2 * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/kdf.h>
16 #define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN 246
18 /* Always filled with zeros */
19 static const unsigned char default_zeros
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
22 * Given a |secret|; a |label| of length |labellen|; and |data| of length
23 * |datalen| (e.g. typically a hash of the handshake messages), derive a new
24 * secret |outlen| bytes long and store it in the location pointed to be |out|.
25 * The |data| value may be zero length. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
27 int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL
*s
, const EVP_MD
*md
, const unsigned char *secret
,
28 const unsigned char *label
, size_t labellen
,
29 const unsigned char *data
, size_t datalen
,
30 unsigned char *out
, size_t outlen
)
32 const unsigned char label_prefix
[] = "tls13 ";
33 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_HKDF
, NULL
);
38 * 2 bytes for length of whole HkdfLabel + 1 byte for length of combined
39 * prefix and label + bytes for the label itself + bytes for the hash
41 unsigned char hkdflabel
[sizeof(uint16_t) + sizeof(uint8_t) +
42 + sizeof(label_prefix
) + TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN
49 hashlen
= EVP_MD_size(md
);
51 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
, hkdflabel
, sizeof(hkdflabel
), 0)
52 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&pkt
, outlen
)
53 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(&pkt
)
54 || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt
, label_prefix
, sizeof(label_prefix
) - 1)
55 || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt
, label
, labellen
)
56 || !WPACKET_close(&pkt
)
57 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&pkt
, data
, (data
== NULL
) ? 0 : datalen
)
58 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt
, &hkdflabellen
)
59 || !WPACKET_finish(&pkt
)) {
60 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
61 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt
);
62 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND
,
63 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
67 ret
= EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx
) <= 0
68 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_hkdf_mode(pctx
, EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY
)
70 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(pctx
, md
) <= 0
71 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_key(pctx
, secret
, hashlen
) <= 0
72 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info(pctx
, hkdflabel
, hkdflabellen
) <= 0
73 || EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx
, out
, &outlen
) <= 0;
75 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
78 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND
,
79 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
85 * Given a |secret| generate a |key| of length |keylen| bytes. Returns 1 on
86 * success 0 on failure.
88 int tls13_derive_key(SSL
*s
, const EVP_MD
*md
, const unsigned char *secret
,
89 unsigned char *key
, size_t keylen
)
91 static const unsigned char keylabel
[] = "key";
93 return tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, md
, secret
, keylabel
, sizeof(keylabel
) - 1,
94 NULL
, 0, key
, keylen
);
98 * Given a |secret| generate an |iv| of length |ivlen| bytes. Returns 1 on
99 * success 0 on failure.
101 int tls13_derive_iv(SSL
*s
, const EVP_MD
*md
, const unsigned char *secret
,
102 unsigned char *iv
, size_t ivlen
)
104 static const unsigned char ivlabel
[] = "iv";
106 return tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, md
, secret
, ivlabel
, sizeof(ivlabel
) - 1,
110 int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL
*s
, const EVP_MD
*md
,
111 const unsigned char *secret
,
112 unsigned char *fin
, size_t finlen
)
114 static const unsigned char finishedlabel
[] = "finished";
116 return tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, md
, secret
, finishedlabel
,
117 sizeof(finishedlabel
) - 1, NULL
, 0, fin
, finlen
);
121 * Given the previous secret |prevsecret| and a new input secret |insecret| of
122 * length |insecretlen|, generate a new secret and store it in the location
123 * pointed to by |outsecret|. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
125 int tls13_generate_secret(SSL
*s
, const EVP_MD
*md
,
126 const unsigned char *prevsecret
,
127 const unsigned char *insecret
,
129 unsigned char *outsecret
)
131 size_t mdlen
, prevsecretlen
;
134 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_HKDF
, NULL
);
135 static const char derived_secret_label
[] = "derived";
136 unsigned char preextractsec
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
139 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS13_GENERATE_SECRET
,
140 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
144 mdleni
= EVP_MD_size(md
);
145 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
146 if (!ossl_assert(mdleni
>= 0)) {
147 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS13_GENERATE_SECRET
,
148 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
151 mdlen
= (size_t)mdleni
;
153 if (insecret
== NULL
) {
154 insecret
= default_zeros
;
157 if (prevsecret
== NULL
) {
158 prevsecret
= default_zeros
;
161 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
162 unsigned char hash
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
164 /* The pre-extract derive step uses a hash of no messages */
166 || EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx
, md
, NULL
) <= 0
167 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx
, hash
, NULL
) <= 0) {
168 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS13_GENERATE_SECRET
,
169 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
