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New extension callback features.
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c
1 /* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 #include <openssl/dh.h>
120 #include <openssl/bn.h>
121 #endif
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
123
124 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
125
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
132 #endif
133
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data={
135 tls1_enc,
136 tls1_mac,
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
145 tls1_alert_code,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
147 0,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
150 ssl3_handshake_write
151 };
152
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data={
154 tls1_enc,
155 tls1_mac,
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
164 tls1_alert_code,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
169 ssl3_handshake_write
170 };
171
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data={
173 tls1_enc,
174 tls1_mac,
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
183 tls1_alert_code,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
189 ssl3_handshake_write
190 };
191
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
193 {
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
196 return(60*60*2);
197 }
198
199 int tls1_new(SSL *s)
200 {
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
203 return(1);
204 }
205
206 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
207 {
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
210 {
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
212 }
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
214 ssl3_free(s);
215 }
216
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
218 {
219 ssl3_clear(s);
220 s->version = s->method->version;
221 }
222
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
224
225 typedef struct
226 {
227 int nid; /* Curve NID */
228 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
229 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
230 } tls_curve_info;
231
232 #define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
233 #define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
234
235 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
236 {
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */
265 };
266
267
268 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
269 {
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
273 };
274
275 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
276 {
277 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
280 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
281 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
284 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
285 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
288 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
289 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
291 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
292 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
293 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
294 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
295 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
296 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
297 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
298 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
302 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
303 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
304 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
305 };
306
307 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
308 {
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
311 };
312
313 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
314 {
315 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
316 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
317 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
318 return 0;
319 return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
320 }
321
322 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
323 {
324 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
325 switch (nid)
326 {
327 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
328 return 1;
329 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
330 return 2;
331 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
332 return 3;
333 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
334 return 4;
335 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
336 return 5;
337 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
338 return 6;
339 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
340 return 7;
341 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
342 return 8;
343 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
344 return 9;
345 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
346 return 10;
347 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
348 return 11;
349 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
350 return 12;
351 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
352 return 13;
353 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
354 return 14;
355 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
356 return 15;
357 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
358 return 16;
359 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
360 return 17;
361 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
362 return 18;
363 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
364 return 19;
365 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
366 return 20;
367 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
368 return 21;
369 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
370 return 22;
371 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
372 return 23;
373 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
374 return 24;
375 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
376 return 25;
377 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
378 return 26;
379 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
380 return 27;
381 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
382 return 28;
383 default:
384 return 0;
385 }
386 }
387 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
388 * preferred list
389 */
390 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
391 const unsigned char **pcurves,
392 size_t *pcurveslen)
393 {
394 if (sess)
395 {
396 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
397 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
398 return;
399 }
400 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
401 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
402 {
403 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
404 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
405 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
406 break;
407
408 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
409 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
410 *pcurveslen = 2;
411 break;
412
413 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
414 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
415 *pcurveslen = 2;
416 break;
417 default:
418 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
419 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
420 }
421 if (!*pcurves)
422 {
423 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
424 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
425 }
426 }
427
428 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
429 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
430 {
431 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
432 if (curve[0])
433 return 1;
434 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
435 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
436 return 0;
437 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
438 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
439 }
440
441 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
442 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
443 {
444 const unsigned char *curves;
445 size_t curveslen, i;
446 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
447 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
448 return 0;
449 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
450 if (suiteb_flags)
451 {
452 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
453 if (p[1])
454 return 0;
455 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
456 {
457 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
458 return 0;
459 }
460 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
461 {
462 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
463 return 0;
464 }
465 else /* Should never happen */
466 return 0;
467 }
468 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
469 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
470 {
471 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
472 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
473 }
474 return 0;
475 }
476
477 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
478 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
479 * an EC tmp key.
480 */
481
482 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
483 {
484 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
485 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
486 int k;
487 /* Can't do anything on client side */
488 if (s->server == 0)
489 return -1;
490 if (nmatch == -2)
491 {
492 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
493 {
494 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
495 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
496 * checks.
497 */
498 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
499 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
500 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
501 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
502 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
503 /* Should never happen */
504 return NID_undef;
505 }
506 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
507 nmatch = 0;
508 }
509 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
510 &supp, &supplen);
511 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
512 &pref, &preflen);
513 preflen /= 2;
514 supplen /= 2;
515 k = 0;
516 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
517 {
518 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
519 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
520 {
521 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
522 {
523 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
524 continue;
525 if (nmatch == k)
526 {
527 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
528 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
529 }
530 k++;
531 }
532 }
533 }
534 if (nmatch == -1)
535 return k;
536 return 0;
537 }
538
539 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
540 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
541 {
542 unsigned char *clist, *p;
543 size_t i;
544 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
545 * while curve ids < 32
546 */
547 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
548 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
549 if (!clist)
550 return 0;
551 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
552 {
553 unsigned long idmask;
554 int id;
555 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
556 idmask = 1L << id;
557 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
558 {
559 OPENSSL_free(clist);
560 return 0;
561 }
562 dup_list |= idmask;
563 s2n(id, p);
564 }
565 if (*pext)
566 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
567 *pext = clist;
568 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
569 return 1;
570 }
571
572 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
573
574 typedef struct
575 {
576 size_t nidcnt;
577 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
578 } nid_cb_st;
579
580 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
581 {
582 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
583 size_t i;
584 int nid;
585 char etmp[20];
586 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
587 return 0;
588 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
589 return 0;
590 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
591 etmp[len] = 0;
592 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
593 if (nid == NID_undef)
594 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
595 if (nid == NID_undef)
596 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
597 if (nid == NID_undef)
598 return 0;
599 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
600 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
601 return 0;
602 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
603 return 1;
604 }
605 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
606 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
607 const char *str)
608 {
609 nid_cb_st ncb;
610 ncb.nidcnt = 0;
611 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
612 return 0;
613 if (pext == NULL)
614 return 1;
615 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
616 }
617 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
618 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
619 EC_KEY *ec)
620 {
621 int is_prime, id;
622 const EC_GROUP *grp;
623 const EC_METHOD *meth;
624 if (!ec)
625 return 0;
626 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
627 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
628 if (!grp)
629 return 0;
630 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
631 if (!meth)
632 return 0;
633 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
634 is_prime = 1;
635 else
636 is_prime = 0;
637 /* Determine curve ID */
638 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
639 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
640 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
641 if (id)
642 {
643 curve_id[0] = 0;
644 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
645 }
646 else
647 {
648 curve_id[0] = 0xff;
649 if (is_prime)
650 curve_id[1] = 0x01;
651 else
652 curve_id[1] = 0x02;
653 }
654 if (comp_id)
655 {
656 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
657 return 0;
658 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
659 {
660 if (is_prime)
661 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
662 else
663 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
664 }
665 else
666 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
667 }
668 return 1;
669 }
670 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
671 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
672 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
673 {
674 const unsigned char *p;
675 size_t plen, i;
676 int j;
677 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
678 * is supported (see RFC4492).
679 */
680 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
681 {
682 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
683 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
684 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
685 {
686 if (*comp_id == *p)
687 break;
688 }
689 if (i == plen)
690 return 0;
691 }
692 if (!curve_id)
693 return 1;
694 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
695 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
696 {
697 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
698 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
699 {
700 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
701 break;
702 }
703 if (i == plen)
704 return 0;
705 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
706 if (!s->server)
707 break;
708 }
709 return 1;
710 }
711
712 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
713 size_t *pformatslen)
714 {
715 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
716 * use default */
717 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
718 {
719 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
720 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
721 }
722 else
723 {
724 *pformats = ecformats_default;
725 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
726 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
727 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
728 else
729 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
730 }
731 }
732
733 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
734 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
735 */
736 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
737 {
738 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
739 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
740 int rv;
741 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
742 if (!pkey)
743 return 0;
744 /* If not EC nothing to do */
745 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
746 {
747 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
748 return 1;
749 }
750 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
751 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
752 if (!rv)
753 return 0;
754 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
755 * supported curves extension.
