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Fix bug in signature algorithm copy.
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c
1 /* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 #include <openssl/dh.h>
120 #include <openssl/bn.h>
121 #endif
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
123
124 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
125
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
132 #endif
133
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
135 tls1_enc,
136 tls1_mac,
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
145 tls1_alert_code,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
147 0,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
150 ssl3_handshake_write
151 };
152
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
154 tls1_enc,
155 tls1_mac,
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
164 tls1_alert_code,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
169 ssl3_handshake_write
170 };
171
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
173 tls1_enc,
174 tls1_mac,
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
183 tls1_alert_code,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
189 ssl3_handshake_write
190 };
191
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
193 {
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
196 return(60*60*2);
197 }
198
199 int tls1_new(SSL *s)
200 {
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
203 return(1);
204 }
205
206 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
207 {
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
210 {
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
212 }
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
214 ssl3_free(s);
215 }
216
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
218 {
219 ssl3_clear(s);
220 s->version = s->method->version;
221 }
222
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
224
225 typedef struct
226 {
227 int nid; /* Curve NID */
228 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
229 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
230 } tls_curve_info;
231
232 #define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
233 #define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
234
235 static tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
236 {
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */
265 };
266
267
268 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
269 {
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
273 };
274
275 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
276 {
277 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
280 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
281 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
284 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
285 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
288 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
289 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
291 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
292 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
293 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
294 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
295 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
296 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
297 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
298 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
302 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
303 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
304 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
305 };
306
307 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
308 {
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
311 };
312
313 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
314 {
315 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
316 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
317 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
318 return 0;
319 return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
320 }
321
322 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
323 {
324 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
325 switch (nid)
326 {
327 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
328 return 1;
329 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
330 return 2;
331 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
332 return 3;
333 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
334 return 4;
335 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
336 return 5;
337 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
338 return 6;
339 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
340 return 7;
341 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
342 return 8;
343 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
344 return 9;
345 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
346 return 10;
347 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
348 return 11;
349 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
350 return 12;
351 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
352 return 13;
353 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
354 return 14;
355 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
356 return 15;
357 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
358 return 16;
359 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
360 return 17;
361 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
362 return 18;
363 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
364 return 19;
365 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
366 return 20;
367 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
368 return 21;
369 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
370 return 22;
371 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
372 return 23;
373 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
374 return 24;
375 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
376 return 25;
377 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
378 return 26;
379 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
380 return 27;
381 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
382 return 28;
383 default:
384 return 0;
385 }
386 }
387 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
388 * preferred list
389 */
390 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
391 const unsigned char **pcurves,
392 size_t *pcurveslen)
393 {
394 if (sess)
395 {
396 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
397 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
398 return;
399 }
400 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
401 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
402 {
403 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
404 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
405 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
406 break;
407
408 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
409 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
410 *pcurveslen = 2;
411 break;
412
413 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
414 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
415 *pcurveslen = 2;
416 break;
417 default:
418 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
419 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
420 }
421 if (!*pcurves)
422 {
423 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
424 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
425 }
426 }
427
428 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
429 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
430 {
431 tls_curve_info *cinfo;
432 if (curve[0])
433 return 1;
434 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
435 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
436 return 0;
437 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
438 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
439 }
440
441 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
442 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
443 {
444 const unsigned char *curves;
445 size_t curveslen, i;
446 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
447 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
448 return 0;
449 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
450 if (suiteb_flags)
451 {
452 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
453 if (p[1])
454 return 0;
455 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
456 {
457 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
458 return 0;
459 }
460 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
461 {
462 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
463 return 0;
464 }
465 else /* Should never happen */
466 return 0;
467 }
468 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
469 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
470 {
471 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
472 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
473 }
474 return 0;
475 }
476
477 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
478 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
479 * an EC tmp key.
480 */
481
482 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
483 {
484 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
485 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
486 int k;
487 /* Can't do anything on client side */
488 if (s->server == 0)
489 return -1;
490 if (nmatch == -2)
491 {
492 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
493 {
494 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
495 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
496 * checks.
497 */
498 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
499 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
500 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
501 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
502 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
503 /* Should never happen */
504 return NID_undef;
505 }
506 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
507 nmatch = 0;
508 }
509 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
510 &supp, &supplen);
511 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
512 &pref, &preflen);
513 preflen /= 2;
514 supplen /= 2;
515 k = 0;
516 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
517 {
518 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
519 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
520 {
521 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
522 {
523 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
524 continue;
525 if (nmatch == k)
526 {
527 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
528 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
529 }
530 k++;
531 }
532 }
533 }
534 if (nmatch == -1)
535 return k;
536 return 0;
537 }
538
539 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
540 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
541 {
542 unsigned char *clist, *p;
543 size_t i;
544 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
545 * while curve ids < 32
546 */
547 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
548 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
549 if (!clist)
550 return 0;
551 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
552 {
553 unsigned long idmask;
554 int id;
555 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
556 idmask = 1L << id;
557 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
558 {
559 OPENSSL_free(clist);
560 return 0;
561 }
562 dup_list |= idmask;
563 s2n(id, p);
564 }
565 if (*pext)
566 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
567 *pext = clist;
568 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
569 return 1;
570 }
571
572 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
573
574 typedef struct
575 {
576 size_t nidcnt;
577 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
578 } nid_cb_st;
579
580 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
581 {
582 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
583 size_t i;
584 int nid;
585 char etmp[20];
586 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
587 return 0;
588 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
589 return 0;
590 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
591 etmp[len] = 0;
592 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
593 if (nid == NID_undef)
594 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
595 if (nid == NID_undef)
596 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
597 if (nid == NID_undef)
598 return 0;
599 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
600 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
601 return 0;
602 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
603 return 1;
604 }
605 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
606 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
607 const char *str)
608 {
609 nid_cb_st ncb;
610 ncb.nidcnt = 0;
611 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
612 return 0;
613 if (pext == NULL)
614 return 1;
615 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
616 }
617 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
618 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
619 EC_KEY *ec)
620 {
621 int is_prime, id;
622 const EC_GROUP *grp;
623 const EC_METHOD *meth;
624 if (!ec)
625 return 0;
626 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
627 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
628 if (!grp)
629 return 0;
630 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
631 if (!meth)
632 return 0;
633 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
634 is_prime = 1;
635 else
636 is_prime = 0;
637 /* Determine curve ID */
638 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
639 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
640 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
641 if (id)
642 {
643 curve_id[0] = 0;
644 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
645 }
646 else
647 {
648 curve_id[0] = 0xff;
649 if (is_prime)
650 curve_id[1] = 0x01;
651 else
652 curve_id[1] = 0x02;
653 }
654 if (comp_id)
655 {
656 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
657 return 0;
658 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
659 {
660 if (is_prime)
661 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
662 else
663 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
664 }
665 else
666 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
667 }
668 return 1;
669 }
670 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
671 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
672 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
673 {
674 const unsigned char *p;
675 size_t plen, i;
676 int j;
677 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
678 * is supported (see RFC4492).
679 */
680 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
681 {
682 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
683 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
684 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
685 {
686 if (*comp_id == *p)
687 break;
688 }
689 if (i == plen)
690 return 0;
691 }
692 if (!curve_id)
693 return 1;
694 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
695 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
696 {
697 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
698 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
699 {
700 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
701 break;
702 }
703 if (i == plen)
704 return 0;
705 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
706 if (!s->server)
707 break;
708 }
709 return 1;
710 }
711
712 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
713 size_t *pformatslen)
714 {
715 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
716 * use default */
717 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
718 {
719 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
720 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
721 }
722 else
723 {
724 *pformats = ecformats_default;
725 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
726 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
727 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
728 else
729 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
730 }
731 }
732
733 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
734 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
735 */
736 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
737 {
738 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
739 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
740 int rv;
741 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
742 if (!pkey)
743 return 0;
744 /* If not EC nothing to do */
745 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
746 {
747 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
748 return 1;
749 }
750 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
751 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
752 if (!rv)
753 return 0;
754 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
755 * supported curves extension.
