--- /dev/null
+ ----------------------------
+ strongSwan - Configuration
+ ----------------------------
+
+
+Contents
+--------
+
+ 1. Overview
+ 2. Quickstart
+ 2.1 Site-to-Site case
+ 2.2 Host-to-Host case
+ 2.3 Four Tunnel case
+ 2.4 Four Tunnel case the elegant way with source routing
+ 2.5 Roadwarrior case
+ 2.6 Roadwarrior case with virtual IP
+ 3. Generating X.509 certificates and CRLs with OpenSSL
+ 3.1 Generating a CA certificate
+ 3.2 Generating a host or user certificate
+ 3.3 Generating a CRL
+ 3.4 Revoking a certificate
+ 4. Configuring the connections - ipsec.conf
+ 4.1 Configuring my side
+ 4.2 Multiple certificates
+ 4.3 Configuring the peer side using CA certificates
+ 4.4 Handling Virtual IPs and wildcard subnets
+ 4.5 Protocol and port selectors
+ 4.6 IPsec policies based on wildcards
+ 4.7 IPsec policies based on CA certificates
+ 4.8 Sending certificate requests
+ 4.9 IPsec policies based on group attributes
+ 5. Configuring certificates and CRLs
+ 5.1 Installing CA certificates
+ 5.2 Installing optional Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)
+ 5.3 Dynamic update of certificates and CRLs
+ 5.4 Local caching of CRLs
+ 5.5 Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
+ 5.6 CRL policy
+ 5.7 Configuring the peer side using locally stored certificates
+ 6. Configuring the private keys - ipsec.secrets
+ 6.1 Loading private key files in PKCS#1 format
+ 6.2 Entering passphrases interactively
+ 6.3 Multiple private keys
+ 7. Configuring CA properties - ipsec.conf
+ 8. Smartcard support
+ 8.1 Configuring a smartcard-based connection
+ 8.2 Entering the PIN code
+ 8.3 PIN-pad equipped smartcard readers
+ 8.4 Configuring a smartcard using pkcs15-init
+ 8.5 PKCS#1 proxy functions
+ 9. Configuring the clients
+ 9.1 strongSwan
+ 9.2 PGPnet
+ 9.3 Safenet/Soft-Remote
+ 9.4 SSH Sentinel
+ 9.5 Windows 2000/XP
+ 10. Monitoring functions
+ 11. Firewall support functions
+ 11.1 Environment variables in the updown script
+ 11.2 Automatic insertion and deletion of iptables firewall rules (NEW)
+ 11.3 Sample Linux 2.6 _updown_espmark script for iptables < 1.3.5
+ 12. Authentication with raw RSA public keys
+ 13. Authentication with OpenPGP certificates
+ 13.1 OpenPGP certificates
+ 13.2 OpenPGP private keys
+ 13.3 Monitoring functions
+ 13.4 Suppression of certificate request messages
+ 14. Additional features
+ 14.1 Authentication and encryption algorithms
+ 14.2 NAT traversal
+ 14.3 Dead peer detection
+ 14.4 IKE Mode Config
+ 15. Copyright statement and acknowledgements
+
+
+1. Overview
+ --------
+
+strongSwan is an OpenSource IPsec solution for the Linux operating system
+and currently supports the following features:
+
+ * runs both on Linux 2.4 (KLIPS) and Linux 2.6 (native IPsec) kernels.
+
+ * strong 3DES, AES, Serpent, Twofish, or Blowfish encryption.
+
+ * Authentication based on X.509 certificates or preshared secrets.
+
+ * IPsec policies based on wildcards or intermediate CAs.
+
+ * Powerful and flexible IPsec policies based on group attributes.
+
+ * Retrieval of Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) via HTTP or LDAP.
+
+ * Local caching of fetched CRLs
+
+ * Full support of the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP, RFC 2560).
+
+ * CA management functions including OCSP and CRL URIs and default LDAP server.
+
+ * Optional storage of RSA private keys on smartcards or USB crypto tokens
+
+ * Standardized PKCS#11 interface with optional proxy functions serving
+ external applications (disc encryption, etc.).
+
+ * NAT-Traversal (RFC 3947)
+
+ * Support of Virtual IPs via static configuratin and IKE Mode Config
+
+ * Support of Delete SA and informational Notification messages.
+
+ * Dead Peer Detection (DPD, RFC 3706)
+
+Compatibility has successfully been tested with peers running the following
+IPsec clients:
+
+ FreeS/WAN, Openswan, SafeNet/SoftRemote, NCP Secure Entry Client,
+ SonicWALL Global VPN Client, The GreenBow, Microsoft Windows 2000/XP, etc.
+
+Furthermore, interoperability with the following VPN gateways
+has been demonstrated during the IPsec 2001 Conference in Paris:
+
+ Cisco IOS Routers, Cisco PIX firewall, Cisco VPN3000,
+ Nortel Contivity VPN Switch, NetScreen (FreeS/WAN as responder only),
+ OpenBSD with isakmpd, Netasq, Netcelo, and 6WIND.
+
+Potentially any IPsec implementation with X.509 certificate support can
+be made to cooperate with strongSwan. The latest addition has been the successful
+interoperability with the Check Point VPN-1 NG gateway.
+
+
+2. Quickstart
+ ----------
+
+In the following examples we assume for reasons of clarity that left designates
+the local host and that right is the remote host. Certificates for users, hosts
+and gateways are issued by a ficticious strongSwan CA. How to generate private keys
+and certificates using OpenSSL will be explained in section 3. The CA certificate
+"strongswanCert.pem" must be present on all VPN end points in order to be able to
+authenticate the peers.
+
+
+2.1 Site-to-site case
+ -----------------
+
+In this scenario two security gateways moon and sun will connect the
+two subnets moon-net and sun-net with each other through a VPN tunnel
+set up between the two gateways:
+
+ 10.1.0.0/16 -- | 192.168.0.1 | === | 192.168.0.2 | -- 10.2.0.0/16
+ moon-net moon sun sun-net
+
+Configuration on gateway moon:
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/strongswanCert.pem
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/certs/moonCert.pem
+
+ /etc/ipsec.secrets:
+
+ : RSA moonKey.pem "<optional passphrase>"
+
+ /etc/ipsec.conf:
+
+ conn net-net
+ left=%defaultroute
+ leftsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
+ leftcert=moonCert.pem
+ right=192.168.0.2
+ rightsubnet=10.2.0.0/16
+ rightid="C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=sun.strongswan.org"
+ auto=start
+
+Configuration on gateway sun:
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/strongswanCert.pem
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/certs/sunCert.pem
+
+ /etc/ipsec.secrets:
+
+ : RSA sunKey.pem "<optional passphrase>"
+
+ /etc/ipsec.conf:
+
+ conn net-net
+ left=%defaultroute
+ leftsubnet=10.2.0.0/16
+ leftcert=sunCert.pem
+ right=192.168.0.1
+ rightsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
+ rightid="C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=moon.strongswan.org"
+ auto=start
+
+
+2.2 Host-to-host case
+ -----------------
+
+This is a setup between two single hosts which don't have a subnet behind
+them. Although IPsec transport mode would be sufficient for host-to-host
+connections we will use the default IPsec tunnel mode.
+
+ | 192.168.0.1 | === | 192.168.0.2 |
+ moon sun
+
+Configuration on host moon:
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/strongswanCert.pem
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/certs/moonCert.pem
+
+ /etc/ipsec.secrets:
+
+ : RSA moonKey.pem "<optional passphrase>"
+
+ /etc/ipsec.conf:
+
+ conn host-host
+ left=%defaultroute
+ leftcert=moonCert.pem
+ right=192.168.0.2
+ rightid="C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=sun.strongswan.org"
+ auto=start
+
+Configuration on host sun:
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/strongswanCert.pem
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/certs/sunCert.pem
+
+ /etc/ipsec.secrets:
+
+ : RSA sunKey.pem "<optional passphrase>"
+
+ /etc/ipsec.conf:
+
+ conn host-host
+ left=%defaultroute
+ leftcert=sunCert.pem
+ right=192.168.0.1
+ rightid="C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=moon.strongswan.org"
+ auto=start
+
+
+2.3 Four Tunnel case
+ ----------------
+
+In a site-to-site setup a system administrator logged into the local gateway
+often would like to access the peer gateway or a server in the subnet behind
+the peer gateway over a secure IPsec tunnel.Since IP packets leaving a gateway
+via the outer network interface carry the IP address of this NIC, four IPsec
+Security Associations (SAs) must be set up to achieve full connectivity. The
+example below shows how this can be done without much additional typing work ,
+using the "also" macro which includes connection definitions defined farther
+down in the ipsec.conf file.
+
+ 10.1.0.0/16 -- | 192.168.0.1 | === | 192.168.0.2 | -- 10.2.0.0/16
+ moon-net moon sun sun-net
+
+Configuration on gateway moon:
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/strongswanCert.pem
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/certs/moonCert.pem
+
+ /etc/ipsec.secrets:
+
+ : RSA moonKey.pem "<optional passphrase>"
+
+ /etc/ipsec.conf:
+
+ conn net-net
+ leftsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
+ rightsubnet=10.2.0.0/16
+ also host-host
+
+ conn net-host
+ leftsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
+ also host-host
+
+ conn host-net
+ rightsubnet=10.2.0.0/16
+ also host-host
+
+ conn host-host
+ left=%defaultroute
+ leftcert=moonCert.pem
+ right=192.168.0.2
+ rightid="C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=sun.strongswan.org"
+ auto=start
+
+Configuration on gateway sun:
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/strongswanCert.pem
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/certs/sunCert.pem
+
+ /etc/ipsec.secrets:
+
+ : RSA sunKey.pem "<optional passphrase>"
+
+ /etc/ipsec.conf:
+
+ conn net-net
+ leftsubnet=10.2.0.0/16
+ rightsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
+ also=host-host
+
+ conn net-host
+ leftsubnet=10.2.0.0/16
+ also=host-host
+
+ conn host-net
+ rightsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
+ also=host-host
+
+ conn host-host
+ left=%defaultroute
+ leftcert=sunCert.pem
+ right=192.168.0.1
+ rightid="C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=moon.strongswan.org"
+ auto=start
+
+
+2.4 The four tunnel case the elegant way with source routing
+ --------------------------------------------------------
+
+As you certainly agree, the full four tunnel case described in the previous
+section becomes quite complex. If we could force the source address of the
+IP packets leaving the gateway through the outer interface to take on the
+IP address of the inner interface then we could use the single subnet-to-subnet
+tunnel from section 2.1. Such a setup becomes possible if we use the
+source routing capabilites of the ip route command that is already used
+by strongSwan's updown scripts.
+
+ 10.1.0.0/16 -- | 192.168.0.1 | === | 192.168.0.2 | -- 10.2.0.0/16
+ moon-net moon sun sun-net
+
+If we assume that the inner IP address of gateway moon is 10.1.0.1
+and the inner IP address of gateway sun is 10.2.0.1 then the
+insertion of the parameter
+
+ leftsourceip=10.1.0.1
+
+in the connection definition of moon and
+
+ leftsourceip=10.2.0.1
+
+on sun, respectively, will install source routing on both gateways.
+As a result the command
+
+ ping 10.2.0.1
+
+executed on moon will leave the gateway with a source address of
+10.1.0.1 and will therefore take the net-net IPsec tunnel.
+
+Configuration on gateway moon:
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/strongswanCert.pem
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/certs/moonCert.pem
+
+ /etc/ipsec.secrets:
+
+ : RSA moonKey.pem "<optional passphrase>"
+
+ /etc/ipsec.conf:
+
+ conn net-net
+ left=%defaultroute
+ leftsourceip=10.1.0.1
+ leftsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
+ leftcert=moonCert.pem
+ right=192.168.0.2
+ rightsubnet=10.2.0.0/16
+ rightid="C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=sun.strongswan.org"
+ auto=start
+
+Configuration on gateway sun:
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/strongswanCert.pem
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/certs/sunCert.pem
+
+ /etc/ipsec.secrets:
+
+ : RSA sunKey.pem "<optional passphrase>"
+
+ /etc/ipsec.conf:
+
+ conn net-net
+ left=%defaultroute
+ leftsubnet=10.2.0.0/16
+ leftsourceip=10.2.0.1
+ leftcert=sunCert.pem
+ right=192.168.0.1
+ rightsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
+ rightid="C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=moon.strongswan.org"
+ auto=start
+
+
+2.5 Roadwarrior case
+ ----------------
+
+This is a very common case where a strongSwan gateway serves an arbitrary number
+of remote VPN clients usually having dynamic IP addresses.
+
+ 10.1.0.0/16 -- | 192.168.0.1 | === | x.x.x.x |
+ moon-net moon carol
+
+Configuration on gateway moon:
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/strongswanCert.pem
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/certs/moonCert.pem
+
+ /etc/ipsec.secrets:
+
+ : RSA moonKey.pem "<optional passphrase>"
+
+ /etc/ipsec.conf:
+
+ conn rw
+ left=%defaultroute
+ leftsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
+ leftcert=moonCert.pem
+ right=%any
+ auto=add
+
+Configuration on roadwarrior carol:
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/strongswanCert.pem
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/certs/carolCert.pem
+
+ /etc/ipsec.secrets:
+
+ : RSA carolKey.pem "<optional passphrase>"
+
+ /etc/ipsec.conf:
+
+ conn home
+ left=%defaultroute
+ leftcert=carolCert.pem
+ right=192.168.0.1
+ rightsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
+ rightid="C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=moon.strongswan.org"
+ auto=start
+
+
+2.6 Roadwarrior case with virtual IP
+ --------------------------------
+
+Roadwarriors usually have dynamic IP addresses assigned by the ISP they are
+currently attached to. In order to simplify the routing from moon-net back
+to the remote access client carol it would be desirable if the roadwarrior had
+an inner IP address chosen from a pre-assigned pool.
