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Fix SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c
1 /* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
119
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
121
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
128 #endif
129
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
131 tls1_enc,
132 tls1_mac,
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
141 tls1_alert_code,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
143 0,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
146 ssl3_handshake_write
147 };
148
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
150 tls1_enc,
151 tls1_mac,
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
160 tls1_alert_code,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
165 ssl3_handshake_write
166 };
167
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
169 tls1_enc,
170 tls1_mac,
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
179 tls1_alert_code,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
185 ssl3_handshake_write
186 };
187
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
189 {
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
192 return(60*60*2);
193 }
194
195 int tls1_new(SSL *s)
196 {
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
199 return(1);
200 }
201
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
203 {
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
206 {
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
208 }
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
210 ssl3_free(s);
211 }
212
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
214 {
215 ssl3_clear(s);
216 s->version = s->method->version;
217 }
218
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
220
221 static int nid_list[] =
222 {
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
248 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
249 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
250 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
251 };
252
253
254 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
255 {
256 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
257 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
258 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
259 };
260
261 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
262 {
263 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
264 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
265 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
266 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
268 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
269 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
270 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
271 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
272 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
273 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
274 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
275 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
276 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
277 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
278 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
279 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
280 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
281 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
282 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
283 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
285 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
286 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
287 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
288 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
289 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
290 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
291 };
292
293 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
294 {
295 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
296 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
297 };
298
299 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
300 {
301 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
302 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
303 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
304 return 0;
305 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
306 }
307
308 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
309 {
310 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
311 switch (nid)
312 {
313 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
314 return 1;
315 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
316 return 2;
317 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
318 return 3;
319 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
320 return 4;
321 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
322 return 5;
323 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
324 return 6;
325 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
326 return 7;
327 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
328 return 8;
329 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
330 return 9;
331 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
332 return 10;
333 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
334 return 11;
335 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
336 return 12;
337 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
338 return 13;
339 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
340 return 14;
341 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
342 return 15;
343 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
344 return 16;
345 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
346 return 17;
347 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
348 return 18;
349 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
350 return 19;
351 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
352 return 20;
353 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
354 return 21;
355 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
356 return 22;
357 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
358 return 23;
359 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
360 return 24;
361 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
362 return 25;
363 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
364 return 26;
365 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
366 return 27;
367 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
368 return 28;
369 default:
370 return 0;
371 }
372 }
373 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
374 * preferred list
375 */
376 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
377 const unsigned char **pcurves,
378 size_t *pcurveslen)
379 {
380 if (sess)
381 {
382 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
383 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
384 return;
385 }
386 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
387 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
388 {
389 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
390 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
391 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
392 break;
393
394 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
395 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
396 *pcurveslen = 2;
397 break;
398
399 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
400 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
401 *pcurveslen = 2;
402 break;
403 default:
404 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
405 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
406 }
407 if (!*pcurves)
408 {
409 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
410 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
411 }
412 }
413 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
414 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
415 {
416 const unsigned char *curves;
417 size_t curveslen, i;
418 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
419 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
420 return 0;
421 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
422 if (suiteb_flags)
423 {
424 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
425 if (p[1])
426 return 0;
427 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
428 {
429 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
430 return 0;
431 }
432 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
433 {
434 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
435 return 0;
436 }
437 else /* Should never happen */
438 return 0;
439 }
440 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
441 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
442 {
443 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
444 return 1;
445 }
446 return 0;
447 }
448
449 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
450 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
451 * an EC tmp key.
452 */
453
454 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
455 {
456 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
457 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
458 int k;
459 /* Can't do anything on client side */
460 if (s->server == 0)
461 return -1;
462 if (nmatch == -2)
463 {
464 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
465 {
466 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
467 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
468 * checks.
469 */
470 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
472 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
473 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
474 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
475 /* Should never happen */
476 return NID_undef;
477 }
478 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
479 nmatch = 0;
480 }
481 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
482 &supp, &supplen);
483 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
484 &pref, &preflen);
485 preflen /= 2;
486 supplen /= 2;
487 k = 0;
488 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
489 {
490 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
491 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
492 {
493 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
494 {
495 if (nmatch == k)
496 {
497 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
498 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
499 }
500 k++;
501 }
502 }
503 }
504 if (nmatch == -1)
505 return k;
506 return 0;
507 }
508
509 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
510 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
511 {
512 unsigned char *clist, *p;
513 size_t i;
514 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
515 * while curve ids < 32
516 */
517 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
518 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
519 if (!clist)
520 return 0;
521 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
522 {
523 unsigned long idmask;
524 int id;
525 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
526 idmask = 1L << id;
527 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
528 {
529 OPENSSL_free(clist);
530 return 0;
531 }
532 dup_list |= idmask;
533 s2n(id, p);
534 }
535 if (*pext)
536 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
537 *pext = clist;
538 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
539 return 1;
540 }
541
542 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
543
544 typedef struct
545 {
546 size_t nidcnt;
547 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
548 } nid_cb_st;
549
550 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
551 {
552 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
553 size_t i;
554 int nid;
555 char etmp[20];
556 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
557 return 0;
558 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
559 return 0;
560 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
561 etmp[len] = 0;
562 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
563 if (nid == NID_undef)
564 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
565 if (nid == NID_undef)
566 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
567 if (nid == NID_undef)
568 return 0;
569 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
570 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
571 return 0;
572 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
573 return 1;
574 }
575 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
576 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
577 const char *str)
578 {
579 nid_cb_st ncb;
580 ncb.nidcnt = 0;
581 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
582 return 0;
583 if (pext == NULL)
584 return 1;
585 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
586 }
587 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
588 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
589 EC_KEY *ec)
590 {
591 int is_prime, id;
592 const EC_GROUP *grp;
593 const EC_METHOD *meth;
594 if (!ec)
595 return 0;
596 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
597 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
598 if (!grp)
599 return 0;
600 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
601 if (!meth)
602 return 0;
603 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
604 is_prime = 1;
605 else
606 is_prime = 0;
607 /* Determine curve ID */
608 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
609 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
610 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
611 if (id)
612 {
613 curve_id[0] = 0;
614 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
615 }
616 else
617 {
618 curve_id[0] = 0xff;
619 if (is_prime)
620 curve_id[1] = 0x01;
621 else
622 curve_id[1] = 0x02;
623 }
624 if (comp_id)
625 {
626 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
627 return 0;
628 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
629 {
630 if (is_prime)
631 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
632 else
633 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
634 }
635 else
636 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
637 }
638 return 1;
639 }
640 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
641 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
642 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
643 {
644 const unsigned char *p;
645 size_t plen, i;
646 int j;
647 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
648 * is supported (see RFC4492).
649 */
650 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
651 {
652 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
653 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
654 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
655 {
656 if (*comp_id == *p)
657 break;
658 }
659 if (i == plen)
660 return 0;
661 }
662 if (!curve_id)
663 return 1;
664 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
665 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
666 {
667 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
668 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
669 {
670 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
671 break;
672 }
673 if (i == plen)
674 return 0;
675 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
676 if (!s->server)
677 return 1;
678 }
679 return 1;
680 }
681
682 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
683 size_t *pformatslen)
684 {
685 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
686 * use default */
687 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
688 {
689 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
690 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
691 }
692 else
693 {
694 *pformats = ecformats_default;
695 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
696 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
697 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
698 else
699 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
700 }
701 }
702
703 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
704 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
705 */
706 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
707 {
708 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
709 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
710 int rv;
711 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
712 if (!pkey)
713 return 0;
714 /* If not EC nothing to do */
715 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
716 {
717 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
718 return 1;
719 }
720 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
721 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
722 if (!rv)
723 return 0;
724 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
725 * supported curves extension.