756 */
757 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
758 if (!rv)
759 return 0;
760 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
761 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
762 */
763 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
764 {
765 int check_md;
766 size_t i;
767 CERT *c = s->cert;
768 if (curve_id[0])
769 return 0;
770 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
771 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
772 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
773 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
774 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
775 else
776 return 0; /* Should never happen */
777 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
778 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
779 break;
780 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
781 return 0;
782 if (set_ee_md == 2)
783 {
784 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
785 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
786 else
787 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
788 }
789 }
790 return rv;
791 }
792 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
793 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
794 {
795 unsigned char curve_id[2];
796 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
797 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
798 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
799 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
800 return 1;
801 #endif
802 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
803 * no other curves permitted.
804 */
805 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
806 {
807 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
808 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
809 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
810 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
811 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
812 else
813 return 0;
814 curve_id[0] = 0;
815 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
816 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
817 return 0;
818 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
819 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
820 return 1;
821 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
822 else
823 {
824 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
825 if (!ec)
826 return 0;
827 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
828 return 0;
829 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
830 return 1;
831 return 0;
832 }
833
834 }
835 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
836 {
837 /* Need a shared curve */
838 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
839 return 1;
840 else return 0;
841 }
842 if (!ec)
843 {
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
845 return 1;
846 else
847 return 0;
848 }
849 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
850 return 0;
851 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
852 #if 0
853 return 1;
854 #else
855 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
856 #endif
857 }
858
859 #else
860
861 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
862 {
863 return 1;
864 }
865
866 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
867
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
869
870 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
871 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
872 */
873
874 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
875 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
876 #else
877 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
878 #endif
879
880 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
881 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
882 #else
883 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
884 #endif
885
886 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
887 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
888 #else
889 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
890 #endif
891
892 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
893 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
894 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
895 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
896
897 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
899 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
900 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
901 #endif
902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
903 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
904 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
905 #endif
906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
907 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
908 #endif
909 };
910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
911 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
912 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
913 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
914 };
915 #endif
916 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
917 {
918 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
919 * preferences.
920 */
921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
922 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
923 {
924 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
925 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
926 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
927
928 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
929 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
930 return 2;
931
932 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
933 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
934 return 2;
935 }
936 #endif
937 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
938 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
939 {
940 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
941 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
942 }
943 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
944 {
945 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
946 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
947 }
948 else
949 {
950 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
951 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
952 }
953 }
954 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
955 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
956 */
957 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
958 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
959 {
960 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
961 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
962 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
963 /* Should never happen */
964 if (sigalg == -1)
965 return -1;
966 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
967 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
968 {
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
970 return 0;
971 }
972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
973 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
974 {
975 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
976 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
977 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
978 return 0;
979 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
980 {
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
982 return 0;
983 }
984 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
985 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
986 {
987 if (curve_id[0])
988 return 0;
989 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
990 {
991 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
992 {
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
994 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
995 return 0;
996 }
997 }
998 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
999 {
1000 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1001 {
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1003 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1004 return 0;
1005 }
1006 }
1007 else
1008 return 0;
1009 }
1010 }
1011 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1012 return 0;
1013 #endif
1014
1015 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1016 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1017 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1018 {
1019 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1020 break;
1021 }
1022 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1023 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1024 {
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1026 return 0;
1027 }
1028 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1029 if (*pmd == NULL)
1030 {
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1032 return 0;
1033 }
1034 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1035 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1036 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1037 (void *)sig))
1038 {
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1040 return 0;
1041 }
1042 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1043 * wish.
1044 */
1045 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1046 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1047 return 1;
1048 }
1049
1050 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1051 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1052 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1053 * session and not global settings.
1054 *
1055 */
1056 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1057 {
1058 CERT *c = s->cert;
1059 c->mask_a = 0;
1060 c->mask_k = 0;
1061 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1062 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1063 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1064 else
1065 c->mask_ssl = 0;
1066 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1067 /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1068 * signature algorithms.
1069 */
1070 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1071 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1072 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1073 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1074 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1077 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1078 {
1079 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1080 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1081 }
1082 #endif
1083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1084 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1085 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1086 {
1087 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1088 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1089 }
1090 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1091 c->valid = 1;
1092 }
1093
1094 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1095 {
1096 CERT *ct = s->cert;
1097 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1098 return 1;
1099 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1100 }
1101
1102 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1103 {
1104 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1105 return 0;
1106 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1107 }
1108
1109 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1110 {
1111 int extdatalen=0;
1112 unsigned char *ret = p;
1113 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1114 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1115 int using_ecc = 0;
1116 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1117 {
1118 int i;
1119 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1120 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1121
1122 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1123 {
1124 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1125
1126 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1127 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1128 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1129 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1130 {
1131 using_ecc = 1;
1132 break;
1133 }
1134 }
1135 }
1136 #endif
1137
1138 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1139 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1140 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1141 return p;
1142
1143 ret+=2;
1144
1145 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1146
1147 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1148 {
1149 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1150 unsigned long size_str;
1151 long lenmax;
1152
1153 /* check for enough space.
1154 4 for the servername type and entension length
1155 2 for servernamelist length
1156 1 for the hostname type
1157 2 for hostname length
1158 + hostname length
1159 */
1160
1161 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1162 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1163 return NULL;
1164
1165 /* extension type and length */
1166 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1167 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1168
1169 /* length of servername list */
1170 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1171
1172 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1173 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1174 s2n(size_str,ret);
1175 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1176 ret+=size_str;
1177 }
1178
1179 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1180 if (s->renegotiate)
1181 {
1182 int el;
1183
1184 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1185 {
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1187 return NULL;
1188 }
1189
1190 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1191
1192 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1193 s2n(el,ret);
1194
1195 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1196 {
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1198 return NULL;
1199 }
1200
1201 ret += el;
1202 }
1203
1204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1205 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1206 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1207 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1208
1209 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1210 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1211 {
1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1213 return NULL;
1214 }
1215
1216 /* check for enough space.
1217 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1218 1 for the srp user identity
1219 + srp user identity length
1220 */
1221 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1222
1223 /* fill in the extension */
1224 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1225 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1226 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1227 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1228 ret+=login_len;
1229 }
1230 #endif
1231
1232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1233 if (using_ecc)
1234 {
1235 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1236 long lenmax;
1237 const unsigned char *plist;
1238 size_t plistlen;
1239 size_t i;
1240 unsigned char *etmp;
1241
1242 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1243
1244 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1245 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1246 if (plistlen > 255)
1247 {
1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1249 return NULL;
1250 }
1251
1252 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1253 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1254 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1255 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1256 ret+=plistlen;
1257
1258 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1259 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1260 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1261
1262 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1263 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1264 if (plistlen > 65532)
1265 {
1266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1267 return NULL;
1268 }
1269
1270
1271 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1272 etmp = ret + 4;
1273 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1274 for (i = 0; i < plistlen; i += 2, plist += 2)
1275 {
1276 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, plist, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1277 {
1278 *etmp++ = plist[0];
1279 *etmp++ = plist[1];
1280 }
1281 }
1282
1283 plistlen = etmp - ret - 4;
1284
1285 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1286 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1287 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1288 * resolves this to two bytes.