+
+ 10.1.0.0/16 -- | 192.168.0.1 | === | x.x.x.x | -- 10.3.0.1
+ moon-net moon carol virtual IP
+
+This virtual IP address can be assigned to a strongSwan roadwarrior by adding
+the parameter
+
+ leftsourceip=10.3.0.1
+
+to the roadwarrior's ipsec.conf. Of course the virtual IP of each roadwarrior
+must be distinct. In our example it is chosen from the address pool
+
+ rightsubnetwithin=10.3.0.0/16
+
+which can be added to the gateway's ipsec.conf so that a single connection
+definition can handle multiple roadwarriors.
+
+Configuration on gateway moon:
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/strongswanCert.pem
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/certs/moonCert.pem
+
+ /etc/ipsec.secrets:
+
+ : RSA moonKey.pem "<optional passphrase>"
+
+ /etc/ipsec.conf:
+
+ conn rw
+ left=%defaultroute
+ leftsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
+ leftcert=moonCert.pem
+ right=%any
+ rightsubnetwithin=10.3.0.0/16
+ auto=add
+
+Configuration on roadwarrior carol:
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/strongswanCert.pem
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/certs/carolCert.pem
+
+ /etc/ipsec.secrets:
+
+ : RSA carolKey.pem "<optional passphrase>"
+
+ /etc/ipsec.conf:
+
+ conn home
+ left=%defaultroute
+ leftsourceip=10.3.0.1
+ leftcert=carolCert.pem
+ right=192.168.0.1
+ rightsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
+ rightid="C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=moon.strongswan.org"
+ auto=start
+
+
+3. Generating certificates and CRLs with OpenSSL
+ ---------------------------------------------
+
+This section is not a full-blown tutorial on how to use OpenSSL. It just lists
+a few points that are relevant if you want to generate your own certificates
+and CRLs for use with strongSwan.
+
+
+3.1 Generating a CA certificate
+ ---------------------------
+
+The OpenSSL statement
+
+ openssl req -x509 -days 1460 -newkey rsa:2048 \
+ -keyout strongswanKey.pem -out strongswanCert.pem
+
+creates a 2048 bit RSA private key strongswanKey.pem and a self-signed CA
+certificate strongswanCert.pem with a validity of 4 years (1460 days).
+
+ openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -text
+
+lists the properties of a X.509 certificate cert.pem. It allows you to verify
+whether the configuration defaults in openssl.cnf have been inserted correctly.
+
+If you prefer the CA certificate to be in binary DER format then the following
+command achieves this transformation:
+
+ openssl x509 -in strongswanCert.pem -outform DER -out strongswanCert.der
+
+The directory /etc/ipsec.d/cacerts contains all required CA certificates either
+in binary DER or in base64 PEM format. Irrespective of the file suffix, Pluto
+"automagically" determines the correct format.
+
+
+3.2 Generating a host or user certificate
+ -------------------------------------
+
+The OpenSSL statement
+
+ openssl req -newkey rsa:1024 -keyout hostKey.pem \
+ -out hostReq.pem
+
+generates a 1024 bit RSA private key hostKey.pem and a certificate request
+hostReq.pem which has to be signed by the CA.
+
+If you want to add a subjectAltName field to the host certificate you must edit
+the OpenSSL configuration file openssl.cnf and add the following line in the
+[ usr_cert ] section:
+
+ subjectAltName=DNS:moon.strongswan.org
+
+if you want to identify the host by its Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN ), or
+
+ subjectAltName=IP:192.168.0.1
+
+if you want the ID to be of type IPV4_ADDR. Of course you could include both
+ID types with
+
+ subjectAltName=DNS:moon.strongswan.org,IP:192.168.0.1
+
+but the use of an IP address for the identification of a host should be
+discouraged anyway.
+
+For user certificates the appropriate ID type is USER_FQDN which can be
+specified as
+
+ subjectAltName=email:carol@strongswan.org
+
+or if the user's e-mail address is part of the subject's distinguished name
+
+ subjectAltName=email:copy
+
+Now the certificate request can be signed by the CA with the command
+
+ openssl ca -in hostReq.pem -days 730 -out hostCert.pem -notext
+
+If you omit the -days option then the default_days value (365 days) specified
+in openssl.cnf is used. The -notext option avoids that a human readable
+listing of the certificate is prepended to the base64 encoded certificate
+body.
+
+If you want to use the dynamic CRL fetching feature described in section 4.7
+then you may include one or several crlDistributionPoints in your end
+certificates. This can be done in the [ usr_cert ] section of the openssl.cnf
+configuration file:
+
+ crlDistributionPoints= @crl_dp
+
+ [ crl_dp ]
+
+ URI.1="http://crl.strongswan.org/strongswan.crl"
+ URI.2="ldap://ldap.strongswan.org/cn=strongSwan Root CA, o=Linux strongSwan
+ , c=CH?certificateRevocationList"
+
+If you have only a single http distribution point then the short form
+
+ crlDistributionPoints="URI:http://crl.strongswan.org/strongswan.crl"
+
+also works. Due to a known bug in OpenSSL this notation fails with ldap URIs.
+
+Usually a Windows-based VPN client needs its private key, its host or
+user certificate, and the CA certificate. The most convenient way to load
+this information is to put everything into a PKCS#12 file:
+
+ openssl pkcs12 -export -inkey carolKey.pem \
+ -in carolCert.pem -name "carol" \
+ -certfile strongswanCert.pem -caname "strongSwan Root CA" \
+ -out carolCert.p12
+
+
+3.3 Generating a CRL
+ ----------------
+
+An empty CRL that is signed by the CA can be generated with the command
+
+ openssl ca -gencrl -crldays 15 -out crl.pem
+
+If you omit the -crldays option then the default_crl_days value (30 days)
+specified in openssl.cnf is used.
+
+If you prefer the CRL to be in binary DER format then this conversion
+can be achieved with
+
+ openssl crl -in crl.pem -outform DER -out cert.crl
+
+The directory /etc/ipsec.d/crls contains all CRLs either in binary DER
+or in base64 PEM format. Irrespective of the file suffix, Pluto
+"automagically" determines the correct format.
+
+
+3.4 Revoking a certificate
+ ----------------------
+
+A specific host certificate stored in the file host.pem is revoked with the
+command
+
+ openssl ca -revoke host.pem
+
+Next the CRL file must be updated
+
+ openssl ca -gencrl -crldays 60 -out crl.pem
+
+The content of the CRL file can be listed with the command
+
+ openssl crl -in crl.pem -noout -text
+
+in the case of a base64 CRL, or alternatively for a CRL in DER format
+
+ openssl crl -inform DER -in cert.crl -noout -text
+
+
+
+4. Configuring the connections - ipsec.conf
+ ----------------------------------------
+
+4.1 Configuring my side
+ -------------------
+
+Usually the local side is the same for all connections. Therefore it makes
+sense to put the definitions characterizing the strongSwan security gateway into
+the conn %default section of the configuration file /etc/ipsec.conf. If we
+assume throughout this document that the strongSwan security gateway is left and
+the peer is right then we can write
+
+conn %default
+ # my side is left - the freeswan security gateway
+ left=%defaultroute
+ leftcert=moonCert.pem
+ # load connection definitions automatically
+ auto=add
+
+The X.509 certificate by which the strongSwan security gateway will authenticate
+itself by sending it in binary form to its peers as part of the Internet Key
+Exchange (IKE) is specified in the line
+
+ leftcert=moonCert.pem
+
+The certificate can either be stored in base64 PEM-format or in the binary
+DER-format. Irrespective of the file suffix, Pluto "automagically" determines
+the correct format. Therefore
+
+ leftcert=moonCert.der
+
+or
+
+ leftcert=moonCert.cer
+
+would also be valid alternatives.
+
+When using relative pathnames as in the examples above, the certificate files
+must be stored in in the directory /etc/ipsec.d/certs. In order to distinguish
+strongSwan's own certificates from locally stored trusted peer certificates
+(see section 5.5 for details), they could also be stored in a subdirectory
+below /etc/ipsec.d/certs as e.g. in
+
+ leftcert=mycerts/moonCert.pem
+
+Absolute pathnames are also possible as in
+
+ leftcert=/usr/ssl/certs/moonCert.pem
+
+As an ID for the VPN gateway we recommend the use of a Fully Qualified Domain
+Name (FQDN) of the form
+
+conn rw
+ right=%any
+ leftid=@moon.strongswan.org
+
+Important: When an FQDN identifier is used it must be explicitly included as a
+so called subjectAltName of type dnsName (DNS:) in the certificate indicated
+by leftcert. For details on how to generate certificates with subjectAltNames,
+please refer to section 7.2.
+
+If you don't want to mess with subjectAltNames, you can use the certificate's
+Distinguished Name (DN) instead, which is an identifier of type DER_ASN1_DN
+and which can be written e.g. in the LDAP-type format
+
+conn rw
+ right=%any
+ leftid="C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=moon.strongswan.org"
+
+Since the subject's DN is part of the certificate, the leftid does not have to
+be declared explicitly. Thus the entry
+
+conn rw
+ right=%any
+
+automatically assumes the subject DN of leftcert to be the host ID.
+
+
+4.2 Multiple certificates
+ ---------------------
+
+strongSwan supports multiple local host certificates and corresponding
+RSA private keys:
+
+conn rw1
+ right=%any
+ rightid=@peer1.domain1
+ leftcert=myCert1.pem
+ # leftid is DN of myCert1
+
+conn rw2
+ right=%any
+ rightid=@peer2.domain2
+ leftcert=myCert2.pem
+ # leftid is DN of myCert2
+
+When peer1 initiates a connection then strongSwan will send myCert1 and will
+sign with myKey1 defined in /etc/ipsec.secrets (see section 6.2) whereas
+myCert2 and myKey2 will be used in a connection setup started from peer2.
+
+
+4.3 Configuring the peer side using CA certificates
+ -----------------------------------------------
+
+Now we can proceed to define our connections. In many applications we might
+have dozens of mostly Windows-based road warriors connecting to a central
+strongSwan security gateway. The following most simple statement:
+
+conn rw
+ right=%any
+
+defines the general roadwarrior case. The line right=%any literally means that
+any IPSec peer is accepted, regardless of its current IP source address and its
+ID, as long as the peer presents a valid X.509 certificate signed by a CA the
+strongSwan security gateway puts explicit trust in. Additionally the signature
+during IKE main mode gives proof that the peer is in possession of the private
+RSA key matching the public key contained in the transmitted certificate.
+
+The ID by which a peer is identifying itself during IKE main mode can by any of
+the ID types IPV4_ADDR, FQDN, USER_FQDN or DER_ASN1_DN. If one of the first
+three ID types is used, then the accompanying X.509 certificate of the peer
+must contain a matching subjectAltName field of the type ipAddress (IP:),
+dnsName (DNS:) or rfc822Name (email:), respectively. With the fourth type
+DER_ASN1_DN the identifier must completely match the subject field of the
+peer's certificate. One of the two possible representations of a
+Distinguished Name (DN) is the LDAP-type format
+
+ rightid="C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=sun.strongswan.org"
+
+Additional whitespace can be added everywhere as desired since it will be
+automatically eliminated by the X.509 parser. An exception is the single
+whitespace between individual words , like e.g. in Linux strongSwan, which is
+preserved by the parser.
+
+The Relative Distinguished Names (RDNs) can alternatively be separated by a
+slash '/' instead of a comma ','
+
+ rightid="/C=CH/O=Linux strongSwan/CN=sun.strongswan.org"
+
+This is the representation extracted from the certificate by the OpenSSL
+command line option
+
+ openssl x509 -in sunCert.pem -noout -subject
+
+The following RDNs are supported by strongSwan
+
++---------------------------------------------------+
+| DC Domain Component |
+|---------------------------------------------------|
+| C Country |
+|---------------------------------------------------|
+| ST State or province |
+|---------------------------------------------------|
+| L Locality or town |
+|---------------------------------------------------|
+| O Organisation |
+|---------------------------------------------------|
+| OU Organisational Unit |
+|---------------------------------------------------|
+| CN Common Name |
+|---------------------------------------------------|
+| ND NameDistinguisher, used with CN |
+|---------------------------------------------------|
+| N Name |
+|---------------------------------------------------|
+| G Given name |
+|---------------------------------------------------|
+| S Surname |
+|---------------------------------------------------|
+| I Initials |
+|---------------------------------------------------|
+| T Personal title |
+|---------------------------------------------------|
+| E E-mail |
+|---------------------------------------------------|
+| Email E-mail |
+|---------------------------------------------------|
+| emailAddress E-mail |
+|---------------------------------------------------|
+| SN Serial number |
+|---------------------------------------------------|
+| serialNumber Serial number |
+|---------------------------------------------------|
+| D Description |
+|---------------------------------------------------|
+| ID X.500 Unique Identifier |
+|---------------------------------------------------|
+| UID User ID |
+|---------------------------------------------------|
+| TCGID [Siemens] Trust Center Global ID |
+|---------------------------------------------------|
+| unstructuredName Unstructured Name |
+|---------------------------------------------------|
+| UN Unstructured Name |
+|---------------------------------------------------|
+| employeeNumber Employee Number |
+|---------------------------------------------------|
+| EN Employee Number |
++---------------------------------------------------+
+
+With the roadwarrior connection definition listed above, an IPsec SA for
+the strongSwan security gateway moon.strongswan.org itself can be established.
