2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
20 #include "internal/nelem.h"
22 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_enc_data
= {
28 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
29 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
30 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
31 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
32 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
34 tls1_export_keying_material
,
36 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
37 tls_close_construct_packet
,
41 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_1_enc_data
= {
45 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
46 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
47 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
48 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
49 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
51 tls1_export_keying_material
,
52 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
,
53 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
54 tls_close_construct_packet
,
58 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_2_enc_data
= {
62 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
63 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
64 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
65 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
66 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
68 tls1_export_keying_material
,
69 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
70 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
71 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
72 tls_close_construct_packet
,
76 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_3_enc_data
= {
79 tls13_setup_key_block
,
80 tls13_generate_master_secret
,
81 tls13_change_cipher_state
,
82 tls13_final_finish_mac
,
83 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
84 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
86 tls13_export_keying_material
,
87 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
,
88 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
89 tls_close_construct_packet
,
93 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
96 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
97 * http, the cache would over fill
106 if (!s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
))
112 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
114 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.session_ticket
);
118 int tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
123 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
)
124 s
->version
= TLS_MAX_VERSION
;
126 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 * Table of curve information.
135 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
136 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
138 static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list
[] = {
139 {NID_sect163k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
140 {NID_sect163r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
141 {NID_sect163r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
142 {NID_sect193r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
143 {NID_sect193r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
144 {NID_sect233k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
145 {NID_sect233r1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
146 {NID_sect239k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
147 {NID_sect283k1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
148 {NID_sect283r1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
149 {NID_sect409k1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
150 {NID_sect409r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
151 {NID_sect571k1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
152 {NID_sect571r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
153 {NID_secp160k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
154 {NID_secp160r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
155 {NID_secp160r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
156 {NID_secp192k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
157 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
158 {NID_secp224k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
159 {NID_secp224r1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
160 {NID_secp256k1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
161 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
162 {NID_secp384r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
163 {NID_secp521r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
164 {NID_brainpoolP256r1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
165 {NID_brainpoolP384r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
166 {NID_brainpoolP512r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
167 {EVP_PKEY_X25519
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM
}, /* X25519 (29) */
168 {EVP_PKEY_X448
, 224, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM
}, /* X448 (30) */
171 static const unsigned char ecformats_default
[] = {
172 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
,
173 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
,
174 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
177 /* The default curves */
178 static const uint16_t eccurves_default
[] = {
179 29, /* X25519 (29) */
180 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
182 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
183 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
186 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves
[] = {
191 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t group_id
)
193 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
194 if (group_id
< 1 || group_id
> OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
))
196 return &nid_list
[group_id
- 1];
199 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid
)
202 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
); i
++) {
203 if (nid_list
[i
].nid
== nid
)
204 return (uint16_t)(i
+ 1);
210 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
211 * the number of groups supported.
213 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL
*s
, const uint16_t **pgroups
,
217 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
218 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
219 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
220 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
221 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves
);
224 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
225 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
229 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
230 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
+ 1;
235 if (s
->ext
.supportedgroups
== NULL
) {
236 *pgroups
= eccurves_default
;
237 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(eccurves_default
);
239 *pgroups
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups
;
240 *pgroupslen
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
;
246 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
247 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL
*s
, uint16_t curve
, int op
)
249 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*cinfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(curve
);
250 unsigned char ctmp
[2];
254 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
255 if (cinfo
->flags
& TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
)
258 ctmp
[0] = curve
>> 8;
259 ctmp
[1] = curve
& 0xff;
260 return ssl_security(s
, op
, cinfo
->secbits
, cinfo
->nid
, (void *)ctmp
);
263 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
264 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id
, const uint16_t *list
, size_t listlen
)
267 for (i
= 0; i
< listlen
; i
++)
274 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
275 * if there is no match.
276 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
277 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
278 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
280 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL
*s
, int nmatch
)
282 const uint16_t *pref
, *supp
;
283 size_t num_pref
, num_supp
, i
;
286 /* Can't do anything on client side */
290 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
292 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
293 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
295 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
297 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
298 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256
;
299 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
300 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384
;
301 /* Should never happen */
304 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
308 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
309 * otherwise peer decides.
