/*
- * Copyright 2018-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2018-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2018-2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* 6.4.1.2.3: rsakpv1-crt Step 7
* 6.4.1.3.3: rsakpv2-crt Step 7
*/
-int rsa_check_crt_components(const RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
+int ossl_rsa_check_crt_components(const RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
int ret = 0;
BIGNUM *r = NULL, *p1 = NULL, *q1 = NULL;
*
* (√2)(2^(nbits/2 - 1) = (√2/2)(2^(nbits/2))
*/
-int rsa_check_prime_factor_range(const BIGNUM *p, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)
+int ossl_rsa_check_prime_factor_range(const BIGNUM *p, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
int ret = 0;
BIGNUM *low;
int shift;
nbits >>= 1;
- shift = nbits - BN_num_bits(&bn_inv_sqrt_2);
+ shift = nbits - BN_num_bits(&ossl_bn_inv_sqrt_2);
/* Upper bound check */
if (BN_num_bits(p) != nbits)
goto err;
/* set low = (√2)(2^(nbits/2 - 1) */
- if (!BN_copy(low, &bn_inv_sqrt_2))
+ if (!BN_copy(low, &ossl_bn_inv_sqrt_2))
goto err;
if (shift >= 0) {
/*
- * We don't have all the bits. bn_inv_sqrt_2 contains a rounded up
+ * We don't have all the bits. ossl_bn_inv_sqrt_2 contains a rounded up
* value, so there is a very low probability that we'll reject a valid
* value.
*/
*
* See SP800-56Br1 6.4.1.2.3 Step 5 (a to d) & (e to h).
*/
-int rsa_check_prime_factor(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *e, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)
+int ossl_rsa_check_prime_factor(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *e, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
int ret = 0;
BIGNUM *p1 = NULL, *gcd = NULL;
/* (Steps 5 a-b) prime test */
if (BN_check_prime(p, ctx, NULL) != 1
/* (Step 5c) (√2)(2^(nbits/2 - 1) <= p <= 2^(nbits/2 - 1) */
- || rsa_check_prime_factor_range(p, nbits, ctx) != 1)
+ || ossl_rsa_check_prime_factor_range(p, nbits, ctx) != 1)
return 0;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
* (Step 6a) 2^(nBit/2) < d < LCM(p–1, q–1).
* (Step 6b) 1 = (d*e) mod LCM(p–1, q–1)
*/
-int rsa_check_private_exponent(const RSA *rsa, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)
+int ossl_rsa_check_private_exponent(const RSA *rsa, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
int ret;
BIGNUM *r, *p1, *q1, *lcm, *p1q1, *gcd;
}
ret = (ret
/* LCM(p - 1, q - 1) */
- && (rsa_get_lcm(ctx, rsa->p, rsa->q, lcm, gcd, p1, q1, p1q1) == 1)
+ && (ossl_rsa_get_lcm(ctx, rsa->p, rsa->q, lcm, gcd, p1, q1,
+ p1q1) == 1)
/* (Step 6a) d < LCM(p - 1, q - 1) */
&& (BN_cmp(rsa->d, lcm) < 0)
/* (Step 6b) 1 = (e . d) mod LCM(p - 1, q - 1) */
return ret;
}
-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
-static int bn_is_three(const BIGNUM *bn)
-{
- BIGNUM *num = BN_dup(bn);
- int ret = (num != NULL && BN_sub_word(num, 3) && BN_is_zero(num));
-
- BN_free(num);
- return ret;
-}
-#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
-
-/* Check exponent is odd, and has a bitlen ranging from [17..256] */
-int rsa_check_public_exponent(const BIGNUM *e)
+/*
+ * Check exponent is odd.
