+++ /dev/null
-From: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne.fitzenreiter@ipfire.org>
-
-patch based on acf69c946233259ab4d64f8869d4037a198c7f06
-From: Or Cohen <orcohen@paloaltonetworks.com>
-Subject: net/packet: fix overflow in tpacket_rcv
-
-Using tp_reserve to calculate netoff can overflow as
-tp_reserve is unsigned int and netoff is unsigned short.
-
-This may lead to macoff receving a smaller value then
-sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr), and if po->has_vnet_hdr
-is set, an out-of-bounds write will occur when
-calling virtio_net_hdr_from_skb.
-
-The bug is fixed by converting netoff to unsigned int
-and checking if it exceeds USHRT_MAX.
-
-This addresses CVE-2020-14386
-
-
-diff -Naur linux-4.14.197.org/net/packet/af_packet.c linux-4.14.197/net/packet/af_packet.c
---- linux-4.14.197.org/net/packet/af_packet.c 2020-09-11 22:27:31.003458577 +0200
-+++ linux-4.14.197/net/packet/af_packet.c 2020-09-11 22:38:53.104021712 +0200
-@@ -2201,7 +2201,8 @@
- int skb_len = skb->len;
- unsigned int snaplen, res;
- unsigned long status = TP_STATUS_USER;
-- unsigned short macoff, netoff, hdrlen;
-+ unsigned short macoff, hdrlen;
-+ unsigned int netoff;
- struct sk_buff *copy_skb = NULL;
- struct timespec ts;
- __u32 ts_status;
-@@ -2264,6 +2265,10 @@
- }
- macoff = netoff - maclen;
- }
-+ if (netoff > USHRT_MAX) {
-+ po->stats.stats1.tp_drops++;
-+ goto drop_n_restore;
-+ }
- if (po->tp_version <= TPACKET_V2) {
- if (macoff + snaplen > po->rx_ring.frame_size) {
- if (po->copy_thresh &&