Jeff King [Mon, 3 Oct 2022 17:35:02 +0000 (13:35 -0400)]
sequencer: detect author name errors in read_author_script()
As we parse the author-script file, we check for missing or duplicate
lines for GIT_AUTHOR_NAME, etc. But after reading the whole file, our
final error conditional checks "date_i" twice and "name_i" not at all.
This not only leads to us failing to abort, but we may do an
out-of-bounds read on the string_list array.
The bug goes back to 442c36bd08 (am: improve author-script error
reporting, 2018-10-31), though the code was soon after moved to this
spot by bcd33ec25f (add read_author_script() to libgit, 2018-10-31).
It was presumably just a typo in 442c36bd08.
We'll add test coverage for all the error cases here, though only the
GIT_AUTHOR_NAME ones fail (even in a vanilla build they segfault
consistently, but certainly with SANITIZE=address).
Reported-by: Michael V. Scovetta <michael.scovetta@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
* maint-2.34:
Git 2.34.4
Git 2.33.4
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.33:
Git 2.33.4
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.32:
Git 2.32.3
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.31:
Git 2.31.4
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
* maint-2.30:
Git 2.30.5
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
8959555cee7 (setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level
directory, 2022-03-02), adds a function to check for ownership of
repositories using a directory that is representative of it, and ways to
add exempt a specific repository from said check if needed, but that
check didn't account for owership of the gitdir, or (when used) the
gitfile that points to that gitdir.
An attacker could create a git repository in a directory that they can
write into but that is owned by the victim to work around the fix that
was introduced with CVE-2022-24765 to potentially run code as the
victim.
An example that could result in privilege escalation to root in *NIX would
be to set a repository in a shared tmp directory by doing (for example):
$ git -C /tmp init
To avoid that, extend the ensure_valid_ownership function to be able to
check for all three paths.
This will have the side effect of tripling the number of stat() calls
when a repository is detected, but the effect is expected to be likely
minimal, as it is done only once during the directory walk in which Git
looks for a repository.
Additionally make sure to resolve the gitfile (if one was used) to find
the relevant gitdir for checking.
While at it change the message printed on failure so it is clear we are
referring to the repository by its worktree (or gitdir if it is bare) and
not to a specific directory.
Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <junio@pobox.com> Helped-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Junio C Hamano [Thu, 26 May 2022 21:51:32 +0000 (14:51 -0700)]
Merge branch 'cb/path-owner-check-with-sudo'
With a recent update to refuse access to repositories of other
people by default, "sudo make install" and "sudo git describe"
stopped working. This series intends to loosen it while keeping
the safety.
* cb/path-owner-check-with-sudo:
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
Previous changes introduced a regression which will prevent root for
accessing repositories owned by thyself if using sudo because SUDO_UID
takes precedence.
Loosen that restriction by allowing root to access repositories owned
by both uid by default and without having to add a safe.directory
exception.
A previous workaround that was documented in the tests is no longer
needed so it has been removed together with its specially crafted
prerequisite.
Helped-by: Johanness Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
Add a support library that provides one function that can be used
to run a "scriplet" of commands through sudo and that helps invoking
sudo in the slightly awkward way that is required to ensure it doesn't
block the call (if shell was allowed as tested in the prerequisite)
and it doesn't run the command through a different shell than the one
we intended.
Add additional negative tests as suggested by Junio and that use a
new workspace that is owned by root.
Document a regression that was introduced by previous commits where
root won't be able anymore to access directories they own unless
SUDO_UID is removed from their environment.
The tests document additional ways that this new restriction could
be worked around and the documentation explains why it might be instead
considered a feature, but a "fix" is planned for a future change.
Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
bdc77d1d685 (Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the
current user, 2022-03-02) checks for the effective uid of the running
process using geteuid() but didn't account for cases where that user was
root (because git was invoked through sudo or a compatible tool) and the
original uid that repository trusted for its config was no longer known,
therefore failing the following otherwise safe call:
guy@renard ~/Software/uncrustify $ sudo git describe --always --dirty
[sudo] password for guy:
fatal: unsafe repository ('/home/guy/Software/uncrustify' is owned by someone else)
Attempt to detect those cases by using the environment variables that
those tools create to keep track of the original user id, and do the
ownership check using that instead.
