2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
16 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
17 #include <openssl/conf.h>
18 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
19 #include <openssl/dh.h>
20 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/provider.h>
22 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
23 #include "internal/nelem.h"
24 #include "internal/sizes.h"
25 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
26 #include "ssl_local.h"
27 #include <openssl/ct.h>
29 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
);
30 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
);
32 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_enc_data
= {
36 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
37 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
38 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
39 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
40 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
42 tls1_export_keying_material
,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
45 tls_close_construct_packet
,
49 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_1_enc_data
= {
53 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
54 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
55 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
56 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
57 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
59 tls1_export_keying_material
,
60 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
,
61 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
62 tls_close_construct_packet
,
66 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_2_enc_data
= {
70 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
71 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
72 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
73 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
74 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
76 tls1_export_keying_material
,
77 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
78 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
79 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
80 tls_close_construct_packet
,
84 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_3_enc_data
= {
87 tls13_setup_key_block
,
88 tls13_generate_master_secret
,
89 tls13_change_cipher_state
,
90 tls13_final_finish_mac
,
91 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
92 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
94 tls13_export_keying_material
,
95 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
,
96 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
97 tls_close_construct_packet
,
101 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
104 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
105 * http, the cache would over fill
107 return (60 * 60 * 2);
114 if (!s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
))
120 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
122 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.session_ticket
);
126 int tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
131 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
)
132 s
->version
= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL
;
134 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
139 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
144 {NID_sect163k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1
},
145 {NID_sect163r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1
},
146 {NID_sect163r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2
},
147 {NID_sect193r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1
},
148 {NID_sect193r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2
},
149 {NID_sect233k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1
},
150 {NID_sect233r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1
},
151 {NID_sect239k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1
},
152 {NID_sect283k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1
},
153 {NID_sect283r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1
},
154 {NID_sect409k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1
},
155 {NID_sect409r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1
},
156 {NID_sect571k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1
},
157 {NID_sect571r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1
},
158 {NID_secp160k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1
},
159 {NID_secp160r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1
},
160 {NID_secp160r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2
},
161 {NID_secp192k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1
},
162 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1
},
163 {NID_secp224k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1
},
164 {NID_secp224r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1
},
165 {NID_secp256k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1
},
166 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
},
167 {NID_secp384r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
},
168 {NID_secp521r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1
},
169 {NID_brainpoolP256r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1
},
170 {NID_brainpoolP384r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1
},
171 {NID_brainpoolP512r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1
},
172 {EVP_PKEY_X25519
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519
},
173 {EVP_PKEY_X448
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448
},
174 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A
},
175 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B
},
176 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C
},
177 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D
},
178 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A
},
179 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B
},
180 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C
},
181 {NID_ffdhe2048
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048
},
182 {NID_ffdhe3072
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072
},
183 {NID_ffdhe4096
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096
},
184 {NID_ffdhe6144
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144
},
185 {NID_ffdhe8192
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192
}
188 static const unsigned char ecformats_default
[] = {
189 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
,
190 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
,
191 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
194 /* The default curves */
195 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default
[] = {
196 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519
, /* X25519 (29) */
197 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
, /* secp256r1 (23) */
198 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448
, /* X448 (30) */
199 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1
, /* secp521r1 (25) */
200 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
, /* secp384r1 (24) */
201 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A
, /* GC256A (34) */
202 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B
, /* GC256B (35) */
203 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C
, /* GC256C (36) */
204 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D
, /* GC256D (37) */
205 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A
, /* GC512A (38) */
206 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B
, /* GC512B (39) */
207 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C
, /* GC512C (40) */
208 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048
, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
209 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072
, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
210 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096
, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
211 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144
, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
212 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192
, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
215 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves
[] = {
216 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
,
217 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
,
220 struct provider_group_data_st
{
222 OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
;
225 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
226 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups
;
227 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params
[], void *data
)
229 struct provider_group_data_st
*pgd
= data
;
230 SSL_CTX
*ctx
= pgd
->ctx
;
231 OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
= pgd
->provider
;
233 TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginf
= NULL
;
234 EVP_KEYMGMT
*keymgmt
;
236 unsigned int is_kem
= 0;
239 if (ctx
->group_list_max_len
== ctx
->group_list_len
) {
240 TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tmp
= NULL
;
242 if (ctx
->group_list_max_len
== 0)
243 tmp
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
)
244 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
246 tmp
= OPENSSL_realloc(ctx
->group_list
,
247 (ctx
->group_list_max_len
248 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
)
249 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
));
251 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
254 ctx
->group_list
= tmp
;
255 memset(tmp
+ ctx
->group_list_max_len
,
257 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
258 ctx
->group_list_max_len
+= TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
;
261 ginf
= &ctx
->group_list
[ctx
->group_list_len
];
263 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME
);
264 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
265 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
268 ginf
->tlsname
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
269 if (ginf
->tlsname
== NULL
) {
270 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
274 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL
);
275 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
276 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
279 ginf
->realname
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
280 if (ginf
->realname
== NULL
) {
281 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
285 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID
);
286 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &gid
) || gid
> UINT16_MAX
) {