+ * For FIPS also check the bit length is in the range [17..256]
+ */
+int ossl_rsa_check_public_exponent(const BIGNUM *e)
{
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
int bitlen;
- /* For legacy purposes RSA_3 is allowed in non fips mode */
-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
- if (bn_is_three(e))
- return 1;
-#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
-
bitlen = BN_num_bits(e);
return (BN_is_odd(e) && bitlen > 16 && bitlen < 257);
+#else
+ /* Allow small exponents larger than 1 for legacy purposes */
+ return BN_is_odd(e) && BN_cmp(e, BN_value_one()) > 0;
+#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
}
/*
* SP800-56Br1 6.4.1.2.1 (Step 5i): |p - q| > 2^(nbits/2 - 100)
* i.e- numbits(p-q-1) > (nbits/2 -100)
*/
-int rsa_check_pminusq_diff(BIGNUM *diff, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q,
+int ossl_rsa_check_pminusq_diff(BIGNUM *diff, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q,
int nbits)
{
int bitlen = (nbits >> 1) - 100;
* Caller should ensure that lcm, gcd, p1, q1, p1q1 are flagged with
* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
*/
-int rsa_get_lcm(BN_CTX *ctx, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q,
- BIGNUM *lcm, BIGNUM *gcd, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *q1,
- BIGNUM *p1q1)
+int ossl_rsa_get_lcm(BN_CTX *ctx, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q,
+ BIGNUM *lcm, BIGNUM *gcd, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *q1,
+ BIGNUM *p1q1)
{
return BN_sub(p1, p, BN_value_one()) /* p-1 */
&& BN_sub(q1, q, BN_value_one()) /* q-1 */
* SP800-89 5.3.3 (Explicit) Partial Public Key Validation for RSA
* caveat is that the modulus must be as specified in SP800-56Br1
*/
-int rsa_sp800_56b_check_public(const RSA *rsa)
+int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_public(const RSA *rsa)
{
int ret = 0, status;
-#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
int nbits;
-#endif
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *gcd = NULL;
if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL)
return 0;
+ nbits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
+ if (nbits > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
/*
* (Step a): modulus must be 2048 or 3072 (caveat from SP800-56Br1)
* NOTE: changed to allow keys >= 2048
*/
- nbits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
- if (!rsa_sp800_56b_validate_strength(nbits, -1)) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SP800_56B_CHECK_PUBLIC, RSA_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+ if (!ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_validate_strength(nbits, -1)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
#endif
if (!BN_is_odd(rsa->n)) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SP800_56B_CHECK_PUBLIC, RSA_R_INVALID_MODULUS);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MODULUS);
return 0;
}
/* (Steps b-c): 2^16 < e < 2^256, n and e must be odd */
- if (!rsa_check_public_exponent(rsa->e)) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SP800_56B_CHECK_PUBLIC,
- RSA_R_PUB_EXPONENT_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+ if (!ossl_rsa_check_public_exponent(rsa->e)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_PUB_EXPONENT_OUT_OF_RANGE);
return 0;
}
* The modulus is composite, but not a power of a prime.
* The modulus has no factors smaller than 752.
*/
- if (!BN_gcd(gcd, rsa->n, bn_get0_small_factors(), ctx) || !BN_is_one(gcd)) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SP800_56B_CHECK_PUBLIC, RSA_R_INVALID_MODULUS);
+ if (!BN_gcd(gcd, rsa->n, ossl_bn_get0_small_factors(), ctx)
+ || !BN_is_one(gcd)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MODULUS);
goto err;
}
- ret = bn_miller_rabin_is_prime(rsa->n, 0, ctx, NULL, 1, &status);
+ /* Highest number of MR rounds from FIPS 186-5 Section B.3 Table B.1 */
+ ret = ossl_bn_miller_rabin_is_prime(rsa->n, 5, ctx, NULL, 1, &status);
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
if (ret != 1 || status != BN_PRIMETEST_COMPOSITE_NOT_POWER_OF_PRIME) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SP800_56B_CHECK_PUBLIC, RSA_R_INVALID_MODULUS);
+#else
+ if (ret != 1 || (status != BN_PRIMETEST_COMPOSITE_NOT_POWER_OF_PRIME
+ && (nbits >= RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS
+ || status != BN_PRIMETEST_COMPOSITE_WITH_FACTOR))) {
+#endif
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_MODULUS);
ret = 0;
goto err;
}
/*
* Perform validation of the RSA private key to check that 0 < D < N.