170 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
171 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
174 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
176 /* Generate the pre-extract secret */
177 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, md
, prevsecret
,
178 (unsigned char *)derived_secret_label
,
179 sizeof(derived_secret_label
) - 1, hash
, mdlen
,
180 preextractsec
, mdlen
)) {
181 /* SSLfatal() already called */
182 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
186 prevsecret
= preextractsec
;
187 prevsecretlen
= mdlen
;
190 ret
= EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx
) <= 0
191 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_hkdf_mode(pctx
, EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY
)
193 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(pctx
, md
) <= 0
194 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_key(pctx
, insecret
, insecretlen
) <= 0
195 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_salt(pctx
, prevsecret
, prevsecretlen
)
197 || EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx
, outsecret
, &mdlen
)
201 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS13_GENERATE_SECRET
,
202 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
204 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
205 if (prevsecret
== preextractsec
)
206 OPENSSL_cleanse(preextractsec
, mdlen
);
211 * Given an input secret |insecret| of length |insecretlen| generate the
212 * handshake secret. This requires the early secret to already have been
213 * generated. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
215 int tls13_generate_handshake_secret(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *insecret
,
218 /* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
219 return tls13_generate_secret(s
, ssl_handshake_md(s
), s
->early_secret
,
220 insecret
, insecretlen
,
221 (unsigned char *)&s
->handshake_secret
);
225 * Given the handshake secret |prev| of length |prevlen| generate the master
226 * secret and store its length in |*secret_size|. Returns 1 on success 0 on
229 int tls13_generate_master_secret(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *out
,
230 unsigned char *prev
, size_t prevlen
,
233 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_handshake_md(s
);
235 *secret_size
= EVP_MD_size(md
);
236 /* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
237 return tls13_generate_secret(s
, md
, prev
, NULL
, 0, out
);
241 * Generates the mac for the Finished message. Returns the length of the MAC or
244 size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL
*s
, const char *str
, size_t slen
,
247 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_handshake_md(s
);
248 unsigned char hash
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
249 size_t hashlen
, ret
= 0;
250 EVP_PKEY
*key
= NULL
;
251 EVP_MD_CTX
*ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
253 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s
, hash
, sizeof(hash
), &hashlen
)) {
254 /* SSLfatal() already called */
258 if (str
== s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
) {
259 key
= EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC
, NULL
,
260 s
->server_finished_secret
, hashlen
);
261 } else if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
262 key
= EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC
, NULL
,
263 s
->client_finished_secret
, hashlen
);
265 unsigned char finsecret
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
267 if (!tls13_derive_finishedkey(s
, ssl_handshake_md(s
),
268 s
->client_app_traffic_secret
,
272 key
= EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC
, NULL
, finsecret
,
274 OPENSSL_cleanse(finsecret
, sizeof(finsecret
));
279 || EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx
, NULL
, md
, NULL
, key
) <= 0
280 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx
, hash
, hashlen
) <= 0
281 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx
, out
, &hashlen
) <= 0) {
282 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS13_FINAL_FINISH_MAC
,
283 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
290 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx
);
295 * There isn't really a key block in TLSv1.3, but we still need this function
296 * for initialising the cipher and hash. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
298 int tls13_setup_key_block(SSL
*s
)
302 int mac_type
= NID_undef
;
304 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
305 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp
306 (s
->session
, &c
, &hash
, &mac_type
, NULL
, NULL
, 0)) {
307 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS13_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK
,
308 SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE
);
312 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_sym_enc
= c
;
313 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_hash
= hash
;
318 static int derive_secret_key_and_iv(SSL
*s
, int sending
, const EVP_MD
*md
,
319 const EVP_CIPHER
*ciph
,
320 const unsigned char *insecret
,
321 const unsigned char *hash
,
322 const unsigned char *label
,
323 size_t labellen
, unsigned char *secret
,
324 unsigned char *iv
, EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ciph_ctx
)
326 unsigned char key
[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH
];
327 size_t ivlen
, keylen
, taglen
;
328 int hashleni
= EVP_MD_size(md
);
331 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
332 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni
>= 0)) {
333 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DERIVE_SECRET_KEY_AND_IV
,
337 hashlen
= (size_t)hashleni
;
339 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, md