287 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
290 ginf
->group_id
= (uint16_t)gid
;
292 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG
);
293 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
294 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
297 ginf
->algorithm
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
298 if (ginf
->algorithm
== NULL
) {
299 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
303 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS
);
304 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &ginf
->secbits
)) {
305 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
309 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_IS_KEM
);
310 if (p
!= NULL
&& (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &is_kem
) || is_kem
> 1)) {
311 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
314 ginf
->is_kem
= 1 & is_kem
;
316 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS
);
317 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->mintls
)) {
318 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
322 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS
);
323 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->maxtls
)) {
324 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
328 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS
);
329 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->mindtls
)) {
330 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
334 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS
);
335 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->maxdtls
)) {
336 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
340 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
341 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
342 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
346 keymgmt
= EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, ginf
->algorithm
, ctx
->propq
);
347 if (keymgmt
!= NULL
) {
349 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
350 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
352 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
353 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
354 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
355 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
356 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
357 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
360 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_provider(keymgmt
) == provider
) {
361 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
362 ctx
->group_list_len
++;
365 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt
);
369 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->tlsname
);
370 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->realname
);
371 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->algorithm
);
372 ginf
->tlsname
= ginf
->realname
= NULL
;
377 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
, void *vctx
)
379 struct provider_group_data_st pgd
;
382 pgd
.provider
= provider
;
383 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider
, "TLS-GROUP",
384 add_provider_groups
, &pgd
);
387 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
389 size_t i
, j
, num_deflt_grps
= 0;
390 uint16_t tmp_supp_groups
[OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default
)];
392 if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx
->libctx
, discover_provider_groups
, ctx
))
395 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default
); i
++) {
396 for (j
= 0; j
< ctx
->group_list_len
; j
++) {
397 if (ctx
->group_list
[j
].group_id
== supported_groups_default
[i
]) {
398 tmp_supp_groups
[num_deflt_grps
++] = ctx
->group_list
[j
].group_id
;
404 if (num_deflt_grps
== 0)
407 ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
408 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_deflt_grps
);
410 if (ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
== NULL
) {
411 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
415 memcpy(ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
,
417 num_deflt_grps
* sizeof(tmp_supp_groups
[0]));
418 ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default_len
= num_deflt_grps
;
423 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
427 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->group_list_len
; i
++) {
428 if (strcmp(ctx
->group_list
[i
].tlsname
, name
) == 0
429 || strcmp(ctx
->group_list
[i
].realname
, name
) == 0)
430 return ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
;
436 uint16_t ssl_group_id_internal_to_tls13(uint16_t curve_id
)
439 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1
:
440 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13
;
441 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1
:
442 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13
;
443 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1
:
444 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13
;
445 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13
:
446 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13
:
447 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13
:
454 uint16_t ssl_group_id_tls13_to_internal(uint16_t curve_id
)
457 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1
:
458 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1
:
459 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1
:
461 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13
:
462 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1
;
463 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13
:
464 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1
;
465 case OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13
:
466 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1
;
472 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint16_t group_id
)
476 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->group_list_len
; i
++) {
477 if (ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
== group_id
)
478 return &ctx
->group_list
[i
];
484 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id
, int include_unknown
)
492 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
493 * work for groups we don't know about.
495 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group
); i
++)
497 if (nid_to_group
[i
].group_id
== group_id
)
498 return nid_to_group
[i
].nid
;
500 if (!include_unknown
)
502 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown
| (int)group_id
;
505 uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid
)
510 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
511 * work for groups we don't know about.
513 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group
); i
++)
515 if (nid_to_group
[i
].nid
== nid
)
516 return nid_to_group
[i
].group_id
;
523 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
524 * the number of groups supported.
526 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL
*s
, const uint16_t **pgroups
,
529 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
530 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
531 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
532 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
533 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves
);
536 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
537 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
541 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
542 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
+ 1;
547 if (s
->ext
.supportedgroups
== NULL
) {
548 *pgroups
= s
->ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
;
549 *pgroupslen
= s
->ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default_len
;
551 *pgroups
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups
;
552 *pgroupslen
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
;
558 int tls_valid_group(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, int minversion
, int maxversion
,
559 int isec
, int *okfortls13
)
561 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(s
->ctx
, group_id
);
564 if (okfortls13
!= NULL
)
570 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
571 if (ginfo
->mindtls
< 0 || ginfo
->maxdtls
< 0)
573 if (ginfo
->maxdtls
== 0)
576 ret
= DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion
, ginfo
->maxdtls
);
577 if (ginfo
->mindtls
> 0)
578 ret
&= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion
, ginfo
->mindtls
);
580 if (ginfo
->mintls
< 0 || ginfo
->maxtls
< 0)
582 if (ginfo
->maxtls
== 0)
585 ret
= (minversion
<= ginfo
->maxtls
);
586 if (ginfo
->mintls
> 0)
587 ret
&= (maxversion
>= ginfo
->mintls
);
588 if (ret
&& okfortls13
!= NULL
&& maxversion
== TLS1_3_VERSION
)
589 *okfortls13
= (ginfo
->maxtls
== 0)
590 || (ginfo
->maxtls
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
);
593 || strcmp(ginfo
->algorithm
, "EC") == 0
594 || strcmp(ginfo
->algorithm
, "X25519") == 0
595 || strcmp(ginfo
->algorithm
, "X448") == 0;
600 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
601 int tls_group_allowed(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group
, int op
)
603 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(s
->ctx
, group
);
604 unsigned char gtmp
[2];
609 gtmp
[0] = group
>> 8;
610 gtmp
[1] = group
& 0xff;
611 return ssl_security(s
, op
, ginfo
->secbits
,
612 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo
->group_id
, 0), (void *)gtmp
);
615 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
616 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id
, const uint16_t *list
, size_t listlen
)
619 for (i
= 0; i
< listlen
; i
++)
626 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
627 * if there is no match.
628 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
629 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
630 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
632 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL
*s
, int nmatch
)
634 const uint16_t *pref
, *supp
;
635 size_t num_pref
, num_supp
, i
;
638 /* Can't do anything on client side */
642 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
644 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
645 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
647 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
649 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
650 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
;
651 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
652 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
;
653 /* Should never happen */
656 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
660 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
661 * otherwise peer decides.
