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Add extra checks for odd-length EC curve lists.
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c
1 /* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 #include <openssl/dh.h>
120 #include <openssl/bn.h>
121 #endif
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
123
124 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
125
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
132 #endif
133
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data={
135 tls1_enc,
136 tls1_mac,
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
145 tls1_alert_code,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
147 0,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
150 ssl3_handshake_write
151 };
152
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data={
154 tls1_enc,
155 tls1_mac,
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
164 tls1_alert_code,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
169 ssl3_handshake_write
170 };
171
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data={
173 tls1_enc,
174 tls1_mac,
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
183 tls1_alert_code,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
189 ssl3_handshake_write
190 };
191
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
193 {
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
196 return(60*60*2);
197 }
198
199 int tls1_new(SSL *s)
200 {
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
203 return(1);
204 }
205
206 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
207 {
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
210 {
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
212 }
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
214 ssl3_free(s);
215 }
216
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
218 {
219 ssl3_clear(s);
220 s->version = s->method->version;
221 }
222
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
224
225 typedef struct
226 {
227 int nid; /* Curve NID */
228 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
229 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
230 } tls_curve_info;
231
232 #define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
233 #define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
234
235 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
236 {
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */
265 };
266
267
268 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
269 {
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
273 };
274
275 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
276 {
277 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
280 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
281 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
284 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
285 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
288 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
289 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
291 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
292 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
293 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
294 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
295 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
296 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
297 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
298 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
302 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
303 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
304 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
305 };
306
307 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
308 {
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
311 };
312
313 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
314 {
315 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
316 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
317 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
318 return 0;
319 return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
320 }
321
322 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
323 {
324 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
325 switch (nid)
326 {
327 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
328 return 1;
329 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
330 return 2;
331 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
332 return 3;
333 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
334 return 4;
335 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
336 return 5;
337 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
338 return 6;
339 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
340 return 7;
341 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
342 return 8;
343 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
344 return 9;
345 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
346 return 10;
347 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
348 return 11;
349 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
350 return 12;
351 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
352 return 13;
353 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
354 return 14;
355 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
356 return 15;
357 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
358 return 16;
359 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
360 return 17;
361 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
362 return 18;
363 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
364 return 19;
365 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
366 return 20;
367 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
368 return 21;
369 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
370 return 22;
371 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
372 return 23;
373 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
374 return 24;
375 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
376 return 25;
377 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
378 return 26;
379 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
380 return 27;
381 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
382 return 28;
383 default:
384 return 0;
385 }
386 }
387 /*
388 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
389 * preferred list.
390 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
391 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
392 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
393 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
394 * lists in the first place.
395 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
396 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
397 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
398 */
399 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
400 const unsigned char **pcurves,
401 size_t *num_curves)
402 {
403 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
404 if (sess)
405 {
406 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
407 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
408 }
409 else
410 {
411 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
412 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
413 {
414 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
415 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
416 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
417 break;
418
419 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
420 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
421 pcurveslen = 2;
422 break;
423
424 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
425 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
426 pcurveslen = 2;
427 break;
428 default:
429 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
430 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
431 }
432 if (!*pcurves)
433 {
434 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
435 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
436 }
437 }
438
439 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
440 if (pcurveslen & 1)
441 {
442 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
443 *num_curves = 0;
444 return 0;
445 }
446 else
447 {
448 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
449 return 1;
450 }
451 }
452
453 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
454 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
455 {
456 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
457 if (curve[0])
458 return 1;
459 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
460 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
461 return 0;
462 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
463 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
464 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
465 return 0;
466 #endif
467 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
468 }
469
470 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
471 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
472 {
473 const unsigned char *curves;
474 size_t num_curves, i;
475 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
476 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
477 return 0;
478 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
479 if (suiteb_flags)
480 {
481 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
482 if (p[1])
483 return 0;
484 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
485 {
486 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
487 return 0;
488 }
489 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
490 {
491 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
492 return 0;
493 }
494 else /* Should never happen */
495 return 0;
496 }
497 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
498 return 0;
499 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2)
500 {
501 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
502 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
503 }
504 return 0;
505 }
506
507 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
508 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
509 * an EC tmp key.
510 */
511
512 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
513 {
514 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
515 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
516 int k;
517 /* Can't do anything on client side */
518 if (s->server == 0)
519 return -1;
520 if (nmatch == -2)
521 {
522 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
523 {
524 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
525 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
526 * checks.
527 */
528 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
529 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
530 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
531 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
532 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
533 /* Should never happen */
534 return NID_undef;
535 }
536 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
537 nmatch = 0;
538 }
539 /*
540 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
541 * but s->options is a long...
542 */
543 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
544 &supp, &num_supp))
545 return 0;
546 if(!tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
547 &pref, &num_pref))
548 return 0;
549 k = 0;
550 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref+=2)
551 {
552 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
553 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp+=2)
554 {
555 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
556 {
557 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
558 continue;
559 if (nmatch == k)
560 {
561 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
562 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
563 }
564 k++;
565 }
566 }
567 }
568 if (nmatch == -1)
569 return k;
570 return 0;
571 }
572
573 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
574 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
575 {
576 unsigned char *clist, *p;
577 size_t i;
578 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
579 * while curve ids < 32
580 */
581 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
582 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
583 if (!clist)
584 return 0;
585 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
586 {
587 unsigned long idmask;
588 int id;
589 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
590 idmask = 1L << id;
591 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
592 {
593 OPENSSL_free(clist);
594 return 0;
595 }
596 dup_list |= idmask;
597 s2n(id, p);
598 }
599 if (*pext)
600 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
601 *pext = clist;
602 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
603 return 1;
604 }
605
606 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
607
608 typedef struct
609 {
610 size_t nidcnt;
611 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
612 } nid_cb_st;
613
614 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
615 {
616 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
617 size_t i;
618 int nid;
619 char etmp[20];
620 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
621 return 0;
622 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
623 return 0;
624 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
625 etmp[len] = 0;
626 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
627 if (nid == NID_undef)
628 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
629 if (nid == NID_undef)
630 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
631 if (nid == NID_undef)
632 return 0;
633 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
634 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
635 return 0;
636 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
637 return 1;
638 }
639 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
640 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
641 const char *str)
642 {
643 nid_cb_st ncb;
644 ncb.nidcnt = 0;
645 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
646 return 0;
647 if (pext == NULL)
648 return 1;
649 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
650 }
651 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
652 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
653 EC_KEY *ec)
654 {
655 int is_prime, id;
656 const EC_GROUP *grp;
657 const EC_METHOD *meth;
658 if (!ec)
659 return 0;
660 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
661 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
662 if (!grp)
663 return 0;
664 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
665 if (!meth)
666 return 0;
667 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
668 is_prime = 1;
669 else
670 is_prime = 0;
671 /* Determine curve ID */
672 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
673 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
674 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
675 if (id)
676 {
677 curve_id[0] = 0;
678 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
679 }
680 else
681 {
682 curve_id[0] = 0xff;
683 if (is_prime)
684 curve_id[1] = 0x01;
685 else
686 curve_id[1] = 0x02;
687 }
688 if (comp_id)
689 {
690 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
691 return 0;
692 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
693 {
694 if (is_prime)
695 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
696 else
697 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
698 }
699 else
700 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
701 }
702 return 1;
703 }
704 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
705 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
706 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
707 {
708 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
709 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
710 int j;
711 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
712 * is supported (see RFC4492).
713 */
714 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
715 {
716 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
717 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
718 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++)
719 {
720 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
721 break;
722 }
723 if (i == num_formats)
724 return 0;
725 }
726 if (!curve_id)
727 return 1;
728 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
729 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
730 {
731 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
732 return 0;
733 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2)
734 {
735 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] &&
736 pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
737 break;
738 }
739 if (i == num_curves)
740 return 0;
741 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
742 if (!s->server)
743 break;
744 }
745 return 1;
746 }
747
748 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
749 size_t *num_formats)
750 {
751 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
752 * use default */
753 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
754 {
755 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
756 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
757 }
758 else
759 {
760 *pformats = ecformats_default;
761 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
762 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
763 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
764 else
765 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
766 }
767 }
768
769 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
770 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
771 */
772 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
773 {
774 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
775 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
776 int rv;
777 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
778 if (!pkey)
779 return 0;
780 /* If not EC nothing to do */
781 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
782 {
783 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
784 return 1;
785 }
786 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
787 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
788 if (!rv)
789 return 0;
790 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
791 * supported curves extension.