756 */
757 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
758 if (!rv)
759 return 0;
760 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
761 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
762 */
763 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
764 {
765 int check_md;
766 size_t i;
767 CERT *c = s->cert;
768 if (curve_id[0])
769 return 0;
770 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
771 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
772 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
773 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
774 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
775 else
776 return 0; /* Should never happen */
777 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
778 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
779 break;
780 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
781 return 0;
782 if (set_ee_md == 2)
783 {
784 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
785 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
786 else
787 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
788 }
789 }
790 return rv;
791 }
792 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
793 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
794 {
795 unsigned char curve_id[2];
796 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
797 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
798 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
799 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
800 return 1;
801 #endif
802 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
803 * no other curves permitted.
804 */
805 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
806 {
807 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
808 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
809 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
810 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
811 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
812 else
813 return 0;
814 curve_id[0] = 0;
815 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
816 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
817 return 0;
818 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
819 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
820 return 1;
821 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
822 else
823 {
824 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
825 if (!ec)
826 return 0;
827 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
828 return 0;
829 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
830 return 1;
831 return 0;
832 }
833
834 }
835 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
836 {
837 /* Need a shared curve */
838 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
839 return 1;
840 else return 0;
841 }
842 if (!ec)
843 {
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
845 return 1;
846 else
847 return 0;
848 }
849 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
850 return 0;
851 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
852 #if 0
853 return 1;
854 #else
855 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
856 #endif
857 }
858
859 #else
860
861 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
862 {
863 return 1;
864 }
865
866 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
867
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
869
870 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
871 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
872 */
873
874 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
875 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
876 #else
877 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
878 #endif
879
880 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
881 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
882 #else
883 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
884 #endif
885
886 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
887 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
888 #else
889 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
890 #endif
891
892 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
893 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
894 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
895 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
896
897 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
899 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
900 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
901 #endif
902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
903 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
904 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
905 #endif
906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
907 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
908 #endif
909 };
910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
911 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
912 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
913 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
914 };
915 #endif
916 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
917 {
918 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
919 * preferences.
920 */
921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
922 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
923 {
924 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
925 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
926 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
927
928 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
929 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
930 return 2;
931
932 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
933 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
934 return 2;
935 }
936 #endif
937 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
938 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
939 {
940 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
941 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
942 }
943 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
944 {
945 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
946 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
947 }
948 else
949 {
950 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
951 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
952 }
953 }
954 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
955 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
956 */
957 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
958 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
959 {
960 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
961 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
962 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
963 /* Should never happen */
964 if (sigalg == -1)
965 return -1;
966 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
967 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
968 {
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
970 return 0;
971 }
972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
973 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
974 {
975 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
976 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
977 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
978 return 0;
979 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
980 {
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
982 return 0;
983 }
984 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
985 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
986 {
987 if (curve_id[0])
988 return 0;
989 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
990 {
991 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
992 {
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
994 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
995 return 0;
996 }
997 }
998 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
999 {
1000 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1001 {
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1003 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1004 return 0;
1005 }
1006 }
1007 else
1008 return 0;
1009 }
1010 }
1011 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1012 return 0;
1013 #endif
1014
1015 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1016 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1017 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1018 {
1019 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1020 break;
1021 }
1022 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1023 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1024 {
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1026 return 0;
1027 }
1028 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1029 if (*pmd == NULL)
1030 {
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1032 return 0;
1033 }
1034 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1035 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1036 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1037 (void *)sig))
1038 {
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1040 return 0;
1041 }
1042 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1043 * wish.
1044 */
1045 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1046 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1047 return 1;
1048 }
1049
1050 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1051 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1052 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1053 * session and not global settings.
1054 *
1055 */
1056 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1057 {
1058 CERT *c = s->cert;
1059 c->mask_a = 0;
1060 c->mask_k = 0;
1061 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1062 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1063 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1064 else
1065 c->mask_ssl = 0;
1066 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1067 /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1068 * signature algorithms.
1069 */
1070 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1071 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1072 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1073 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1074 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1077 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1078 {
1079 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1080 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1081 }
1082 #endif
1083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1084 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1085 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1086 {
1087 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1088 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1089 }
1090 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1092 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1093 {
1094 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1095 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1096 }
1097 #endif
1098 c->valid = 1;
1099 }
1100
1101 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1102 {
1103 CERT *ct = s->cert;
1104 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1105 return 1;
1106 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1107 }
1108
1109 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1110 {
1111 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1112 return 0;
1113 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1114 }
1115
1116 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1117 {
1118 int extdatalen=0;
1119 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1120 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1122 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1123 int using_ecc = 0;
1124 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1125 {
1126 int i;
1127 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1128 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1129
1130 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1131 {
1132 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1133
1134 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1135 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1136 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1137 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1138 {
1139 using_ecc = 1;
1140 break;
1141 }
1142 }
1143 }
1144 #endif
1145
1146 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1147 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1148 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1149 return orig;
1150
1151 ret+=2;
1152
1153 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1154
1155 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1156 {
1157 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1158 unsigned long size_str;
1159 long lenmax;
1160
1161 /* check for enough space.
1162 4 for the servername type and entension length
1163 2 for servernamelist length
1164 1 for the hostname type
1165 2 for hostname length
1166 + hostname length
1167 */
1168
1169 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1170 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1171 return NULL;
1172
1173 /* extension type and length */
1174 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1175 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1176
1177 /* length of servername list */
1178 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1179
1180 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1181 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1182 s2n(size_str,ret);
1183 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1184 ret+=size_str;
1185 }
1186
1187 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1188 if (s->renegotiate)
1189 {
1190 int el;
1191
1192 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1193 {
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1195 return NULL;
1196 }
1197
1198 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1199
1200 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1201 s2n(el,ret);
1202
1203 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1204 {
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1206 return NULL;
1207 }
1208
1209 ret += el;
1210 }
1211
1212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1213 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1214 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1215 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1216
1217 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1218 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1219 {
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1221 return NULL;
1222 }
1223
1224 /* check for enough space.
1225 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1226 1 for the srp user identity
1227 + srp user identity length
1228 */
1229 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1230
1231 /* fill in the extension */
1232 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1233 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1234 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1235 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1236 ret+=login_len;
1237 }
1238 #endif
1239
1240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1241 if (using_ecc)
1242 {
1243 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1244 long lenmax;
1245 const unsigned char *plist;
1246 size_t plistlen;
1247 size_t i;
1248 unsigned char *etmp;
1249
1250 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1251
1252 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1253 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1254 if (plistlen > 255)
1255 {
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1257 return NULL;
1258 }
1259
1260 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1261 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1262 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1263 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1264 ret+=plistlen;
1265
1266 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1267 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1268 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1269
1270 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1271 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1272 if (plistlen > 65532)
1273 {
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1275 return NULL;
1276 }
1277
1278
1279 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1280 etmp = ret + 4;
1281 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1282 for (i = 0; i < plistlen; i += 2, plist += 2)
1283 {
1284 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, plist, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1285 {
1286 *etmp++ = plist[0];
1287 *etmp++ = plist[1];
1288 }
1289 }
1290
1291 plistlen = etmp - ret - 4;
1292
1293 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1294 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1295 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1296 * resolves this to two bytes.