311 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) {
312 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
313 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
315 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
316 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
319 for (k
= 0, i
= 0; i
< num_pref
; i
++) {
320 uint16_t id
= pref
[i
];
322 if (!tls1_in_list(id
, supp
, num_supp
)
323 || !tls_curve_allowed(s
, id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED
))
331 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
335 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
336 int *groups
, size_t ngroups
)
341 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
344 unsigned long dup_list
= 0;
345 glist
= OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups
* sizeof(*glist
));
348 for (i
= 0; i
< ngroups
; i
++) {
349 unsigned long idmask
;
351 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
352 id
= tls1_nid2group_id(groups
[i
]);
354 if (!id
|| (dup_list
& idmask
)) {
367 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
371 int nid_arr
[MAX_CURVELIST
];
374 static int nid_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
376 nid_cb_st
*narg
= arg
;
382 if (narg
->nidcnt
== MAX_CURVELIST
)
384 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
386 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
388 nid
= EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp
);
389 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
390 nid
= OBJ_sn2nid(etmp
);
391 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
392 nid
= OBJ_ln2nid(etmp
);
393 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
395 for (i
= 0; i
< narg
->nidcnt
; i
++)
396 if (narg
->nid_arr
[i
] == nid
)
398 narg
->nid_arr
[narg
->nidcnt
++] = nid
;
402 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
403 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
, const char *str
)
407 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, nid_cb
, &ncb
))
411 return tls1_set_groups(pext
, pextlen
, ncb
.nid_arr
, ncb
.nidcnt
);
413 /* Return group id of a key */
414 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
416 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
421 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
);
422 return tls1_nid2group_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp
));
425 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
426 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL
*s
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
430 unsigned char comp_id
;
433 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
434 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) != EVP_PKEY_EC
)
436 ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
437 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
);
439 /* Get required compression id */
440 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec
) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
) {
441 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
;
442 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
443 /* Compression not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
446 int field_type
= EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp
));
448 if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_prime_field
)
449 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
;
450 else if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
)
451 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
;
456 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
457 * supported (see RFC4492).
459 if (s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
== NULL
)
462 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
; i
++) {
463 if (s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
[i
] == comp_id
)
469 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
470 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
)
472 const uint16_t *groups
;
478 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
479 if (tls1_suiteb(s
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
) {
480 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
482 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
) {
483 if (group_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
485 } else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
) {
486 if (group_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
489 /* Should never happen */
494 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
495 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
496 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
))
499 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s
, group_id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))
502 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
506 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
507 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
510 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
511 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
512 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
513 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
517 return tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
);
520 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char **pformats
,
524 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
526 if (s
->ext
.ecpointformats
) {
527 *pformats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats
;
528 *num_formats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
;
530 *pformats
= ecformats_default
;
531 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
533 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
) - 1;
535 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
);
540 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
541 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
543 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int check_ee_md
)
547 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
550 /* If not EC nothing to do */
551 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) != EVP_PKEY_EC
)
553 /* Check compression */
554 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
))
556 group_id
= tls1_get_group_id(pkey
);
557 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, group_id
))
560 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
563 if (check_ee_md
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
568 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
569 if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
570 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
;
571 else if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
572 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
;
574 return 0; /* Should never happen */
575 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
576 if (check_md
== c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
585 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
587 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
589 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
590 * is compatible with the client extensions.