, insecret
, label
, labellen
, hash
, hashlen
,
341 /* SSLfatal() already called */
345 /* TODO(size_t): convert me */
346 keylen
= EVP_CIPHER_key_length(ciph
);
347 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(ciph
) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
) {
350 ivlen
= EVP_CCM_TLS_IV_LEN
;
351 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
352 /* We've not selected a cipher yet - we must be doing early data */
353 algenc
= s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm_enc
;
355 algenc
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
;
357 if (algenc
& (SSL_AES128CCM8
| SSL_AES256CCM8
))
358 taglen
= EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN
;
360 taglen
= EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN
;
362 ivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(ciph
);
366 if (!tls13_derive_key(s
, md
, secret
, key
, keylen
)
367 || !tls13_derive_iv(s
, md
, secret
, iv
, ivlen
)) {
368 /* SSLfatal() already called */
372 if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx
, ciph
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, sending
) <= 0
373 || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx
, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN
, ivlen
, NULL
)
374 || (taglen
!= 0 && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx
, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG
,
376 || EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx
, NULL
, NULL
, key
, NULL
, -1) <= 0) {
377 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_DERIVE_SECRET_KEY_AND_IV
,
384 OPENSSL_cleanse(key
, sizeof(key
));
388 int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL
*s
, int which
)
390 static const unsigned char client_early_traffic
[] = "c e traffic";
391 static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic
[] = "c hs traffic";
392 static const unsigned char client_application_traffic
[] = "c ap traffic";
393 static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic
[] = "s hs traffic";
394 static const unsigned char server_application_traffic
[] = "s ap traffic";
395 static const unsigned char exporter_master_secret
[] = "exp master";
396 static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret
[] = "res master";
397 static const unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret
[] = "e exp master";
399 unsigned char secret
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
400 unsigned char hashval
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
401 unsigned char *hash
= hashval
;
402 unsigned char *insecret
;
403 unsigned char *finsecret
= NULL
;
404 const char *log_label
= NULL
;
405 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ciph_ctx
;
406 size_t finsecretlen
= 0;
407 const unsigned char *label
;
408 size_t labellen
, hashlen
= 0;
410 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
411 const EVP_CIPHER
*cipher
= NULL
;
413 if (which
& SSL3_CC_READ
) {
414 if (s
->enc_read_ctx
!= NULL
) {
415 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s
->enc_read_ctx
);
417 s
->enc_read_ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
418 if (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
) {
419 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
420 SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
424 ciph_ctx
= s
->enc_read_ctx
;
427 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s
->rlayer
);
429 s
->statem
.enc_write_state
= ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID
;
430 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
) {
431 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
433 s
->enc_write_ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
434 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) {
435 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
436 SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
440 ciph_ctx
= s
->enc_write_ctx
;
443 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s
->rlayer
);
446 if (((which
& SSL3_CC_CLIENT
) && (which
& SSL3_CC_WRITE
))
447 || ((which
& SSL3_CC_SERVER
) && (which
& SSL3_CC_READ
))) {
448 if (which
& SSL3_CC_EARLY
) {
449 EVP_MD_CTX
*mdctx
= NULL
;
452 unsigned int hashlenui
;
453 const SSL_CIPHER
*sslcipher
= SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s
->session
);
455 insecret
= s
->early_secret
;
456 label
= client_early_traffic
;
457 labellen
= sizeof(client_early_traffic
) - 1;
458 log_label
= CLIENT_EARLY_LABEL
;
460 handlen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
462 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
463 SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE
,
464 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH
);
468 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
469 && s
->max_early_data
> 0
470 && s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
== 0) {
472 * If we are attempting to send early data, and we've decided to
473 * actually do it but max_early_data in s->session is 0 then we
474 * must be using an external PSK.
476 if (!ossl_assert(s
->psksession
!= NULL
477 && s
->max_early_data
==
478 s
->psksession
->ext
.max_early_data
)) {
479 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
480 SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE
,
481 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
484 sslcipher
= SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s
->psksession
);
486 if (sslcipher
== NULL
) {
487 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
488 SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE
, SSL_R_BAD_PSK
);
493 * We need to calculate the handshake digest using the digest from
494 * the session. We haven't yet selected our ciphersuite so we can't
495 * use ssl_handshake_md().