1297 */
1298 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1299 s2n(plistlen, ret);
1300 ret+=plistlen;
1301 }
1302 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1303
1304 if (tls_use_ticket(s))
1305 {
1306 int ticklen;
1307 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1308 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1309 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1310 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1311 {
1312 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1313 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1314 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1315 return NULL;
1316 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1317 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1318 ticklen);
1319 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1320 }
1321 else
1322 ticklen = 0;
1323 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1324 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1325 goto skip_ext;
1326 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1327 * rest for ticket
1328 */
1329 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1330 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1331 s2n(ticklen,ret);
1332 if (ticklen)
1333 {
1334 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1335 ret += ticklen;
1336 }
1337 }
1338 skip_ext:
1339
1340 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1341 {
1342 size_t salglen;
1343 const unsigned char *salg;
1344 unsigned char *etmp;
1345 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1346 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1347 return NULL;
1348 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1349 etmp = ret;
1350 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1351 ret += 4;
1352 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1353 /* Fill in lengths */
1354 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1355 s2n(salglen, etmp);
1356 ret += salglen;
1357 }
1358
1359 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1360 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1361 {
1362 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1363
1364 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
1365 return NULL;
1366 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1367 return NULL;
1368
1369 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1370 s2n(col + 2, ret);
1371 s2n(col, ret);
1372 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1373 ret += col;
1374 }
1375 #endif
1376
1377 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1378 {
1379 int i;
1380 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1381 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1382
1383 idlen = 0;
1384 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1385 {
1386 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1387 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1388 if (itmp <= 0)
1389 return NULL;
1390 idlen += itmp + 2;
1391 }
1392
1393 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1394 {
1395 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1396 if (extlen < 0)
1397 return NULL;
1398 }
1399 else
1400 extlen = 0;
1401
1402 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1403 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1404 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1405 return NULL;
1406 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1407 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1408 s2n(idlen, ret);
1409 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1410 {
1411 /* save position of id len */
1412 unsigned char *q = ret;
1413 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1414 /* skip over id len */
1415 ret += 2;
1416 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1417 /* write id len */
1418 s2n(itmp, q);
1419 }
1420 s2n(extlen, ret);
1421 if (extlen > 0)
1422 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1423 }
1424
1425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1426 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1427 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1428 return NULL;
1429 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1430 s2n(1,ret);
1431 /* Set mode:
1432 * 1: peer may send requests
1433 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1434 */
1435 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1436 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1437 else
1438 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1439 #endif
1440
1441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1442 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1443 {
1444 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1445 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1446 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1447 return NULL;
1448 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1449 s2n(0,ret);
1450 }
1451 #endif
1452
1453 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1454 {
1455 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1456 return NULL;
1457 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1458 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1459 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1460 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1461 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1462 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1463 }
1464
1465 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1466 {
1467 int el;
1468
1469 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1470
1471 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1472
1473 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1474 s2n(el,ret);
1475
1476 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1477 {
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1479 return NULL;
1480 }
1481 ret += el;
1482 }
1483 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1484 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1485 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1486 return NULL;
1487 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1488 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1489 s2n(0,ret);
1490 #endif
1491
1492 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1493 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1494 *
1495 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1496 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1497 */
1498 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1499 {
1500 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1501 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1502 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1503 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1504 */
1505 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1506 hlen -= 5;
1507 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1508 {
1509 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1510 if (hlen >= 4)
1511 hlen -= 4;
1512 else
1513 hlen = 0;
1514
1515 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1516 s2n(hlen, ret);
1517 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1518 ret += hlen;
1519 }
1520 }
1521
1522 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1523 return orig;
1524
1525 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1526 return ret;
1527 }
1528
1529 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1530 {
1531 int extdatalen=0;
1532 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1533 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1534 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1535 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1536 #endif
1537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1538 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1539 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1540 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1541 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1542 #endif
1543 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1544 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1545 return orig;
1546
1547 ret+=2;
1548 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1549
1550 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1551 {
1552 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1553
1554 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1555 s2n(0,ret);
1556 }
1557
1558 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1559 {
1560 int el;
1561
1562 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1563 {
1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1565 return NULL;
1566 }
1567
1568 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1569
1570 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1571 s2n(el,ret);
1572
1573 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1574 {
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1576 return NULL;
1577 }
1578
1579 ret += el;
1580 }
1581
1582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1583 if (using_ecc)
1584 {
1585 const unsigned char *plist;
1586 size_t plistlen;
1587 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1588 long lenmax;
1589
1590 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1591
1592 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1593 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1594 if (plistlen > 255)
1595 {
1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1597 return NULL;
1598 }
1599
1600 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1601 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1602 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1603 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1604 ret+=plistlen;
1605
1606 }
1607 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1608 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1609
1610 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
1611 {
1612 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1613 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1614 s2n(0,ret);
1615 }
1616
1617 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1618 {
1619 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1620 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1621 s2n(0,ret);
1622 }
1623
1624 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1625 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1626 {
1627 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1628
1629 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1630 return NULL;
1631 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1632 return NULL;
1633
1634 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1635 s2n(sol + 2, ret);
1636 s2n(sol, ret);
1637 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1638 ret += sol;
1639 }
1640 #endif
1641
1642 if(s->srtp_profile)
1643 {
1644 int el;
1645
1646 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1647
1648 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1649
1650 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1651 s2n(el,ret);
1652
1653 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1654 {
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1656 return NULL;
1657 }
1658 ret+=el;
1659 }
1660
1661 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1662 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1663 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1664 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1665 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1666 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1667 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1668 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1669 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1670 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1671 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1672 ret+=36;
1673
1674 }
1675
1676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1677 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1678 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1679 {
1680 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1681 return NULL;
1682 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1683 s2n(1,ret);
1684 /* Set mode:
1685 * 1: peer may send requests
1686 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1687 */
1688 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1689 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1690 else
1691 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1692
1693 }
1694 #endif
1695
1696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1697 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1698 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1699 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1700 {
1701 const unsigned char *npa;
1702 unsigned int npalen;
1703 int r;
1704
1705 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1706 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1707 {
1708 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1709 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1710 s2n(npalen,ret);
1711 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1712 ret += npalen;
1713 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1714 }
1715 }
1716 #endif
1717 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1718 return NULL;
1719 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1720 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1721 {
1722 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
1723 * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
1724 */
1725 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
1726 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1727 else
1728 {
1729 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1730 s2n(0,ret);
1731 }
1732 }
1733 #endif
1734
1735 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1736 {
1737 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1738 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1739
1740 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1741 return NULL;
1742 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1743 s2n(3 + len,ret);
1744 s2n(1 + len,ret);
1745 *ret++ = len;
1746 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1747 ret += len;
1748 }
1749
1750 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1751 return orig;
1752
1753 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1754 return ret;
1755 }
1756
1757 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1758 * ClientHello.
1759 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1760 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1761 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1762 * return.