726 */
727 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
728 if (!rv)
729 return 0;
730 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
731 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
732 */
733 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
734 {
735 int check_md;
736 size_t i;
737 CERT *c = s->cert;
738 if (curve_id[0])
739 return 0;
740 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
741 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
742 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
743 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
744 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
745 else
746 return 0; /* Should never happen */
747 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
748 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
749 break;
750 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
751 return 0;
752 if (set_ee_md == 2)
753 {
754 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
755 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
756 else
757 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
758 }
759 }
760 return rv;
761 }
762 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
763 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
764 {
765 unsigned char curve_id[2];
766 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
767 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
768 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
769 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
770 return 1;
771 #endif
772 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
773 * no other curves permitted.
774 */
775 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
776 {
777 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
778 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
779 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
780 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
781 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
782 else
783 return 0;
784 curve_id[0] = 0;
785 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
786 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
787 return 0;
788 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
789 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
790 return 1;
791 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
792 else
793 {
794 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
795 if (!ec)
796 return 0;
797 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
798 return 0;
799 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
800 return 1;
801 return 0;
802 }
803
804 }
805 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
806 {
807 /* Need a shared curve */
808 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
809 return 1;
810 else return 0;
811 }
812 if (!ec)
813 {
814 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
815 return 1;
816 else
817 return 0;
818 }
819 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
820 return 0;
821 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
822 #if 0
823 return 1;
824 #else
825 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
826 #endif
827 }
828
829 #else
830
831 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
832 {
833 return 1;
834 }
835
836 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
837
838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
839
840 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
841 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
842 */
843
844 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
845 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
846 #else
847 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
848 #endif
849
850 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
851 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
852 #else
853 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
854 #endif
855
856 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
857 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
858 #else
859 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
860 #endif
861
862 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
863 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
864 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
865 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
866
867 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
869 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
870 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
871 #endif
872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
873 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
874 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
875 #endif
876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
877 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
878 #endif
879 };
880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
881 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
882 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
883 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
884 };
885 #endif
886 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
887 {
888 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
889 * preferences.
890 */
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
892 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
893 {
894 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
895 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
896 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
897
898 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
899 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
900 return 2;
901
902 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
903 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
904 return 2;
905 }
906 #endif
907 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
908 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
909 {
910 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
911 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
912 }
913 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
914 {
915 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
916 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
917 }
918 else
919 {
920 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
921 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
922 }
923 }
924 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
925 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
926 */
927 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
928 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
929 {
930 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
931 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
932 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
933 /* Should never happen */
934 if (sigalg == -1)
935 return -1;
936 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
937 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
938 {
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
940 return 0;
941 }
942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
943 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
944 {
945 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
946 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
947 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
948 return 0;
949 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
950 {
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
952 return 0;
953 }
954 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
955 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
956 {
957 if (curve_id[0])
958 return 0;
959 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
960 {
961 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
962 {
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
964 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
965 return 0;
966 }
967 }
968 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
969 {
970 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
971 {
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
973 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
974 return 0;
975 }
976 }
977 else
978 return 0;
979 }
980 }
981 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
982 return 0;
983 #endif
984
985 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
986 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
987 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
988 {
989 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
990 break;
991 }
992 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
993 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
994 {
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
996 return 0;
997 }
998 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
999 if (*pmd == NULL)
1000 {
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1002 return 0;
1003 }
1004 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1005 * wish.
1006 */
1007 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1008 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1009 return 1;
1010 }
1011 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1012 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1013 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1014 * session and not global settings.
1015 *
1016 */
1017 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1018 {
1019 CERT *c = s->cert;
1020 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1021 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1022 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1023 c->mask_a = 0;
1024 c->mask_k = 0;
1025 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1026 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1027 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1028 else
1029 c->mask_ssl = 0;
1030 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1031 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1032 * TLS 1.2.
1033 */
1034 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1035 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1036 {
1037 switch(sigalgs[1])
1038 {
1039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1040 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1041 have_rsa = 1;
1042 break;
1043 #endif
1044 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1045 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1046 have_dsa = 1;
1047 break;
1048 #endif
1049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1050 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1051 have_ecdsa = 1;
1052 break;
1053 #endif
1054 }
1055 }
1056 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1057 * signature algorithms.
1058 */
1059 if (!have_rsa)
1060 {
1061 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1062 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1063 }
1064 if (!have_dsa)
1065 {
1066 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1067 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1068 }
1069 if (!have_ecdsa)
1070 {
1071 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1072 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1073 }
1074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1075 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1076 {
1077 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1078 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1079 }
1080 #endif
1081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1082 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1083 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1084 {
1085 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1086 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1087 }
1088 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1089 c->valid = 1;
1090 }
1091
1092 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1093 {
1094 int extdatalen=0;
1095 unsigned char *ret = p;
1096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1097 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1098 int using_ecc = 0;
1099 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1100 {
1101 int i;
1102 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1103 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1104
1105 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1106 {
1107 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1108
1109 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1110 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1111 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1112 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1113 {
1114 using_ecc = 1;
1115 break;
1116 }
1117 }
1118 }
1119 #endif
1120
1121 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1122 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1123 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1124 return p;
1125
1126 ret+=2;
1127
1128 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1129
1130 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1131 {
1132 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1133 unsigned long size_str;
1134 long lenmax;
1135
1136 /* check for enough space.
1137 4 for the servername type and entension length
1138 2 for servernamelist length
1139 1 for the hostname type
1140 2 for hostname length
1141 + hostname length
1142 */
1143
1144 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1145 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1146 return NULL;
1147
1148 /* extension type and length */
1149 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1150 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1151
1152 /* length of servername list */
1153 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1154
1155 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1156 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1157 s2n(size_str,ret);
1158 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1159 ret+=size_str;
1160 }
1161
1162 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1163 if (s->renegotiate)
1164 {
1165 int el;
1166
1167 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1168 {
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1170 return NULL;
1171 }
1172
1173 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1174
1175 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1176 s2n(el,ret);
1177
1178 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1179 {
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1181 return NULL;
1182 }
1183
1184 ret += el;
1185 }
1186
1187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1188 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1189 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1190 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1191
1192 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1193 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1194 {
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1196 return NULL;
1197 }
1198
1199 /* check for enough space.
1200 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1201 1 for the srp user identity
1202 + srp user identity length
1203 */
1204 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1205
1206 /* fill in the extension */
1207 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1208 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1209 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1210 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1211 ret+=login_len;
1212 }
1213 #endif
1214
1215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1216 if (using_ecc)
1217 {
1218 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1219 long lenmax;
1220 const unsigned char *plist;
1221 size_t plistlen;
1222
1223 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1224
1225 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1226 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1227 if (plistlen > 255)
1228 {
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1230 return NULL;
1231 }
1232
1233 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1234 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1235 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1236 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1237 ret+=plistlen;
1238
1239 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1240 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1241 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1242
1243 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1244 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1245 if (plistlen > 65532)
1246 {
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1248 return NULL;
1249 }
1250
1251 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1252 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1253
1254 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1255 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1256 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1257 * resolves this to two bytes.