792 */
793 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
794 if (!rv)
795 return 0;
796 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
797 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
798 */
799 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
800 {
801 int check_md;
802 size_t i;
803 CERT *c = s->cert;
804 if (curve_id[0])
805 return 0;
806 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
807 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
808 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
809 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
810 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
811 else
812 return 0; /* Should never happen */
813 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
814 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
815 break;
816 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
817 return 0;
818 if (set_ee_md == 2)
819 {
820 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
821 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
822 else
823 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
824 }
825 }
826 return rv;
827 }
828 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
829 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
830 {
831 unsigned char curve_id[2];
832 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
833 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
834 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
835 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
836 return 1;
837 #endif
838 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
839 * no other curves permitted.
840 */
841 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
842 {
843 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
844 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
845 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
846 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
847 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
848 else
849 return 0;
850 curve_id[0] = 0;
851 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
852 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
853 return 0;
854 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
855 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
856 return 1;
857 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
858 else
859 {
860 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
861 if (!ec)
862 return 0;
863 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
864 return 0;
865 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
866 return 1;
867 return 0;
868 }
869
870 }
871 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
872 {
873 /* Need a shared curve */
874 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
875 return 1;
876 else return 0;
877 }
878 if (!ec)
879 {
880 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
881 return 1;
882 else
883 return 0;
884 }
885 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
886 return 0;
887 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
888 #if 0
889 return 1;
890 #else
891 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
892 #endif
893 }
894
895 #else
896
897 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
898 {
899 return 1;
900 }
901
902 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
903
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
905
906 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
907 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
908 */
909
910 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
911 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
912 #else
913 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
914 #endif
915
916 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
917 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
918 #else
919 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
920 #endif
921
922 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
923 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
924 #else
925 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
926 #endif
927
928 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
929 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
930 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
931 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
932
933 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
935 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
936 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
937 #endif
938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
939 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
940 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
941 #endif
942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
943 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
944 #endif
945 };
946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
947 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
948 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
949 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
950 };
951 #endif
952 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
953 {
954 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
955 * preferences.
956 */
957 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
958 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
959 {
960 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
961 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
962 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
963
964 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
965 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
966 return 2;
967
968 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
969 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
970 return 2;
971 }
972 #endif
973 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
974 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
975 {
976 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
977 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
978 }
979 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
980 {
981 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
982 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
983 }
984 else
985 {
986 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
987 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
988 }
989 }
990 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
991 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
992 */
993 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
994 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
995 {
996 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
997 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
998 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
999 /* Should never happen */
1000 if (sigalg == -1)
1001 return -1;
1002 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1003 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
1004 {
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1006 return 0;
1007 }
1008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1009 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1010 {
1011 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1012 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1013 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1014 return 0;
1015 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
1016 {
1017 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1018 return 0;
1019 }
1020 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1021 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1022 {
1023 if (curve_id[0])
1024 return 0;
1025 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
1026 {
1027 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1028 {
1029 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1030 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1031 return 0;
1032 }
1033 }
1034 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1035 {
1036 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1037 {
1038 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1039 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1040 return 0;
1041 }
1042 }
1043 else
1044 return 0;
1045 }
1046 }
1047 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1048 return 0;
1049 #endif
1050
1051 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1052 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1053 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1054 {
1055 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1056 break;
1057 }
1058 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1059 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1060 {
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1062 return 0;
1063 }
1064 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1065 if (*pmd == NULL)
1066 {
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1068 return 0;
1069 }
1070 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1071 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1072 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1073 (void *)sig))
1074 {
1075 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1076 return 0;
1077 }
1078 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1079 * wish.
1080 */
1081 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1082 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1083 return 1;
1084 }
1085
1086 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1087 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1088 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1089 * session and not global settings.
1090 *
1091 */
1092 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1093 {
1094 CERT *c = s->cert;
1095 c->mask_a = 0;
1096 c->mask_k = 0;
1097 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1098 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1099 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1100 else
1101 c->mask_ssl = 0;
1102 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1103 /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1104 * signature algorithms.
1105 */
1106 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1107 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1108 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1109 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1110 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1111 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1112 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1113 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1114 {
1115 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1116 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1117 }
1118 #endif
1119 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1120 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1121 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1122 {
1123 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1124 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1125 }
1126 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1128 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1129 {
1130 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1131 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1132 }
1133 #endif
1134 c->valid = 1;
1135 }
1136
1137 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1138 {
1139 CERT *ct = s->cert;
1140 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1141 return 1;
1142 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1143 }
1144
1145 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1146 {
1147 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1148 return 0;
1149 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1150 }
1151
1152 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1153 {
1154 int extdatalen=0;
1155 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1156 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1158 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1159 int using_ecc = 0;
1160 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1161 {
1162 int i;
1163 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1164 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1165
1166 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1167 {
1168 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1169
1170 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1171 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1172 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1173 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1174 {
1175 using_ecc = 1;
1176 break;
1177 }
1178 }
1179 }
1180 #endif
1181
1182 ret+=2;
1183
1184 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1185
1186 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1187 if (s->renegotiate)
1188 {
1189 int el;
1190
1191 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1192 {
1193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1194 return NULL;
1195 }
1196
1197 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1198
1199 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1200 s2n(el,ret);
1201
1202 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1203 {
1204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1205 return NULL;
1206 }
1207
1208 ret += el;
1209 }
1210 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1211 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1212 goto done;
1213
1214 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1215 {
1216 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1217 unsigned long size_str;
1218 long lenmax;
1219
1220 /* check for enough space.
1221 4 for the servername type and entension length
1222 2 for servernamelist length
1223 1 for the hostname type
1224 2 for hostname length
1225 + hostname length
1226 */
1227
1228 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1229 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1230 return NULL;
1231
1232 /* extension type and length */
1233 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1234 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1235
1236 /* length of servername list */
1237 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1238
1239 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1240 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1241 s2n(size_str,ret);
1242 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1243 ret+=size_str;
1244 }
1245
1246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1247 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1248 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1249 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1250
1251 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1252 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1253 {
1254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1255 return NULL;
1256 }
1257
1258 /* check for enough space.