+If any roadwarrior should be able to reach e.g. the two subnets 10.1.0.0/24
+and 10.1.3.0/24 behind the security gateway then the following connection
+definitions will make this possible
+
+conn rw1
+ right=%any
+ leftsubnet=10.1.0.0/24
+
+conn rw3
+ right=%any
+ leftsubnet=10.1.3.0/24
+
+If not all peers in possession of a X.509 certificate signed by a specific
+certificate authority shall be given access to the Linux security gateway,
+then either a subset of them can be barred by listing the serial numbers of
+their certificates in a certificate revocation list (CRL) as specified in
+section 5.2 or as an alternative, access can be controlled by explicitly
+putting a roadwarrior entry for each eligible peer into ipsec.conf:
+
+conn sun
+ right=%any
+ rightid=@sun.strongswan.org
+
+conn carol
+ right=%any
+ rightid=carol@strongswan.org
+
+conn dave
+ right=%any
+ rightid="C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=dave@strongswan.org"
+
+When the IP address of a peer is known to be stable, it can be specified as
+well. This entry is mandatory when the strongSwan host wants to act as the
+initiator of an IPSec connection.
+
+conn sun
+ right=192.168.0.2
+ rightid=@sun.strongswan.org
+
+conn carol
+ right=192.168.0.100
+ rightid=carol@strongswan.org
+
+conn dave
+ right=192.168.0.200
+ rightid="C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=dave@strongswan.org"
+
+conn venus
+ right=192.168.0.50
+
+In the last example the ID types FQDN, USER_FQDN, DER_ASN1_DN and IPV4_ADDR,
+respectively, were used. Of course all connection definitions presented so far
+have included the lines in the conn %defaults section, comprising among other
+a left and leftcert entry.
+
+
+4.4 Handling Virtual IPs and wildcard subnets
+ -----------------------------------------
+
+Often roadwarriors are behind NAT-boxes with IPsec passthrough, which causes
+the inner IP source address of an IPsec tunnel to be different from the
+outer IP source address usually assigned dynamically by the ISP.
+Whereas the varying outer IP address can be handled by the right=%any
+construct, the inner IP address or subnet must always be declared in a
+connection definition. Therefore for the three roadwarriors rw1 to rw3
+connecting to a strongSwan security gateway the following entries are
+required in /etc/ipsec.conf:
+
+conn rw1
+ right=%any
+ righsubnet=10.4.0.5/32
+
+conn rw2
+ right=%any
+ rightsubnet=10.4.0.47/32
+
+conn rw3
+ right=%any
+ rightsubnet=10.4.0.128/28
+
+With the wildcard parameter rightsubnetwithin these three entries can be
+reduced to the single connection definition
+
+conn rw
+ right=%any
+ rightsubnetwithin=10.4.0.0/24
+
+Any host will be accepted (of course after successful authentication based on
+the peer's X.509 certificate only) if it declares a client subnet lying totally
+within the brackets defined by the wildcard subnet definition (in our example
+10.4.0.0/24). For each roadwarrior a connection instance tailored to the
+subnet of the particular client will be created,based on the generic
+rightsubnetwithin template.
+
+This strongSwan feature can also be helpful with VPN clients getting a
+dynamically assigned inner IP from a DHCP server located on the NAT router box.
+
+
+4.5 Protocol and Port Selectors
+ ---------------------------
+
+strongSwan offer the possibility to restrict the protocol and optionally the
+ports in an IPsec SA using the rightprotoport and leftprotoport parameters.
+
+Some examples:
+
+conn icmp
+ right=%any
+ rightprotoport=icmp
+ left=%defaultroute
+ leftid=@moon.strongswan.org
+ leftprotoport=icmp
+
+conn http
+ right=%any
+ rightprotoport=6
+ left=%defaultroute
+ leftid=@moon.strongswan.org
+ leftprotoport=6/80
+
+conn l2tp # with port wildcard for Mac OS X Panther interoperability
+ right=%any
+ rightprotoport=17/%any
+ left=%defaultroute
+ leftid=@moon.strongswan.org
+ leftprotoport=17/1701
+
+conn dhcp
+ right=%any
+ rightprotoport=udp/bootpc
+ left=%defaultroute
+ leftid=@moon.strongswan.org
+ leftsubnet=0.0.0.0/0 #allows DHCP discovery broadcast
+ leftprotoport=udp/bootps
+ rekey=no
+ keylife=20s
+ rekeymargin=10s
+ auto=add
+
+Protocols and ports can be designated either by their numerical values
+or by their acronyms defined in /etc/services.
+
+ ipsec status
+
+shows the following connection definitions:
+
+"icmp": 192.168.0.1[@moon.strongswan.org]:1/0...%any:1/0
+"http": 192.168.0.1[@moon.strongswan.org]:6/80...%any:6/0
+"l2tp": 192.168.0.1[@moon.strongswan.org]:17/1701...%any:17/%any
+"dhcp": 0.0.0.0/0===192.168.0.1[@moon.strongswan.org]:17/67...%any:17/68
+
+Based on the protocol and port selectors appropriate eroutes will be set
+up, so that only the specified payload types will pass through the IPsec
+tunnel.
+
+
+4.6 IPsec policies based on wildcards
+ ---------------------------------
+
+In large VPN-based remote access networks there is often a requirement that
+access to the various parts of an internal network must be granted selectively,
+e.g. depending on the group membership of the remote access user. strongSwan
+makes this possible by applying wildcard filtering on the VPN user's
+distinguished name (ID_DER_ASN1_DN).
+
+Let's make a practical example:
+
+An organization has a sales department (OU=Sales) and a research group
+(OU=Research). In the company intranet there are separate subnets for Sales
+(10.0.0.0/24) and Research (10.0.1.0/24) but both groups share a common web
+server (10.0.2.100). The VPN clients use Virtual IP addresses that are either
+assigned statically or via DHCP-over-IPsec. The sales and research departments
+use IP addresses from separate DHCP address pools (10.1.0.0/24) and (10.1.1.0/24),
+respectively. An X.509 certificate is issued to each employee, containing in its
+subject distinguished name the country (C=CH), the company (O=ACME),
+the group membership(OU=Sales or OU=Research) and the common name (e.g.
+CN=Bart Simpson).
+
+The IPsec policy defined above can now be enforced with the following three
+IPsec security associations:
+
+conn sales
+ right=%any
+ rightid="C=CH, O=ACME, OU=Sales, CN=*"
+ rightsubnetwithin=10.1.0.0/24 # Sales DHCP range
+ leftsubnet=10.0.0.0/24 # Sales subnet
+
+conn research
+ right=%any
+ rightid="C=CH, O=ACME, OU=Research, CN=*"
+ rightsubnetwithin=10.1.1.0/24 # Research DHCP range
+ leftsubnet=10.0.1.0/24 # Research subnet
+
+conn web
+ right=%any
+ rightid="C=CH, O=ACME, OU=*, CN=*"
+ rightsubnetwithin=10.1.0.0/23 # Remote access DHCP range
+ leftsubnet=10.0.2.100/32 # Web server
+ rightprotoport=tcp # TCP protocol only
+ leftprotoport=tcp/http # TCP port 80 only
+
+Of course group specific tunneling could be implemented on the
+basis of the Virtual IP range specified by the rightsubnetwithin
+parameter alone, but the wildcard matching mechanism guarantees that
+only authorized user can access the corresponding subnets.
+
+The '*' character is used as a wildcard in relative distinguished names (RDNs).
+In order to match a wildcard template, the ID_DER_ASN1_DN of a peer must contain
+the same number of RDNs (selected from the list in section 4.3) appearing in the
+exact order defined by the template.
+
+ "C=CH, O=ACME, OU=Research, OU=Special Effects, CN=Bart Simpson"
+
+matches the templates
+
+ "C=CH, O=ACME, OU=Research, OU=*, CN=*"
+
+ "C=CH, O=ACME, OU=*, OU=Special Effects, CN=*"
+
+ "C=CH, O=ACME, OU=*, OU=*, CN=*"
+
+but not the template
+
+ "C=CH, O=ACME, OU=*, CN=*"
+
+which doesn't have the same number of RDNs.
+
+
+4.7 IPsec policies based on CA certificates
+ ---------------------------------------
+
+As an alternative to the wildcard based IPsec policies described in section 4.6,
+access to specific client host and subnets can abe controlled on the basis of
+the CA that issued the peer certificate
+
+
+conn sales
+ right=%any
+ rightca="C=CH, O=ACME, OU=Sales, CN=Sales CA"
+ rightsubnetwithin=10.1.0.0/24 # Sales DHCP range
+ leftsubnet=10.0.0.0/24 # Sales subnet
+
+conn research
+ right=%any
+ rightca="C=CH, O=ACME, OU=Research, CN=Research CA"
+ rightsubnetwithin=10.1.1.0/24 # Research DHCP range
+ leftsubnet=10.0.1.0/24 # Research subnet
+
+conn web
+ right=%any
+ rightca="C=CH, O=ACME, CN=ACME Root CA"
+ rightsubnetwithin=10.1.0.0/23 # Remote access DHCP range
+ leftsubnet=10.0.2.100/32 # Web server
+ rightprotoport=tcp # TCP protocol only
+ leftprotoport=tcp/http # TCP port 80 only
+
+In the example above, the connection "sales" can be used by peers
+presenting certificates issued by the Sales CA, only. In the same way,
+the use of the connection "research" is restricted to owners of certificates
+issued by the Research CA. The connection "web" is open to both "Sales" and
+"Research" peers because the required "ACME Root CA" is the issuer of the
+Research and Sales intermediate CAs. If no rightca parameter is present
+then any valid certificate issued by one of the trusted CAs in
+/etc/ipsec.d/cacerts can be used by the peer.
+
+The leftca parameter usually doesn't have to be set explicitly because
+by default it is set to the issuer field of the certificate loaded via
+leftcert. The statement
+
+ rightca=%same
+
+sets the CA requested from the peer to the CA used by the left side itself
+as e.g. in
+
+conn sales
+ right=%any
+ rightca=%same
+ leftcert=mySalesCert.pem
+
+
+4.8 Sending certificate requests
+ ----------------------------
+
+The presence of a rightca parameter also causes the CA to be sent as
+part of the certificate request message when strongSwan is the initiator.
+A special case occurs when strongSwan responds to a roadwarrior. If several
+roadwarrior connections based on different CAs are defined then all eligible
+CAs will be listed in Pluto\92s certificate request message.
+
+
+4.9 IPsec policies based on group attributes
+ ----------------------------------------
+
+X.509 attribute certificates are the most powerful mechanism for implementing
+IPsec security policies. The rightgroups parameter in a connection definition
+restricts the access to members of the listed groups only. An IPsec peer must
+have a valid attribute certificate issued by a trusted Authorization Authority
+and listing one of the requirede group attributes in order to get admitted.
+
+conn sales
+ right=%any
+ rightgroups="Sales"
+ rightsubnetwithin=10.1.0.0/24 # Sales DHCP range
+ leftsubnet=10.0.0.0/24 # Sales subnet
+
+conn research
+ right=%any
+ rightgroups="Research"
+ rightsubnetwithin=10.1.1.0/24 # Research DHCP range
+ leftsubnet=10.0.1.0/24 # Research subnet
+
+conn web
+ right=%any
+ rightgroups="Sales, Research"
+ rightsubnetwithin=10.1.0.0/23 # Remote access DHCP range
+ leftsubnet=10.0.2.100/32 # Web server
+ rightprotoport=tcp # TCP protocol only
+ leftprotoport=tcp/http # TCP port 80 only
+
+In the examples above membership of the group "Sales" is required for
+connection sales and membership of "Research" for connection research
+whereas connection web is accessible for both groups.
+
+Currently the attribute certificates of the peers must be loaded statically
+via the /etc/ipsec.d/acerts/ directory. In future releases of strongSwan it
+will be possible to fetch them from an LDAP directory server.
+
+
+5. Configuring certificates and CRLs
+ ---------------------------------
+
+
+5.1 Installing the CA certificates
+ ------------------------------
+
+X.509 certificates received by strongSwan during the IKE protocol are
+automatically authenticated by going up the trust chain until a self-signed
+root CA certificate is reached. Usually host certificates are directly signed
+by a root CA, but strongSwan also supports multi-level hierarchies with
+intermediate CAs in between. All CA certificates belonging to a trust chain
+must be copied in either binary DER or base64 PEM format into the directory
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/
+
+
+5.2 Installing optional certificate revocation lists (CRLs)
+ -------------------------------------------------------
+
+By copying a CA certificate into /etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/, automatically all user
+or host certificates issued by this CA are declared valid. Unfortunately
+private keys might get compromised inadvertently or intentionally, personal
+certificates of users leaving a company have to be blocked immediately, etc.
+To this purpose certificate revocation lists (CRLs) have been created. CRLs
+contain the serial numbers of all user or host certificates that have been
+revoked due to various reasons.
+
+After successful verification of the X.509 trust chain, Pluto searches its
+list of CRLs either obtained by loading them from the /etc/ipsec.d/crls/
+directory or fetching them dynamically from a HTTP or LDAP server for the
+presence of a CRL issued by the CA that has signed the certificate.
