--- /dev/null
+From: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
+Subject: AppArmor: Main Part
+
+The underlying functions by which the AppArmor LSM hooks are implemented.
+
+Signed-off-by: John Johansen <jjohansen@suse.de>
+Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
+
+---
+ security/apparmor/main.c | 1478 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 1478 insertions(+)
+
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/main.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,1478 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (C) 2002-2007 Novell/SUSE
++ *
++ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
++ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
++ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
++ * License.
++ *
++ * AppArmor Core
++ */
++
++#include <linux/security.h>
++#include <linux/namei.h>
++#include <linux/audit.h>
++#include <linux/mount.h>
++#include <linux/ptrace.h>
++
++#include "apparmor.h"
++
++#include "inline.h"
++
++/*
++ * Table of capability names: we generate it from capabilities.h.
++ */
++static const char *capability_names[] = {
++#include "capability_names.h"
++};
++
++struct aa_namespace *default_namespace;
++
++static int aa_inode_mode(struct inode *inode)
++{
++ /* if the inode doesn't exist the user is creating it */
++ if (!inode || current->fsuid == inode->i_uid)
++ return AA_USER_SHIFT;
++ return AA_OTHER_SHIFT;
++}
++
++int alloc_default_namespace(void)
++{
++ struct aa_namespace *ns;
++ char *name = kstrdup("default", GFP_KERNEL);
++ if (!name)
++ return -ENOMEM;
++ ns = alloc_aa_namespace(name);
++ if (!ns) {
++ kfree(name);
++ return -ENOMEM;
++ }
++
++ write_lock(&profile_ns_list_lock);
++ default_namespace = ns;
++ aa_get_namespace(ns);
++ list_add(&ns->list, &profile_ns_list);
++ write_unlock(&profile_ns_list_lock);
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++void free_default_namespace(void)
++{
++ write_lock(&profile_ns_list_lock);
++ list_del_init(&default_namespace->list);
++ write_unlock(&profile_ns_list_lock);
++ aa_put_namespace(default_namespace);
++ default_namespace = NULL;
++}
++
++static void aa_audit_file_sub_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *buffer,
++ int mask)
++{
++ const char unsafex[] = "upcn";
++ const char safex[] = "UPCN";
++ char *m = buffer;
++
++ if (mask & AA_EXEC_MMAP)
++ *m++ = 'm';
++ if (mask & MAY_READ)
++ *m++ = 'r';
++ if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
++ *m++ = 'w';
++ else if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
++ *m++ = 'a';
++ if (mask & MAY_EXEC) {
++ int index = AA_EXEC_INDEX(mask);
++ /* all indexes > 4 are also named transitions */
++ if (index > 4)
++ index = 4;
++ if (index > 0) {
++ if (mask & AA_EXEC_UNSAFE)
++ *m++ = unsafex[index - 1];
++ else
++ *m++ = safex[index - 1];
++ }
++ if (mask & AA_EXEC_INHERIT)
++ *m++ = 'i';
++ *m++ = 'x';
++ }
++ if (mask & AA_MAY_LINK)
++ *m++ = 'l';
++ if (mask & AA_MAY_LOCK)
++ *m++ = 'k';
++ *m++ = '\0';
++}
++
++static void aa_audit_file_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *name,
++ int mask)
++{
++ char user[10], other[10];
++
++ aa_audit_file_sub_mask(ab, user,
++ (mask & AA_USER_PERMS) >> AA_USER_SHIFT);
++ aa_audit_file_sub_mask(ab, other,
++ (mask & AA_OTHER_PERMS) >> AA_OTHER_SHIFT);
++
++ audit_log_format(ab, " %s=\"%s::%s\"", name, user, other);
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_audit - Log an audit event to the audit subsystem
++ * @profile: profile to check against
++ * @sa: audit event
++ * @audit_cxt: audit context to log message to
++ * @type: audit event number
++ */
++static int aa_audit_base(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_audit *sa,
++ struct audit_context *audit_cxt, int type)
++{
++ struct audit_buffer *ab = NULL;
++
++ ab = audit_log_start(audit_cxt, sa->gfp_mask, type);
++
++ if (!ab) {
++ AA_ERROR("Unable to log event (%d) to audit subsys\n",
++ type);
++ /* don't fail operations in complain mode even if logging
++ * fails */
++ return type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
++ }
++
++ if (sa->operation)
++ audit_log_format(ab, "operation=\"%s\"", sa->operation);
++
++ if (sa->info) {
++ audit_log_format(ab, " info=\"%s\"", sa->info);
++ if (sa->error_code)
++ audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", sa->error_code);
++ }
++
++ if (sa->request_mask)
++ aa_audit_file_mask(ab, "requested_mask", sa->request_mask);
++
++ if (sa->denied_mask)
++ aa_audit_file_mask(ab, "denied_mask", sa->denied_mask);
++
++ if (sa->request_mask)
++ audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d", current->fsuid);
++
++ if (sa->iattr) {
++ struct iattr *iattr = sa->iattr;
++
++ audit_log_format(ab, " attribute=\"%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\"",
++ iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE ? "mode," : "",
++ iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_UID ? "uid," : "",
++ iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_GID ? "gid," : "",
++ iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE ? "size," : "",
++ iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_ATIME | ATTR_ATIME_SET) ?
++ "atime," : "",
++ iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MTIME | ATTR_MTIME_SET) ?