1289 */
1290 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1291 s2n(plistlen, ret);
1292 ret+=plistlen;
1293 }
1294 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1295
1296 if (tls_use_ticket(s))
1297 {
1298 int ticklen;
1299 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1300 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1301 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1302 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1303 {
1304 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1305 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1306 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1307 return NULL;
1308 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1309 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1310 ticklen);
1311 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1312 }
1313 else
1314 ticklen = 0;
1315 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1316 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1317 goto skip_ext;
1318 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1319 * rest for ticket
1320 */
1321 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1322 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1323 s2n(ticklen,ret);
1324 if (ticklen)
1325 {
1326 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1327 ret += ticklen;
1328 }
1329 }
1330 skip_ext:
1331
1332 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1333 {
1334 size_t salglen;
1335 const unsigned char *salg;
1336 unsigned char *etmp;
1337 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1338 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1339 return NULL;
1340 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1341 etmp = ret;
1342 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1343 ret += 4;
1344 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1345 /* Fill in lengths */
1346 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1347 s2n(salglen, etmp);
1348 ret += salglen;
1349 }
1350
1351 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1352 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1353 {
1354 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1355
1356 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1357 return NULL;
1358 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1359 return NULL;
1360
1361 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1362 s2n(col + 2, ret);
1363 s2n(col, ret);
1364 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1365 ret += col;
1366 }
1367 #endif
1368
1369 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1370 {
1371 int i;
1372 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1373 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1374
1375 idlen = 0;
1376 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1377 {
1378 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1379 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1380 if (itmp <= 0)
1381 return NULL;
1382 idlen += itmp + 2;
1383 }
1384
1385 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1386 {
1387 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1388 if (extlen < 0)
1389 return NULL;
1390 }
1391 else
1392 extlen = 0;
1393
1394 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1395 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1396 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1397 return NULL;
1398 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1399 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1400 s2n(idlen, ret);
1401 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1402 {
1403 /* save position of id len */
1404 unsigned char *q = ret;
1405 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1406 /* skip over id len */
1407 ret += 2;
1408 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1409 /* write id len */
1410 s2n(itmp, q);
1411 }
1412 s2n(extlen, ret);
1413 if (extlen > 0)
1414 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1415 }
1416
1417 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1418 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1419 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1420 s2n(1,ret);
1421 /* Set mode:
1422 * 1: peer may send requests
1423 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1424 */
1425 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1426 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1427 else
1428 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1429 #endif
1430
1431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1432 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1433 {
1434 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1435 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1436 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1437 return NULL;
1438 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1439 s2n(0,ret);
1440 }
1441 #endif
1442
1443 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1444 {
1445 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1446 return NULL;
1447 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1448 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1449 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1450 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1451 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1452 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1453 }
1454
1455 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1456 {
1457 int el;
1458
1459 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1460
1461 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1462
1463 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1464 s2n(el,ret);
1465
1466 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1467 {
1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1469 return NULL;
1470 }
1471 ret += el;
1472 }
1473
1474 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1475 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1476 {
1477 size_t i;
1478 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1479
1480 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1481 {
1482 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1483 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1484
1485 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1486 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1487 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1488 if (record->fn1)
1489 {
1490 int cb_retval = 0;
1491 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1492 &out, &outlen, al,
1493 record->arg);
1494 if (cb_retval == 0)
1495 return NULL; /* error */
1496 if (cb_retval == -1)
1497 continue; /* skip this extension */
1498 }
1499 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1500 return NULL;
1501 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1502 s2n(outlen, ret);
1503 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1504 ret += outlen;
1505 }
1506 }
1507 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1508 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1509 s2n(0,ret);
1510 #endif
1511 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
1512 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1513 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1514 *
1515 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1516 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1517 */
1518 {
1519 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1520 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1521 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does
1522 * not. */
1523 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1524 hlen -= 5;
1525 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1526 {
1527 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1528 if (hlen >= 4)
1529 hlen -= 4;
1530 else
1531 hlen = 0;
1532
1533 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1534 s2n(hlen, ret);
1535 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1536 ret += hlen;
1537 }
1538 }
1539 #endif
1540
1541 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1542 return p;
1543
1544 s2n(extdatalen,p);
1545 return ret;
1546 }
1547
1548 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1549 {
1550 int extdatalen=0;
1551 unsigned char *ret = p;
1552 size_t i;
1553 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1555 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1556 #endif
1557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1558 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1559 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1560 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1561 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1562 #endif
1563 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1564 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1565 return p;
1566
1567 ret+=2;
1568 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1569
1570 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1571 {
1572 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1573
1574 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1575 s2n(0,ret);
1576 }
1577
1578 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1579 {
1580 int el;
1581
1582 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1583 {
1584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1585 return NULL;
1586 }
1587
1588 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1589
1590 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1591 s2n(el,ret);
1592
1593 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1594 {
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1596 return NULL;
1597 }
1598
1599 ret += el;
1600 }
1601
1602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1603 if (using_ecc)
1604 {
1605 const unsigned char *plist;
1606 size_t plistlen;
1607 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1608 long lenmax;
1609
1610 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1611
1612 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1613 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1614 if (plistlen > 255)
1615 {
1616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1617 return NULL;
1618 }
1619
1620 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1621 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1622 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1623 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1624 ret+=plistlen;
1625
1626 }
1627 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1628 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1629
1630 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
1631 {
1632 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1633 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1634 s2n(0,ret);
1635 }
1636
1637 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1638 {
1639 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1640 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1641 s2n(0,ret);
1642 }
1643
1644 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1645 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1646 {
1647 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1648
1649 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1650 return NULL;
1651 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1652 return NULL;
1653
1654 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1655 s2n(sol + 2, ret);
1656 s2n(sol, ret);
1657 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1658 ret += sol;
1659 }
1660 #endif
1661
1662 if(s->srtp_profile)
1663 {
1664 int el;
1665
1666 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1667
1668 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1669
1670 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1671 s2n(el,ret);
1672
1673 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1674 {
1675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1676 return NULL;
1677 }
1678 ret+=el;
1679 }
1680
1681 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1682 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1683 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1684 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1685 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1686 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1687 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1688 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1689 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1690 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1691 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1692 ret+=36;
1693
1694 }
1695
1696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1697 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1698 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1699 {
1700 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1701 s2n(1,ret);
1702 /* Set mode:
1703 * 1: peer may send requests
1704 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1705 */
1706 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1707 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1708 else
1709 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1710
1711 }
1712 #endif
1713
1714 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1715 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1716 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1717 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1718 {
1719 const unsigned char *npa;
1720 unsigned int npalen;
1721 int r;
1722
1723 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1724 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1725 {
1726 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1727 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1728 s2n(npalen,ret);
1729 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1730 ret += npalen;
1731 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1732 }
1733 }
1734 #endif
1735
1736 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
1737 {
1738 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1739 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1740 int cb_retval = 0;
1741
1742 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
1743
1744 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1745 if (!record->fn2)
1746 continue;
1747 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1748 &out, &outlen, al,
1749 record->arg);
1750 if (cb_retval == 0)
1751 return NULL; /* error */
1752 if (cb_retval == -1)
1753 continue; /* skip this extension */
1754 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1755 return NULL;
1756 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1757 s2n(outlen, ret);
1758 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1759 ret += outlen;
1760 }
1761 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1762 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1763 {
1764 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
1765 * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
1766 */
1767 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
1768 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1769 else
1770 {
1771 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1772 s2n(0,ret);
1773 }
1774 }
1775 #endif
1776
1777 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1778 {
1779 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1780 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1781
1782 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1783 return NULL;
1784 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1785 s2n(3 + len,ret);
1786 s2n(1 + len,ret);
1787 *ret++ = len;
1788 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1789 ret += len;
1790 }
1791
1792 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1793 return p;
1794
1795 s2n(extdatalen,p);
1796 return ret;
1797 }
1798
1799 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1800 * ClientHello.
1801 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1802 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1803 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1804 * return.
