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[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c
1 /* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
119
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
121
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
128 #endif
129
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
131 tls1_enc,
132 tls1_mac,
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
141 tls1_alert_code,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
143 0,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
146 ssl3_handshake_write
147 };
148
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
150 tls1_enc,
151 tls1_mac,
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
160 tls1_alert_code,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
165 ssl3_handshake_write
166 };
167
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
169 tls1_enc,
170 tls1_mac,
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
179 tls1_alert_code,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
185 ssl3_handshake_write
186 };
187
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
189 {
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
192 return(60*60*2);
193 }
194
195 int tls1_new(SSL *s)
196 {
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
199 return(1);
200 }
201
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
203 {
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
206 {
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
208 }
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
210 ssl3_free(s);
211 }
212
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
214 {
215 ssl3_clear(s);
216 s->version = s->method->version;
217 }
218
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
220
221 static int nid_list[] =
222 {
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
248 };
249
250
251 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
252 {
253 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
254 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
255 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
256 };
257
258 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
259 {
260 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
261 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
262 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
263 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
264 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
265 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
266 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
267 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
268 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
269 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
270 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
271 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
272 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
273 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
274 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
275 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
276 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
277 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
278 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
279 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
280 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
281 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
282 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
283 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
284 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
285 };
286
287 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
288 {
289 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
290 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
291 };
292
293 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
294 {
295 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
296 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
297 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
298 return 0;
299 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
300 }
301
302 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
303 {
304 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
305 switch (nid)
306 {
307 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
308 return 1;
309 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
310 return 2;
311 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
312 return 3;
313 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
314 return 4;
315 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
316 return 5;
317 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
318 return 6;
319 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
320 return 7;
321 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
322 return 8;
323 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
324 return 9;
325 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
326 return 10;
327 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
328 return 11;
329 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
330 return 12;
331 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
332 return 13;
333 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
334 return 14;
335 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
336 return 15;
337 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
338 return 16;
339 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
340 return 17;
341 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
342 return 18;
343 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
344 return 19;
345 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
346 return 20;
347 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
348 return 21;
349 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
350 return 22;
351 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
352 return 23;
353 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
354 return 24;
355 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
356 return 25;
357 default:
358 return 0;
359 }
360 }
361 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
362 * preferred list
363 */
364 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
365 const unsigned char **pcurves,
366 size_t *pcurveslen)
367 {
368 if (sess)
369 {
370 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
371 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
372 return;
373 }
374 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
375 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
376 {
377 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
378 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
379 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
380 break;
381
382 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
383 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
384 *pcurveslen = 2;
385 break;
386
387 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
388 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
389 *pcurveslen = 2;
390 break;
391 default:
392 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
393 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
394 }
395 if (!*pcurves)
396 {
397 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
398 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
399 }
400 }
401 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
402 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
403 {
404 const unsigned char *curves;
405 size_t curveslen, i;
406 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
407 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
408 return 0;
409 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
410 if (suiteb_flags)
411 {
412 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
413 if (p[1])
414 return 0;
415 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
416 {
417 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
418 return 0;
419 }
420 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
421 {
422 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
423 return 0;
424 }
425 else /* Should never happen */
426 return 0;
427 }
428 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
429 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
430 {
431 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
432 return 1;
433 }
434 return 0;
435 }
436
437 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
438 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
439 * an EC tmp key.
440 */
441
442 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
443 {
444 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
445 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
446 int k;
447 /* Can't do anything on client side */
448 if (s->server == 0)
449 return -1;
450 if (nmatch == -2)
451 {
452 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
453 {
454 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
455 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
456 * checks.
457 */
458 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
459 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
460 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
461 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
462 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
463 /* Should never happen */
464 return NID_undef;
465 }
466 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
467 nmatch = 0;
468 }
469 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
470 &supp, &supplen);
471 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
472 &pref, &preflen);
473 preflen /= 2;
474 supplen /= 2;
475 k = 0;
476 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
477 {
478 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
479 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
480 {
481 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
482 {
483 if (nmatch == k)
484 {
485 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
486 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
487 }
488 k++;
489 }
490 }
491 }
492 if (nmatch == -1)
493 return k;
494 return 0;
495 }
496
497 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
498 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
499 {
500 unsigned char *clist, *p;
501 size_t i;
502 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
503 * while curve ids < 32
504 */
505 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
506 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
507 if (!clist)
508 return 0;
509 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
510 {
511 unsigned long idmask;
512 int id;
513 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
514 idmask = 1L << id;
515 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
516 {
517 OPENSSL_free(clist);
518 return 0;
519 }
520 dup_list |= idmask;
521 s2n(id, p);
522 }
523 if (*pext)
524 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
525 *pext = clist;
526 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
527 return 1;
528 }
529
530 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
531
532 typedef struct
533 {
534 size_t nidcnt;
535 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
536 } nid_cb_st;
537
538 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
539 {
540 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
541 size_t i;
542 int nid;
543 char etmp[20];
544 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
545 return 0;
546 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
547 return 0;
548 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
549 etmp[len] = 0;
550 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
551 if (nid == NID_undef)
552 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
553 if (nid == NID_undef)
554 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
555 if (nid == NID_undef)
556 return 0;
557 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
558 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
559 return 0;
560 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
561 return 1;
562 }
563 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
564 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
565 const char *str)
566 {
567 nid_cb_st ncb;
568 ncb.nidcnt = 0;
569 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
570 return 0;
571 if (pext == NULL)
572 return 1;
573 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
574 }
575 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
576 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
577 EC_KEY *ec)
578 {
579 int is_prime, id;
580 const EC_GROUP *grp;
581 const EC_POINT *pt;
582 const EC_METHOD *meth;
583 if (!ec)
584 return 0;
585 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
586 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
587 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
588 if (!grp || !pt)
589 return 0;
590 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
591 if (!meth)
592 return 0;
593 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
594 is_prime = 1;
595 else
596 is_prime = 0;
597 /* Determine curve ID */
598 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
599 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
600 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
601 if (id)
602 {
603 curve_id[0] = 0;
604 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
605 }
606 else
607 {
608 curve_id[0] = 0xff;
609 if (is_prime)
610 curve_id[1] = 0x01;
611 else
612 curve_id[1] = 0x02;
613 }
614 if (comp_id)
615 {
616 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
617 {
618 if (is_prime)
619 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
620 else
621 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
622 }
623 else
624 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
625 }
626 return 1;
627 }
628 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
629 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
630 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
631 {
632 const unsigned char *p;
633 size_t plen, i;
634 int j;
635 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
636 * is supported (see RFC4492).
637 */
638 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
639 {
640 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
641 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
642 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
643 {
644 if (*comp_id == *p)
645 break;
646 }
647 if (i == plen)
648 return 0;
649 }
650 if (!curve_id)
651 return 1;
652 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
653 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
654 {
655 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
656 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
657 {
658 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
659 break;
660 }
661 if (i == plen)
662 return 0;
663 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
664 if (!s->server)
665 return 1;
666 }
667 return 1;
668 }
669
670 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
671 size_t *pformatslen)
672 {
673 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
674 * use default */
675 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
676 {
677 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
678 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
679 }
680 else
681 {
682 *pformats = ecformats_default;
683 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
684 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
685 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
686 else
687 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
688 }
689 }
690
691 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
692 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
693 */
694 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
695 {
696 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
697 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
698 int rv;
699 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
700 if (!pkey)
701 return 0;
702 /* If not EC nothing to do */
703 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
704 {
705 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
706 return 1;
707 }
708 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
709 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
710 if (!rv)
711 return 0;
712 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
713 * supported curves extension.