1258 */
1259 s2n(plistlen, ret);
1260 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1261 ret+=plistlen;
1262 }
1263 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1264
1265 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1266 {
1267 int ticklen;
1268 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1269 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1270 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1271 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1272 {
1273 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1274 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1275 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1276 return NULL;
1277 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1278 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1279 ticklen);
1280 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1281 }
1282 else
1283 ticklen = 0;
1284 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1285 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1286 goto skip_ext;
1287 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1288 * rest for ticket
1289 */
1290 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1291 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1292 s2n(ticklen,ret);
1293 if (ticklen)
1294 {
1295 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1296 ret += ticklen;
1297 }
1298 }
1299 skip_ext:
1300
1301 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1302 {
1303 size_t salglen;
1304 const unsigned char *salg;
1305 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1306 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1307 return NULL;
1308 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1309 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1310 s2n(salglen, ret);
1311 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1312 ret += salglen;
1313 }
1314
1315 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1316 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1317 {
1318 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1319
1320 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1321 return NULL;
1322 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1323 return NULL;
1324
1325 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1326 s2n(col + 2, ret);
1327 s2n(col, ret);
1328 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1329 ret += col;
1330 }
1331 #endif
1332
1333 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1334 {
1335 int i;
1336 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1337 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1338
1339 idlen = 0;
1340 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1341 {
1342 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1343 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1344 if (itmp <= 0)
1345 return NULL;
1346 idlen += itmp + 2;
1347 }
1348
1349 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1350 {
1351 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1352 if (extlen < 0)
1353 return NULL;
1354 }
1355 else
1356 extlen = 0;
1357
1358 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1359 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1360 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1361 return NULL;
1362 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1363 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1364 s2n(idlen, ret);
1365 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1366 {
1367 /* save position of id len */
1368 unsigned char *q = ret;
1369 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1370 /* skip over id len */
1371 ret += 2;
1372 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1373 /* write id len */
1374 s2n(itmp, q);
1375 }
1376 s2n(extlen, ret);
1377 if (extlen > 0)
1378 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1379 }
1380
1381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1382 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1383 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1384 s2n(1,ret);
1385 /* Set mode:
1386 * 1: peer may send requests
1387 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1388 */
1389 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1390 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1391 else
1392 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1393 #endif
1394
1395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1396 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1397 {
1398 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1399 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1400 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1401 return NULL;
1402 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1403 s2n(0,ret);
1404 }
1405 #endif
1406
1407 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1408 {
1409 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1410 return NULL;
1411 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1412 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1413 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1414 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1415 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1416 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1417 }
1418
1419 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1420 {
1421 int el;
1422
1423 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1424
1425 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1426
1427 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1428 s2n(el,ret);
1429
1430 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1431 {
1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1433 return NULL;
1434 }
1435 ret += el;
1436 }
1437
1438 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1439 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1440 {
1441 size_t i;
1442 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1443
1444 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1445 {
1446 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1447 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1448
1449 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1450 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1451 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1452 if (record->fn1)
1453 {
1454 int cb_retval = 0;
1455 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1456 &out, &outlen,
1457 record->arg);
1458 if (cb_retval == 0)
1459 return NULL; /* error */
1460 if (cb_retval == -1)
1461 continue; /* skip this extension */
1462 }
1463 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1464 return NULL;
1465 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1466 s2n(outlen, ret);
1467 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1468 ret += outlen;
1469 }
1470 }
1471 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1472 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1473 s2n(0,ret);
1474 #endif
1475
1476 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1477 return p;
1478
1479 s2n(extdatalen,p);
1480 return ret;
1481 }
1482
1483 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1484 {
1485 int extdatalen=0;
1486 unsigned char *ret = p;
1487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1488 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1489 #endif
1490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1491 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1492 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1493 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1494 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1495 #endif
1496 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1497 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1498 return p;
1499
1500 ret+=2;
1501 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1502
1503 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1504 {
1505 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1506
1507 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1508 s2n(0,ret);
1509 }
1510
1511 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1512 {
1513 int el;
1514
1515 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1516 {
1517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1518 return NULL;
1519 }
1520
1521 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1522
1523 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1524 s2n(el,ret);
1525
1526 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1527 {
1528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1529 return NULL;
1530 }
1531
1532 ret += el;
1533 }
1534
1535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1536 if (using_ecc)
1537 {
1538 const unsigned char *plist;
1539 size_t plistlen;
1540 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1541 long lenmax;
1542
1543 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1544
1545 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1546 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1547 if (plistlen > 255)
1548 {
1549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1550 return NULL;
1551 }
1552
1553 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1554 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1555 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1556 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1557 ret+=plistlen;
1558
1559 }
1560 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1561 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1562
1563 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1564 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1565 {
1566 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1567 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1568 s2n(0,ret);
1569 }
1570
1571 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1572 {
1573 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1574 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1575 s2n(0,ret);
1576 }
1577
1578 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1579 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1580 {
1581 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1582
1583 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1584 return NULL;
1585 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1586 return NULL;
1587
1588 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1589 s2n(sol + 2, ret);
1590 s2n(sol, ret);
1591 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1592 ret += sol;
1593 }
1594 #endif
1595
1596 if(s->srtp_profile)
1597 {
1598 int el;
1599
1600 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1601
1602 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1603
1604 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1605 s2n(el,ret);
1606
1607 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1608 {
1609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1610 return NULL;
1611 }
1612 ret+=el;
1613 }
1614
1615 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1616 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1617 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1618 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1619 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1620 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1621 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1622 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1623 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1624 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1625 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1626 ret+=36;
1627
1628 }
1629
1630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1631 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1632 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1633 {
1634 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1635 s2n(1,ret);
1636 /* Set mode:
1637 * 1: peer may send requests
1638 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1639 */
1640 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1641 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1642 else
1643 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1644
1645 }
1646 #endif
1647
1648 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1649 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1650 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1651 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1652 {
1653 const unsigned char *npa;
1654 unsigned int npalen;
1655 int r;
1656
1657 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1658 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1659 {
1660 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1661 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1662 s2n(npalen,ret);
1663 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1664 ret += npalen;
1665 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1666 }
1667 }
1668 #endif
1669
1670 /* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
1671 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
1672 {
1673 size_t i;
1674
1675 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
1676 {
1677 size_t j;
1678 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1679
1680 for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
1681 {
1682 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
1683 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
1684 {
1685 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1686 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1687 int cb_retval = 0;
1688
1689 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1690 if (!record->fn2)
1691 break;
1692 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1693 &out, &outlen,
1694 record->arg);
1695 if (cb_retval == 0)
1696 return NULL; /* error */
1697 if (cb_retval == -1)
1698 break; /* skip this extension */
1699 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1700 return NULL;
1701 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1702 s2n(outlen, ret);
1703 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1704 ret += outlen;
1705 break;
1706 }
1707 }
1708 }
1709 }
1710 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1711 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1712 {
1713 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
1714 * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
1715 */
1716 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
1717 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1718 else
1719 {
1720 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1721 s2n(0,ret);
1722 }
1723 }
1724 #endif
1725
1726 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1727 {
1728 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1729 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1730
1731 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1732 return NULL;
1733 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1734 s2n(3 + len,ret);
1735 s2n(1 + len,ret);
1736 *ret++ = len;
1737 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1738 ret += len;
1739 }
1740
1741 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1742 return p;
1743
1744 s2n(extdatalen,p);
1745 return ret;
1746 }
1747
1748 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1749 * ClientHello.
1750 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1751 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1752 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1753 * return.