1763 *
1764 * returns: 0 on success. */
1765 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1766 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1767 {
1768 unsigned i;
1769 unsigned proto_len;
1770 const unsigned char *selected;
1771 unsigned char selected_len;
1772 int r;
1773
1774 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1775 return 0;
1776
1777 if (data_len < 2)
1778 goto parse_error;
1779
1780 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1781 * length-prefixed strings. */
1782 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1783 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1784 data_len -= 2;
1785 data += 2;
1786 if (data_len != i)
1787 goto parse_error;
1788
1789 if (data_len < 2)
1790 goto parse_error;
1791
1792 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1793 {
1794 proto_len = data[i];
1795 i++;
1796
1797 if (proto_len == 0)
1798 goto parse_error;
1799
1800 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1801 goto parse_error;
1802
1803 i += proto_len;
1804 }
1805
1806 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1807 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1808 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1809 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1810 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1811 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1812 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1813 {
1814 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1815 return -1;
1816 }
1817 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1818 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1819 }
1820 return 0;
1821
1822 parse_error:
1823 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1824 return -1;
1825 }
1826
1827 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1828 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1829 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1830 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1831 * SNI,
1832 * elliptic_curves
1833 * ec_point_formats
1834 *
1835 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1836 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1837 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1838 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1839 */
1840 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1841 unsigned short type, size;
1842 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1843 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1844 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1845 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1846 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1847 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1848 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1849
1850 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1851 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1852 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1853 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1854 };
1855
1856 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1857 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1858 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1859 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1860 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1861 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1862 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1863 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1864 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1865 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1866 };
1867
1868 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1869 return;
1870 data += 2;
1871
1872 if (data > (d+n-4))
1873 return;
1874 n2s(data,type);
1875 n2s(data,size);
1876
1877 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1878 return;
1879
1880 if (data+size > d+n)
1881 return;
1882 data += size;
1883
1884 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1885 {
1886 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1887 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1888
1889 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1890 return;
1891 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1892 return;
1893 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1894 return;
1895 }
1896 else
1897 {
1898 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1899
1900 if (data + len != d+n)
1901 return;
1902 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1903 return;
1904 }
1905
1906 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1907 }
1908 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1909
1910
1911 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1912 {
1913 unsigned short type;
1914 unsigned short size;
1915 unsigned short len;
1916 unsigned char *data = *p;
1917 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1918 size_t i;
1919
1920 s->servername_done = 0;
1921 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1923 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1924 #endif
1925
1926 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1927 {
1928 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1929 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1930 }
1931
1932 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1933 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1934 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1935 #endif
1936
1937 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1938 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1939 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1940 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1941
1942 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1943 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1944 {
1945 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1946 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1947 }
1948 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1949 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1950 {
1951 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1952 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1953 }
1954 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1955 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1956 {
1957 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1958 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1959 }
1960
1961 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1962 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1963 #endif
1964
1965 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1966 goto ri_check;
1967 n2s(data,len);
1968
1969 if (data > (d+n-len))
1970 goto ri_check;
1971
1972 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1973 {
1974 n2s(data,type);
1975 n2s(data,size);
1976
1977 if (data+size > (d+n))
1978 goto ri_check;
1979 #if 0
1980 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1981 #endif
1982 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1983 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1984 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1985 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1986
1987 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1988 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1989 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1990 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1991 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1992 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1993 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1994 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1995 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1996 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1997 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1998 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1999 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2000 the value of the Host: field.
2001 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2002 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2003 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2004 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2005
2006 */
2007
2008 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2009 {
2010 unsigned char *sdata;
2011 int servname_type;
2012 int dsize;
2013
2014 if (size < 2)
2015 {
2016 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2017 return 0;
2018 }
2019 n2s(data,dsize);
2020 size -= 2;
2021 if (dsize > size )
2022 {
2023 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2024 return 0;
2025 }
2026
2027 sdata = data;
2028 while (dsize > 3)
2029 {
2030 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2031 n2s(sdata,len);
2032 dsize -= 3;
2033
2034 if (len > dsize)
2035 {
2036 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2037 return 0;
2038 }
2039 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2040 switch (servname_type)
2041 {
2042 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2043 if (!s->hit)
2044 {
2045 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2046 {
2047 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2048 return 0;
2049 }
2050 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2051 {
2052 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2053 return 0;
2054 }
2055 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2056 {
2057 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2058 return 0;
2059 }
2060 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2061 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2062 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2063 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2064 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2065 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2066 return 0;
2067 }
2068 s->servername_done = 1;
2069
2070 }
2071 else
2072 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2073 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2074 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2075
2076 break;
2077
2078 default:
2079 break;
2080 }
2081
2082 dsize -= len;
2083 }
2084 if (dsize != 0)
2085 {
2086 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2087 return 0;
2088 }
2089
2090 }
2091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2092 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2093 {
2094 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2095 {
2096 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2097 return 0;
2098 }
2099 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2100 {
2101 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2102 return 0;
2103 }
2104 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2105 return -1;
2106 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2107 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2108
2109 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2110 {
2111 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2112 return 0;
2113 }
2114 }
2115 #endif
2116
2117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2118 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2119 {
2120 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2121 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2122
2123 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2124 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2125 {
2126 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2127 return 0;
2128 }
2129 if (!s->hit)
2130 {
2131 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2132 {
2133 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2134 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2135 }
2136 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2137 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2138 {
2139 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2140 return 0;
2141 }
2142 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2143 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2144 }
2145 #if 0
2146 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2147 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2148 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2149 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2150 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2151 #endif
2152 }
2153 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2154 {
2155 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2156 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2157 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2158
2159 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2160 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2161 {
2162 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2163 return 0;
2164 }
2165 if (!s->hit)
2166 {
2167 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2168 {
2169 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2170 return 0;
2171 }
2172 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2173 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2174 {
2175 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2176 return 0;
2177 }
2178 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2179 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2180 }
2181 #if 0
2182 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2183 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2184 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2185 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2186 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2187 #endif
2188 }
2189 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2190 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2191 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2192 {
2193 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2194
2195 if (size < 2)
2196 {
2197 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2198 return 0;
2199 }
2200 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2201 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2202 {
2203 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2204 return 0;
2205 }
2206
2207 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2208 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2209 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2210 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2211 else
2212 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2213 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2214 {
2215 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2216 return 0;
2217 }
2218 }
2219 #endif
2220 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2221 {
2222 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2223 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2224 {
2225 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2226 return 0;
2227 }
2228 }
2229 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2230 {
2231 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2232 return 0;
2233 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2234 }
2235 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2236 {
2237 int dsize;
2238 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2239 {
2240 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2241 return 0;
2242 }
2243 n2s(data,dsize);
2244 size -= 2;
2245 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2246 {
2247 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2248 return 0;
2249 }
2250 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2251 {
2252 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2253 return 0;
2254 }
2255 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2256 * error.
2257 */
2258 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2259 {
2260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2261 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2262 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2263 return 0;
2264 }
2265 }
2266 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2267 {
2268
2269 if (size < 5)
2270 {
2271 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2272 return 0;
2273 }
2274
2275 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2276 size--;
2277 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2278 {
2279 const unsigned char *sdata;
2280 int dsize;
2281 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2282 n2s(data,dsize);
2283 size -= 2;
2284 if (dsize > size )
2285 {
2286 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2287 return 0;
2288 }
2289 while (dsize > 0)
2290 {
2291 OCSP_RESPID *id;
2292 int idsize;
2293 if (dsize < 4)
2294 {
2295 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2296 return 0;
2297 }
2298 n2s(data, idsize);
2299 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2300 size -= 2 + idsize;
2301 if (dsize < 0)
2302 {
2303 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2304 return 0;
2305 }
2306 sdata = data;
2307 data += idsize;
2308 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2309 &sdata, idsize);
2310 if (!id)
2311 {
2312 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2313 return 0;
2314 }
2315 if (data != sdata)
2316 {
2317 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2318 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2319 return 0;
2320 }
2321 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2322 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2323 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2324 {
2325 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2326 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2327 return 0;
2328 }
2329 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2330 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2331 {
2332 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2333 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2334 return 0;
2335 }
2336 }
2337
2338 /* Read in request_extensions */
2339 if (size < 2)
2340 {
2341 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2342 return 0;
2343 }
2344 n2s(data,dsize);
2345 size -= 2;
2346 if (dsize != size)
2347 {
2348 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2349 return 0;
2350 }
2351 sdata = data;
2352 if (dsize > 0)
2353 {
2354 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2355 {
2356 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2357 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2358 }
2359
2360 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2361 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2362 &sdata, dsize);
2363 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2364 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2365 {
2366 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2367 return 0;
2368 }
2369 }
2370 }
2371 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2372 * so ignore it.
2373 */
2374 else
2375 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2376 }
2377 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2378 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2379 {
2380 switch(data[0])
2381 {
2382 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2383 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2384 break;
2385 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2386 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2387 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2388 break;
2389 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2390 return 0;
2391 }
2392 }
2393 #endif
2394 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2395 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2396 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2397 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2398 {
2399 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2400 * renegotiation.
2401 *
2402 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2403 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2404 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2405 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2406 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2407 * anything like that, but this might change).
