Initial OCSP server support, using index.txt format.

[thirdparty/openssl.git] / CHANGES

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index e7d773f8627e065f60a9aa712533e94834c615a2..b1929cace8fb341b664a70f03d9d6bd4115ed168 100644 (file)
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -4,13 +4,70 @@
 
  Changes between 0.9.6 and 0.9.7  [xx XXX 2001]
 
-     Both OpenSSL 0.9.6a (bugfix release, 5 Apr 2001) and OpenSSL 0.9.7
-     are based on OpenSSL 0.9.6.  
+     OpenSSL 0.9.6a/0.9.6b (bugfix releases, 5 Apr 2001 and 9 July 2001)
+     and OpenSSL 0.9.7 were developped in parallel, based on OpenSSL 0.9.6.  
+
      Change log entries are tagged as follows:
-         -) applies to 0.9.6a (/0.9.6b) only
-         *) applies to 0.9.6a (/0.9.6b) and 0.9.7
+         -) applies to 0.9.6a/0.9.6b only
+         *) applies to 0.9.6a/0.9.6b and 0.9.7
          +) applies to 0.9.7 only
 
+  +) Add initial OCSP responder support to ocsp application. The
+     revocation information is handled using the text based index
+     use by the ca application. The responder can either handle
+     requests generated internally, supplied in files (for example
+     via a CGI script) or using an internal minimal server.
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  +) Add configuration choices to get zlib compression for TLS.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  +) Changes to Kerberos SSL for RFC 2712 compliance:
+     1.  Implemented real KerberosWrapper, instead of just using
+         KRB5 AP_REQ message.  [Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>]
+     2.  Implemented optional authenticator field of KerberosWrapper.
+
+     Added openssl-style ASN.1 macros for Kerberos ticket, ap_req,
+     and authenticator structs; see crypto/krb5/.
+
+     Generalized Kerberos calls to support multiple Kerberos libraries.
+     [Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil>,
+      Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@columbia.edu>
+      via Richard Levitte]
+
+  +) Cause 'openssl speed' to use fully hard-coded DSA keys as it
+     already does with RSA. testdsa.h now has 'priv_key/pub_key'
+     values for each of the key sizes rather than having just
+     parameters (and 'speed' generating keys each time).
+     [Geoff Thorpe]
+
+  -) OpenSSL 0.9.6b released [9 July 2001]
+
+  *) Change ssleay_rand_bytes (crypto/rand/md_rand.c)
+     to avoid a SSLeay/OpenSSL PRNG weakness pointed out by
+     Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <markku-juhani.saarinen@nokia.com>:
+     PRNG state recovery was possible based on the output of
+     one PRNG request appropriately sized to gain knowledge on
+     'md' followed by enough consecutive 1-byte PRNG requests
+     to traverse all of 'state'.
+
+     1. When updating 'md_local' (the current thread's copy of 'md')
+        during PRNG output generation, hash all of the previous
+        'md_local' value, not just the half used for PRNG output.
+
+     2. Make the number of bytes from 'state' included into the hash
+        independent from the number of PRNG bytes requested.
+
+     The first measure alone would be sufficient to avoid
+     Markku-Juhani's attack.  (Actually it had never occurred
+     to me that the half of 'md_local' used for chaining was the
+     half from which PRNG output bytes were taken -- I had always
+     assumed that the secret half would be used.)  The second
+     measure makes sure that additional data from 'state' is never
+     mixed into 'md_local' in small portions; this heuristically
+     further strengthens the PRNG.
+     [Bodo Moeller]
+  
   +) Speed up EVP routines.
      Before:
 encrypt