663 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) {
664 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
665 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
667 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
668 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
671 for (k
= 0, i
= 0; i
< num_pref
; i
++) {
672 uint16_t id
= pref
[i
];
675 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
676 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
)
677 cid
= ssl_group_id_internal_to_tls13(id
);
679 cid
= id
= ssl_group_id_tls13_to_internal(id
);
681 if (!tls1_in_list(cid
, supp
, num_supp
)
682 || !tls_group_allowed(s
, id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED
))
690 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
694 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
695 int *groups
, size_t ngroups
)
700 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
701 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
703 unsigned long *dup_list
= NULL
;
704 unsigned long dup_list_egrp
= 0;
705 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp
= 0;
708 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
711 if ((glist
= OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups
* sizeof(*glist
))) == NULL
) {
712 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
715 for (i
= 0; i
< ngroups
; i
++) {
716 unsigned long idmask
;
718 id
= tls1_nid2group_id(groups
[i
]);
719 if ((id
& 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
721 idmask
= 1L << (id
& 0x00FF);
722 dup_list
= (id
< 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp
: &dup_list_dhgrp
;
723 if (!id
|| ((*dup_list
) & idmask
))
737 # define GROUPLIST_INCREMENT 40
738 # define GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH 64
746 static int gid_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
748 gid_cb_st
*garg
= arg
;
751 char etmp
[GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH
];
755 if (garg
->gidcnt
== garg
->gidmax
) {
757 OPENSSL_realloc(garg
->gid_arr
, garg
->gidmax
+ GROUPLIST_INCREMENT
);
760 garg
->gidmax
+= GROUPLIST_INCREMENT
;
763 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
765 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
768 gid
= tls1_group_name2id(garg
->ctx
, etmp
);
771 for (i
= 0; i
< garg
->gidcnt
; i
++)
772 if (garg
->gid_arr
[i
] == gid
)
774 garg
->gid_arr
[garg
->gidcnt
++] = gid
;
778 /* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
779 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
787 gcb
.gidmax
= GROUPLIST_INCREMENT
;
788 gcb
.gid_arr
= OPENSSL_malloc(gcb
.gidmax
* sizeof(*gcb
.gid_arr
));
789 if (gcb
.gid_arr
== NULL
)
792 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, gid_cb
, &gcb
))
800 * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
803 tmparr
= OPENSSL_memdup(gcb
.gid_arr
, gcb
.gidcnt
* sizeof(*tmparr
));
807 *pextlen
= gcb
.gidcnt
;
810 OPENSSL_free(gcb
.gid_arr
);
814 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
815 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, int check_own_groups
)
817 const uint16_t *groups
;
823 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
824 if (tls1_suiteb(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
) {
825 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
827 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
) {
828 if (group_id
!= OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
)
830 } else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
) {
831 if (group_id
!= OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
)
834 /* Should never happen */
839 if (check_own_groups
) {
840 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
841 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
842 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
))
846 if (!tls_group_allowed(s
, group_id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))
849 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
853 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
854 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
857 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
858 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
859 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
860 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
864 return tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
);
867 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char **pformats
,
871 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
873 if (s
->ext
.ecpointformats
) {
874 *pformats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats
;
875 *num_formats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
;
877 *pformats
= ecformats_default
;
878 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
880 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
) - 1;
882 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
);
886 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
887 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL
*s
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
889 unsigned char comp_id
;
893 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
894 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC"))
898 /* Get required compression id */
899 point_conv
= EVP_PKEY_get_ec_point_conv_form(pkey
);
902 if (point_conv
== POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
) {
903 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
;
904 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
906 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
911 int field_type
= EVP_PKEY_get_field_type(pkey
);
913 if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_prime_field
)
914 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
;
915 else if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
)
916 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
;
921 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
922 * supported (see RFC4492).
924 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
== NULL
)
927 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats_len
; i
++) {
928 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
[i
] == comp_id
)
934 /* Return group id of a key */
935 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
937 int curve_nid
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey
);
939 if (curve_nid
== NID_undef
)
941 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid
);
945 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
946 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
948 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int check_ee_md
)
952 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
955 /* If not EC nothing to do */
956 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC"))
958 /* Check compression */
959 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
))
961 group_id
= tls1_get_group_id(pkey
);
963 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
966 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, group_id
, !s
->server
))
969 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
972 if (check_ee_md
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
976 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
977 if (group_id
== OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
)
978 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
;
979 else if (group_id
== OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
)
980 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
;
982 return 0; /* Should never happen */
983 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
984 if (check_md
== s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
993 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
995 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
997 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
998 * is compatible with the client extensions.
1000 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
1002 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL
*s
, unsigned long cid
)
1004 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
1005 if (!tls1_suiteb(s
))
1006 return tls1_shared_group(s
, 0) != 0;
1008 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
1011 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
1012 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
, 1);
1013 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
1014 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
, 1);
1019 /* Default sigalg schemes */
1020 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs
[] = {
1021 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1022 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
1023 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
1024 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
1025 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
,
1026 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256
,
1027 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384
,
1028 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512
,
1030 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
1031 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
1032 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
1033 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
1034 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
1035 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
1037 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
1038 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
1039 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
1041 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
1042 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
1044 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
1045 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
1047 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
1048 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
1050 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
1051 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
1052 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
1054 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1055 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
,
1056 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
,
1057 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
1058 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
1059 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
1064 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs
[] = {
1065 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1066 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1069 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl
[] = {
1070 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1071 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1072 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
, NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, 1},
1073 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
1074 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1075 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
, NID_secp384r1
, 1},
1076 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
1077 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1078 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512
, NID_secp521r1
, 1},
1079 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
1080 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
,
1081 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1082 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
,
1083 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
,
1084 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1085 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
1086 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1087 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224
, NID_undef
, 1},
1088 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
1089 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1090 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
, NID_undef
, 1},
1091 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256
,
1092 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1093 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
, NID_brainpoolP256r1
, 1},
1094 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384
,
1095 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1096 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
, NID_brainpoolP384r1
, 1},
1097 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512
,
1098 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1099 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512
, NID_brainpoolP512r1
, 1},
1100 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
1101 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1102 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1103 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
1104 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1105 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1106 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
1107 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1108 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1109 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
1110 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1111 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1112 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
1113 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1114 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1115 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
1116 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1117 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1118 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
1119 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1120 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1121 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
1122 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1123 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1124 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
1125 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1126 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1127 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
1128 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1129 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1130 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
1131 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1132 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1133 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
1134 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1135 NID_dsa_with_SHA256
, NID_undef
, 1},
1136 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
1137 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1138 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1139 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
1140 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1141 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1142 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
1143 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1144 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1145 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
1146 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1147 NID_dsaWithSHA1
, NID_undef
, 1},
1148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1149 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
,
1150 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
1151 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
1152 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1153 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
,
1154 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
1155 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
1156 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1157 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
1158 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
1159 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
1160 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1161 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
1162 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
1163 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
1164 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1165 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
1166 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
,
1167 NID_id_GostR3410_2001
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
,
1168 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1}
1171 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1172 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg
= {
1173 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1174 NID_md5_sha1
, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
,
1175 EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1176 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1
1180 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1181 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1183 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg
[] = {
1184 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1185 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1186 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1187 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1188 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1189 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1190 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1191 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1192 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1195 int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
1198 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1199 SIGALG_LOOKUP
*cache
1200 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu
) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
));
1201 EVP_PKEY
*tmpkey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1204 if (cache
== NULL
|| tmpkey
== NULL
)
1208 for (i
= 0, lu
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
;
1209 i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
); lu
++, i
++) {
1215 * Check hash is available.