592 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
594 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL
*s
, unsigned long cid
)
596 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
598 return tls1_shared_group(s
, 0) != 0;
600 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
603 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
604 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_256
);
605 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
606 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
);
613 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int set_ee_md
)
618 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
620 /* Default sigalg schemes */
621 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs
[] = {
622 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
623 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
624 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
625 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
626 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
630 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
631 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
632 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
633 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
634 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
635 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
637 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
638 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
639 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
641 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
642 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
643 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
645 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
646 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
647 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
648 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
649 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
651 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
652 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
653 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
658 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs
[] = {
659 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
660 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
664 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl
[] = {
665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
666 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
667 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
668 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
, NID_X9_62_prime256v1
},
669 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
670 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
671 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
, NID_secp384r1
},
672 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
673 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
674 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512
, NID_secp521r1
},
675 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
676 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
,
677 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
678 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
,
679 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
,
680 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
681 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
682 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
683 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224
, NID_undef
},
684 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
685 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
686 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
, NID_undef
},
688 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
689 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
690 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
691 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
692 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
693 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
694 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
695 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
696 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
697 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
698 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
699 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
700 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
701 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
702 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
703 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
704 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
705 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
706 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
707 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
708 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
709 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
710 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
711 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
712 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
713 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
714 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
715 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
716 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
717 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
718 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
719 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
720 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
721 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
722 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
723 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
724 NID_dsa_with_SHA256
, NID_undef
},
725 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
726 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
727 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
728 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
729 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
730 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
731 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
732 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
733 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
734 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
735 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
736 NID_dsaWithSHA1
, NID_undef
},
738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
739 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
740 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
741 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
742 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
743 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
744 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
745 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
746 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
747 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
748 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
,
749 NID_id_GostR3410_2001
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
,
750 NID_undef
, NID_undef
}
753 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
754 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg
= {
755 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
756 NID_md5_sha1
, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
,
757 EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
762 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
763 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
765 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg
[] = {
766 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
767 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
768 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
769 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
770 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
771 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
772 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
773 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
774 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
777 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
778 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg
)
781 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
783 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
785 if (s
->sigalg
== sigalg
)
790 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
791 int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
, const EVP_MD
**pmd
)
796 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
797 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
) {
800 md
= ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
);
810 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
812 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
813 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
814 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
816 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
817 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(const RSA
*rsa
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
823 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
) || md
== NULL
)
825 if (RSA_size(rsa
) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md
))
831 * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
832 * is fixed by the certificate type.
834 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL
*s
, int idx
)
840 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
841 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
842 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i
);
844 if (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) {
850 idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
853 if (idx
< 0 || idx
>= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg
))
855 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
856 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg
[idx
]);
858 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, NULL
))
862 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg
;
864 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
865 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL
*s
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
868 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
870 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
872 lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, idx
);
875 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
879 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL
*s
, int sent
, const uint16_t **psigs
)
882 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
885 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
886 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
887 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
888 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
889 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs
);
891 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
892 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
895 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
896 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
+ 1;
901 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
902 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
903 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
905 if ((s
->server
== sent
) && s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
906 *psigs
= s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
;
907 return s
->cert
->client_sigalgslen
;
908 } else if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
909 *psigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
910 return s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
912 *psigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
913 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
918 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
919 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
922 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL
*s
, uint16_t sig
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
924 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
925 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
927 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
;
928 int pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
929 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
931 /* Should never happen */
934 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
935 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
936 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