1259 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1260 1 for the srp user identity
1261 + srp user identity length
1262 */
1263 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1264
1265 /* fill in the extension */
1266 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1267 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1268 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1269 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1270 ret+=login_len;
1271 }
1272 #endif
1273
1274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1275 if (using_ecc)
1276 {
1277 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1278 long lenmax;
1279 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1280 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1281 size_t i;
1282 unsigned char *etmp;
1283
1284 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1285
1286 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1287 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1288 if (num_formats > 255)
1289 {
1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1291 return NULL;
1292 }
1293
1294 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1295 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1296 s2n(num_formats + 1,ret);
1297 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats ;
1298 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1299 ret+=num_formats;
1300
1301 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1302 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1303 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1304 return NULL;
1305
1306 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1307 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2) return NULL;
1308 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2)
1309 {
1310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1311 return NULL;
1312 }
1313
1314
1315 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1316 etmp = ret + 4;
1317 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1318 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2)
1319 {
1320 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1321 {
1322 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1323 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1324 }
1325 }
1326
1327 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1328
1329 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1330 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1331 ret += curves_list_len;
1332 }
1333 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1334
1335 if (tls_use_ticket(s))
1336 {
1337 int ticklen;
1338 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1339 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1340 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1341 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1342 {
1343 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1344 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1345 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1346 return NULL;
1347 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1348 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1349 ticklen);
1350 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1351 }
1352 else
1353 ticklen = 0;
1354 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1355 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1356 goto skip_ext;
1357 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1358 * rest for ticket
1359 */
1360 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1361 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1362 s2n(ticklen,ret);
1363 if (ticklen)
1364 {
1365 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1366 ret += ticklen;
1367 }
1368 }
1369 skip_ext:
1370
1371 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1372 {
1373 size_t salglen;
1374 const unsigned char *salg;
1375 unsigned char *etmp;
1376 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1377 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1378 return NULL;
1379 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1380 etmp = ret;
1381 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1382 ret += 4;
1383 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1384 /* Fill in lengths */
1385 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1386 s2n(salglen, etmp);
1387 ret += salglen;
1388 }
1389
1390 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1391 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1392 {
1393 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1394
1395 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
1396 return NULL;
1397 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1398 return NULL;
1399
1400 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1401 s2n(col + 2, ret);
1402 s2n(col, ret);
1403 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1404 ret += col;
1405 }
1406 #endif
1407
1408 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1409 {
1410 int i;
1411 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1412 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1413
1414 idlen = 0;
1415 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1416 {
1417 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1418 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1419 if (itmp <= 0)
1420 return NULL;
1421 idlen += itmp + 2;
1422 }
1423
1424 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1425 {
1426 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1427 if (extlen < 0)
1428 return NULL;
1429 }
1430 else
1431 extlen = 0;
1432
1433 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1434 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1435 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1436 return NULL;
1437 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1438 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1439 s2n(idlen, ret);
1440 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1441 {
1442 /* save position of id len */
1443 unsigned char *q = ret;
1444 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1445 /* skip over id len */
1446 ret += 2;
1447 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1448 /* write id len */
1449 s2n(itmp, q);
1450 }
1451 s2n(extlen, ret);
1452 if (extlen > 0)
1453 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1454 }
1455
1456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1457 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1458 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1459 return NULL;
1460 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1461 s2n(1,ret);
1462 /* Set mode:
1463 * 1: peer may send requests
1464 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1465 */
1466 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1467 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1468 else
1469 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1470 #endif
1471
1472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1473 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1474 {
1475 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1476 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1477 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1478 return NULL;
1479 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1480 s2n(0,ret);
1481 }
1482 #endif
1483
1484 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1485 {
1486 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1487 return NULL;
1488 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1489 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1490 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1491 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1492 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1493 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1494 }
1495
1496 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1497 {
1498 int el;
1499
1500 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1501
1502 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1503
1504 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1505 s2n(el,ret);
1506
1507 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1508 {
1509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1510 return NULL;
1511 }
1512 ret += el;
1513 }
1514 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1515 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1516 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1517 return NULL;
1518 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1519 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1520 s2n(0,ret);
1521 #endif
1522
1523 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1524 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1525 *
1526 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1527 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1528 */
1529 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1530 {
1531 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1532 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1533 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1534 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1535 */
1536 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1537 hlen -= 5;
1538 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1539 {
1540 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1541 if (hlen >= 4)
1542 hlen -= 4;
1543 else
1544 hlen = 0;
1545
1546 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1547 s2n(hlen, ret);
1548 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1549 ret += hlen;
1550 }
1551 }
1552
1553 done:
1554
1555 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1556 return orig;
1557
1558 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1559 return ret;
1560 }
1561
1562 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1563 {
1564 int extdatalen=0;
1565 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1566 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1567 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1568 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1569 #endif
1570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1571 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1572 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1573 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1574 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1575 #endif
1576
1577 ret+=2;
1578 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1579
1580 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1581 {
1582 int el;
1583
1584 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1585 {
1586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1587 return NULL;
1588 }
1589
1590 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1591
1592 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1593 s2n(el,ret);
1594
1595 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1596 {
1597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1598 return NULL;
1599 }
1600
1601 ret += el;
1602 }
1603
1604 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1605 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1606 goto done;
1607
1608 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1609 {
1610 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1611
1612 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1613 s2n(0,ret);
1614 }
1615
1616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1617 if (using_ecc)
1618 {
1619 const unsigned char *plist;
1620 size_t plistlen;
1621 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1622 long lenmax;
1623
1624 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1625
1626 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1627 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1628 if (plistlen > 255)
1629 {
1630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1631 return NULL;
1632 }
1633
1634 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1635 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1636 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1637 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1638 ret+=plistlen;
1639
1640 }
1641 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1642 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1643
1644 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
1645 {
1646 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1647 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1648 s2n(0,ret);
1649 }
1650
1651 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1652 {
1653 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1654 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1655 s2n(0,ret);
1656 }
1657
1658 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1659 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1660 {
1661 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1662
1663 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1664 return NULL;
1665 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1666 return NULL;
1667
1668 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1669 s2n(sol + 2, ret);
1670 s2n(sol, ret);
1671 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1672 ret += sol;
1673 }
1674 #endif
1675
1676 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
1677 {
1678 int el;
1679
1680 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1681
1682 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1683
1684 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1685 s2n(el,ret);
1686
1687 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1688 {
1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1690 return NULL;
1691 }
1692 ret+=el;
1693 }
1694
1695 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1696 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1697 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1698 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1699 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1700 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1701 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1702 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1703 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1704 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1705 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1706 ret+=36;
1707
1708 }
1709
1710 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1711 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1712 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1713 {
1714 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1715 return NULL;
1716 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1717 s2n(1,ret);
1718 /* Set mode:
1719 * 1: peer may send requests
1720 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1721 */
1722 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1723 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1724 else
1725 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1726
1727 }
1728 #endif
1729
1730 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1731 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1732 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1733 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1734 {
1735 const unsigned char *npa;
1736 unsigned int npalen;
1737 int r;
1738
1739 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1740 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1741 {
1742 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1743 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1744 s2n(npalen,ret);
1745 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1746 ret += npalen;
1747 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1748 }
1749 }
1750 #endif
1751 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1752 return NULL;
1753 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1754 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1755 {
1756 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4
1757 * might want to disable for other cases too.
1758 */
1759 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1760 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1761 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1762 else
1763 {
1764 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1765 s2n(0,ret);
1766 }
1767 }
1768 #endif
1769
1770 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1771 {
1772 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1773 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1774
1775 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1776 return NULL;
1777 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1778 s2n(3 + len,ret);
1779 s2n(1 + len,ret);
1780 *ret++ = len;
1781 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1782 ret += len;
1783 }
1784
1785 done:
1786
1787 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1788 return orig;
1789
1790 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1791 return ret;
1792 }
1793
1794 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1795 * ClientHello.
1796 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1797 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1798 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1799 * return.