This assumes the environment the user is running on after going
privileged can't be tampered with, and also adds code to restrict that
the new behavior only applies if running as root, therefore keeping the
most common case, which runs unprivileged, from changing, but because of
that, it will miss cases where sudo (or an equivalent) was used to change
to another unprivileged user or where the equivalent tool used to raise
privileges didn't track the original id in a sudo compatible way.
Because of compatibility with sudo, the code assumes that uid_t is an
unsigned integer type (which is not required by the standard) but is used
that way in their codebase to generate SUDO_UID. In systems where uid_t
is signed, sudo might be also patched to NOT be unsigned and that might
be able to trigger an edge case and a bug (as described in the code), but
it is considered unlikely to happen and even if it does, the code would
just mostly fail safely, so there was no attempt either to detect it or
prevent it by the code, which is something that might change in the future,
based on expected user feedback.
Reported-by: Guy Maurel <guy.j@maurel.de> Helped-by: SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com> Helped-by: Randall Becker <rsbecker@nexbridge.com> Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
Originally reported after release of v2.35.2 (and other maint branches)
for CVE-2022-24765 and blocking otherwise harmless commands that were
done using sudo in a repository that was owned by the user.
Add a new test script with very basic support to allow running git
commands through sudo, so a reproduction could be implemented and that
uses only `git status` as a proxy of the issue reported.
Note that because of the way sudo interacts with the system, a much
more complete integration with the test framework will require a lot
more work and that was therefore intentionally punted for now.
The current implementation requires the execution of a special cleanup
function which should always be kept as the last "test" or otherwise
the standard cleanup functions will fail because they can't remove
the root owned directories that are used. This also means that if
failures are found while running, the specifics of the failure might
not be kept for further debugging and if the test was interrupted, it
will be necessary to clean the working directory manually before
restarting by running:
The test file also uses at least one initial "setup" test that creates
a parallel execution directory under the "root" sub directory, which
should be used as top level directory for all repositories that are
used in this test file. Unlike all other tests the repository provided
by the test framework should go unused.
Special care should be taken when invoking commands through sudo, since
the environment is otherwise independent from what the test framework
setup and might have changed the values for HOME, SHELL and dropped
several relevant environment variables for your test. Indeed `git status`
was used as a proxy because it doesn't even require commits in the
repository to work and usually doesn't require much from the environment
to run, but a future patch will add calls to `git init` and that will
fail to honor the default branch name, unless that setting is NOT
provided through an environment variable (which means even a CI run
could fail that test if enabled incorrectly).
A new SUDO prerequisite is provided that does some sanity checking
to make sure the sudo command that will be used allows for passwordless
execution as root without restrictions and doesn't mess with git's
execution path. This matches what is provided by the macOS agents that
are used as part of GitHub actions and probably nowhere else.
Most of those characteristics make this test mostly only suitable for
CI, but it might be executed locally if special care is taken to provide
for all of them in the local configuration and maybe making use of the
sudo credential cache by first invoking sudo, entering your password if
needed, and then invoking the test with:
If it fails to run, then it means your local setup wouldn't work for the
test because of the configuration sudo has or other system settings, and
things that might help are to comment out sudo's secure_path config, and
make sure that the account you are using has no restrictions on the
commands it can run through sudo, just like is provided for the user in
the CI.
For example (assuming a username of marta for you) something probably
similar to the following entry in your /etc/sudoers (or equivalent) file:
marta ALL=(ALL:ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL
Reported-by: SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com> Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
With the addition of the safe.directory in 8959555ce
(setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory,
2022-03-02) released in v2.35.2, we are receiving feedback from a
variety of users about the feature.