1805 *
1806 * returns: 0 on success. */
1807 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1808 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1809 {
1810 unsigned i;
1811 unsigned proto_len;
1812 const unsigned char *selected;
1813 unsigned char selected_len;
1814 int r;
1815
1816 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1817 return 0;
1818
1819 if (data_len < 2)
1820 goto parse_error;
1821
1822 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1823 * length-prefixed strings. */
1824 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1825 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1826 data_len -= 2;
1827 data += 2;
1828 if (data_len != i)
1829 goto parse_error;
1830
1831 if (data_len < 2)
1832 goto parse_error;
1833
1834 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1835 {
1836 proto_len = data[i];
1837 i++;
1838
1839 if (proto_len == 0)
1840 goto parse_error;
1841
1842 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1843 goto parse_error;
1844
1845 i += proto_len;
1846 }
1847
1848 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1849 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1850 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1851 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1852 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1853 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1854 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1855 {
1856 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1857 return -1;
1858 }
1859 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1860 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1861 }
1862 return 0;
1863
1864 parse_error:
1865 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1866 return -1;
1867 }
1868
1869 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1870 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1871 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1872 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1873 * SNI,
1874 * elliptic_curves
1875 * ec_point_formats
1876 *
1877 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1878 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1879 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1880 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1881 */
1882 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1883 unsigned short type, size;
1884 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1885 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1886 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1887 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1888 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1889 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1890 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1891
1892 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1893 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1894 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1895 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1896 };
1897
1898 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1899 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1900 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1901 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1902 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1903 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1904 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1905 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1906 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1907 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1908 };
1909
1910 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1911 return;
1912 data += 2;
1913
1914 if (data > (d+n-4))
1915 return;
1916 n2s(data,type);
1917 n2s(data,size);
1918
1919 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1920 return;
1921
1922 if (data+size > d+n)
1923 return;
1924 data += size;
1925
1926 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1927 {
1928 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1929 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1930
1931 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1932 return;
1933 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1934 return;
1935 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1936 return;
1937 }
1938 else
1939 {
1940 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1941
1942 if (data + len != d+n)
1943 return;
1944 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1945 return;
1946 }
1947
1948 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1949 }
1950 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1951
1952 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1953 {
1954 unsigned short type;
1955 unsigned short size;
1956 unsigned short len;
1957 unsigned char *data = *p;
1958 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1959 size_t i;
1960
1961 s->servername_done = 0;
1962 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1964 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1965 #endif
1966
1967 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1968 {
1969 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1970 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1971 }
1972
1973 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1974 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1975 if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1976 {
1977 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
1978 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1979 }
1980
1981 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1982 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1983 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1984 #endif
1985
1986 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1987 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1988 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1989 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1990
1991 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1992 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1993 {
1994 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1995 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1996 }
1997 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1998 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1999 {
2000 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2001 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2002 }
2003 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2004 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2005 {
2006 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2007 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2008 }
2009
2010 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2011 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2012 #endif
2013
2014 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2015 goto ri_check;
2016 n2s(data,len);
2017
2018 if (data > (d+n-len))
2019 goto ri_check;
2020
2021 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2022 {
2023 n2s(data,type);
2024 n2s(data,size);
2025
2026 if (data+size > (d+n))
2027 goto ri_check;
2028 #if 0
2029 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2030 #endif
2031 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2032 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2033 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2034 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2035
2036 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2037 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2038 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2039 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2040 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2041 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2042 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2043 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2044 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2045 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2046 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2047 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2048 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2049 the value of the Host: field.
2050 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2051 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2052 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2053 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2054
2055 */
2056
2057 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2058 {
2059 unsigned char *sdata;
2060 int servname_type;
2061 int dsize;
2062
2063 if (size < 2)
2064 {
2065 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2066 return 0;
2067 }
2068 n2s(data,dsize);
2069 size -= 2;
2070 if (dsize > size )
2071 {
2072 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2073 return 0;
2074 }
2075
2076 sdata = data;
2077 while (dsize > 3)
2078 {
2079 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2080 n2s(sdata,len);
2081 dsize -= 3;
2082
2083 if (len > dsize)
2084 {
2085 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2086 return 0;
2087 }
2088 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2089 switch (servname_type)
2090 {
2091 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2092 if (!s->hit)
2093 {
2094 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2095 {
2096 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2097 return 0;
2098 }
2099 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2100 {
2101 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2102 return 0;
2103 }
2104 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2105 {
2106 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2107 return 0;
2108 }
2109 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2110 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2111 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2112 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2113 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2114 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2115 return 0;
2116 }
2117 s->servername_done = 1;
2118
2119 }
2120 else
2121 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2122 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2123 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2124
2125 break;
2126
2127 default:
2128 break;
2129 }
2130
2131 dsize -= len;
2132 }
2133 if (dsize != 0)
2134 {
2135 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2136 return 0;
2137 }
2138
2139 }
2140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2141 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2142 {
2143 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2144 {
2145 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2146 return 0;
2147 }
2148 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2149 {
2150 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2151 return 0;
2152 }
2153 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2154 return -1;
2155 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2156 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2157
2158 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2159 {
2160 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2161 return 0;
2162 }
2163 }
2164 #endif
2165
2166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2167 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2168 {
2169 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2170 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2171
2172 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2173 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2174 {
2175 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2176 return 0;
2177 }
2178 if (!s->hit)
2179 {
2180 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2181 {
2182 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2183 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2184 }
2185 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2186 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2187 {
2188 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2189 return 0;
2190 }
2191 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2192 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2193 }
2194 #if 0
2195 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2196 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2197 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2198 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2199 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2200 #endif
2201 }
2202 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2203 {
2204 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2205 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2206 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2207
2208 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2209 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2210 {
2211 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2212 return 0;
2213 }
2214 if (!s->hit)
2215 {
2216 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2217 {
2218 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2219 return 0;
2220 }
2221 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2222 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2223 {
2224 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2225 return 0;
2226 }
2227 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2228 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2229 }
2230 #if 0
2231 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2232 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2233 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2234 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2235 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2236 #endif
2237 }
2238 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2239 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2240 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2241 {
2242 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2243
2244 if (size < 2)
2245 {
2246 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2247 return 0;
2248 }
2249 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2250 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2251 {
2252 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2253 return 0;
2254 }
2255
2256 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2257 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2258 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2259 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2260 else
2261 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2262 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2263 {
2264 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2265 return 0;
2266 }
2267 }
2268 #endif
2269 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2270 {
2271 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2272 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2273 {
2274 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2275 return 0;
2276 }
2277 }
2278 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2279 {
2280 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2281 return 0;
2282 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2283 }
2284 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2285 {
2286 int dsize;
2287 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2288 {
2289 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2290 return 0;
2291 }
2292 n2s(data,dsize);
2293 size -= 2;
2294 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2295 {
2296 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2297 return 0;
2298 }
2299 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2300 {
2301 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2302 return 0;
2303 }
2304 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2305 * error.
2306 */
2307 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2308 {
2309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2310 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2311 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2312 return 0;
2313 }
2314 }
2315 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2316 {
2317
2318 if (size < 5)
2319 {
2320 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2321 return 0;
2322 }
2323
2324 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2325 size--;
2326 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2327 {
2328 const unsigned char *sdata;
2329 int dsize;
2330 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2331 n2s(data,dsize);
2332 size -= 2;
2333 if (dsize > size )
2334 {
2335 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2336 return 0;
2337 }
2338 while (dsize > 0)
2339 {
2340 OCSP_RESPID *id;
2341 int idsize;
2342 if (dsize < 4)
2343 {
2344 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2345 return 0;
2346 }
2347 n2s(data, idsize);
2348 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2349 size -= 2 + idsize;
2350 if (dsize < 0)
2351 {
2352 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2353 return 0;
2354 }
2355 sdata = data;
2356 data += idsize;
2357 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2358 &sdata, idsize);
2359 if (!id)
2360 {
2361 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2362 return 0;
2363 }
2364 if (data != sdata)
2365 {
2366 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2367 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2368 return 0;
2369 }
2370 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2371 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2372 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2373 {
2374 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2375 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2376 return 0;
2377 }
2378 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2379 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2380 {
2381 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2382 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2383 return 0;
2384 }
2385 }
2386
2387 /* Read in request_extensions */
2388 if (size < 2)
2389 {
2390 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2391 return 0;
2392 }
2393 n2s(data,dsize);
2394 size -= 2;
2395 if (dsize != size)
2396 {
2397 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2398 return 0;
2399 }
2400 sdata = data;
2401 if (dsize > 0)
2402 {
2403 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2404 {
2405 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2406 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2407 }
2408
2409 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2410 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2411 &sdata, dsize);
2412 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2413 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2414 {
2415 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2416 return 0;
2417 }
2418 }
2419 }
2420 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2421 * so ignore it.