1800 *
1801 * returns: 0 on success. */
1802 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1803 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1804 {
1805 unsigned i;
1806 unsigned proto_len;
1807 const unsigned char *selected;
1808 unsigned char selected_len;
1809 int r;
1810
1811 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1812 return 0;
1813
1814 if (data_len < 2)
1815 goto parse_error;
1816
1817 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1818 * length-prefixed strings. */
1819 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1820 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1821 data_len -= 2;
1822 data += 2;
1823 if (data_len != i)
1824 goto parse_error;
1825
1826 if (data_len < 2)
1827 goto parse_error;
1828
1829 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1830 {
1831 proto_len = data[i];
1832 i++;
1833
1834 if (proto_len == 0)
1835 goto parse_error;
1836
1837 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1838 goto parse_error;
1839
1840 i += proto_len;
1841 }
1842
1843 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1844 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1845 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1846 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1847 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1848 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1849 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1850 {
1851 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1852 return -1;
1853 }
1854 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1855 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1856 }
1857 return 0;
1858
1859 parse_error:
1860 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1861 return -1;
1862 }
1863
1864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1865 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1866 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1867 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1868 * SNI,
1869 * elliptic_curves
1870 * ec_point_formats
1871 *
1872 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1873 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1874 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1875 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1876 */
1877 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1878 unsigned short type, size;
1879 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1880 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1881 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1882 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1883 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1884 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1885 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1886
1887 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1888 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1889 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1890 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1891 };
1892
1893 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1894 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1895 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1896 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1897 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1898 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1899 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1900 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1901 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1902 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1903 };
1904
1905 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1906 return;
1907 data += 2;
1908
1909 if (data > (d+n-4))
1910 return;
1911 n2s(data,type);
1912 n2s(data,size);
1913
1914 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1915 return;
1916
1917 if (data+size > d+n)
1918 return;
1919 data += size;
1920
1921 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1922 {
1923 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1924 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1925
1926 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1927 return;
1928 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1929 return;
1930 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1931 return;
1932 }
1933 else
1934 {
1935 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1936
1937 if (data + len != d+n)
1938 return;
1939 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1940 return;
1941 }
1942
1943 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1944 }
1945 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1946
1947
1948 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1949 {
1950 unsigned short type;
1951 unsigned short size;
1952 unsigned short len;
1953 unsigned char *data = *p;
1954 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1955
1956 s->servername_done = 0;
1957 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1958 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1959 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1960 #endif
1961
1962 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1963 {
1964 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1965 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1966 }
1967
1968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1969 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1970 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1971 #endif
1972
1973 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1974 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1975 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1976 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1977
1978 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1979 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1980 {
1981 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1982 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1983 }
1984
1985 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1986 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1987 #endif
1988
1989 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1990 goto ri_check;
1991 n2s(data,len);
1992
1993 if (data > (d+n-len))
1994 goto ri_check;
1995
1996 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1997 {
1998 n2s(data,type);
1999 n2s(data,size);
2000
2001 if (data+size > (d+n))
2002 goto ri_check;
2003 #if 0
2004 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2005 #endif
2006 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2007 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2008 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2009 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2010 {
2011 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2012 return 0;
2013 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2014 }
2015 else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2016 {}
2017 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2018
2019 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2020 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2021 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2022 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2023 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2024 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2025 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2026 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2027 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2028 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2029 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2030 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2031 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2032 the value of the Host: field.
2033 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2034 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2035 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2036 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2037
2038 */
2039
2040 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2041 {
2042 unsigned char *sdata;
2043 int servname_type;
2044 int dsize;
2045
2046 if (size < 2)
2047 {
2048 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2049 return 0;
2050 }
2051 n2s(data,dsize);
2052 size -= 2;
2053 if (dsize > size )
2054 {
2055 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2056 return 0;
2057 }
2058
2059 sdata = data;
2060 while (dsize > 3)
2061 {
2062 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2063 n2s(sdata,len);
2064 dsize -= 3;
2065
2066 if (len > dsize)
2067 {
2068 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2069 return 0;
2070 }
2071 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2072 switch (servname_type)
2073 {
2074 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2075 if (!s->hit)
2076 {
2077 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2078 {
2079 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2080 return 0;
2081 }
2082 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2083 {
2084 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2085 return 0;
2086 }
2087 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2088 {
2089 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2090 return 0;
2091 }
2092 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2093 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2094 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2095 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2096 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2097 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2098 return 0;
2099 }
2100 s->servername_done = 1;
2101
2102 }
2103 else
2104 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2105 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2106 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2107
2108 break;
2109
2110 default:
2111 break;
2112 }
2113
2114 dsize -= len;
2115 }
2116 if (dsize != 0)
2117 {
2118 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2119 return 0;
2120 }
2121
2122 }
2123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2124 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2125 {
2126 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2127 {
2128 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2129 return 0;
2130 }
2131 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2132 {
2133 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2134 return 0;
2135 }
2136 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2137 return -1;
2138 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2139 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2140
2141 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2142 {
2143 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2144 return 0;
2145 }
2146 }
2147 #endif
2148
2149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2150 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2151 {
2152 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2153 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2154
2155 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2156 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2157 {
2158 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2159 return 0;
2160 }
2161 if (!s->hit)
2162 {
2163 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2164 {
2165 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2166 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2167 }
2168 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2169 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2170 {
2171 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2172 return 0;
2173 }
2174 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2175 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2176 }
2177 #if 0
2178 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2179 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2180 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2181 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2182 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2183 #endif
2184 }
2185 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2186 {
2187 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2188 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2189 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2190
2191 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2192 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2193 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2194 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
2195 {
2196 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2197 return 0;
2198 }
2199 if (!s->hit)
2200 {
2201 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2202 {
2203 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2204 return 0;
2205 }
2206 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2207 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2208 {
2209 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2210 return 0;
2211 }
2212 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2213 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2214 }
2215 #if 0
2216 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2217 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2218 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2219 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2220 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2221 #endif
2222 }
2223 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2224 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2225 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2226 {
2227 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2228
2229 if (size < 2)
2230 {
2231 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2232 return 0;
2233 }
2234 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2235 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2236 {
2237 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2238 return 0;
2239 }
2240
2241 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2242 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2243 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2244 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2245 else
2246 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2247 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2248 {
2249 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2250 return 0;
2251 }
2252 }
2253 #endif
2254 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2255 {
2256 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2257 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2258 {
2259 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2260 return 0;
2261 }
2262 }
2263 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2264 {
2265 int dsize;
2266 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2267 {
2268 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2269 return 0;
2270 }
2271 n2s(data,dsize);
2272 size -= 2;
2273 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2274 {
2275 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2276 return 0;
2277 }
2278 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2279 {
2280 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2281 return 0;
2282 }
2283 }
2284 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2285 {
2286
2287 if (size < 5)
2288 {
2289 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2290 return 0;
2291 }
2292
2293 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2294 size--;
2295 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2296 {
2297 const unsigned char *sdata;
2298 int dsize;
2299 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2300 n2s(data,dsize);
2301 size -= 2;
2302 if (dsize > size )
2303 {
2304 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2305 return 0;
2306 }
2307 while (dsize > 0)
2308 {
2309 OCSP_RESPID *id;
2310 int idsize;
2311 if (dsize < 4)
2312 {
2313 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2314 return 0;
2315 }
2316 n2s(data, idsize);
2317 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2318 size -= 2 + idsize;
2319 if (dsize < 0)
2320 {
2321 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2322 return 0;
2323 }
2324 sdata = data;
2325 data += idsize;
2326 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2327 &sdata, idsize);
2328 if (!id)
2329 {
2330 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2331 return 0;
2332 }
2333 if (data != sdata)
2334 {
2335 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2336 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2337 return 0;
2338 }
2339 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2340 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2341 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2342 {
2343 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2344 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2345 return 0;
2346 }
2347 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2348 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2349 {
2350 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2351 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2352 return 0;
2353 }
2354 }
2355
2356 /* Read in request_extensions */
2357 if (size < 2)
2358 {
2359 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2360 return 0;
2361 }
2362 n2s(data,dsize);
2363 size -= 2;
2364 if (dsize != size)
2365 {
2366 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2367 return 0;
2368 }
2369 sdata = data;
2370 if (dsize > 0)
2371 {
2372 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2373 {
2374 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2375 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2376 }
2377
2378 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2379 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2380 &sdata, dsize);
2381 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2382 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2383 {
2384 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2385 return 0;
2386 }
2387 }
2388 }
2389 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2390 * so ignore it.
2391 */
2392 else
2393 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2394 }
2395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2396 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2397 {
2398 switch(data[0])
2399 {
2400 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2401 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2402 break;
2403 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2404 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2405 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2406 break;
2407 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2408 return 0;
2409 }
2410 }
2411 #endif
2412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2413 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2414 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2415 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2416 {
2417 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2418 * renegotiation.
2419 *
2420 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2421 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2422 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2423 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2424 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2425 * anything like that, but this might change).