++ "mtime," : "",
++ iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_CTIME ? "ctime," : "");
++ }
++
++ if (sa->task)
++ audit_log_format(ab, " task=%d", sa->task);
++
++ if (sa->parent)
++ audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%d", sa->parent);
++
++ if (sa->name) {
++ audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
++ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->name);
++ }
++
++ if (sa->name2) {
++ audit_log_format(ab, " name2=");
++ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->name2);
++ }
++
++ audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d", current->pid);
++
++ if (profile) {
++ audit_log_format(ab, " profile=");
++ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->name);
++
++ if (profile->ns != default_namespace) {
++ audit_log_format(ab, " namespace=");
++ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->ns->name);
++ }
++ }
++
++ audit_log_end(ab);
++
++ return type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED ? 0 : sa->error_code;
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_audit_syscallreject - Log a syscall rejection to the audit subsystem
++ * @profile: profile to check against
++ * @gfp: memory allocation flags
++ * @msg: string describing syscall being rejected
++ */
++int aa_audit_syscallreject(struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp,
++ const char *msg)
++{
++ struct aa_audit sa;
++ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
++ sa.operation = "syscall";
++ sa.name = msg;
++ sa.gfp_mask = gfp;
++ sa.error_code = -EPERM;
++
++ return aa_audit_base(profile, &sa, current->audit_context,
++ AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED);
++}
++
++int aa_audit_message(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_audit *sa,
++ int type)
++{
++ struct audit_context *audit_cxt;
++
++ audit_cxt = apparmor_logsyscall ? current->audit_context : NULL;
++ return aa_audit_base(profile, sa, audit_cxt, type);
++}
++
++void aa_audit_hint(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_audit *sa)
++{
++ aa_audit_message(profile, sa, AUDIT_APPARMOR_HINT);
++}
++
++void aa_audit_status(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_audit *sa)
++{
++ aa_audit_message(profile, sa, AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS);
++}
++
++int aa_audit_reject(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_audit *sa)
++{
++ return aa_audit_message(profile, sa, AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED);
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_audit - Log an audit event to the audit subsystem
++ * @profile: profile to check against
++ * @sa: audit event
++ */
++int aa_audit(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_audit *sa)
++{
++ int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED;
++ struct audit_context *audit_cxt;
++
++ if (likely(!sa->error_code))
++ type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
++ else if (PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile))
++ type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED;
++
++ audit_cxt = apparmor_logsyscall ? current->audit_context : NULL;
++ return aa_audit_base(profile, sa, audit_cxt, type);
++}
++
++static int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_audit *sa)
++{
++ if (likely(!sa->error_code)) {
++ int mask = sa->audit_mask & AUDIT_FILE_MASK;
++
++ if (unlikely(PROFILE_AUDIT(profile)))
++ mask |= AUDIT_FILE_MASK;
++
++ if (likely(!(sa->request_mask & mask)))
++ return 0;
++
++ /* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
++ sa->request_mask &= mask | ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE;
++ } else {
++ int mask = AUDIT_QUIET_MASK(sa->audit_mask);
++
++ if (!(sa->denied_mask & ~mask))
++ return sa->error_code;
++
++ /* mask off perms whose denial is being silenced */
++ sa->denied_mask &= (~mask) | ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE;
++ }
++
++ return aa_audit(profile, sa);
++}
++
++static int aa_audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_audit *sa,
++ int cap)
++{
++ if (likely(!sa->error_code)) {
++ if (likely(!PROFILE_AUDIT(profile) &&
++ !cap_raised(profile->audit_caps, cap)))
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ /* quieting of capabilities is handled the caps_logged cache */
++ return aa_audit(profile, sa);
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_file_denied - check for @mask access on a file
++ * @profile: profile to check against
++ * @name: pathname of file
++ * @mask: permission mask requested for file
++ * @audit_mask: return audit mask for the match
++ *
++ * Return %0 on success, or else the permissions in @mask that the
++ * profile denies.
++ */
++static int aa_file_denied(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *name,
++ int mask, int *audit_mask)
++{
++ return (mask & ~aa_match(profile->file_rules, name, audit_mask));
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_link_denied - check for permission to link a file
++ * @profile: profile to check against
++ * @link: pathname of link being created
++ * @target: pathname of target to be linked to
++ * @target_mode: UGO shift for target inode
++ * @request_mask: the permissions subset valid only if link succeeds
++ * @audit_mask: return the audit_mask for the link permission
++ * Return %0 on success, or else the permissions that the profile denies.
++ */
++static int aa_link_denied(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *link,
++ const char *target, int target_mode,
++ int *request_mask, int *audit_mask)
++{
++ unsigned int state;
++ int l_mode, t_mode, l_x, t_x, denied_mask = 0;
++ int link_mask = AA_MAY_LINK << target_mode;
++
++ *request_mask = link_mask;
++
++ l_mode = aa_match_state(profile->file_rules, DFA_START, link, &state);
++
++ if (l_mode & link_mask) {
++ int mode;
++ /* test to see if target can be paired with link */
++ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file_rules, state);
++ mode = aa_match_state(profile->file_rules, state, target,
++ &state);
++
++ if (!(mode & link_mask))
++ denied_mask |= link_mask;
++
++ *audit_mask = dfa_audit_mask(profile->file_rules, state);
++
++ /* return if link subset test is not required */
++ if (!(mode & (AA_LINK_SUBSET_TEST << target_mode)))
++ return denied_mask;
++ }
++
++ /* Do link perm subset test requiring permission on link are a
++ * subset of the permissions on target.
++ * If a subset test is required a permission subset test of the
++ * perms for the link are done against the user::other of the
++ * target's 'r', 'w', 'x', 'a', 'k', and 'm' permissions.
++ *
++ * If the link has 'x', an exact match of all the execute flags
++ * must match.