2422 */
2423 else
2424 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2425 }
2426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2427 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2428 {
2429 switch(data[0])
2430 {
2431 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2432 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2433 break;
2434 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2435 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2436 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2437 break;
2438 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2439 return 0;
2440 }
2441 }
2442 #endif
2443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2444 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2445 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2446 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2447 {
2448 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2449 * renegotiation.
2450 *
2451 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2452 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2453 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2454 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2455 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2456 * anything like that, but this might change).
2457
2458 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2459 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2460 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2461 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2462 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2463 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2464 }
2465 #endif
2466
2467 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2468 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2469 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2470 {
2471 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2472 return 0;
2473 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2474 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2475 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2476 #endif
2477 }
2478
2479 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2480 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2481 {
2482 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2483 al))
2484 return 0;
2485 }
2486 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2487 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2488 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2489 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2490 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2491 */
2492 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2493 {
2494 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2495
2496 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2497 {
2498 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2499 if (type == record->ext_type)
2500 {
2501 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2502 return 0;
2503 }
2504 }
2505 }
2506 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2507 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2508 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2509 #endif
2510
2511 data+=size;
2512 }
2513
2514 *p = data;
2515
2516 ri_check:
2517
2518 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2519
2520 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2521 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2522 {
2523 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2525 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2526 return 0;
2527 }
2528 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2529 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2530 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2531
2532 return 1;
2533 }
2534
2535 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2536 {
2537 int al = -1;
2538 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2539 {
2540 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2541 return 0;
2542 }
2543
2544 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2545 {
2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2547 return 0;
2548 }
2549 return 1;
2550 }
2551
2552 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2553 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2554 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2555 * the length of the block. */
2556 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2557 {
2558 unsigned int off = 0;
2559
2560 while (off < len)
2561 {
2562 if (d[off] == 0)
2563 return 0;
2564 off += d[off];
2565 off++;
2566 }
2567
2568 return off == len;
2569 }
2570 #endif
2571
2572 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2573 {
2574 unsigned short length;
2575 unsigned short type;
2576 unsigned short size;
2577 unsigned char *data = *p;
2578 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2579 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2580
2581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2582 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2583 #endif
2584
2585 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2586 {
2587 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2588 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2589 }
2590
2591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2592 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2593 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2594 #endif
2595
2596 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2597 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2598 #endif
2599
2600 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2601 goto ri_check;
2602
2603 n2s(data,length);
2604 if (data+length != d+n)
2605 {
2606 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2607 return 0;
2608 }
2609
2610 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2611 {
2612 n2s(data,type);
2613 n2s(data,size);
2614
2615 if (data+size > (d+n))
2616 goto ri_check;
2617
2618 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2619 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2620 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2621
2622 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2623 {
2624 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2625 {
2626 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2627 return 0;
2628 }
2629 tlsext_servername = 1;
2630 }
2631
2632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2633 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2634 {
2635 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2636 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2637
2638 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2639 {
2640 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2641 return 0;
2642 }
2643 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2644 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2645 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2646 {
2647 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2648 return 0;
2649 }
2650 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2651 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2652 #if 0
2653 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2654 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2655 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2656 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2657 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2658 #endif
2659 }
2660 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2661
2662 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2663 {
2664 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2665 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2666 {
2667 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2668 return 0;
2669 }
2670 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
2671 {
2672 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2673 return 0;
2674 }
2675 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2676 }
2677 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2678 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2679 {
2680 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2681
2682 if (size < 2)
2683 {
2684 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2685 return 0;
2686 }
2687 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2688 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2689 {
2690 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2691 return 0;
2692 }
2693
2694 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2695 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2696 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2697 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2698 else
2699 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2700
2701 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2702 {
2703 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2704 return 0;
2705 }
2706 }
2707 #endif
2708 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2709 {
2710 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2711 * a status request message.
2712 */
2713 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2714 {
2715 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2716 return 0;
2717 }
2718 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2719 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2720 }
2721 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2722 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2723 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2724 {
2725 unsigned char *selected;
2726 unsigned char selected_len;
2727
2728 /* We must have requested it. */
2729 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2730 {
2731 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2732 return 0;
2733 }
2734 /* The data must be valid */
2735 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2736 {
2737 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2738 return 0;
2739 }
2740 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2741 {
2742 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2743 return 0;
2744 }
2745 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2746 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2747 {
2748 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2749 return 0;
2750 }
2751 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2752 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2753 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2754 }
2755 #endif
2756
2757 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2758 {
2759 unsigned len;
2760
2761 /* We must have requested it. */
2762 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2763 {
2764 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2765 return 0;
2766 }
2767 if (size < 4)
2768 {
2769 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2770 return 0;
2771 }
2772 /* The extension data consists of:
2773 * uint16 list_length
2774 * uint8 proto_length;
2775 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2776 len = data[0];
2777 len <<= 8;
2778 len |= data[1];
2779 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2780 {
2781 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2782 return 0;
2783 }
2784 len = data[2];
2785 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2786 {
2787 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2788 return 0;
2789 }
2790 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2791 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2792 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2793 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2794 {
2795 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2796 return 0;
2797 }
2798 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2799 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2800 }
2801
2802 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2803 {
2804 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2805 return 0;
2806 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2807 }
2808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2809 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2810 {
2811 switch(data[0])
2812 {
2813 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2814 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2815 break;
2816 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2817 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2818 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2819 break;
2820 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2821 return 0;
2822 }
2823 }
2824 #endif
2825 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2826 {
2827 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2828 al))
2829 return 0;
2830 }
2831 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2832 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2833 * callback */
2834 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2835 {
2836 size_t i;
2837 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2838
2839 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2840 {
2841 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2842 if (record->ext_type == type)
2843 {
2844 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2845 return 0;
2846 break;
2847 }
2848 }
2849 }
2850 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2851 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2852 {
2853 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2854 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
2855 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2856 }
2857 #endif
2858
2859 data += size;
2860 }
2861
2862 if (data != d+n)
2863 {
2864 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2865 return 0;
2866 }
2867
2868 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2869 {
2870 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2871 {
2872 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2873 {
2874 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2875 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2876 {
2877 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2878 return 0;
2879 }
2880 }
2881 else
2882 {
2883 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2884 return 0;
2885 }
2886 }
2887 }
2888
2889 *p = data;
2890
2891 ri_check:
2892
2893 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2894 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2895 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2896 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2897 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2898 * absence on initial connect only.
2899 */
2900 if (!renegotiate_seen
2901 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2902 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2903 {
2904 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2906 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2907 return 0;
2908 }
2909
2910 return 1;
2911 }
2912
2913
2914 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2915 {
2916
2917 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2918 {
2919 int r = 1;
2920
2921 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2922 {
2923 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2924 if (!r)
2925 return -1;
2926 }
2927
2928 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2929 {
2930 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2931 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2932
2933 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2934 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2935 else
2936 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2937 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2938 {
2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2940 return -1;
2941 }
2942 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2943 }
2944
2945 if (r == 2)
2946 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2947 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2948 }
2949 #endif
2950
2951 return 1;
2952 }
2953
2954 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2955 {
2956 return 1;
2957 }
2958
2959 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2960 {
2961 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2962 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2963
2964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2965 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2966 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2967 */
2968 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2969 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2970 */
2971 #endif
2972
2973 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2974 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2975 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2976 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2977
2978 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2979 {
2980 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2981 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2982 * so this has to happen here in
2983 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2984
2985 int r = 1;
2986
2987 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2988 {
2989 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2990 if (!r)
2991 {
2992 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2993 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2994 goto err;
2995 }
2996 }
2997
2998 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2999 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
3000 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
3001
3002 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3003 {
3004 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
3005 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
3006 {
3007 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
3008 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
3009
3010 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3011 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3012 else
3013 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3014 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3015 {
3016 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3017 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3018 goto err;
3019 }
3020 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3021 }
3022 }
3023
3024 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3025 {
3026 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3027 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3028 * abort the handshake.