2426
2427 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2428 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2429 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2430 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2431 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2432 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2433 }
2434 #endif
2435
2436 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2437 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2438 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2439 {
2440 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2441 return 0;
2442 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2443 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2444 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2445 #endif
2446 }
2447
2448 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2449 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2450 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2451 {
2452 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2453 al))
2454 return 0;
2455 }
2456 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2457 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2458 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2459 #endif
2460 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2461 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2462 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2463 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2464 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2465 */
2466 else if (!s->hit)
2467 {
2468 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2469 return 0;
2470 }
2471
2472 data+=size;
2473 }
2474
2475 *p = data;
2476
2477 ri_check:
2478
2479 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2480
2481 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2482 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2483 {
2484 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2486 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2487 return 0;
2488 }
2489
2490 return 1;
2491 }
2492
2493 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2494 {
2495 int al = -1;
2496 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2497 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2498 {
2499 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2500 return 0;
2501 }
2502
2503 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2504 {
2505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2506 return 0;
2507 }
2508 return 1;
2509 }
2510
2511 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2512 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2513 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2514 * the length of the block. */
2515 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2516 {
2517 unsigned int off = 0;
2518
2519 while (off < len)
2520 {
2521 if (d[off] == 0)
2522 return 0;
2523 off += d[off];
2524 off++;
2525 }
2526
2527 return off == len;
2528 }
2529 #endif
2530
2531 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2532 {
2533 unsigned short length;
2534 unsigned short type;
2535 unsigned short size;
2536 unsigned char *data = *p;
2537 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2538 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2539
2540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2541 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2542 #endif
2543 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2544
2545 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2546 {
2547 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2548 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2549 }
2550
2551 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2552 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2553 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2554 #endif
2555
2556 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2557 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2558 #endif
2559
2560 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2561 goto ri_check;
2562
2563 n2s(data,length);
2564 if (data+length != d+n)
2565 {
2566 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2567 return 0;
2568 }
2569
2570 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2571 {
2572 n2s(data,type);
2573 n2s(data,size);
2574
2575 if (data+size > (d+n))
2576 goto ri_check;
2577
2578 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2579 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2580 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2581
2582
2583 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2584 {
2585 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2586 return 0;
2587 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2588 }
2589 else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2590 {}
2591 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2592 {
2593 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2594 {
2595 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2596 return 0;
2597 }
2598 tlsext_servername = 1;
2599 }
2600
2601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2602 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2603 {
2604 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2605 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2606
2607 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2608 {
2609 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2610 return 0;
2611 }
2612 if (!s->hit)
2613 {
2614 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2615 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2616 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2617 {
2618 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2619 return 0;
2620 }
2621 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2622 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2623 }
2624 #if 0
2625 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2626 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2627 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2628 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2629 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2630 #endif
2631 }
2632 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2633
2634 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2635 {
2636 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2637 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2638 {
2639 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2640 return 0;
2641 }
2642 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
2643 {
2644 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2645 return 0;
2646 }
2647 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2648 }
2649 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2650 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2651 {
2652 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2653
2654 if (size < 2)
2655 {
2656 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2657 return 0;
2658 }
2659 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2660 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2661 {
2662 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2663 return 0;
2664 }
2665
2666 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2667 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2668 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2669 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2670 else
2671 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2672
2673 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2674 {
2675 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2676 return 0;
2677 }
2678 }
2679 #endif
2680 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2681 {
2682 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2683 * a status request message.
2684 */
2685 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2686 {
2687 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2688 return 0;
2689 }
2690 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2691 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2692 }
2693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2694 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2695 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2696 {
2697 unsigned char *selected;
2698 unsigned char selected_len;
2699
2700 /* We must have requested it. */
2701 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2702 {
2703 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2704 return 0;
2705 }
2706 /* The data must be valid */
2707 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2708 {
2709 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2710 return 0;
2711 }
2712 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2713 {
2714 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2715 return 0;
2716 }
2717 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2718 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2719 {
2720 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2721 return 0;
2722 }
2723 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2724 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2725 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2726 }
2727 #endif
2728
2729 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2730 {
2731 unsigned len;
2732
2733 /* We must have requested it. */
2734 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2735 {
2736 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2737 return 0;
2738 }
2739 if (size < 4)
2740 {
2741 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2742 return 0;
2743 }
2744 /* The extension data consists of:
2745 * uint16 list_length
2746 * uint8 proto_length;
2747 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2748 len = data[0];
2749 len <<= 8;
2750 len |= data[1];
2751 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2752 {
2753 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2754 return 0;
2755 }
2756 len = data[2];
2757 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2758 {
2759 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2760 return 0;
2761 }
2762 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2763 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2764 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2765 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2766 {
2767 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2768 return 0;
2769 }
2770 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2771 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2772 }
2773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2774 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2775 {
2776 switch(data[0])
2777 {
2778 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2779 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2780 break;
2781 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2782 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2783 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2784 break;
2785 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2786 return 0;
2787 }
2788 }
2789 #endif
2790 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2791 {
2792 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2793 al))
2794 return 0;
2795 }
2796 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2797 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2798 {
2799 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2800 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2801 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2802 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2803 }
2804 #endif
2805 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2806 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2807 * callback */
2808 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2809 return 0;
2810
2811 data += size;
2812 }
2813
2814 if (data != d+n)
2815 {
2816 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2817 return 0;
2818 }
2819
2820 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2821 {
2822 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2823 {
2824 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2825 {
2826 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2827 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2828 {
2829 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2830 return 0;
2831 }
2832 }
2833 else
2834 {
2835 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2836 return 0;
2837 }
2838 }
2839 }
2840
2841 *p = data;
2842
2843 ri_check:
2844
2845 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2846 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2847 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2848 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2849 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2850 * absence on initial connect only.
2851 */
2852 if (!renegotiate_seen
2853 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2854 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2855 {
2856 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2858 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2859 return 0;
2860 }
2861
2862 return 1;
2863 }
2864
2865
2866 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2867 {
2868
2869 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2870 {
2871 int r = 1;
2872
2873 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2874 {
2875 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2876 if (!r)
2877 return -1;
2878 }
2879
2880 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2881 {
2882 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2883 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2884
2885 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2886 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2887 else
2888 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2889 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2890 {
2891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2892 return -1;
2893 }
2894 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2895 }
2896
2897 if (r == 2)
2898 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2899 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2900 }
2901 #endif
2902
2903 return 1;
2904 }
2905
2906 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2907 {
2908 return 1;
2909 }
2910
2911 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2912 {
2913 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2914 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2915
2916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2917 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2918 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2919 */
2920 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2921 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2922 */
2923 #endif
2924
2925 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2926 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2927 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2928 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2929
2930 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2931 {
2932 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2933 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2934 * so this has to happen here in
2935 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2936
2937 int r = 1;
2938
2939 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2940 {
2941 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2942 if (!r)
2943 {
2944 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2945 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2946 goto err;
2947 }
2948 }
2949
2950 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2951 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2952 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2953
2954 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2955 {
2956 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2957 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2958 {
2959 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2960 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2961
2962 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2963 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2964 else
2965 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2966 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2967 {
2968 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2969 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2970 goto err;
2971 }
2972 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2973 }
2974 }
2975
2976 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2977 {
2978 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2979 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2980 * abort the handshake.
2981 */
2982 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2983 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2984 }
2985 }
2986
2987 err:
2988 #endif
2989 switch (ret)
2990 {
2991 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2992 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2993 return -1;
2994
2995 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2996 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2997 return 1;
2998
2999 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3000 s->servername_done=0;
3001 default:
3002 return 1;
3003 }
3004 }
3005
3006 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3007 {
3008 int al;
3009 size_t i;
3010 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
3011 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3012 {
3013 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
3014 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3015 }
3016 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
3017 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
3018 {
3019 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
3020 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
3021 }
3022
3023 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
3024 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
3025 {
3026 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s))
3027 {
3028 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3029 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3030 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3031 goto err;
3032 }
3033 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
3034 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3035 {
3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3037 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3038 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3039 goto err;
3040 }
3041 }
3042 else
3043 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3044 return 1;
3045 err:
3046 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3047 return 0;
3048 }
3049
3050 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3051 {
3052 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3053 int al;
3054
3055 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3056 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3057 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3058 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3059 */
3060 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3061 {
3062 int r;
3063 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3064 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3065 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3066 if (certpkey == NULL)
3067 {
3068 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3069 return 1;
3070 }
3071 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3072 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3073 */
3074 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3075 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3076 switch (r)
3077 {
3078 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3079 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3080 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3081 break;
3082 /* status request response should be sent */
3083 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3084 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3085 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3086 else
3087 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3088 break;
3089 /* something bad happened */
3090 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3091 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3092 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3093 goto err;
3094 }
3095 }
3096 else
3097 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3098
3099 err:
3100 switch (ret)
3101 {
3102 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3103 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3104 return -1;
3105
3106 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3107 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3108 return 1;
3109
3110 default:
3111 return 1;
3112 }
3113 }
3114
3115 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3116 {
3117 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3118 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3119
3120 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3121 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3122 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3123 * it must contain uncompressed.
