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31b28ad9 DDO |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 2007-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
3 | * Copyright Nokia 2007-2020 | |
4 | * Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2020 | |
5 | * | |
6 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use | |
7 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
8 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
9 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
10 | */ | |
11 | ||
12 | /* CMP functions for PKIMessage checking */ | |
13 | ||
14 | #include "cmp_local.h" | |
15 | #include <openssl/cmp_util.h> | |
16 | ||
17 | /* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */ | |
18 | #include <openssl/asn1t.h> | |
19 | #include <openssl/cmp.h> | |
20 | #include <openssl/crmf.h> | |
21 | #include <openssl/err.h> | |
22 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
23 | #include "crypto/x509.h" | |
24 | ||
23000838 | 25 | /* Verify a message protected by signature according to RFC section 5.1.3.3 */ |
31b28ad9 DDO |
26 | static int verify_signature(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *cmp_ctx, |
27 | const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, X509 *cert) | |
28 | { | |
642f60d8 | 29 | OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part; |
31b28ad9 | 30 | EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL; |
31b28ad9 DDO |
31 | BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); /* may be NULL */ |
32 | int res = 0; | |
33 | ||
34 | if (!ossl_assert(cmp_ctx != NULL && msg != NULL && cert != NULL)) | |
35 | return 0; | |
36 | ||
37 | /* verify that keyUsage, if present, contains digitalSignature */ | |
38 | if (!cmp_ctx->ignore_keyusage | |
39 | && (X509_get_key_usage(cert) & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) == 0) { | |
40 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_USAGE_DIGITALSIGNATURE); | |
41 | goto sig_err; | |
42 | } | |
43 | ||
44 | pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert); | |
45 | if (pubkey == NULL) { | |
46 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_FAILED_EXTRACTING_PUBKEY); | |
47 | goto sig_err; | |
48 | } | |
49 | ||
31b28ad9 DDO |
50 | prot_part.header = msg->header; |
51 | prot_part.body = msg->body; | |
52 | ||
d8652be0 MC |
53 | if (ASN1_item_verify_ex(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART), |
54 | msg->header->protectionAlg, msg->protection, | |
55 | &prot_part, NULL, pubkey, cmp_ctx->libctx, | |
56 | cmp_ctx->propq) > 0) { | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
57 | res = 1; |
58 | goto end; | |
59 | } | |
60 | ||
61 | sig_err: | |
62 | res = x509_print_ex_brief(bio, cert, X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS); | |
032b13c7 | 63 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_SIGNATURE); |
31b28ad9 DDO |
64 | if (res) |
65 | ERR_add_error_mem_bio("\n", bio); | |
66 | res = 0; | |
67 | ||
68 | end: | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
69 | EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey); |
70 | BIO_free(bio); | |
71 | ||
72 | return res; | |
73 | } | |
74 | ||
75 | /* Verify a message protected with PBMAC */ | |
6d1f50b5 | 76 | static int verify_PBMAC(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) |
31b28ad9 DDO |
77 | { |
78 | ASN1_BIT_STRING *protection = NULL; | |
79 | int valid = 0; | |
80 | ||
81 | /* generate expected protection for the message */ | |
6d1f50b5 | 82 | if ((protection = ossl_cmp_calc_protection(ctx, msg)) == NULL) |
31b28ad9 DDO |
83 | return 0; /* failed to generate protection string! */ |
84 | ||
85 | valid = msg->protection != NULL && msg->protection->length >= 0 | |
86 | && msg->protection->type == protection->type | |
87 | && msg->protection->length == protection->length | |
88 | && CRYPTO_memcmp(msg->protection->data, protection->data, | |
89 | protection->length) == 0; | |
90 | ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(protection); | |
91 | if (!valid) | |
92 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_PBM_VALUE); | |
93 | ||
94 | return valid; | |
95 | } | |
96 | ||
c4a9e3eb | 97 | /*- |
31b28ad9 DDO |
98 | * Attempt to validate certificate and path using any given store with trusted |
99 | * certs (possibly including CRLs and a cert verification callback function) | |
100 | * and non-trusted intermediate certs from the given ctx. | |
101 | * | |
102 | * Returns 1 on successful validation and 0 otherwise. | |
103 | */ | |
c4a9e3eb DDO |
104 | int OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, |
105 | X509_STORE *trusted_store, X509 *cert) | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
106 | { |
107 | int valid = 0; | |
108 | X509_STORE_CTX *csc = NULL; | |
109 | int err; | |
110 | ||
111 | if (ctx == NULL || cert == NULL) { | |
112 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT); | |
113 | return 0; | |
114 | } | |
115 | ||
116 | if (trusted_store == NULL) { | |
117 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_TRUST_STORE); | |
118 | return 0; | |
119 | } | |
120 | ||
d8652be0 | 121 | if ((csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(ctx->libctx, ctx->propq)) == NULL |