3029 */
3030 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3031 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3032 }
3033 }
3034
3035 err:
3036 #endif
3037 switch (ret)
3038 {
3039 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3040 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3041 return -1;
3042
3043 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3044 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3045 return 1;
3046
3047 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3048 s->servername_done=0;
3049 default:
3050 return 1;
3051 }
3052 }
3053
3054 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3055 {
3056 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3057 int al;
3058
3059 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3060 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3061 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3062 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3063 */
3064 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3065 {
3066 int r;
3067 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3068 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3069 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3070 if (certpkey == NULL)
3071 {
3072 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3073 return 1;
3074 }
3075 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3076 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3077 */
3078 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3079 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3080 switch (r)
3081 {
3082 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3083 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3084 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3085 break;
3086 /* status request response should be sent */
3087 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3088 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3089 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3090 else
3091 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3092 break;
3093 /* something bad happened */
3094 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3095 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3096 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3097 goto err;
3098 }
3099 }
3100 else
3101 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3102
3103 err:
3104 switch (ret)
3105 {
3106 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3107 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3108 return -1;
3109
3110 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3111 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3112 return 1;
3113
3114 default:
3115 return 1;
3116 }
3117 }
3118
3119 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3120 {
3121 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3122 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3123
3124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3125 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3126 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3127 * it must contain uncompressed.
3128 */
3129 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3130 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3131 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3132 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3133 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3134 {
3135 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3136 size_t i;
3137 unsigned char *list;
3138 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3139 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3140 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3141 {
3142 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3143 {
3144 found_uncompressed = 1;
3145 break;
3146 }
3147 }
3148 if (!found_uncompressed)
3149 {
3150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3151 return -1;
3152 }
3153 }
3154 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3155 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3156
3157 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3158 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3159 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3160 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3161
3162 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3163 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3164 {
3165 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3166 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3167
3168 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3169 {
3170 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3171 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3172 }
3173
3174 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3175 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3176 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3177 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3178 {
3179 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3180 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3181 }
3182 }
3183 #endif
3184
3185 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3186 * tell the callback
3187 */
3188 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3189 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3190 {
3191 int r;
3192 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3193 * there is no response.
3194 */
3195 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3196 {
3197 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3198 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3199 }
3200 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3201 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3202 if (r == 0)
3203 {
3204 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3205 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3206 }
3207 if (r < 0)
3208 {
3209 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3210 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3211 }
3212 }
3213
3214 switch (ret)
3215 {
3216 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3217 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3218 return -1;
3219
3220 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3221 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3222 return 1;
3223
3224 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3225 s->servername_done=0;
3226 default:
3227 return 1;
3228 }
3229 }
3230
3231 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3232 {
3233 int al = -1;
3234 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3235 return 1;
3236 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3237 {
3238 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3239 return 0;
3240 }
3241
3242 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3243 {
3244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3245 return 0;
3246 }
3247 return 1;
3248 }
3249
3250 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3251 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3252 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3253 *
3254 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3255 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3256 * extension, if any.
3257 * len: the length of the session ID.
3258 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3259 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3260 * point to the resulting session.
3261 *
3262 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3263 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3264 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3265 *
3266 * Returns:
3267 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3268 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3269 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3270 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3271 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3272 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3273 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3274 *
3275 * Side effects:
3276 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3277 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3278 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3279 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3280 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3281 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3282 */
3283 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3284 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3285 {
3286 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3287 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3288 unsigned short i;
3289
3290 *ret = NULL;
3291 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3292
3293 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3294 * to permit stateful resumption.
3295 */
3296 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
3297 return 0;
3298 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3299 return 0;
3300 if (p >= limit)
3301 return -1;
3302 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3303 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
3304 {
3305 i = *(p++);
3306 p+= i;
3307 if (p >= limit)
3308 return -1;
3309 }
3310 /* Skip past cipher list */
3311 n2s(p, i);
3312 p+= i;
3313 if (p >= limit)
3314 return -1;
3315 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3316 i = *(p++);
3317 p += i;
3318 if (p > limit)
3319 return -1;
3320 /* Now at start of extensions */
3321 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3322 return 0;
3323 n2s(p, i);
3324 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3325 {
3326 unsigned short type, size;
3327 n2s(p, type);
3328 n2s(p, size);
3329 if (p + size > limit)
3330 return 0;
3331 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3332 {
3333 int r;
3334 if (size == 0)
3335 {
3336 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3337 * currently have one. */
3338 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3339 return 1;
3340 }
3341 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3342 {
3343 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3344 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3345 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3346 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3347 * calculate the master secret later. */
3348 return 2;
3349 }
3350 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3351 switch (r)
3352 {
3353 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3354 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3355 return 2;
3356 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3357 return r;
3358 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3359 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3360 return 3;
3361 default: /* fatal error */
3362 return -1;
3363 }
3364 }
3365 p += size;
3366 }
3367 return 0;
3368 }
3369
3370 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3371 *
3372 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3373 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3374 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3375 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3376 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3377 * point to the resulting session.
3378 *
3379 * Returns:
3380 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3381 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3382 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3383 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3384 */
3385 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3386 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3387 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3388 {
3389 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3390 unsigned char *sdec;
3391 const unsigned char *p;
3392 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3393 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3394 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3395 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3396 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3397 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3398 if (eticklen < 48)
3399 return 2;
3400 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3401 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3402 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3403 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3404 {
3405 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3406 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3407 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
3408 if (rv < 0)
3409 return -1;
3410 if (rv == 0)
3411 return 2;
3412 if (rv == 2)
3413 renew_ticket = 1;
3414 }
3415 else
3416 {
3417 /* Check key name matches */
3418 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3419 return 2;
3420 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3421 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3422 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3423 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3424 }
3425 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3426 * integrity checks on ticket.
3427 */
3428 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3429 if (mlen < 0)
3430 {
3431 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3432 return -1;
3433 }
3434 eticklen -= mlen;
3435 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3436 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3437 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3438 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3439 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3440 return 2;
3441 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3442 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3443 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3444 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3445 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3446 if (!sdec)
3447 {
3448 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3449 return -1;
3450 }
3451 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3452 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3453 return 2;
3454 slen += mlen;
3455 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3456 p = sdec;
3457
3458 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3459 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3460 if (sess)
3461 {
3462 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3463 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3464 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3465 * as required by standard.
3466 */
3467 if (sesslen)
3468 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3469 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3470 *psess = sess;
3471 if (renew_ticket)
3472 return 4;
3473 else
3474 return 3;
3475 }
3476 ERR_clear_error();
3477 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3478 * ticket. */
3479 return 2;
3480 }
3481
3482 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3483
3484 typedef struct
3485 {
3486 int nid;
3487 int id;
3488 } tls12_lookup;
3489
3490 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3491 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3492 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3493 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3494 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3495 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3496 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3497 };
3498
3499 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3500 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3501 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3502 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3503 };
3504
3505 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3506 {
3507 size_t i;
3508 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3509 {
3510 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3511 return table[i].id;
3512 }
3513 return -1;
3514 }
3515
3516 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3517 {
3518 size_t i;
3519 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3520 {
3521 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3522 return table[i].nid;
3523 }
3524 return NID_undef;
3525 }
3526
3527 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3528 {
3529 int sig_id, md_id;
3530 if (!md)
3531 return 0;
3532 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3533 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3534 if (md_id == -1)
3535 return 0;
3536 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3537 if (sig_id == -1)
3538 return 0;
3539 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3540 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3541 return 1;
3542 }
3543
3544 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3545 {
3546 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3547 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3548 }
3549
3550 typedef struct
3551 {
3552 int nid;
3553 int secbits;
3554 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
3555 } tls12_hash_info;
3556
3557 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3558 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3559 {NID_md5, 64, 0},
3560 #else
3561 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3562 #endif
3563 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3564 {NID_sha1, 80, 0},
3565 #else
3566 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3567 #endif
3568 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3569 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3570 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3571 #else
3572 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3573 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3574 #endif
3575 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3576 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3577 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3578 #else
3579 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3580 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3581 #endif
3582 };
3583
3584 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3585 {
3586 if (hash_alg == 0)
3587 return NULL;
3588 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3589 return NULL;
3590 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3591 }
3592
3593 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3594 {
3595 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3596 #ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
3597 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3598 return NULL;
3599 #endif
3600 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3601 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3602 return NULL;
3603 return inf->mfunc();
3604 }
3605
3606 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3607 {
3608 switch(sig_alg)
3609 {
3610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3611 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3612 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3613 #endif
3614 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3615 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3616 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3617 #endif
3618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3619 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3620 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3621 #endif
3622 }
3623 return -1;
3624 }
3625
3626 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3627 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3628 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3629 {
3630 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3631 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3632 return;
3633 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3634 {
3635 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3636 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3637 if (phash_nid)
3638 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3639 }
3640 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3641 {
3642 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3643 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3644 if (psign_nid)
3645 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3646 }
3647 if (psignhash_nid)
3648 {
3649 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3650 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3651 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3652 else
3653 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3654 }
3655 }
3656 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3657 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3658 {
3659 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3660 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3661 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3662 return 0;
3663 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3664 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3665 return 0;
3666 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3667 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3668 }
3669
3670 /* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
3671 * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
3672 * then RSA is disabled.
