
2542 decrypt_good
&= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt
[j
]);
2544 decrypt_good
&= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
- 1]);
2547 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2548 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2549 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2550 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2551 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2552 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2555 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
],
2556 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
>> 8));
2558 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ 1],
2559 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
& 0xff));
2562 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2563 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2564 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2565 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2566 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2567 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2570 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) {
2571 unsigned char workaround_good
;
2572 workaround_good
= constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
],
2573 (unsigned)(s
->version
>> 8));
2575 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ 1],
2576 (unsigned)(s
->version
& 0xff));
2577 version_good
|= workaround_good
;
2581 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2582 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2584 decrypt_good
&= version_good
;
2587 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2588 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2589 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2590 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2592 for (j
= 0; j
< sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
); j
++) {
2593 rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ j
] =
2594 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good
,
2595 rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ j
],
2596 rand_premaster_secret
[j
]);
2599 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, rsa_decrypt
+ padding_len
,
2600 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
), 0)) {
2601 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2608 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt
);
2611 /* Should never happen */
2612 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2613 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2618 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2621 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
2625 const unsigned char *data
;
2626 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
2629 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
) || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != i
) {
2630 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
2632 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2635 skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
2637 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2638 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2642 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
2643 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2644 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2647 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
2648 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2649 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2650 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2653 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2654 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
2655 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2658 cdh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2659 pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
);
2661 if (pub_key
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_key(cdh
, pub_key
, NULL
)) {
2662 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2663 if (pub_key
!= NULL
)
2668 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
2669 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2670 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2675 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2676 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
2678 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2681 /* Should never happen */
2682 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2683 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2688 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2690 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2691 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
2692 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
2695 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
2696 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2697 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2702 const unsigned char *data
;
2705 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2706 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2709 /* Get encoded point length */
2710 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &i
) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)
2711 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2712 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2713 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2716 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2717 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) <= 0) {
2718 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2721 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, data
, i
) == 0) {
2722 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2723 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2728 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
2729 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2730 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2735 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2736 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
2738 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2742 /* Should never happen */
2743 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2744 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2749 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2753 const unsigned char *data
;
2755 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
)
2756 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
2757 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2761 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.A
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
2762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2765 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
)) {
2766 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2767 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
2770 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2771 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2772 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2773 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2777 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s
)) {
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2784 /* Should never happen */
2785 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2786 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2791 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2793 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2794 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2795 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2796 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32];
2797 const unsigned char *start
;
2798 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
;
2799 unsigned long alg_a
;
2802 size_t sess_key_len
;
2803 const unsigned char *data
;
2806 /* Get our certificate private key */
2807 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2808 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST12
) {
2810 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2812 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
].privatekey
;
2814 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
].privatekey
;
2817 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2819 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
) {
2820 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2823 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
, NULL
);
2824 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2825 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2826 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2829 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
2830 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2835 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2836 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2837 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2838 * client certificate for authorization only.