3124 */
3125 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3126 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3127 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3128 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3129 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3130 {
3131 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3132 size_t i;
3133 unsigned char *list;
3134 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3135 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3136 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3137 {
3138 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3139 {
3140 found_uncompressed = 1;
3141 break;
3142 }
3143 }
3144 if (!found_uncompressed)
3145 {
3146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3147 return -1;
3148 }
3149 }
3150 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3151 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3152
3153 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3154 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3155 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3156 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3157
3158 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3159 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3160 {
3161 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3162 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3163
3164 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3165 {
3166 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3167 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3168 }
3169
3170 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3171 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3172 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3173 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3174 {
3175 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3176 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3177 }
3178 }
3179 #endif
3180
3181 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3182 * tell the callback
3183 */
3184 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3185 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3186 {
3187 int r;
3188 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3189 * there is no response.
3190 */
3191 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3192 {
3193 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3194 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3195 }
3196 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3197 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3198 if (r == 0)
3199 {
3200 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3201 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3202 }
3203 if (r < 0)
3204 {
3205 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3206 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3207 }
3208 }
3209
3210 switch (ret)
3211 {
3212 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3213 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3214 return -1;
3215
3216 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3217 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3218 return 1;
3219
3220 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3221 s->servername_done=0;
3222 default:
3223 return 1;
3224 }
3225 }
3226
3227 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3228 {
3229 int al = -1;
3230 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3231 return 1;
3232 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3233 {
3234 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3235 return 0;
3236 }
3237
3238 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3239 {
3240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3241 return 0;
3242 }
3243 return 1;
3244 }
3245
3246 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3247 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3248 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3249 *
3250 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3251 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3252 * extension, if any.
3253 * len: the length of the session ID.
3254 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3255 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3256 * point to the resulting session.
3257 *
3258 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3259 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3260 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3261 *
3262 * Returns:
3263 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3264 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3265 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3266 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3267 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3268 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3269 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3270 *
3271 * Side effects:
3272 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3273 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3274 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3275 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3276 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3277 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3278 */
3279 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3280 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3281 {
3282 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3283 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3284 unsigned short i;
3285
3286 *ret = NULL;
3287 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3288
3289 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3290 * to permit stateful resumption.
3291 */
3292 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
3293 return 0;
3294 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3295 return 0;
3296 if (p >= limit)
3297 return -1;
3298 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3299 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
3300 {
3301 i = *(p++);
3302 p+= i;
3303 if (p >= limit)
3304 return -1;
3305 }
3306 /* Skip past cipher list */
3307 n2s(p, i);
3308 p+= i;
3309 if (p >= limit)
3310 return -1;
3311 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3312 i = *(p++);
3313 p += i;
3314 if (p > limit)
3315 return -1;
3316 /* Now at start of extensions */
3317 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3318 return 0;
3319 n2s(p, i);
3320 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3321 {
3322 unsigned short type, size;
3323 n2s(p, type);
3324 n2s(p, size);
3325 if (p + size > limit)
3326 return 0;
3327 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3328 {
3329 int r;
3330 if (size == 0)
3331 {
3332 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3333 * currently have one. */
3334 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3335 return 1;
3336 }
3337 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3338 {
3339 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3340 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3341 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3342 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3343 * calculate the master secret later. */
3344 return 2;
3345 }
3346 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3347 switch (r)
3348 {
3349 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3350 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3351 return 2;
3352 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3353 return r;
3354 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3355 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3356 return 3;
3357 default: /* fatal error */
3358 return -1;
3359 }
3360 }
3361 p += size;
3362 }
3363 return 0;
3364 }
3365
3366 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3367 *
3368 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3369 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3370 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3371 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3372 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3373 * point to the resulting session.
3374 *
3375 * Returns:
3376 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3377 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3378 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3379 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3380 */
3381 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3382 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3383 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3384 {
3385 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3386 unsigned char *sdec;
3387 const unsigned char *p;
3388 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3389 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3390 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3391 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3392 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3393 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3394 if (eticklen < 48)
3395 return 2;
3396 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3397 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3398 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3399 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3400 {
3401 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3402 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3403 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
3404 if (rv < 0)
3405 return -1;
3406 if (rv == 0)
3407 return 2;
3408 if (rv == 2)
3409 renew_ticket = 1;
3410 }
3411 else
3412 {
3413 /* Check key name matches */
3414 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3415 return 2;
3416 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3417 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3418 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3419 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3420 }
3421 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3422 * integrity checks on ticket.
3423 */
3424 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3425 if (mlen < 0)
3426 {
3427 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3428 return -1;
3429 }
3430 eticklen -= mlen;
3431 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3432 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3433 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3434 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3435 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3436 {
3437 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3438 return 2;
3439 }
3440 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3441 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3442 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3443 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3444 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3445 if (!sdec)
3446 {
3447 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3448 return -1;
3449 }
3450 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3451 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3452 {
3453 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3454 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3455 return 2;
3456 }
3457 slen += mlen;
3458 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3459 p = sdec;
3460
3461 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3462 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3463 if (sess)
3464 {
3465 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3466 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3467 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3468 * as required by standard.
3469 */
3470 if (sesslen)
3471 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3472 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3473 *psess = sess;
3474 if (renew_ticket)
3475 return 4;
3476 else
3477 return 3;
3478 }
3479 ERR_clear_error();
3480 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3481 * ticket. */
3482 return 2;
3483 }
3484
3485 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3486
3487 typedef struct
3488 {
3489 int nid;
3490 int id;
3491 } tls12_lookup;
3492
3493 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3494 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3495 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3496 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3497 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3498 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3499 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3500 };
3501
3502 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3503 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3504 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3505 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3506 };
3507
3508 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3509 {
3510 size_t i;
3511 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3512 {
3513 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3514 return table[i].id;
3515 }
3516 return -1;
3517 }
3518
3519 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3520 {
3521 size_t i;
3522 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3523 {
3524 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3525 return table[i].nid;
3526 }
3527 return NID_undef;
3528 }
3529
3530 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3531 {
3532 int sig_id, md_id;
3533 if (!md)
3534 return 0;
3535 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3536 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3537 if (md_id == -1)
3538 return 0;
3539 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3540 if (sig_id == -1)
3541 return 0;
3542 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3543 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3544 return 1;
3545 }
3546
3547 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3548 {
3549 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3550 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3551 }
3552
3553 typedef struct
3554 {
3555 int nid;
3556 int secbits;
3557 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
3558 } tls12_hash_info;
3559
3560 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3561 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3562 {NID_md5, 64, 0},
3563 #else
3564 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3565 #endif
3566 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3567 {NID_sha1, 80, 0},
3568 #else
3569 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3570 #endif
3571 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3572 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3573 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3574 #else
3575 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3576 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3577 #endif
3578 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3579 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3580 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3581 #else
3582 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3583 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3584 #endif
3585 };
3586
3587 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3588 {
3589 if (hash_alg == 0)
3590 return NULL;
3591 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3592 return NULL;
3593 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3594 }
3595
3596 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3597 {
3598 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3599 #ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
3600 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3601 return NULL;
3602 #endif
3603 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3604 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3605 return NULL;
3606 return inf->mfunc();
3607 }
3608
3609 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3610 {
3611 switch(sig_alg)
3612 {
3613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3614 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3615 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3616 #endif
3617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3618 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3619 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3620 #endif
3621 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3622 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3623 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3624 #endif
3625 }
3626 return -1;
3627 }
3628
3629 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3630 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3631 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3632 {
3633 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3634 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3635 return;
3636 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3637 {
3638 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3639 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3640 if (phash_nid)
3641 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3642 }
3643 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3644 {
3645 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3646 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3647 if (psign_nid)
3648 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3649 }
3650 if (psignhash_nid)
3651 {
3652 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3653 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3654 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3655 else
3656 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3657 }
3658 }
3659 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3660 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3661 {
3662 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3663 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3664 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3665 return 0;
3666 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3667 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3668 return 0;
3669 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3670 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3671 }
3672
3673 /* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
3674 * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
3675 * then RSA is disabled.