31b28ad9 | 122 | || !X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, trusted_store, |
0b86eefd | 123 | cert, ctx->untrusted)) |
31b28ad9 DDO |
124 | goto err; |
125 | ||
126 | valid = X509_verify_cert(csc) > 0; | |
127 | ||
128 | /* make sure suitable error is queued even if callback did not do */ | |
129 | err = ERR_peek_last_error(); | |
130 | if (!valid && ERR_GET_REASON(err) != CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE) | |
131 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE); | |
132 | ||
133 | err: | |
a1e4c8ef DDO |
134 | /* directly output any fresh errors, needed for check_msg_find_cert() */ |
135 | OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx); | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
136 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc); |
137 | return valid; | |
138 | } | |
139 | ||
140 | /* Return 0 if expect_name != NULL and there is no matching actual_name */ | |
c4a9e3eb | 141 | static int check_name(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int log_success, |
31b28ad9 DDO |
142 | const char *actual_desc, const X509_NAME *actual_name, |
143 | const char *expect_desc, const X509_NAME *expect_name) | |
144 | { | |
145 | char *str; | |
146 | ||
147 | if (expect_name == NULL) | |
148 | return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */ | |
149 | ||
150 | /* make sure that a matching name is there */ | |
151 | if (actual_name == NULL) { | |
152 | ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "missing %s", actual_desc); | |
153 | return 0; | |
154 | } | |
ca6f1ba9 DDO |
155 | str = X509_NAME_oneline(actual_name, NULL, 0); |
156 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(actual_name, expect_name) == 0) { | |
157 | if (log_success && str != NULL) | |
158 | ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " subject matches %s: %s", expect_desc, | |
159 | str); | |
160 | OPENSSL_free(str); | |
31b28ad9 | 161 | return 1; |
ca6f1ba9 | 162 | } |
31b28ad9 | 163 | |
ca6f1ba9 | 164 | if (str != NULL) |
31b28ad9 DDO |
165 | ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " actual name in %s = %s", actual_desc, str); |
166 | OPENSSL_free(str); | |
167 | if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(expect_name, NULL, 0)) != NULL) | |
168 | ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " does not match %s = %s", expect_desc, str); | |
169 | OPENSSL_free(str); | |
170 | return 0; | |
171 | } | |
172 | ||
173 | /* Return 0 if skid != NULL and there is no matching subject key ID in cert */ | |
c4a9e3eb DDO |
174 | static int check_kid(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, |
175 | const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ckid, | |
176 | const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid) | |
31b28ad9 | 177 | { |
ca6f1ba9 | 178 | char *str; |
31b28ad9 DDO |
179 | |
180 | if (skid == NULL) | |
181 | return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */ | |
182 | ||
183 | /* make sure that the expected subject key identifier is there */ | |
184 | if (ckid == NULL) { | |
185 | ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "missing Subject Key Identifier in certificate"); | |
186 | return 0; | |
187 | } | |
ca6f1ba9 DDO |
188 | str = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(ckid->data, ckid->length); |
189 | if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ckid, skid) == 0) { | |
190 | if (str != NULL) | |
191 | ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subjectKID matches senderKID: %s", str); | |
192 | OPENSSL_free(str); | |
31b28ad9 | 193 | return 1; |
ca6f1ba9 | 194 | } |
31b28ad9 | 195 | |
ca6f1ba9 DDO |
196 | if (str != NULL) |
197 | ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " cert Subject Key Identifier = %s", str); | |
198 | OPENSSL_free(str); | |
199 | if ((str = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid->data, skid->length)) != NULL) | |
200 | ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " does not match senderKID = %s", str); | |
201 | OPENSSL_free(str); | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
202 | return 0; |
203 | } | |
204 | ||
c4a9e3eb DDO |
205 | static int already_checked(const X509 *cert, |
206 | const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked) | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
207 | { |
208 | int i; | |
209 | ||
210 | for (i = sk_X509_num(already_checked /* may be NULL */); i > 0; i--) | |
211 | if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(already_checked, i - 1), cert) == 0) | |
212 | return 1; | |
213 | return 0; | |
214 | } | |
215 | ||
c4a9e3eb | 216 | /*- |
31b28ad9 DDO |
217 | * Check if the given cert is acceptable as sender cert of the given message. |
218 | * The subject DN must match, the subject key ID as well if present in the msg, | |
219 | * and the cert must be current (checked if ctx->trusted is not NULL). | |
220 | * Note that cert revocation etc. is checked by OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(). | |
221 | * | |
222 | * Returns 0 on error or not acceptable, else 1. | |
223 | */ | |
c4a9e3eb | 224 | static int cert_acceptable(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, |
31b28ad9 DDO |
225 | const char *desc1, const char *desc2, X509 *cert, |
