2 * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
20 #include "internal/nelem.h"
22 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_enc_data
= {
28 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
29 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
30 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
31 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
32 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
34 tls1_export_keying_material
,
36 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
37 tls_close_construct_packet
,
41 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_1_enc_data
= {
45 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
46 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
47 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
48 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
49 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
51 tls1_export_keying_material
,
52 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
,
53 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
54 tls_close_construct_packet
,
58 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_2_enc_data
= {
62 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
63 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
64 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
65 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
66 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
68 tls1_export_keying_material
,
69 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
70 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
71 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
72 tls_close_construct_packet
,
76 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_3_enc_data
= {
79 tls13_setup_key_block
,
80 tls13_generate_master_secret
,
81 tls13_change_cipher_state
,
82 tls13_final_finish_mac
,
83 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
84 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
86 tls13_export_keying_material
,
87 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
,
88 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
89 tls_close_construct_packet
,
93 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
96 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
97 * http, the cache would over fill
106 if (!s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
))
112 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
114 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.session_ticket
);
118 int tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
123 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
)
124 s
->version
= TLS_MAX_VERSION
;
126 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 * Table of curve information.
135 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
136 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
138 static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list
[] = {
139 {NID_sect163k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
140 {NID_sect163r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
141 {NID_sect163r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
142 {NID_sect193r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
143 {NID_sect193r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
144 {NID_sect233k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
145 {NID_sect233r1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
146 {NID_sect239k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
147 {NID_sect283k1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
148 {NID_sect283r1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
149 {NID_sect409k1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
150 {NID_sect409r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
151 {NID_sect571k1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
152 {NID_sect571r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
153 {NID_secp160k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
154 {NID_secp160r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
155 {NID_secp160r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
156 {NID_secp192k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
157 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
158 {NID_secp224k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
159 {NID_secp224r1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
160 {NID_secp256k1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
161 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
162 {NID_secp384r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
163 {NID_secp521r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
164 {NID_brainpoolP256r1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
165 {NID_brainpoolP384r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
166 {NID_brainpoolP512r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
167 {EVP_PKEY_X25519
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM
}, /* X25519 (29) */
170 static const unsigned char ecformats_default
[] = {
171 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
,
172 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
,
173 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
176 /* The default curves */
177 static const uint16_t eccurves_default
[] = {
178 29, /* X25519 (29) */
179 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
180 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
181 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
184 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves
[] = {
189 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(uint16_t curve_id
, unsigned int *pflags
)
191 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*cinfo
;
192 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
193 if (curve_id
< 1 || curve_id
> OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
))
195 cinfo
= nid_list
+ curve_id
- 1;
197 *pflags
= cinfo
->flags
;
201 uint16_t tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid
)
204 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
); i
++) {
205 if (nid_list
[i
].nid
== nid
)
212 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
214 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
215 * the length of |pcurves| is num_curves.
216 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
217 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
218 * lists in the first place.
220 int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL
*s
, int sess
, const uint16_t **pcurves
,
223 size_t pcurveslen
= 0;
226 *pcurves
= s
->session
->ext
.supportedgroups
;
227 pcurveslen
= s
->session
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
;
229 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
230 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
231 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
232 *pcurves
= suiteb_curves
;
233 pcurveslen
= OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves
);
236 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
237 *pcurves
= suiteb_curves
;
241 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
242 *pcurves
= suiteb_curves
+ 1;
246 *pcurves
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups
;
247 pcurveslen
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
;
250 *pcurves
= eccurves_default
;
251 pcurveslen
= OSSL_NELEM(eccurves_default
);
255 *num_curves
= pcurveslen
;
259 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
260 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL
*s
, uint16_t curve
, int op
)
262 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*cinfo
;
263 unsigned char ctmp
[2];
266 if (curve
< 1 || curve
> OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
))
268 cinfo
= &nid_list
[curve
- 1];
269 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
270 if (cinfo
->flags
& TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
)
273 ctmp
[0] = curve
>> 8;
274 ctmp
[1] = curve
& 0xff;
275 return ssl_security(s
, op
, cinfo
->secbits
, cinfo
->nid
, (void *)ctmp
);
278 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
279 int tls1_check_curve(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *p
, size_t len
)
281 const uint16_t *curves
;
283 size_t num_curves
, i
;
284 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
285 if (len
!= 3 || p
[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
)
287 curve_id
= (p
[1] << 8) | p
[2];
288 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
290 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
291 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
) {
292 if (curve_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
294 } else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
) {
295 if (curve_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
297 } else /* Should never happen */
300 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
, 0, &curves
, &num_curves
))
302 for (i
= 0; i
< num_curves
; i
++) {
303 if (curve_id
== curves
[i
])
304 return tls_curve_allowed(s
, curve_id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
);
310 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
311 * if there is no match.