937 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
938 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
941 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
942 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
943 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
945 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig
);
947 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
948 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
951 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
|| lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
))
952 || (pkeyid
!= lu
->sig
953 && (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
|| pkeyid
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
))) {
954 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
955 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
958 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
959 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
961 /* Check point compression is permitted */
962 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
)) {
963 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
964 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
965 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION
);
969 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
970 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
971 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
972 int curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
974 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
) {
975 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
976 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
980 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
981 /* Check curve matches extensions */
982 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, tls1_get_group_id(pkey
))) {
983 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
984 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
987 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
988 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
989 if (sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
990 && sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
) {
991 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
992 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
993 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
998 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
999 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1000 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1005 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1006 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1007 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
1008 if (sig
== *sent_sigs
)
1011 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1012 if (i
== sent_sigslen
&& (lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1013 || s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
1014 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1015 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1018 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
)) {
1019 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1020 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
1025 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1026 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1028 sigalgstr
[0] = (sig
>> 8) & 0xff;
1029 sigalgstr
[1] = sig
& 0xff;
1030 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK
,
1031 EVP_MD_size(md
) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md
),
1032 (void *)sigalgstr
)) {
1033 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1034 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1038 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1039 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1043 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1045 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
== NULL
)
1047 *pnid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
->sig
;
1052 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1053 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1054 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1056 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1059 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1061 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL
*s
)
1063 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
= 0;
1064 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
= 0;
1065 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
, s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK
);
1066 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
,
1067 &s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
) != 0)
1069 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1070 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1071 if (!s
->psk_client_callback
) {
1072 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aPSK
;
1073 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_PSK
;
1075 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1077 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.srp_Mask
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1078 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aSRP
;
1079 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kSRP
;
1086 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1087 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1088 * @c: cipher to check
1089 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1090 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1092 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1094 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL
*s
, const SSL_CIPHER
*c
, int op
, int ecdhe
)
1096 if (c
->algorithm_mkey
& s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
1097 || c
->algorithm_auth
& s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
)
1099 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
== 0)
1101 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1102 int min_tls
= c
->min_tls
;
1105 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1106 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1108 if (min_tls
== TLS1_VERSION
&& ecdhe
1109 && (c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) != 0)
1110 min_tls
= SSL3_VERSION
;
1112 if ((min_tls
> s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
) || (c
->max_tls
< s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
))
1115 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
1116 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
)))
1119 return !ssl_security(s
, op
, c
->strength_bits
, 0, (void *)c
);
1122 int tls_use_ticket(SSL
*s
)
1124 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
))
1126 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TICKET
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1129 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1133 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1134 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
);
1135 s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1136 s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1137 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1138 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
1139 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
1141 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1142 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1144 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
== NULL
1145 && s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
) {
1146 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1147 size_t sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1149 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1150 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, i
);
1155 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1156 for (j
= 0; j
< sent_sigslen
; j
++) {
1157 if (lu
->sigalg
== sent_sigs
[j
]) {
1158 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
1166 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
1167 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1168 SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1171 if (s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
!= NULL
)
1174 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1175 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
,
1176 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS
);
1181 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1183 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1184 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1185 * point to the resulting session.
1187 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
1188 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
1189 * never be decrypted, nor will s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1192 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
1193 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
1194 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
1195 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
1196 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
1197 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
1198 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
1201 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1202 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1203 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1204 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1205 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1206 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1208 SSL_TICKET_RETURN
tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
,
1213 RAW_EXTENSION
*ticketext
;
1216 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1219 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1220 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1223 if (s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
|| !tls_use_ticket(s
))
1224 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1226 ticketext
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket
];
1227 if (!ticketext
->present
)
1228 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1230 size
= PACKET_remaining(&ticketext
->data
);
1233 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1236 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1237 return SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
;
1239 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1241 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1242 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1243 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1244 * calculate the master secret later.
1246 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1249 retv
= tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, PACKET_data(&ticketext
->data
), size
,
1250 hello
->session_id
, hello
->session_id_len
, ret
);
1253 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is always called regardless of the
1254 * return from tls_decrypt_ticket(). The callback is responsible for
1255 * checking |retv| before it performs any action
1257 if (s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb
!= NULL
) {
1258 size_t keyname_len
= size
;
1260 if (keyname_len
> TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
)
1261 keyname_len
= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
;
1262 retv
= s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb(s
, *ret
,
1263 PACKET_data(&ticketext
->data
),
1265 retv
, s
->session_ctx
->ticket_cb_data
);
1269 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
:
1270 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1271 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1273 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
:
1274 return SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1276 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
:
1277 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1278 return SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1280 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
:
1281 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1282 return SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
;
1284 case SSL_TICKET_NONE
:
1285 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1288 return SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1293 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1295 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1296 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1297 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1298 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1299 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1300 * point to the resulting session.