++ */
++ denied_mask |= ~l_mode & link_mask;
++
++ t_mode = aa_match(profile->file_rules, target, NULL);
++
++ l_x = l_mode & (ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE | AA_EXEC_BITS);
++ t_x = t_mode & (ALL_AA_EXEC_TYPE | AA_EXEC_BITS);
++
++ /* For actual subset test ignore valid-profile-transition flags,
++ * and link bits
++ */
++ l_mode &= AA_FILE_PERMS & ~AA_LINK_BITS;
++ t_mode &= AA_FILE_PERMS & ~AA_LINK_BITS;
++
++ *request_mask = l_mode | link_mask;
++
++ if (l_mode) {
++ int x = l_x | (t_x & ALL_AA_EXEC_UNSAFE);
++ denied_mask |= l_mode & ~t_mode;
++ /* mask off x modes not used by link */
++
++ /* handle exec subset
++ * - link safe exec issubset of unsafe exec
++ * - no link x perm is subset of target having x perm
++ */
++ if ((l_mode & AA_USER_EXEC) &&
++ (x & AA_USER_EXEC_TYPE) != (t_x & AA_USER_EXEC_TYPE))
++ denied_mask = AA_USER_EXEC | (l_x & AA_USER_EXEC_TYPE);
++ if ((l_mode & AA_OTHER_EXEC) &&
++ (x & AA_OTHER_EXEC_TYPE) != (t_x & AA_OTHER_EXEC_TYPE))
++ denied_mask = AA_OTHER_EXEC | (l_x & AA_OTHER_EXEC_TYPE);
++ }
++
++ return denied_mask;
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_get_name - compute the pathname of a file
++ * @dentry: dentry of the file
++ * @mnt: vfsmount of the file
++ * @buffer: buffer that aa_get_name() allocated
++ * @check: AA_CHECK_DIR is set if the file is a directory
++ *
++ * Returns a pointer to the beginning of the pathname (which usually differs
++ * from the beginning of the buffer), or an error code.
++ *
++ * We need @check to indicate whether the file is a directory or not because
++ * the file may not yet exist, and so we cannot check the inode's file type.
++ */
++static char *aa_get_name(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
++ char **buffer, int check)
++{
++ char *name;
++ int is_dir, size = 256;
++
++ is_dir = (check & AA_CHECK_DIR) ? 1 : 0;
++
++ for (;;) {
++ char *buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
++ if (!buf)
++ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++
++ name = d_namespace_path(dentry, mnt, buf, size - is_dir);
++ if (!IS_ERR(name)) {
++ if (name[0] != '/') {
++ /*
++ * This dentry is not connected to the
++ * namespace root -- reject access.
++ */
++ kfree(buf);
++ return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
++ }
++ if (is_dir && name[1] != '\0') {
++ /*
++ * Append "/" to the pathname. The root
++ * directory is a special case; it already
++ * ends in slash.
++ */
++ buf[size - 2] = '/';
++ buf[size - 1] = '\0';
++ }
++
++ *buffer = buf;
++ return name;
++ }
++ if (PTR_ERR(name) != -ENAMETOOLONG)
++ return name;
++
++ kfree(buf);
++ size <<= 1;
++ if (size > apparmor_path_max)
++ return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
++ }
++}
++
++static char *new_compound_name(const char *n1, const char *n2)
++{
++ char *name = kmalloc(strlen(n1) + strlen(n2) + 3, GFP_KERNEL);
++ if (name)
++ sprintf(name, "%s//%s", n1, n2);
++ return name;
++}
++static inline void aa_put_name_buffer(char *buffer)
++{
++ kfree(buffer);
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_perm_dentry - check if @profile allows @mask for a file
++ * @profile: profile to check against
++ * @dentry: dentry of the file
++ * @mnt: vfsmount o the file
++ * @sa: audit context
++ * @mask: requested profile permissions
++ * @check: kind of check to perform
++ *
++ * Returns 0 upon success, or else an error code.
++ *
++ * @check indicates the file type, and whether the file was accessed through
++ * an open file descriptor (AA_CHECK_FD) or not.
++ */
++static int aa_perm_dentry(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *dentry,
++ struct vfsmount *mnt, struct aa_audit *sa, int check)
++{
++ int error;
++ char *buffer = NULL;
++
++ sa->name = aa_get_name(dentry, mnt, &buffer, check);
++ sa->request_mask <<= aa_inode_mode(dentry->d_inode);
++ if (IS_ERR(sa->name)) {
++ /*
++ * deleted files are given a pass on permission checks when
++ * accessed through a file descriptor.