3673 */
3674
3675 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3676 {
3677 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3678 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3679 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3680 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
3681 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
3682 * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
3683 * if we have to.
3684 */
3685 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3686 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
3687 {
3688 switch(sigalgs[1])
3689 {
3690 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3691 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3692 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3693 have_rsa = 1;
3694 break;
3695 #endif
3696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3697 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3698 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3699 have_dsa = 1;
3700 break;
3701 #endif
3702 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3703 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3704 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3705 have_ecdsa = 1;
3706 break;
3707 #endif
3708 }
3709 }
3710 if (!have_rsa)
3711 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3712 if (!have_dsa)
3713 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3714 if (!have_ecdsa)
3715 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3716 }
3717
3718 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3719 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3720 {
3721 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3722 size_t i;
3723 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
3724 {
3725 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
3726 {
3727 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3728 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3729 }
3730 }
3731 return tmpout - out;
3732 }
3733
3734 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3735 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3736 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3737 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3738 {
3739 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3740 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3741 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3742 {
3743 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3744 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3745 continue;
3746 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3747 {
3748 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3749 {
3750 nmatch++;
3751 if (shsig)
3752 {
3753 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3754 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3755 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3756 &shsig->sign_nid,
3757 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3758 ptmp);
3759 shsig++;
3760 }
3761 break;
3762 }
3763 }
3764 }
3765 return nmatch;
3766 }
3767
3768 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3769 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3770 {
3771 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3772 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3773 size_t nmatch;
3774 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3775 CERT *c = s->cert;
3776 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3777 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3778 {
3779 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3780 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3781 }
3782 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3783 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3784 {
3785 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3786 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3787 }
3788 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3789 {
3790 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3791 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3792 }
3793 else
3794 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3795 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3796 {
3797 pref = conf;
3798 preflen = conflen;
3799 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3800 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3801 }
3802 else
3803 {
3804 allow = conf;
3805 allowlen = conflen;
3806 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3807 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3808 }
3809 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3810 if (!nmatch)
3811 return 1;
3812 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3813 if (!salgs)
3814 return 0;
3815 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3816 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3817 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3818 return 1;
3819 }
3820
3821
3822 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3823
3824 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3825 {
3826 int idx;
3827 size_t i;
3828 const EVP_MD *md;
3829 CERT *c = s->cert;
3830 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3831 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3832 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3833 return 1;
3834 /* Should never happen */
3835 if (!c)
3836 return 0;
3837
3838 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3839 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3840 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3841 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3842 return 0;
3843 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3844 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3845
3846 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3847
3848 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3849 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3850 {
3851 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3852 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3853 */
3854 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3855 if (s->server)
3856 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3857 else
3858 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3859 if (sigs)
3860 {
3861 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3862 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3863 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3864 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3865 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3866 {
3867 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3868 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3869 }
3870 }
3871 }
3872 #endif
3873
3874 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3875 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3876 {
3877 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3878 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3879 {
3880 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3881 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3882 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3883 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3884 {
3885 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3886 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3887 }
3888 }
3889
3890 }
3891 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3892 * use the certificate for signing.
3893 */
3894 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3895 {
3896 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3897 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3898 */
3899 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3900 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3901 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3902 #endif
3903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3904 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3905 {
3906 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3907 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3908 }
3909 #endif
3910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3911 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3912 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3913 #endif
3914 }
3915 return 1;
3916 }
3917
3918
3919 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3920 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3921 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3922 {
3923 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3924 if (psig == NULL)
3925 return 0;
3926 if (idx >= 0)
3927 {
3928 idx <<= 1;
3929 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3930 return 0;
3931 psig += idx;
3932 if (rhash)
3933 *rhash = psig[0];
3934 if (rsig)
3935 *rsig = psig[1];
3936 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3937 }
3938 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3939 }
3940
3941 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3942 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3943 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3944 {
3945 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3946 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3947 return 0;
3948 shsigalgs += idx;
3949 if (phash)
3950 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3951 if (psign)
3952 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3953 if (psignhash)
3954 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3955 if (rsig)
3956 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3957 if (rhash)
3958 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3959 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3960 }
3961
3962
3963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3964 int
3965 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3966 {
3967 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3968 unsigned short hbtype;
3969 unsigned int payload;
3970 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3971
3972 if (s->msg_callback)
3973 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3974 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3975 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3976
3977 /* Read type and payload length first */
3978 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3979 return 0; /* silently discard */
3980 hbtype = *p++;
3981 n2s(p, payload);
3982 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3983 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3984 pl = p;
3985
3986 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3987 {
3988 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3989 int r;
3990
3991 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3992 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3993 * payload, plus padding
3994 */
3995 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3996 bp = buffer;
3997
3998 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3999 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
4000 s2n(payload, bp);
4001 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
4002 bp += payload;
4003 /* Random padding */
4004 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
4005
4006 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
4007
4008 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
4009 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4010 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
4011 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4012
4013 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
4014
4015 if (r < 0)
4016 return r;
4017 }
4018 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
4019 {
4020 unsigned int seq;
4021
4022 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
4023 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
4024 * sequence number */
4025 n2s(pl, seq);
4026
4027 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
4028 {
4029 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
4030 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4031 }
4032 }
4033
4034 return 0;
4035 }
4036
4037 int
4038 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4039 {
4040 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4041 int ret;
4042 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4043 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4044
4045 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4046 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4047 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4048 {
4049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4050 return -1;
4051 }
4052
4053 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4054 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4055 {
4056 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4057 return -1;
4058 }
4059
4060 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4061 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4062 {
4063 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4064 return -1;
4065 }
4066
4067 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4068 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4069 */
4070 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4071
4072 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4073 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4074 * some random stuff.