1302 SSL_TICKET_RETURN
tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *etick
,
1303 size_t eticklen
, const unsigned char *sess_id
,
1304 size_t sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
1307 unsigned char *sdec
;
1308 const unsigned char *p
;
1309 int slen
, renew_ticket
= 0, declen
;
1310 SSL_TICKET_RETURN ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1312 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
1313 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
1314 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
1315 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
1317 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1318 if (eticklen
< TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
) {
1319 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1323 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1324 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
1326 return SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1327 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1329 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1332 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
) {
1333 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
1334 int rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, nctick
,
1335 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
1340 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1346 /* Check key name matches */
1347 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
1348 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) != 0) {
1349 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1352 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.tick_hmac_key
,
1353 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_hmac_key
),
1354 EVP_sha256(), NULL
) <= 0
1355 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx
, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL
,
1356 tctx
->ext
.tick_aes_key
,
1357 etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) <= 0) {
1362 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1365 mlen
= HMAC_size(hctx
);
1369 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1371 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
) + mlen
) {
1372 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1376 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1377 if (HMAC_Update(hctx
, etick
, eticklen
) <= 0
1378 || HMAC_Final(hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
) <= 0) {
1381 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
1382 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
1383 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1384 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1386 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1387 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1388 p
= etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1389 eticklen
-= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1390 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
1391 if (sdec
== NULL
|| EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
,
1392 (int)eticklen
) <= 0) {
1393 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1395 return SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1397 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &declen
) <= 0) {
1398 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1400 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1403 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1407 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &p
, slen
);
1411 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1413 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1414 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1417 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1418 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1419 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1423 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
1424 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
1428 return SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
1430 return SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1434 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1436 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1438 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1439 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
1443 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1444 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1446 unsigned char sigalgstr
[2];
1449 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1450 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, NULL
))
1452 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1453 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
1455 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1456 if (!s
->server
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
1457 && (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
|| lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1458 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1459 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
))
1461 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1462 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu
->sig_idx
))
1464 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
)
1466 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1467 secbits
= EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
)) * 4;
1468 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1469 sigalgstr
[0] = (lu
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff;
1470 sigalgstr
[1] = lu
->sigalg
& 0xff;
1471 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, lu
->hash
, (void *)sigalgstr
);
1475 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1476 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1480 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a
, SSL
*s
, int op
)
1482 const uint16_t *sigalgs
;
1483 size_t i
, sigalgslen
;
1484 uint32_t disabled_mask
= SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
| SSL_aECDSA
;
1486 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1489 sigalgslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sigalgs
);
1490 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++, sigalgs
++) {
1491 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs
);
1492 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
1497 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu
->sig_idx
);
1501 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1502 if ((clu
->amask
& disabled_mask
) != 0
1503 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, lu
))
1504 disabled_mask
&= ~clu
->amask
;
1506 *pmask_a
|= disabled_mask
;
1509 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1510 const uint16_t *psig
, size_t psiglen
)
1515 for (i
= 0; i
< psiglen
; i
++, psig
++) {
1516 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig
);
1518 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
1520 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, *psig
))
1523 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1524 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1526 if (rv
== 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
1527 || (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
1528 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1529 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha224
)))
1533 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
1537 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1538 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**shsig
,
1539 const uint16_t *pref
, size_t preflen
,
1540 const uint16_t *allow
, size_t allowlen
)
1542 const uint16_t *ptmp
, *atmp
;
1543 size_t i
, j
, nmatch
= 0;
1544 for (i
= 0, ptmp
= pref
; i
< preflen
; i
++, ptmp
++) {
1545 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp
);
1547 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1548 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED
, lu
))
1550 for (j
= 0, atmp
= allow
; j
< allowlen
; j
++, atmp
++) {
1551 if (*ptmp
== *atmp
) {
1562 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1563 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1565 const uint16_t *pref
, *allow
, *conf
;
1566 size_t preflen
, allowlen
, conflen
;
1568 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**salgs
= NULL
;
1570 unsigned int is_suiteb
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
1572 OPENSSL_free(c
->shared_sigalgs
);
1573 c
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1574 c
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1575 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1576 if (!s
->server
&& c
->client_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
1577 conf
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
1578 conflen
= c
->client_sigalgslen
;
1579 } else if (c
->conf_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
1580 conf
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
1581 conflen
= c
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1583 conflen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 0, &conf
);
1584 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|| is_suiteb
) {
1587 allow
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1588 allowlen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1592 pref
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1593 preflen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1595 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, NULL
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
1597 salgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch
* sizeof(*salgs
));
1600 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, salgs
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