++ */
++ if (PTR_ERR(sa->name) == -ENOENT && (check & AA_CHECK_FD))
++ sa->denied_mask = 0;
++ else {
++ sa->denied_mask = sa->request_mask;
++ sa->error_code = PTR_ERR(sa->name);
++ if (sa->error_code == -ENOENT)
++ sa->info = "Failed name resolution - object not a valid entry";
++ else if (sa->error_code == -ENAMETOOLONG)
++ sa->info = "Failed name resolution - name too long";
++ else
++ sa->info = "Failed name resolution";
++ }
++ sa->name = NULL;
++ } else
++ sa->denied_mask = aa_file_denied(profile, sa->name,
++ sa->request_mask,
++ &sa->audit_mask);
++
++ if (!sa->denied_mask)
++ sa->error_code = 0;
++
++ error = aa_audit_file(profile, sa);
++ aa_put_name_buffer(buffer);
++
++ return error;
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_attr - check if attribute change is allowed
++ * @profile: profile to check against
++ * @dentry: dentry of the file to check
++ * @mnt: vfsmount of the file to check
++ * @iattr: attribute changes requested
++ */
++int aa_attr(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *dentry,
++ struct vfsmount *mnt, struct iattr *iattr)
++{
++ struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
++ int error, check;
++ struct aa_audit sa;
++
++ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
++ sa.operation = "setattr";
++ sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
++ sa.iattr = iattr;
++ sa.request_mask = MAY_WRITE;
++ sa.error_code = -EACCES;
++
++ check = 0;
++ if (inode && S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
++ check |= AA_CHECK_DIR;
++ if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FILE)
++ check |= AA_CHECK_FD;
++
++ error = aa_perm_dentry(profile, dentry, mnt, &sa, check);
++
++ return error;
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_perm_xattr - check if xattr attribute change is allowed
++ * @profile: profile to check against
++ * @dentry: dentry of the file to check
++ * @mnt: vfsmount of the file to check
++ * @operation: xattr operation being done
++ * @mask: access mode requested
++ * @check: kind of check to perform
++ */
++int aa_perm_xattr(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *operation,
++ struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, int mask,
++ int check)
++{
++ struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
++ int error;
++ struct aa_audit sa;
++
++ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
++ sa.operation = operation;
++ sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
++ sa.request_mask = mask;
++ sa.error_code = -EACCES;
++
++ if (inode && S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
++ check |= AA_CHECK_DIR;
++
++ error = aa_perm_dentry(profile, dentry, mnt, &sa, check);
++
++ return error;
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_perm - basic apparmor permissions check
++ * @profile: profile to check against
++ * @dentry: dentry of the file to check
++ * @mnt: vfsmount of the file to check
++ * @mask: access mode requested
++ * @check: kind of check to perform
++ *
++ * Determine if access @mask for the file is authorized by @profile.
++ * Returns 0 on success, or else an error code.
++ */
++int aa_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *operation,
++ struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, int mask, int check)
++{
++ struct aa_audit sa;
++ int error = 0;
++
++ if (mask == 0)
++ goto out;
++
++ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
++ sa.operation = operation;
++ sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
++ sa.request_mask = mask;
++ sa.error_code = -EACCES;
++
++ error = aa_perm_dentry(profile, dentry, mnt, &sa, check);
++
++out:
++ return error;
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_perm_dir
++ * @profile: profile to check against
++ * @dentry: dentry of directory to check
++ * @mnt: vfsmount of directory to check
++ * @operation: directory operation being performed
++ * @mask: access mode requested
++ *
++ * Determine if directory operation (make/remove) for dentry is authorized
++ * by @profile.
++ * Returns 0 on success, or else an error code.
++ */
++int aa_perm_dir(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *operation,
++ struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, int mask)
++{
++ struct aa_audit sa;
++
++ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
++ sa.operation = operation;
++ sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
++ sa.request_mask = mask;
++ sa.error_code = -EACCES;
++
++ return aa_perm_dentry(profile, dentry, mnt, &sa, AA_CHECK_DIR);
++}
++
++int aa_perm_path(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *operation,
++ const char *name, int mask, uid_t uid)
++{
++ struct aa_audit sa;
++
++ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
++ sa.operation = operation;
++ sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
++ sa.request_mask = mask;
++ sa.name = name;
++ if (current->fsuid == uid)
++ sa.request_mask = mask << AA_USER_SHIFT;
++ else
++ sa.request_mask = mask << AA_OTHER_SHIFT;
++
++ sa.denied_mask = aa_file_denied(profile, name, sa.request_mask,
++ &sa.audit_mask) ;
++ sa.error_code = sa.denied_mask ? -EACCES : 0;
++
++ return aa_audit_file(profile, &sa);
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_capability - test permission to use capability
++ * @cxt: aa_task_context with profile to check against
++ * @cap: capability to be tested
++ *
++ * Look up capability in profile capability set.
++ * Returns 0 on success, or else an error code.
++ */
++int aa_capability(struct aa_task_context *cxt, int cap)
++{
++ int error = cap_raised(cxt->profile->capabilities, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
++ struct aa_audit sa;
++
++ /* test if cap has alread been logged */
++ if (cap_raised(cxt->caps_logged, cap)) {
++ if (PROFILE_COMPLAIN(cxt->profile))
++ error = 0;
++ return error;
++ } else
++ /* don't worry about rcu replacement of the cxt here.
++ * caps_logged is a cache to reduce the occurence of
++ * duplicate messages in the log. The worst that can
++ * happen is duplicate capability messages shows up in
++ * the audit log
++ */
++ cap_raise(cxt->caps_logged, cap);
++
++ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
++ sa.operation = "capable";
++ sa.gfp_mask = GFP_ATOMIC;
++ sa.name = capability_names[cap];
++ sa.error_code = error;
++
++ error = aa_audit_caps(cxt->profile, &sa, cap);
++
++ return error;
++}
++
++/* must be used inside rcu_read_lock or task_lock */
++int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_task_context *cxt, struct aa_profile *tracee)
++{
++ if (!cxt || cxt->profile == tracee)
++ return 0;
++ return aa_capability(cxt, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_link - hard link check
++ * @profile: profile to check against
++ * @link: dentry of link being created
++ * @link_mnt: vfsmount of link being created
++ * @target: dentry of link target
++ * @target_mnt: vfsmunt of link target
++ *
++ * Returns 0 on success, or else an error code.