+
+If the serial number of the certificate is found in the CRL then the public key
+contained in the certificate is declared invalid and the IPSec SA will not be
+established. If no CRL is found or if the deadline defined in the nextUpdate
+field of the CRL has been reached, a warning is issued but the public key will
+nevertheless be accepted. CRLs must be stored either in binary DER or base64 PEM
+format in the crls directory. Section 7.3 will explain in detail how CRLs can
+be created using OpenSSL.
+
+
+5.3 Dynamic update of certificates and CRLs
+ ---------------------------------------
+
+Pluto reads certificates and CRLs from their respective files during system
+startup and keeps them in memory in the form of chained lists. X.509
+certificates have a finite life span defined by their validity field. Therefore
+it must be possible to replace CA or OCSP certificates kept in system memory
+without disturbing established ISAKMP SAs. Certificate revocation lists should
+also be updated in the regular intervals indicated by the nextUpdate field in
+the CRL body. The following interactive commands allow the manual replacement
+of the various files:
+
++---------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+| ipsec rereadsecrets reload file /etc/ipsec.secrets |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| ipsec rereadcacerts reload all files in /etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/ |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| ipsec rereadaacerts reload all files in /etc/ipsec.d/aacerts/ |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| ipsec rereadocspcerts reload all files in /etc/ipsec.d/ocspcerts/ |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| ipsec rereadacerts reload all files in /etc/ipsec.d/acerts/ |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| ipsec rereadcrls reload all files in /etc/ipsec.d/crls/ |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| ipsec rereadall ipsec rereadsecrets |
+| rereadcacerts |
+| rereadaacerts |
+| rereadocspcerts |
+| rereadacerts |
+| rereadcrls |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| ipsec purgeocsp purge the OCSP cache and fetching requests |
++---------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+
+CRLs can also be automatically fetched from an HTTP or LDAP server by using
+the CRL distribution points contained in X.509 certificates. The command
+
+ ipsec listcrls
+
+shows any pending fetch requests:
+
+ Oct 31 00:29:53 2002, trials: 2
+ issuer: 'C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=strongSwan Root CA'
+ distPts: 'http://crl.strongswan.org/strongswan.crl'
+ 'ldap://ldap.strongswan.org/o=Linux strongSwan, c=CH
+ ?certificateRevocationList?base
+ ?(objectClass=certificationAuthority)'
+
+In the example above, an http and an ldap URL were extracted from a received
+end certificate. An independent thread then tries to fetch a CRL from the
+designated distribution points. The same thread also periodically checks
+if any loaded CRLs are about to expire. The check interval can be defined in
+the "config setup" section of the ipsec.conf file:
+
+ config setup
+ crlcheckinterval=600
+
+In our example the thread wakes up every 600 seconds or 10 minutes in order
+to check the validity of the CRLs or to retry any pending fetch requests:
+
+ List of X.509 CRLs:
+
+ Dec 19 09:35:31 2002, revoked certs: 40
+ issuer: 'C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=strongSwan Root CA'
+ distPts: 'http://crl.strongswan.org/strongswan.crl'
+ updates: this Dec 19 09:35:00 2002
+ next Dec 19 10:35:00 2002 warning (expires in 19 minutes)
+
+ List of fetch requests:
+
+ Dec 19 10:15:31 2002, trials: 1
+ issuer: 'C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=strongSwan Root CA'
+ distPts: 'http://crl.strongwan.org/strongswan.crl'
+
+The first trial to update a CRL is started 2*crlcheckinterval before the
+nextUpdate time, i.e. when less than 20 minutes are left in our practical
+example. When crlcheckinterval is set to 0 (this is also the default value
+when the parameter is not set in ipsec.conf) then the CRL checking and updating
+thread is not started and dynamic CRL fetching is disabled.
+
+
+5.4 Local caching of CRLs
+ ---------------------
+
+The the ipsec.conf option
+
+ config setup
+ cachecrls=yes
+
+activates the local caching of CRLs that were dynamically fetched from an
+HTTP or LDAP server. Cached copies are stored in /etc/ipsec.d/crls under a
+unique filename formed from the issuer's SubjectKeyIdentifier and the suffix .crl.
+
+With the cached copy the CRL is immediately available after pluto's startup.
+When the local copy is about to expire it is automatically replaced with an
+updated CRL fetched from one of the defined CRL distribution points.
+
+
+5.5 Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
+ -----------------------------------------
+
+The Online Certificate Status Protocol is defined by RFC 2560. It can be
+used to query an OCSP server about the current status of an X.509 certificate
+and is often used as a more dynamic alternative to a static Certificate
+Revocation List (CRL). Both the OCSP request sent by the client and the OCSP
+response messages returned by the server are transported via a standard
+TCP/HTTP connection. Therefore cURL support must be enabled in pluto/Makefile:
+
+ # Uncomment this line to enable OCSP fetching using HTTP
+ LIBCURL=1
+
+In the simplest OCSP setup, a default URI under which the OCSP server for a
+given CA can be accessed is defined in ipsec.conf:
+
+ config setup
+ crlcheckinterval=600
+
+ ca strongswan
+ cacert=strongswanCert.pem
+ ocspuri=http://ocsp.strongswan.org:8880
+ auto=add
+
+The HTTP port can be freely chosen. In our example we have assumed TCP port 8880.
+The crlcheckinterval must be set to a value different from zero. Otherwise the
+OCSP fetching thread will not be started.
+
+The well-known openssl-0.9.7 package from http://www.openssl.org implements
+an OCSP server that can be used in conjunction with an openssl-based Public
+Key Infrastructure. The OCSP client integrated into Pluto does not contain
+any OpenSSL code though, but is based on the existing ASN.1 functionality of
+strongSwan.
+
+The OpenSSL-based OCSP server is started with the following command:
+
+ openssl ocsp -index index.txt -CA strongswanCert.pem -port 8880 \
+ -rkey ocspKey.pem -rsigner ocspCert.pem \
+ -resp_no_certs -nmin 60 -text
+
+The command consists of the parameters
+
+ -index index.txt is a copy of the OpenSSL index file containing the list of
+ all issued certificates. The certificate status in indext.txt
+ is designated either by V for valid or R for revoked. If
+ a new certificate is added or if a certificate is revoked
+ using the openssl ca command, the OCSP server must be restarted
+ in order for the changes in index.txt to take effect.
+
+ -CA the CA certificate
+
+ -port the HTTP port the OCSP server is listening on.
+
+-rkey the private key used to sign the OCSP response. The use of the
+ sensitive CA private key is not recommended since this could
+ jeopardize the security of your production PKI if the OCSP
+ server is hacked. It is much better to generate a special
+ RSA private key just for OCSP signing use instead.
+
+-rsigner the certificate of the OCSP server containing a public key which
+ matches the private key defined by -rkey and which can be used by
+ the client to check the trustworthiness of the signed OCSP response.
+
+-resp_no_certs With this option the OCSP signer certificate defined by
+ -rsigner is not included in the OCSP response.
+
+-nmin the validity interval of an OCSP response given in minutes.
+ 2*crlcheckinterval before the expiration of the OCSP responses,
+ a new query will by pro-actively started by the Pluto fetching thread.
+
+ If nmin is missing or set to zero then the default validity interval
+ compiled into Pluto will be 2 minutes, leading to a quasi one-time
+ use of the OCSP status response which will not be periodically
+ refreshed by the fetching thread. In conjunction with the parameter
+ setting "strictcrlpolicy=yes" a real-time certificate status query
+ can be implemented in this way.
+
+-text This option activates a verbose logging output, showing the contents
+ of both the received OCSP request and sent OCSP response.
+
+How does Pluto get hold of the OCSP signer certificate? There are two
+possibilities:
+
+Either you put the OCSP certificate into the default directory
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/ocspcerts
+
+or alternatively Pluto can receive it as part of the OCSP response from the
+remote OCSP server. In the latter case, how can Pluto make sure that
+the server has indeed been authorized by the CA to deal out certificate status
+information? In order to ascertain the OCSP signer capability, an extended
+key usage attribute can be included in the OCSP server certificate. Just
+insert the parameter
+
+ extendedKeyUsage=OCSPSigner
+
+in the [ usr_cert ] section of your openssl.cnf configuration file before
+the CA signs the OCSP server certificate.
+
+For a given CA the corresponding ca section in ipsec.conf (see section 7) allows
+to define the URI of a single OCSP server. As an alternative an OCSP URI can be
+embedded into each host and user certificate by putting the line
+
+ authorityInfoAccess = OCSP;URI:http://ocsp.strongswan.org:8880
+
+into the [ usr_cert ] section of your openssl.cnf configuration file.
+If an OCSP authorityInfoAccess extension is present in a certificate then this
+record overrides the default URI defined by the ca section.
+
+
+5.6 CRL Policy
+ ----------
+
+By default Pluto is quite tolerant concerning the handling of CRLs. It is not
+mandatory for a CRL to be present in /etc/ipsec.d/crls and if the expiration
+date defined by the nextUpdate field of a CRL has been reached just a warning
+is issued but a peer certificate will always be accepted if it has not been
+revoked.
+
+If you want to enforce a stricter CRL policy then you can do this by setting
+the "strictcrlpolicy" option. This is done in the "config setup" section
+of the ipsec.conf file:
+
+ config setup
+ strictcrlpolicy=yes
+ ...
+
+A certificate received from a peer will not be accepted if no corresponding
+CRL or OCSP response is available. And if an ISAKMP SA re-negotiation takes
+place after the nextUpdate deadline has been reached, the peer certificate
+will be declared invalid and the cached RSA public key will be deleted, causing
+the connection in question to fail. Therefore if you are going to use the
+"strictcrlpolicy=yes" option, make sure that the CRLs will always be updated
+in time. Otherwise a total standstill would ensue.
+
+As mentioned earlier the default setting is "strictcrlpolicy=no"
+
+
+5.7 Configuring the peer side using locally stored certificates
+ -----------------------------------------------------------
+
+If you don't want to use trust chains based on CA certificates as proposed in
+section 4.3 you can alternatively import trusted peer certificates directly
+into Pluto. Thus you do not have to rely on the certificate to be transmitted
+by the peer as part of the IKE protocol.
+
+With the conn %default section defined in section 4.1 and the use of the
+rightcert keyword for the peer side, the connection definitions in section 4.3
+can alternatively be written as
+
+ conn sun
+ right=%any
+ rightid=@sun.strongswan.org
+ rightcert=sunCert.cer
+
+ conn carol
+ right=192.168.0.100
+ rightcert=carolCert.der
+
+If the peer certificates are loaded locally then there is no sense in sending
+any certificates to the other end via the IKE Main Mode protocol. Especially
+if self-signed certificates are used which wouldn't be accepted any way by
+the other side. In these cases it is recommended to add
+
+ leftsendcert=never
+
+to the connection definition[s] in order to avoid the sending of the host's
+own certificate. The default value is
+
+ leftsendcert=always.
+
+If a peer certificate contains a subjectAltName extension, then an alternative
+rightid type can be used, as the example "conn sun" shows. If no rightid
+entry is present then the subject distinguished name contained in the
+certificate is taken as the ID.
+
+Using the same rules concerning pathnames that apply to strongSwan's own
+certificates, the following two definitions are also valid for trusted peer
+certificates:
+
+ rightcert=peercerts/carolCert.der
+
+or
+
+ rightcert=/usr/ssl/certs/carolCert.der
+
+
+6. Installing the private key - ipsec.secrets
+ ------------------------------------------
+
+6.1 Loading private key files in PKCS#1 format
+ ------------------------------------------
+
+Besides strongSwan's raw private key format strongSwan has been enabled to
+load RSA private keys in the PKCS#1 file format. The key files can be
+optionally secured with a passphrase.
+
+RSA private key files are declared in /etc/ipsec.secrets using the syntax
+
+ : RSA <my keyfile> "<optional passphrase>"
+
+The key file can be either in base64 PEM-format or binary DER-format. The
+actual coding is detected "automagically" by Pluto. The example
+
+ : RSA moonKey.pem
+
+uses a relative pathname. In this case Pluto will look for the key file
+in the directory
+
+ /etc/ipsec.d/private
+
+As an alternative an absolute pathname can be given as in
+
+ : RSA /usr/ssl/private/moonKey.pem
+
+In both cases make sure that the key files are root readable only.
+
+Often a private key must be transported from the Certification Authority
+where it was generated to the target security gateway where it is going
+to be used. In order to protect the key it can be encrypted with 3DES
+using a symmetric transport key derived from a cryptographically strong
+passphrase.
+
+ openssl genrsa -des3 -out moonKey.pem 1024
+
+Because of the weak security, key files protected by single DES will not
+be accepted by Pluto!!!
+
+Once on the security gateway the private key can either be permanently
+unlocked so that it can be used by Pluto without having to know a
+passphrase
+
+ openssl rsa -in moonKey.pem -out moonKey.pem
+
+or as an option the key file can remain secured. In this case the passphrase
+unlocking the private key must be added after the pathname in
+/etc/ipsec.secrets
+
+ : RSA moonKey.pem "This is my passphrase"
+
+Some CAs distribute private keys embedded in a PKCS#12 file. Since Pluto
+is not able yet to read this format directly, the private key part must
+first be extracted using the command
+
+ openssl pkcs12 -nocerts -in moonCert.p12 -out moonKey.pem
+
+if the key file moonKey.pem is to be secured again by a passphrase, or
+
+ openssl pkcs12 -nocerts -nodes -in moonCert.p12 -out moonKey.pem
+
+if the private key is to be stored unlocked.