Some users have a very large list of shared repositories and find it
cumbersome to add this config for every one of them.
In a more difficult case, certain workflows involve running Git commands
within containers. The container boundary prevents any global or system
config from communicating `safe.directory` values from the host into the
container. Further, the container almost always runs as a different user
than the owner of the directory in the host.
To simplify the reactions necessary for these users, extend the
definition of the safe.directory config value to include a possible '*'
value. This value implies that all directories are safe, providing a
single setting to opt-out of this protection.
Note that an empty assignment of safe.directory clears all previous
values, and this is already the case with the "if (!value || !*value)"
condition.
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
It seems that nothing is ever checking to make sure the safe directories
in the configs actually have the key safe.directory, so some unrelated
config that has a value with a certain directory would also make it a
safe directory.
Signed-off-by: Matheus Valadares <me@m28.io> Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
It is difficult to change the ownership on a directory in our test
suite, so insert a new GIT_TEST_ASSUME_DIFFERENT_OWNER environment
variable to trick Git into thinking we are in a differently-owned
directory. This allows us to test that the config is parsed correctly.
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
* maint-2.34:
Git 2.34.2
Git 2.33.2
Git 2.32.1
Git 2.31.2
GIT-VERSION-GEN: bump to v2.33.1
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
* maint-2.33:
Git 2.33.2
Git 2.32.1
Git 2.31.2
GIT-VERSION-GEN: bump to v2.33.1
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
* maint-2.32:
Git 2.32.1
Git 2.31.2
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
* maint-2.31:
Git 2.31.2
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
* maint-2.30:
Git 2.30.3
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
Fix `GIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIES` with `C:\` and the likes
When determining the length of the longest ancestor of a given path with
respect to to e.g. `GIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIES`, we special-case the root
directory by returning 0 (i.e. we pretend that the path `/` does not end
in a slash by virtually stripping it).
That is the correct behavior because when normalizing paths, the root
directory is special: all other directory paths have their trailing
slash stripped, but not the root directory's path (because it would
become the empty string, which is not a legal path).
However, this special-casing of the root directory in
`longest_ancestor_length()` completely forgets about Windows-style root
directories, e.g. `C:\`. These _also_ get normalized with a trailing
slash (because `C:` would actually refer to the current directory on
that drive, not necessarily to its root directory).
In fc56c7b34b (mingw: accomodate t0060-path-utils for MSYS2,
2016-01-27), we almost got it right. We noticed that
`longest_ancestor_length()` expects a slash _after_ the matched prefix,
and if the prefix already ends in a slash, the normalized path won't
ever match and -1 is returned.
But then that commit went astray: The correct fix is not to adjust the
_tests_ to expect an incorrect -1 when that function is fed a prefix
that ends in a slash, but instead to treat such a prefix as if the
trailing slash had been removed.
Likewise, that function needs to handle the case where it is fed a path
that ends in a slash (not only a prefix that ends in a slash): if it
matches the prefix (plus trailing slash), we still need to verify that
the path does not end there, otherwise the prefix is not actually an
ancestor of the path but identical to it (and we need to return -1 in
that case).
With these two adjustments, we no longer need to play games in t0060
where we only add `$rootoff` if the passed prefix is different from the
MSYS2 pseudo root, instead we also add it for the MSYS2 pseudo root
itself. We do have to be careful to skip that logic entirely for Windows
paths, though, because they do are not subject to that MSYS2 pseudo root
treatment.
This patch fixes the scenario where a user has set
`GIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIES=C:\`, which would be ignored otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level directory
It poses a security risk to search for a git directory outside of the
directories owned by the current user.
For example, it is common e.g. in computer pools of educational
institutes to have a "scratch" space: a mounted disk with plenty of
space that is regularly swiped where any authenticated user can create
a directory to do their work. Merely navigating to such a space with a
Git-enabled `PS1` when there is a maliciously-crafted `/scratch/.git/`
can lead to a compromised account.