++ */
++int aa_link(struct aa_profile *profile,
++ struct dentry *link, struct vfsmount *link_mnt,
++ struct dentry *target, struct vfsmount *target_mnt)
++{
++ int error;
++ struct aa_audit sa;
++ char *buffer = NULL, *buffer2 = NULL;
++
++ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
++ sa.operation = "inode_link";
++ sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
++ sa.name = aa_get_name(link, link_mnt, &buffer, 0);
++ sa.name2 = aa_get_name(target, target_mnt, &buffer2, 0);
++
++ if (IS_ERR(sa.name)) {
++ sa.error_code = PTR_ERR(sa.name);
++ sa.name = NULL;
++ }
++ if (IS_ERR(sa.name2)) {
++ sa.error_code = PTR_ERR(sa.name2);
++ sa.name2 = NULL;
++ }
++
++ if (sa.name && sa.name2) {
++ sa.denied_mask = aa_link_denied(profile, sa.name, sa.name2,
++ aa_inode_mode(target->d_inode),
++ &sa.request_mask,
++ &sa.audit_mask);
++ sa.error_code = sa.denied_mask ? -EACCES : 0;
++ }
++
++ error = aa_audit_file(profile, &sa);
++
++ aa_put_name_buffer(buffer);
++ aa_put_name_buffer(buffer2);
++
++ return error;
++}
++
++/*******************************
++ * Global task related functions
++ *******************************/
++
++/**
++ * aa_clone - initialize the task context for a new task
++ * @child: task that is being created
++ *
++ * Returns 0 on success, or else an error code.
++ */
++int aa_clone(struct task_struct *child)
++{
++ struct aa_task_context *cxt, *child_cxt;
++ struct aa_profile *profile;
++
++ if (!aa_task_context(current))
++ return 0;
++ child_cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
++ if (!child_cxt)
++ return -ENOMEM;
++
++repeat:
++ profile = aa_get_profile(current);
++ if (profile) {
++ lock_profile(profile);
++ cxt = aa_task_context(current);
++ if (unlikely(profile->isstale || !cxt ||
++ cxt->profile != profile)) {
++ /**
++ * Race with profile replacement or removal, or with
++ * task context removal.
++ */
++ unlock_profile(profile);
++ aa_put_profile(profile);
++ goto repeat;
++ }
++
++ /* No need to grab the child's task lock here. */
++ aa_change_task_context(child, child_cxt, profile,
++ cxt->cookie, cxt->previous_profile);
++ unlock_profile(profile);
++
++ if (APPARMOR_COMPLAIN(child_cxt) &&
++ profile == profile->ns->null_complain_profile) {
++ struct aa_audit sa;
++ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
++ sa.operation = "clone";
++ sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
++ sa.task = child->pid;
++ aa_audit_hint(profile, &sa);
++ }
++ aa_put_profile(profile);
++ } else
++ aa_free_task_context(child_cxt);
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++static struct aa_profile *
++aa_register_find(struct aa_profile *profile, const char* ns_name,
++ const char *name, int mandatory, int complain,
++ struct aa_audit *sa)
++{
++ struct aa_namespace *ns;
++ struct aa_profile *new_profile;
++ int ns_ref = 0;
++
++ if (profile)
++ ns = profile->ns;
++ else
++ ns = default_namespace;
++
++ if (ns_name) {
++ /* locate the profile namespace */
++ ns = aa_find_namespace(ns_name);
++ if (!ns) {
++ if (mandatory) {
++ sa->info = "profile namespace not found";
++ sa->denied_mask = sa->request_mask;
++ sa->error_code = -ENOENT;
++ return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
++ } else {
++ return NULL;
++ }
++ }
++ ns_ref++;
++ }
++
++ /* Locate new profile */
++ new_profile = aa_find_profile(ns, name);
++
++ if (new_profile) {
++ AA_DEBUG("%s: setting profile %s\n",
++ __FUNCTION__, new_profile->name);
++ } else if (mandatory && profile) {
++ sa->info = "mandatory profile missing";
++ sa->denied_mask = sa->request_mask; /* shifted MAY_EXEC */
++ if (complain) {
++ aa_audit_hint(profile, sa);
++ new_profile =
++ aa_dup_profile(profile->ns->null_complain_profile);
++ } else {
++ sa->error_code = -EACCES;
++ if (ns_ref)
++ aa_put_namespace(ns);
++ return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
++ }
++ } else {
++ /* Only way we can get into this code is if task
++ * is unconfined, pix, nix.
++ */
++ AA_DEBUG("%s: No profile found for exec image '%s'\n",
++ __FUNCTION__,
++ name);
++ }
++ if (ns_ref)
++ aa_put_namespace(ns);
++ return new_profile;
++}
++
++static struct aa_profile *
++aa_x_to_profile(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *filename, int xmode,
++ struct aa_audit *sa, char **child)
++{
++ struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
++ int ix = xmode & AA_EXEC_INHERIT;
++ int complain = PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile);
++ int index;
++
++ *child = NULL;
++ switch (xmode & AA_EXEC_MODIFIERS) {
++ case 0:
++ /* only valid with ix flag */
++ ix = 1;
++ break;
++ case AA_EXEC_UNCONFINED:
++ /* only valid without ix flag */
++ ix = 0;
++ break;
++ case AA_EXEC_PROFILE:
++ new_profile = aa_register_find(profile, NULL, filename, !ix,
++ complain, sa);
++ break;
++ case AA_EXEC_CHILD:
++ *child = new_compound_name(profile->name, filename);
++ sa->name2 = *child;
++ if (!*child) {
++ sa->info = "Failed name resolution - exec failed";
++ sa->error_code = -ENOMEM;
++ new_profile = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++ } else {
++ new_profile = aa_register_find(profile, NULL, *child,
++ !ix, complain, sa);
++ }
++ break;
++ default:
++ /* all other indexes are named transitions */
++ index = AA_EXEC_INDEX(xmode);
++ if (index - 4 > profile->exec_table_size) {
++ sa->info = "invalid named transition - exec failed";
++ sa->error_code = -EACCES;
++ new_profile = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
++ } else {
++ char *ns_name = NULL;
++ char *name = profile->exec_table[index - 4];
++ if (*name == ':') {
++ ns_name = name + 1;
++ name = ns_name + strlen(ns_name) + 1;
++ }
++ sa->name2 = name;
++ sa->name3 = ns_name;
++ new_profile =
++ aa_register_find(profile, ns_name, name,
++ !ix, complain, sa);
++ }
++ }
++ if (IS_ERR(new_profile))
++ /* all these failures must be audited - no quieting */
++ return ERR_PTR(aa_audit_reject(profile, sa));
++ return new_profile;
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_register - register a new program
++ * @bprm: binprm of program being registered
++ *
++ * Try to register a new program during execve(). This should give the
++ * new program a valid aa_task_context if confined.