1216 * This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1217 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1218 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1219 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1220 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1222 if (lu
->hash
!= NID_undef
1223 && ctx
->ssl_digest_methods
[lu
->hash_idx
] == NULL
) {
1224 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1228 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey
, lu
->sig
)) {
1229 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1232 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx
->libctx
, tmpkey
, ctx
->propq
);
1233 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1235 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1236 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1239 ctx
->sigalg_lookup_cache
= cache
;
1244 OPENSSL_free(cache
);
1245 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey
);
1249 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1250 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL
*s
, uint16_t sigalg
)
1253 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1255 for (i
= 0, lu
= s
->ctx
->sigalg_lookup_cache
;
1256 /* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
1257 i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1259 if (lu
->sigalg
== sigalg
) {
1267 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1268 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
, const EVP_MD
**pmd
)
1273 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1274 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
) {
1277 md
= ssl_md(ctx
, lu
->hash_idx
);
1287 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1289 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1290 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1291 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1293 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_get_size(md) + 2)
1294 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
,
1295 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1301 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx
, lu
, &md
) || md
== NULL
)
1303 if (EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey
) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md
))
1309 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1310 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1311 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1312 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1313 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1315 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL
*s
, int idx
)
1321 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1322 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1323 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i
);
1327 if (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) {
1334 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1336 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST01
&& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aGOST01
) {
1339 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
1341 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
1348 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1349 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1351 else if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
) {
1354 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
1356 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
1363 idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
1366 if (idx
< 0 || idx
>= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg
))
1368 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
1369 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, tls_default_sigalg
[idx
]);
1373 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->ctx
, lu
, NULL
))
1375 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
1379 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, &legacy_rsa_sigalg
))
1381 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg
;
1383 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1384 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL
*s
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1387 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1389 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
1391 lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, idx
);
1394 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1398 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL
*s
, int sent
, const uint16_t **psigs
)
1401 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1404 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1405 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
1406 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1407 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs
);
1409 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
1410 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1413 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
1414 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
+ 1;
1418 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1419 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1420 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1422 if ((s
->server
== sent
) && s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
1423 *psigs
= s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
;
1424 return s
->cert
->client_sigalgslen
;
1425 } else if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1426 *psigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1427 return s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1429 *psigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
1430 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
1435 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1436 * specified EC curve.
1438 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL
*s
, int curve
)
1440 const uint16_t *sigs
;
1443 if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1444 sigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1445 siglen
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1447 sigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
1448 siglen
= OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
1451 for (i
= 0; i
< siglen
; i
++) {
1452 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, sigs
[i
]);
1456 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
1457 && lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
1458 && curve
== lu
->curve
)
1466 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1469 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1471 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1474 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx
, lu
, &md
))
1478 int md_type
= EVP_MD_get_type(md
);
1480 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1481 secbits
= EVP_MD_get_size(md
) * 4;
1483 * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
1484 * they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
1485 * really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our
1487 * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for
1488 * SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
1489 * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
1490 * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
1492 if (md_type
== NID_sha1
)
1494 else if (md_type
== NID_md5_sha1
)
1496 else if (md_type
== NID_md5
)
1499 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1500 if (lu
->sigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
)
1502 else if (lu
->sigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
)
1509 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1510 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1513 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL
*s
, uint16_t sig
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1515 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1516 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1518 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
, cidx
;
1520 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1523 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey
);
1524 /* Should never happen */
1527 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1528 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1529 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
1530 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1533 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1534 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1535 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
1537 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, sig
);
1539 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1540 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1543 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
|| lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
))
1544 || (pkeyid
!= lu
->sig
1545 && (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
|| pkeyid
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
))) {
1546 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1549 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1550 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey
), &cidx
)
1551 || lu
->sig_idx
!= (int)cidx
) {
1552 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1556 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
1558 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1559 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
)) {
1560 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1561 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION
);
1565 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1566 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1567 int curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey
);
1569 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
) {
1570 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1574 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1575 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1576 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, tls1_get_group_id(pkey
), 1)) {
1577 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1580 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1581 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1582 if (sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1583 && sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
) {
1584 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1585 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1590 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1591 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1595 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1596 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1597 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
1598 if (sig
== *sent_sigs
)
1601 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1602 if (i
== sent_sigslen
&& (lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1603 || s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
1604 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1607 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->ctx
, lu
, &md
)) {
1608 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
1612 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1613 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1615 sigalgstr
[0] = (sig
>> 8) & 0xff;
1616 sigalgstr
[1] = sig
& 0xff;
1617 secbits
= sigalg_security_bits(s
->ctx
, lu
);
1619 !ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK
, secbits
,
1620 md
!= NULL
? EVP_MD_get_type(md
) : NID_undef
,
1621 (void *)sigalgstr
)) {
1622 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1625 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1626 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1630 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1632 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
== NULL
)
1634 *pnid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
->sig
;
1638 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1640 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
1642 *pnid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
->sig
;
1647 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1648 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1649 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1651 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1654 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1656 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL
*s
)
1658 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
= 0;
1659 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
= 0;
1660 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
, s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK
);
1661 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
,
1662 &s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
, NULL
) != 0)
1664 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1665 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1666 if (!s
->psk_client_callback
) {
1667 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aPSK
;
1668 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_PSK
;
1670 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1671 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1672 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.srp_Mask
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1673 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aSRP
;
1674 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kSRP
;
1681 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1682 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1683 * @c: cipher to check
1684 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1685 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1687 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1689 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_CIPHER
*c
, int op
, int ecdhe
)
1691 if (c
->algorithm_mkey
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
1692 || c
->algorithm_auth
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
)
1694 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
== 0)
1696 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1697 int min_tls
= c
->min_tls
;
1700 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1701 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1703 if (min_tls
== TLS1_VERSION
&& ecdhe
1704 && (c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) != 0)
1705 min_tls
= SSL3_VERSION
;
1707 if ((min_tls
> s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
) || (c
->max_tls
< s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
))
1710 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
)
1711 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
)))
1714 return !ssl_security(s
, op
, c
->strength_bits
, 0, (void *)c
);
1717 int tls_use_ticket(SSL
*s
)
1719 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
))
1721 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TICKET
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1724 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1728 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1729 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
1730 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1731 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1732 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1733 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
1734 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
1736 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1737 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1739 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
== NULL
1740 && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
) {
1741 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1742 size_t sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1744 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1745 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, i
);
1750 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1751 for (j
= 0; j
< sent_sigslen
; j
++) {
1752 if (lu
->sigalg
== sent_sigs
[j
]) {
1753 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
1761 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
1762 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1765 if (s
->shared_sigalgs
!= NULL
)
1768 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1769 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1770 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS
);
1775 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1777 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1778 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1779 * point to the resulting session.