The same holds true in multi-user setups running Windows, as `C:\` is
writable to every authenticated user by default.
To plug this vulnerability, we stop Git from accepting top-level
directories owned by someone other than the current user. We avoid
looking at the ownership of each and every directories between the
current and the top-level one (if there are any between) to avoid
introducing a performance bottleneck.
This new default behavior is obviously incompatible with the concept of
shared repositories, where we expect the top-level directory to be owned
by only one of its legitimate users. To re-enable that use case, we add
support for adding exceptions from the new default behavior via the
config setting `safe.directory`.
The `safe.directory` config setting is only respected in the system and
global configs, not from repository configs or via the command-line, and
can have multiple values to allow for multiple shared repositories.
We are particularly careful to provide a helpful message to any user
trying to use a shared repository.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the current user
This function will be used in the next commit to prevent
`setup_git_directory()` from discovering a repository in a directory
that is owned by someone other than the current user.
Note: We cannot simply use `st.st_uid` on Windows just like we do on
Linux and other Unix-like platforms: according to
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/c-runtime-library/reference/stat-functions
this field is always zero on Windows (because Windows' idea of a user ID
does not fit into a single numerical value). Therefore, we have to do
something a little involved to replicate the same functionality there.
Also note: On Windows, a user's home directory is not actually owned by
said user, but by the administrator. For all practical purposes, it is
under the user's control, though, therefore we pretend that it is owned
by the user.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
mingw-w64's pthread_unistd.h had a bug that mistakenly (because there is
no support for the *lockfile() functions required[1]) defined
_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS and that was being worked around since 3ecd153a3b (compat/mingw: support MSys2-based MinGW build, 2016-01-14).
The bug was fixed in winphtreads, but as a side effect, leaves the
reentrant functions from time.h no longer visible and therefore breaks
the build.
Since the intention all along was to avoid using the fallback functions,
formalize the use of POSIX by setting the corresponding feature flag and
compile out the implementation for the fallback functions.
[1] https://unix.org/whitepapers/reentrant.html
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com> Acked-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Elijah Newren [Wed, 26 Jan 2022 01:43:45 +0000 (01:43 +0000)]
sequencer, stash: fix running from worktree subdir
In commits bc3ae46b42 ("rebase: do not attempt to remove
startup_info->original_cwd", 2021-12-09) and 0fce211ccc ("stash: do not
attempt to remove startup_info->original_cwd", 2021-12-09), we wanted to
allow the subprocess to know which directory the parent process was
running from, so that the subprocess could protect it. However...
When run from a non-main worktree, setup_git_directory() will note
that the discovered git directory
(/PATH/TO/.git/worktree/non-main-worktree) does not match
DEFAULT_GIT_DIR_ENVIRONMENT (see setup_discovered_git_dir()), and
decide to set GIT_DIR in the environment. This matters because...
Whenever git is run with the GIT_DIR environment variable set, and
GIT_WORK_TREE not set, it presumes that '.' is the working tree. So...
This combination results in the subcommand being very confused about
the working tree. Fix it by also setting the GIT_WORK_TREE environment
variable along with setting cmd.dir.
A possibly more involved fix we could consider for later would be to
make setup.c set GIT_WORK_TREE whenever (a) it discovers both the git
directory and the working tree and (b) it decides to set GIT_DIR in the
environment. I did not attempt that here as such would be too big of a
change for a 2.35.1 release.
Test-case-by: Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com> Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Junio C Hamano [Mon, 24 Jan 2022 17:14:46 +0000 (09:14 -0800)]
Merge branch 'ab/checkout-branch-info-leakfix'
We added an unrelated sanity checking that leads to a BUG() while
plugging a leak, which triggered in a repository with symrefs in
the local branch namespace that point at a ref outside. Partially
revert the change to avoid triggering the BUG().