714 */
715 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
716 if (!rv)
717 return 0;
718 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
719 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
720 */
721 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
722 {
723 int check_md;
724 size_t i;
725 CERT *c = s->cert;
726 if (curve_id[0])
727 return 0;
728 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
729 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
730 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
731 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
732 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
733 else
734 return 0; /* Should never happen */
735 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
736 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
737 break;
738 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
739 return 0;
740 if (set_ee_md == 2)
741 {
742 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
743 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
744 else
745 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
746 }
747 }
748 return rv;
749 }
750 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
751 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
752 {
753 unsigned char curve_id[2];
754 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
755 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
756 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
757 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
758 return 1;
759 #endif
760 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
761 * no other curves permitted.
762 */
763 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
764 {
765 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
766 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
767 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
768 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
769 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
770 else
771 return 0;
772 curve_id[0] = 0;
773 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
774 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
775 return 0;
776 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
777 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
778 return 1;
779 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
780 else
781 {
782 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
783 if (!ec)
784 return 0;
785 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
786 return 0;
787 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
788 return 1;
789 return 0;
790 }
791
792 }
793 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
794 {
795 /* Need a shared curve */
796 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
797 return 1;
798 else return 0;
799 }
800 if (!ec)
801 {
802 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
803 return 1;
804 else
805 return 0;
806 }
807 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
808 return 0;
809 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
810 #if 0
811 return 1;
812 #else
813 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
814 #endif
815 }
816
817 #else
818
819 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
820 {
821 return 1;
822 }
823
824 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
825
826 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
827
828 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
829 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
830 */
831
832 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
833 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
834 #else
835 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
836 #endif
837
838 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
839 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
840 #else
841 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
842 #endif
843
844 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
845 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
846 #else
847 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
848 #endif
849
850 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
851 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
852 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
853 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
854
855 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
856 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
857 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
858 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
859 #endif
860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
861 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
862 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
863 #endif
864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
865 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
866 #endif
867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
868 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
869 #endif
870 };
871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
872 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
873 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
874 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
875 };
876 #endif
877 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
878 {
879 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
880 * preferences.
881 */
882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
883 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
884 {
885 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
886 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
887 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
888
889 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
890 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
891 return 2;
892
893 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
894 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
895 return 2;
896 }
897 #endif
898 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
899 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
900 {
901 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
902 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
903 }
904 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
905 {
906 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
907 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
908 }
909 else
910 {
911 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
912 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
913 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
914 if (FIPS_mode())
915 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
916 else
917 #endif
918 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
919 }
920 }
921 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
922 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
923 */
924 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
925 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
926 {
927 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
928 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
929 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
930 /* Should never happen */
931 if (sigalg == -1)
932 return -1;
933 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
934 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
935 {
936 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
937 return 0;
938 }
939 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
940 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
941 {
942 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
943 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
944 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
945 return 0;
946 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
947 {
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
949 return 0;
950 }
951 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
952 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
953 {
954 if (curve_id[0])
955 return 0;
956 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
957 {
958 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
959 {
960 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
961 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
962 return 0;
963 }
964 }
965 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
966 {
967 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
968 {
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
970 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
971 return 0;
972 }
973 }
974 else
975 return 0;
976 }
977 }
978 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
979 return 0;
980 #endif
981
982 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
983 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
984 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
985 {
986 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
987 break;
988 }
989 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
990 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
991 {
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
993 return 0;
994 }
995 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
996 if (*pmd == NULL)
997 {
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
999 return 0;
1000 }
1001 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1002 * wish.
1003 */
1004 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1005 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1006 return 1;
1007 }
1008 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1009 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1010 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1011 * session and not global settings.
1012 *
1013 */
1014 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1015 {
1016 CERT *c = s->cert;
1017 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1018 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1019 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1020 c->mask_a = 0;
1021 c->mask_k = 0;
1022 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1023 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1024 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1025 else
1026 c->mask_ssl = 0;
1027 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1028 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1029 * TLS 1.2.
1030 */
1031 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1032 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1033 {
1034 switch(sigalgs[1])
1035 {
1036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1037 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1038 have_rsa = 1;
1039 break;
1040 #endif
1041 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1042 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1043 have_dsa = 1;
1044 break;
1045 #endif
1046 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1047 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1048 have_ecdsa = 1;
1049 break;
1050 #endif
1051 }
1052 }
1053 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1054 * signature algorithms.
1055 */
1056 if (!have_rsa)
1057 {
1058 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1059 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1060 }
1061 if (!have_dsa)
1062 {
1063 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1064 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1065 }
1066 if (!have_ecdsa)
1067 {
1068 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1069 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1070 }
1071 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1072 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1073 {
1074 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1076 }
1077 #endif
1078 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1079 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1080 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1081 {
1082 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1083 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1084 }
1085 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1086 c->valid = 1;
1087 }
1088
1089 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1090 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1091 {
1092 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1093 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1094
1095 if (a > b)
1096 return 1;
1097 else if (a < b)
1098 return -1;
1099 return 0;
1100 }
1101
1102 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1103 {
1104 int extdatalen=0;
1105 unsigned char *ret = p;
1106 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1107 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1108 int using_ecc = 0;
1109 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1110 {
1111 int i;
1112 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1113 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1114
1115 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1116 {
1117 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1118
1119 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1120 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1121 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1122 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1123 {
1124 using_ecc = 1;
1125 break;
1126 }
1127 }
1128 }
1129 #endif
1130
1131 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1132 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1133 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1134 return p;
1135
1136 ret+=2;
1137
1138 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1139
1140 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1141 {
1142 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1143 unsigned long size_str;
1144 long lenmax;
1145
1146 /* check for enough space.
1147 4 for the servername type and entension length
1148 2 for servernamelist length
1149 1 for the hostname type
1150 2 for hostname length
1151 + hostname length
1152 */
1153
1154 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1155 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1156 return NULL;
1157
1158 /* extension type and length */
1159 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1160 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1161
1162 /* length of servername list */
1163 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1164
1165 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1166 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1167 s2n(size_str,ret);
1168 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1169 ret+=size_str;
1170 }
1171
1172 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1173 if (s->renegotiate)
1174 {
1175 int el;
1176
1177 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1178 {
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1180 return NULL;
1181 }
1182
1183 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1184
1185 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1186 s2n(el,ret);
1187
1188 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1189 {
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1191 return NULL;
1192 }
1193
1194 ret += el;
1195 }
1196
1197 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1198 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1199 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1200 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1201
1202 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1203 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1204 {
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1206 return NULL;
1207 }
1208
1209 /* check for enough space.
1210 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1211 1 for the srp user identity
1212 + srp user identity length
1213 */
1214 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1215
1216 /* fill in the extension */
1217 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1218 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1219 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1220 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1221 ret+=login_len;
1222 }
1223 #endif
1224
1225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1226 if (using_ecc)
1227 {
1228 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1229 long lenmax;
1230 const unsigned char *plist;
1231 size_t plistlen;
1232
1233 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1234
1235 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1236 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1237 if (plistlen > 255)
1238 {
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1240 return NULL;
1241 }
1242
1243 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1244 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1245 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1246 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1247 ret+=plistlen;
1248
1249 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1250 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1251 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1252
1253 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1254 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1255 if (plistlen > 65532)
1256 {
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1258 return NULL;
1259 }
1260
1261 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1262 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1263
1264 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1265 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1266 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1267 * resolves this to two bytes.