1754 *
1755 * returns: 0 on success. */
1756 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1757 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1758 {
1759 unsigned i;
1760 unsigned proto_len;
1761 const unsigned char *selected;
1762 unsigned char selected_len;
1763 int r;
1764
1765 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1766 return 0;
1767
1768 if (data_len < 2)
1769 goto parse_error;
1770
1771 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1772 * length-prefixed strings. */
1773 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1774 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1775 data_len -= 2;
1776 data += 2;
1777 if (data_len != i)
1778 goto parse_error;
1779
1780 if (data_len < 2)
1781 goto parse_error;
1782
1783 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1784 {
1785 proto_len = data[i];
1786 i++;
1787
1788 if (proto_len == 0)
1789 goto parse_error;
1790
1791 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1792 goto parse_error;
1793
1794 i += proto_len;
1795 }
1796
1797 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1798 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1799 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1800 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1801 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1802 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1803 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1804 {
1805 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1806 return -1;
1807 }
1808 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1809 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1810 }
1811 return 0;
1812
1813 parse_error:
1814 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1815 return -1;
1816 }
1817
1818 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1819 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1820 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1821 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1822 * SNI,
1823 * elliptic_curves
1824 * ec_point_formats
1825 *
1826 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1827 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1828 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1829 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1830 */
1831 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1832 unsigned short type, size;
1833 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1834 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1835 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1836 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1837 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1838 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1839 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1840
1841 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1842 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1843 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1844 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1845 };
1846
1847 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1848 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1849 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1850 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1851 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1852 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1853 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1854 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1855 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1856 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1857 };
1858
1859 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1860 return;
1861 data += 2;
1862
1863 if (data > (d+n-4))
1864 return;
1865 n2s(data,type);
1866 n2s(data,size);
1867
1868 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1869 return;
1870
1871 if (data+size > d+n)
1872 return;
1873 data += size;
1874
1875 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1876 {
1877 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1878 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1879
1880 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1881 return;
1882 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1883 return;
1884 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1885 return;
1886 }
1887 else
1888 {
1889 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1890
1891 if (data + len != d+n)
1892 return;
1893 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1894 return;
1895 }
1896
1897 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1898 }
1899 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1900
1901 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1902 {
1903 unsigned short type;
1904 unsigned short size;
1905 unsigned short len;
1906 unsigned char *data = *p;
1907 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1908 size_t i;
1909
1910 s->servername_done = 0;
1911 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1912 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1913 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1914 #endif
1915
1916 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1917 {
1918 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1919 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1920 }
1921
1922 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1923 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1924 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1925 {
1926 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_custom_types);
1927 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1928 }
1929
1930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1931 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1932 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1933 #endif
1934
1935 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1936 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1937 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1938 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1939
1940 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1941 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1942 {
1943 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1944 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1945 }
1946 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1947 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1948 {
1949 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1950 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1951 }
1952 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1953 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1954 {
1955 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1956 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1957 }
1958
1959 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1960 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1961 #endif
1962
1963 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1964 goto ri_check;
1965 n2s(data,len);
1966
1967 if (data > (d+n-len))
1968 goto ri_check;
1969
1970 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1971 {
1972 n2s(data,type);
1973 n2s(data,size);
1974
1975 if (data+size > (d+n))
1976 goto ri_check;
1977 #if 0
1978 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1979 #endif
1980 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1981 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1982 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1983 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1984
1985 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1986 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1987 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1988 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1989 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1990 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1991 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1992 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1993 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1994 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1995 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1996 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1997 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1998 the value of the Host: field.
1999 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2000 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2001 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2002 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2003
2004 */
2005
2006 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2007 {
2008 unsigned char *sdata;
2009 int servname_type;
2010 int dsize;
2011
2012 if (size < 2)
2013 {
2014 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2015 return 0;
2016 }
2017 n2s(data,dsize);
2018 size -= 2;
2019 if (dsize > size )
2020 {
2021 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2022 return 0;
2023 }
2024
2025 sdata = data;
2026 while (dsize > 3)
2027 {
2028 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2029 n2s(sdata,len);
2030 dsize -= 3;
2031
2032 if (len > dsize)
2033 {
2034 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2035 return 0;
2036 }
2037 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2038 switch (servname_type)
2039 {
2040 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2041 if (!s->hit)
2042 {
2043 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2044 {
2045 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2046 return 0;
2047 }
2048 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2049 {
2050 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2051 return 0;
2052 }
2053 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2054 {
2055 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2056 return 0;
2057 }
2058 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2059 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2060 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2061 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2062 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2063 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2064 return 0;
2065 }
2066 s->servername_done = 1;
2067
2068 }
2069 else
2070 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2071 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2072 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2073
2074 break;
2075
2076 default:
2077 break;
2078 }
2079
2080 dsize -= len;
2081 }
2082 if (dsize != 0)
2083 {
2084 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2085 return 0;
2086 }
2087
2088 }
2089 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2090 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2091 {
2092 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2093 {
2094 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2095 return 0;
2096 }
2097 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2098 {
2099 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2100 return 0;
2101 }
2102 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2103 return -1;
2104 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2105 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2106
2107 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2108 {
2109 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2110 return 0;
2111 }
2112 }
2113 #endif
2114
2115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2116 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2117 {
2118 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2119 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2120
2121 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2122 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2123 {
2124 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2125 return 0;
2126 }
2127 if (!s->hit)
2128 {
2129 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2130 {
2131 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2132 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2133 }
2134 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2135 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2136 {
2137 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2138 return 0;
2139 }
2140 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2141 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2142 }
2143 #if 0
2144 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2145 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2146 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2147 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2148 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2149 #endif
2150 }
2151 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2152 {
2153 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2154 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2155 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2156
2157 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2158 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2159 {
2160 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2161 return 0;
2162 }
2163 if (!s->hit)
2164 {
2165 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2166 {
2167 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2168 return 0;
2169 }
2170 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2171 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2172 {
2173 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2174 return 0;
2175 }
2176 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2177 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2178 }
2179 #if 0
2180 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2181 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2182 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2183 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2184 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2185 #endif
2186 }
2187 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2188 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2189 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2190 {
2191 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2192
2193 if (size < 2)
2194 {
2195 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2196 return 0;
2197 }
2198 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2199 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2200 {
2201 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2202 return 0;
2203 }
2204
2205 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2206 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2207 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2208 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2209 else
2210 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2211 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2212 {
2213 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2214 return 0;
2215 }
2216 }
2217 #endif
2218 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2219 {
2220 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2221 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2222 {
2223 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2224 return 0;
2225 }
2226 }
2227 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2228 {
2229 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2230 return 0;
2231 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2232 }
2233 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2234 {
2235 int dsize;
2236 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2237 {
2238 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2239 return 0;
2240 }
2241 n2s(data,dsize);
2242 size -= 2;
2243 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2244 {
2245 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2246 return 0;
2247 }
2248 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2249 {
2250 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2251 return 0;
2252 }
2253 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2254 * error.