++ */
++int aa_register(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
++{
++ const char *filename;
++ char *buffer = NULL, *child = NULL;
++ struct file *filp = bprm->file;
++ struct aa_profile *profile, *old_profile, *new_profile = NULL;
++ int exec_mode, complain = 0, shift;
++ struct aa_audit sa;
++
++ AA_DEBUG("%s\n", __FUNCTION__);
++
++ profile = aa_get_profile(current);
++
++ shift = aa_inode_mode(filp->f_dentry->d_inode);
++ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
++ sa.operation = "exec";
++ sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
++ sa.request_mask = MAY_EXEC << shift;
++
++ filename = aa_get_name(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, &buffer, 0);
++ if (IS_ERR(filename)) {
++ if (profile) {
++ sa.info = "Failed name resolution - exec failed";
++ sa.error_code = PTR_ERR(filename);
++ aa_audit_file(profile, &sa);
++ return sa.error_code;
++ } else
++ return 0;
++ }
++ sa.name = filename;
++
++ exec_mode = AA_EXEC_UNSAFE << shift;
++
++repeat:
++ if (profile) {
++ complain = PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile);
++
++ /* Confined task, determine what mode inherit, unconfined or
++ * mandatory to load new profile
++ */
++ exec_mode = aa_match(profile->file_rules, filename,
++ &sa.audit_mask);
++
++
++ if (exec_mode & sa.request_mask) {
++ int xm = exec_mode >> shift;
++ new_profile = aa_x_to_profile(profile, filename,
++ xm, &sa, &child);
++
++ if (!new_profile && (xm & AA_EXEC_INHERIT))
++ /* (p|c|n|)ix - don't change profile */
++ goto cleanup;
++ /* error case caught below */
++
++ } else if (sa.request_mask & AUDIT_QUIET_MASK(sa.audit_mask)) {
++ /* quiet failed exit */
++ new_profile = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
++ } else if (complain) {
++ /* There was no entry in calling profile
++ * describing mode to execute image in.
++ * Drop into null-profile (disabling secure exec).
++ */
++ new_profile =
++ aa_dup_profile(profile->ns->null_complain_profile);
++ exec_mode |= AA_EXEC_UNSAFE << shift;
++ } else {
++ sa.denied_mask = sa.request_mask;
++ sa.error_code = -EACCES;
++ new_profile = ERR_PTR(aa_audit_file(profile, &sa));
++ }
++ } else {
++ /* Unconfined task, load profile if it exists */
++ new_profile = aa_register_find(NULL, NULL, filename, 0, 0, &sa);
++ if (new_profile == NULL)
++ goto cleanup;
++ }
++
++ if (IS_ERR(new_profile))
++ goto cleanup;
++
++ old_profile = __aa_replace_profile(current, new_profile);
++ if (IS_ERR(old_profile)) {
++ aa_put_profile(new_profile);
++ aa_put_profile(profile);
++ if (PTR_ERR(old_profile) == -ESTALE) {
++ profile = aa_get_profile(current);
++ goto repeat;
++ }
++ if (PTR_ERR(old_profile) == -EPERM) {
++ sa.denied_mask = sa.request_mask;
++ sa.info = "unable to set profile due to ptrace";
++ sa.task = current->parent->pid;
++ aa_audit_reject(profile, &sa);
++ }
++ new_profile = old_profile;
++ goto cleanup;
++ }
++ aa_put_profile(old_profile);
++ aa_put_profile(profile);
++
++ /* Handle confined exec.
++ * Can be at this point for the following reasons:
++ * 1. unconfined switching to confined
++ * 2. confined switching to different confinement
++ * 3. confined switching to unconfined
++ *
++ * Cases 2 and 3 are marked as requiring secure exec
++ * (unless policy specified "unsafe exec")
++ */
++ if (!(exec_mode & (AA_EXEC_UNSAFE << shift))) {
++ unsigned long bprm_flags;
++
++ bprm_flags = AA_SECURE_EXEC_NEEDED;
++ bprm->security = (void*)
++ ((unsigned long)bprm->security | bprm_flags);
++ }
++
++ if (complain && new_profile &&
++ new_profile == new_profile->ns->null_complain_profile) {
++ sa.request_mask = 0;
++ sa.name = NULL;
++ sa.info = "set profile";
++ aa_audit_hint(new_profile, &sa);
++ }
++
++cleanup:
++ aa_put_name_buffer(child);
++ aa_put_name_buffer(buffer);
++ if (IS_ERR(new_profile))
++ return PTR_ERR(new_profile);
++ aa_put_profile(new_profile);
++ return 0;
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_release - release a task context
++ * @task: task being released
++ *
++ * This is called after a task has exited and the parent has reaped it.
++ */
++void aa_release(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++ struct aa_task_context *cxt;
++ struct aa_profile *profile;
++ /*
++ * While the task context is still on a profile's task context
++ * list, another process could replace the profile under us,
++ * leaving us with a locked profile that is no longer attached
++ * to this task. So after locking the profile, we check that
++ * the profile is still attached. The profile lock is
++ * sufficient to prevent the replacement race so we do not lock
++ * the task.