1268 */
1269 s2n(plistlen, ret);
1270 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1271 ret+=plistlen;
1272 }
1273 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1274
1275 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1276 {
1277 int ticklen;
1278 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1279 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1280 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1281 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1282 {
1283 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1284 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1285 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1286 return NULL;
1287 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1288 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1289 ticklen);
1290 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1291 }
1292 else
1293 ticklen = 0;
1294 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1295 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1296 goto skip_ext;
1297 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1298 * rest for ticket
1299 */
1300 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1301 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1302 s2n(ticklen,ret);
1303 if (ticklen)
1304 {
1305 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1306 ret += ticklen;
1307 }
1308 }
1309 skip_ext:
1310
1311 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1312 {
1313 size_t salglen;
1314 const unsigned char *salg;
1315 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1316 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1317 return NULL;
1318 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1319 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1320 s2n(salglen, ret);
1321 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1322 ret += salglen;
1323 }
1324
1325 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1326 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1327 {
1328 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1329
1330 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1331 return NULL;
1332 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1333 return NULL;
1334
1335 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1336 s2n(col + 2, ret);
1337 s2n(col, ret);
1338 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1339 ret += col;
1340 }
1341 #endif
1342
1343 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1344 {
1345 int i;
1346 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1347 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1348
1349 idlen = 0;
1350 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1351 {
1352 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1353 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1354 if (itmp <= 0)
1355 return NULL;
1356 idlen += itmp + 2;
1357 }
1358
1359 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1360 {
1361 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1362 if (extlen < 0)
1363 return NULL;
1364 }
1365 else
1366 extlen = 0;
1367
1368 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1369 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1370 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1371 return NULL;
1372 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1373 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1374 s2n(idlen, ret);
1375 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1376 {
1377 /* save position of id len */
1378 unsigned char *q = ret;
1379 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1380 /* skip over id len */
1381 ret += 2;
1382 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1383 /* write id len */
1384 s2n(itmp, q);
1385 }
1386 s2n(extlen, ret);
1387 if (extlen > 0)
1388 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1389 }
1390
1391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1392 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1393 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1394 s2n(1,ret);
1395 /* Set mode:
1396 * 1: peer may send requests
1397 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1398 */
1399 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1400 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1401 else
1402 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1403 #endif
1404
1405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1406 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1407 {
1408 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1409 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1410 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1411 return NULL;
1412 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1413 s2n(0,ret);
1414 }
1415 #endif
1416
1417 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1418 {
1419 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1420 return NULL;
1421 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1422 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1423 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1424 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1425 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1426 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1427 }
1428
1429 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1430 {
1431 int el;
1432
1433 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1434
1435 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1436
1437 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1438 s2n(el,ret);
1439
1440 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1441 {
1442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1443 return NULL;
1444 }
1445 ret += el;
1446 }
1447
1448 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1449 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1450 {
1451 size_t i;
1452 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1453
1454 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1455 {
1456 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1457 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1458
1459 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1460 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1461 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1462 if (record->fn1)
1463 {
1464 int cb_retval = 0;
1465 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1466 &out, &outlen,
1467 record->arg);
1468 if (cb_retval == 0)
1469 return NULL; /* error */
1470 if (cb_retval == -1)
1471 continue; /* skip this extension */
1472 }
1473 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1474 return NULL;
1475 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1476 s2n(outlen, ret);
1477 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1478 ret += outlen;
1479 }
1480 }
1481
1482 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1483 return p;
1484
1485 s2n(extdatalen,p);
1486 return ret;
1487 }
1488
1489 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1490 {
1491 int extdatalen=0;
1492 unsigned char *ret = p;
1493 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1494 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1495 #endif
1496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1497 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1498 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1499 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1500 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1501 #endif
1502 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1503 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1504 return p;
1505
1506 ret+=2;
1507 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1508
1509 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1510 {
1511 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1512
1513 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1514 s2n(0,ret);
1515 }
1516
1517 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1518 {
1519 int el;
1520
1521 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1522 {
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1524 return NULL;
1525 }
1526
1527 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1528
1529 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1530 s2n(el,ret);
1531
1532 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1533 {
1534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1535 return NULL;
1536 }
1537
1538 ret += el;
1539 }
1540
1541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1542 if (using_ecc)
1543 {
1544 const unsigned char *plist;
1545 size_t plistlen;
1546 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1547 long lenmax;
1548
1549 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1550
1551 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1552 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1553 if (plistlen > 255)
1554 {
1555 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1556 return NULL;
1557 }
1558
1559 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1560 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1561 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1562 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1563 ret+=plistlen;
1564
1565 }
1566 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1567 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1568
1569 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1570 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1571 {
1572 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1573 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1574 s2n(0,ret);
1575 }
1576
1577 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1578 {
1579 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1580 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1581 s2n(0,ret);
1582 }
1583
1584 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1585 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1586 {
1587 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1588
1589 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1590 return NULL;
1591 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1592 return NULL;
1593
1594 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1595 s2n(sol + 2, ret);
1596 s2n(sol, ret);
1597 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1598 ret += sol;
1599 }
1600 #endif
1601
1602 if(s->srtp_profile)
1603 {
1604 int el;
1605
1606 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1607
1608 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1609
1610 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1611 s2n(el,ret);
1612
1613 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1614 {
1615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1616 return NULL;
1617 }
1618 ret+=el;
1619 }
1620
1621 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1622 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1623 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1624 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1625 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1626 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1627 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1628 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1629 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1630 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1631 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1632 ret+=36;
1633
1634 }
1635
1636 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1637 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1638 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1639 {
1640 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1641 s2n(1,ret);
1642 /* Set mode:
1643 * 1: peer may send requests
1644 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1645 */
1646 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1647 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1648 else
1649 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1650
1651 }
1652 #endif
1653
1654 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1655 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1656 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1657 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1658 {
1659 const unsigned char *npa;
1660 unsigned int npalen;
1661 int r;
1662
1663 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1664 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1665 {
1666 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1667 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1668 s2n(npalen,ret);
1669 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1670 ret += npalen;
1671 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1672 }
1673 }
1674 #endif
1675
1676 /* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
1677 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
1678 {
1679 size_t i;
1680
1681 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
1682 {
1683 size_t j;
1684 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1685
1686 for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
1687 {
1688 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
1689 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
1690 {
1691 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1692 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1693 int cb_retval = 0;
1694
1695 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1696 if (!record->fn2)
1697 break;
1698 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1699 &out, &outlen,
1700 record->arg);
1701 if (cb_retval == 0)
1702 return NULL; /* error */
1703 if (cb_retval == -1)
1704 break; /* skip this extension */
1705 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1706 return NULL;
1707 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1708 s2n(outlen, ret);
1709 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1710 ret += outlen;
1711 break;
1712 }
1713 }
1714 }
1715 }
1716
1717 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1718 {
1719 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1720 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1721
1722 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1723 return NULL;
1724 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1725 s2n(3 + len,ret);
1726 s2n(1 + len,ret);
1727 *ret++ = len;
1728 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1729 ret += len;
1730 }
1731
1732 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1733 return p;
1734
1735 s2n(extdatalen,p);
1736 return ret;
1737 }
1738
1739 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1740 * ClientHello.
1741 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1742 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1743 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1744 * return.