3676 */
3677
3678 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3679 {
3680 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3681 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3682 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3683 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
3684 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
3685 * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
3686 * if we have to.
3687 */
3688 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3689 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
3690 {
3691 switch(sigalgs[1])
3692 {
3693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3694 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3695 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3696 have_rsa = 1;
3697 break;
3698 #endif
3699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3700 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3701 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3702 have_dsa = 1;
3703 break;
3704 #endif
3705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3706 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3707 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3708 have_ecdsa = 1;
3709 break;
3710 #endif
3711 }
3712 }
3713 if (!have_rsa)
3714 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3715 if (!have_dsa)
3716 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3717 if (!have_ecdsa)
3718 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3719 }
3720
3721 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3722 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3723 {
3724 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3725 size_t i;
3726 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
3727 {
3728 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
3729 {
3730 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3731 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3732 }
3733 }
3734 return tmpout - out;
3735 }
3736
3737 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3738 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3739 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3740 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3741 {
3742 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3743 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3744 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3745 {
3746 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3747 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3748 continue;
3749 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3750 {
3751 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3752 {
3753 nmatch++;
3754 if (shsig)
3755 {
3756 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3757 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3758 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3759 &shsig->sign_nid,
3760 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3761 ptmp);
3762 shsig++;
3763 }
3764 break;
3765 }
3766 }
3767 }
3768 return nmatch;
3769 }
3770
3771 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3772 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3773 {
3774 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3775 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3776 size_t nmatch;
3777 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3778 CERT *c = s->cert;
3779 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3780 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3781 {
3782 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3783 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3784 }
3785 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3786 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3787 {
3788 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3789 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3790 }
3791 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3792 {
3793 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3794 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3795 }
3796 else
3797 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3798 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3799 {
3800 pref = conf;
3801 preflen = conflen;
3802 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3803 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3804 }
3805 else
3806 {
3807 allow = conf;
3808 allowlen = conflen;
3809 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3810 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3811 }
3812 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3813 if (!nmatch)
3814 return 1;
3815 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3816 if (!salgs)
3817 return 0;
3818 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3819 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3820 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3821 return 1;
3822 }
3823
3824
3825 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3826
3827 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3828 {
3829 CERT *c = s->cert;
3830 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3831 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3832 return 1;
3833 /* Should never happen */
3834 if (!c)
3835 return 0;
3836
3837 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3838 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3839 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3840 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3841 return 0;
3842 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3843 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3844 return 1;
3845 }
3846
3847 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3848 {
3849 int idx;
3850 size_t i;
3851 const EVP_MD *md;
3852 CERT *c = s->cert;
3853 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3854 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3855 return 0;
3856
3857 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3858 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3859 {
3860 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3861 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3862 */
3863 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3864 if (s->server)
3865 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3866 else
3867 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3868 if (sigs)
3869 {
3870 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3871 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3872 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3873 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3874 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3875 {
3876 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3877 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3878 }
3879 }
3880 }
3881 #endif
3882
3883 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3884 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3885 {
3886 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3887 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3888 {
3889 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3890 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3891 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3892 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3893 {
3894 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3895 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3896 }
3897 }
3898
3899 }
3900 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3901 * use the certificate for signing.
3902 */
3903 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3904 {
3905 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3906 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3907 */
3908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3909 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3910 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3911 #endif
3912 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3913 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3914 {
3915 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3916 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3917 }
3918 #endif
3919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3920 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3921 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3922 #endif
3923 }
3924 return 1;
3925 }
3926
3927
3928 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3929 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3930 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3931 {
3932 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3933 if (psig == NULL)
3934 return 0;
3935 if (idx >= 0)
3936 {
3937 idx <<= 1;
3938 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3939 return 0;
3940 psig += idx;
3941 if (rhash)
3942 *rhash = psig[0];
3943 if (rsig)
3944 *rsig = psig[1];
3945 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3946 }
3947 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3948 }
3949
3950 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3951 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3952 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3953 {
3954 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3955 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3956 return 0;
3957 shsigalgs += idx;
3958 if (phash)
3959 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3960 if (psign)
3961 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3962 if (psignhash)
3963 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3964 if (rsig)
3965 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3966 if (rhash)
3967 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3968 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3969 }
3970
3971
3972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3973 int
3974 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3975 {
3976 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3977 unsigned short hbtype;
3978 unsigned int payload;
3979 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3980
3981 if (s->msg_callback)
3982 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3983 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3984 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3985
3986 /* Read type and payload length first */
3987 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3988 return 0; /* silently discard */
3989 hbtype = *p++;
3990 n2s(p, payload);
3991 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3992 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3993 pl = p;
3994
3995 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3996 {
3997 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3998 int r;
3999
4000 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
4001 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
4002 * payload, plus padding
4003 */
4004 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4005 bp = buffer;
4006
4007 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
4008 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
4009 s2n(payload, bp);
4010 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
4011 bp += payload;
4012 /* Random padding */
4013 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
4014
4015 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
4016
4017 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
4018 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4019 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
4020 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4021
4022 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
4023
4024 if (r < 0)
4025 return r;
4026 }
4027 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
4028 {
4029 unsigned int seq;
4030
4031 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
4032 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
4033 * sequence number */
4034 n2s(pl, seq);
4035
4036 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
4037 {
4038 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
4039 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4040 }
4041 }
4042
4043 return 0;
4044 }
4045
4046 int
4047 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4048 {
4049 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4050 int ret;
4051 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4052 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4053
4054 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4055 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4056 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4057 {
4058 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4059 return -1;
4060 }
4061
4062 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4063 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4064 {
4065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4066 return -1;
4067 }
4068
4069 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4070 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4071 {
4072 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4073 return -1;
4074 }
4075
4076 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4077 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4078 */
4079 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4080
4081 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4082 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4083 * some random stuff.