312 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
313 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
314 * an tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
316 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL
*s
, int nmatch
)
318 const uint16_t *pref
, *supp
;
319 size_t num_pref
, num_supp
, i
, j
;
322 /* Can't do anything on client side */
326 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
328 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
329 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
331 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
333 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
334 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256
;
335 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
336 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384
;
337 /* Should never happen */
340 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
344 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
345 * but s->options is a long...
347 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
,
348 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) != 0,
351 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
,
352 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) == 0,
356 for (k
= 0, i
= 0; i
< num_pref
; i
++) {
357 uint16_t id
= pref
[i
];
359 for (j
= 0; j
< num_supp
; j
++) {
361 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s
, id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED
))
371 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
375 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
376 int *groups
, size_t ngroups
)
381 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
384 unsigned long dup_list
= 0;
385 glist
= OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups
* sizeof(*glist
));
388 for (i
= 0; i
< ngroups
; i
++) {
389 unsigned long idmask
;
391 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
392 id
= tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups
[i
]);
394 if (!id
|| (dup_list
& idmask
)) {
407 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
411 int nid_arr
[MAX_CURVELIST
];
414 static int nid_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
416 nid_cb_st
*narg
= arg
;
422 if (narg
->nidcnt
== MAX_CURVELIST
)
424 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
426 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
428 nid
= EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp
);
429 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
430 nid
= OBJ_sn2nid(etmp
);
431 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
432 nid
= OBJ_ln2nid(etmp
);
433 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
435 for (i
= 0; i
< narg
->nidcnt
; i
++)
436 if (narg
->nid_arr
[i
] == nid
)
438 narg
->nid_arr
[narg
->nidcnt
++] = nid
;
442 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
443 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
, const char *str
)
447 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, nid_cb
, &ncb
))
451 return tls1_set_groups(pext
, pextlen
, ncb
.nid_arr
, ncb
.nidcnt
);
454 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
455 static int tls1_set_ec_id(uint16_t *pcurve_id
, unsigned char *comp_id
,
462 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
463 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
);
466 /* Determine curve ID */
467 curve_nid
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp
);
468 *pcurve_id
= tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curve_nid
);
469 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
473 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec
) == NULL
)
475 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec
) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
) {
476 *comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
;
478 if ((nid_list
[*pcurve_id
- 1].flags
& TLS_CURVE_TYPE
) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME
)
479 *comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
;
481 *comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
;
487 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
488 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL
*s
, uint16_t curve_id
, unsigned char *comp_id
)
490 const unsigned char *pformats
;
491 const uint16_t *pcurves
;
492 size_t num_formats
, num_curves
, i
;
495 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
496 * supported (see RFC4492).
498 if (comp_id
&& s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
) {
499 pformats
= s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
;
500 num_formats
= s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
;
501 for (i
= 0; i
< num_formats
; i
++, pformats
++) {
502 if (*comp_id
== *pformats
)
505 if (i
== num_formats
)
510 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
511 for (j
= 0; j
<= 1; j
++) {
512 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
, j
, &pcurves
, &num_curves
))
514 if (j
== 1 && num_curves
== 0) {
516 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
517 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
518 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
519 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
520 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
524 for (i
= 0; i
< num_curves
; i
++) {
525 if (pcurves
[i
] == curve_id
)
530 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
537 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char **pformats
,
541 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
543 if (s
->ext
.ecpointformats
) {
544 *pformats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats
;
545 *num_formats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
;
547 *pformats
= ecformats_default
;
548 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
550 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
) - 1;
552 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
);
557 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
558 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
560 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int check_ee_md
)
562 unsigned char comp_id
;
566 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
569 /* If not EC nothing to do */
570 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) != EVP_PKEY_EC
)
572 rv
= tls1_set_ec_id(&curve_id
, &comp_id
, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
));
576 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
579 rv
= tls1_check_ec_key(s
, s
->server
? curve_id
: 0, &comp_id
);
583 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
586 if (check_ee_md
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
591 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
592 if (curve_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
593 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
;
594 else if (curve_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
595 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
;
597 return 0; /* Should never happen */
598 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++)
599 if (check_md
== c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
601 if (i
== c
->shared_sigalgslen
)
608 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
610 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
612 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
613 * is compatible with the client extensions.