++ *
++ * Use lock subtyping to avoid lockdep reporting a false irq
++ * possible inversion between the task_lock and profile_lock
++ *
++ * We also avoid taking the task_lock here because lock_dep
++ * would report another false {softirq-on-W} potential irq_lock
++ * inversion.
++ *
++ * If the task does not have a profile attached we are safe;
++ * nothing can race with us at this point.
++ */
++
++repeat:
++ profile = aa_get_profile(task);
++ if (profile) {
++ lock_profile_nested(profile, aa_lock_task_release);
++ cxt = aa_task_context(task);
++ if (unlikely(!cxt || cxt->profile != profile)) {
++ unlock_profile(profile);
++ aa_put_profile(profile);
++ goto repeat;
++ }
++ aa_change_task_context(task, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
++ unlock_profile(profile);
++ aa_put_profile(profile);
++ }
++}
++
++static int do_change_profile(struct aa_profile *expected,
++ struct aa_namespace *ns, const char *name,
++ u64 cookie, int restore, int hat,
++ struct aa_audit *sa)
++{
++ struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL, *old_profile = NULL,
++ *previous_profile = NULL;
++ struct aa_task_context *new_cxt, *cxt;
++ int error = 0;
++
++ sa->name = name;
++
++ new_cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
++ if (!new_cxt)
++ return -ENOMEM;
++
++ new_profile = aa_find_profile(ns, name);
++ if (!new_profile && !restore) {
++ if (!PROFILE_COMPLAIN(expected)) {
++ aa_free_task_context(new_cxt);
++ return -ENOENT;
++ }
++ new_profile = aa_dup_profile(ns->null_complain_profile);
++ } else if (new_profile && hat && !PROFILE_IS_HAT(new_profile)) {
++ aa_free_task_context(new_cxt);
++ aa_put_profile(new_profile);
++ return error;
++ }
++
++ cxt = lock_task_and_profiles(current, new_profile);
++ if (!cxt) {
++ error = -EPERM;
++ goto out;
++ }
++ old_profile = cxt->profile;
++
++ if (cxt->profile != expected || (new_profile && new_profile->isstale)) {
++ error = -ESTALE;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++ if (cxt->previous_profile) {
++ if (cxt->cookie != cookie) {
++ error = -EACCES;
++ sa->info = "killing process";
++ aa_audit_reject(cxt->profile, sa);
++ /* terminate process */
++ (void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL, current);
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++ if (!restore)
++ previous_profile = cxt->previous_profile;
++ } else
++ previous_profile = cxt->profile;
++
++ if ((current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && aa_may_ptrace(cxt, new_profile)) {
++ error = -EACCES;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++ if (new_profile == ns->null_complain_profile)
++ aa_audit_hint(cxt->profile, sa);
++
++ if (APPARMOR_AUDIT(cxt))
++ aa_audit_message(cxt->profile, sa, AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT);
++
++ if (!restore && cookie)
++ aa_change_task_context(current, new_cxt, new_profile, cookie,
++ previous_profile);
++ else
++ /* either return to previous_profile, or a permanent change */
++ aa_change_task_context(current, new_cxt, new_profile, 0, NULL);
++
++out:
++ if (aa_task_context(current) != new_cxt)
++ aa_free_task_context(new_cxt);
++ task_unlock(current);
++ unlock_both_profiles(old_profile, new_profile);
++ aa_put_profile(new_profile);
++ return error;
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_change_profile - perform a one-way profile transition
++ * @ns_name: name of the profile namespace to change to
++ * @name: name of profile to change to
++ * Change to new profile @name. Unlike with hats, there is no way
++ * to change back.
++ *
++ * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise.
++ */
++int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *name)
++{
++ struct aa_task_context *cxt;
++ struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
++ struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL;
++ struct aa_audit sa;
++ unsigned int state;
++ int error = -EINVAL;
++
++ if (!name)
++ return -EINVAL;
++
++ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
++ sa.gfp_mask = GFP_ATOMIC;
++ sa.operation = "change_profile";
++
++repeat:
++ task_lock(current);
++ cxt = aa_task_context(current);
++ if (cxt)
++ profile = aa_dup_profile(cxt->profile);
++ task_unlock(current);
++
++ if (ns_name)
++ ns = aa_find_namespace(ns_name);
++ else if (profile)
++ ns = aa_get_namespace(profile->ns);
++ else
++ ns = aa_get_namespace(default_namespace);
++
++ if (!ns) {
++ aa_put_profile(profile);
++ return -ENOENT;
++ }
++
++ if (!profile || PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile) ||
++ (ns == profile->ns &&
++ (aa_match(profile->file_rules, name, NULL) & AA_CHANGE_PROFILE)))
++ error = do_change_profile(profile, ns, name, 0, 0, 0, &sa);
++ else {
++ /* check for a rule with a namespace prepended */
++ aa_match_state(profile->file_rules, DFA_START, ns->name,
++ &state);
++ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file_rules, state);
++ if ((aa_match_state(profile->file_rules, state, name, NULL) &
++ AA_CHANGE_PROFILE))
++ error = do_change_profile(profile, ns, name, 0, 0, 0,
++ &sa);
++ else
++ /* no permission to transition to profile @name */
++ error = -EACCES;
++ }
++
++ aa_put_namespace(ns);
++ aa_put_profile(profile);
++ if (error == -ESTALE)
++ goto repeat;
++
++ return error;
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_change_hat - change hat to/from subprofile
++ * @hat_name: hat to change to
++ * @cookie: magic value to validate the hat change
++ *
++ * Change to new @hat_name, and store the @hat_magic in the current task
++ * context. If the new @hat_name is %NULL and the @cookie matches that
++ * stored in the current task context and is not 0, return to the top level
++ * profile.
++ * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise.