+
+
+6.2 Entering passphrases interactively
+ ----------------------------------
+
+On a VPN gateway you would want to put the passphrase protecting the private
+key file right into /etc/ipsec.secrets as described in the previous paragraph,
+so that the gateway can be booted in unattended mode. The risk of keeping
+unencrypted secrets on a server can be minimized by putting the box into a
+locked room. As long as no one can get root access on the machine the private
+keys are safe.
+
+On a mobile laptop computer the situation is quite different. The computer can
+be stolen or the user is leaving it unattended so that unauthorized persons
+can get access to it. In theses cases it would be preferable not to keep any
+passphrases openly in /etc/ipsec.secrets but to prompt for them interactively
+instead. This is easily done by defining
+
+ : RSA moonKey.pem %prompt
+
+Since strongSwan is usually started during the boot process, usually no
+interactive console windows is available which can be used by Pluto to
+prompt for the passphrase. This must be initiated by the user by typing
+
+ ipsec secrets
+
+which actually is an alias for the existing command
+
+ ipsec rereadsecrets
+
+and which causes the prompt
+
+ need passphrase for '/etc/ipsec.d/private/moonKey.pem'
+ Enter:
+
+to appear. If the passphrase was correct and the private key file could be
+successfully decrypted then
+
+ valid passphrase
+
+results. Otherwise the prompt
+
+ invalid passphrase, please try again
+ Enter:
+
+will give you another try. Entering a carriage return will abort the
+the passphrase prompting.
+
+
+6.3 Multiple private keys
+ ---------------------
+
+strongSwan supports multiple private keys. Since the connections defined
+in ipsec.conf can find the correct private key based on the public key
+contained in the certificate assigned by leftcert, default private key
+definitions without specific IDs can be used
+
+ : RSA myKey1.pem "<optional passphrase1>"
+
+ : RSA myKey2.pem "<optional passphrase2>"
+
+
+7. Configuring CA properties - ipsec.conf
+ --------------------------------------
+
+Besides the definition of IPsec connections the ipsec.conf file can also
+be used to configure a few properties of the certification authorities
+needed to establish the X.509 trust chains. The following example shows
+the parameters that are currently available:
+
+ ca strongswan
+ cacert=strongswanCert.pem
+ ocspuri=http://ocsp.strongswan.org:8880
+ crluri=http://crl.strongswan.org/strongswan.crl'
+ crluri2="ldap:///O=Linux strongSwan, C=CH?certificateRevocationList"
+ ldaphost=ldap.strongswan.org
+ auto=add
+
+In a similar way as conn sections are used for connection definitions, an
+arbitrary number of optional ca sections define the basic properties of CAs.
+
+Each ca section is named with a unique label
+
+ ca strongswan
+
+The only mandatory parameter is
+
+ cacert=strongswanCert.pem
+
+which points to the CA certificate which usually resides in the default
+directory /etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/ but could also be retrieved via an absolute
+path name. If the CA certificate is stored on a smartcard then the
+notation
+
+ cacert=%smartcard#<n>
+
+or alternatively
+
+ cacert=%smartcard<optional slot nr>:<key id>
+
+can be used. The selection of smartcard slots is described in more detail
+in section 8.1.
+
+From the certificate the CA's distinguished name and the serial number
+is extracted. If an optional subjectKeyAuthentifier is present then it can
+be used to uniquely identify consecutive generations of CA certificates
+carrying the same distinguished name.
+
+The OCSP URI
+
+ ocspuri=http://ocsp.strongswan.org:8880
+
+allows to define an individual OCSP server per CA. Also up to two additional
+CRL distribution points (CDPs) can be defined
+
+ crluri=http://crl.strongswan.org/strongswan.crl'
+ crluri2="ldap:///O=Linux strongSwan, C=CH?certificateRevocationList"
+
+which are added to any CDPs already present in the received certificates
+themselves. The last parameter
+
+ ldaphost=ldap.strongswan.org
+
+can be used to fill in the actual server name in LDAP CDPs where the host is missing
+as e.g. in the crluri2 above. In future releases this ldaphost parameter might be used
+to retrieve user, host and attribute certificates.
+
+
+With the auto=add statement the ca definition is automatically loaded into Pluto during
+system startup. Setting auto=ignore will ignore the ca section. Additional ca definitions
+can be loaded from ipsec.conf during runtime with the command
+
+ ipsec auto --type ca --add strongswan-sales
+
+and
+
+ ipsec auto --type ca --delete strongswan-sales
+
+deletes the labeled ca entry. And finally the command
+
+ ipsec auto --type ca --replace strongswan
+
+first deletes the old definition in Pluto's memory and then loads the updated version
+from ipsec.conf. Any parameters which appear in several ca definitions can be put in
+a common ca %default section
+
+ ca %default
+ ldaphost=ldap.strongswan.org
+
+
+8. Smartcard support
+ -----------------
+
+8.1 Configuring a smartcard-based connection
+ ----------------------------------------
+
+Defining a smartcard-based connection in ipsec.conf is easy:
+
+ conn sun
+ right=192.168.0.2
+ rightid=@sun.strongswan.org
+ left=%defaultroute
+ leftcert=%smartcard
+ auto=add
+
+In most cases there is a single smartcard reader or cryptotoken and only one
+RSA private key safely stored on the crypto device. Thus usually the entry
+
+ leftcert=%smartcard
+
+which stands for the full notation
+
+ leftcert=%smartcard#1
+
+is sufficient where the first certificate/private key object enumerated by
+the PKCS#11 module is used. If several certificate/private key objects are
+present then the nth object can be selected using
+
+ leftcert=%smartcard#<n>
+
+The command
+
+ ipsec listcards
+
+gives an overview over all certificate objects made available by the PKCS#11
+module.CA certificates are automatically available as trust anchors.
+
+As an alternative the certificate ID and/or the slot number defined by
+the PKCS#11 standard can be specified using the notation
+
+ leftcert=%smartcard<optional slot nr>:<key id in hex format>
+
+Thus
+
+ leftcert=%smartcard:50
+
+will look in all available slots for ID 0x50 starting with the first slot
+(usually slot 0) whereas
+
+ leftcert=%smartcard4:50
+
+will directly check slot 4 (which is usually the first slot on the second
+reader/token when using the OpenSC library) for a key with ID 0x50.
+
+
+8.2 Entering the PIN code
+ ---------------------
+
+Since the smartcard signing operation needed to sign the hash with the
+RSA private key during IKE Main Mode is protected by a PIN code,
+the secret PIN must be made available to Pluto.
+
+For gateways that must be able to start IPsec tunnels automatically in
+unattended mode after a reboot, the secret PIN can be stored statically
+in ipsec.secrets
+
+ : PIN %smartcard "12345678"
+
+or with the general notation
+
+ : PIN %smartcard#<n> "<PIN code>"
+
+or alternatively
+
+ : PIN %smartcard<optional slot nr>:<key id> "<PIN code>"
+
+On personal notebooks that could get stolen, you wouldn't want to store
+your PIN in ipsec.secrets. Thus the alternative form
+
+ : PIN %smartcard %prompt
+
+will prompt you for the PIN when you start up the first IPsec connection
+using the command
+
+ ipsec up sun
+
+The auto command calls the whack function which in turn communicates with
+Pluto over a socket. Since the whack function call is executed from a command
+window, Pluto can prompt you for the PIN over this socket connection.
+Unfortunately roadwarrior connections which just wait passively for peers
+cannot be initiated via the command window:
+
+ conn rw
+ right=%any
+ left=%defaultroute
+ leftcert=%smartcard4:50
+ auto=add
+
+But if there is a corresponding entry
+
+ : PIN %smartcard4:50 %prompt
+
+in ipsec.secrets, then the standard command
+
+ ipsec rereadsecrets
+
+or the alias
+
+ ipsec secrets
+
+can be used to enter the PIN code for this connection interactively.
+
+The command
+
+ ipsec listcards
+
+can be executed at any time to check the current status of the PIN code[s].
+
+
+8.3 PIN-pad equipped smartcard readers
+ ----------------------------------
+
+Smartcard readers with an integrated PIN-pad offer an increased security
+level because the PIN entry cannot be sniffed on the host computer e.g.
+by a surrepticiously installed key logger. In order to tell pluto not to
+prompt for the PIN on the host itself, the entry
+
+ : PIN %smartcard:50 %pinpad
+
+can be used in ipsec.secrets. Because the key pad does not cache the PIN in
+the smartcard reader, it must be entered for every PKCS #11 session login.
+By default pluto does a session logout after every RSA signature. In order
+to avoid the repeated entry of the PIN code during the periodic IKE main
+mode rekeyings, the following parameter can be set in the config setup
+section of ipsec.conf:
+
+ config setup
+ pkcs11keepstate=yes
+
+The default setting is pkcs11keepstate=no.
+
+
+8.4 Configuring a smartcard with pkcsc15-init
+ -----------------------------------------
+
+strongSwan's smartcard solution is based on the PKCS#15 "Cryptographic Token
+Information Format Standard" fully supported by OpenSC library functions.
+Using the command
+
+ pkcs15-init --erase-card --create-pkcs15
+
+a fresh PKCS#15 file structure is created on a smartcard or cryptotoken.
+With the next command
+
+ pkcs15-init --auth-id 1 --store-pin --pin "12345678" --puk "87654321"
+ --label "my PIN"
+
+a secret PIN code with auth-id 1 is stored in an unretrievable location on
+the smart card. The PIN will protect the RSA signing operation. If the PIN
+is entered incorrectly more than three times the smartcard will be locked
+and the PUK code can be used to unlock the card again.
+
+Next the RSA private key is transferred to the smartcard
+
+ pkcs15-init --auth-id 1 --store-private-key myKey.pem [--id 45]
+
+By default the PKCS#15 smartcard record will be assigned the id 45.
+Using the --id option multiple key records can be stored on a smartcard.
+
+At last we load the matching X.509 certificate onto the smartcard
+
+ pkcs15-init --auth-id 1 --store-certificate myCert.pem [--id 45]
+
+The pkcs15-tool can now be used to verify the contents of the smartcard.
+
+ pkcs15-tool --list-pins --list-keys --list-certificates
+
+If everything is ok then you are ready to use the generated PKCS#15
+structure with strongSwan.
+
+8.5 PKCS#11 proxy functions
+ -----------------------
+
+ With the setting pkcs11keepstate=yes some PKCS#11 implementations
+ (e.g. OpenSC) will lock the access to the smartcard as soon as pluto has
+ opened a session and will thus prevent other application from sharing the
+ smartcard resource. In order to solve this locking problem, strongSwan
+ offers a PKCS#11 proxy service making use of the whack socket communication
+ channel. The setting
+
+ config setup
+ pkcs11proxy=yes
+
+will enable the proxy mode that is disabled by default.
+
+Currently two smartcard operations are supported: RSA encryption and
+RSA decryption. The notation is as follows:
+
+ ipsec scdecrypt <encrypted data>
+ [--inbase 16|hex|64|base64|256|text|ascii]
+ [--outbase 16|hex|64|base64|256|text|ascii]
+ [--keyid <id>]
+
+The default settings for inbase and outbase is hexadecimal.
+Thus the simplest call has the form
+
+ ipsec scdecrypt bb952b71920094ce0696ef9b8b26...12e6
+
+and the returned result might be a decrypted 128 bit AES key
+
+ 000 8836362e030e6707c32ffaa0bdad5540
+
+The leading three characters represent the return code of the whack channel
+with 000 signifying that no error has occured. Here is another example showing
+the use of the inbase and outbase attributes
+
+ ipsec scdecrypt m/ewDnTs0k...woE= --inbase base64 --outbase text
+
+where the result has the form
+
+ 000 This is a secret
+
+By default the first RSA private key found by the PKCS#11 enumeration is
+used. If a different key should be selected then the notation introduced
+in sections 8.1 and 8.2 can be used:
+
+ --keyid %smartcard:50
+ --keyid %smartcard4:50
+ --keyid %smartcard#3
+
+with --keyid %smartcard#1 being the default. If supported by the smartcard
+and PKCS#11 library RSA encryption can be used with the notation
+
+ ipsec scencrypt <plaintext data>
+ [--inbase 16|hex|64|base64|256|text|ascii]
+ [--outbase 16|hex|64|base64|256|text|ascii]
+ [--keyid <id>]
+
+with the example
+
+ ipsec scencrypt "This is a secret" --inbase ascii --outbase 64
+
+returning the expected output
+
+ 000 m/ewDnTs0k...woE=
+
+
+9. Configuring the clients
+ -----------------------
+
+9.1 strongSwan
+ ----------
+
+A strongSwan to strongSwan connection is symmetrical. Any of the four defined
+ID types can be used, even different types on either end of the connection,
+although this wouldn't make much sense.
+
++--------------------------------------------------------------+
+| Connection Definition ID type subjectAltName |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------|
+| rightid (strongSwan) DER_ASN1_DN - |
+| FQDN DNS: |
+| USER_FQDN email: |
+| IPV4_ADDR IP: |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------|
+| leftid (strongSwan) DER_ASN1_DN - |
+| FQDN DNS: |
+| USER_FQDN email: |
+| IPV4_ADDR IP: |
++--------------------------------------------------------------+
+
+
+9.2 PGPnet
+ ------
+
+Use the file peerCert.p12 to import PGPnet's X.509 certificate, the CA
+certificate, plus the encrypted private key in binary PKCS#12 format into the
+PGPkey tool. You will be prompted for the passphrase securing the private key.