615 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
617 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL
*s
, unsigned long cid
)
620 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
623 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
626 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
627 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
628 curve_id
= TLSEXT_curve_P_256
;
629 else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
630 curve_id
= TLSEXT_curve_P_384
;
633 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
634 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s
, curve_id
, NULL
))
638 /* Need a shared curve */
639 return tls1_shared_group(s
, 0) != 0;
644 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int set_ee_md
)
649 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
651 /* Default sigalg schemes */
652 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs
[] = {
653 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
654 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
655 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
656 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
657 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
660 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256
,
661 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384
,
662 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512
,
664 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
665 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
666 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
668 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
669 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
670 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
672 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
673 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
675 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
676 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
678 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
679 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
680 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
684 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
685 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs
[] = {
686 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
687 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
691 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl
[] = {
692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
693 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
694 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
695 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
, NID_X9_62_prime256v1
},
696 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
697 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
698 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
, NID_secp384r1
},
699 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
700 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
701 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512
, NID_secp521r1
},
702 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
703 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
,
704 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
705 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
706 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
707 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224
, NID_undef
},
708 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
709 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
710 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
, NID_undef
},
712 {"rsa_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256
,
713 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
714 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
715 {"rsa_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384
,
716 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
717 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
718 {"rsa_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512
,
719 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
720 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
721 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
722 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
723 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
724 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
725 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
726 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
727 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
728 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
729 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
730 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
731 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
732 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
733 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
734 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
735 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
737 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
738 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
739 NID_dsa_with_SHA256
, NID_undef
},
740 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
741 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
742 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
743 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
744 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
745 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
746 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
747 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
748 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
749 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
750 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
751 NID_dsaWithSHA1
, NID_undef
},
753 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
754 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
755 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
756 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
757 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
758 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
759 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
760 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
761 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
762 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
763 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
,
764 NID_id_GostR3410_2001
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
,
765 NID_undef
, NID_undef
}
768 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
769 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg
= {
770 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
771 NID_md5_sha1
, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
,
772 EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
777 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
778 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
780 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg
[] = {
781 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
782 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
783 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
784 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
785 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
786 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
787 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
788 0 /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
791 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
792 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg
)
795 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
797 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
799 if (s
->sigalg
== sigalg
)
804 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
805 int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
, const EVP_MD
**pmd
)
810 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
811 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
) {
814 md
= ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
);
824 * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
825 * is fixed by the certificate type.
827 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL
*s
, int idx
)
833 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
834 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
835 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i
);
837 if (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) {
843 idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
846 if (idx
< 0 || idx
>= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg
))
848 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
849 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg
[idx
]);
851 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, NULL
))
855 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg
;
857 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
858 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL
*s
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
861 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
863 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
865 lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, idx
);
868 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
872 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL
*s
, int sent
, const uint16_t **psigs
)
875 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
878 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
879 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
880 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
881 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
882 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs
);
884 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
885 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
888 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
889 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
+ 1;
894 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
895 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
896 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
898 if ((s
->server
== sent
) && s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
899 *psigs
= s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
;
900 return s
->cert
->client_sigalgslen
;
901 } else if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
902 *psigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
903 return s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
905 *psigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
906 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
911 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
912 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
915 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL
*s
, uint16_t sig
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
917 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
918 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
920 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
;
921 int pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
922 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
924 /* Should never happen */
927 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
928 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
929 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
930 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
933 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
934 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
935 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
937 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig
);
939 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
940 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
943 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
|| lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
))
944 || (pkeyid
!= lu
->sig
945 && (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
|| pkeyid
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
))) {
946 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
949 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
950 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
951 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
952 int curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
954 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
955 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec
) != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
) {
956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
957 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION
);
960 /* For TLS 1.3 check curve matches signature algorithm */
961 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
) {
962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
966 unsigned char comp_id
;
969 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
970 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(&curve_id
, &comp_id
, ec
))
972 if (!s
->server
&& !tls1_check_ec_key(s
, curve_id
, &comp_id
)) {
973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
976 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
977 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
978 if (sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
979 && sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
) {
980 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
981 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
985 * Suite B also requires P-256+SHA256 and P-384+SHA384:
986 * this matches the TLS 1.3 requirements so we can just
987 * check the curve is the expected TLS 1.3 value.