1745 *
1746 * returns: 0 on success. */
1747 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1748 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1749 {
1750 unsigned i;
1751 unsigned proto_len;
1752 const unsigned char *selected;
1753 unsigned char selected_len;
1754 int r;
1755
1756 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1757 return 0;
1758
1759 if (data_len < 2)
1760 goto parse_error;
1761
1762 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1763 * length-prefixed strings. */
1764 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1765 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1766 data_len -= 2;
1767 data += 2;
1768 if (data_len != i)
1769 goto parse_error;
1770
1771 if (data_len < 2)
1772 goto parse_error;
1773
1774 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1775 {
1776 proto_len = data[i];
1777 i++;
1778
1779 if (proto_len == 0)
1780 goto parse_error;
1781
1782 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1783 goto parse_error;
1784
1785 i += proto_len;
1786 }
1787
1788 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1789 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1790 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1791 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1792 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1793 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1794 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1795 {
1796 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1797 return -1;
1798 }
1799 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1800 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1801 }
1802 return 0;
1803
1804 parse_error:
1805 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1806 return -1;
1807 }
1808
1809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1810 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1811 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1812 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1813 * SNI,
1814 * elliptic_curves
1815 * ec_point_formats
1816 *
1817 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1818 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1819 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1820 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1821 */
1822 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1823 unsigned short type, size;
1824 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1825 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1826 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1827 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1828 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1829 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1830 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1831
1832 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1833 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1834 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1835 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1836 };
1837
1838 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1839 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1840 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1841 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1842 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1843 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1844 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1845 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1846 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1847 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1848 };
1849
1850 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1851 return;
1852 data += 2;
1853
1854 if (data > (d+n-4))
1855 return;
1856 n2s(data,type);
1857 n2s(data,size);
1858
1859 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1860 return;
1861
1862 if (data+size > d+n)
1863 return;
1864 data += size;
1865
1866 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1867 {
1868 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1869 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1870
1871 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1872 return;
1873 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1874 return;
1875 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1876 return;
1877 }
1878 else
1879 {
1880 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1881
1882 if (data + len != d+n)
1883 return;
1884 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1885 return;
1886 }
1887
1888 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1889 }
1890 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1891
1892 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1893 {
1894 unsigned short type;
1895 unsigned short size;
1896 unsigned short len;
1897 unsigned char *data = *p;
1898 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1899 size_t i;
1900
1901 s->servername_done = 0;
1902 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1904 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1905 #endif
1906
1907 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1908 {
1909 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1910 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1911 }
1912
1913 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1914 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1915 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1916 {
1917 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_custom_types);
1918 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1919 }
1920
1921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1922 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1923 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1924 #endif
1925
1926 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1927 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1928 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1929 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1930
1931 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1932 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1933 {
1934 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1935 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1936 }
1937 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1938 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1939 {
1940 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1941 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1942 }
1943 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1944 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1945 {
1946 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1947 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1948 }
1949
1950 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1951 goto ri_check;
1952 n2s(data,len);
1953
1954 if (data > (d+n-len))
1955 goto ri_check;
1956
1957 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1958 {
1959 n2s(data,type);
1960 n2s(data,size);
1961
1962 if (data+size > (d+n))
1963 goto ri_check;
1964 #if 0
1965 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1966 #endif
1967 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1968 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1969 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1970 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1971
1972 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1973 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1974 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1975 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1976 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1977 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1978 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1979 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1980 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1981 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1982 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1983 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1984 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1985 the value of the Host: field.
1986 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1987 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1988 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1989 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1990
1991 */
1992
1993 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1994 {
1995 unsigned char *sdata;
1996 int servname_type;
1997 int dsize;
1998
1999 if (size < 2)
2000 {
2001 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2002 return 0;
2003 }
2004 n2s(data,dsize);
2005 size -= 2;
2006 if (dsize > size )
2007 {
2008 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2009 return 0;
2010 }
2011
2012 sdata = data;
2013 while (dsize > 3)
2014 {
2015 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2016 n2s(sdata,len);
2017 dsize -= 3;
2018
2019 if (len > dsize)
2020 {
2021 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2022 return 0;
2023 }
2024 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2025 switch (servname_type)
2026 {
2027 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2028 if (!s->hit)
2029 {
2030 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2031 {
2032 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2033 return 0;
2034 }
2035 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2036 {
2037 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2038 return 0;
2039 }
2040 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2041 {
2042 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2043 return 0;
2044 }
2045 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2046 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2047 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2048 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2049 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2050 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2051 return 0;
2052 }
2053 s->servername_done = 1;
2054
2055 }
2056 else
2057 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2058 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2059 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2060
2061 break;
2062
2063 default:
2064 break;
2065 }
2066
2067 dsize -= len;
2068 }
2069 if (dsize != 0)
2070 {
2071 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2072 return 0;
2073 }
2074
2075 }
2076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2077 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2078 {
2079 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2080 {
2081 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2082 return 0;
2083 }
2084 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2085 {
2086 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2087 return 0;
2088 }
2089 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2090 return -1;
2091 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2092 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2093
2094 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2095 {
2096 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2097 return 0;
2098 }
2099 }
2100 #endif
2101
2102 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2103 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2104 {
2105 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2106 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2107
2108 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2109 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2110 {
2111 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2112 return 0;
2113 }
2114 if (!s->hit)
2115 {
2116 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2117 {
2118 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2119 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2120 }
2121 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2122 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2123 {
2124 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2125 return 0;
2126 }
2127 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2128 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2129 }
2130 #if 0
2131 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2132 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2133 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2134 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2135 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2136 #endif
2137 }
2138 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2139 {
2140 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2141 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2142 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2143
2144 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2145 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2146 {
2147 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2148 return 0;
2149 }
2150 if (!s->hit)
2151 {
2152 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2153 {
2154 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2155 return 0;
2156 }
2157 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2158 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2159 {
2160 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2161 return 0;
2162 }
2163 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2164 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2165 }
2166 #if 0
2167 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2168 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2169 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2170 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2171 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2172 #endif
2173 }
2174 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2175 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2176 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2177 {
2178 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2179
2180 if (size < 2)
2181 {
2182 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2183 return 0;
2184 }
2185 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2186 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2187 {
2188 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2189 return 0;
2190 }
2191
2192 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2193 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2194 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2195 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2196 else
2197 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2198 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2199 {
2200 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2201 return 0;
2202 }
2203 }
2204 #endif
2205 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2206 {
2207 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2208 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2209 {
2210 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2211 return 0;
2212 }
2213 }
2214 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2215 {
2216 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2217 return 0;
2218 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2219 }
2220 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2221 {
2222 int dsize;
2223 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2224 {
2225 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2226 return 0;
2227 }
2228 n2s(data,dsize);
2229 size -= 2;
2230 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2231 {
2232 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2233 return 0;
2234 }
2235 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2236 {
2237 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2238 return 0;
2239 }
2240 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2241 * error.