+
+Use the file myCert.pem to import the X.509 certificate of the strongSwan
+security gateway into the PGPkey tool. The PGPkeyTool does not accept X.509
+certificates in binary DER format, so it must be imported in base64 format:
+
+ -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+ M...
+
+ ...
+ -----END CERTIFICATE-----
+
+Make sure that there is no human-readable listing of the X.509 certificate in
+front of the line
+
+ -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+
+otherwise PGPnet will refuse to load the *.PEM file. Any surplus lines can
+either be deleted by loading the certificate into a text editor or you can
+apply the command
+
+ openssl x509 -in myCert.pem -out myCert.pem
+
+to achieve the same effect.
+
+With authentication based on X.509 certificates, PGPnet always sends the ID
+type DER_ASN1_DN, therefore rightid in the connection definition of the
+strongSwan security gateway must be an ASN.1 distinguished name.
+
+In the receiving direction PGPnet accepts all four ID types from strongSwan.
+
++--------------------------------------------------------------+
+| Connection Definition ID type subjectAltName |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------|
+| rightid (PGPnet) DER_ASN1_DN - |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------|
+| leftid (strongSwan) DER_ASN1_DN - |
+| FQDN DNS: |
+| USER_FQDN email: |
+| IPV4_ADDR IP: |
++--------------------------------------------------------------+
+
+
+9.3 SafeNet/Soft-PK/Soft-Remote
+ ---------------------------
+
+SafeNet/Soft-PK and SafeNet/Soft-Remote can be configured to send their
+identity either as DER_ASN1_DN, IPV4_ADDR, FQDN, or USER_FQDN.
+In the receiving direction SafeNet/Soft-PK and SafeNet/Soft-Remote
+accept all four ID types coming from strongSwan.
+
++--------------------------------------------------------------+
+| Connection Definition ID type subjectAltName |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------|
+| rightid (SafeNet/Soft-PK) DER_ASN1_DN - |
+| FQDN DNS: |
+| USER_FQDN email: |
+| IPV4_ADDR IP: |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------|
+| leftid (strongSwan) DER_ASN1_DN - |
+| FQDN DNS: |
+| USER_FQDN email: |
+| IPV4_ADDR IP: |
++--------------------------------------------------------------+
+
+
+9.4 SSH Sentinel
+ ------------
+
+SSH Sentinel sends its identity as DER_ASN1_DN if the subjectAltName field of
+its certificate is empty. If a subjectAltName field is present, then the
+corresponding type IPV4_ADDR, FQDN, or USER_FQDN is automatically chosen.
+With several subjectAltName entries, the precedence of the different ID types
+is not quite clear. In the receiving direction SSH Sentinel accepts all four
+ID types from strongSwan.
+
++--------------------------------------------------------------+
+| Connection Definition ID type subjectAltName |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------|
+| rightid (SSH Sentinel) DER_ASN1_DN - |
+| FQDN DNS: |
+| USER_FQDN email: |
+| IPV4_ADDR IP: |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------|
+| leftid (strongSwan) DER_ASN1_DN - |
+| FQDN DNS: |
+| USER_FQDN email: |
+| IPV4_ADDR IP: |
++--------------------------------------------------------------+
+
+
+9.5 Windows 2000/XP
+ ---------------
+
+Windows 2000 and Windows XP always send the ID type DER_ASN1_DN,
+therefore rightid in the connection definition of the strongSwan
+security gateway must be an ASN.1 distinguished name.In the
+receiving direction Windows 2000/XP accepts all four ID types
+from strongSwan.
+
++--------------------------------------------------------------+
+| Connection Definition ID type subjectAltName |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------|
+| rightid (Windows 2000/XP) DER_ASN1_DN - |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------|
+| leftid (strongSwan) DER_ASN1_D - |
+| FQDN DNS: |
+| USER_FQDN email: |
+| IPV4_ADDR IP: |
++--------------------------------------------------------------+
+
+
+10. Monitoring functions
+ --------------------
+
+strongSwan offers the following monitoring functions:
+
+
+ ipsec listalgs
+
+lists all IKE and ESP cryptographic algorithms that are currently
+registered with strongSwan.
+
+The a listing has the following form:
+
+ List of registered IKE Encryption Algorithms:
+
+ #3 OAKLEY_BLOWFISH_CBC, blocksize: 64, keylen: 128-128-256
+ #5 OAKLEY_3DES_CBC, blocksize: 64, keylen: 192-192-192
+ #7 OAKLEY_AES_CBC, blocksize: 128, keylen: 128-128-256
+ #65004 OAKLEY_SERPENT_CBC, blocksize: 128, keylen: 128-128-256
+ #65005 OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC, blocksize: 128, keylen: 128-128-256
+ #65289 OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC_SSH, blocksize: 128, keylen: 128-128-256
+
+ List of registered IKE Hash Algorithms:
+
+ #1 OAKLEY_MD5, hashsize: 128
+ #2 OAKLEY_SHA, hashsize: 160
+ #4 OAKLEY_SHA2_256, hashsize: 256
+ #6 OAKLEY_SHA2_512, hashsize: 512
+
+ List of registered IKE DH Groups:
+
+ #2 OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024, groupsize: 1024
+ #5 OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1536, groupsize: 1536
+ #14 OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048, groupsize: 2048
+ #15 OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072, groupsize: 3072
+ #16 OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096, groupsize: 4096
+ #17 OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP6144, groupsize: 6144
+ #18 OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192, groupsize: 8192
+
+ List of registered ESP Encryption Algorithms:
+
+ #3 ESP_3DES, blocksize: 64, keylen: 168-168
+ #7 ESP_BLOWFISH, blocksize: 64, keylen: 96-128
+ #12 ESP_AES, blocksize: 128, keylen: 128-256
+ #252 ESP_SERPENT, blocksize: 128, keylen: 128-256
+ #253 ESP_TWOFISH, blocksize: 128, keylen: 128-256
+
+ List of registered ESP Authentication Algorithms:
+
+ #1 AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5, keylen: 128-128
+ #2 AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1, keylen: 160-160
+ #5 AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_256, keylen: 256-256
+ #7 AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_512, keylen: 512-512
+
+
+The command
+
+ ipsec listpubkeys [--utc]
+
+lists all public keys currently installed in the chained list of public
+keys. These keys were statically loaded from ipsec.conf or aquired either
+from received certificates or retrieved from secure DNS servers using
+opportunistic mode.
+
+The public key listing has the following form:
+
+ Feb 11 14:40:18 2005, 2048 RSA Key AwEAAa+uL,
+ until Sep 09 13:17:25 2009 ok
+ ID_FQDN '@moon.strongswan.org'
+ issuer: 'C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=strongSwan Root CA'
+ serial: '03'
+ Feb 11 14:40:18 2005, 2048 RSA Key AwEAAa+uL,
+ until Sep 09 13:17:25 2009 ok
+ ID_DER_ASN1_DN 'C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=moon.strongswan.org'
+ issuer: 'C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=strongSwan Root CA'
+ serial: '03'
+ Feb 11 13:36:53 2005, 2048 RSA Key AwEAAbgbh,
+ until Dec 31 22:43:18 2009 ok
+ ID_USER_FQDN 'carol@strongswan.org'
+ issuer: 'C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=strongSwan Root CA'
+ serial: '0a'
+
+It consists of
+
+ - the date the public key was installed either in local time or UTC (--utc)
+ - the modulus size of the RSA key in bits
+ - a keyID consisting of 9 base64 symbols representing the public exponent
+ and the most significant bits of the modulus
+ - the expiration date of the public key (extracted from the certificate)
+ - the type and value of the ID associated with the public key.
+ - the issuer of the certificate the public key was extracted from.
+ - the serial number of the certificate the public key was extracted from.
+
+A public key can be associated with several IDs, e.g. using subjectAltNames
+in certificates and an ID can possess several public keys, e.g. retrieved
+from a secure DNS server.
+
+
+The command
+
+ ipsec listcerts [--utc]
+
+lists all local certificates, both strongSwan's own and those of
+trusted peer loaded via leftcert and rightcert, respectively.
+
+The output has the form
+
+ Feb 11 13:36:47 2005, count: 4
+ subject: 'C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=moon.strongswan.org'
+ issuer: 'C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=strongSwan Root CA'
+ serial: 03
+ pubkey: 2048 RSA Key AwEAAa+uL, has private key
+ validity: not before Sep 10 13:17:25 2004 ok
+ not after Sep 09 13:17:25 2009 ok
+ subjkey: e5:e4:10:87:6c:2a:c4:be:ad:85:49:42:a6:de:76:58:30:3a:9f:c1
+ authkey: 5d:a7:dd:70:06:51:32:7e:e7:b6:6d:b3:b5:e5:e0:60:ea:2e:4d:ef
+ aserial: 00
+
+and shows
+
+ - the date the certificate was installed either in local time or UTC (--utc)
+ - the count shows how many connections refer to this certificate
+ - the subject of the certificate
+ - the issuer of the certificate
+ - the serial number of the certificate
+ - the size and keyid of the RSA public key contained in the certificate.
+ the label "has private key" indicates that a matching RSA private key
+ has been found, defined or loaded in ipsec.secrets.
+ - the label "on smartcard" indicates that the certificate was loaded from
+ a smartcard or cryptotoken and that most probably a matching RSA private
+ key also resides on-card.
+ - the validity of the CA certificate expressed either in local time or
+ UTC (--utc). The validity is checked automatically resulting either
+ in an "ok" message or a "fatal" error message.
+ - the optional subjectKeyIdentifier extension which is a 20 byte SHA-1 hash
+ over the certificate's public key.
+ - the optional authorityKeyIdentifier extension which is a 20 byte SHA-1 hash
+ over the public key of the issuer who signed the certificate.
+ - the serial number of the issuer's certificate.
+
+
+The command
+
+ ipsec listcacerts [--utc]
+
+lists all CA certificates that have been either been loaded from the directory
+/etc/ipsec.d/cacerts/ or received via the IKE protocol. The output has the form
+
+ Feb 11 13:36:52 2005, count: 1
+ subject: 'C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=strongSwan Root CA'
+ issuer: 'C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=strongSwan Root CA'
+ serial: 00
+ pubkey: 2048 RSA Key AwEAAb/yX
+ validity: not before Sep 10 13:01:45 2004 ok
+ not after Sep 08 13:01:45 2014 ok
+ subjkey: 5d:a7:dd:70:06:51:32:7e:e7:b6:6d:b3:b5:e5:e0:60:ea:2e:4d:ef
+ authkey: 5d:a7:dd:70:06:51:32:7e:e7:b6:6d:b3:b5:e5:e0:60:ea:2e:4d:ef
+ aserial: 00
+
+and shows
+
+ - the date the CA certificate was installed either in local time or UTC (--utc)
+ - the count is always set to 1
+ - the subject of the CA certificate
+ - the issuer of the CA certificate
+ - the serial number of the CA certificate
+ - the size and keyid of the RSA public key contained in the certificate.
+ - the validity of the CA certificate expressed either in local time or
+ UTC (--utc). The validity is checked automatically resulting either
+ in an "ok" message or a "fatal" error message.
+ - the optional subjectKeyIdentifier extension which is a 20 byte SHA-1 hash
+ over the CA certificate's public key.
+ - the optional authorityKeyIdentifier extension which is a 20 byte SHA-1 hash
+ over the public key of the issuer who signed the CA certificate.
+ For Root CA certificates the authorityKeyIdentifier and subjectKeyIdentifier
+ fields must be equal.
+ - the serial number of the issuer's certificate.
+
+
+The command
+
+ ipsec listaacerts [--utc]
+
+lists all Authorization Authority certificates that have been loaded from
+the directory /etc/ipsec.d/aacerts/.
+The output has the form
+
+ Dec 20 13:29:55 2004, count: 1
+ subject: 'C=CH, O=strongSec GmbH, CN=strongSec Authorization Authority'
+ issuer: 'C=CH, O=strongSec GmbH, CN=strongSec Root CA'
+ serial: 0f
+ pubkey: 2048 RSA Key AwEAAfazH
+ validity: not before Aug 24 13:41:56 2003 ok
+ not after Aug 23 13:41:56 2005 ok
+ subjkey: 56:89:b9:28:c9:1b:a0:00:7f:50:9d:ec:28:75:23:c1:1e:d1:dd:90
+ authkey: af:80:d5:c6:02:1c:96:78:b3:85:a5:65:a2:23:fd:ad:cf:e2:55:b2
+ aserial: 00
+
+and shows
+
+ - the date the AA certificate was installed either in local time or UTC (--utc)
+ - the count is always set to 1
+ - the subject of the AA certificate
+ - the issuer of the AA certificate
+ - the serial number of the AA certificate
+ - the size and keyid of the RSA public key contained in the certificate.
+ - the validity of the AA certificate expressed either in local time or
+ UTC (--utc). The validity is checked automatically resulting either
+ in an "ok" message or a "fatal" error message.
+ - the optional subjectKeyIdentifier extension which is a 20 byte SHA-1 hash
+ over the AA certificate's public key.
+ - the optional authorityKeyIdentifier extension which is a 20 byte SHA-1 hash
+ over the public key of the issuer who signed the AA certificate.