4084 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4085 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4086 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4087 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4088 * - Padding
4089 */
4090 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4091 p = buf;
4092 /* Message Type */
4093 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4094 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4095 s2n(payload, p);
4096 /* Sequence number */
4097 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4098 /* 16 random bytes */
4099 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4100 p += 16;
4101 /* Random padding */
4102 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4103
4104 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4105 if (ret >= 0)
4106 {
4107 if (s->msg_callback)
4108 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4109 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4110 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4111
4112 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4113 }
4114
4115 OPENSSL_free(buf);
4116
4117 return ret;
4118 }
4119 #endif
4120
4121 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4122
4123 typedef struct
4124 {
4125 size_t sigalgcnt;
4126 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4127 } sig_cb_st;
4128
4129 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4130 {
4131 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4132 size_t i;
4133 char etmp[20], *p;
4134 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4135 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4136 return 0;
4137 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4138 return 0;
4139 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4140 etmp[len] = 0;
4141 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4142 if (!p)
4143 return 0;
4144 *p = 0;
4145 p++;
4146 if (!*p)
4147 return 0;
4148
4149 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4150 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4151 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4152 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4153 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4154 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4155 else return 0;
4156
4157 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4158 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4159 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4160 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4161 return 0;
4162
4163 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4164 {
4165 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4166 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4167 return 0;
4168 }
4169 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4170 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4171 return 1;
4172 }
4173
4174 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4175 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4176 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4177 {
4178 sig_cb_st sig;
4179 sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
4180 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4181 return 0;
4182 if (c == NULL)
4183 return 1;
4184 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4185 }
4186
4187 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4188 {
4189 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4190 int rhash, rsign;
4191 size_t i;
4192 if (salglen & 1)
4193 return 0;
4194 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4195 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4196 return 0;
4197 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4198 {
4199 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4200 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4201 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4202 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4203
4204 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4205 goto err;
4206 *sptr++ = rhash;
4207 *sptr++ = rsign;
4208 }
4209
4210 if (client)
4211 {
4212 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4213 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4214 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4215 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4216 }
4217 else
4218 {
4219 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4220 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4221 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4222 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4223 }
4224
4225 return 1;
4226
4227 err:
4228 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4229 return 0;
4230 }
4231
4232 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4233 {
4234 int sig_nid;
4235 size_t i;
4236 if (default_nid == -1)
4237 return 1;
4238 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4239 if (default_nid)
4240 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4241 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4242 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4243 return 1;
4244 return 0;
4245 }
4246 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4247 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4248 {
4249 X509_NAME *nm;
4250 int i;
4251 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4252 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4253 {
4254 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4255 return 1;
4256 }
4257 return 0;
4258 }
4259
4260 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4261 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4262 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4263 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4264 */
4265
4266 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4267
4268 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4269 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4270 /* Strict mode flags */
4271 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4272 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4273 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4274
4275 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4276 int idx)
4277 {
4278 int i;
4279 int rv = 0;
4280 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4281 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4282 CERT *c = s->cert;
4283 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4284 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4285 if (idx != -1)
4286 {
4287 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4288 if (idx == -2)
4289 {
4290 cpk = c->key;
4291 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4292 }
4293 else
4294 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4295 x = cpk->x509;
4296 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4297 chain = cpk->chain;
4298 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4299 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4300 if (!x || !pk)
4301 goto end;
4302 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4303 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4304 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4305 {
4306 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4307 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4308 return rv;
4309 }
4310 #endif
4311 }
4312 else
4313 {
4314 if (!x || !pk)
4315 goto end;
4316 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4317 if (idx == -1)
4318 goto end;
4319 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4320 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4321 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4322 else
4323 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4324 strict_mode = 1;
4325 }
4326
4327 if (suiteb_flags)
4328 {
4329 int ok;
4330 if (check_flags)
4331 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4332 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4333 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4334 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4335 else if (!check_flags)
4336 goto end;
4337 }
4338
4339 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4340 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4341 * and strict mode.
4342 */
4343 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4344 {
4345 int default_nid;
4346 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4347 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4348 default_nid = 0;
4349 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4350 else
4351 {
4352 switch(idx)
4353 {
4354 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4355 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4356 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4357 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4358 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4359 break;
4360
4361 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4362 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4363 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4364 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4365 break;
4366
4367 case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
4368 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4369 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4370 break;
4371
4372 default:
4373 default_nid = -1;
4374 break;
4375 }
4376 }
4377 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4378 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4379 * sha1.
4380 */
4381 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4382 {
4383 size_t j;
4384 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4385 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4386 {
4387 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4388 break;
4389 }
4390 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4391 {
4392 if (check_flags)
4393 goto skip_sigs;
4394 else
4395 goto end;
4396 }
4397 }
4398 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4399 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4400 {
4401 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4402 }
4403 else
4404 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4405 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4406 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4407 {
4408 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4409 default_nid))
4410 {
4411 if (check_flags)
4412 {
4413 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4414 break;
4415 }
4416 else
4417 goto end;
4418 }
4419 }
4420 }
4421 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4422 else if(check_flags)
4423 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4424 skip_sigs:
4425 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4426 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4427 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4428 else if (!check_flags)
4429 goto end;
4430 if (!s->server)
4431 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4432 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4433 else if (strict_mode)
4434 {
4435 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4436 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4437 {
4438 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4439 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4440 {
4441 if (check_flags)
4442 {
4443 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4444 break;
4445 }
4446 else
4447 goto end;
4448 }
4449 }
4450 }
4451 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4452 {
4453 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4454 int check_type = 0;
4455 switch (pk->type)
4456 {
4457 case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
4458 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4459 break;
4460 case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
4461 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4462 break;
4463 case EVP_PKEY_EC:
4464 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4465 break;
4466 case EVP_PKEY_DH:
4467 case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
4468 {
4469 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4470 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4471 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4472 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4473 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4474 }
4475 }
4476 if (check_type)
4477 {
4478 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4479 int ctypelen;
4480 if (c->ctypes)
4481 {
4482 ctypes = c->ctypes;
4483 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4484 }
4485 else
4486 {
4487 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4488 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4489 }
4490 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4491 {
4492 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4493 {
4494 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4495 break;
4496 }
4497 }
4498 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4499 goto end;
4500 }
4501 else
4502 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4503
4504
4505 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4506
4507 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4508 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4509
4510 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4511 {
4512 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4513 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4514 }
4515 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4516 {
4517 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4518 {
4519 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4520 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4521 {
4522 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4523 break;
4524 }
4525 }
4526 }
4527 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4528 goto end;
4529 }
4530 else
4531 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4532
4533 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4534 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4535
4536 end:
4537
4538 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4539 {
4540 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4541 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4542 else if (cpk->digest)
4543 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4544 }
4545 else
4546 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4547
4548 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4549 * if the chain is invalid.
4550 */
4551 if (!check_flags)
4552 {
4553 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4554 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4555 else
4556 {
4557 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4558 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4559 return 0;
4560 }
4561 }
4562 return rv;
4563 }
4564
4565 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4566 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4567 {
4568 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4569 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4570 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4571 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4572 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4573 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4574 }
4575 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4576 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4577 {
4578 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4579 }
4580
4581 #endif
4582
4583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4584 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4585 {
4586 int dh_secbits = 80;
4587 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4588 return DH_get_1024_160();
4589 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4590 {
4591 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4592 dh_secbits = 128;
4593 else
4594 dh_secbits = 80;
4595 }
4596 else
4597 {
4598 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4599 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4600 }
4601
4602 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4603 {
4604 DH *dhp = DH_new();
4605 if (!dhp)
4606 return NULL;
4607 dhp->g = BN_new();
4608 if (dhp->g)
4609 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4610 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4611 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4612 else
4613 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4614 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4615 {
4616 DH_free(dhp);
4617 return NULL;
4618 }
4619 return dhp;
4620 }
4621 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4622 return DH_get_2048_224();
4623 return DH_get_1024_160();
4624 }
4625 #endif
4626
4627 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4628 {
4629 int secbits;
4630 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4631 if (pkey)
4632 {
4633 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4634 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4635 }
4636 else
4637 secbits = -1;
4638 if (s)
4639 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4640 else
4641 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4642 }
4643
4644 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4645 {
4646 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4647 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4648 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4649 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
4650 {
4651 const EVP_MD *md;
4652 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4653 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4654 }
4655 if (s)
4656 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4657 else
4658 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4659 }
4660
4661 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4662 {
4663 if (vfy)
4664 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4665 if (is_ee)
4666 {
4667 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4668 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4669 }
4670 else
4671 {
4672 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4673 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4674 }
4675 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4676 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4677 return 1;
4678 }
4679
4680 /* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
4681 * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
4682 * not sending one to the peer.
4683 * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4684 */
4685
4686 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4687 {
4688 int rv, start_idx, i;
4689 if (x == NULL)
4690 {
4691 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4692 start_idx = 1;
4693 }
4694 else
4695 start_idx = 0;
4696
4697 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4698 if (rv != 1)
4699 return rv;
4700
4701 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
4702 {
4703 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4704 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
4705 if (rv != 1)
4706 return rv;
4707 }
4708 return 1;
4709 }
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