* ab/checkout-branch-info-leakfix:
checkout: avoid BUG() when hitting a broken repository
Junio C Hamano [Sat, 22 Jan 2022 00:58:30 +0000 (16:58 -0800)]
checkout: avoid BUG() when hitting a broken repository
When 9081a421 (checkout: fix "branch info" memory leaks, 2021-11-16)
cleaned up existing memory leaks, we added an unrelated sanity check
to ensure that a local branch is truly local and not a symref to
elsewhere that dies with BUG() otherwise. This was misguided in two
ways. First of all, such a tightening did not belong to a leak-fix
patch. And the condition it detected was *not* a bug in our program
but a problem in user data, where warning() or die() would have been
more appropriate.
As the condition is not fatal (the result of computing the local
branch name in the code that is involved in the faulty check is only
used as a textual label for the commit), let's revert the code to
the original state, i.e. strip "refs/heads/" to compute the local
branch name if possible, and otherwise leave it NULL. The consumer
of the information in merge_working_tree() is prepared to see NULL
in there and act accordingly.
René Scharfe [Thu, 20 Jan 2022 12:35:54 +0000 (13:35 +0100)]
branch,checkout: fix --track documentation
Document that the accepted variants of the --track option are --track,
--track=direct, and --track=inherit. The equal sign in the latter two
cannot be replaced with whitespace; in general optional arguments need
to be attached firmly to their option.
Put "direct" consistently before "inherit", if only for the reasons
that the former is the default, explained first in the documentation,
and comes before the latter alphabetically.
Mention both modes in the short help so that readers don't have to look
them up in the full documentation. They are literal strings and thus
untranslatable. PARSE_OPT_LITERAL_ARGHELP is inferred due to the pipe
and parenthesis characters, so we don't have to provide that flag
explicitly.
Mention that -t has the same effect as --track and --track=direct.
There is no way to specify inherit mode using the short option, because
short options generally don't accept optional arguments.
Signed-off-by: René Scharfe <l.s.r@web.de> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
getcwd(mingw): handle the case when there is no cwd
A recent upstream topic introduced checks for certain Git commands that
prevent them from deleting the current working directory, introducing
also a regression test that ensures that commands such as `git version`
_can_ run without a current working directory.
While technically not possible on Windows via the regular Win32 API, we
do run the regression tests in an MSYS2 Bash which uses a POSIX
emulation layer (the MSYS2/Cygwin runtime) where a really evil hack
_does_ allow to delete a directory even if it is the current working
directory.
Therefore, Git needs to be prepared for a missing working directory,
even on Windows.
This issue was not noticed in upstream Git because there was no caller
that tried to discover a Git directory with a deleted current working
directory in the test suite. But in the microsoft/git fork, we do want
to run `pre-command`/`post-command` hooks for every command, even for
`git version`, which means that we make precisely such a call. The bug
is not in that `pre-command`/`post-command` feature, though, but in
`mingw_getcwd()` and needs to be addressed there.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Junio C Hamano [Wed, 19 Jan 2022 00:02:23 +0000 (16:02 -0800)]
Merge branch 'jc/freebsd-without-c99-only-build'
FreeBSD 13.0 headers have unconditional dependency on C11 language
features, and adding -std=gnu99 to DEVELOPER_CFLAGS would just
break the developer build.
* jc/freebsd-without-c99-only-build:
Makefile: FreeBSD cannot do C99-or-below build
Josh Steadmon [Tue, 18 Jan 2022 20:49:46 +0000 (12:49 -0800)]
branch,checkout: fix --track usage strings
As Ævar pointed out in [1], the use of PARSE_OPT_LITERAL_ARGHELP with a
list of allowed parameters is not recommended. Both git-branch and
git-checkout were changed in d311566 (branch: add flags and config to
inherit tracking, 2021-12-20) to use this discouraged combination for
their --track flags.
Fix this by removing PARSE_OPT_LITERAL_ARGHELP, and changing the arghelp
to simply be "mode". Users may discover allowed values in the manual
pages.