226 | const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1, | |
227 | const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2, | |
228 | const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) | |
229 | { | |
230 | X509_STORE *ts = ctx->trusted; | |
a1e4c8ef DDO |
231 | int self_issued = X509_check_issued(cert, cert) == X509_V_OK; |
232 | char *str; | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
233 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ts != NULL ? X509_STORE_get0_param(ts) : NULL; |
234 | int time_cmp; | |
235 | ||
a1e4c8ef DDO |
236 | ossl_cmp_log3(INFO, ctx, " considering %s%s %s with..", |
237 | self_issued ? "self-issued ": "", desc1, desc2); | |
238 | if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0)) != NULL) | |
239 | ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subject = %s", str); | |
240 | OPENSSL_free(str); | |
241 | if (!self_issued) { | |
242 | str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), NULL, 0); | |
243 | if (str != NULL) | |
244 | ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " issuer = %s", str); | |
245 | OPENSSL_free(str); | |
246 | } | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
247 | |
248 | if (already_checked(cert, already_checked1) | |
249 | || already_checked(cert, already_checked2)) { | |
250 | ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert has already been checked"); | |
251 | return 0; | |
252 | } | |
253 | ||
254 | time_cmp = X509_cmp_timeframe(vpm, X509_get0_notBefore(cert), | |
255 | X509_get0_notAfter(cert)); | |
256 | if (time_cmp != 0) { | |
257 | ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, time_cmp > 0 ? "cert has expired" | |
258 | : "cert is not yet valid"); | |
259 | return 0; | |
260 | } | |
261 | ||
ca6f1ba9 | 262 | if (!check_name(ctx, 1, |
31b28ad9 DDO |
263 | "cert subject", X509_get_subject_name(cert), |
264 | "sender field", msg->header->sender->d.directoryName)) | |
265 | return 0; | |
266 | ||
c4a9e3eb | 267 | if (!check_kid(ctx, X509_get0_subject_key_id(cert), msg->header->senderKID)) |
31b28ad9 | 268 | return 0; |
23000838 DDO |
269 | /* prevent misleading error later in case x509v3_cache_extensions() fails */ |
270 | if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(cert)) { | |
271 | ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "cert appears to be invalid"); | |
272 | return 0; | |
273 | } | |
7b1a3a50 DDO |
274 | if (!verify_signature(ctx, msg, cert)) { |
275 | ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "msg signature verification failed"); | |
276 | return 0; | |
277 | } | |
31b28ad9 | 278 | /* acceptable also if there is no senderKID in msg header */ |
a1e4c8ef | 279 | ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert seems acceptable"); |
31b28ad9 DDO |
280 | return 1; |
281 | } | |
282 | ||
7b1a3a50 DDO |
283 | static int check_cert_path(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, |
284 | X509 *scrt) | |
31b28ad9 | 285 | { |
a1e4c8ef DDO |
286 | if (OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt)) |
287 | return 1; | |
288 | ||
289 | ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, | |
290 | "msg signature validates but cert path validation failed"); | |
291 | return 0; | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
292 | } |
293 | ||
294 | /* | |
295 | * Exceptional handling for 3GPP TS 33.310 [3G/LTE Network Domain Security | |
a1e4c8ef DDO |
296 | * (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)], only to use for IP messages |
297 | * and if the ctx option is explicitly set: use self-issued certificates | |
7b1a3a50 | 298 | * from extraCerts as trust anchor to validate sender cert - |
31b28ad9 DDO |
299 | * provided it also can validate the newly enrolled certificate |
300 | */ | |
7b1a3a50 DDO |
301 | static int check_cert_path_3gpp(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, |
302 | const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, X509 *scrt) | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
303 | { |
304 | int valid = 0; | |
a1e4c8ef DDO |
305 | X509_STORE *store; |
306 | ||
307 | if (!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR) | |
308 | return 0; | |
31b28ad9 | 309 | |
a1e4c8ef DDO |
310 | if ((store = X509_STORE_new()) == NULL |
311 | || !ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(store, msg->extraCerts, | |
312 | 1 /* self-issued only */)) | |
313 | goto err; | |
314 | ||
315 | /* store does not include CRLs */ | |
316 | valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt); | |
317 | if (!valid) { | |
318 | ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, | |
319 | "also exceptional 3GPP mode cert path validation failed"); | |
320 | } else { | |
31b28ad9 | 321 | /* |
a1e4c8ef DDO |
322 | * verify that the newly enrolled certificate (which assumed rid == |
323 | * OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID) can also be validated with the same trusted store | |
31b28ad9 | 324 | */ |
6d1f50b5 | 325 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_newPkey(ctx, 1); |
31b28ad9 | 326 | OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep = |
a1e4c8ef DDO |
327 | ossl_cmp_certrepmessage_get0_certresponse(msg->body->value.ip, |