4075 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4076 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4077 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4078 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4079 * - Padding
4080 */
4081 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4082 p = buf;
4083 /* Message Type */
4084 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4085 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4086 s2n(payload, p);
4087 /* Sequence number */
4088 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4089 /* 16 random bytes */
4090 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4091 p += 16;
4092 /* Random padding */
4093 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4094
4095 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4096 if (ret >= 0)
4097 {
4098 if (s->msg_callback)
4099 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4100 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4101 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4102
4103 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4104 }
4105
4106 OPENSSL_free(buf);
4107
4108 return ret;
4109 }
4110 #endif
4111
4112 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4113
4114 typedef struct
4115 {
4116 size_t sigalgcnt;
4117 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4118 } sig_cb_st;
4119
4120 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4121 {
4122 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4123 size_t i;
4124 char etmp[20], *p;
4125 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4126 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4127 return 0;
4128 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4129 return 0;
4130 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4131 etmp[len] = 0;
4132 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4133 if (!p)
4134 return 0;
4135 *p = 0;
4136 p++;
4137 if (!*p)
4138 return 0;
4139
4140 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4141 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4142 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4143 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4144 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4145 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4146 else return 0;
4147
4148 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4149 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4150 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4151 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4152 return 0;
4153
4154 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4155 {
4156 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4157 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4158 return 0;
4159 }
4160 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4161 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4162 return 1;
4163 }
4164
4165 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4166 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4167 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4168 {
4169 sig_cb_st sig;
4170 sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
4171 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4172 return 0;
4173 if (c == NULL)
4174 return 1;
4175 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4176 }
4177
4178 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4179 {
4180 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4181 int rhash, rsign;
4182 size_t i;
4183 if (salglen & 1)
4184 return 0;
4185 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4186 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4187 return 0;
4188 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4189 {
4190 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4191 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4192 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4193 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4194
4195 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4196 goto err;
4197 *sptr++ = rhash;
4198 *sptr++ = rsign;
4199 }
4200
4201 if (client)
4202 {
4203 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4204 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4205 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4206 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4207 }
4208 else
4209 {
4210 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4211 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4212 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4213 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4214 }
4215
4216 return 1;
4217
4218 err:
4219 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4220 return 0;
4221 }
4222
4223 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4224 {
4225 int sig_nid;
4226 size_t i;
4227 if (default_nid == -1)
4228 return 1;
4229 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4230 if (default_nid)
4231 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4232 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4233 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4234 return 1;
4235 return 0;
4236 }
4237 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4238 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4239 {
4240 X509_NAME *nm;
4241 int i;
4242 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4243 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4244 {
4245 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4246 return 1;
4247 }
4248 return 0;
4249 }
4250
4251 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4252 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4253 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4254 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4255 */
4256
4257 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4258
4259 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4260 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4261 /* Strict mode flags */
4262 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4263 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4264 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4265
4266 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4267 int idx)
4268 {
4269 int i;
4270 int rv = 0;
4271 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4272 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4273 CERT *c = s->cert;
4274 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4275 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4276 if (idx != -1)
4277 {
4278 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4279 if (idx == -2)
4280 {
4281 cpk = c->key;
4282 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4283 }
4284 else
4285 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4286 x = cpk->x509;
4287 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4288 chain = cpk->chain;
4289 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4290 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4291 if (!x || !pk)
4292 goto end;
4293 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4294 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4295 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4296 {
4297 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4298 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4299 return rv;
4300 }
4301 #endif
4302 }
4303 else
4304 {
4305 if (!x || !pk)
4306 goto end;
4307 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4308 if (idx == -1)
4309 goto end;
4310 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4311 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4312 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4313 else
4314 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4315 strict_mode = 1;
4316 }
4317
4318 if (suiteb_flags)
4319 {
4320 int ok;
4321 if (check_flags)
4322 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4323 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4324 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4325 {
4326 if (check_flags)
4327 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4328 else
4329 goto end;
4330 }
4331 }
4332
4333 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4334 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4335 * and strict mode.
4336 */
4337 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4338 {
4339 int default_nid;
4340 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4341 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4342 default_nid = 0;
4343 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4344 else
4345 {
4346 switch(idx)
4347 {
4348 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4349 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4350 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4351 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4352 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4353 break;
4354
4355 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4356 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4357 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4358 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4359 break;
4360
4361 case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
4362 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4363 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4364 break;
4365
4366 default:
4367 default_nid = -1;
4368 break;
4369 }
4370 }
4371 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4372 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4373 * sha1.
4374 */
4375 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4376 {
4377 size_t j;
4378 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4379 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4380 {
4381 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4382 break;
4383 }
4384 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4385 {
4386 if (check_flags)
4387 goto skip_sigs;
4388 else
4389 goto end;
4390 }
4391 }
4392 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4393 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4394 {
4395 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4396 }
4397 else
4398 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4399 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4400 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4401 {
4402 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4403 default_nid))
4404 {
4405 if (check_flags)
4406 {
4407 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4408 break;
4409 }
4410 else
4411 goto end;
4412 }
4413 }
4414 }
4415 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4416 else if(check_flags)
4417 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4418 skip_sigs:
4419 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4420 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4421 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4422 else if (!check_flags)
4423 goto end;
4424 if (!s->server)
4425 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4426 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4427 else if (strict_mode)
4428 {
4429 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4430 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4431 {
4432 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4433 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4434 {
4435 if (check_flags)
4436 {
4437 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4438 break;
4439 }
4440 else
4441 goto end;
4442 }
4443 }
4444 }
4445 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4446 {
4447 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4448 int check_type = 0;
4449 switch (pk->type)
4450 {
4451 case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
4452 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4453 break;
4454 case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
4455 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4456 break;
4457 case EVP_PKEY_EC:
4458 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4459 break;
4460 case EVP_PKEY_DH:
4461 case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
4462 {
4463 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4464 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4465 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4466 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4467 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4468 }
4469 }
4470 if (check_type)
4471 {
4472 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4473 int ctypelen;
4474 if (c->ctypes)
4475 {
4476 ctypes = c->ctypes;
4477 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4478 }
4479 else
4480 {
4481 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4482 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4483 }
4484 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4485 {
4486 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4487 {
4488 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4489 break;
4490 }
4491 }
4492 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4493 goto end;
4494 }
4495 else
4496 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4497
4498
4499 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4500
4501 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4502 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4503
4504 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4505 {
4506 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4507 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4508 }
4509 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4510 {
4511 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4512 {
4513 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4514 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4515 {
4516 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4517 break;
4518 }
4519 }
4520 }
4521 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4522 goto end;
4523 }
4524 else
4525 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4526
4527 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4528 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4529
4530 end:
4531
4532 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4533 {
4534 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4535 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4536 else if (cpk->digest)
4537 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4538 }
4539 else
4540 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4541
4542 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4543 * if the chain is invalid.
4544 */
4545 if (!check_flags)
4546 {
4547 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4548 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4549 else
4550 {
4551 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4552 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4553 return 0;
4554 }
4555 }
4556 return rv;
4557 }
4558
4559 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4560 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4561 {
4562 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4563 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4564 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4565 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4566 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4567 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4568 }
4569 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4570 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4571 {
4572 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4573 }
4574
4575 #endif
4576
4577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4578 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4579 {
4580 int dh_secbits = 80;
4581 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4582 return DH_get_1024_160();
4583 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4584 {
4585 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4586 dh_secbits = 128;
4587 else
4588 dh_secbits = 80;
4589 }
4590 else
4591 {
4592 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4593 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4594 }
4595
4596 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4597 {
4598 DH *dhp = DH_new();
4599 if (!dhp)
4600 return NULL;
4601 dhp->g = BN_new();
4602 if (dhp->g)
4603 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4604 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4605 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4606 else
4607 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4608 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4609 {
4610 DH_free(dhp);
4611 return NULL;
4612 }
4613 return dhp;
4614 }
4615 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4616 return DH_get_2048_224();
4617 return DH_get_1024_160();
4618 }
4619 #endif
4620
4621 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4622 {
4623 int secbits;
4624 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4625 if (pkey)
4626 {
4627 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4628 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4629 }
4630 else
4631 secbits = -1;
4632 if (s)
4633 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4634 else
4635 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4636 }
4637
4638 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4639 {
4640 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4641 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4642 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4643 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
4644 {
4645 const EVP_MD *md;
4646 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4647 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4648 }
4649 if (s)
4650 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4651 else
4652 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4653 }
4654
4655 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4656 {
4657 if (vfy)
4658 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4659 if (is_ee)
4660 {
4661 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4662 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4663 }
4664 else
4665 {
4666 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4667 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4668 }
4669 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4670 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4671 return 1;
4672 }
4673
4674 /* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
4675 * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
4676 * not sending one to the peer.
4677 * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4678 */
4679
4680 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4681 {
4682 int rv, start_idx, i;
4683 if (x == NULL)
4684 {
4685 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4686 start_idx = 1;
4687 }
4688 else
4689 start_idx = 0;
4690
4691 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4692 if (rv != 1)
4693 return rv;
4694
4695 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
4696 {
4697 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4698 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
4699 if (rv != 1)
4700 return rv;
4701 }
4702 return 1;
4703 }
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