2255 */
2256 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2257 {
2258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2259 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2260 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2261 return 0;
2262 }
2263 }
2264 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
2265 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2266 {
2267
2268 if (size < 5)
2269 {
2270 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2271 return 0;
2272 }
2273
2274 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2275 size--;
2276 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2277 {
2278 const unsigned char *sdata;
2279 int dsize;
2280 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2281 n2s(data,dsize);
2282 size -= 2;
2283 if (dsize > size )
2284 {
2285 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2286 return 0;
2287 }
2288 while (dsize > 0)
2289 {
2290 OCSP_RESPID *id;
2291 int idsize;
2292 if (dsize < 4)
2293 {
2294 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2295 return 0;
2296 }
2297 n2s(data, idsize);
2298 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2299 size -= 2 + idsize;
2300 if (dsize < 0)
2301 {
2302 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2303 return 0;
2304 }
2305 sdata = data;
2306 data += idsize;
2307 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2308 &sdata, idsize);
2309 if (!id)
2310 {
2311 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2312 return 0;
2313 }
2314 if (data != sdata)
2315 {
2316 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2317 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2318 return 0;
2319 }
2320 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2321 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2322 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2323 {
2324 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2325 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2326 return 0;
2327 }
2328 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2329 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2330 {
2331 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2332 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2333 return 0;
2334 }
2335 }
2336
2337 /* Read in request_extensions */
2338 if (size < 2)
2339 {
2340 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2341 return 0;
2342 }
2343 n2s(data,dsize);
2344 size -= 2;
2345 if (dsize != size)
2346 {
2347 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2348 return 0;
2349 }
2350 sdata = data;
2351 if (dsize > 0)
2352 {
2353 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2354 {
2355 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2356 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2357 }
2358
2359 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2360 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2361 &sdata, dsize);
2362 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2363 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2364 {
2365 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2366 return 0;
2367 }
2368 }
2369 }
2370 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2371 * so ignore it.
2372 */
2373 else
2374 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2375 }
2376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2377 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2378 {
2379 switch(data[0])
2380 {
2381 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2382 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2383 break;
2384 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2385 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2386 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2387 break;
2388 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2389 return 0;
2390 }
2391 }
2392 #endif
2393 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2394 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2395 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2396 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2397 {
2398 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2399 * renegotiation.
2400 *
2401 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2402 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2403 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2404 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2405 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2406 * anything like that, but this might change).
2407
2408 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2409 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2410 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2411 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2412 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2413 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2414 }
2415 #endif
2416
2417 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2418 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2419 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2420 {
2421 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2422 return 0;
2423 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2424 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2425 }
2426
2427 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2428 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2429 {
2430 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2431 al))
2432 return 0;
2433 }
2434 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2435 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2436 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2437 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2438 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2439 */
2440 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2441 {
2442 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2443
2444 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2445 {
2446 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2447 if (type == record->ext_type)
2448 {
2449 size_t j;
2450
2451 /* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
2452 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
2453 {
2454 if (type == s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j])
2455 {
2456 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2457 return 0;
2458 }
2459 }
2460
2461 /* NULL callback still notes the extension */
2462 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2463 return 0;
2464
2465 /* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
2466 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
2467 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
2468 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
2469 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count * 2);
2470 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
2471 {
2472 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
2473 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2474 return 0;
2475 }
2476 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
2477 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count - 1] = type;
2478 }
2479 }
2480 }
2481 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2482 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2483 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2484 #endif
2485
2486 data+=size;
2487 }
2488
2489 *p = data;
2490
2491 ri_check:
2492
2493 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2494
2495 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2496 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2497 {
2498 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2500 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2501 return 0;
2502 }
2503 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2504 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2505 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2506
2507 return 1;
2508 }
2509
2510 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2511 {
2512 int al = -1;
2513 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2514 {
2515 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2516 return 0;
2517 }
2518
2519 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2520 {
2521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2522 return 0;
2523 }
2524 return 1;
2525 }
2526
2527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2528 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2529 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2530 * the length of the block. */
2531 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2532 {
2533 unsigned int off = 0;
2534
2535 while (off < len)
2536 {
2537 if (d[off] == 0)
2538 return 0;
2539 off += d[off];
2540 off++;
2541 }
2542
2543 return off == len;
2544 }
2545 #endif
2546
2547 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2548 {
2549 unsigned short length;
2550 unsigned short type;
2551 unsigned short size;
2552 unsigned char *data = *p;
2553 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2554 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2555
2556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2557 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2558 #endif
2559
2560 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2561 {
2562 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2563 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2564 }
2565
2566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2567 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2568 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2569 #endif
2570
2571 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2572 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2573 #endif
2574
2575 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2576 goto ri_check;
2577
2578 n2s(data,length);
2579 if (data+length != d+n)
2580 {
2581 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2582 return 0;
2583 }
2584
2585 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2586 {
2587 n2s(data,type);
2588 n2s(data,size);
2589
2590 if (data+size > (d+n))
2591 goto ri_check;
2592
2593 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2594 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2595 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2596
2597 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2598 {
2599 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2600 {
2601 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2602 return 0;
2603 }
2604 tlsext_servername = 1;
2605 }
2606
2607 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2608 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2609 {
2610 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2611 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2612
2613 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2614 {
2615 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2616 return 0;
2617 }
2618 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2619 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2620 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2621 {
2622 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2623 return 0;
2624 }
2625 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2626 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2627 #if 0
2628 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2629 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2630 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2631 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2632 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2633 #endif
2634 }
2635 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2636
2637 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2638 {
2639 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2640 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2641 {
2642 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2643 return 0;
2644 }
2645 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2646 || (size > 0))
2647 {
2648 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2649 return 0;
2650 }
2651 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2652 }
2653 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2654 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2655 {
2656 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2657
2658 if (size < 2)
2659 {
2660 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2661 return 0;
2662 }
2663 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2664 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2665 {
2666 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2667 return 0;
2668 }
2669
2670 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2671 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2672 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2673 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2674 else
2675 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2676
2677 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2678 {
2679 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2680 return 0;
2681 }
2682 }
2683 #endif
2684 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2685 {
2686 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2687 * a status request message.
2688 */
2689 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2690 {
2691 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2692 return 0;
2693 }
2694 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2695 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2696 }
2697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2698 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2699 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2700 {
2701 unsigned char *selected;
2702 unsigned char selected_len;
2703
2704 /* We must have requested it. */
2705 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2706 {
2707 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2708 return 0;
2709 }
2710 /* The data must be valid */
2711 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2712 {
2713 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2714 return 0;
2715 }
2716 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2717 {
2718 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2719 return 0;
2720 }
2721 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2722 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2723 {
2724 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2725 return 0;
2726 }
2727 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2728 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2729 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2730 }
2731 #endif
2732
2733 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2734 {
2735 unsigned len;
2736
2737 /* We must have requested it. */
2738 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2739 {
2740 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2741 return 0;
2742 }
2743 if (size < 4)
2744 {
2745 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2746 return 0;
2747 }
2748 /* The extension data consists of:
2749 * uint16 list_length
2750 * uint8 proto_length;
2751 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2752 len = data[0];
2753 len <<= 8;
2754 len |= data[1];
2755 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2756 {
2757 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2758 return 0;
2759 }
2760 len = data[2];
2761 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2762 {
2763 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2764 return 0;
2765 }
2766 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2767 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2768 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2769 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2770 {
2771 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2772 return 0;
2773 }
2774 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2775 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2776 }
2777
2778 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2779 {
2780 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2781 return 0;
2782 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2783 }
2784 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2785 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2786 {
2787 switch(data[0])
2788 {
2789 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2790 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2791 break;
2792 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2793 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2794 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2795 break;
2796 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2797 return 0;
2798 }
2799 }
2800 #endif
2801 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2802 {
2803 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2804 al))
2805 return 0;
2806 }
2807 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2808 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2809 * callback */
2810 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2811 {
2812 size_t i;
2813 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2814
2815 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2816 {
2817 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2818 if (record->ext_type == type)
2819 {
2820 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2821 return 0;
2822 break;
2823 }
2824 }
2825 }
2826 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2827 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2828 {
2829 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2830 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
2831 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2832 }
2833 #endif
2834
2835 data += size;
2836 }
2837
2838 if (data != d+n)
2839 {
2840 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2841 return 0;
2842 }
2843
2844 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2845 {
2846 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2847 {
2848 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2849 {
2850 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2851 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2852 {
2853 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2854 return 0;
2855 }
2856 }
2857 else
2858 {
2859 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2860 return 0;
2861 }
2862 }
2863 }
2864
2865 *p = data;
2866
2867 ri_check:
2868
2869 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2870 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2871 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2872 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2873 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2874 * absence on initial connect only.