2408
2409 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2410 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2411 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2412 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2413 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2414 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2415 }
2416 #endif
2417
2418 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2419 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2420 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2421 {
2422 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2423 return 0;
2424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2425 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2426 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2427 #endif
2428 }
2429
2430 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2431 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2432 {
2433 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2434 al))
2435 return 0;
2436 }
2437 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2438 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2439 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2440 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2441 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2442 */
2443 else if (!s->hit)
2444 {
2445 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2446 return 0;
2447 }
2448 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2449 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2450 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2451 #endif
2452
2453 data+=size;
2454 }
2455
2456 *p = data;
2457
2458 ri_check:
2459
2460 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2461
2462 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2463 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2464 {
2465 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2467 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2468 return 0;
2469 }
2470 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2471 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2472 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2473
2474 return 1;
2475 }
2476
2477 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2478 {
2479 int al = -1;
2480 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2481 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2482 {
2483 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2484 return 0;
2485 }
2486
2487 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2488 {
2489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2490 return 0;
2491 }
2492 return 1;
2493 }
2494
2495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2496 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2497 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2498 * the length of the block. */
2499 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2500 {
2501 unsigned int off = 0;
2502
2503 while (off < len)
2504 {
2505 if (d[off] == 0)
2506 return 0;
2507 off += d[off];
2508 off++;
2509 }
2510
2511 return off == len;
2512 }
2513 #endif
2514
2515 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2516 {
2517 unsigned short length;
2518 unsigned short type;
2519 unsigned short size;
2520 unsigned char *data = *p;
2521 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2522 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2523
2524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2525 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2526 #endif
2527
2528 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2529 {
2530 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2531 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2532 }
2533
2534 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2535 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2536 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2537 #endif
2538
2539 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2540 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2541 #endif
2542
2543 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2544 goto ri_check;
2545
2546 n2s(data,length);
2547 if (data+length != d+n)
2548 {
2549 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2550 return 0;
2551 }
2552
2553 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2554 {
2555 n2s(data,type);
2556 n2s(data,size);
2557
2558 if (data+size > (d+n))
2559 goto ri_check;
2560
2561 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2562 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2563 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2564
2565 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2566 {
2567 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2568 {
2569 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2570 return 0;
2571 }
2572 tlsext_servername = 1;
2573 }
2574
2575 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2576 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2577 {
2578 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2579 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2580
2581 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2582 {
2583 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2584 return 0;
2585 }
2586 if (!s->hit)
2587 {
2588 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2589 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2590 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2591 {
2592 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2593 return 0;
2594 }
2595 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2596 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2597 }
2598 #if 0
2599 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2600 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2601 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2602 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2603 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2604 #endif
2605 }
2606 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2607
2608 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2609 {
2610 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2611 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2612 {
2613 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2614 return 0;
2615 }
2616 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
2617 {
2618 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2619 return 0;
2620 }
2621 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2622 }
2623 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2624 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2625 {
2626 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2627
2628 if (size < 2)
2629 {
2630 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2631 return 0;
2632 }
2633 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2634 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2635 {
2636 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2637 return 0;
2638 }
2639
2640 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2641 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2642 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2643 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2644 else
2645 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2646
2647 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2648 {
2649 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2650 return 0;
2651 }
2652 }
2653 #endif
2654 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2655 {
2656 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2657 * a status request message.
2658 */
2659 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2660 {
2661 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2662 return 0;
2663 }
2664 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2665 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2666 }
2667 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2668 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2669 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2670 {
2671 unsigned char *selected;
2672 unsigned char selected_len;
2673
2674 /* We must have requested it. */
2675 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2676 {
2677 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2678 return 0;
2679 }
2680 /* The data must be valid */
2681 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2682 {
2683 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2684 return 0;
2685 }
2686 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2687 {
2688 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2689 return 0;
2690 }
2691 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2692 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2693 {
2694 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2695 return 0;
2696 }
2697 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2698 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2699 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2700 }
2701 #endif
2702
2703 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2704 {
2705 unsigned len;
2706
2707 /* We must have requested it. */
2708 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2709 {
2710 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2711 return 0;
2712 }
2713 if (size < 4)
2714 {
2715 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2716 return 0;
2717 }
2718 /* The extension data consists of:
2719 * uint16 list_length
2720 * uint8 proto_length;
2721 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2722 len = data[0];
2723 len <<= 8;
2724 len |= data[1];
2725 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2726 {
2727 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2728 return 0;
2729 }
2730 len = data[2];
2731 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2732 {
2733 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2734 return 0;
2735 }
2736 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2737 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2738 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2739 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2740 {
2741 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2742 return 0;
2743 }
2744 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2745 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2746 }
2747
2748 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2749 {
2750 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2751 return 0;
2752 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2753 }
2754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2755 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2756 {
2757 switch(data[0])
2758 {
2759 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2760 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2761 break;
2762 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2763 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2764 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2765 break;
2766 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2767 return 0;
2768 }
2769 }
2770 #endif
2771 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2772 {
2773 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2774 al))
2775 return 0;
2776 }
2777 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2778 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2779 * callback */
2780 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2781 return 0;
2782 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2783 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2784 {
2785 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2786 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
2787 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2788 }
2789 #endif
2790
2791 data += size;
2792 }
2793
2794 if (data != d+n)
2795 {
2796 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2797 return 0;
2798 }
2799
2800 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2801 {
2802 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2803 {
2804 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2805 {
2806 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2807 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2808 {
2809 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2810 return 0;
2811 }
2812 }
2813 else
2814 {
2815 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2816 return 0;
2817 }
2818 }
2819 }
2820
2821 *p = data;
2822
2823 ri_check:
2824
2825 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2826 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2827 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2828 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2829 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2830 * absence on initial connect only.
2831 */
2832 if (!renegotiate_seen
2833 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2834 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2835 {
2836 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2838 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2839 return 0;
2840 }
2841
2842 return 1;
2843 }
2844
2845
2846 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2847 {
2848
2849 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2850 {
2851 int r = 1;
2852
2853 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2854 {
2855 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2856 if (!r)
2857 return -1;
2858 }
2859
2860 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2861 {
2862 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2863 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2864
2865 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2866 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2867 else
2868 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2869 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2870 {
2871 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2872 return -1;
2873 }
2874 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2875 }
2876
2877 if (r == 2)
2878 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2879 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2880 }
2881 #endif
2882
2883 return 1;
2884 }
2885
2886 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2887 {
2888 return 1;
2889 }
2890
2891 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2892 {
2893 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2894 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2895
2896 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2897 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2898 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2899 */
2900 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2901 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2902 */
2903 #endif
2904
2905 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2906 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2907 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2908 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2909
2910 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2911 {
2912 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2913 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2914 * so this has to happen here in
2915 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2916
2917 int r = 1;
2918
2919 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2920 {
2921 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2922 if (!r)
2923 {
2924 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2925 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2926 goto err;
2927 }
2928 }
2929
2930 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2931 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2932 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2933
2934 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2935 {
2936 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2937 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2938 {
2939 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2940 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2941
2942 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2943 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2944 else
2945 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2946 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2947 {
2948 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2949 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2950 goto err;
2951 }
2952 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2953 }
2954 }
2955
2956 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2957 {
2958 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2959 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2960 * abort the handshake.
2961 */
2962 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2963 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2964 }
2965 }
2966
2967 err:
2968 #endif
2969 switch (ret)
2970 {
2971 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2972 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2973 return -1;
2974
2975 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2976 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2977 return 1;
2978
2979 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2980 s->servername_done=0;
2981 default:
2982 return 1;
2983 }
2984 }
2985
2986 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2987 {
2988 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2989 int al;
2990
2991 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2992 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2993 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2994 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2995 */
2996 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2997 {
2998 int r;
2999 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3000 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3001 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3002 if (certpkey == NULL)
3003 {
3004 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3005 return 1;
3006 }
3007 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3008 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3009 */
3010 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3011 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3012 switch (r)
3013 {
3014 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3015 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3016 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3017 break;
3018 /* status request response should be sent */
3019 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3020 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3021 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3022 else
3023 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3024 break;
3025 /* something bad happened */
3026 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3027 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3028 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3029 goto err;
3030 }
3031 }
3032 else
3033 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3034
3035 err:
3036 switch (ret)
3037 {
3038 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3039 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3040 return -1;
3041
3042 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3043 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3044 return 1;
3045
3046 default:
3047 return 1;
3048 }
3049 }
3050
3051 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3052 {
3053 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3054 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3055
3056 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3057 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3058 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3059 * it must contain uncompressed.
