}
#endif
-int mac_selinux_fix_container(const char *path, const char *inside_path, LabelFixFlags flags) {
-
- assert(path);
- assert(inside_path);
-
#if HAVE_SELINUX
- _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
-
- /* if mac_selinux_init() wasn't called before we are a NOOP */
- if (!label_hnd)
- return 0;
-
- /* Open the file as O_PATH, to pin it while we determine and adjust the label */
- fd = open(path, O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC|O_PATH);
- if (fd < 0) {
- if ((flags & LABEL_IGNORE_ENOENT) && errno == ENOENT)
- return 0;
-
- return -errno;
- }
+static int selinux_fix_fd(
+ int fd,
+ const char *label_path,
+ LabelFixFlags flags) {
- return mac_selinux_fix_container_fd(fd, path, inside_path, flags);
-#endif
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int mac_selinux_fix_container_fd(int fd, const char *path, const char *inside_path, LabelFixFlags flags) {
-
- assert(fd >= 0);
- assert(inside_path);
-
-#if HAVE_SELINUX
_cleanup_freecon_ char* fcon = NULL;
struct stat st;
int r;
- /* if mac_selinux_init() wasn't called before we are a NOOP */
- if (!label_hnd)
- return 0;
+ assert(fd >= 0);
+ assert(label_path);
+ assert(path_is_absolute(label_path));
if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
return -errno;
if (!label_hnd)
return 0;
- if (selabel_lookup_raw(label_hnd, &fcon, inside_path, st.st_mode) < 0) {
+ if (selabel_lookup_raw(label_hnd, &fcon, label_path, st.st_mode) < 0) {
/* If there's no label to set, then exit without warning */
if (errno == ENOENT)
return 0;
- r = -errno;
- goto fail;
+ return log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Unable to lookup intended SELinux security context of %s: %m", label_path);
}
if (setfilecon_raw(FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(fd), fcon) < 0) {
_cleanup_freecon_ char *oldcon = NULL;
+ r = -errno;
+
/* If the FS doesn't support labels, then exit without warning */
- if (ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(errno))
+ if (ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r))
return 0;
/* It the FS is read-only and we were told to ignore failures caused by that, suppress error */
- if (errno == EROFS && (flags & LABEL_IGNORE_EROFS))
+ if (r == -EROFS && (flags & LABEL_IGNORE_EROFS))
return 0;
- r = -errno;
-
/* If the old label is identical to the new one, suppress any kind of error */
- if (getfilecon_raw(FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(fd), &oldcon) >= 0 && streq(fcon, oldcon))
+ if (getfilecon_raw(FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(fd), &oldcon) >= 0 && streq_ptr(fcon, oldcon))
return 0;
- goto fail;
+ return log_enforcing_errno(r, "Unable to fix SELinux security context of %s: %m", label_path);
}
return 0;
-
-fail:
- return log_enforcing_errno(r, "Unable to fix SELinux security context of %s (%s): %m", strna(path), strna(inside_path));
+}
#endif
+int mac_selinux_fix_full(
+ int atfd,
+ const char *inode_path,
+ const char *label_path,
+ LabelFixFlags flags) {
+
+ assert(atfd >= 0 || atfd == AT_FDCWD);
+ assert(atfd >= 0 || inode_path);
+
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
+ _cleanup_close_ int opened_fd = -EBADF;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL;
+ int inode_fd, r;
+
+ /* if mac_selinux_init() wasn't called before we are a NOOP */
+ if (!label_hnd)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (inode_path) {
+ opened_fd = openat(atfd, inode_path, O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC|O_PATH);
+ if (opened_fd < 0) {
+ if ((flags & LABEL_IGNORE_ENOENT) && errno == ENOENT)
+ return 0;
+
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ inode_fd = opened_fd;
+ } else
+ inode_fd = atfd;
+
+ if (!label_path) {
+ if (path_is_absolute(inode_path))
+ label_path = inode_path;
+ else {
+ r = fd_get_path(inode_fd, &p);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ label_path = p;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return selinux_fix_fd(inode_fd, label_path, flags);
+#else
return 0;
+#endif
}
int mac_selinux_apply(const char *path, const char *label) {
assert(label);
- if (fsetfilecon(fd, label) < 0)
+ if (setfilecon(FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(fd), label) < 0)
return log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to set SELinux security context %s on path %s: %m", label, strna(path));
#endif
return 0;
#if HAVE_SELINUX
_cleanup_freecon_ char *mycon = NULL, *fcon = NULL;
security_class_t sclass;
- int r;
assert(exe);
assert(label);
if (!mac_selinux_use())
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- r = getcon_raw(&mycon);
- if (r < 0)
+ if (getcon_raw(&mycon) < 0)
return -errno;
+ if (!mycon)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- r = getfilecon_raw(exe, &fcon);
- if (r < 0)
+ if (getfilecon_raw(exe, &fcon) < 0)
return -errno;
+ if (!fcon)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
sclass = string_to_security_class("process");
if (sclass == 0)
return -ENOSYS;
- r = security_compute_create_raw(mycon, fcon, sclass, label);
- if (r < 0)
- return -errno;
-
- return 0;