2875 */
2876 if (!renegotiate_seen
2877 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2878 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2879 {
2880 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2882 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2883 return 0;
2884 }
2885
2886 return 1;
2887 }
2888
2889
2890 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2891 {
2892
2893 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2894 {
2895 int r = 1;
2896
2897 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2898 {
2899 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2900 if (!r)
2901 return -1;
2902 }
2903
2904 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2905 {
2906 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2907 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2908
2909 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2910 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2911 else
2912 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2913 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2914 {
2915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2916 return -1;
2917 }
2918 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2919 }
2920
2921 if (r == 2)
2922 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2923 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2924 }
2925 #endif
2926
2927 return 1;
2928 }
2929
2930 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2931 {
2932 return 1;
2933 }
2934
2935 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2936 {
2937 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2938 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2939
2940 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2941 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2942 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2943 */
2944 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2945 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2946 */
2947 #endif
2948
2949 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2950 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2951 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2952 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2953
2954 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2955 {
2956 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2957 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2958 * so this has to happen here in
2959 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2960
2961 int r = 1;
2962
2963 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2964 {
2965 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2966 if (!r)
2967 {
2968 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2969 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2970 goto err;
2971 }
2972 }
2973
2974 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2975 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2976 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2977
2978 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2979 {
2980 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2981 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2982 {
2983 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2984 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2985
2986 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2987 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2988 else
2989 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2990 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2991 {
2992 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2993 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2994 goto err;
2995 }
2996 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2997 }
2998 }
2999
3000 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3001 {
3002 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3003 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3004 * abort the handshake.
3005 */
3006 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3007 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3008 }
3009 }
3010
3011 err:
3012 #endif
3013 switch (ret)
3014 {
3015 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3016 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3017 return -1;
3018
3019 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3020 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3021 return 1;
3022
3023 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3024 s->servername_done=0;
3025 default:
3026 return 1;
3027 }
3028 }
3029
3030 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3031 {
3032 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3033 int al;
3034
3035 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3036 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3037 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3038 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3039 */
3040 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3041 {
3042 int r;
3043 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3044 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3045 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3046 if (certpkey == NULL)
3047 {
3048 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3049 return 1;
3050 }
3051 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3052 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3053 */
3054 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3055 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3056 switch (r)
3057 {
3058 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3059 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3060 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3061 break;
3062 /* status request response should be sent */
3063 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3064 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3065 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3066 else
3067 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3068 break;
3069 /* something bad happened */
3070 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3071 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3072 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3073 goto err;
3074 }
3075 }
3076 else
3077 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3078
3079 err:
3080 switch (ret)
3081 {
3082 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3083 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3084 return -1;
3085
3086 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3087 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3088 return 1;
3089
3090 default:
3091 return 1;
3092 }
3093 }
3094
3095 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3096 {
3097 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3098 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3099
3100 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3101 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3102 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3103 * it must contain uncompressed.
3104 */
3105 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3106 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3107 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3108 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3109 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3110 {
3111 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3112 size_t i;
3113 unsigned char *list;
3114 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3115 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3116 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3117 {
3118 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3119 {
3120 found_uncompressed = 1;
3121 break;
3122 }
3123 }
3124 if (!found_uncompressed)
3125 {
3126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3127 return -1;
3128 }
3129 }
3130 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3131 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3132
3133 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3134 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3135 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3136 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3137
3138 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3139 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3140 {
3141 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3142 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3143
3144 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3145 {
3146 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3147 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3148 }
3149
3150 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3151 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3152 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3153 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3154 {
3155 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3156 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3157 }
3158 }
3159 #endif
3160
3161 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3162 * tell the callback
3163 */
3164 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3165 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3166 {
3167 int r;
3168 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3169 * there is no response.
3170 */
3171 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3172 {
3173 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3174 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3175 }
3176 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3177 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3178 if (r == 0)
3179 {
3180 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3181 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3182 }
3183 if (r < 0)
3184 {
3185 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3186 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3187 }
3188 }
3189
3190 switch (ret)
3191 {
3192 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3193 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3194 return -1;
3195
3196 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3197 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3198 return 1;
3199
3200 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3201 s->servername_done=0;
3202 default:
3203 return 1;
3204 }
3205 }
3206
3207 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3208 {
3209 int al = -1;
3210 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3211 return 1;
3212 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3213 {
3214 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3215 return 0;
3216 }
3217
3218 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3219 {
3220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3221 return 0;
3222 }
3223 return 1;
3224 }
3225
3226 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3227 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3228 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3229 *
3230 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3231 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3232 * extension, if any.
3233 * len: the length of the session ID.
3234 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3235 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3236 * point to the resulting session.
3237 *
3238 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3239 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3240 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3241 *
3242 * Returns:
3243 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3244 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3245 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3246 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3247 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3248 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3249 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3250 *
3251 * Side effects:
3252 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3253 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3254 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3255 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3256 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3257 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3258 */
3259 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3260 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3261 {
3262 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3263 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3264 unsigned short i;
3265
3266 *ret = NULL;
3267 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3268
3269 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3270 * to permit stateful resumption.
3271 */
3272 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3273 return 0;
3274 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3275 return 0;
3276 if (p >= limit)
3277 return -1;
3278 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3279 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
3280 {
3281 i = *(p++);
3282 p+= i;
3283 if (p >= limit)
3284 return -1;
3285 }
3286 /* Skip past cipher list */
3287 n2s(p, i);
3288 p+= i;
3289 if (p >= limit)
3290 return -1;
3291 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3292 i = *(p++);
3293 p += i;
3294 if (p > limit)
3295 return -1;
3296 /* Now at start of extensions */
3297 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3298 return 0;
3299 n2s(p, i);
3300 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3301 {
3302 unsigned short type, size;
3303 n2s(p, type);
3304 n2s(p, size);
3305 if (p + size > limit)
3306 return 0;
3307 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3308 {
3309 int r;
3310 if (size == 0)
3311 {
3312 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3313 * currently have one. */
3314 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3315 return 1;
3316 }
3317 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3318 {
3319 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3320 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3321 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3322 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3323 * calculate the master secret later. */
3324 return 2;
3325 }
3326 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3327 switch (r)
3328 {
3329 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3330 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3331 return 2;
3332 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3333 return r;
3334 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3335 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3336 return 3;
3337 default: /* fatal error */
3338 return -1;
3339 }
3340 }
3341 p += size;
3342 }
3343 return 0;
3344 }
3345
3346 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3347 *
3348 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3349 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3350 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3351 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3352 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3353 * point to the resulting session.
3354 *
3355 * Returns:
3356 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3357 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3358 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3359 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3360 */
3361 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3362 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3363 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3364 {
3365 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3366 unsigned char *sdec;
3367 const unsigned char *p;
3368 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3369 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3370 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3371 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3372 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3373 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3374 if (eticklen < 48)
3375 return 2;
3376 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3377 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3378 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3379 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3380 {
3381 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3382 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3383 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
3384 if (rv < 0)
3385 return -1;
3386 if (rv == 0)
3387 return 2;
3388 if (rv == 2)
3389 renew_ticket = 1;
3390 }
3391 else
3392 {
3393 /* Check key name matches */
3394 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3395 return 2;
3396 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3397 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3398 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3399 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3400 }
3401 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3402 * integrity checks on ticket.