1604 c
->shared_sigalgs
= salgs
;
1605 c
->shared_sigalgslen
= nmatch
;
1609 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET
*pkt
, uint16_t **pdest
, size_t *pdestlen
)
1615 size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
1617 /* Invalid data length */
1618 if (size
== 0 || (size
& 1) != 0)
1623 buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
* sizeof(*buf
));
1626 for (i
= 0; i
< size
&& PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &stmp
); i
++)
1634 OPENSSL_free(*pdest
);
1641 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int cert
)
1643 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1644 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
1646 /* Should never happen */
1647 if (s
->cert
== NULL
)
1651 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
,
1652 &s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
);
1654 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
,
1655 &s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
);
1659 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1661 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1664 uint32_t *pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
;
1667 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s
))
1670 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
1673 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
1674 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigptr
= c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
1675 int idx
= sigptr
->sig_idx
;
1677 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1678 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && sigptr
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1680 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1681 if (pvalid
[idx
] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx
))
1682 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
1687 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
1688 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
1689 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
1691 uint16_t *psig
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1692 size_t numsigalgs
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1693 if (psig
== NULL
|| numsigalgs
> INT_MAX
)
1696 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1698 if (idx
>= (int)numsigalgs
)
1702 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((*psig
>> 8) & 0xff);
1704 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(*psig
& 0xff);
1705 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig
);
1707 *psign
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sig
: NID_undef
;
1709 *phash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->hash
: NID_undef
;
1710 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
1711 *psignhash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sigandhash
: NID_undef
;
1713 return (int)numsigalgs
;
1716 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
1717 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
1718 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
1720 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*shsigalgs
;
1721 if (s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
== NULL
1723 || idx
>= (int)s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
1724 || s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
> INT_MAX
)
1726 shsigalgs
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
[idx
];
1728 *phash
= shsigalgs
->hash
;
1730 *psign
= shsigalgs
->sig
;
1731 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
1732 *psignhash
= shsigalgs
->sigandhash
;
1734 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(shsigalgs
->sigalg
& 0xff);
1736 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((shsigalgs
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff);
1737 return (int)s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
;
1740 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1741 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1745 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
1746 uint16_t sigalgs
[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
];
1749 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig
, int *phash
, const char *str
)
1751 if (strcmp(str
, "RSA") == 0) {
1752 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
1753 } else if (strcmp(str
, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str
, "PSS") == 0) {
1754 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
1755 } else if (strcmp(str
, "DSA") == 0) {
1756 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
1757 } else if (strcmp(str
, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1758 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
1760 *phash
= OBJ_sn2nid(str
);
1761 if (*phash
== NID_undef
)
1762 *phash
= OBJ_ln2nid(str
);
1765 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1766 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1768 static int sig_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
1770 sig_cb_st
*sarg
= arg
;
1772 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
1773 char etmp
[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN
], *p
;
1774 int sig_alg
= NID_undef
, hash_alg
= NID_undef
;
1777 if (sarg
->sigalgcnt
== TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
)
1779 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
1781 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
1783 p
= strchr(etmp
, '+');
1785 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1786 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
1787 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
1788 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
1789 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
1790 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
1794 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1796 if (s
->name
!= NULL
&& strcmp(etmp
, s
->name
) == 0) {
1797 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
1801 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
1808 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, etmp
);
1809 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, p
);
1810 if (sig_alg
== NID_undef
|| hash_alg
== NID_undef
)
1812 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1814 if (s
->hash
== hash_alg
&& s
->sig
== sig_alg
) {
1815 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
1819 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
1823 /* Reject duplicates */
1824 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1; i
++) {
1825 if (sarg
->sigalgs
[i
] == sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1]) {
1834 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1835 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1837 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT
*c
, const char *str
, int client
)
1841 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, sig_cb
, &sig
))
1845 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c
, sig
.sigalgs
, sig
.sigalgcnt
, client
);
1848 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const uint16_t *psigs
, size_t salglen
,
1853 sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
));
1854 if (sigalgs
== NULL
)
1856 memcpy(sigalgs
, psigs
, salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
));
1859 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
1860 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
1861 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
1863 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
1864 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
1865 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
1871 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const int *psig_nids
, size_t salglen
, int client
)
1873 uint16_t *sigalgs
, *sptr
;
1878 sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc((salglen
/ 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs
));
1879 if (sigalgs
== NULL
)
1881 for (i
= 0, sptr
= sigalgs
; i
< salglen
; i
+= 2) {
1883 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*curr
;
1884 int md_id
= *psig_nids
++;
1885 int sig_id
= *psig_nids
++;
1887 for (j
= 0, curr
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; j
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1889 if (curr
->hash
== md_id
&& curr
->sig
== sig_id
) {
1890 *sptr
++ = curr
->sigalg
;
1895 if (j
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
1900 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
1901 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
1902 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
1904 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
1905 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
1906 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
1912 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs
);
1916 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT
*c
, X509
*x
, int default_nid
)
1920 if (default_nid
== -1)
1922 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
1924 return sig_nid
== default_nid
? 1 : 0;
1925 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++)
1926 if (sig_nid
== c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
1931 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
1932 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *names
, X509
*x
)
1936 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
1937 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(names
); i
++) {
1938 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, sk_X509_NAME_value(names
, i
)))
1945 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
1946 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
1947 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
1948 * attempting to use them.