Junio C Hamano [Tue, 18 Jan 2022 17:47:39 +0000 (09:47 -0800)]
Makefile: FreeBSD cannot do C99-or-below build
In "make DEVELOPER=YesPlease" builds, we try to help developers to
catch as many potential issues as they can by using -Wall and
turning compilation warnings into errors. In the same spirit, we
recently started adding -std=gnu99 to their CFLAGS, so that they can
notice when they accidentally used language features beyond C99.
It however turns out that FreeBSD 13.0 mistakenly uses C11 extension
in its system header files regardless of what __STDC_VERSION__ says,
which means that the platform (unless we tweak their system headers)
cannot be used for this purpose.
It seems that -std=gnu99 is only added conditionally even in today's
config.mak.dev, so it is fine if we dropped -std=gnu99 from there.
Which means that developers on FreeBSD cannot participate in vetting
use of features beyond C99, but there are developers on other
platforms who will, so it's not too bad.
We might want a more "fundamental" fix to make the platform capable
of taking -std=gnu99, like working around the use of unconditional
C11 extension in its system header files by supplying a set of
"replacement" definitions in our header files. We chose not to
pursue such an approach for two reasons at this point:
(1) The fix belongs to the FreeBSD project, not this project, and
such an upstream fix may happen hopefully in a not-too-distant
future.
(2) Fixing such a bug in system header files and working it around
can lead to unexpected breakages (other parts of their system
header files may not be expecting to see and do not work well
with our "replacement" definitions). This close to the final
release of this cycle, we have no time for that.
Jiang Xin [Mon, 17 Jan 2022 00:50:41 +0000 (08:50 +0800)]
l10n: batch update to fix typo in branch.c
In git 2.35 l10n round 1, a space between two words was missing in the
message from "branch.c", and it was fixed by commit 68d924e1de (branch:
missing space fix at line 313, 2022-01-11).
Do a batch update for teams (bg, fr, id, sv, tr and zh_CN) that have
already completed their works on l10n round 1.
Jiang Xin [Mon, 17 Jan 2022 00:30:45 +0000 (08:30 +0800)]
Merge tag 'v2.35.0-rc1'
Git 2.35-rc1
* tag 'v2.35.0-rc1':
Git 2.35-rc1
reftable tests: avoid "int" overflow, use "uint64_t"
reftable: avoid initializing structs from structs
t1450-fsck: exec-bit is not needed to make loose object writable
refs API: use "failure_errno", not "errno"
Last minute fixes before -rc1
build: NonStop ships with an older zlib
packfile: fix off-by-one error in decoding logic
t/gpg: simplify test for unknown key
branch: missing space fix at line 313
fmt-merge-msg: prevent use-after-free with signed tags
cache.h: drop duplicate `ensure_full_index()` declaration
lazyload: use correct calling conventions
fetch: fix deadlock when cleaning up lockfiles in async signals
reftable tests: avoid "int" overflow, use "uint64_t"
Change code added in 1ae2b8cda84 (reftable: add merged table view,
2021-10-07) to consistently use the "uint64_t" type. These "min" and
"max" variables get passed in the body of this function to a function
whose prototype is:
[...] reftable_writer_set_limits([...], uint64_t min, uint64_t max
This avoids the following warning on SunCC 12.5 on
gcc211.fsffrance.org:
"reftable/merged_test.c", line 27: warning: initializer does not fit or is out of range: 0xffffffff
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Johannes Sixt [Thu, 13 Jan 2022 20:28:45 +0000 (21:28 +0100)]
t1450-fsck: exec-bit is not needed to make loose object writable
A test case wants to append stuff to a loose object file to ensure
that this kind of corruption is detected. To make a read-only loose
object file writable with chmod, it is not necessary to also make
it executable. Replace the bitmask 755 with the instruction +w to
request only the write bit and to also heed the umask. And get rid
of a POSIXPERM prerequisite, which is unnecessary for the test.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Sixt <j6t@kdbg.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Fix a logic error in refs_resolve_ref_unsafe() introduced in a recent
series of mine to abstract the refs API away from errno. See 96f6623ada0 (Merge branch 'ab/refs-errno-cleanup', 2021-11-29)for that
series.