988 * If this fails an inappropriate digest is being used.
990 if (curve
!= lu
->curve
) {
991 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
992 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST
);
997 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1002 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1003 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1004 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
1005 if (sig
== *sent_sigs
)
1008 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1009 if (i
== sent_sigslen
&& (lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1010 || s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1014 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
)) {
1015 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
1020 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1021 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1023 sigalgstr
[0] = (sig
>> 8) & 0xff;
1024 sigalgstr
[1] = sig
& 0xff;
1025 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK
,
1026 EVP_MD_size(md
) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md
),
1027 (void *)sigalgstr
)) {
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1032 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1033 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1037 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1039 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
== NULL
)
1041 *pnid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
->sig
;
1046 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1047 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1048 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1050 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1053 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1055 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL
*s
)
1057 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
= 0;
1058 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
= 0;
1059 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
, s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK
);
1060 ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
);
1061 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1062 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1063 if (!s
->psk_client_callback
) {
1064 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aPSK
;
1065 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_PSK
;
1067 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1069 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.srp_Mask
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1070 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aSRP
;
1071 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kSRP
;
1077 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1078 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1079 * @c: cipher to check
1080 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1081 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1083 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1085 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL
*s
, const SSL_CIPHER
*c
, int op
, int ecdhe
)
1087 if (c
->algorithm_mkey
& s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
1088 || c
->algorithm_auth
& s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
)
1090 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
== 0)
1092 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1093 int min_tls
= c
->min_tls
;
1096 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1097 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1099 if (min_tls
== TLS1_VERSION
&& ecdhe
1100 && (c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) != 0)
1101 min_tls
= SSL3_VERSION
;
1103 if ((min_tls
> s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
) || (c
->max_tls
< s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
))
1106 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
1107 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
)))
1110 return !ssl_security(s
, op
, c
->strength_bits
, 0, (void *)c
);
1113 int tls_use_ticket(SSL
*s
)
1115 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
))
1117 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TICKET
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1120 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1125 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1126 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
);
1127 s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1128 s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1129 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1130 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
1131 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
1133 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1134 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1136 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
) {
1137 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1138 size_t sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1140 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1141 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, i
);
1146 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1147 for (j
= 0; j
< sent_sigslen
; j
++) {
1148 if (lu
->sigalg
== sent_sigs
[j
]) {
1149 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
1157 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
1158 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1159 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1162 if (s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
!= NULL
)
1164 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS
);
1166 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1168 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1173 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1175 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1176 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1177 * point to the resulting session.
1179 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1180 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1181 * never be decrypted, nor will s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1184 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1185 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1186 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1187 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1188 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1189 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1190 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
1193 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1194 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1195 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1196 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1197 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1198 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1200 TICKET_RETURN
tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
,
1205 RAW_EXTENSION
*ticketext
;
1208 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1211 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1212 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1215 if (s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
|| !tls_use_ticket(s
))
1218 ticketext
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket
];
1219 if (!ticketext
->present
)
1222 size
= PACKET_remaining(&ticketext
->data
);
1225 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1228 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1229 return TICKET_EMPTY
;
1231 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1233 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1234 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1235 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1236 * calculate the master secret later.
1238 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1241 retv
= tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, PACKET_data(&ticketext
->data
), size
,
1242 hello
->session_id
, hello
->session_id_len
, ret
);
1244 case TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
:
1245 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1246 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1248 case TICKET_SUCCESS
:
1249 return TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1251 case TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
:
1252 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1253 return TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1256 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1261 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1263 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1264 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1265 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1266 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1267 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1268 * point to the resulting session.
