X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=man%2Fsystemd.exec.xml;h=3b39a9c912be182a01ab5f9f5dcec1ed1f3964cb;hb=add005357d535681c7075ced8eec2b6e61b43728;hp=0973f4047a798862a9658a0f1d952a44647b5326;hpb=9156493171cf2d78e1ac1a3746c385b0e281acf1;p=thirdparty%2Fsystemd.git diff --git a/man/systemd.exec.xml b/man/systemd.exec.xml index 0973f4047a7..3b39a9c912b 100644 --- a/man/systemd.exec.xml +++ b/man/systemd.exec.xml @@ -1234,22 +1234,16 @@ NoNewPrivileges= - Takes a boolean argument. If true, ensures that the service - process and all its children can never gain new privileges through - execve (e.g. via setuid or setgid bits, or filesystem - capabilities). This is the simplest and most effective way to ensure that - a process and its children can never elevate privileges again. Defaults to false, - but in the user manager instance certain settings force - NoNewPrivileges=yes, ignoring the value of this setting. - This is the case when SystemCallFilter=, - SystemCallArchitectures=, - RestrictAddressFamilies=, - PrivateDevices=, - ProtectKernelTunables=, - ProtectKernelModules=, - MemoryDenyWriteExecute=, or - RestrictRealtime= are specified. - + Takes a boolean argument. If true, ensures that the service process and all its children can + never gain new privileges through execve() (e.g. via setuid or setgid bits, or filesystem + capabilities). This is the simplest and most effective way to ensure that a process and its children can never + elevate privileges again. Defaults to false, but in the user manager instance certain settings force + NoNewPrivileges=yes, ignoring the value of this setting. This is the case when + SystemCallFilter=, SystemCallArchitectures=, + RestrictAddressFamilies=, RestrictNamespaces=, + PrivateDevices=, ProtectKernelTunables=, + ProtectKernelModules=, MemoryDenyWriteExecute=, or + RestrictRealtime= are specified. @@ -1467,6 +1461,30 @@ logging. This does not affect commands prefixed with +. + + RestrictNamespaces= + + Restricts access to Linux namespace functionality for the processes of this unit. For details + about Linux namespaces, see + namespaces7. Either takes a + boolean argument, or a space-separated list of namespace type identifiers. If false (the default), no + restrictions on namespace creation and switching are made. If true, access to any kind of namespacing is + prohibited. Otherwise, a space-separated list of namespace type identifiers must be specified, consisting of + any combination of: cgroup, ipc, net, + mnt, pid, user and uts. Any + namespace type listed is made accessible to the unit's processes, access to namespace types not listed is + prohibited (whitelisting). By prepending the list with a single tilda character (~) the + effect may be inverted: only the listed namespace types will be made inaccessible, all unlisted ones are + permitted (blacklisting). If the empty string is assigned, the default namespace restrictions are applied, + which is equivalent to false. Internally, this setting limits access to the + unshare2, + clone2 and + setns2 system calls, taking + the specified flags parameters into account. Note that — if this option is used — in addition to restricting + creation and switching of the specified types of namespaces (or all of them, if true) access to the + setns() system call with a zero flags parameter is prohibited. + + ProtectKernelModules=