In that series introduction of "failure_errno" to
refs_resolve_ref_unsafe came in ef18119dec8 (refs API: add a version
of refs_resolve_ref_unsafe() with "errno", 2021-10-16). There we'd set
"errno = 0" immediately before refs_read_raw_ref(), and then set
"failure_errno" to "errno" if errno was non-zero afterwards.
Then in the next commit 8b72fea7e91 (refs API: make
refs_read_raw_ref() not set errno, 2021-10-16) we started expecting
"refs_read_raw_ref()" to set "failure_errno". It would do that if
refs_read_raw_ref() failed, but it wouldn't be the same errno.
So we might set the "errno" here to any arbitrary bad value, and end
up e.g. returning NULL when we meant to return the refname from
refs_resolve_ref_unsafe(), or the other way around. Instrumenting this
code will reveal cases where refs_read_raw_ref() will fail, and
"errno" and "failure_errno" will be set to different values.
In practice I haven't found a case where this scary bug changed
anything in practice. The reason for that is that we'll not care about
the actual value of "errno" here per-se, but only whether:
1. We have an errno
2. If it's one of ENOENT, EISDIR or ENOTDIR. See the adjacent code
added in a1c1d8170db (refs_resolve_ref_unsafe: handle d/f
conflicts for writes, 2017-10-06)
I.e. if we clobber "failure_errno" with "errno", but it happened to be
one of those three, and we'll clobber it with another one of the three
we were OK.
Perhaps there are cases where the difference ended up mattering, but I
haven't found them. Instrumenting the test suite to fail if "errno"
and "failure_errno" are different shows a lot of failures, checking if
they're different *and* one is but not the other is outside that list
of three "errno" values yields no failures.
But let's fix the obvious bug. We should just stop paying attention to
"errno" in refs_resolve_ref_unsafe(). In addition let's change the
partial resetting of "errno" in files_read_raw_ref() to happen just
before the "return", to ensure that any such bug will be more easily
spotted in the future.
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Fangyi Zhou [Tue, 11 Jan 2022 16:42:06 +0000 (16:42 +0000)]
l10n: zh_CN: v2.35.0 round 1
- Translate new messages
- Translate the word 'cone' instead of leaving it verbatim
(in the context of sparse checkout)
- Make translations of 'failed to' consistent
Signed-off-by: Fangyi Zhou <me@fangyi.io> Reviewed-by: Teng Long <dyroneteng@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: 依云 <lilydjwg@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jiang Xin <worldhello.net@gmail.com>
Junio C Hamano [Wed, 12 Jan 2022 20:11:42 +0000 (12:11 -0800)]
packfile: fix off-by-one error in decoding logic
shift count being exactly at 7-bit smaller than the long is OK; on
32-bit architecture, shift count starts at 4 and goes through 11, 18
and 25, at which point the guard triggers one iteration too early.
Reported-by: Marc Strapetz <marc.strapetz@syntevo.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Fabian Stelzer [Wed, 12 Jan 2022 12:07:57 +0000 (13:07 +0100)]
t/gpg: simplify test for unknown key
To test for a key that is completely unknown to the keyring we need one
to sign the commit with. This was done by generating a new key and not
add it into the keyring. To avoid the key generation overhead and
problems where GPG did hang in CI during it, switch GNUPGHOME to the
empty $GNUPGHOME_NOT_USED instead, therefore making all used keys unknown
for this single `verify-commit` call.
Reported-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Fabian Stelzer <fs@gigacodes.de> Reviewed-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Bagas Sanjaya [Tue, 11 Jan 2022 12:36:27 +0000 (19:36 +0700)]
branch: missing space fix at line 313
The message introduced by commit 593a2a5d06 (branch: protect branches
checked out in all worktrees, 2021-12-01) is missing a space in the
first line, add it.
Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
projects / thirdparty / git.git / log