1270 TICKET_RETURN
tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *etick
,
1271 size_t eticklen
, const unsigned char *sess_id
,
1272 size_t sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
1275 unsigned char *sdec
;
1276 const unsigned char *p
;
1277 int slen
, renew_ticket
= 0, declen
;
1278 TICKET_RETURN ret
= TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1280 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
1281 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
1282 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
;
1283 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
1285 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1286 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
1288 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1289 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1291 ret
= TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1294 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
) {
1295 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
1296 int rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, nctick
, nctick
+ 16,
1301 ret
= TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1307 /* Check key name matches */
1308 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
1309 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
)) != 0) {
1310 ret
= TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1313 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.tick_hmac_key
,
1314 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_hmac_key
),
1315 EVP_sha256(), NULL
) <= 0
1316 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx
, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL
,
1317 tctx
->ext
.tick_aes_key
,
1319 + sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
)) <= 0) {
1324 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1327 mlen
= HMAC_size(hctx
);
1331 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1333 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
) + mlen
) {
1334 ret
= TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1338 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1339 if (HMAC_Update(hctx
, etick
, eticklen
) <= 0
1340 || HMAC_Final(hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
) <= 0) {
1343 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
1344 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
1345 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1346 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1348 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1349 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1350 p
= etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1351 eticklen
-= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1352 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
1353 if (sdec
== NULL
|| EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
,
1354 (int)eticklen
) <= 0) {
1355 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1357 return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1359 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &declen
) <= 0) {
1360 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1362 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1365 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1369 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &p
, slen
);
1373 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1374 if (slen
!= 0 || sess
->session_id_length
!= 0) {
1375 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1376 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1379 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1380 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1381 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1385 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
1386 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
1389 return TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
1391 return TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1395 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1397 return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1399 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1400 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
1404 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1405 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1407 unsigned char sigalgstr
[2];
1410 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1411 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, NULL
))
1413 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1414 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
1416 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1417 if (!s
->server
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
1418 && (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
|| lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1419 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1420 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
))
1422 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1423 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu
->sig_idx
))
1425 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
)
1427 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1428 secbits
= EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
)) * 4;
1429 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1430 sigalgstr
[0] = (lu
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff;
1431 sigalgstr
[1] = lu
->sigalg
& 0xff;
1432 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, lu
->hash
, (void *)sigalgstr
);
1436 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1437 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1441 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a
, SSL
*s
, int op
)
1443 const uint16_t *sigalgs
;
1444 size_t i
, sigalgslen
;
1445 uint32_t disabled_mask
= SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
| SSL_aECDSA
;
1447 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1450 sigalgslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sigalgs
);
1451 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++, sigalgs
++) {
1452 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs
);
1453 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
1458 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu
->sig_idx
);
1460 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1461 if ((clu
->amask
& disabled_mask
) != 0
1462 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, lu
))
1463 disabled_mask
&= ~clu
->amask
;
1465 *pmask_a
|= disabled_mask
;
1468 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1469 const uint16_t *psig
, size_t psiglen
)
1474 for (i
= 0; i
< psiglen
; i
++, psig
++) {
1475 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig
);
1477 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
1479 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, *psig
))
1482 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1483 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1485 if (rv
== 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
1486 || (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
1487 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1488 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha224
)))
1492 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
1496 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1497 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**shsig
,
1498 const uint16_t *pref
, size_t preflen
,
1499 const uint16_t *allow
, size_t allowlen
)
1501 const uint16_t *ptmp
, *atmp
;
1502 size_t i
, j
, nmatch
= 0;
1503 for (i
= 0, ptmp
= pref
; i
< preflen
; i
++, ptmp
++) {
1504 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp
);
1506 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1507 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED
, lu
))
1509 for (j
= 0, atmp
= allow
; j
< allowlen
; j
++, atmp
++) {
1510 if (*ptmp
== *atmp
) {
1521 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1522 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1524 const uint16_t *pref
, *allow
, *conf
;
1525 size_t preflen
, allowlen
, conflen
;
1527 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**salgs
= NULL
;
1529 unsigned int is_suiteb
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
1531 OPENSSL_free(c
->shared_sigalgs
);
1532 c
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1533 c
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1534 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1535 if (!s
->server
&& c
->client_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
1536 conf