1951 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
1953 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
1954 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
1955 /* Strict mode flags */
1956 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
1957 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
1958 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
1960 int tls1_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
1965 int check_flags
= 0, strict_mode
;
1966 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
1969 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
1970 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
1972 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
1975 idx
= (int)(cpk
- c
->pkeys
);
1977 cpk
= c
->pkeys
+ idx
;
1978 pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
1980 pk
= cpk
->privatekey
;
1982 strict_mode
= c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
;
1983 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
1992 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk
, &certidx
) == NULL
)
1995 pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
1997 if (c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
1998 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
;
2000 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS
;
2007 check_flags
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2008 ok
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, x
, chain
, suiteb_flags
);
2009 if (ok
== X509_V_OK
)
2010 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2011 else if (!check_flags
)
2016 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2017 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2019 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& strict_mode
) {
2022 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
2023 || s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2025 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2029 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2030 default_nid
= NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
;
2033 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
2034 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2035 default_nid
= NID_dsaWithSHA1
;
2039 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2040 default_nid
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
;
2043 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
2044 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2001
;
2045 default_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001
;
2048 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
2049 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
;
2050 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256
;
2053 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
2054 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
;
2055 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512
;
2064 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2065 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2067 if (default_nid
> 0 && c
->conf_sigalgs
) {
2069 const uint16_t *p
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2070 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->conf_sigalgslen
; j
++, p
++) {
2071 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p
);
2073 if (lu
!= NULL
&& lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
&& lu
->sig
== rsign
)
2076 if (j
== c
->conf_sigalgslen
) {
2083 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2084 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c
, x
, default_nid
)) {
2088 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2089 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2090 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2091 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c
, sk_X509_value(chain
, i
), default_nid
)) {
2093 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2100 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2101 else if (check_flags
)
2102 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2104 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2105 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s
, x
, 1))
2106 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM
;
2107 else if (!check_flags
)
2110 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2111 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2112 else if (strict_mode
) {
2113 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2114 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2115 X509
*ca
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2116 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s
, ca
, 0)) {
2118 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2125 if (!s
->server
&& strict_mode
) {
2126 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_dn
;
2128 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
2130 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN
;
2133 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN
;
2136 check_type
= TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN
;
2140 const uint8_t *ctypes
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
;
2143 for (j
= 0; j
< s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
; j
++, ctypes
++) {
2144 if (*ctypes
== check_type
) {
2145 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2149 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
) && !check_flags
)
2152 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2155 ca_dn
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_ca_names
;
2157 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn
))
2158 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2160 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2161 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, x
))
2162 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2164 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2165 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2166 X509
*xtmp
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2167 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, xtmp
)) {
2168 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2173 if (!check_flags
&& !(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
))
2176 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2178 if (!check_flags
|| (rv
& check_flags
) == check_flags
)
2179 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_VALID
;
2183 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2184 rv
|= *pvalid
& (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
);
2186 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
2189 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2193 if (rv
& CERT_PKEY_VALID
) {
2196 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2197 *pvalid
&= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2204 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2205 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL
*s
)
2207 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
);
2208 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
);
2209 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
);
2210 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
);
2211 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
);
2212 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
);
2213 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
);
2214 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
);
2215 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
);
2218 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2219 int SSL_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2221 return tls1_check_chain(s
, x
, pk
, chain
, -1);
2224 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2225 DH
*ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL
*s
)
2227 int dh_secbits
= 80;
2228 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
== 2)
2229 return DH_get_1024_160();
2230 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aPSK
)) {
2231 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->strength_bits
== 256)
2236 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
== NULL
)
2238 dh_secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
->privatekey
);
2241 if (dh_secbits
>= 128) {
2249 if (dh_secbits
>= 192)
2250 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL
);
2252 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL
);
2253 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_pqg(dhp
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
2261 if (dh_secbits
>= 112)
2262 return DH_get_2048_224();
2263 return DH_get_1024_160();
2267 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2270 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
2273 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2274 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2275 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2276 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2278 secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey
);
2281 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2283 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2286 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2288 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2289 int secbits
, nid
, pknid
;