+ - the serial number of the issuer's certificate.
+
+
+The command
+
+ ipsec listocspcerts [--utc]
+
+lists all OCSO signer certificates that have been either loaded from
+/etc/ipsec.d/ocspcerts/ or have been received included in the OCSP server
+response. The output has the form
+
+ Feb 09 22:56:17 2005, count: 1
+ subject: 'C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, OU=OCSP, CN=ocsp.strongswan.org'
+ issuer: 'C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=strongSwan Root CA'
+ serial: 09
+ pubkey: 2048 RSA Key AwEAAaonT
+ validity: not before Nov 19 17:29:28 2004 ok
+ not after Nov 18 17:29:28 2009 ok
+ subjkey: 88:07:0a:b8:ae:c7:c1:07:5c:be:68:6a:c4:a5:7f:81:1f:37:b5:56
+ authkey: 5d:a7:dd:70:06:51:32:7e:e7:b6:6d:b3:b5:e5:e0:60:ea:2e:4d:ef
+ aserial: 00
+
+and shows
+
+ - the date the OCSP signer certificate was installed either in local time
+ or UTC (--utc)
+ - the count is always set to 1
+ - the subject of the OCSP signer certificate
+ - the issuer of the OCSP signer certificate
+ - the serial number of the OCSP signer certificate
+ - the size and keyid of the RSA public key contained in the certificate.
+ - the validity of the OCSP signer certificate expressed either in local time
+ or UTC (--utc). The validity is checked automatically resulting either
+ in an "ok" message or a "fatal" error message.
+ - the optional subjectKeyIdentifier extension which is a 20 byte SHA-1 hash
+ over the OCSP signer certificate's public key.
+ - the optional authorityKeyIdentifier extension which is a 20 byte SHA-1 hash
+ over the public key of the issuer who signed the OCSP certificate.
+ - the serial number of the issuer's certificate.
+
+
+The command
+
+ ipsec listacerts [--utc]
+
+lists all X.509 attribute certificates that have been loaded from the directory
+/etc/ipsec.d/acerts/.
+The output has the form
+
+ Dec 20 13:29:56 2004
+ holder: 'C=CH, O=strongSec GmbH, CN=Andreas Steffen'
+ hissuer: 'C=CH, O=strongSec GmbH, CN=strongSec Root CA'
+ hserial: 1e
+ groups: Research, Sales
+ issuer: 'C=CH, O=strongSec GmbH, CN=strongSec Authorization Authority'
+ serial: 2c
+ validity: not before Dec 19 14:51:38 2004 ok
+ not after Dec 20 14:51:38 2004 fatal (expired)
+ authkey: 56:89:b9:28:c9:1b:a0:00:7f:50:9d:ec:28:75:23:c1:1e:d1:dd:90
+ aserial: 0f
+
+and shows
+
+ - the date the attribute certificate was installed either in local time
+ or UTC (--utc)
+ - the holder of the attribute certificate
+ - the issuer of holder's certificate
+ - the serial number of the holder's certificate
+ - the group attributes
+ - the issuing Authorization Authority of the attribute certificate
+ - the serial number of the attribute certificate
+ - the validity of the attribute certificate expressed either in local time or
+ UTC (--utc). The validity is checked automatically resulting either
+ in an "ok" message or a "fatal" error message.
+ - an authorityKeyIdentifier extension which is a 20 byte SHA-1 hash
+ over the public key of the issuing Authorization Authority
+ - the serial number of the AA certificate.
+
+
+The command
+
+ ipsec listgroups [--utc]
+
+lists all group attributes either defined in right|leftgroups statements
+in ipsec.conf or contained in loaded X.509 attribute certificates.
+The output has the form
+
+ Dec 20 13:29:55 2004, count: 4
+ Research
+ Dec 20 13:30:04 2004, count: 1
+ Research New York
+ Dec 20 13:29:55 2004, count: 3
+ Sales
+
+and shows
+
+ - the date the group attribute was first installed either in local time
+ or UTC (--utc)
+ - the count shows how many times the attribute is used
+ - the group name
+
+
+The command
+
+ ipsec listcainfos [--utc]
+
+lists the properties defined by the ca definition sections in ipsec.conf.
+The output has the form
+
+ Jun 08 22:31:37 2004, "strongswan"
+ authname: 'C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=strongSwan Root CA'
+ ldaphost: 'ldap.strongswan.org'
+ ocspuri: 'http://ocsp.strongswan.org:8880'
+ distPts: 'http://crl.strongswan.org/strongswan.crl'
+ 'ldap:///O=Linux strongSwan, C=CH?certificateRevocationList'
+ authkey: 5d:a7:dd:70:06:51:32:7e:e7:b6:6d:b3:b5:e5:e0:60:ea:2e:4d:ef
+ aserial: 00
+
+and shows
+
+ - the date the CA definition was loaded either in local time or UTC (--utc)
+ - the name of the ca section
+ - the distinguished name of the CA
+ - an optional default ldap host for the CA
+ - an optional OCSP URI
+ - a maximum of two optional CRL distribution points
+ - the optional authorityKeyIdentifier extension which is a 20 byte SHA-1 hash
+ over the public key of the CA.
+ - the serial number of the CA.
+
+
+The command
+
+ ipsec listcrls [--utc]
+
+lists all CRLs that have been loaded from /etc/ipsec.d/crls/.
+The output has the form
+
+ Feb 11 13:37:00 2005, revoked certs: 1
+ issuer: 'C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=strongSwan Root CA'
+ distPts: 'http://crl.strongswan.org/strongswan.crl'
+ updates: this Feb 08 07:46:29 2005
+ next Mar 10 07:46:29 2005 ok
+ authkey: 5d:a7:dd:70:06:51:32:7e:e7:b6:6d:b3:b5:e5:e0:60:ea:2e:4d:ef
+ aserial: 00
+
+and shows
+
+ - the date the CRL was installed either in local time or UTC (--utc)
+ - the number revoked certificates
+ - the issuer of the CRL
+ - the URLs of the distribution points where the CRL can be fetched from.
+ - the dates when the CRL was issued and when the next update
+ is expected, respectively, expressed either in local time or
+ UTC (--utc). It is automatically checked if the next update
+ deadline has passed, resulting either in an "ok" message, a
+ a "warning" message when strictcrlpolicy=no or a "fatal" message when
+ strictcrlpolicy=yes.
+ - the optional authorityKeyIdentifier extension which is a 20 byte SHA-1 hash
+ over the public key of the issuer who signed the CRL. This extension is
+ present in version 2 CRLs, only.
+ - the serial number of the issuer's certificate.
+
+
+The command
+
+
+ ipsec listocsp [--utc]
+
+lists the contents of the OCSP response cache. The output has the form
+
+ issuer: 'C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=strongSwan Root CA'
+ uri: 'http://ocsp.strongswan.org:8880'
+ authname: 13:9d:a0:9e:f4:32:ab:8f:e2:89:56:67:fa:d0:d4:e3:35:86:71:b9
+ authkey: 5d:a7:dd:70:06:51:32:7e:e7:b6:6d:b3:b5:e5:e0:60:ea:2e:4d:ef
+ aserial: 00
+ Feb 09 22:56:17 2005, until Feb 09 23:01:17 2005 warning (expires in 4 minutes)
+ serial: 0a, good
+
+and shows
+
+ - the distinguished name of the CA handled by the OCSP server
+ - the http URI of the OCSP server.
+ - the 20 byte SHA-1 hash of the CA's distinguished name
+ - the 20 byte SHA-1 hash of the CA's public key
+ - the serial number of the CA's certificate
+ - a certificate status list showing
+ - the time the OCSP status was received
+ - an optional nextUpdate deadline (if missing the OCSP status will be
+ onetime with a lifetime of 2 minutes only).
+ - the serial number of the certificate
+ - the status of the certificate (good, revoked, unknown)
+
+
+The command
+
+ ipsec listcards [--utc]
+
+lists all smartcard records that are currently in use by Pluto.
+The output has the form
+
+ Aug 17 16:47:59 2005, #1, count: 6
+ slot: 0, session closed, logged out, has valid pin
+ id: 45
+ label: 'strongSwan'
+ subject: 'C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=carol@strongswan.org'
+
+with pkcs11keepstate=no and
+
+ Aug 17 16:47:59 2005, #1, count: 6
+ slot: 0, session opened, logged in, has pin pad
+ id: 45
+ label: 'strongSwan'
+ subject: 'C=CH, O=Linux strongSwan, CN=carol@strongswan.org'
+
+with pkcs11keepstate=yes and shows
+
+- the date the certificate was read from the smartcard record
+- the certificate objects are numbered starting from #1
+- the count shows how many connections and secret pin entries point
+ to the smartcard record
+- the PKCS #11 slot number
+- the PKCS #11 session state: closed | opened
+- the PKCS #11 session login state: logged out | logged in
+- the status of the PIN: no pin | valid pin | invalid pin | pin pad
+- the ID of the certificate object
+- the label of the certificate object
+- the subject distinguished name of the certificate
+
+
+The command
+
+ ipsec auto --listall [--utc]
+
+is equivalent to
+
+ ipsec listalgs
+ ipsec listpubkeys [--utc]
+ ipsec listcerts [--utc]
+ ipsec listcacerts [--utc]
+ ipsec listaacerts [--utc]
+ ipsec listocspcerts [--utc]
+ ipsec listacerts [--utc]
+ ipsec listgroups [--utc]
+ ipsec listcainfos [--utc]
+ ipsec listcrls [--utc]
+ ipsec listocsp [--utc]
+ ipsec listcards [--utc]
+
+
+11. Firewall support functions
+ --------------------------
+
+
+11.1 Environment variables in the updown script
+ ------------------------------------------
+
+strongSwan makes the following environment variables available
+in the updown script indicated by the leftupdown option:
+
++------------------------------------------------------------------+
+| Variable Example Comment |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| $PLUTO_PEER_ID carol@strongswan.org USER_FQDN (1) |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| $PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL 17 udp (2) |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| $PLUTO_PEER_PORT 68 bootpc (3) |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| $PLUTO_PEER_CA C=CH, O=ACME, CN=Sales CA (4) |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| $PLUTO_MY_ID @moon.strongswan.org FQDN (1) |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| $PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL 17 udp (2) |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| $PLUTO_MY_PORT 67 bootps (3) |
++------------------------------------------------------------------+
+
+(1) $PLUTO_PEER_ID/$PLUTO_MY_ID contain the IDs of the two ends
+ of an established connection. In our examples these
+ correspond to the strings defined by rightid and leftid,
+ respectively.
+
+(2) $PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL/$PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL contain the protocol
+ defined by the rightprotoport and leftprotoport options,
+ respectively. Both variables contain the same protocol value.
+ The variables take on the value '0' if no protocol has been defined.
+
+(3) $PLUTO_PEER_PORT/$PLUTO_MY_PORT contain the ports defined by
+ the rightprotoport and leftprotoport options, respectively.
+ The variables take on the value '0' if no port has been defined.
+
+(4) $PLUTO_PEER_CA contains the distinguished name of the CA that
+ issued the peer's certificate.
+
+
+11.2 Automatic insertion and deletion of iptables firewall rules
+ -----------------------------------------------------------
+
+Starting with strongswan-2.7.0, the default _updown script automatically inserts
+and deletes dynamic iptables firewall rules upon the establishment or teardown,
+respectively, of an IPsec security association. This new feature is activated
+with the line
+
+ leftfirewall=yes
+
+and can be used when the following prerequisites are fulfilled:
+
+ - Linux 2.4.x kernel, KLIPS IPsec stack, and arbitrary iptables version.
+ Filtering of tunneled traffic is based on ipsecN interfaces.
+
+ - Linux 2.6.16 kernel or newer, native NETKEY IPsec stack, and
+ iptables-1.3.5 or newer. Filtering of tunneled traffic is based on
+ IPsec policy matching rules.
+
+If you define a local client subnet with a netmask larger than /32 behind
+the gateway then the automatically inserted FORWARD iptables rules will
+not allow to access the internal IP address of the host although it is
+part of the client subnet definition. If you want additional INPUT and
+OUTPUT iptables rules to be inserted, so that the host itself can be accessed
+then add the following line:
+
+ lefthostaccess=yes
+
+The _updown script also features a logging facility which will register the
+creation (+) and the expiration (-) of each successfully established VPN
+connection in a special syslog file in the following concise and easily
+readable format:
+
+Jul 19 18:58:38 moon vpn:
+ + @carol.strongswan.org 192.168.0.100 -- 192.168.0.1 == 10.1.0.0/16
+Jul 19 22:15:17 moon vpn:
+ - @carol.strongswan.org 192.168.0.100 -- 192.168.0.1 == 10.1.0.0/16
+
+
+11.3 Sample Linux 2.6 updown script for iptables < 1.3.5
+ ---------------------------------------------------
+
+If you are using a Linux 2.6 kernel older than 2.6.16 or an iptables version
+older than 1.3.5 then the IPsec policy matching rules will not be available.
+In order to make sure that only tunneled packets are accepted, a mark can be
+set on incoming ESP packets. This "ESP" mark will be retained on the
+decapsulated packet so that iptables rules inserted by the updown script can
+check on the presence of this mark. For this purpose the template located in
+
+ programs/_updown_espmark
+
+can be used. Store a copy of _updown_espmark e.g. in /etc/ipsec.updown and load
+the script with the line
+
+ leftupdown=/etc/updown.ipsec.