328 | OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID); | |
6d1f50b5 | 329 | X509 *newcrt = ossl_cmp_certresponse_get1_cert(crep, ctx, pkey); |
31b28ad9 DDO |
330 | /* |
331 | * maybe better use get_cert_status() from cmp_client.c, which catches | |
332 | * errors | |
333 | */ | |
334 | valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, newcrt); | |
335 | X509_free(newcrt); | |
336 | } | |
a1e4c8ef DDO |
337 | |
338 | err: | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
339 | X509_STORE_free(store); |
340 | return valid; | |
341 | } | |
342 | ||
c4a9e3eb | 343 | static int check_msg_given_cert(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, |
ca6f1ba9 DDO |
344 | const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) |
345 | { | |
346 | return cert_acceptable(ctx, "previously validated", "sender cert", | |
347 | cert, NULL, NULL, msg) | |
7b1a3a50 DDO |
348 | && (check_cert_path(ctx, ctx->trusted, cert) |
349 | || check_cert_path_3gpp(ctx, msg, cert)); | |
ca6f1ba9 DDO |
350 | } |
351 | ||
c4a9e3eb | 352 | /*- |
31b28ad9 DDO |
353 | * Try all certs in given list for verifying msg, normally or in 3GPP mode. |
354 | * If already_checked1 == NULL then certs are assumed to be the msg->extraCerts. | |
c4a9e3eb | 355 | * On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(). |
31b28ad9 | 356 | */ |
c4a9e3eb | 357 | static int check_msg_with_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const STACK_OF(X509) *certs, |
31b28ad9 DDO |
358 | const char *desc, |
359 | const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1, | |
360 | const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2, | |
361 | const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int mode_3gpp) | |
362 | { | |
363 | int in_extraCerts = already_checked1 == NULL; | |
364 | int n_acceptable_certs = 0; | |
365 | int i; | |
366 | ||
367 | if (sk_X509_num(certs) <= 0) { | |
368 | ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "no %s", desc); | |
369 | return 0; | |
370 | } | |
371 | ||
372 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { /* certs may be NULL */ | |
373 | X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i); | |
374 | ||
375 | if (!ossl_assert(cert != NULL)) | |
376 | return 0; | |
377 | if (!cert_acceptable(ctx, "cert from", desc, cert, | |
378 | already_checked1, already_checked2, msg)) | |
379 | continue; | |
380 | n_acceptable_certs++; | |
7b1a3a50 DDO |
381 | if (mode_3gpp ? check_cert_path_3gpp(ctx, msg, cert) |
382 | : check_cert_path(ctx, ctx->trusted, cert)) { | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
383 | /* store successful sender cert for further msgs in transaction */ |
384 | if (!X509_up_ref(cert)) | |
385 | return 0; | |
386 | if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, cert)) { | |
387 | X509_free(cert); | |
388 | return 0; | |
389 | } | |
390 | return 1; | |
391 | } | |
392 | } | |
393 | if (in_extraCerts && n_acceptable_certs == 0) | |
394 | ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "no acceptable cert in extraCerts"); | |
395 | return 0; | |
396 | } | |
397 | ||
c4a9e3eb | 398 | /*- |
0b86eefd | 399 | * Verify msg trying first ctx->untrusted, which should include extraCerts |
31b28ad9 | 400 | * at its front, then trying the trusted certs in truststore (if any) of ctx. |
c4a9e3eb | 401 | * On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(). |
31b28ad9 DDO |
402 | */ |
403 | static int check_msg_all_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, | |
404 | int mode_3gpp) | |
405 | { | |
406 | int ret = 0; | |
407 | ||
a1e4c8ef DDO |
408 | if (mode_3gpp |
409 | && ((!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR | |
410 | || ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg) != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP))) | |
411 | return 0; | |
412 | ||
31b28ad9 | 413 | ossl_cmp_info(ctx, |
a1e4c8ef | 414 | mode_3gpp ? "normal mode failed; trying now 3GPP mode trusting extraCerts" |
31b28ad9 DDO |
415 | : "trying first normal mode using trust store"); |
416 | if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, msg->extraCerts, "extraCerts", | |
417 | NULL, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp)) | |
418 | return 1; | |
0b86eefd | 419 | if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, ctx->untrusted, "untrusted certs", |
31b28ad9 DDO |
420 | msg->extraCerts, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp)) |
421 | return 1; | |
422 | ||
423 | if (ctx->trusted == NULL) { | |
424 | ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, mode_3gpp ? "no self-issued extraCerts" | |
425 | : "no trusted store"); | |
426 | } else { | |
427 | STACK_OF(X509) *trusted = X509_STORE_get1_all_certs(ctx->trusted); | |
428 | ret = check_msg_with_certs(ctx, trusted, | |
429 | mode_3gpp ? "self-issued extraCerts" | |
430 | : "certs in trusted store", | |
0b86eefd | 431 | msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted, |
31b28ad9 DDO |
432 | msg, mode_3gpp); |
433 | sk_X509_pop_free(trusted, X509_free); | |
434 | } | |
435 | return ret; | |
436 | } | |
437 | ||
a1e4c8ef DDO |
438 | static int no_log_cb(const char *func, const char *file, int line, |
439 | OSSL_CMP_severity level, const char *msg) | |
440 | { | |
441 | return 1; | |