1781 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
,
1785 RAW_EXTENSION
*ticketext
;
1788 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1791 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1792 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1795 if (s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
|| !tls_use_ticket(s
))
1796 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1798 ticketext
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket
];
1799 if (!ticketext
->present
)
1800 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1802 size
= PACKET_remaining(&ticketext
->data
);
1804 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, PACKET_data(&ticketext
->data
), size
,
1805 hello
->session_id
, hello
->session_id_len
, ret
);
1809 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1811 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1812 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1813 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1814 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1817 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1818 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1819 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1820 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1821 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1822 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1824 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1825 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1826 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1827 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1828 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1829 * point to the resulting session.
1831 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *etick
,
1832 size_t eticklen
, const unsigned char *sess_id
,
1833 size_t sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
1835 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= NULL
;
1836 unsigned char *sdec
;
1837 const unsigned char *p
;
1838 int slen
, renew_ticket
= 0, declen
;
1839 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1841 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
1842 SSL_HMAC
*hctx
= NULL
;
1843 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
1844 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
1846 if (eticklen
== 0) {
1848 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1849 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1851 ret
= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
;
1854 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1856 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1857 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1858 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1859 * calculate the master secret later.
1861 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1865 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1866 if (eticklen
< TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
) {
1867 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1871 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1872 hctx
= ssl_hmac_new(tctx
);
1874 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1877 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1879 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1883 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
|| tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
1885 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
1888 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
1891 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
1892 rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb(s
, nctick
,
1893 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
1895 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx
),
1897 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1898 else if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
1899 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1900 rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, nctick
,
1901 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
1902 ctx
, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx
), 0);
1905 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1909 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1915 EVP_CIPHER
*aes256cbc
= NULL
;
1917 /* Check key name matches */
1918 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
1919 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) != 0) {
1920 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1924 aes256cbc
= EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s
->ctx
->libctx
, "AES-256-CBC",
1926 if (aes256cbc
== NULL
1927 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
,
1928 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
),
1930 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx
, aes256cbc
, NULL
,
1931 tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_aes_key
,
1932 etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) <= 0) {
1933 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc
);
1934 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1937 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc
);
1938 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
1942 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1945 mlen
= ssl_hmac_size(hctx
);
1947 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1951 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1953 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx
) + mlen
) {
1954 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1958 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1959 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx
, etick
, eticklen
) <= 0
1960 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
, sizeof(tick_hmac
)) <= 0) {
1961 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1965 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
1966 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1969 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1970 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1971 p
= etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx
);
1972 eticklen
-= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx
);
1973 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
1974 if (sdec
== NULL
|| EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
,
1975 (int)eticklen
) <= 0) {
1977 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1980 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &declen
) <= 0) {
1982 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1988 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &p
, slen
);
1992 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1994 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1996 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2000 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
2001 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
2002 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
2006 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
2007 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
2010 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
2012 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
2017 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
2019 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2022 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
2023 ssl_hmac_free(hctx
);
2026 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
2027 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
2028 * performs any action
2030 if (s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb
!= NULL
2031 && (ret
== SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
2032 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
2033 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2034 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)) {
2035 size_t keyname_len
= eticklen
;
2038 if (keyname_len
> TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
)
2039 keyname_len
= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
;
2040 retcb
= s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb(s
, sess
, etick
, keyname_len
,
2042 s
->session_ctx
->ticket_cb_data
);
2044 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT
:
2045 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2048 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE
:
2049 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
2050 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2054 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW
:
2055 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
&& ret
!= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
)
2056 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2057 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
2058 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2062 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
:
2063 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW
:
2064 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2065 && ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)
2066 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2067 else if (retcb
== SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
)
2068 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
2070 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
2074 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2078 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
== NULL
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2080 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
:
2081 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
:
2082 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
:
2083 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
2092 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2093 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
2095 unsigned char sigalgstr
[2];
2098 if (lu
== NULL
|| !lu
->enabled
)
2100 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2101 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
2104 * At some point we should fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello as per TLS 1.3
2107 if (!s
->server
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
2108 && (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
|| lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2109 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2110 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
))
2113 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2114 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(s
->ctx
, lu
->sig_idx
))
2117 if (lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2118 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2119 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
2120 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2121 if (s
->server
&& SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
2124 && s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
2125 && s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
2127 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
2130 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2131 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2132 * ciphersuites enabled.