*/
-int rsa_sp800_56b_check_private(const RSA *rsa)
+int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_private(const RSA *rsa)
{
if (rsa->d == NULL || rsa->n == NULL)
return 0;
* 6.4.1.2.3 "rsakpv1 - crt"
* 6.4.1.3.3 "rsakpv2 - crt"
*/
-int rsa_sp800_56b_check_keypair(const RSA *rsa, const BIGNUM *efixed,
- int strength, int nbits)
+int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_keypair(const RSA *rsa, const BIGNUM *efixed,
+ int strength, int nbits)
{
int ret = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
|| rsa->e == NULL
|| rsa->d == NULL
|| rsa->n == NULL) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SP800_56B_CHECK_KEYPAIR, RSA_R_INVALID_REQUEST);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_REQUEST);
return 0;
}
/* (Step 1): Check Ranges */
- if (!rsa_sp800_56b_validate_strength(nbits, strength))
+ if (!ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_validate_strength(nbits, strength))
return 0;
/* If the exponent is known */
if (efixed != NULL) {
/* (2): Check fixed exponent matches public exponent. */
if (BN_cmp(efixed, rsa->e) != 0) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SP800_56B_CHECK_KEYPAIR, RSA_R_INVALID_REQUEST);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_REQUEST);
return 0;
}
}
/* (Step 1.c): e is odd integer 65537 <= e < 2^256 */
- if (!rsa_check_public_exponent(rsa->e)) {
+ if (!ossl_rsa_check_public_exponent(rsa->e)) {
/* exponent out of range */
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SP800_56B_CHECK_KEYPAIR,
- RSA_R_PUB_EXPONENT_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_PUB_EXPONENT_OUT_OF_RANGE);
return 0;
}
/* (Step 3.b): check the modulus */
if (nbits != BN_num_bits(rsa->n)) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SP800_56B_CHECK_KEYPAIR, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYPAIR);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYPAIR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* (Step 3.c): check that the modulus length is a positive even integer */
+ if (nbits <= 0 || (nbits & 0x1)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYPAIR);
return 0;
}
goto err;
/* (Step 4.c): Check n = pq */
if (BN_cmp(rsa->n, r) != 0) {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SP800_56B_CHECK_KEYPAIR, RSA_R_INVALID_REQUEST);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_REQUEST);
goto err;
}
/* (Step 5): check prime factors p & q */
- ret = rsa_check_prime_factor(rsa->p, rsa->e, nbits, ctx)
- && rsa_check_prime_factor(rsa->q, rsa->e, nbits, ctx)
- && (rsa_check_pminusq_diff(r, rsa->p, rsa->q, nbits) > 0)
+ ret = ossl_rsa_check_prime_factor(rsa->p, rsa->e, nbits, ctx)
+ && ossl_rsa_check_prime_factor(rsa->q, rsa->e, nbits, ctx)
+ && (ossl_rsa_check_pminusq_diff(r, rsa->p, rsa->q, nbits) > 0)
/* (Step 6): Check the private exponent d */
- && rsa_check_private_exponent(rsa, nbits, ctx)
+ && ossl_rsa_check_private_exponent(rsa, nbits, ctx)
/* 6.4.1.2.3 (Step 7): Check the CRT components */
- && rsa_check_crt_components(rsa, ctx);
+ && ossl_rsa_check_crt_components(rsa, ctx);
if (ret != 1)
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SP800_56B_CHECK_KEYPAIR, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYPAIR);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYPAIR);
err:
BN_clear(r);
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