442 | } | |
443 | ||
c4a9e3eb DDO |
444 | /*- |
445 | * Verify message signature with any acceptable and valid candidate cert. | |
446 | * On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(). | |
447 | */ | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
448 | static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) |
449 | { | |
450 | X509 *scrt = ctx->validatedSrvCert; /* previous successful sender cert */ | |
451 | GENERAL_NAME *sender = msg->header->sender; | |
452 | char *sname = NULL; | |
453 | char *skid_str = NULL; | |
454 | const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid = msg->header->senderKID; | |
7e765f46 | 455 | OSSL_CMP_log_cb_t backup_log_cb = ctx->log_cb; |
31b28ad9 DDO |
456 | int res = 0; |
457 | ||
458 | if (sender == NULL || msg->body == NULL) | |
459 | return 0; /* other NULL cases already have been checked */ | |
460 | if (sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) { | |
461 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED); | |
462 | return 0; | |
463 | } | |
464 | ||
a1e4c8ef DDO |
465 | /* dump any hitherto errors to avoid confusion when printing further ones */ |
466 | OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx); | |
467 | ||
ca6f1ba9 DDO |
468 | /* enable clearing irrelevant errors in attempts to validate sender certs */ |
469 | (void)ERR_set_mark(); | |
470 | ctx->log_cb = no_log_cb; /* temporarily disable logging */ | |
471 | ||
31b28ad9 DDO |
472 | /* |
473 | * try first cached scrt, used successfully earlier in same transaction, | |
474 | * for validating this and any further msgs where extraCerts may be left out | |
475 | */ | |
a1e4c8ef | 476 | if (scrt != NULL) { |
ca6f1ba9 DDO |
477 | if (check_msg_given_cert(ctx, scrt, msg)) { |
478 | ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb; | |
a1e4c8ef DDO |
479 | (void)ERR_pop_to_mark(); |
480 | return 1; | |
481 | } | |
a1e4c8ef DDO |
482 | /* cached sender cert has shown to be no more successfully usable */ |
483 | (void)ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, NULL); | |
ca6f1ba9 DDO |
484 | /* re-do the above check (just) for adding diagnostic information */ |
485 | ossl_cmp_info(ctx, | |
486 | "trying to verify msg signature with previously validated cert"); | |
487 | (void)check_msg_given_cert(ctx, scrt, msg); | |
31b28ad9 | 488 | } |
31b28ad9 | 489 | |
a1e4c8ef DDO |
490 | res = check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */) |
491 | || check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */); | |
492 | ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb; | |
493 | if (res) { | |
494 | /* discard any diagnostic information on trying to use certs */ | |
31b28ad9 | 495 | (void)ERR_pop_to_mark(); |
31b28ad9 DDO |
496 | goto end; |
497 | } | |
498 | /* failed finding a sender cert that verifies the message signature */ | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
499 | (void)ERR_clear_last_mark(); |
500 | ||
501 | sname = X509_NAME_oneline(sender->d.directoryName, NULL, 0); | |
502 | skid_str = skid == NULL ? NULL | |
503 | : OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid->data, skid->length); | |
504 | if (ctx->log_cb != NULL) { | |
a1e4c8ef | 505 | ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "trying to verify msg signature with a valid cert that.."); |
31b28ad9 | 506 | if (sname != NULL) |
a1e4c8ef | 507 | ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg sender = %s", sname); |
31b28ad9 | 508 | if (skid_str != NULL) |
a1e4c8ef | 509 | ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg senderKID = %s", skid_str); |
31b28ad9 DDO |
510 | else |
511 | ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "while msg header does not contain senderKID"); | |
512 | /* re-do the above checks (just) for adding diagnostic information */ | |
ca6f1ba9 DDO |
513 | (void)check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */); |
514 | (void)check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */); | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
515 | } |
516 | ||
517 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NO_SUITABLE_SENDER_CERT); | |
518 | if (sname != NULL) { | |
519 | ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, "for msg sender name = "); | |
520 | ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, sname); | |
521 | } | |
522 | if (skid_str != NULL) { | |
523 | ERR_add_error_txt(" and ", "for msg senderKID = "); | |
524 | ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, skid_str); | |
525 | } | |
526 | ||
527 | end: | |
528 | OPENSSL_free(sname); | |
529 | OPENSSL_free(skid_str); | |
530 | return res; | |
531 | } | |
532 | ||
c4a9e3eb | 533 | /*- |
31b28ad9 DDO |
534 | * Validate the protection of the given PKIMessage using either password- |
535 | * based mac (PBM) or a signature algorithm. In the case of signature algorithm, | |
536 | * the sender certificate can have been pinned by providing it in ctx->srvCert, | |
0b86eefd | 537 | * else it is searched in msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted, in ctx->trusted |
31b28ad9 | 538 | * (in this order) and is path is validated against ctx->trusted. |
c4a9e3eb | 539 | * On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(). |
31b28ad9 DDO |