2840 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2841 if (client_pub_pkey
) {
2842 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2845 /* Decrypt session key */
2846 sess_key_len
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
2847 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, sess_key_len
)) {
2848 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2849 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2852 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2853 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data
, &Tlen
, &Ttag
,
2854 &Tclass
, (long)sess_key_len
) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2855 || Ttag
!= V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
|| Tclass
!= V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL
) {
2856 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2857 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2862 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2863 (pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
, inlen
) <= 0) {
2864 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2865 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2868 /* Generate master secret */
2869 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, premaster_secret
,
2870 sizeof(premaster_secret
), 0)) {
2871 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2875 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2876 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2877 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
2878 s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
= 1;
2882 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2885 /* Should never happen */
2886 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2887 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2892 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2895 unsigned long alg_k
;
2897 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2899 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2900 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2903 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2904 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2905 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2906 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2907 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2908 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2911 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2912 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, NULL
, 0, 0)) {
2913 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2914 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2917 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2918 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2920 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2921 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2923 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2924 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2926 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2927 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2929 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2930 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2933 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2934 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2935 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2939 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2942 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2944 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
2945 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
2947 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2948 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2951 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2953 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2954 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2955 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2956 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
2957 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
2959 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2962 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
2963 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
2965 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
2966 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
2967 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
2969 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2973 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
2974 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
2979 if ((wst
== WORK_MORE_B
)
2981 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
2982 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2984 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2985 && (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
)
2986 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
2987 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
2988 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
2989 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
2990 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
2991 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
2994 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
2998 if (s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
|| !s
->session
->peer
) {
3000 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3001 * the handshake_buffer
3003 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3004 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3007 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3009 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
3010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3011 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3012 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3016 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3017 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3019 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3020 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3025 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3028 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3030 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3032 unsigned long l
, llen
;
3033 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
3034 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
3035 PACKET spkt
, context
;
3038 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
3039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3043 /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
3044 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &context
))
3045 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &llen
)
3046 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &spkt
, llen
)
3047 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3048 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3053 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) > 0; chainidx
++) {
3054 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt
, &l
)
3055 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt
, &certbytes
, l
)) {
3056 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3057 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3058 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3062 certstart
= certbytes
;
3063 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, l
);
3065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3068 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ l
)) {
3069 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3070 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3071 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3075 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3076 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3079 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt
, &extensions
)) {
3080 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
3084 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
3086 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
3087 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
, &al
)) {
3088 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3091 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3094 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
3095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3101 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0) {
3102 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3103 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3104 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3105 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3106 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3109 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3110 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3111 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3112 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3113 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3114 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3117 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3118 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3123 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
3125 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
3126 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3127 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
3131 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
3132 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3135 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk
, 0));
3137 al
= SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3138 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3139 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
3144 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3145 s
->session
->peer
= sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3146 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3148 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->peer_chain
, X509_free
);
3149 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
3152 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3155 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3156 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3157 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3162 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3163 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3167 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3169 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
3170 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
3171 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
3172 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3173 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3177 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3181 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3182 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3185 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
3189 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3192 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3194 cpk
= ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
3196 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3201 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3202 * for the server Certificate message
3204 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0))
3205 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
, &al
)) {
3206 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3207 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3214 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3216 unsigned char *senc
= NULL
;
3217 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
3218 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
3219 unsigned char *p
, *encdata1
, *encdata2
, *macdata1
, *macdata2
;
3220 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3221 int len
, slen_full
, slen
, lenfinal
;
3224 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