2135 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
2138 sk
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
2139 num
= sk
!= NULL
? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) : 0;
2140 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; i
++) {
2141 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
2143 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
2144 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2145 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
2148 if ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kGOST
| SSL_kGOST18
)) != 0)
2156 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2157 secbits
= sigalg_security_bits(s
->ctx
, lu
);
2158 sigalgstr
[0] = (lu
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff;
2159 sigalgstr
[1] = lu
->sigalg
& 0xff;
2160 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, lu
->hash
, (void *)sigalgstr
);
2164 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2165 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2169 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a
, SSL
*s
, int op
)
2171 const uint16_t *sigalgs
;
2172 size_t i
, sigalgslen
;
2173 uint32_t disabled_mask
= SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
| SSL_aECDSA
;
2175 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2178 sigalgslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sigalgs
);
2179 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++, sigalgs
++) {
2180 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *sigalgs
);
2181 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
2186 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu
->sig_idx
);
2190 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2191 if ((clu
->amask
& disabled_mask
) != 0
2192 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, lu
))
2193 disabled_mask
&= ~clu
->amask
;
2195 *pmask_a
|= disabled_mask
;
2198 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
2199 const uint16_t *psig
, size_t psiglen
)
2204 for (i
= 0; i
< psiglen
; i
++, psig
++) {
2205 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *psig
);
2208 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
2210 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, *psig
))
2213 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2214 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2216 if (rv
== 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
2217 || (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
2218 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
2219 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha224
)))
2223 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
2227 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2228 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**shsig
,
2229 const uint16_t *pref
, size_t preflen
,
2230 const uint16_t *allow
, size_t allowlen
)
2232 const uint16_t *ptmp
, *atmp
;
2233 size_t i
, j
, nmatch
= 0;
2234 for (i
= 0, ptmp
= pref
; i
< preflen
; i
++, ptmp
++) {
2235 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *ptmp
);
2237 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2239 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED
, lu
))
2241 for (j
= 0, atmp
= allow
; j
< allowlen
; j
++, atmp
++) {
2242 if (*ptmp
== *atmp
) {
2253 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2254 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
2256 const uint16_t *pref
, *allow
, *conf
;
2257 size_t preflen
, allowlen
, conflen
;
2259 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**salgs
= NULL
;
2261 unsigned int is_suiteb
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
2263 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
2264 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
2265 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
2266 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2267 if (!s
->server
&& c
->client_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
2268 conf
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
2269 conflen
= c
->client_sigalgslen
;
2270 } else if (c
->conf_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
2271 conf
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2272 conflen
= c
->conf_sigalgslen
;
2274 conflen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 0, &conf
);
2275 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|| is_suiteb
) {
2278 allow
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2279 allowlen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2283 pref
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2284 preflen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2286 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, NULL
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
2288 if ((salgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch
* sizeof(*salgs
))) == NULL
) {
2289 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2292 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, salgs
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
2296 s
->shared_sigalgs
= salgs
;
2297 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= nmatch
;
2301 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET
*pkt
, uint16_t **pdest
, size_t *pdestlen
)
2307 size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
2309 /* Invalid data length */
2310 if (size
== 0 || (size
& 1) != 0)
2315 if ((buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
* sizeof(*buf
))) == NULL
) {
2316 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2319 for (i
= 0; i
< size
&& PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &stmp
); i
++)
2327 OPENSSL_free(*pdest
);
2334 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int cert
)
2336 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2337 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2339 /* Should never happen */
2340 if (s
->cert
== NULL
)
2344 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
,
2345 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
);
2347 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
,
2348 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
);
2352 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2354 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
2357 uint32_t *pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
;
2359 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s
))
2362 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
2365 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2366 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigptr
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2367 int idx
= sigptr
->sig_idx
;
2369 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2370 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && sigptr
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2372 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2373 if (pvalid
[idx
] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(s
->ctx
, idx
))
2374 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2379 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
2380 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
2381 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
2383 uint16_t *psig
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2384 size_t numsigalgs
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2385 if (psig
== NULL
|| numsigalgs
> INT_MAX
)
2388 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
2390 if (idx
>= (int)numsigalgs
)
2394 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((*psig
>> 8) & 0xff);
2396 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(*psig
& 0xff);
2397 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *psig
);
2399 *psign
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sig
: NID_undef
;
2401 *phash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->hash
: NID_undef
;
2402 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
2403 *psignhash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sigandhash
: NID_undef
;
2405 return (int)numsigalgs
;
2408 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
2409 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
2410 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
2412 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*shsigalgs
;
2413 if (s
->shared_sigalgs
== NULL
2415 || idx
>= (int)s
->shared_sigalgslen
2416 || s
->shared_sigalgslen
> INT_MAX
)
2418 shsigalgs
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[idx
];
2420 *phash
= shsigalgs
->hash
;
2422 *psign
= shsigalgs
->sig
;
2423 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
2424 *psignhash
= shsigalgs
->sigandhash
;
2426 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(shsigalgs
->sigalg
& 0xff);
2428 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((shsigalgs
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff);
2429 return (int)s
->shared_sigalgslen
;
2432 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2433 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2437 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2438 uint16_t sigalgs
[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
];
2441 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig
, int *phash
, const char *str
)
2443 if (strcmp(str
, "RSA") == 0) {
2444 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2445 } else if (strcmp(str
, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str
, "PSS") == 0) {
2446 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
2447 } else if (strcmp(str
, "DSA") == 0) {
2448 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2449 } else if (strcmp(str
, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2450 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2452 *phash
= OBJ_sn2nid(str
);
2453 if (*phash
== NID_undef
)
2454 *phash
= OBJ_ln2nid(str
);
2457 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2458 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2460 static int sig_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
2462 sig_cb_st
*sarg
= arg
;
2464 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
2465 char etmp
[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN
], *p
;
2466 int sig_alg
= NID_undef
, hash_alg
= NID_undef
;
2469 if (sarg
->sigalgcnt
== TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
)
2471 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
2473 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
2475 p
= strchr(etmp
, '+');
2477 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2478 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2479 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2480 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2481 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2482 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2486 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2488 if (s
->name
!= NULL
&& strcmp(etmp
, s
->name
) == 0) {
2489 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2493 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2500 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, etmp
);
2501 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, p
);
2502 if (sig_alg
== NID_undef
|| hash_alg
== NID_undef
)
2504 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2506 if (s
->hash
== hash_alg
&& s
->sig
== sig_alg
) {
2507 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2511 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2515 /* Reject duplicates */
2516 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1; i
++) {
2517 if (sarg
->sigalgs
[i
] == sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1]) {
2526 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2527 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2529 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT
*c
, const char *str
, int client
)
2533 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, sig_cb
, &sig
))
2537 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c
, sig
.sigalgs
, sig
.sigalgcnt
, client
);
2540 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const uint16_t *psigs
, size_t salglen
,
2545 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
2546 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2549 memcpy(sigalgs
, psigs
, salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
));
2552 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2553 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2554 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2556 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2557 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2558 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2564 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const int *psig_nids
, size_t salglen
, int client
)
2566 uint16_t *sigalgs
, *sptr
;
2571 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc((salglen
/ 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
2572 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2575 for (i
= 0, sptr
= sigalgs
; i
< salglen
; i
+= 2) {
2577 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*curr
;
2578 int md_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2579 int sig_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2581 for (j
= 0, curr
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; j
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2583 if (curr
->hash
== md_id
&& curr
->sig
== sig_id
) {
2584 *sptr
++ = curr
->sigalg
;
2589 if (j
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2594 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2595 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2596 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2598 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2599 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2600 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2606 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs
);
2610 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int default_nid
)
2612 int sig_nid
, use_pc_sigalgs
= 0;
2614 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigalg
;
2616 if (default_nid
== -1)
2618 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
2620 return sig_nid
== default_nid
? 1 : 0;
2622 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2624 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2625 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2626 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2628 sigalgslen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
;
2631 sigalgslen
= s
->shared_sigalgslen
;
2633 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2634 sigalg
= use_pc_sigalgs
2635 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
])
2636 : s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2637 if (sigalg
!= NULL
&& sig_nid
== sigalg
->sigandhash
)
2643 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2644 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *names
, X509
*x
)
2646 const X509_NAME
*nm
;
2648 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
2649 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(names
); i
++) {
2650 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, sk_X509_NAME_value(names
, i
)))
2657 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2658 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2659 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2660 * attempting to use them.