2242 */
2243 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2244 {
2245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2246 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2247 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2248 return 0;
2249 }
2250 }
2251 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
2252 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2253 {
2254
2255 if (size < 5)
2256 {
2257 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2258 return 0;
2259 }
2260
2261 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2262 size--;
2263 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2264 {
2265 const unsigned char *sdata;
2266 int dsize;
2267 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2268 n2s(data,dsize);
2269 size -= 2;
2270 if (dsize > size )
2271 {
2272 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2273 return 0;
2274 }
2275 while (dsize > 0)
2276 {
2277 OCSP_RESPID *id;
2278 int idsize;
2279 if (dsize < 4)
2280 {
2281 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2282 return 0;
2283 }
2284 n2s(data, idsize);
2285 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2286 size -= 2 + idsize;
2287 if (dsize < 0)
2288 {
2289 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2290 return 0;
2291 }
2292 sdata = data;
2293 data += idsize;
2294 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2295 &sdata, idsize);
2296 if (!id)
2297 {
2298 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2299 return 0;
2300 }
2301 if (data != sdata)
2302 {
2303 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2304 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2305 return 0;
2306 }
2307 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2308 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2309 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2310 {
2311 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2312 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2313 return 0;
2314 }
2315 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2316 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2317 {
2318 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2319 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2320 return 0;
2321 }
2322 }
2323
2324 /* Read in request_extensions */
2325 if (size < 2)
2326 {
2327 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2328 return 0;
2329 }
2330 n2s(data,dsize);
2331 size -= 2;
2332 if (dsize != size)
2333 {
2334 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2335 return 0;
2336 }
2337 sdata = data;
2338 if (dsize > 0)
2339 {
2340 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2341 {
2342 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2343 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2344 }
2345
2346 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2347 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2348 &sdata, dsize);
2349 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2350 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2351 {
2352 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2353 return 0;
2354 }
2355 }
2356 }
2357 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2358 * so ignore it.
2359 */
2360 else
2361 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2362 }
2363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2364 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2365 {
2366 switch(data[0])
2367 {
2368 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2369 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2370 break;
2371 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2372 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2373 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2374 break;
2375 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2376 return 0;
2377 }
2378 }
2379 #endif
2380 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2381 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2382 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2383 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2384 {
2385 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2386 * renegotiation.
2387 *
2388 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2389 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2390 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2391 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2392 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2393 * anything like that, but this might change).
2394
2395 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2396 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2397 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2398 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2399 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2400 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2401 }
2402 #endif
2403
2404 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2405 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2406 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2407 {
2408 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2409 return 0;
2410 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2411 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2412 }
2413
2414 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2415 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2416 {
2417 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2418 al))
2419 return 0;
2420 }
2421 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2422 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2423 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2424 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2425 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2426 */
2427 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2428 {
2429 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2430
2431 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2432 {
2433 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2434 if (type == record->ext_type)
2435 {
2436 size_t j;
2437
2438 /* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
2439 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
2440 {
2441 if (type == s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j])
2442 {
2443 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2444 return 0;
2445 }
2446 }
2447
2448 /* NULL callback still notes the extension */
2449 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2450 return 0;
2451
2452 /* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
2453 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
2454 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
2455 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
2456 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count * 2);
2457 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
2458 {
2459 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
2460 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2461 return 0;
2462 }
2463 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
2464 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count - 1] = type;
2465 }
2466 }
2467 }
2468
2469 data+=size;
2470 }
2471
2472 *p = data;
2473
2474 ri_check:
2475
2476 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2477
2478 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2479 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2480 {
2481 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2483 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2484 return 0;
2485 }
2486 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2487 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2488 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2489
2490 return 1;
2491 }
2492
2493 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2494 {
2495 int al = -1;
2496 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2497 {
2498 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2499 return 0;
2500 }
2501
2502 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2503 {
2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2505 return 0;
2506 }
2507 return 1;
2508 }
2509
2510 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2511 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2512 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2513 * the length of the block. */
2514 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2515 {
2516 unsigned int off = 0;
2517
2518 while (off < len)
2519 {
2520 if (d[off] == 0)
2521 return 0;
2522 off += d[off];
2523 off++;
2524 }
2525
2526 return off == len;
2527 }
2528 #endif
2529
2530 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2531 {
2532 unsigned short length;
2533 unsigned short type;
2534 unsigned short size;
2535 unsigned char *data = *p;
2536 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2537 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2538
2539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2540 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2541 #endif
2542
2543 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2544 {
2545 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2546 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2547 }
2548
2549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2550 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2551 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2552 #endif
2553
2554 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2555 goto ri_check;
2556
2557 n2s(data,length);
2558 if (data+length != d+n)
2559 {
2560 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2561 return 0;
2562 }
2563
2564 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2565 {
2566 n2s(data,type);
2567 n2s(data,size);
2568
2569 if (data+size > (d+n))
2570 goto ri_check;
2571
2572 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2573 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2574 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2575
2576 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2577 {
2578 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2579 {
2580 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2581 return 0;
2582 }
2583 tlsext_servername = 1;
2584 }
2585
2586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2587 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2588 {
2589 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2590 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2591
2592 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2593 {
2594 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2595 return 0;
2596 }
2597 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2598 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2599 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2600 {
2601 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2602 return 0;
2603 }
2604 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2605 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2606 #if 0
2607 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2608 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2609 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2610 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2611 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2612 #endif
2613 }
2614 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2615
2616 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2617 {
2618 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2619 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2620 {
2621 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2622 return 0;
2623 }
2624 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2625 || (size > 0))
2626 {
2627 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2628 return 0;
2629 }
2630 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2631 }
2632 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2633 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2634 {
2635 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2636
2637 if (size < 2)
2638 {
2639 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2640 return 0;
2641 }
2642 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2643 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2644 {
2645 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2646 return 0;
2647 }
2648
2649 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2650 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2651 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2652 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2653 else
2654 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2655
2656 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2657 {
2658 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2659 return 0;
2660 }
2661 }
2662 #endif
2663 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2664 {
2665 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2666 * a status request message.
2667 */
2668 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2669 {
2670 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2671 return 0;
2672 }
2673 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2674 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2675 }
2676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2677 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2678 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2679 {
2680 unsigned char *selected;
2681 unsigned char selected_len;
2682
2683 /* We must have requested it. */
2684 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2685 {
2686 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2687 return 0;
2688 }
2689 /* The data must be valid */
2690 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2691 {
2692 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2693 return 0;
2694 }
2695 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2696 {
2697 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2698 return 0;
2699 }
2700 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2701 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2702 {
2703 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2704 return 0;
2705 }
2706 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2707 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2708 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2709 }
2710 #endif
2711
2712 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2713 {
2714 unsigned len;
2715
2716 /* We must have requested it. */
2717 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2718 {
2719 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2720 return 0;
2721 }
2722 if (size < 4)
2723 {
2724 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2725 return 0;
2726 }
2727 /* The extension data consists of:
2728 * uint16 list_length
2729 * uint8 proto_length;
2730 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2731 len = data[0];
2732 len <<= 8;
2733 len |= data[1];
2734 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2735 {
2736 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2737 return 0;
2738 }
2739 len = data[2];
2740 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2741 {
2742 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2743 return 0;
2744 }
2745 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2746 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2747 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2748 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2749 {
2750 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2751 return 0;
2752 }
2753 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2754 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2755 }
2756
2757 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2758 {
2759 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2760 return 0;
2761 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2762 }
2763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2764 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2765 {
2766 switch(data[0])
2767 {
2768 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2769 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2770 break;
2771 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2772 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2773 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2774 break;
2775 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2776 return 0;
2777 }
2778 }
2779 #endif
2780 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2781 {
2782 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2783 al))
2784 return 0;
2785 }
2786 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2787 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2788 * callback */
2789 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2790 {
2791 size_t i;
2792 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2793
2794 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2795 {
2796 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2797 if (record->ext_type == type)
2798 {
2799 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2800 return 0;
2801 break;
2802 }
2803 }
2804 }
2805
2806 data += size;
2807 }
2808
2809 if (data != d+n)
2810 {
2811 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2812 return 0;
2813 }
2814
2815 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2816 {
2817 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2818 {
2819 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2820 {
2821 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2822 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2823 {
2824 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2825 return 0;
2826 }
2827 }
2828 else
2829 {
2830 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2831 return 0;
2832 }
2833 }
2834 }
2835
2836 *p = data;
2837
2838 ri_check:
2839
2840 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2841 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2842 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2843 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2844 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2845 * absence on initial connect only.