497 mdctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
499 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
500 SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
503 cipher
= EVP_get_cipherbynid(SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(sslcipher
));
504 md
= ssl_md(sslcipher
->algorithm2
);
505 if (md
== NULL
|| !EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx
, md
, NULL
)
506 || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx
, hdata
, handlen
)
507 || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx
, hashval
, &hashlenui
)) {
508 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
509 SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
510 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx
);
514 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx
);
516 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, md
, insecret
,
517 early_exporter_master_secret
,
518 sizeof(early_exporter_master_secret
) - 1,
520 s
->early_exporter_master_secret
, hashlen
)) {
521 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
522 SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
526 if (!ssl_log_secret(s
, EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL
,
527 s
->early_exporter_master_secret
, hashlen
)) {
528 /* SSLfatal() already called */
531 } else if (which
& SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
) {
532 insecret
= s
->handshake_secret
;
533 finsecret
= s
->client_finished_secret
;
534 finsecretlen
= EVP_MD_size(ssl_handshake_md(s
));
535 label
= client_handshake_traffic
;
536 labellen
= sizeof(client_handshake_traffic
) - 1;
537 log_label
= CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_LABEL
;
539 * The handshake hash used for the server read/client write handshake
540 * traffic secret is the same as the hash for the server
541 * write/client read handshake traffic secret. However, if we
542 * processed early data then we delay changing the server
543 * read/client write cipher state until later, and the handshake
544 * hashes have moved on. Therefore we use the value saved earlier
545 * when we did the server write/client read change cipher state.
547 hash
= s
->handshake_traffic_hash
;
549 insecret
= s
->master_secret
;
550 label
= client_application_traffic
;
551 labellen
= sizeof(client_application_traffic
) - 1;
552 log_label
= CLIENT_APPLICATION_LABEL
;
554 * For this we only use the handshake hashes up until the server
555 * Finished hash. We do not include the client's Finished, which is
556 * what ssl_handshake_hash() would give us. Instead we use the
557 * previously saved value.
559 hash
= s
->server_finished_hash
;
562 /* Early data never applies to client-read/server-write */
563 if (which
& SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
) {
564 insecret
= s
->handshake_secret
;
565 finsecret
= s
->server_finished_secret
;
566 finsecretlen
= EVP_MD_size(ssl_handshake_md(s
));
567 label
= server_handshake_traffic
;
568 labellen
= sizeof(server_handshake_traffic
) - 1;
569 log_label
= SERVER_HANDSHAKE_LABEL
;
571 insecret
= s
->master_secret
;
572 label
= server_application_traffic
;
573 labellen
= sizeof(server_application_traffic
) - 1;
574 log_label
= SERVER_APPLICATION_LABEL
;
578 if (!(which
& SSL3_CC_EARLY
)) {
579 md
= ssl_handshake_md(s
);
580 cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_sym_enc
;
581 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)
582 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, hashval
, sizeof(hashval
), &hashlen
)) {
583 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
589 * Save the hash of handshakes up to now for use when we calculate the
590 * client application traffic secret
592 if (label
== server_application_traffic
)
593 memcpy(s
->server_finished_hash
, hashval
, hashlen
);
595 if (label
== server_handshake_traffic
)
596 memcpy(s
->handshake_traffic_hash
, hashval
, hashlen
);
598 if (label
== client_application_traffic
) {
600 * We also create the resumption master secret, but this time use the
601 * hash for the whole handshake including the Client Finished
603 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, ssl_handshake_md(s
), insecret
,
604 resumption_master_secret
,
605 sizeof(resumption_master_secret
) - 1,
606 hashval
, hashlen
, s
->resumption_master_secret
,
608 /* SSLfatal() already called */
613 if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s
, which
& SSL3_CC_WRITE
, md
, cipher
,
614 insecret
, hash
, label
, labellen
, secret
, iv
,
616 /* SSLfatal() already called */
620 if (label
== server_application_traffic
) {
621 memcpy(s
->server_app_traffic_secret
, secret
, hashlen
);
622 /* Now we create the exporter master secret */
623 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, ssl_handshake_md(s
), insecret
,
624 exporter_master_secret
,
625 sizeof(exporter_master_secret
) - 1,
626 hash
, hashlen
, s
->exporter_master_secret
,
628 /* SSLfatal() already called */
632 if (!ssl_log_secret(s
, EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL
, s
->exporter_master_secret
,
634 /* SSLfatal() already called */
637 } else if (label
== client_application_traffic
)
638 memcpy(s
->client_app_traffic_secret
, secret
, hashlen
);
640 if (!ssl_log_secret(s
, log_label
, secret
, hashlen
)) {
641 /* SSLfatal() already called */
645 if (finsecret
!= NULL
646 && !tls13_derive_finishedkey(s
, ssl_handshake_md(s
), secret
,
647 finsecret
, finsecretlen
)) {
648 /* SSLfatal() already called */
652 if (!s
->server
&& label
== client_early_traffic
)
653 s
->statem
.enc_write_state
= ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