2663 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2665 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2666 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2667 /* Strict mode flags */
2668 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2669 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2670 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2672 int tls1_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
2677 int check_flags
= 0, strict_mode
;
2678 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
2681 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
2682 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2684 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2687 idx
= (int)(cpk
- c
->pkeys
);
2689 cpk
= c
->pkeys
+ idx
;
2690 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2692 pk
= cpk
->privatekey
;
2694 strict_mode
= c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
;
2695 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2704 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk
, &certidx
) == NULL
)
2707 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2709 if (c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
2710 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
;
2712 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS
;
2719 check_flags
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2720 ok
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, x
, chain
, suiteb_flags
);
2721 if (ok
== X509_V_OK
)
2722 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2723 else if (!check_flags
)
2728 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2729 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2731 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& strict_mode
) {
2734 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
2735 || s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2737 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2741 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2742 default_nid
= NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
;
2745 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
2746 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2747 default_nid
= NID_dsaWithSHA1
;
2751 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2752 default_nid
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
;
2755 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
2756 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2001
;
2757 default_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001
;
2760 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
2761 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
;
2762 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256
;
2765 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
2766 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
;
2767 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512
;
2776 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2777 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2779 if (default_nid
> 0 && c
->conf_sigalgs
) {
2781 const uint16_t *p
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2782 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->conf_sigalgslen
; j
++, p
++) {
2783 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *p
);
2785 if (lu
!= NULL
&& lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
&& lu
->sig
== rsign
)
2788 if (j
== c
->conf_sigalgslen
) {
2795 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2796 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2798 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2799 * so check_flags is always set.
2801 if (find_sig_alg(s
, x
, pk
) != NULL
)
2802 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2803 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, x
, default_nid
)) {
2807 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2808 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2809 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2810 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, sk_X509_value(chain
, i
), default_nid
)) {
2812 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2819 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2820 else if (check_flags
)
2821 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2823 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2824 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s
, x
, 1))
2825 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM
;
2826 else if (!check_flags
)
2829 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2830 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2831 else if (strict_mode
) {
2832 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2833 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2834 X509
*ca
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2835 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s
, ca
, 0)) {
2837 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2844 if (!s
->server
&& strict_mode
) {
2845 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_dn
;
2848 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "RSA"))
2849 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN
;
2850 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "DSA"))
2851 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN
;
2852 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "EC"))
2853 check_type
= TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN
;
2856 const uint8_t *ctypes
= s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
;
2859 for (j
= 0; j
< s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
; j
++, ctypes
++) {
2860 if (*ctypes
== check_type
) {
2861 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2865 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
) && !check_flags
)
2868 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2871 ca_dn
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_ca_names
;
2873 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn
))
2874 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2876 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2877 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, x
))
2878 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2880 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2881 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2882 X509
*xtmp
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2883 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, xtmp
)) {
2884 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2889 if (!check_flags
&& !(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
))
2892 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2894 if (!check_flags
|| (rv
& check_flags
) == check_flags
)
2895 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_VALID
;
2899 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2900 rv
|= *pvalid
& (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
);
2902 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
2905 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2909 if (rv
& CERT_PKEY_VALID
) {
2912 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2913 *pvalid
&= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2920 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2921 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL
*s
)
2923 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
);
2924 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
);
2925 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
);
2926 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
);
2927 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
);
2928 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
);
2929 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
);
2930 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
);
2931 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
);
2934 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2935 int SSL_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2937 return tls1_check_chain(s
, x
, pk
, chain
, -1);
2940 EVP_PKEY
*ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL
*s
)
2942 EVP_PKEY
*dhp
= NULL
;
2944 int dh_secbits
= 80, sec_level_bits
;
2945 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2946 OSSL_PARAM_BLD
*tmpl
= NULL
;
2947 OSSL_PARAM
*params
= NULL
;
2949 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
!= 2) {
2950 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aPSK
)) {
2951 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->strength_bits
== 256)
2956 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
== NULL
)
2958 dh_secbits
= EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
->privatekey
);
2962 /* Do not pick a prime that is too weak for the current security level */
2963 sec_level_bits
= ssl_get_security_level_bits(s
, NULL
, NULL
);
2964 if (dh_secbits
< sec_level_bits
)
2965 dh_secbits
= sec_level_bits
;
2967 if (dh_secbits
>= 192)
2968 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL
);
2969 else if (dh_secbits
>= 152)
2970 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL
);
2971 else if (dh_secbits
>= 128)
2972 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL
);
2973 else if (dh_secbits
>= 112)
2974 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL
);
2976 p
= BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL
);
2980 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(s
->ctx
->libctx
, "DH", s
->ctx
->propq
);
2982 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx
) != 1)
2985 tmpl
= OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2987 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P
, p
)
2988 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_uint(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G
, 2))
2991 params
= OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl
);
2993 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx
, &dhp
, EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS
, params
) != 1)
2997 OSSL_PARAM_free(params
);
2998 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl
);
2999 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3004 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
3007 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
3010 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
3011 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
3012 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
3013 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
3015 secbits
= EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkey
);
3018 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
3020 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
3023 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
3025 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
3026 int secbits
, nid
, pknid
;
3027 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
3028 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x
) & EXFLAG_SS
) != 0)
3030 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &nid
, &pknid
, &secbits
, NULL
))
3032 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
3033 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
3036 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
3038 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
3041 int ssl_security_cert(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int vfy
, int is_ee
)
3044 vfy
= SSL_SECOP_PEER
;
3046 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY
| vfy
))
3047 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
3049 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY
| vfy
))
3050 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
3052 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD
| vfy
))
3053 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
;
3058 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
3059 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
3060 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
3063 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
, int vfy
)
3065 int rv
, start_idx
, i
;
3067 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
3072 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 1);
3076 for (i
= start_idx
; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
3077 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
3078 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 0);
3086 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
3087 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3090 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
3092 int sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3093 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx
);
3095 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3097 || (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0
3098 || (clu
->nid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3099 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kRSA
) != 0))
3102 return s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[sig_idx
] & CERT_PKEY_VALID
? sig_idx
: -1;
3106 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3107 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3109 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3111 static int check_cert_usable(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, X509
*x
,
3114 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
3115 int mdnid
, pknid
, supported
;
3117 const char *mdname
= NULL
;
3120 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot support signing with this digest,
3121 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3123 if (sig
->hash
!= NID_undef
)
3124 mdname
= OBJ_nid2sn(sig
->hash
);
3125 supported
= EVP_PKEY_digestsign_supports_digest(pkey
, s
->ctx
->libctx
,
3132 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3133 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3135 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3136 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &mdnid
, &pknid
, NULL
, NULL
))
3138 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3139 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
]);
3144 * This does not differentiate between the
3145 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3146 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3147 * signing certificate.