2846 */
2847 if (!renegotiate_seen
2848 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2849 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2850 {
2851 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2852 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2853 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2854 return 0;
2855 }
2856
2857 return 1;
2858 }
2859
2860
2861 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2862 {
2863
2864 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2865 {
2866 int r = 1;
2867
2868 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2869 {
2870 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2871 if (!r)
2872 return -1;
2873 }
2874
2875 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2876 {
2877 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2878 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2879
2880 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2881 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2882 else
2883 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2884 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2885 {
2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2887 return -1;
2888 }
2889 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2890 }
2891
2892 if (r == 2)
2893 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2894 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2895 }
2896 #endif
2897
2898 return 1;
2899 }
2900
2901 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2902 {
2903 return 1;
2904 }
2905
2906 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2907 {
2908 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2909 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2910
2911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2912 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2913 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2914 */
2915 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2916 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2917 */
2918 #endif
2919
2920 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2921 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2922 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2923 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2924
2925 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2926 {
2927 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2928 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2929 * so this has to happen here in
2930 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2931
2932 int r = 1;
2933
2934 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2935 {
2936 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2937 if (!r)
2938 {
2939 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2940 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2941 goto err;
2942 }
2943 }
2944
2945 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2946 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2947 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2948
2949 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2950 {
2951 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2952 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2953 {
2954 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2955 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2956
2957 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2958 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2959 else
2960 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2961 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2962 {
2963 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2964 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2965 goto err;
2966 }
2967 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2968 }
2969 }
2970
2971 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2972 {
2973 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2974 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2975 * abort the handshake.
2976 */
2977 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2978 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2979 }
2980 }
2981
2982 err:
2983 #endif
2984 switch (ret)
2985 {
2986 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2987 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2988 return -1;
2989
2990 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2991 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2992 return 1;
2993
2994 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2995 s->servername_done=0;
2996 default:
2997 return 1;
2998 }
2999 }
3000
3001 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3002 {
3003 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3004 int al;
3005
3006 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3007 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3008 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3009 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3010 */
3011 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3012 {
3013 int r;
3014 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3015 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3016 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3017 if (certpkey == NULL)
3018 {
3019 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3020 return 1;
3021 }
3022 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3023 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3024 */
3025 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3026 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3027 switch (r)
3028 {
3029 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3030 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3031 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3032 break;
3033 /* status request response should be sent */
3034 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3035 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3036 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3037 else
3038 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3039 break;
3040 /* something bad happened */
3041 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3042 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3043 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3044 goto err;
3045 }
3046 }
3047 else
3048 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3049
3050 err:
3051 switch (ret)
3052 {
3053 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3054 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3055 return -1;
3056
3057 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3058 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3059 return 1;
3060
3061 default:
3062 return 1;
3063 }
3064 }
3065
3066 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3067 {
3068 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3069 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3070
3071 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3072 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3073 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3074 * it must contain uncompressed.
3075 */
3076 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3077 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3078 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3079 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3080 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3081 {
3082 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3083 size_t i;
3084 unsigned char *list;
3085 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3086 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3087 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3088 {
3089 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3090 {
3091 found_uncompressed = 1;
3092 break;
3093 }
3094 }
3095 if (!found_uncompressed)
3096 {
3097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3098 return -1;
3099 }
3100 }
3101 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3102 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3103
3104 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3105 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3106 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3107 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3108
3109 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3110 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3111 {
3112 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3113 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3114
3115 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3116 {
3117 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3118 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3119 }
3120
3121 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3122 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3123 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3124 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3125 {
3126 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3127 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3128 }
3129 }
3130 #endif
3131
3132 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3133 * tell the callback
3134 */
3135 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3136 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3137 {
3138 int r;
3139 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3140 * there is no response.
3141 */
3142 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3143 {
3144 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3145 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3146 }
3147 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3148 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3149 if (r == 0)
3150 {
3151 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3152 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3153 }
3154 if (r < 0)
3155 {
3156 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3157 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3158 }
3159 }
3160
3161 switch (ret)
3162 {
3163 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3164 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3165 return -1;
3166
3167 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3168 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3169 return 1;
3170
3171 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3172 s->servername_done=0;
3173 default:
3174 return 1;
3175 }
3176 }
3177
3178 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3179 {
3180 int al = -1;
3181 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3182 return 1;
3183 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3184 {
3185 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3186 return 0;
3187 }
3188
3189 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3190 {
3191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3192 return 0;
3193 }
3194 return 1;
3195 }
3196
3197 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3198 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3199 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3200 *
3201 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3202 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3203 * extension, if any.
3204 * len: the length of the session ID.
3205 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3206 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3207 * point to the resulting session.
3208 *
3209 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3210 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3211 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3212 *
3213 * Returns:
3214 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3215 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3216 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3217 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3218 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3219 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3220 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3221 *
3222 * Side effects:
3223 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3224 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3225 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3226 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3227 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3228 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3229 */
3230 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3231 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3232 {
3233 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3234 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3235 unsigned short i;
3236
3237 *ret = NULL;
3238 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3239
3240 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3241 * to permit stateful resumption.
3242 */
3243 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3244 return 0;
3245 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3246 return 0;
3247 if (p >= limit)
3248 return -1;
3249 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3250 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
3251 {
3252 i = *(p++);
3253 p+= i;
3254 if (p >= limit)
3255 return -1;
3256 }
3257 /* Skip past cipher list */
3258 n2s(p, i);
3259 p+= i;
3260 if (p >= limit)
3261 return -1;
3262 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3263 i = *(p++);
3264 p += i;
3265 if (p > limit)
3266 return -1;
3267 /* Now at start of extensions */
3268 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3269 return 0;
3270 n2s(p, i);
3271 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3272 {
3273 unsigned short type, size;
3274 n2s(p, type);
3275 n2s(p, size);
3276 if (p + size > limit)
3277 return 0;
3278 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3279 {
3280 int r;
3281 if (size == 0)
3282 {
3283 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3284 * currently have one. */
3285 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3286 return 1;
3287 }
3288 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3289 {
3290 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3291 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3292 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3293 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3294 * calculate the master secret later. */
3295 return 2;
3296 }
3297 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3298 switch (r)
3299 {
3300 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3301 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3302 return 2;
3303 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3304 return r;
3305 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3306 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3307 return 3;
3308 default: /* fatal error */
3309 return -1;
3310 }
3311 }
3312 p += size;
3313 }
3314 return 0;
3315 }
3316
3317 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3318 *
3319 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3320 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3321 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3322 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3323 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3324 * point to the resulting session.
3325 *
3326 * Returns:
3327 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3328 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3329 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3330 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3331 */
3332 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3333 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3334 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3335 {
3336 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3337 unsigned char *sdec;
3338 const unsigned char *p;
3339 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3340 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3341 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3342 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3343 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3344 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3345 if (eticklen < 48)
3346 return 2;
3347 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3348 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3349 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3350 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3351 {
3352 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3353 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3354 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
3355 if (rv < 0)
3356 return -1;
3357 if (rv == 0)
3358 return 2;
3359 if (rv == 2)
3360 renew_ticket = 1;
3361 }
3362 else
3363 {
3364 /* Check key name matches */
3365 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3366 return 2;
3367 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3368 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3369 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3370 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3371 }
3372 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3373 * integrity checks on ticket.