3060 */
3061 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3062 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3063 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3064 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3065 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3066 {
3067 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3068 size_t i;
3069 unsigned char *list;
3070 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3071 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3072 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3073 {
3074 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3075 {
3076 found_uncompressed = 1;
3077 break;
3078 }
3079 }
3080 if (!found_uncompressed)
3081 {
3082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3083 return -1;
3084 }
3085 }
3086 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3087 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3088
3089 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3090 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3091 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3092 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3093
3094 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3095 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3096 {
3097 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3098 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3099
3100 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3101 {
3102 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3103 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3104 }
3105
3106 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3107 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3108 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3109 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3110 {
3111 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3112 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3113 }
3114 }
3115 #endif
3116
3117 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3118 * tell the callback
3119 */
3120 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3121 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3122 {
3123 int r;
3124 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3125 * there is no response.
3126 */
3127 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3128 {
3129 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3130 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3131 }
3132 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3133 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3134 if (r == 0)
3135 {
3136 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3137 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3138 }
3139 if (r < 0)
3140 {
3141 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3142 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3143 }
3144 }
3145
3146 switch (ret)
3147 {
3148 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3149 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3150 return -1;
3151
3152 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3153 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3154 return 1;
3155
3156 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3157 s->servername_done=0;
3158 default:
3159 return 1;
3160 }
3161 }
3162
3163 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3164 {
3165 int al = -1;
3166 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3167 return 1;
3168 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3169 {
3170 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3171 return 0;
3172 }
3173
3174 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3175 {
3176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3177 return 0;
3178 }
3179 return 1;
3180 }
3181
3182 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3183 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3184 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3185 *
3186 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3187 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3188 * extension, if any.
3189 * len: the length of the session ID.
3190 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3191 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3192 * point to the resulting session.
3193 *
3194 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3195 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3196 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3197 *
3198 * Returns:
3199 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3200 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3201 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3202 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3203 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3204 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3205 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3206 *
3207 * Side effects:
3208 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3209 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3210 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3211 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3212 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3213 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3214 */
3215 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3216 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3217 {
3218 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3219 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3220 unsigned short i;
3221
3222 *ret = NULL;
3223 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3224
3225 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3226 * to permit stateful resumption.
3227 */
3228 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
3229 return 0;
3230 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3231 return 0;
3232 if (p >= limit)
3233 return -1;
3234 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3235 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
3236 {
3237 i = *(p++);
3238 p+= i;
3239 if (p >= limit)
3240 return -1;
3241 }
3242 /* Skip past cipher list */
3243 n2s(p, i);
3244 p+= i;
3245 if (p >= limit)
3246 return -1;
3247 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3248 i = *(p++);
3249 p += i;
3250 if (p > limit)
3251 return -1;
3252 /* Now at start of extensions */
3253 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3254 return 0;
3255 n2s(p, i);
3256 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3257 {
3258 unsigned short type, size;
3259 n2s(p, type);
3260 n2s(p, size);
3261 if (p + size > limit)
3262 return 0;
3263 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3264 {
3265 int r;
3266 if (size == 0)
3267 {
3268 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3269 * currently have one. */
3270 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3271 return 1;
3272 }
3273 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3274 {
3275 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3276 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3277 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3278 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3279 * calculate the master secret later. */
3280 return 2;
3281 }
3282 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3283 switch (r)
3284 {
3285 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3286 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3287 return 2;
3288 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3289 return r;
3290 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3291 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3292 return 3;
3293 default: /* fatal error */
3294 return -1;
3295 }
3296 }
3297 p += size;
3298 }
3299 return 0;
3300 }
3301
3302 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3303 *
3304 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3305 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3306 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3307 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3308 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3309 * point to the resulting session.
3310 *
3311 * Returns:
3312 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3313 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3314 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3315 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3316 */
3317 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3318 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3319 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3320 {
3321 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3322 unsigned char *sdec;
3323 const unsigned char *p;
3324 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3325 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3326 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3327 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3328 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3329 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3330 if (eticklen < 48)
3331 return 2;
3332 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3333 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3334 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3335 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3336 {
3337 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3338 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3339 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
3340 if (rv < 0)
3341 return -1;
3342 if (rv == 0)
3343 return 2;
3344 if (rv == 2)
3345 renew_ticket = 1;
3346 }
3347 else
3348 {
3349 /* Check key name matches */
3350 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3351 return 2;
3352 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3353 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3354 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3355 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3356 }
3357 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3358 * integrity checks on ticket.
3359 */
3360 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3361 if (mlen < 0)
3362 {
3363 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3364 return -1;
3365 }
3366 eticklen -= mlen;
3367 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3368 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3369 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3370 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3371 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3372 return 2;
3373 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3374 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3375 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3376 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3377 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3378 if (!sdec)
3379 {
3380 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3381 return -1;
3382 }
3383 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3384 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3385 {
3386 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3387 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3388 return 2;
3389 }
3390 slen += mlen;
3391 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3392 p = sdec;
3393
3394 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3395 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3396 if (sess)
3397 {
3398 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3399 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3400 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3401 * as required by standard.
3402 */
3403 if (sesslen)
3404 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3405 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3406 *psess = sess;
3407 if (renew_ticket)
3408 return 4;
3409 else
3410 return 3;
3411 }
3412 ERR_clear_error();
3413 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3414 * ticket. */
3415 return 2;
3416 }
3417
3418 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3419
3420 typedef struct
3421 {
3422 int nid;
3423 int id;
3424 } tls12_lookup;
3425
3426 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3427 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3428 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3429 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3430 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3431 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3432 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3433 };
3434
3435 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3436 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3437 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3438 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3439 };
3440
3441 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3442 {
3443 size_t i;
3444 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3445 {
3446 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3447 return table[i].id;
3448 }
3449 return -1;
3450 }
3451
3452 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3453 {
3454 size_t i;
3455 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3456 {
3457 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3458 return table[i].nid;
3459 }
3460 return NID_undef;
3461 }
3462
3463 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3464 {
3465 int sig_id, md_id;
3466 if (!md)
3467 return 0;
3468 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3469 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3470 if (md_id == -1)
3471 return 0;
3472 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3473 if (sig_id == -1)
3474 return 0;
3475 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3476 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3477 return 1;
3478 }
3479
3480 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3481 {
3482 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3483 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3484 }
3485
3486 typedef struct
3487 {
3488 int nid;
3489 int secbits;
3490 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
3491 } tls12_hash_info;
3492
3493 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3494 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3495 {NID_md5, 64, 0},
3496 #else
3497 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3498 #endif
3499 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3500 {NID_sha1, 80, 0},
3501 #else
3502 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3503 #endif
3504 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3505 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3506 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3507 #else
3508 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3509 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3510 #endif
3511 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3512 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3513 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3514 #else
3515 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3516 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3517 #endif
3518 };
3519
3520 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3521 {
3522 if (hash_alg == 0)
3523 return NULL;
3524 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3525 return NULL;
3526 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3527 }
3528
3529 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3530 {
3531 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3532 #ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
3533 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3534 return NULL;
3535 #endif
3536 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3537 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3538 return NULL;
3539 return inf->mfunc();
3540 }
3541
3542 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3543 {
3544 switch(sig_alg)
3545 {
3546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3547 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3548 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3549 #endif
3550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3551 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3552 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3553 #endif
3554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3555 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3556 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3557 #endif
3558 }
3559 return -1;
3560 }
3561
3562 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3563 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3564 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3565 {
3566 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3567 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3568 return;
3569 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3570 {
3571 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3572 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3573 if (phash_nid)
3574 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3575 }
3576 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3577 {
3578 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3579 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3580 if (psign_nid)
3581 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3582 }
3583 if (psignhash_nid)
3584 {
3585 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3586 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3587 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3588 else
3589 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3590 }
3591 }
3592 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3593 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3594 {
3595 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3596 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3597 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3598 return 0;
3599 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3600 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3601 return 0;
3602 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3603 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3604 }
3605
3606 /* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
3607 * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
3608 * then RSA is disabled.