++ */
++int aa_change_hat(const char *hat_name, u64 cookie)
++{
++ struct aa_task_context *cxt;
++ struct aa_profile *profile, *previous_profile;
++ struct aa_audit sa;
++ int error = 0;
++
++ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
++ sa.gfp_mask = GFP_ATOMIC;
++ sa.operation = "change_hat";
++
++repeat:
++ task_lock(current);
++ cxt = aa_task_context(current);
++ if (!cxt) {
++ task_unlock(current);
++ return -EPERM;
++ }
++ profile = aa_dup_profile(cxt->profile);
++ previous_profile = aa_dup_profile(cxt->previous_profile);
++ task_unlock(current);
++
++ if (hat_name) {
++ char *name, *profile_name;
++
++ if (previous_profile)
++ profile_name = previous_profile->name;
++ else
++ profile_name = profile->name;
++
++ name = new_compound_name(profile_name, hat_name);
++ if (!name) {
++ error = -ENOMEM;
++ goto out;
++ }
++ error = do_change_profile(profile, profile->ns, name, cookie,
++ 0, 1, &sa);
++ aa_put_name_buffer(name);
++ } else if (previous_profile)
++ error = do_change_profile(profile, profile->ns,
++ previous_profile->name, cookie, 1, 0,
++ &sa);
++ /* else ignore restores when there is no saved profile */
++
++out:
++ aa_put_profile(previous_profile);
++ aa_put_profile(profile);
++ if (error == -ESTALE)
++ goto repeat;
++
++ return error;
++}
++
++/**
++ * __aa_replace_profile - replace a task's profile
++ * @task: task to switch the profile of
++ * @profile: profile to switch to
++ *
++ * Returns a handle to the previous profile upon success, or else an
++ * error code.
++ */
++struct aa_profile *__aa_replace_profile(struct task_struct *task,
++ struct aa_profile *profile)
++{
++ struct aa_task_context *cxt, *new_cxt = NULL;
++ struct aa_profile *old_profile = NULL;
++
++ if (profile) {
++ new_cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
++ if (!new_cxt)
++ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++ }
++
++ cxt = lock_task_and_profiles(task, profile);
++ if (unlikely(profile && profile->isstale)) {
++ task_unlock(task);
++ unlock_both_profiles(profile, cxt ? cxt->profile : NULL);
++ aa_free_task_context(new_cxt);
++ return ERR_PTR(-ESTALE);
++ }
++
++ if ((current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && aa_may_ptrace(cxt, profile)) {
++ task_unlock(task);
++ unlock_both_profiles(profile, cxt ? cxt->profile : NULL);
++ aa_free_task_context(new_cxt);
++ return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
++ }
++
++ if (cxt)
++ old_profile = aa_dup_profile(cxt->profile);
++ aa_change_task_context(task, new_cxt, profile, 0, NULL);
++
++ task_unlock(task);
++ unlock_both_profiles(profile, old_profile);
++ return old_profile;
++}
++
++/**
++ * lock_task_and_profiles - lock the task and confining profiles and @profile
++ * @task: task to lock
++ * @profile: extra profile to lock in addition to the current profile
++ *
++ * Handle the spinning on locking to make sure the task context and
++ * profile are consistent once all locks are aquired.
++ *
++ * return the aa_task_context currently confining the task. The task lock
++ * will be held whether or not the task is confined.
++ */
++struct aa_task_context *
++lock_task_and_profiles(struct task_struct *task, struct aa_profile *profile)
++{
++ struct aa_task_context *cxt;
++ struct aa_profile *old_profile = NULL;
++
++ rcu_read_lock();
++repeat:
++ cxt = aa_task_context(task);
++ if (cxt)
++ old_profile = cxt->profile;
++
++ lock_both_profiles(profile, old_profile);
++ task_lock(task);
++
++ /* check for race with profile transition, replacement or removal */
++ if (unlikely(cxt != aa_task_context(task))) {
++ task_unlock(task);
++ unlock_both_profiles(profile, old_profile);
++ old_profile = NULL;
++ goto repeat;
++ }
++ rcu_read_unlock();
++ return cxt;
++}
++
++static void free_aa_task_context_rcu_callback(struct rcu_head *head)
++{
++ struct aa_task_context *cxt;
++
++ cxt = container_of(head, struct aa_task_context, rcu);
++ aa_free_task_context(cxt);
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_change_task_context - switch a task to use a new context and profile
++ * @task: task that is having its task context changed
++ * @new_cxt: new task context to use after the switch
++ * @profile: new profile to use after the switch
++ * @cookie: magic value to switch to
++ * @previous_profile: profile the task can return to
++ */
++void aa_change_task_context(struct task_struct *task,
++ struct aa_task_context *new_cxt,
++ struct aa_profile *profile, u64 cookie,
++ struct aa_profile *previous_profile)
++{
++ struct aa_task_context *old_cxt = aa_task_context(task);
++
++ if (old_cxt) {
++ list_del_init(&old_cxt->list);
++ call_rcu(&old_cxt->rcu, free_aa_task_context_rcu_callback);
++ }
++ if (new_cxt) {
++ /* set the caps_logged cache to the quiet_caps mask
++ * this has the effect of quieting caps that are not
++ * supposed to be logged
++ */
++ new_cxt->caps_logged = profile->quiet_caps;
++ new_cxt->cookie = cookie;
++ new_cxt->task = task;
++ new_cxt->profile = aa_dup_profile(profile);
++ new_cxt->previous_profile = aa_dup_profile(previous_profile);
++ list_move(&new_cxt->list, &profile->task_contexts);
++ }
++ rcu_assign_pointer(task->security, new_cxt);
++}
projects / people / pmueller / ipfire-2.x.git / blobdiff