This makes the implementation less likely to provide useful timing
information to potential attackers from comparisons of information
received from a remote device and private material known only by the
authorized devices.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
buf, sizeof(buf));
hmac_sha1(data->cmk, 20, buf, sizeof(buf), mac);
- if (os_memcmp(mac, pos, SHA1_MAC_LEN) != 0) {
+ if (os_memcmp_const(mac, pos, SHA1_MAC_LEN) != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Invalid Compound_MAC in "
"cryptobinding TLV");
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Received MAC",
buf[60] = EAP_TYPE_PEAP;
hmac_sha1(data->cmk, 20, buf, sizeof(buf), mac);
- if (os_memcmp(mac, pos, SHA1_MAC_LEN) != 0) {
+ if (os_memcmp_const(mac, pos, SHA1_MAC_LEN) != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Invalid Compound_MAC in "
"cryptobinding TLV");
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: CMK", data->cmk, 20);