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
1537 conflen
= c
->client_sigalgslen
;
1538 } else if (c
->conf_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
1539 conf
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
1540 conflen
= c
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1542 conflen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 0, &conf
);
1543 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|| is_suiteb
) {
1546 allow
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1547 allowlen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1551 pref
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1552 preflen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1554 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, NULL
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
1556 salgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch
* sizeof(*salgs
));
1559 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, salgs
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
1563 c
->shared_sigalgs
= salgs
;
1564 c
->shared_sigalgslen
= nmatch
;
1568 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET
*pkt
, uint16_t **pdest
, size_t *pdestlen
)
1574 size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
1576 /* Invalid data length */
1577 if (size
== 0 || (size
& 1) != 0)
1582 buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
* sizeof(*buf
));
1585 for (i
= 0; i
< size
&& PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &stmp
); i
++)
1593 OPENSSL_free(*pdest
);
1600 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1602 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1603 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
1605 /* Should never happen */
1606 if (s
->cert
== NULL
)
1609 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
,
1610 &s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
);
1615 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1617 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1620 uint32_t *pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
;
1623 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s
))
1626 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
1629 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
1630 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigptr
= c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
1631 int idx
= sigptr
->sig_idx
;
1633 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1634 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && sigptr
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1636 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1637 if (pvalid
[idx
] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx
))
1638 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
1643 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
1644 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
1645 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
1647 uint16_t *psig
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1648 size_t numsigalgs
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1649 if (psig
== NULL
|| numsigalgs
> INT_MAX
)
1652 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1654 if (idx
>= (int)numsigalgs
)
1658 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((*psig
>> 8) & 0xff);
1660 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(*psig
& 0xff);
1661 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig
);
1663 *psign
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sig
: NID_undef
;
1665 *phash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->hash
: NID_undef
;
1666 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
1667 *psignhash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sigandhash
: NID_undef
;
1669 return (int)numsigalgs
;
1672 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
1673 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
1674 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
1676 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*shsigalgs
;
1677 if (s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
== NULL
1679 || idx
>= (int)s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
1680 || s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
> INT_MAX
)
1682 shsigalgs
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
[idx
];
1684 *phash
= shsigalgs
->hash
;
1686 *psign
= shsigalgs
->sig
;
1687 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
1688 *psignhash
= shsigalgs
->sigandhash
;
1690 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(shsigalgs
->sigalg
& 0xff);
1692 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((shsigalgs
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff);
1693 return (int)s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
;
1696 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1697 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1701 int sigalgs
[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
];
1704 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig
, int *phash
, const char *str
)
1706 if (strcmp(str
, "RSA") == 0) {
1707 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
1708 } else if (strcmp(str
, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str
, "PSS") == 0) {
1709 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
1710 } else if (strcmp(str
, "DSA") == 0) {
1711 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
1712 } else if (strcmp(str
, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1713 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
1715 *phash
= OBJ_sn2nid(str
);
1716 if (*phash
== NID_undef
)
1717 *phash
= OBJ_ln2nid(str
);
1720 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1721 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1723 static int sig_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
1725 sig_cb_st
*sarg
= arg
;
1727 char etmp
[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN
], *p
;
1728 int sig_alg
= NID_undef
, hash_alg
= NID_undef
;
1731 if (sarg
->sigalgcnt
== TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
)
1733 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
1735 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
1737 p
= strchr(etmp
, '+');
1738 /* See if we have a match for TLS 1.3 names */
1740 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
1742 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1744 if (s
->name
!= NULL
&& strcmp(etmp
, s
->name
) == 0) {
1755 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, etmp
);
1756 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, p
);
1759 if (sig_alg
== NID_undef
|| (p
!= NULL
&& hash_alg
== NID_undef
))
1762 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->sigalgcnt
; i
+= 2) {
1763 if (sarg
->sigalgs
[i
] == sig_alg
&& sarg
->sigalgs
[i
+ 1] == hash_alg
)
1766 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = hash_alg
;
1767 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = sig_alg
;
1772 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1773 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1775 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT
*c
, const char *str
, int client
)
1779 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, sig_cb
, &sig
))
1783 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c
, sig
.sigalgs
, sig
.sigalgcnt
, client
);
1786 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const int *psig_nids
, size_t salglen
, int client
)
1788 uint16_t *sigalgs
, *sptr
;
1793 sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc((salglen
/ 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs
));
1794 if (sigalgs
== NULL
)
1796 for (i
= 0, sptr
= sigalgs
; i
< salglen
; i
+= 2) {
1798 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*curr
;
1799 int md_id
= *psig_nids
++;
1800 int sig_id
= *psig_nids
++;
1802 for (j
= 0, curr
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; j
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1804 if (curr
->hash
== md_id
&& curr
->sig
== sig_id
) {
1805 *sptr
++ = curr
->sigalg
;
1810 if (j
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
1815 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
1816 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
1817 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
1819 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
1820 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
1821 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
1827 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs
);
1831 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT
*c
, X509
*x
, int default_nid
)