3225 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3226 unsigned char key_name
[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
];
3227 int iv_len
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3228 size_t macoffset
, macendoffset
;
3230 unsigned char age_add_c
[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3234 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3235 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u
.age_add_c
, sizeof(age_add_u
)) <= 0)
3237 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add_u
.age_add
;
3240 /* get session encoding length */
3241 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3243 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3246 if (slen_full
== 0 || slen_full
> 0xFF00) {
3247 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3250 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3252 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3256 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3257 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
3258 if (ctx
== NULL
|| hctx
== NULL
) {
3259 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3264 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
))
3268 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3271 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3274 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3276 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3277 if (slen
== 0 || slen
> slen_full
) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3278 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3282 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
)) {
3283 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3286 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3289 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3290 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3292 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
) {
3293 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3294 int ret
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, ctx
,
3299 /* Put timeout and length */
3300 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, 0)
3301 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
3302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3303 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3307 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3308 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3313 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
3315 const EVP_CIPHER
*cipher
= EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3317 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher
);
3318 if (RAND_bytes(iv
, iv_len
) <= 0)
3320 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx
, cipher
, NULL
,
3321 tctx
->ext
.tick_aes_key
, iv
))
3323 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.tick_hmac_key
,
3324 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_hmac_key
),
3325 EVP_sha256(), NULL
))
3327 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
3328 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
));
3332 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3333 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3334 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3336 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, s
->hit
? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
)
3338 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, age_add_u
.age_add
))
3339 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3340 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
3341 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macoffset
)
3342 /* Output key name */
3343 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, key_name
, sizeof(key_name
))
3345 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, iv
, iv_len
)
3346 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
,
3348 /* Encrypt session data */
3349 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx
, encdata1
, &len
, senc
, slen
)
3350 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &encdata2
)
3351 || encdata1
!= encdata2
3352 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx
, encdata1
+ len
, &lenfinal
)
3353 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, lenfinal
, &encdata2
)
3354 || encdata1
+ len
!= encdata2
3355 || len
+ lenfinal
> slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3356 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macendoffset
)
3357 || !HMAC_Update(hctx
,
3358 (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ macoffset
,
3359 macendoffset
- macoffset
)
3360 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &macdata1
)
3361 || !HMAC_Final(hctx
, macdata1
, &hlen
)
3362 || hlen
> EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3363 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, hlen
, &macdata2
)
3364 || macdata1
!= macdata2
3365 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
3367 && !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
3368 EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3370 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3373 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3374 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3380 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3381 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3382 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3387 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3388 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3390 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3392 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.status_type
)
3393 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
,
3394 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
)) {
3395 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3402 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3404 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
3405 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3414 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3415 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3417 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_next_proto(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3419 PACKET next_proto
, padding
;
3420 size_t next_proto_len
;
3423 * The payload looks like:
3425 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3426 * uint8 padding_len;
3427 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3429 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &next_proto
)
3430 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &padding
)
3431 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3436 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto
, &s
->ext
.npn
, &next_proto_len
)) {
3441 s
->ext
.npn_len
= (unsigned char)next_proto_len
;
3443 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3445 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3446 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3450 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3454 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3456 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3457 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3458 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3465 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3467 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL
*s
,
3468 PACKET
*cipher_suites
,
3469 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) **skp
,
3470 int sslv2format
, int *al
)
3472 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3473 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
3475 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3476 unsigned char cipher
[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN
];
3478 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 0;
3480 n
= sslv2format
? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN
: TLS_CIPHER_LEN
;
3482 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites
) == 0) {
3483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
3484 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
3488 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites
) % n
!= 0) {
3489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
,
3490 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST
);
3491 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3495 sk
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
3497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3498 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3503 size_t numciphers
= PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites
) / n
;
3504 PACKET sslv2ciphers
= *cipher_suites
;
3505 unsigned int leadbyte
;
3509 * We store the raw ciphers list in SSLv3+ format so we need to do some
3510 * preprocessing to convert the list first. If there are any SSLv2 only
3511 * ciphersuites with a non-zero leading byte then we are going to
3512 * slightly over allocate because we won't store those. But that isn't a
3515 raw
= OPENSSL_malloc(numciphers
* TLS_CIPHER_LEN
);
3516 s
->s3
->tmp
.ciphers_raw
= raw
;
3518 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3521 for (s
->s3
->tmp
.ciphers_rawlen
= 0;
3522 PACKET_remaining(&sslv2ciphers
) > 0;
3523 raw
+= TLS_CIPHER_LEN
) {
3524 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sslv2ciphers
, &leadbyte
)
3526 && !PACKET_copy_bytes(&sslv2ciphers
, raw
,
3529 && !PACKET_forward(&sslv2ciphers
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
))) {
3530 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3531 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ciphers_raw
);
3532 s
->s3
->tmp
.ciphers_raw
= NULL
;
3533 s
->s3
->tmp
.ciphers_rawlen
= 0;
3537 s
->s3
->tmp
.ciphers_rawlen
+= TLS_CIPHER_LEN
;
3539 } else if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ciphers_raw
,
3540 &s
->s3
->tmp
.ciphers_rawlen
)) {
3541 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3545 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites
, cipher
, n
)) {
3547 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3548 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3549 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3551 if (sslv2format
&& cipher
[0] != '\0')
3554 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3555 if ((cipher
[n
- 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV
>> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3556 (cipher
[n
- 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV
& 0xff))) {
3557 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3558 if (s
->renegotiate
) {
3559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
,
3560 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING
);
3561 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3564 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 1;
3568 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3569 if ((cipher
[n
- 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
>> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3570 (cipher
[n
- 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
& 0xff))) {
3572 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3573 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3576 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s
)) {
3577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
,
3578 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
3579 *al
= SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
;
3585 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3586 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, sslv2format
? &cipher
[1] : cipher
);
3588 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk
, c
)) {
3589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3590 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3595 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites
) > 0) {
3596 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3604 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk
);