3374 */
3375 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3376 if (mlen < 0)
3377 {
3378 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3379 return -1;
3380 }
3381 eticklen -= mlen;
3382 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3383 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3384 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3385 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3386 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3387 return 2;
3388 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3389 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3390 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3391 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3392 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3393 if (!sdec)
3394 {
3395 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3396 return -1;
3397 }
3398 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3399 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3400 return 2;
3401 slen += mlen;
3402 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3403 p = sdec;
3404
3405 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3406 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3407 if (sess)
3408 {
3409 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3410 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3411 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3412 * as required by standard.
3413 */
3414 if (sesslen)
3415 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3416 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3417 *psess = sess;
3418 if (renew_ticket)
3419 return 4;
3420 else
3421 return 3;
3422 }
3423 ERR_clear_error();
3424 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3425 * ticket. */
3426 return 2;
3427 }
3428
3429 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3430
3431 typedef struct
3432 {
3433 int nid;
3434 int id;
3435 } tls12_lookup;
3436
3437 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3438 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3439 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3440 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3441 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3442 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3443 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3444 };
3445
3446 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3447 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3448 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3449 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3450 };
3451
3452 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3453 {
3454 size_t i;
3455 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3456 {
3457 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3458 return table[i].id;
3459 }
3460 return -1;
3461 }
3462
3463 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3464 {
3465 size_t i;
3466 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3467 {
3468 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3469 return table[i].nid;
3470 }
3471 return NID_undef;
3472 }
3473
3474 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3475 {
3476 int sig_id, md_id;
3477 if (!md)
3478 return 0;
3479 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3480 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3481 if (md_id == -1)
3482 return 0;
3483 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3484 if (sig_id == -1)
3485 return 0;
3486 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3487 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3488 return 1;
3489 }
3490
3491 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3492 {
3493 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3494 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3495 }
3496
3497 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3498 {
3499 switch(hash_alg)
3500 {
3501 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3502 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3503 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
3504 if (FIPS_mode())
3505 return NULL;
3506 #endif
3507 return EVP_md5();
3508 #endif
3509 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3510 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3511 return EVP_sha1();
3512 #endif
3513 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3514 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3515 return EVP_sha224();
3516
3517 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3518 return EVP_sha256();
3519 #endif
3520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3521 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3522 return EVP_sha384();
3523
3524 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3525 return EVP_sha512();
3526 #endif
3527 default:
3528 return NULL;
3529
3530 }
3531 }
3532
3533 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3534 {
3535 switch(sig_alg)
3536 {
3537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3538 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3539 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3540 #endif
3541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3542 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3543 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3544 #endif
3545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3546 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3547 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3548 #endif
3549 }
3550 return -1;
3551 }
3552
3553 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3554 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3555 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3556 {
3557 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3558 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3559 return;
3560 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3561 {
3562 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3563 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3564 if (phash_nid)
3565 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3566 }
3567 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3568 {
3569 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3570 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3571 if (psign_nid)
3572 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3573 }
3574 if (psignhash_nid)
3575 {
3576 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3577 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3578 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3579 else
3580 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3581 }
3582 }
3583 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3584 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3585 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3586 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3587 {
3588 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3589 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3590 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3591 {
3592 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3593 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3594 continue;
3595 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3596 continue;
3597 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3598 {
3599 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3600 {
3601 nmatch++;
3602 if (shsig)
3603 {
3604 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3605 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3606 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3607 &shsig->sign_nid,
3608 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3609 ptmp);
3610 shsig++;
3611 }
3612 break;
3613 }
3614 }
3615 }
3616 return nmatch;
3617 }
3618
3619 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3620 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3621 {
3622 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3623 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3624 size_t nmatch;
3625 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3626 CERT *c = s->cert;
3627 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3628 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3629 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3630 {
3631 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3632 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3633 }
3634 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3635 {
3636 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3637 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3638 }
3639 else
3640 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3641 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3642 {
3643 pref = conf;
3644 preflen = conflen;
3645 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3646 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3647 }
3648 else
3649 {
3650 allow = conf;
3651 allowlen = conflen;
3652 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3653 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3654 }
3655 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3656 if (!nmatch)
3657 return 1;
3658 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3659 if (!salgs)
3660 return 0;
3661 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3662 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3663 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3664 return 1;
3665 }
3666
3667
3668 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3669
3670 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3671 {
3672 int idx;
3673 size_t i;
3674 const EVP_MD *md;
3675 CERT *c = s->cert;
3676 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3677 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3678 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3679 return 1;
3680 /* Should never happen */
3681 if (!c)
3682 return 0;
3683
3684 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3685 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3686 return 0;
3687 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3688 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3689
3690 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3691
3692 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3693 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3694 {
3695 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3696 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3697 */
3698 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3699 if (s->server)
3700 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3701 else
3702 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3703 if (sigs)
3704 {
3705 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3706 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3707 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3708 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3709 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3710 {
3711 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3712 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3713 }
3714 }
3715 }
3716 #endif
3717
3718 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3719 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3720 {
3721 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3722 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3723 {
3724 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3725 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3726 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3727 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3728 {
3729 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3730 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3731 }
3732 }
3733
3734 }
3735 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3736 * use the certificate for signing.
3737 */
3738 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3739 {
3740 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3741 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3742 */
3743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3744 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3745 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3746 #endif
3747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3748 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3749 {
3750 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3751 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3752 }
3753 #endif
3754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3755 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3756 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3757 #endif
3758 }
3759 return 1;
3760 }
3761
3762
3763 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3764 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3765 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3766 {
3767 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3768 if (psig == NULL)
3769 return 0;
3770 if (idx >= 0)
3771 {
3772 idx <<= 1;
3773 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3774 return 0;
3775 psig += idx;
3776 if (rhash)
3777 *rhash = psig[0];
3778 if (rsig)
3779 *rsig = psig[1];
3780 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3781 }
3782 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3783 }
3784
3785 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3786 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3787 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3788 {
3789 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3790 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3791 return 0;
3792 shsigalgs += idx;
3793 if (phash)
3794 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3795 if (psign)
3796 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3797 if (psignhash)
3798 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3799 if (rsig)
3800 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3801 if (rhash)
3802 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3803 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3804 }
3805
3806
3807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3808 int
3809 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3810 {
3811 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3812 unsigned short hbtype;
3813 unsigned int payload;
3814 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3815
3816 /* Read type and payload length first */
3817 hbtype = *p++;
3818 n2s(p, payload);
3819 pl = p;
3820
3821 if (s->msg_callback)
3822 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3823 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3824 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3825
3826 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3827 {
3828 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3829 int r;
3830
3831 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3832 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3833 * payload, plus padding
3834 */
3835 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3836 bp = buffer;
3837
3838 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3839 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3840 s2n(payload, bp);
3841 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3842 bp += payload;
3843 /* Random padding */
3844 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3845
3846 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3847
3848 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3849 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3850 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3851 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3852
3853 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3854
3855 if (r < 0)
3856 return r;
3857 }
3858 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3859 {
3860 unsigned int seq;
3861
3862 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3863 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3864 * sequence number */
3865 n2s(pl, seq);
3866
3867 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3868 {
3869 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
3870 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3871 }
3872 }
3873
3874 return 0;
3875 }
3876
3877 int
3878 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3879 {
3880 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3881 int ret;
3882 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3883 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3884
3885 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3886 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3887 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3888 {
3889 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3890 return -1;
3891 }
3892
3893 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3894 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3895 {
3896 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3897 return -1;
3898 }
3899
3900 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3901 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3902 {
3903 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3904 return -1;
3905 }
3906
3907 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3908 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3909 */
3910 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3911
3912 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3913 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3914 * some random stuff.