540 | * |
541 | * If ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR is true and when validating a CMP IP msg, | |
542 | * the trust anchor for validating the IP msg may be taken from msg->extraCerts | |
543 | * if a self-issued certificate is found there that can be used to | |
544 | * validate the enrolled certificate returned in the IP. | |
545 | * This is according to the need given in 3GPP TS 33.310. | |
546 | * | |
547 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on error or validation failed. | |
548 | */ | |
549 | int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) | |
550 | { | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
551 | X509 *scrt; |
552 | ||
1a5ae1da | 553 | ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, "validating CMP message"); |
31b28ad9 DDO |
554 | if (ctx == NULL || msg == NULL |
555 | || msg->header == NULL || msg->body == NULL) { | |
556 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT); | |
557 | return 0; | |
558 | } | |
559 | ||
12bbcee2 | 560 | if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL /* unprotected message */ |
31b28ad9 DDO |
561 | || msg->protection == NULL || msg->protection->data == NULL) { |
562 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION); | |
563 | return 0; | |
564 | } | |
565 | ||
12bbcee2 | 566 | switch (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(msg->header)) { |
31b28ad9 DDO |
567 | /* 5.1.3.1. Shared Secret Information */ |
568 | case NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC: | |
b434b2c0 DDO |
569 | if (ctx->secretValue == NULL) { |
570 | ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "no secret available for verifying PBM-based CMP message protection"); | |
571 | return 1; | |
572 | } | |
6d1f50b5 DDO |
573 | if (verify_PBMAC(ctx, msg)) { |
574 | /* | |
575 | * RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is | |
576 | * "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in | |
577 | * the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA | |
578 | * certificate by the initiator.' | |
579 | */ | |
580 | switch (ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg)) { | |
581 | case -1: | |
582 | return 0; | |
583 | case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP: | |
584 | case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP: | |
585 | case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP: | |
586 | case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP: | |
587 | if (ctx->trusted != NULL) { | |
588 | STACK_OF(X509) *certs = msg->body->value.ip->caPubs; | |
589 | /* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */ | |
590 | ||
591 | if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx->trusted, certs, 0)) | |
592 | /* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */ | |
593 | return 0; | |
594 | } | |
595 | break; | |
596 | default: | |
597 | break; | |
598 | } | |
1a5ae1da DDO |
599 | ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, |
600 | "sucessfully validated PBM-based CMP message protection"); | |
31b28ad9 | 601 | return 1; |
6d1f50b5 | 602 | } |
1a5ae1da | 603 | ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "verifying PBM-based CMP message protection failed"); |
31b28ad9 DDO |
604 | break; |
605 | ||
606 | /* | |
607 | * 5.1.3.2 DH Key Pairs | |
608 | * Not yet supported | |
609 | */ | |
610 | case NID_id_DHBasedMac: | |
611 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTECTION_ALG_DHBASEDMAC); | |
612 | break; | |
613 | ||
614 | /* | |
615 | * 5.1.3.3. Signature | |
616 | */ | |
617 | default: | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
618 | scrt = ctx->srvCert; |
619 | if (scrt == NULL) { | |
b434b2c0 DDO |
620 | if (ctx->trusted == NULL) { |
621 | ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "no trust store nor pinned server cert available for verifying signature-based CMP message protection"); | |
622 | return 1; | |
623 | } | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
624 | if (check_msg_find_cert(ctx, msg)) |
625 | return 1; | |
626 | } else { /* use pinned sender cert */ | |
627 | /* use ctx->srvCert for signature check even if not acceptable */ | |
1a5ae1da DDO |
628 | if (verify_signature(ctx, msg, scrt)) { |
629 | ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, | |
630 | "sucessfully validated signature-based CMP message protection"); | |
631 | ||
31b28ad9 | 632 | return 1; |
1a5ae1da DDO |
633 | } |
634 | ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "CMP message signature verification failed"); | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
635 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SRVCERT_DOES_NOT_VALIDATE_MSG); |
636 | } | |
637 | break; | |
638 | } | |
639 | return 0; | |
640 | } | |
641 | ||
642 | ||
643 | /*- | |
644 | * Check received message (i.e., response by server or request from client) | |
0b86eefd | 645 | * Any msg->extraCerts are prepended to ctx->untrusted. |
31b28ad9 DDO |
646 | * |
647 | * Ensures that: | |
c4a9e3eb DDO |
648 | * its sender is of appropriate type (curently only X509_NAME) and |
649 | * matches any expected sender or srvCert subject given in the ctx | |
31b28ad9 | 650 | * it has a valid body type |
7e765f46 DDO |
