tree-wide: use -EBADF for fd initialization

[thirdparty/systemd.git] / src / shared / selinux-util.c

diff --git a/src/shared/selinux-util.c b/src/shared/selinux-util.c
index 57f330f8bc32484b9cfbafa7cbf2db3e38f8442d..a74883ab81ef4c5b2eacfedcfae126ef8cce0444 100644 (file)
--- a/src/shared/selinux-util.c
+++ b/src/shared/selinux-util.c
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ static int selinux_fix_fd(
                         return 0;
 
                 /* If the old label is identical to the new one, suppress any kind of error */
-                if (getfilecon_raw(FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(fd), &oldcon) >= 0 && streq(fcon, oldcon))
+                if (getfilecon_raw(FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(fd), &oldcon) >= 0 && streq_ptr(fcon, oldcon))
                         return 0;
 
                 return log_enforcing_errno(r, "Unable to fix SELinux security context of %s: %m", label_path);
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ int mac_selinux_fix_full(
         assert(atfd >= 0 || inode_path);
 
 #if HAVE_SELINUX
-        _cleanup_close_ int opened_fd = -1;
+        _cleanup_close_ int opened_fd = -EBADF;
         _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL;
         int inode_fd, r;
 
@@ -372,7 +372,6 @@ int mac_selinux_get_create_label_from_exe(const char *exe, char **label) {
 #if HAVE_SELINUX
         _cleanup_freecon_ char *mycon = NULL, *fcon = NULL;
         security_class_t sclass;
-        int r;
 
         assert(exe);
         assert(label);
@@ -380,13 +379,15 @@ int mac_selinux_get_create_label_from_exe(const char *exe, char **label) {
         if (!mac_selinux_use())
                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-        r = getcon_raw(&mycon);
-        if (r < 0)
+        if (getcon_raw(&mycon) < 0)
                 return -errno;
+        if (!mycon)
+                return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-        r = getfilecon_raw(exe, &fcon);
-        if (r < 0)
+        if (getfilecon_raw(exe, &fcon) < 0)
                 return -errno;
+        if (!fcon)
+                return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
         sclass = string_to_security_class("process");
         if (sclass == 0)
@@ -398,48 +399,55 @@ int mac_selinux_get_create_label_from_exe(const char *exe, char **label) {
 #endif
 }
 
-int mac_selinux_get_our_label(char **label) {
-#if HAVE_SELINUX
-        assert(label);
+int mac_selinux_get_our_label(char **ret) {
+        assert(ret);
 
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
         if (!mac_selinux_use())
                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-        return RET_NERRNO(getcon_raw(label));
+        _cleanup_freecon_ char *con = NULL;
+        if (getcon_raw(&con) < 0)
+                return -errno;
+        if (!con)
+                return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+        *ret = TAKE_PTR(con);
+        return 0;
 #else
         return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 #endif
 }
 
-int mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(int socket_fd, const char *exe, const char *exec_label, char **label) {
+int mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(int socket_fd, const char *exe, const char *exec_label, char **ret_label) {
 #if HAVE_SELINUX
         _cleanup_freecon_ char *mycon = NULL, *peercon = NULL, *fcon = NULL;
         _cleanup_context_free_ context_t pcon = NULL, bcon = NULL;
+        const char *range = NULL, *bcon_str = NULL;
         security_class_t sclass;
-        const char *range = NULL;
-        int r;
 
         assert(socket_fd >= 0);
         assert(exe);
-        assert(label);
+        assert(ret_label);
 
         if (!mac_selinux_use())
                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-        r = getcon_raw(&mycon);
-        if (r < 0)
+        if (getcon_raw(&mycon) < 0)
                 return -errno;
+        if (!mycon)
+                return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-        r = getpeercon_raw(socket_fd, &peercon);
-        if (r < 0)
+        if (getpeercon_raw(socket_fd, &peercon) < 0)
                 return -errno;
+        if (!peercon)
+                return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-        if (!exec_label) {
-                /* If there is no context set for next exec let's use context
-                   of target executable */
-                r = getfilecon_raw(exe, &fcon);
-                if (r < 0)
+        if (!exec_label) { /* If there is no context set for next exec let's use context of target executable */
+                if (getfilecon_raw(exe, &fcon) < 0)
                         return -errno;
+                if (!fcon)
+                        return -EOPNOTSUPP;
         }
 
         bcon = context_new(mycon);
@@ -454,20 +462,18 @@ int mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(int socket_fd, const char *exe, const char *
         if (!range)
                 return -errno;
 
-        r = context_range_set(bcon, range);
-        if (r)
+        if (context_range_set(bcon, range) != 0)
                 return -errno;
 
-        freecon(mycon);
-        mycon = strdup(context_str(bcon));
-        if (!mycon)
+        bcon_str = context_str(bcon);
+        if (!bcon_str)
                 return -ENOMEM;
 
         sclass = string_to_security_class("process");
         if (sclass == 0)
                 return -ENOSYS;
 
-        return RET_NERRNO(security_compute_create_raw(mycon, fcon, sclass, label));
+        return RET_NERRNO(security_compute_create_raw(bcon_str, fcon, sclass, ret_label));
 #else
         return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 #endif
@@ -610,6 +616,7 @@ int mac_selinux_bind(int fd, const struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen) {
         _cleanup_freecon_ char *fcon = NULL;
         const struct sockaddr_un *un;
         bool context_changed = false;
+        size_t sz;
         char *path;
         int r;
 
@@ -633,8 +640,10 @@ int mac_selinux_bind(int fd, const struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen) {
         if (un->sun_path[0] == 0)
                 goto skipped;
 
-        path = strndupa_safe(un->sun_path,
-                             addrlen - offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path));
+        sz = addrlen - offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path);
+        if (sz > PATH_MAX)
+                goto skipped;
+        path = strndupa_safe(un->sun_path, sz);
 
         /* Check for policy reload so 'label_hnd' is kept up-to-date by callbacks */
         mac_selinux_maybe_reload();