3609 */
3610
3611 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3612 {
3613 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3614 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3615 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3616 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
3617 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
3618 * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
3619 * if we have to.
3620 */
3621 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3622 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
3623 {
3624 switch(sigalgs[1])
3625 {
3626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3627 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3628 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3629 have_rsa = 1;
3630 break;
3631 #endif
3632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3633 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3634 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3635 have_dsa = 1;
3636 break;
3637 #endif
3638 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3639 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3640 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3641 have_ecdsa = 1;
3642 break;
3643 #endif
3644 }
3645 }
3646 if (!have_rsa)
3647 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3648 if (!have_dsa)
3649 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3650 if (!have_ecdsa)
3651 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3652 }
3653
3654 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3655 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3656 {
3657 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3658 size_t i;
3659 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
3660 {
3661 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
3662 {
3663 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3664 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3665 }
3666 }
3667 return tmpout - out;
3668 }
3669
3670 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3671 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3672 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3673 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3674 {
3675 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3676 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3677 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3678 {
3679 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3680 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3681 continue;
3682 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3683 {
3684 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3685 {
3686 nmatch++;
3687 if (shsig)
3688 {
3689 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3690 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3691 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3692 &shsig->sign_nid,
3693 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3694 ptmp);
3695 shsig++;
3696 }
3697 break;
3698 }
3699 }
3700 }
3701 return nmatch;
3702 }
3703
3704 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3705 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3706 {
3707 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3708 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3709 size_t nmatch;
3710 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3711 CERT *c = s->cert;
3712 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3713 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3714 {
3715 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3716 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3717 }
3718 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3719 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3720 {
3721 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3722 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3723 }
3724 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3725 {
3726 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3727 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3728 }
3729 else
3730 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3731 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3732 {
3733 pref = conf;
3734 preflen = conflen;
3735 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3736 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3737 }
3738 else
3739 {
3740 allow = conf;
3741 allowlen = conflen;
3742 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3743 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3744 }
3745 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3746 if (!nmatch)
3747 return 1;
3748 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3749 if (!salgs)
3750 return 0;
3751 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3752 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3753 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3754 return 1;
3755 }
3756
3757
3758 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3759
3760 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3761 {
3762 int idx;
3763 size_t i;
3764 const EVP_MD *md;
3765 CERT *c = s->cert;
3766 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3767 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3768 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3769 return 1;
3770 /* Should never happen */
3771 if (!c)
3772 return 0;
3773
3774 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3775 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3776 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3777 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3778 return 0;
3779 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3780 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3781
3782 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3783
3784 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3785 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3786 {
3787 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3788 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3789 */
3790 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3791 if (s->server)
3792 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3793 else
3794 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3795 if (sigs)
3796 {
3797 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3798 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3799 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3800 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3801 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3802 {
3803 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3804 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3805 }
3806 }
3807 }
3808 #endif
3809
3810 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3811 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3812 {
3813 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3814 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3815 {
3816 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3817 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3818 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3819 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3820 {
3821 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3822 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3823 }
3824 }
3825
3826 }
3827 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3828 * use the certificate for signing.
3829 */
3830 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3831 {
3832 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3833 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3834 */
3835 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3836 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3837 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3838 #endif
3839 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3840 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3841 {
3842 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3843 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3844 }
3845 #endif
3846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3847 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3848 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3849 #endif
3850 }
3851 return 1;
3852 }
3853
3854
3855 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3856 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3857 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3858 {
3859 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3860 if (psig == NULL)
3861 return 0;
3862 if (idx >= 0)
3863 {
3864 idx <<= 1;
3865 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3866 return 0;
3867 psig += idx;
3868 if (rhash)
3869 *rhash = psig[0];
3870 if (rsig)
3871 *rsig = psig[1];
3872 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3873 }
3874 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3875 }
3876
3877 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3878 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3879 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3880 {
3881 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3882 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3883 return 0;
3884 shsigalgs += idx;
3885 if (phash)
3886 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3887 if (psign)
3888 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3889 if (psignhash)
3890 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3891 if (rsig)
3892 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3893 if (rhash)
3894 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3895 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3896 }
3897
3898
3899 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3900 int
3901 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3902 {
3903 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3904 unsigned short hbtype;
3905 unsigned int payload;
3906 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3907
3908 if (s->msg_callback)
3909 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3910 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3911 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3912
3913 /* Read type and payload length first */
3914 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3915 return 0; /* silently discard */
3916 hbtype = *p++;
3917 n2s(p, payload);
3918 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3919 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3920 pl = p;
3921
3922 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3923 {
3924 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3925 int r;
3926
3927 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3928 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3929 * payload, plus padding
3930 */
3931 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3932 bp = buffer;
3933
3934 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3935 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3936 s2n(payload, bp);
3937 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3938 bp += payload;
3939 /* Random padding */
3940 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3941
3942 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3943
3944 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3945 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3946 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3947 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3948
3949 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3950
3951 if (r < 0)
3952 return r;
3953 }
3954 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3955 {
3956 unsigned int seq;
3957
3958 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3959 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3960 * sequence number */
3961 n2s(pl, seq);
3962
3963 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3964 {
3965 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
3966 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3967 }
3968 }
3969
3970 return 0;
3971 }
3972
3973 int
3974 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3975 {
3976 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3977 int ret;
3978 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3979 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3980
3981 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3982 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3983 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3984 {
3985 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3986 return -1;
3987 }
3988
3989 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3990 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3991 {
3992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3993 return -1;
3994 }
3995
3996 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3997 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3998 {
3999 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4000 return -1;
4001 }
4002
4003 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4004 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4005 */
4006 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4007
4008 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4009 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4010 * some random stuff.