651 | * its protection is valid (or invalid/absent, but only if a callback function |
652 | * is present and yields a positive result using also the supplied argument) | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
653 | * its transaction ID matches the previous transaction ID stored in ctx (if any) |
654 | * its recipNonce matches the previous senderNonce stored in the ctx (if any) | |
655 | * | |
656 | * If everything is fine: | |
657 | * learns the senderNonce from the received message, | |
c4a9e3eb DDO |
658 | * learns the transaction ID if it is not yet in ctx, |
659 | * and makes any certs in caPubs directly trusted. | |
31b28ad9 | 660 | * |
c4a9e3eb | 661 | * Returns 1 on success, 0 on error. |
31b28ad9 | 662 | */ |
430efff1 DDO |
663 | int ossl_cmp_msg_check_update(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, |
664 | ossl_cmp_allow_unprotected_cb_t cb, int cb_arg) | |
31b28ad9 | 665 | { |
c4a9e3eb DDO |
666 | OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr; |
667 | const X509_NAME *expected_sender; | |
668 | ||
669 | if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL && msg->header != NULL)) | |
670 | return 0; | |
671 | hdr = OSSL_CMP_MSG_get0_header(msg); | |
672 | ||
673 | /* validate sender name of received msg */ | |
674 | if (hdr->sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) { | |
675 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED); | |
676 | return 0; /* TODO FR#42: support for more than X509_NAME */ | |
677 | } | |
678 | /* | |
679 | * Compare actual sender name of response with expected sender name. | |
680 | * Mitigates risk to accept misused PBM secret | |
681 | * or misused certificate of an unauthorized entity of a trusted hierarchy. | |
682 | */ | |
683 | expected_sender = ctx->expected_sender; | |
684 | if (expected_sender == NULL && ctx->srvCert != NULL) | |
685 | expected_sender = X509_get_subject_name(ctx->srvCert); | |
686 | if (!check_name(ctx, 0, "sender DN field", hdr->sender->d.directoryName, | |
687 | "expected sender", expected_sender)) | |
430efff1 | 688 | return 0; |
c4a9e3eb | 689 | /* Note: if recipient was NULL-DN it could be learned here if needed */ |
31b28ad9 DDO |
690 | |
691 | if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) > 10) | |
692 | ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, | |
693 | "received CMP message contains more than 10 extraCerts"); | |
430efff1 DDO |
694 | /* |
695 | * Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for use in OSSL_CMP_validate_msg() | |
696 | * and for future use, such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and | |
697 | * the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction. | |
698 | * Note that it does not help validating the message before storing the | |
699 | * extraCerts because they do not belong to the protected msg part anyway. | |
700 | * For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first. | |
701 | */ | |
0b86eefd | 702 | if (!X509_add_certs(ctx->untrusted, msg->extraCerts, |
eeccc237 DDO |
703 | /* this allows self-signed certs */ |
704 | X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP | |
705 | | X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND)) | |
430efff1 | 706 | return 0; |
31b28ad9 DDO |
707 | |
708 | /* validate message protection */ | |
c4a9e3eb | 709 | if (hdr->protectionAlg != NULL) { |
31b28ad9 DDO |
710 | /* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for invalid protection */ |
711 | if (!OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(ctx, msg) | |
7e765f46 | 712 | && (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 1, cb_arg) <= 0)) { |
e599d0ae | 713 | #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION |
31b28ad9 | 714 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION); |
430efff1 | 715 | return 0; |
e599d0ae | 716 | #endif |
31b28ad9 DDO |
717 | } |
718 | } else { | |
719 | /* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for missing protection */ | |
7e765f46 | 720 | if (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 0, cb_arg) <= 0) { |
e599d0ae | 721 | #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION |
31b28ad9 | 722 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION); |
430efff1 | 723 | return 0; |
e599d0ae | 724 | #endif |
31b28ad9 DDO |
725 | } |
726 | } | |
727 | ||
31b28ad9 | 728 | /* check CMP version number in header */ |
c4a9e3eb | 729 | if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(hdr) != OSSL_CMP_PVNO) { |
e599d0ae | 730 | #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION |
31b28ad9 | 731 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PVNO); |
430efff1 | 732 | return 0; |
e599d0ae | 733 | #endif |
31b28ad9 DDO |
734 | } |
735 | ||
430efff1 | 736 | if (ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg) < 0) { |
e599d0ae | 737 | #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION |
7e765f46 | 738 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR); |
430efff1 | 739 | return 0; |
e599d0ae | 740 | #endif |
7e765f46 DDO |
741 | } |
742 | ||
31b28ad9 DDO |
743 | /* compare received transactionID with the expected one in previous msg */ |
744 | if (ctx->transactionID != NULL | |
c4a9e3eb | 745 | && (hdr->transactionID == NULL |