3915 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3916 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3917 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3918 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3919 * - Padding
3920 */
3921 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3922 p = buf;
3923 /* Message Type */
3924 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3925 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3926 s2n(payload, p);
3927 /* Sequence number */
3928 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3929 /* 16 random bytes */
3930 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3931 p += 16;
3932 /* Random padding */
3933 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3934
3935 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3936 if (ret >= 0)
3937 {
3938 if (s->msg_callback)
3939 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3940 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3941 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3942
3943 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3944 }
3945
3946 OPENSSL_free(buf);
3947
3948 return ret;
3949 }
3950 #endif
3951
3952 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3953
3954 typedef struct
3955 {
3956 size_t sigalgcnt;
3957 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3958 } sig_cb_st;
3959
3960 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3961 {
3962 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3963 size_t i;
3964 char etmp[20], *p;
3965 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3966 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3967 return 0;
3968 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3969 return 0;
3970 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3971 etmp[len] = 0;
3972 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3973 if (!p)
3974 return 0;
3975 *p = 0;
3976 p++;
3977 if (!*p)
3978 return 0;
3979
3980 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3981 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3982 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3983 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3984 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3985 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3986 else return 0;
3987
3988 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3989 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3990 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3991 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3992 return 0;
3993
3994 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3995 {
3996 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3997 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3998 return 0;
3999 }
4000 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4001 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4002 return 1;
4003 }
4004
4005 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4006 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4007 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4008 {
4009 sig_cb_st sig;
4010 sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
4011 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4012 return 0;
4013 if (c == NULL)
4014 return 1;
4015 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4016 }
4017
4018 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4019 {
4020 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4021 int rhash, rsign;
4022 size_t i;
4023 if (salglen & 1)
4024 return 0;
4025 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4026 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4027 return 0;
4028 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4029 {
4030 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4031 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4032 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4033 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4034
4035 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4036 goto err;
4037 *sptr++ = rhash;
4038 *sptr++ = rsign;
4039 }
4040
4041 if (client)
4042 {
4043 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4044 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4045 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4046 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4047 }
4048 else
4049 {
4050 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4051 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4052 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4053 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4054 }
4055
4056 return 1;
4057
4058 err:
4059 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4060 return 0;
4061 }
4062
4063 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4064 {
4065 int sig_nid;
4066 size_t i;
4067 if (default_nid == -1)
4068 return 1;
4069 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4070 if (default_nid)
4071 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4072 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4073 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4074 return 1;
4075 return 0;
4076 }
4077 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4078 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4079 {
4080 X509_NAME *nm;
4081 int i;
4082 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4083 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4084 {
4085 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4086 return 1;
4087 }
4088 return 0;
4089 }
4090
4091 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4092 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4093 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4094 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4095 */
4096
4097 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4098
4099 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4100 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4101 /* Strict mode flags */
4102 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4103 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4104 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4105
4106 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4107 int idx)
4108 {
4109 int i;
4110 int rv = 0;
4111 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4112 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4113 CERT *c = s->cert;
4114 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4115 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4116 if (idx != -1)
4117 {
4118 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4119 if (idx == -2)
4120 {
4121 cpk = c->key;
4122 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4123 }
4124 else
4125 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4126 x = cpk->x509;
4127 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4128 chain = cpk->chain;
4129 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4130 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4131 if (!x || !pk)
4132 goto end;
4133 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4134 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4135 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4136 {
4137 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4138 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4139 return rv;
4140 }
4141 #endif
4142 }
4143 else
4144 {
4145 if (!x || !pk)
4146 goto end;
4147 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4148 if (idx == -1)
4149 goto end;
4150 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4151 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4152 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4153 else
4154 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4155 strict_mode = 1;
4156 }
4157
4158 if (suiteb_flags)
4159 {
4160 int ok;
4161 if (check_flags)
4162 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4163 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4164 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4165 {
4166 if (check_flags)
4167 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4168 else
4169 goto end;
4170 }
4171 }
4172
4173 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4174 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4175 * and strict mode.
4176 */
4177 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4178 {
4179 int default_nid;
4180 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4181 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4182 default_nid = 0;
4183 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4184 else
4185 {
4186 switch(idx)
4187 {
4188 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4189 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4190 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4191 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4192 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4193 break;
4194
4195 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4196 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4197 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4198 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4199 break;
4200
4201 case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
4202 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4203 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4204 break;
4205
4206 default:
4207 default_nid = -1;
4208 break;
4209 }
4210 }
4211 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4212 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4213 * sha1.
4214 */
4215 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4216 {
4217 size_t j;
4218 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4219 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4220 {
4221 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4222 break;
4223 }
4224 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4225 {
4226 if (check_flags)
4227 goto skip_sigs;
4228 else
4229 goto end;
4230 }
4231 }
4232 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4233 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4234 {
4235 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4236 }
4237 else
4238 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4239 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4240 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4241 {
4242 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4243 default_nid))
4244 {
4245 if (check_flags)
4246 {
4247 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4248 break;
4249 }
4250 else
4251 goto end;
4252 }
4253 }
4254 }
4255 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4256 else if(check_flags)
4257 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4258 skip_sigs:
4259 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4260 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4261 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4262 else if (!check_flags)
4263 goto end;
4264 if (!s->server)
4265 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4266 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4267 else if (strict_mode)
4268 {
4269 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4270 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4271 {
4272 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4273 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4274 {
4275 if (check_flags)
4276 {
4277 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4278 break;
4279 }
4280 else
4281 goto end;
4282 }
4283 }
4284 }
4285 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4286 {
4287 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4288 int check_type = 0;
4289 switch (pk->type)
4290 {
4291 case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
4292 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4293 break;
4294 case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
4295 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4296 break;
4297 case EVP_PKEY_EC:
4298 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4299 break;
4300 case EVP_PKEY_DH:
4301 case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
4302 {
4303 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4304 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4305 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4306 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4307 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4308 }
4309 }
4310 if (check_type)
4311 {
4312 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4313 int ctypelen;
4314 if (c->ctypes)
4315 {
4316 ctypes = c->ctypes;
4317 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4318 }
4319 else
4320 {
4321 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4322 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4323 }
4324 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4325 {
4326 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4327 {
4328 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4329 break;
4330 }
4331 }
4332 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4333 goto end;
4334 }
4335 else
4336 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4337
4338
4339 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4340
4341 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4342 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4343
4344 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4345 {
4346 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4347 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4348 }
4349 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4350 {
4351 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4352 {
4353 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4354 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4355 {
4356 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4357 break;
4358 }
4359 }
4360 }
4361 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4362 goto end;
4363 }
4364 else
4365 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4366
4367 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4368 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4369
4370 end:
4371
4372 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4373 {
4374 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4375 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4376 else if (cpk->digest)
4377 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4378 }
4379 else
4380 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4381
4382 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4383 * if the chain is invalid.
4384 */
4385 if (!check_flags)
4386 {
4387 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4388 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4389 else
4390 {
4391 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4392 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4393 return 0;
4394 }
4395 }
4396 return rv;
4397 }
4398
4399 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4400 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4401 {
4402 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4403 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4404 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4405 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4406 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4407 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4408 }
4409 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4410 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4411 {
4412 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4413 }
4414
4415 #endif
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