4011 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4012 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4013 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4014 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4015 * - Padding
4016 */
4017 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4018 p = buf;
4019 /* Message Type */
4020 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4021 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4022 s2n(payload, p);
4023 /* Sequence number */
4024 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4025 /* 16 random bytes */
4026 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4027 p += 16;
4028 /* Random padding */
4029 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4030
4031 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4032 if (ret >= 0)
4033 {
4034 if (s->msg_callback)
4035 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4036 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4037 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4038
4039 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4040 }
4041
4042 OPENSSL_free(buf);
4043
4044 return ret;
4045 }
4046 #endif
4047
4048 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4049
4050 typedef struct
4051 {
4052 size_t sigalgcnt;
4053 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4054 } sig_cb_st;
4055
4056 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4057 {
4058 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4059 size_t i;
4060 char etmp[20], *p;
4061 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4062 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4063 return 0;
4064 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4065 return 0;
4066 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4067 etmp[len] = 0;
4068 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4069 if (!p)
4070 return 0;
4071 *p = 0;
4072 p++;
4073 if (!*p)
4074 return 0;
4075
4076 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4077 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4078 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4079 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4080 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4081 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4082 else return 0;
4083
4084 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4085 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4086 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4087 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4088 return 0;
4089
4090 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4091 {
4092 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4093 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4094 return 0;
4095 }
4096 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4097 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4098 return 1;
4099 }
4100
4101 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4102 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4103 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4104 {
4105 sig_cb_st sig;
4106 sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
4107 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4108 return 0;
4109 if (c == NULL)
4110 return 1;
4111 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4112 }
4113
4114 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4115 {
4116 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4117 int rhash, rsign;
4118 size_t i;
4119 if (salglen & 1)
4120 return 0;
4121 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4122 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4123 return 0;
4124 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4125 {
4126 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4127 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4128 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4129 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4130
4131 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4132 goto err;
4133 *sptr++ = rhash;
4134 *sptr++ = rsign;
4135 }
4136
4137 if (client)
4138 {
4139 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4140 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4141 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4142 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4143 }
4144 else
4145 {
4146 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4147 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4148 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4149 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4150 }
4151
4152 return 1;
4153
4154 err:
4155 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4156 return 0;
4157 }
4158
4159 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4160 {
4161 int sig_nid;
4162 size_t i;
4163 if (default_nid == -1)
4164 return 1;
4165 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4166 if (default_nid)
4167 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4168 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4169 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4170 return 1;
4171 return 0;
4172 }
4173 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4174 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4175 {
4176 X509_NAME *nm;
4177 int i;
4178 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4179 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4180 {
4181 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4182 return 1;
4183 }
4184 return 0;
4185 }
4186
4187 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4188 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4189 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4190 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4191 */
4192
4193 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4194
4195 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4196 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4197 /* Strict mode flags */
4198 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4199 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4200 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4201
4202 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4203 int idx)
4204 {
4205 int i;
4206 int rv = 0;
4207 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4208 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4209 CERT *c = s->cert;
4210 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4211 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4212 if (idx != -1)
4213 {
4214 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4215 if (idx == -2)
4216 {
4217 cpk = c->key;
4218 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4219 }
4220 else
4221 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4222 x = cpk->x509;
4223 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4224 chain = cpk->chain;
4225 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4226 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4227 if (!x || !pk)
4228 goto end;
4229 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4230 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4231 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4232 {
4233 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4234 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4235 return rv;
4236 }
4237 #endif
4238 }
4239 else
4240 {
4241 if (!x || !pk)
4242 goto end;
4243 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4244 if (idx == -1)
4245 goto end;
4246 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4247 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4248 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4249 else
4250 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4251 strict_mode = 1;
4252 }
4253
4254 if (suiteb_flags)
4255 {
4256 int ok;
4257 if (check_flags)
4258 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4259 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4260 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4261 {
4262 if (check_flags)
4263 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4264 else
4265 goto end;
4266 }
4267 }
4268
4269 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4270 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4271 * and strict mode.
4272 */
4273 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4274 {
4275 int default_nid;
4276 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4277 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4278 default_nid = 0;
4279 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4280 else
4281 {
4282 switch(idx)
4283 {
4284 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4285 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4286 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4287 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4288 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4289 break;
4290
4291 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4292 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4293 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4294 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4295 break;
4296
4297 case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
4298 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4299 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4300 break;
4301
4302 default:
4303 default_nid = -1;
4304 break;
4305 }
4306 }
4307 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4308 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4309 * sha1.
4310 */
4311 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4312 {
4313 size_t j;
4314 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4315 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4316 {
4317 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4318 break;
4319 }
4320 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4321 {
4322 if (check_flags)
4323 goto skip_sigs;
4324 else
4325 goto end;
4326 }
4327 }
4328 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4329 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4330 {
4331 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4332 }
4333 else
4334 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4335 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4336 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4337 {
4338 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4339 default_nid))
4340 {
4341 if (check_flags)
4342 {
4343 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4344 break;
4345 }
4346 else
4347 goto end;
4348 }
4349 }
4350 }
4351 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4352 else if(check_flags)
4353 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4354 skip_sigs:
4355 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4356 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4357 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4358 else if (!check_flags)
4359 goto end;
4360 if (!s->server)
4361 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4362 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4363 else if (strict_mode)
4364 {
4365 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4366 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4367 {
4368 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4369 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4370 {
4371 if (check_flags)
4372 {
4373 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4374 break;
4375 }
4376 else
4377 goto end;
4378 }
4379 }
4380 }
4381 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4382 {
4383 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4384 int check_type = 0;
4385 switch (pk->type)
4386 {
4387 case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
4388 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4389 break;
4390 case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
4391 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4392 break;
4393 case EVP_PKEY_EC:
4394 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4395 break;
4396 case EVP_PKEY_DH:
4397 case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
4398 {
4399 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4400 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4401 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4402 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4403 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4404 }
4405 }
4406 if (check_type)
4407 {
4408 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4409 int ctypelen;
4410 if (c->ctypes)
4411 {
4412 ctypes = c->ctypes;
4413 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4414 }
4415 else
4416 {
4417 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4418 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4419 }
4420 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4421 {
4422 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4423 {
4424 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4425 break;
4426 }
4427 }
4428 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4429 goto end;
4430 }
4431 else
4432 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4433
4434
4435 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4436
4437 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4438 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4439
4440 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4441 {
4442 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4443 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4444 }
4445 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4446 {
4447 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4448 {
4449 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4450 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4451 {
4452 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4453 break;
4454 }
4455 }
4456 }
4457 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4458 goto end;
4459 }
4460 else
4461 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4462
4463 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4464 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4465
4466 end:
4467
4468 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4469 {
4470 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4471 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4472 else if (cpk->digest)
4473 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4474 }
4475 else
4476 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4477
4478 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4479 * if the chain is invalid.
4480 */
4481 if (!check_flags)
4482 {
4483 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4484 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4485 else
4486 {
4487 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4488 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4489 return 0;
4490 }
4491 }
4492 return rv;
4493 }
4494
4495 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4496 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4497 {
4498 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4499 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4500 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4501 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4502 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4503 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4504 }
4505 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4506 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4507 {
4508 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4509 }
4510
4511 #endif
4512
4513 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4514 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4515 {
4516 int dh_secbits = 80;
4517 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4518 return DH_get_1024_160();
4519 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4520 {
4521 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4522 dh_secbits = 128;
4523 else
4524 dh_secbits = 80;
4525 }
4526 else
4527 {
4528 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4529 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4530 }
4531
4532 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4533 {
4534 DH *dhp = DH_new();
4535 if (!dhp)
4536 return NULL;
4537 dhp->g = BN_new();
4538 if (dhp->g)
4539 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4540 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4541 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4542 else
4543 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4544 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4545 {
4546 DH_free(dhp);
4547 return NULL;
4548 }
4549 return dhp;
4550 }
4551 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4552 return DH_get_2048_224();
4553 return DH_get_1024_160();
4554 }
4555 #endif
4556
4557 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4558 {
4559 int secbits;
4560 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4561 if (pkey)
4562 {
4563 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4564 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4565 }
4566 else
4567 secbits = -1;
4568 if (s)
4569 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4570 else
4571 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4572 }
4573
4574 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4575 {
4576 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4577 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4578 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4579 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
4580 {
4581 const EVP_MD *md;
4582 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4583 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4584 }
4585 if (s)
4586 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4587 else
4588 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4589 }
4590
4591 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4592 {
4593 if (vfy)
4594 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4595 if (is_ee)
4596 {
4597 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4598 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4599 }
4600 else
4601 {
4602 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4603 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4604 }
4605 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4606 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4607 return 1;
4608 }
4609
4610 /* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
4611 * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
4612 * not sending one to the peer.
4613 * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4614 */
4615
4616 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4617 {
4618 int rv, start_idx, i;
4619 if (x == NULL)
4620 {
4621 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4622 start_idx = 1;
4623 }
4624 else
4625 start_idx = 0;
4626
4627 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4628 if (rv != 1)
4629 return rv;
4630
4631 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
4632 {
4633 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4634 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
4635 if (rv != 1)
4636 return rv;
4637 }
4638 return 1;
4639 }
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