31b28ad9 | 746 | || ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ctx->transactionID, |
c4a9e3eb | 747 | hdr->transactionID) != 0)) { |
e599d0ae | 748 | #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION |
31b28ad9 | 749 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_TRANSACTIONID_UNMATCHED); |
430efff1 | 750 | return 0; |
e599d0ae | 751 | #endif |
31b28ad9 DDO |
752 | } |
753 | ||
754 | /* compare received nonce with the one we sent */ | |
755 | if (ctx->senderNonce != NULL | |
756 | && (msg->header->recipNonce == NULL | |
757 | || ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ctx->senderNonce, | |
c4a9e3eb | 758 | hdr->recipNonce) != 0)) { |
e599d0ae | 759 | #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION |
31b28ad9 | 760 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_RECIPNONCE_UNMATCHED); |
430efff1 | 761 | return 0; |
e599d0ae | 762 | #endif |
31b28ad9 DDO |
763 | } |
764 | ||
765 | /* | |
766 | * RFC 4210 section 5.1.1 states: the recipNonce is copied from | |
767 | * the senderNonce of the previous message in the transaction. | |
768 | * --> Store for setting in next message | |
769 | */ | |
c4a9e3eb | 770 | if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_recipNonce(ctx, hdr->senderNonce)) |
430efff1 | 771 | return 0; |
31b28ad9 DDO |
772 | |
773 | /* if not yet present, learn transactionID */ | |
774 | if (ctx->transactionID == NULL | |
c4a9e3eb | 775 | && !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_transactionID(ctx, hdr->transactionID)) |
eeccc237 DDO |
776 | return -1; |
777 | ||
778 | /* | |
779 | * Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for future use, | |
780 | * such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and | |
781 | * the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction. | |
782 | * For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first. | |
783 | */ | |
0b86eefd | 784 | if (!X509_add_certs(ctx->untrusted, msg->extraCerts, |
eeccc237 DDO |
785 | /* this allows self-signed certs */ |
786 | X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP | |
787 | | X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND)) | |
788 | return -1; | |
7e765f46 | 789 | |
c4a9e3eb DDO |
790 | if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(hdr) == NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC) { |
791 | /* | |
792 | * RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is | |
793 | * "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in | |
794 | * the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA | |
795 | * certificate by the initiator.' | |
796 | */ | |
797 | switch (ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg)) { | |
798 | case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP: | |
799 | case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP: | |
800 | case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP: | |
801 | case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP: | |
802 | if (ctx->trusted != NULL) { | |
803 | STACK_OF(X509) *certs = msg->body->value.ip->caPubs; | |
804 | /* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */ | |
805 | ||
806 | if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx->trusted, certs, 0)) | |
807 | /* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */ | |
808 | return 0; | |
7b1a3a50 | 809 | } |
c4a9e3eb DDO |
810 | break; |
811 | default: | |
812 | break; | |
813 | } | |
814 | } | |
430efff1 | 815 | return 1; |
31b28ad9 DDO |
816 | } |
817 | ||
6d1f50b5 DDO |
818 | int ossl_cmp_verify_popo(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, |
819 | const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int acceptRAVerified) | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
820 | { |
821 | if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL && msg->body != NULL)) | |
822 | return 0; | |
823 | switch (msg->body->type) { | |
824 | case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR: | |
825 | { | |
826 | X509_REQ *req = msg->body->value.p10cr; | |
827 | ||
d8652be0 MC |
828 | if (X509_REQ_verify_ex(req, X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req), ctx->libctx, |
829 | ctx->propq) <= 0) { | |
e599d0ae DDO |
830 | #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION |
831 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_REQUEST_NOT_ACCEPTED); | |
832 | return 0; | |
833 | #endif | |
834 | } | |
31b28ad9 | 835 | } |
e599d0ae | 836 | break; |
31b28ad9 DDO |
837 | case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IR: |
838 | case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CR: | |
839 | case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR: | |
e599d0ae | 840 | if (!OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_verify_popo(msg->body->value.ir, OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID, |
6d1f50b5 DDO |
841 | acceptRAVerified, |
842 | ctx->libctx, ctx->propq)) { | |
e599d0ae DDO |
843 | #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION |
844 | return 0; | |
845 | #endif | |
846 | } | |
847 | break; | |
31b28ad9 DDO |
848 | default: |
849 | CMPerr(0, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR); | |
850 | return 0; | |
851 | } | |
e599d0ae | 852 | return 1; |
31b28ad9 | 853 | } |