3403 */
3404 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3405 if (mlen < 0)
3406 {
3407 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3408 return -1;
3409 }
3410 eticklen -= mlen;
3411 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3412 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3413 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3414 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3415 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3416 return 2;
3417 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3418 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3419 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3420 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3421 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3422 if (!sdec)
3423 {
3424 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3425 return -1;
3426 }
3427 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3428 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3429 return 2;
3430 slen += mlen;
3431 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3432 p = sdec;
3433
3434 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3435 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3436 if (sess)
3437 {
3438 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3439 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3440 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3441 * as required by standard.
3442 */
3443 if (sesslen)
3444 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3445 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3446 *psess = sess;
3447 if (renew_ticket)
3448 return 4;
3449 else
3450 return 3;
3451 }
3452 ERR_clear_error();
3453 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3454 * ticket. */
3455 return 2;
3456 }
3457
3458 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3459
3460 typedef struct
3461 {
3462 int nid;
3463 int id;
3464 } tls12_lookup;
3465
3466 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3467 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3468 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3469 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3470 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3471 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3472 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3473 };
3474
3475 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3476 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3477 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3478 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3479 };
3480
3481 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3482 {
3483 size_t i;
3484 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3485 {
3486 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3487 return table[i].id;
3488 }
3489 return -1;
3490 }
3491
3492 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3493 {
3494 size_t i;
3495 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3496 {
3497 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3498 return table[i].nid;
3499 }
3500 return NID_undef;
3501 }
3502
3503 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3504 {
3505 int sig_id, md_id;
3506 if (!md)
3507 return 0;
3508 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3509 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3510 if (md_id == -1)
3511 return 0;
3512 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3513 if (sig_id == -1)
3514 return 0;
3515 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3516 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3517 return 1;
3518 }
3519
3520 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3521 {
3522 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3523 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3524 }
3525
3526 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3527 {
3528 switch(hash_alg)
3529 {
3530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3531 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3532 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
3533 if (FIPS_mode())
3534 return NULL;
3535 #endif
3536 return EVP_md5();
3537 #endif
3538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3539 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3540 return EVP_sha1();
3541 #endif
3542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3543 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3544 return EVP_sha224();
3545
3546 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3547 return EVP_sha256();
3548 #endif
3549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3550 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3551 return EVP_sha384();
3552
3553 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3554 return EVP_sha512();
3555 #endif
3556 default:
3557 return NULL;
3558
3559 }
3560 }
3561
3562 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3563 {
3564 switch(sig_alg)
3565 {
3566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3567 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3568 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3569 #endif
3570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3571 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3572 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3573 #endif
3574 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3575 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3576 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3577 #endif
3578 }
3579 return -1;
3580 }
3581
3582 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3583 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3584 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3585 {
3586 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3587 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3588 return;
3589 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3590 {
3591 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3592 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3593 if (phash_nid)
3594 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3595 }
3596 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3597 {
3598 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3599 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3600 if (psign_nid)
3601 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3602 }
3603 if (psignhash_nid)
3604 {
3605 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3606 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3607 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3608 else
3609 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3610 }
3611 }
3612 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3613 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3614 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3615 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3616 {
3617 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3618 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3619 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3620 {
3621 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3622 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3623 continue;
3624 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3625 continue;
3626 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3627 {
3628 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3629 {
3630 nmatch++;
3631 if (shsig)
3632 {
3633 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3634 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3635 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3636 &shsig->sign_nid,
3637 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3638 ptmp);
3639 shsig++;
3640 }
3641 break;
3642 }
3643 }
3644 }
3645 return nmatch;
3646 }
3647
3648 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3649 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3650 {
3651 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3652 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3653 size_t nmatch;
3654 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3655 CERT *c = s->cert;
3656 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3657 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3658 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3659 {
3660 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3661 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3662 }
3663 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3664 {
3665 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3666 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3667 }
3668 else
3669 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3670 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3671 {
3672 pref = conf;
3673 preflen = conflen;
3674 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3675 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3676 }
3677 else
3678 {
3679 allow = conf;
3680 allowlen = conflen;
3681 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3682 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3683 }
3684 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3685 if (!nmatch)
3686 return 1;
3687 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3688 if (!salgs)
3689 return 0;
3690 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3691 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3692 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3693 return 1;
3694 }
3695
3696
3697 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3698
3699 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3700 {
3701 int idx;
3702 size_t i;
3703 const EVP_MD *md;
3704 CERT *c = s->cert;
3705 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3706 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3707 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3708 return 1;
3709 /* Should never happen */
3710 if (!c)
3711 return 0;
3712
3713 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3714 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3715 return 0;
3716 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3717 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3718
3719 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3720
3721 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3722 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3723 {
3724 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3725 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3726 */
3727 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3728 if (s->server)
3729 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3730 else
3731 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3732 if (sigs)
3733 {
3734 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3735 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3736 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3737 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3738 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3739 {
3740 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3741 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3742 }
3743 }
3744 }
3745 #endif
3746
3747 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3748 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3749 {
3750 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3751 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3752 {
3753 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3754 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3755 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3756 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3757 {
3758 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3759 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3760 }
3761 }
3762
3763 }
3764 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3765 * use the certificate for signing.
3766 */
3767 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3768 {
3769 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3770 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3771 */
3772 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3773 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3774 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3775 #endif
3776 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3777 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3778 {
3779 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3780 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3781 }
3782 #endif
3783 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3784 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3785 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3786 #endif
3787 }
3788 return 1;
3789 }
3790
3791
3792 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3793 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3794 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3795 {
3796 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3797 if (psig == NULL)
3798 return 0;
3799 if (idx >= 0)
3800 {
3801 idx <<= 1;
3802 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3803 return 0;
3804 psig += idx;
3805 if (rhash)
3806 *rhash = psig[0];
3807 if (rsig)
3808 *rsig = psig[1];
3809 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3810 }
3811 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3812 }
3813
3814 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3815 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3816 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3817 {
3818 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3819 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3820 return 0;
3821 shsigalgs += idx;
3822 if (phash)
3823 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3824 if (psign)
3825 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3826 if (psignhash)
3827 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3828 if (rsig)
3829 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3830 if (rhash)
3831 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3832 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3833 }
3834
3835
3836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3837 int
3838 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3839 {
3840 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3841 unsigned short hbtype;
3842 unsigned int payload;
3843 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3844
3845 /* Read type and payload length first */
3846 hbtype = *p++;
3847 n2s(p, payload);
3848 pl = p;
3849
3850 if (s->msg_callback)
3851 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3852 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3853 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3854
3855 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3856 {
3857 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3858 int r;
3859
3860 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3861 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3862 * payload, plus padding
3863 */
3864 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3865 bp = buffer;
3866
3867 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3868 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3869 s2n(payload, bp);
3870 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3871 bp += payload;
3872 /* Random padding */
3873 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3874
3875 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3876
3877 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3878 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3879 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3880 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3881
3882 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3883
3884 if (r < 0)
3885 return r;
3886 }
3887 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3888 {
3889 unsigned int seq;
3890
3891 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3892 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3893 * sequence number */
3894 n2s(pl, seq);
3895
3896 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3897 {
3898 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
3899 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3900 }
3901 }
3902
3903 return 0;
3904 }
3905
3906 int
3907 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3908 {
3909 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3910 int ret;
3911 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3912 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3913
3914 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3915 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3916 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3917 {
3918 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3919 return -1;
3920 }
3921
3922 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3923 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3924 {
3925 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3926 return -1;
3927 }
3928
3929 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3930 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3931 {
3932 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3933 return -1;
3934 }
3935
3936 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3937 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3938 */
3939 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3940
3941 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3942 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3943 * some random stuff.