1835 if (default_nid
== -1)
1837 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
1839 return sig_nid
== default_nid
? 1 : 0;
1840 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++)
1841 if (sig_nid
== c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
1846 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
1847 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *names
, X509
*x
)
1851 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
1852 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(names
); i
++) {
1853 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, sk_X509_NAME_value(names
, i
)))
1860 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
1861 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
1862 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
1863 * attempting to use them.
1866 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
1868 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
1869 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
1870 /* Strict mode flags */
1871 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
1872 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
1873 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
1875 int tls1_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
1880 int check_flags
= 0, strict_mode
;
1881 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
1884 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
1885 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
1887 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
1890 idx
= (int)(cpk
- c
->pkeys
);
1892 cpk
= c
->pkeys
+ idx
;
1893 pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
1895 pk
= cpk
->privatekey
;
1897 strict_mode
= c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
;
1898 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
1907 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk
, &certidx
) == NULL
)
1910 pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
1912 if (c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
1913 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
;
1915 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS
;
1922 check_flags
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
1923 ok
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, x
, chain
, suiteb_flags
);
1924 if (ok
== X509_V_OK
)
1925 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
1926 else if (!check_flags
)
1931 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
1932 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
1934 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& strict_mode
) {
1937 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
)
1939 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
1943 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
1944 default_nid
= NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
;
1947 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
1948 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
1949 default_nid
= NID_dsaWithSHA1
;
1953 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
1954 default_nid
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
;
1957 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
1958 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2001
;
1959 default_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001
;
1962 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
1963 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
;
1964 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256
;
1967 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
1968 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
;
1969 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512
;
1978 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
1979 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
1981 if (default_nid
> 0 && c
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1983 const uint16_t *p
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
1984 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->conf_sigalgslen
; j
++, p
++) {
1985 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p
);
1987 if (lu
!= NULL
&& lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
&& lu
->sig
== rsign
)
1990 if (j
== c
->conf_sigalgslen
) {
1997 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
1998 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c
, x
, default_nid
)) {
2002 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2003 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2004 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2005 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c
, sk_X509_value(chain
, i
), default_nid
)) {
2007 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2014 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2015 else if (check_flags
)
2016 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2018 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2019 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s
, x
, 1))
2020 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM
;
2021 else if (!check_flags
)
2024 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2025 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2026 else if (strict_mode
) {
2027 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2028 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2029 X509
*ca
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2030 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s
, ca
, 0)) {
2032 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2039 if (!s
->server
&& strict_mode
) {
2040 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_dn
;
2042 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
2044 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN
;
2047 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN
;
2050 check_type
= TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN
;
2054 const uint8_t *ctypes
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
;
2057 for (j
= 0; j
< s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
; j
++, ctypes
++) {
2058 if (*ctypes
== check_type
) {
2059 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2063 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
) && !check_flags
)
2066 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2069 ca_dn
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_ca_names
;
2071 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn
))
2072 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2074 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2075 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, x
))
2076 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2078 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2079 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2080 X509
*xtmp
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2081 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, xtmp
)) {
2082 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2087 if (!check_flags
&& !(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
))
2090 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2092 if (!check_flags
|| (rv
& check_flags
) == check_flags
)
2093 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_VALID
;
2097 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2098 rv
|= *pvalid
& (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
);
2100 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
2103 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2107 if (rv
& CERT_PKEY_VALID
) {
2110 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2111 *pvalid
&= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2118 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2119 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL
*s
)
2121 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
);
2122 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
);
2123 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
);
2124 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
);
2125 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
);
2126 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
);
2127 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
);
2128 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
);
2131 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2132 int SSL_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2134 return tls1_check_chain(s
, x
, pk
, chain
, -1);
2137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2138 DH
*ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL
*s
)
2140 int dh_secbits
= 80;