+ return RET_NERRNO(security_compute_create_raw(mycon, fcon, sclass, label));
#else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}
-int mac_selinux_get_our_label(char **label) {
-#if HAVE_SELINUX
- int r;
-
- assert(label);
+int mac_selinux_get_our_label(char **ret) {
+ assert(ret);
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
if (!mac_selinux_use())
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- r = getcon_raw(label);
- if (r < 0)
+ _cleanup_freecon_ char *con = NULL;
+ if (getcon_raw(&con) < 0)
return -errno;
+ if (!con)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ *ret = TAKE_PTR(con);
return 0;
#else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}
-int mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(int socket_fd, const char *exe, const char *exec_label, char **label) {
+int mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(int socket_fd, const char *exe, const char *exec_label, char **ret_label) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
_cleanup_freecon_ char *mycon = NULL, *peercon = NULL, *fcon = NULL;
_cleanup_context_free_ context_t pcon = NULL, bcon = NULL;
+ const char *range = NULL, *bcon_str = NULL;
security_class_t sclass;
- const char *range = NULL;
- int r;
assert(socket_fd >= 0);
assert(exe);
- assert(label);
+ assert(ret_label);
if (!mac_selinux_use())
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- r = getcon_raw(&mycon);
- if (r < 0)
+ if (getcon_raw(&mycon) < 0)
return -errno;
+ if (!mycon)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- r = getpeercon_raw(socket_fd, &peercon);
- if (r < 0)
+ if (getpeercon_raw(socket_fd, &peercon) < 0)
return -errno;
+ if (!peercon)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- if (!exec_label) {
- /* If there is no context set for next exec let's use context
- of target executable */
- r = getfilecon_raw(exe, &fcon);
- if (r < 0)
+ if (!exec_label) { /* If there is no context set for next exec let's use context of target executable */
+ if (getfilecon_raw(exe, &fcon) < 0)
return -errno;
+ if (!fcon)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
bcon = context_new(mycon);
if (!range)
return -errno;
- r = context_range_set(bcon, range);
- if (r)
+ if (context_range_set(bcon, range) != 0)
return -errno;
- freecon(mycon);
- mycon = strdup(context_str(bcon));
- if (!mycon)
+ bcon_str = context_str(bcon);
+ if (!bcon_str)
return -ENOMEM;
sclass = string_to_security_class("process");
if (sclass == 0)
return -ENOSYS;
- r = security_compute_create_raw(mycon, fcon, sclass, label);
- if (r < 0)
- return -errno;
-
- return 0;
+ return RET_NERRNO(security_compute_create_raw(bcon_str, fcon, sclass, ret_label));
#else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}
#endif
-int mac_selinux_create_file_prepare_at(int dirfd, const char *path, mode_t mode) {
+int mac_selinux_create_file_prepare_at(
+ int dir_fd,
+ const char *path,
+ mode_t mode) {
+
#if HAVE_SELINUX
_cleanup_free_ char *abspath = NULL;
int r;
- assert(path);
+ if (dir_fd < 0 && dir_fd != AT_FDCWD)
+ return -EBADF;
if (!label_hnd)
return 0;
- if (!path_is_absolute(path)) {
- if (dirfd == AT_FDCWD)
+ if (isempty(path) || !path_is_absolute(path)) {
+ if (dir_fd == AT_FDCWD)
r = safe_getcwd(&abspath);
else
- r = fd_get_path(dirfd, &abspath);
+ r = fd_get_path(dir_fd, &abspath);
if (r < 0)
return r;
- if (!path_extend(&abspath, path))
+ if (!isempty(path) && !path_extend(&abspath, path))
return -ENOMEM;
path = abspath;
#endif
}
-int mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(const char *path, mode_t mode) {
+int mac_selinux_create_file_prepare_label(const char *path, const char *label) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
- int r;
-
- _cleanup_free_ char *abspath = NULL;
-
- assert(path);
- if (!label_hnd)
+ if (!label)
return 0;
- r = path_make_absolute_cwd(path, &abspath);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
+ if (!mac_selinux_use())
+ return 0;
- return selinux_create_file_prepare_abspath(abspath, mode);
-#else
- return 0;
+ if (setfscreatecon_raw(label) < 0)
+ return log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to set specified SELinux security context '%s' for '%s': %m", label, strna(path));
#endif
+ return 0;
}
void mac_selinux_create_file_clear(void) {
_cleanup_freecon_ char *fcon = NULL;
const struct sockaddr_un *un;
bool context_changed = false;
+ size_t sz;
char *path;
int r;
if (un->sun_path[0] == 0)
goto skipped;
- path = strndupa(un->sun_path, addrlen - offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path));
+ sz = addrlen - offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path);
+ if (sz > PATH_MAX)
+ goto skipped;
+ path = strndupa_safe(un->sun_path, sz);
/* Check for policy reload so 'label_hnd' is kept up-to-date by callbacks */
mac_selinux_maybe_reload();
context_changed = true;
}
- r = bind(fd, addr, addrlen) < 0 ? -errno : 0;
+ r = RET_NERRNO(bind(fd, addr, addrlen));
if (context_changed)
(void) setfscreatecon_raw(NULL);
skipped:
#endif
- if (bind(fd, addr, addrlen) < 0)
- return -errno;
-
- return 0;
+ return RET_NERRNO(bind(fd, addr, addrlen));
}
projects / thirdparty / systemd.git / blobdiff