3944 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3945 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3946 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3947 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3948 * - Padding
3949 */
3950 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3951 p = buf;
3952 /* Message Type */
3953 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3954 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3955 s2n(payload, p);
3956 /* Sequence number */
3957 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3958 /* 16 random bytes */
3959 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3960 p += 16;
3961 /* Random padding */
3962 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3963
3964 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3965 if (ret >= 0)
3966 {
3967 if (s->msg_callback)
3968 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3969 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3970 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3971
3972 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3973 }
3974
3975 OPENSSL_free(buf);
3976
3977 return ret;
3978 }
3979 #endif
3980
3981 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3982
3983 typedef struct
3984 {
3985 size_t sigalgcnt;
3986 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3987 } sig_cb_st;
3988
3989 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3990 {
3991 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3992 size_t i;
3993 char etmp[20], *p;
3994 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3995 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3996 return 0;
3997 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3998 return 0;
3999 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4000 etmp[len] = 0;
4001 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4002 if (!p)
4003 return 0;
4004 *p = 0;
4005 p++;
4006 if (!*p)
4007 return 0;
4008
4009 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4010 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4011 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4012 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4013 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4014 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4015 else return 0;
4016
4017 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4018 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4019 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4020 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4021 return 0;
4022
4023 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4024 {
4025 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4026 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4027 return 0;
4028 }
4029 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4030 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4031 return 1;
4032 }
4033
4034 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4035 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4036 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4037 {
4038 sig_cb_st sig;
4039 sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
4040 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4041 return 0;
4042 if (c == NULL)
4043 return 1;
4044 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4045 }
4046
4047 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4048 {
4049 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4050 int rhash, rsign;
4051 size_t i;
4052 if (salglen & 1)
4053 return 0;
4054 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4055 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4056 return 0;
4057 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4058 {
4059 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4060 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4061 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4062 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4063
4064 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4065 goto err;
4066 *sptr++ = rhash;
4067 *sptr++ = rsign;
4068 }
4069
4070 if (client)
4071 {
4072 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4073 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4074 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4075 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4076 }
4077 else
4078 {
4079 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4080 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4081 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4082 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4083 }
4084
4085 return 1;
4086
4087 err:
4088 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4089 return 0;
4090 }
4091
4092 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4093 {
4094 int sig_nid;
4095 size_t i;
4096 if (default_nid == -1)
4097 return 1;
4098 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4099 if (default_nid)
4100 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4101 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4102 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4103 return 1;
4104 return 0;
4105 }
4106 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4107 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4108 {
4109 X509_NAME *nm;
4110 int i;
4111 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4112 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4113 {
4114 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4115 return 1;
4116 }
4117 return 0;
4118 }
4119
4120 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4121 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4122 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4123 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4124 */
4125
4126 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4127
4128 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4129 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4130 /* Strict mode flags */
4131 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4132 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4133 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4134
4135 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4136 int idx)
4137 {
4138 int i;
4139 int rv = 0;
4140 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4141 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4142 CERT *c = s->cert;
4143 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4144 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4145 if (idx != -1)
4146 {
4147 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4148 if (idx == -2)
4149 {
4150 cpk = c->key;
4151 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4152 }
4153 else
4154 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4155 x = cpk->x509;
4156 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4157 chain = cpk->chain;
4158 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4159 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4160 if (!x || !pk)
4161 goto end;
4162 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4163 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4164 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4165 {
4166 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4167 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4168 return rv;
4169 }
4170 #endif
4171 }
4172 else
4173 {
4174 if (!x || !pk)
4175 goto end;
4176 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4177 if (idx == -1)
4178 goto end;
4179 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4180 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4181 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4182 else
4183 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4184 strict_mode = 1;
4185 }
4186
4187 if (suiteb_flags)
4188 {
4189 int ok;
4190 if (check_flags)
4191 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4192 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4193 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4194 {
4195 if (check_flags)
4196 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4197 else
4198 goto end;
4199 }
4200 }
4201
4202 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4203 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4204 * and strict mode.
4205 */
4206 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4207 {
4208 int default_nid;
4209 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4210 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4211 default_nid = 0;
4212 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4213 else
4214 {
4215 switch(idx)
4216 {
4217 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4218 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4219 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4220 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4221 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4222 break;
4223
4224 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4225 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4226 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4227 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4228 break;
4229
4230 case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
4231 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4232 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4233 break;
4234
4235 default:
4236 default_nid = -1;
4237 break;
4238 }
4239 }
4240 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4241 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4242 * sha1.
4243 */
4244 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4245 {
4246 size_t j;
4247 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4248 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4249 {
4250 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4251 break;
4252 }
4253 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4254 {
4255 if (check_flags)
4256 goto skip_sigs;
4257 else
4258 goto end;
4259 }
4260 }
4261 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4262 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4263 {
4264 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4265 }
4266 else
4267 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4268 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4269 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4270 {
4271 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4272 default_nid))
4273 {
4274 if (check_flags)
4275 {
4276 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4277 break;
4278 }
4279 else
4280 goto end;
4281 }
4282 }
4283 }
4284 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4285 else if(check_flags)
4286 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4287 skip_sigs:
4288 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4289 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4290 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4291 else if (!check_flags)
4292 goto end;
4293 if (!s->server)
4294 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4295 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4296 else if (strict_mode)
4297 {
4298 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4299 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4300 {
4301 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4302 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4303 {
4304 if (check_flags)
4305 {
4306 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4307 break;
4308 }
4309 else
4310 goto end;
4311 }
4312 }
4313 }
4314 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4315 {
4316 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4317 int check_type = 0;
4318 switch (pk->type)
4319 {
4320 case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
4321 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4322 break;
4323 case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
4324 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4325 break;
4326 case EVP_PKEY_EC:
4327 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4328 break;
4329 case EVP_PKEY_DH:
4330 case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
4331 {
4332 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4333 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4334 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4335 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4336 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4337 }
4338 }
4339 if (check_type)
4340 {
4341 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4342 int ctypelen;
4343 if (c->ctypes)
4344 {
4345 ctypes = c->ctypes;
4346 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4347 }
4348 else
4349 {
4350 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4351 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4352 }
4353 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4354 {
4355 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4356 {
4357 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4358 break;
4359 }
4360 }
4361 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4362 goto end;
4363 }
4364 else
4365 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4366
4367
4368 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4369
4370 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4371 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4372
4373 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4374 {
4375 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4376 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4377 }
4378 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4379 {
4380 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4381 {
4382 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4383 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4384 {
4385 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4386 break;
4387 }
4388 }
4389 }
4390 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4391 goto end;
4392 }
4393 else
4394 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4395
4396 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4397 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4398
4399 end:
4400
4401 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4402 {
4403 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4404 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4405 else if (cpk->digest)
4406 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4407 }
4408 else
4409 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4410
4411 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4412 * if the chain is invalid.
4413 */
4414 if (!check_flags)
4415 {
4416 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4417 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4418 else
4419 {
4420 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4421 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4422 return 0;
4423 }
4424 }
4425 return rv;
4426 }
4427
4428 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4429 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4430 {
4431 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4432 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4433 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4434 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4435 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4436 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4437 }
4438 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4439 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4440 {
4441 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4442 }
4443
4444 #endif
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