+
+In addition for the dynamic updown script to work the following static iptables rules
+must be applied:
+
+ iptables -t mangle -A INPUT -p 50 -j MARK --set-mark 50
+
+
+12. Authentication with raw RSA public keys
+ ---------------------------------------
+
+FreeS/WAN, as it is available from www.freeswan.org does public key
+authentication with raw RSA public keys that are directly defined in
+/etc/ipsec.conf
+
+ rightrsasigkey=0sAq4c....
+
+When version 1.x of standard FreeS/WAN receives a certificate request (CR),
+it immediately drops the negotiation because it does not know how to answer
+the request. As a workaround strongSwan does not send a CR if the RSA
+key has been statically loaded using [right/left]rsasigkey. A problem
+remains with roadwarriors initiating a connection. Since strongSwan
+does not know the identity of the initiating peer in advance, it will always
+send a CR, causing the rupture of the IKE negotiation if the peer is a
+version 1.x FreeS/WAN host. To circumvent this problem the configuration
+parameter 'nocrsend' can be set in the config setup section of /etc/ipsec.conf:
+
+ config setup:
+ nocrsend=yes
+
+With this entry no certificate request is sent in any connection.
+The default setting is nocrsend=no.
+
+
+13. Authentication with OpenPGP certificates
+ ----------------------------------------
+
+strongSwan also supports RSA based authentication using OpenPGP
+certificates and OpenPGP V3 fingerprints used as an KEY_ID identifier.
+
+
+13.1 OpenPGP certificates
+ --------------------
+
+OpenPGP certificates containing RSA public keys can now directly be loaded
+in ASCII armored PGP format using the leftcert and rightcert parameters
+in /etc/ipsec.conf:
+
+ conn pgp
+ right=%any
+ righcert=peerCert.asc
+ left=%defaultroute
+ leftcert=gatewayCert.asc
+
+The peer certificate must be stored locally (the default directory is
+/etc/ipsec.d/certs) since currently no trust can be established for
+PGP certificates received from a peer via the IKE protocol.
+
+
+13.2 OpenPGP private keys
+ --------------------
+
+PGP private keys in unencrypted form can now directly be loaded in ASCII
+armored PGP format via an entry in /etc/ipsec.secrets:
+
+ : RSA gatewayKey.asc
+
+Existing IDEA-encrypted RSA private keys can be unlocked with GnuPG and
+the IDEA extension (see http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/pgp2x.html) using
+the commands
+
+ gpg --import gatewayCert.asc
+
+ gpg --allow-secret-key-import --import gatewayKey.asc
+
+ gpg --edit-key <gateway ID>
+ > passwd #change to empty password
+ > save
+
+ gpg -a --export-secret-key <gateway ID> gatewayKey.asc
+
+
+13.3 Monitoring functions
+ --------------------
+
+The command ipsec listcerts shows all loaded PGP certificates
+in the following format:
+
+ Aug 28 09:51:55 2002, count: 1
+ fingerprint: 0x1ccfca12d93467ffa9d5093d87a465dc
+ pubkey: 1024 RSA Key ARHso6uKQ
+ created: Aug 27 08:51:39 2002
+ until: --- -- --:--:-- ---- ok (expires never)
+
+The entries are
+
+ - the date the certificate was loaded either in local time or UTC (--utc)
+ - the V3 fingerprint consisting of the 16 byte MD5 hash of the public key
+ which is used as an ID of type KEY_ID
+ - the modulus size of the RSA key in bits
+ - a keyID consisting of 9 base64 symbols representing the public exponent
+ and the most significant bits of the modulus
+ - the creation date of the public key (extracted from the certificate)
+ - the optional expiration date of the public key (extracted from the
+ certificate)
+
+
+13.4 Suppression of certificate request messages
+ -------------------------------------------
+
+PGPnet configured to work with OpenPGP certificates aborts the IKE
+negotiation when it receives a X.509 certificate. Therefore it is recommended
+(mandatory for roadwarrior connections) to set
+
+ config setup:
+ nocrsend=yes
+
+in /etc/ipsec.conf.
+
+
+14. Additional Features
+ -------------------
+
+
+14.1 Authentication and encryption algorithms
+ ----------------------------------------
+
+strongSwan supports the following suite of encryption and authentication
+algorithms for both IKE and ESP payloads.
+
++------------------------------------------------------------------+
+| IKE algorithms (negotiated in Phase 1 Main Mode) |
++------------------------------------------------------------------+
+| Encryption algorithms: 3des, aes, serpent, twofish, blowfish |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Hash algorithms: md5, sha, sha2 |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| DH groups: 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192 |
++------------------------------------------------------------------+
+
+NOTE: For IKE the SHA-1 algorithm is denoted by "sha"
+
+The cryptographic IKE algorithms listed above are a fixed part of the
+strongSwan distribution. Particular algorithms can be added or removed
+in the "programs/pluto/alg" directory.
+
++------------------------------------------------------------------+
+| ESP algorithms (negotiated in Phase 2 Quick Mode) |
++------------------------------------------------------------------+
+| Encryption algorithms: 3des, aes, serpent, twofish, blowfish |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Hash algorithms: md5, sha1, sha2 |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| PFS groups: 1024, 1536, 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192 |
++------------------------------------------------------------------+
+
+The cryptographic ESP algorithms listed above are a fixed part of the
+strongSwan distribution. If your Linux 2.4 or 2.6 kernel includes the
+CryptoAPI then additional ESP algorithms can be added or deleted as
+kernel modules.
+
+The IKE and ESP cryptographic algorithms to be proposed to the peer
+as an initiator can be specified on a per connection basis in the form
+
+conn normal
+ ...
+ ike=aes128-sha-modp1536,3des-sha-modp1536
+ esp=aes128-sha1,3des-sha1
+ ...
+
+or if you are more paranoid
+
+conn paranoid
+ ...
+ ike=aes256-sha2_512-modp2048
+ esp=aes256-sha2_512
+ ...
+
+If the the "ike" and "esp" configuration parameters are missing in
+ipsec.conf, then the default settings
+
+ ike=3des-md5-modp1536,3des-sha-modp1536,\
+ 3des-md5-modp1024,3des-sha-modp1024
+ esp=3des-md5,3des-sha1
+
+arre implicitly assumed. The 3DES encryption algorithm and the MD5 and
+SHA-1 hash algorithms are hardcoded into strongSwan and cannot be removed.
+
+If Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS is desired), then a PFS group can be
+optionally specified:
+
+conn make_sure
+ ...
+ pfs=yes
+ pfsgroup=modp2048,modp1536
+ ...
+
+If the "pfs" parameter is missing then "pfs=yes" is assumed by default.
+This means that PFS must be disabled explicitly by setting "pfs=no".
+
+If the "pfsgroup" parameter is missing then the default is
+
+ pfsgroup=<Phase1 DH group>
+
+The "ike" and "esp" parameters are used to formulate one or several
+transform proposals to the peer if the strongSwan VPN host is the initiator.
+Attention! As a responder the first proposal from the peer is accepted that
+is supported the by one of the registered algorithms listed by the command
+
+ ipsec listalgs
+
+If the responder wants to restrict the allowed cipher suites the '!' flag
+can be used to do so. The configuration
+
+conn normal_but_strict
+ ...
+ ike=aes128-sha-modp1536,3des-sha-modp1536!
+ esp=aes128-sha1,3des-sha1!
+ ...
+
+will only permit the listed algorithms defined above but no other methods
+even if they might be supported by the responder.
+
+
+14.2 NAT traversal
+ -------------
+
+Currently please refer to README.NAT-Traversal document in the strongSwan
+distribution.
+
+
+14.3 Dead peer detection
+ --------------------
+
+strongSwan implements the RFC 3706 Dead Peer Detection (DPD) keep-alive
+scheme. If an established IPsec SA has been idle (i.e. without any traffic)
+for N seconds (dpddelay=N) then strongSwan side sends a "hello" message
+(R_U_THERE) and the peer replies with an acknowledge message (R_U_THERE_ACK).
+If no response is received, the R_U_THERE messages are repeated until a DPD
+timeout of M seconds (dpdtimeout=M) has elapsed. If still no traffic or
+R_U_THERE_ACK packets were received, the peer is declared to be dead and all
+SAs belonging to a common Phase 1 SA are deleted.
+
+DPD support is tuneable on a per connection basis by using the dpdaction,
+dpddelay and dpdtimeout directives:
+
+ conn roadwarrior
+ right=%any
+ left=%defaultroute
+ leftsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
+ dpdaction=clear
+
+ conn net-to-net
+ right=192.168.0.2
+ rightsubnet=10.2.0.0/16
+ left=%defaultroute
+ leftsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
+ dpdaction=hold
+ dpddelay=60
+ dpdtimeout=500
+
+In the first example dpdaction=clear activates the DPD mechanism under the
+condition that the peer supports RFC 3706. The values dpddelay=30s and
+dpdtimeout=120s are assumed by default in the absence of these parameters, so
+that during idle periods an R_U_THERE packet is sent every 30 seconds. If no
+traffic or a no R_U_THERE_ACK packet is received from the peer within a
+120 second time span, the peer will be declared dead and all SAs and associated
+eroutes will be cleared.
+
+In the second example R_U_THERE packets are sent every 60 seconds and the
+parameter setting dpdaction=hold will put the eroute of the ruptured connection
+into a %trap state, so that when new outgoing traffic will occur, the
+correspondig connection will be automatically renegotiated as soon as the
+peer is up again.
+
+It is recommended to use dpdaction=hold for statically defined connections and
+dpdaction=clear for dynamic roadwarrior connections. The default value is
+dpdaction=none, which disables DPD.
+
+
+14.4 IKE Mode Config
+ ---------------
+
+The IKE Mode Config protocol <draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-mode-cfg-04.txt> allows
+the dynamic assignment of virtual IP addresses and optional DNS and WINS server
+information to IPsec clients. Currently only "Mode Config Pull Mode" is
+implemented where the client actively sends a Mode Config request to the server
+in order to obtain a virtual IP.
+
+Client side configuration (carol):
+
+ conn home
+ right=192.168.0.1
+ rightsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
+ rightid=@moon.strongswan.org
+ left=%defaultroute
+ leftsourceip=%modeconfig
+ leftcert=carolCert.pem
+ leftid=carol@strongswan.org
+ auto=start
+
+Server side configuration (moon):
+
+ conn roadwarrior
+ right=%any
+ rightid=carol@strongswan.org
+ rightsourceip=10.3.0.1
+ left=%defaultroute
+ leftsubnet=10.1.0.0/16
+ leftcert=moonCert.pem
+ leftid=@moon.strongswan.org
+ auto=add
+
+The wildcard %modeconfig or %modecfg used in the leftsourceip parameter of the
+client will trigger a Mode Config request. Currently the server will return
+the virtual IP address defined by the rightsourceip parameter. In the future
+an LDAP-based lookup mechanism will be supported.
+
+
+15. Copyright statement and acknowledgements
+ ----------------------------------------
+
+
+ FreeS/WAN version base system:
+
+ Copyright (c) 1999-2004
+ Henry Spencer, Richard Guy Briggs,
+ D. Hugh Redelmeier, Sandy Harris, Claudia Schmeing,
+ Michael Richardson, Angelos D. Keromytis, John Ioannidis,
+
+ NAT-Traversal, ipsec starter, Delete SA and Notification messages:
+
+ Copyright (c) 2002-2003, Mathieu Lafon
+
+ Additional cryptoalgorithms (AES, etc):
+
+ Copyright (c) 2002-2003, JuanJo Ciarlante
+
+ Dead Peer Detection:
+
+ Copyright (c) 2002-2004
+ Ken Bantoft, JuanJo Ciarlante, Philip Craig,
+ Pawel Krawczyk, Srinvasan Venkataraman
+
+ Porting to Linux 2.6 kernel:
+
+ Copyright (c) 2003, Herbert Xu
+
+ Dynamic CRL fetching:
+
+ Copyright (c) 2002, Stephane Laroche
+
+ IKE Mode Config protocol:
+
+ Copyright (c) 2001-2002, Colubris Networks
+
+ Virtual IP and source routing:
+
+ Copyright (c) 2003, Tuomo Soini
+
+ Port and protocol selectors for outbound traffic:
+
+ Copyright (c) 2002, Stephen J. Bevan
+
+ PGPnet-RSA parts of patch:
+
+ Copyright (c) 2000, Kai Martius
+
+ X.509, OCSP and smartcard functionality:
+
+ Copyright (c) 2000, Andreas Hess, Patric Lichtsteiner, Roger Wegmann
+ Copyright (c) 2001, Marco Bertossa, Andreas Schleiss
+ Copyright (c) 2002, Uli Galizzi, Ariane Seiler, Mario Strasser
+ Copyright (c) 2002, Martin Berner, Lukas Suter
+ Copyright (c) 2003, Christoph Gysin, Simon Zwahlen
+ Copyright (c) 2004, David Buechi, Michael Meier
+ Copyright (c) 2000-2005, Andreas Steffen
+
+ Zurich University of Applied Sciences in Winterthur, Switzerland
+
+ scepclient:
+
+ Copyright (c) 2005, Jan Hutter, Martin Willi
+ Copyright (c) 2005-2006, Andreas Steffen
+
+ University of Applied Sciences in Rapperswil, Switzerland
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version. See http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License
+ for more details.
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+This file is RCSID $Id: README,v 1.33 2006/04/24 21:27:49 as Exp $
+
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