3149 if (mdnid
== lu
->hash
&& pknid
== lu
->sig
)
3156 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3157 * a viable public key is permitted.
3163 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3164 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3165 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3166 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3167 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3169 static int has_usable_cert(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, int idx
)
3171 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3174 if (!ssl_has_cert(s
, idx
))
3177 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].x509
,
3178 s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].privatekey
);
3182 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3183 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3185 static int is_cert_usable(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, X509
*x
,
3190 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
3193 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3194 if ((int)idx
!= sig
->sig_idx
)
3197 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, x
, pkey
);
3201 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3202 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3203 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3205 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
3207 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
3212 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3213 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3214 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
3216 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3217 if (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
3218 || lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
3219 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
3220 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
3222 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3223 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->ctx
, lu
, NULL
))
3225 if ((pkey
== NULL
&& !has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, -1))
3226 || (pkey
!= NULL
&& !is_cert_usable(s
, lu
, x
, pkey
)))
3229 tmppkey
= (pkey
!= NULL
) ? pkey
3230 : s
->cert
->pkeys
[lu
->sig_idx
].privatekey
;
3232 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3234 curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(tmppkey
);
3235 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
)
3237 } else if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
3238 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3239 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s
->ctx
, tmppkey
, lu
))
3245 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
)
3252 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3253 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3255 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3256 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3258 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3259 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3260 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3262 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL
*s
, int fatalerrs
)
3264 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
3267 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= NULL
;
3268 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= NULL
;
3270 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3271 lu
= find_sig_alg(s
, NULL
, NULL
);
3275 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3276 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3280 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3281 if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aCERT
))
3283 if (!s
->server
&& !ssl_has_cert(s
, s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
))
3286 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3288 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3291 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3293 curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
]
3297 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3300 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3301 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
3304 if ((sig_idx
= tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s
, lu
)) == -1)
3307 int cc_idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
3309 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3310 if (cc_idx
!= sig_idx
)
3313 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3314 if (!has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, sig_idx
))
3316 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
3317 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3318 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
].privatekey
;
3320 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s
->ctx
, pkey
, lu
))
3323 if (curve
== -1 || lu
->curve
== curve
)
3326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3328 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3329 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3330 * we have to assume GOST support.
3332 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
&& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aGOST01
| SSL_aGOST12
)) {
3333 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3336 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3337 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3341 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3345 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
) {
3348 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3349 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3354 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3356 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
3357 size_t sent_sigslen
;
3359 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3362 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3363 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3367 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3368 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
3369 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
3370 if (lu
->sigalg
== *sent_sigs
3371 && has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, lu
->sig_idx
))
3374 if (i
== sent_sigslen
) {
3377 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3378 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
3383 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3386 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3387 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3393 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3394 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= &s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
];
3395 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
;
3396 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= lu
;
3400 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint8_t mode
)
3402 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3403 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
3404 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
3408 ctx
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
3412 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL
*ssl
, uint8_t mode
)
3414 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3415 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
3416 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
3420 ssl
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
3424 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION
*session
)
3426 return session
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
;
3430 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3432 SSL_HMAC
*ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
3434 SSL_HMAC
*ret
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret
));
3435 EVP_MAC
*mac
= NULL
;
3439 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3440 if (ctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
== NULL
3441 && ctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
) {
3442 if (!ssl_hmac_old_new(ret
))
3447 mac
= EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, "HMAC", ctx
->propq
);
3448 if (mac
== NULL
|| (ret
->ctx
= EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac
)) == NULL
)
3453 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret
->ctx
);
3459 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3462 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx
->ctx
);
3463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3464 ssl_hmac_old_free(ctx
);
3470 EVP_MAC_CTX
*ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3475 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, void *key
, size_t len
, char *md
)
3477 OSSL_PARAM params
[2], *p
= params
;
3479 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
) {
3480 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST
, md
, 0);
3481 *p
= OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3482 if (EVP_MAC_init(ctx
->ctx
, key
, len
, params
))
3485 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3486 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3487 return ssl_hmac_old_init(ctx
, key
, len
, md
);
3492 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, const unsigned char *data
, size_t len
)
3494 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3495 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx
->ctx
, data
, len
);
3496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3497 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3498 return ssl_hmac_old_update(ctx
, data
, len
);
3503 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, unsigned char *md
, size_t *len
,
3506 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3507 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx
->ctx
, md
, len
, max_size
);
3508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3509 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3510 return ssl_hmac_old_final(ctx
, md
, len
);
3515 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3517 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3518 return EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx
->ctx
);
3519 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3520 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3521 return ssl_hmac_old_size(ctx
);
3526 int ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
3528 char gname
[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE
];
3530 if (EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey
, gname
, sizeof(gname
), NULL
) > 0)
3531 return OBJ_txt2nid(gname
);
3536 __owur
int tls13_set_encoded_pub_key(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
,
3537 const unsigned char *enckey
,
3540 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "DH")) {
3541 int bits
= EVP_PKEY_get_bits(pkey
);
3543 if (bits
<= 0 || enckeylen
!= (size_t)bits
/ 8)
3544 /* the encoded key must be padded to the length of the p */
3546 } else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC")) {
3547 if (enckeylen
< 3 /* point format and at least 1 byte for x and y */
3548 || enckey
[0] != 0x04)
3552 return EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(pkey
, enckey
, enckeylen
);