2290 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2291 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x
) & EXFLAG_SS
) != 0)
2293 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &nid
, &pknid
, &secbits
, NULL
))
2295 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2296 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
2299 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2301 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2304 int ssl_security_cert(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int vfy
, int is_ee
)
2307 vfy
= SSL_SECOP_PEER
;
2309 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY
| vfy
))
2310 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2312 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY
| vfy
))
2313 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2315 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD
| vfy
))
2316 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
;
2321 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2322 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2323 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2326 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
, int vfy
)
2328 int rv
, start_idx
, i
;
2330 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
2335 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 1);
2339 for (i
= start_idx
; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
2340 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
2341 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 0);
2349 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2350 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2353 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
2355 int sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2356 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx
);
2358 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2359 if (clu
== NULL
|| !(clu
->amask
& s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
))
2362 return s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[sig_idx
] & CERT_PKEY_VALID
? sig_idx
: -1;
2366 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
2367 * with signature scheme |sig|.
2368 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
2369 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
2370 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
2372 static int has_usable_cert(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, int idx
)
2374 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
2378 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override lu->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
2381 if (!ssl_has_cert(s
, idx
))
2383 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2384 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2385 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
]);
2387 || !X509_get_signature_info(s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].x509
, &mdnid
,
2388 &pknid
, NULL
, NULL
))
2391 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
2392 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
2393 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
2394 * signing certificate.
2396 if (mdnid
== lu
->hash
&& pknid
== lu
->sig
)
2405 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2406 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2408 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
2409 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
2411 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2412 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2413 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2415 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL
*s
, int fatalerrs
)
2417 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
2420 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
= NULL
;
2421 s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
= NULL
;
2423 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2426 int curve
= -1, skip_ec
= 0;
2429 /* Look for a certificate matching shared sigalgs */
2430 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2431 lu
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2434 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2435 if (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
2436 || lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
2437 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
2438 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2440 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
2441 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, NULL
) || !has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, -1))
2443 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
2444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2446 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
);
2448 curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
2449 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec
)
2450 != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
)
2453 if (skip_ec
|| (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
))
2458 } else if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
2459 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2462 pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[lu
->sig_idx
].privatekey
;
2463 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey
), lu
))
2468 if (i
== s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
) {
2471 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2472 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
2476 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2477 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aCERT
))
2479 if (!s
->server
&& !ssl_has_cert(s
, s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
))
2482 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2484 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2485 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2488 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2489 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
2490 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
);
2491 curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
2498 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2501 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2502 lu
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2505 if ((sig_idx
= tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s
, lu
)) == -1)
2508 int cc_idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
2510 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2511 if (cc_idx
!= sig_idx
)
2514 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
2515 if (!has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, sig_idx
))
2517 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
2518 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2519 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
].privatekey
;
2521 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey
), lu
))
2524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2525 if (curve
== -1 || lu
->curve
== curve
)
2529 if (i
== s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
) {
2532 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2533 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2538 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2540 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
2541 size_t sent_sigslen
;
2543 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
2546 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2547 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2551 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2552 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
2553 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
2554 if (lu
->sigalg
== *sent_sigs
2555 && has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, lu
->sig_idx
))
2558 if (i
== sent_sigslen
) {
2561 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
2562 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2563 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
2568 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
2571 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2572 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2578 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2579 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
= &s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
];
2580 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
;
2581 s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
= lu
;
2585 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint8_t mode
)
2587 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2588 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
2589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
,
2590 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
2594 ctx
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
2598 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL
*ssl
, uint8_t mode
)
2600 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2601 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
,
2603 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
2607 ssl
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
2611 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION
*session
)
2613 return session
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
;