2141 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
== 2)
2142 return DH_get_1024_160();
2143 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aPSK
)) {
2144 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->strength_bits
== 256)
2149 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
== NULL
)
2151 dh_secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
->privatekey
);
2154 if (dh_secbits
>= 128) {
2162 if (dh_secbits
>= 192)
2163 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL
);
2165 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL
);
2166 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_pqg(dhp
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
2174 if (dh_secbits
>= 112)
2175 return DH_get_2048_224();
2176 return DH_get_1024_160();
2180 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2183 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
2186 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2187 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2188 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2189 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2191 secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey
);
2194 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2196 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2199 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2201 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2202 int secbits
, nid
, pknid
;
2203 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2204 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x
) & EXFLAG_SS
) != 0)
2206 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &nid
, &pknid
, &secbits
, NULL
))
2208 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2209 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
2212 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2214 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2217 int ssl_security_cert(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int vfy
, int is_ee
)
2220 vfy
= SSL_SECOP_PEER
;
2222 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY
| vfy
))
2223 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2225 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY
| vfy
))
2226 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2228 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD
| vfy
))
2229 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
;
2234 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2235 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2236 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2239 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
, int vfy
)
2241 int rv
, start_idx
, i
;
2243 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
2248 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 1);
2252 for (i
= start_idx
; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
2253 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
2254 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 0);
2262 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2263 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2266 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
2268 int sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2269 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx
);
2271 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2272 if (clu
== NULL
|| !(clu
->amask
& s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
))
2275 /* If PSS and we have no PSS cert use RSA */
2276 if (sig_idx
== SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
&& !ssl_has_cert(s
, sig_idx
))
2277 sig_idx
= SSL_PKEY_RSA
;
2279 return s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[sig_idx
] & CERT_PKEY_VALID
? sig_idx
: -1;
2283 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2284 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2286 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error
2287 * and an appropriate error code is set and the TLS alert set in *al.
2289 * For clients al is set to NULL. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2290 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2291 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2293 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
2295 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
2298 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
= NULL
;
2299 s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
= NULL
;
2301 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2304 int curve
= -1, skip_ec
= 0;
2307 /* Look for a certificate matching shared sigalgs */
2308 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2309 lu
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2311 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2312 if (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
2313 || lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
2314 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
2315 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2317 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, NULL
))
2319 if (!ssl_has_cert(s
, lu
->sig_idx
)) {
2320 if (lu
->sig_idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
2321 || !ssl_has_cert(s
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
))
2323 sig_idx
= SSL_PKEY_RSA
;
2325 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
2326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2328 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
);
2330 curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
2331 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec
)
2332 != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
)
2335 if (skip_ec
|| (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
))
2343 if (i
== s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
) {
2346 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2347 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2348 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
2352 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2353 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aCERT
))
2355 if (!s
->server
&& !ssl_has_cert(s
, s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
))
2358 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2359 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2364 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2365 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
2366 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
);
2367 curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
2374 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2377 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2378 lu
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2381 if ((sig_idx
= tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s
, lu
)) == -1)
2384 int cc_idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
2386 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2387 if (cc_idx
!= sig_idx
) {
2388 if (sig_idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
2389 || cc_idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
)
2391 sig_idx
= SSL_PKEY_RSA
;
2394 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2395 if (curve
== -1 || lu
->curve
== curve
)
2399 if (i
== s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
) {
2402 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2403 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2408 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2410 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
2411 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
;
2413 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
2416 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2417 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2421 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2422 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
2423 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
2424 if (lu
->sigalg
== *sent_sigs
)
2427 if (i
== sent_sigslen
) {
2430 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
2431 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2436 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
2439 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2440 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2446 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2447 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
= &s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
];
2448 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
;
2449 s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
= lu
;