;
655 s
->statem
.enc_write_state
= ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID
;
658 OPENSSL_cleanse(secret
, sizeof(secret
));
662 int tls13_update_key(SSL
*s
, int sending
)
664 static const unsigned char application_traffic
[] = "traffic upd";
665 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_handshake_md(s
);
666 size_t hashlen
= EVP_MD_size(md
);
667 unsigned char *insecret
, *iv
;
668 unsigned char secret
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
669 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ciph_ctx
;
672 if (s
->server
== sending
)
673 insecret
= s
->server_app_traffic_secret
;
675 insecret
= s
->client_app_traffic_secret
;
678 s
->statem
.enc_write_state
= ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID
;
680 ciph_ctx
= s
->enc_write_ctx
;
681 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s
->rlayer
);
684 ciph_ctx
= s
->enc_read_ctx
;
685 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s
->rlayer
);
688 if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s
, sending
, ssl_handshake_md(s
),
689 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_sym_enc
, insecret
, NULL
,
691 sizeof(application_traffic
) - 1, secret
, iv
,
693 /* SSLfatal() already called */
697 memcpy(insecret
, secret
, hashlen
);
699 s
->statem
.enc_write_state
= ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID
;
702 OPENSSL_cleanse(secret
, sizeof(secret
));
706 int tls13_alert_code(int code
)
708 /* There are 2 additional alerts in TLSv1.3 compared to TLSv1.2 */
709 if (code
== SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION
|| code
== SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED
)
712 return tls1_alert_code(code
);
715 int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *out
, size_t olen
,
716 const char *label
, size_t llen
,
717 const unsigned char *context
,
718 size_t contextlen
, int use_context
)
720 unsigned char exportsecret
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
721 static const unsigned char exporterlabel
[] = "exporter";
722 unsigned char hash
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
], data
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
723 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_handshake_md(s
);
724 EVP_MD_CTX
*ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
725 unsigned int hashsize
, datalen
;
728 if (ctx
== NULL
|| !ossl_statem_export_allowed(s
))
734 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx
, md
, NULL
) <= 0
735 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx
, context
, contextlen
) <= 0
736 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx
, hash
, &hashsize
) <= 0
737 || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx
, md
, NULL
) <= 0
738 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx
, data
, &datalen
) <= 0
739 || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, md
, s
->exporter_master_secret
,
740 (const unsigned char *)label
, llen
,
741 data
, datalen
, exportsecret
, hashsize
)
742 || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, md
, exportsecret
, exporterlabel
,
743 sizeof(exporterlabel
) - 1, hash
, hashsize
,
749 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx
);
753 int tls13_export_keying_material_early(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *out
, size_t olen
,
754 const char *label
, size_t llen
,
755 const unsigned char *context
,
758 static const unsigned char exporterlabel
[] = "exporter";
759 unsigned char exportsecret
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
760 unsigned char hash
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
], data
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
762 EVP_MD_CTX
*ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
763 unsigned int hashsize
, datalen
;
765 const SSL_CIPHER
*sslcipher
;
767 if (ctx
== NULL
|| !ossl_statem_export_early_allowed(s
))
770 if (!s
->server
&& s
->max_early_data
> 0
771 && s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
== 0)
772 sslcipher
= SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s
->psksession
);
774 sslcipher
= SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s
->session
);
776 md
= ssl_md(sslcipher
->algorithm2
);
779 * Calculate the hash value and store it in |data|. The reason why
780 * the empty string is used is that the definition of TLS-Exporter
783 * TLS-Exporter(label, context_value, key_length) =
784 * HKDF-Expand-Label(Derive-Secret(Secret, label, ""),
785 * "exporter", Hash(context_value), key_length)
787 * Derive-Secret(Secret, Label, Messages) =
788 * HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label,
789 * Transcript-Hash(Messages), Hash.length)
791 * Here Transcript-Hash is the cipher suite hash algorithm.
793 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx
, md
, NULL
) <= 0
794 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx
, context
, contextlen
) <= 0
795 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx
, hash
, &hashsize
) <= 0
796 || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx
, md
, NULL
) <= 0
797 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx
, data
, &datalen
) <= 0
798 || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, md
, s
->early_exporter_master_secret
,
799 (const unsigned char *)label
, llen
,
800 data
, datalen
, exportsecret
, hashsize
)
801 || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, md
, exportsecret
, exporterlabel
,
802 sizeof(exporterlabel
) - 1, hash
, hashsize
,
808 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx
);