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0abae163 | 1 | /* |
a28d06f3 | 2 | * Copyright 2020-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
0abae163 RL |
3 | * |
4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use | |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8 | */ | |
9 | ||
d7e498ac RL |
10 | /* |
11 | * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for | |
12 | * internal use. | |
13 | */ | |
14 | #include "internal/deprecated.h" | |
15 | ||
15671090 | 16 | #include <string.h> |
0abae163 RL |
17 | #include <openssl/core_names.h> |
18 | #include <openssl/params.h> | |
cf333799 | 19 | #include <openssl/err.h> |
15671090 RL |
20 | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
21 | #include "internal/sizes.h" | |
22 | #include "internal/param_build_set.h" | |
cf333799 | 23 | #include "crypto/asn1.h" |
0abae163 | 24 | #include "crypto/rsa.h" |
4a9fe33c | 25 | #include "rsa_local.h" |
0abae163 | 26 | |
15671090 RL |
27 | #include "e_os.h" /* strcasecmp for Windows() */ |
28 | ||
0abae163 RL |
29 | /* |
30 | * The intention with the "backend" source file is to offer backend support | |
31 | * for legacy backends (EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD and EVP_PKEY_METHOD) and provider | |
32 | * implementations alike. | |
33 | */ | |
34 | ||
35 | DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIGNUM) | |
36 | ||
37 | static int collect_numbers(STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *numbers, | |
96ebe52e | 38 | const OSSL_PARAM params[], const char *names[]) |
0abae163 RL |
39 | { |
40 | const OSSL_PARAM *p = NULL; | |
96ebe52e | 41 | int i; |
0abae163 RL |
42 | |
43 | if (numbers == NULL) | |
44 | return 0; | |
45 | ||
96ebe52e SL |
46 | for (i = 0; names[i] != NULL; i++){ |
47 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, names[i]); | |
48 | if (p != NULL) { | |
49 | BIGNUM *tmp = NULL; | |
0abae163 | 50 | |
96ebe52e SL |
51 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(p, &tmp) |
52 | || sk_BIGNUM_push(numbers, tmp) == 0) | |
53 | return 0; | |
54 | } | |
0abae163 RL |
55 | } |
56 | ||
57 | return 1; | |
58 | } | |
59 | ||
23b2fc0b | 60 | int ossl_rsa_fromdata(RSA *rsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) |
0abae163 RL |
61 | { |
62 | const OSSL_PARAM *param_n, *param_e, *param_d; | |
63 | BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL; | |
64 | STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *factors = NULL, *exps = NULL, *coeffs = NULL; | |
65 | int is_private = 0; | |
66 | ||
67 | if (rsa == NULL) | |
68 | return 0; | |
69 | ||
70 | param_n = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N); | |
71 | param_e = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E); | |
72 | param_d = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D); | |
73 | ||
74 | if ((param_n != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_n, &n)) | |
75 | || (param_e != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_e, &e)) | |
76 | || (param_d != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_d, &d))) | |
77 | goto err; | |
78 | ||
79 | is_private = (d != NULL); | |
80 | ||
81 | if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, d)) | |
82 | goto err; | |
83 | n = e = d = NULL; | |
84 | ||
85 | if (is_private) { | |
86 | if (!collect_numbers(factors = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), params, | |
23b2fc0b | 87 | ossl_rsa_mp_factor_names) |
0abae163 | 88 | || !collect_numbers(exps = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), params, |
23b2fc0b | 89 | ossl_rsa_mp_exp_names) |
0abae163 | 90 | || !collect_numbers(coeffs = sk_BIGNUM_new_null(), params, |
23b2fc0b | 91 | ossl_rsa_mp_coeff_names)) |
0abae163 RL |
92 | goto err; |
93 | ||
94 | /* It's ok if this private key just has n, e and d */ | |
95 | if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) != 0 | |
23b2fc0b | 96 | && !ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs)) |
0abae163 RL |
97 | goto err; |
98 | } | |
99 | ||
4f2271d5 | 100 | |
0abae163 RL |
101 | sk_BIGNUM_free(factors); |
102 | sk_BIGNUM_free(exps); | |
103 | sk_BIGNUM_free(coeffs); | |
104 | return 1; | |
105 | ||
106 | err: | |
107 | BN_free(n); | |
108 | BN_free(e); | |
109 | BN_free(d); | |
110 | sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(factors, BN_free); | |
111 | sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(exps, BN_free); | |
112 | sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(coeffs, BN_free); | |
113 | return 0; | |
114 | } | |
115 | ||
645a541a RL |
116 | DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(BIGNUM_const, BIGNUM) |
117 | ||
23b2fc0b | 118 | int ossl_rsa_todata(RSA *rsa, OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, OSSL_PARAM params[]) |
645a541a RL |
119 | { |
120 | int ret = 0; | |
121 | const BIGNUM *rsa_d = NULL, *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL; | |
122 | STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *factors = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null(); | |
123 | STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *exps = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null(); | |
124 | STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *coeffs = sk_BIGNUM_const_new_null(); | |
125 | ||
126 | if (rsa == NULL || factors == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL) | |
127 | goto err; | |
128 | ||
129 | RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, &rsa_d); | |
23b2fc0b | 130 | ossl_rsa_get0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs); |
645a541a | 131 | |
26a8f2ac RL |
132 | if (!ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, rsa_n) |
133 | || !ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, rsa_e)) | |
134 | goto err; | |
135 | ||
645a541a RL |
136 | /* Check private key data integrity */ |
137 | if (rsa_d != NULL) { | |
138 | int numprimes = sk_BIGNUM_const_num(factors); | |
139 | int numexps = sk_BIGNUM_const_num(exps); | |
140 | int numcoeffs = sk_BIGNUM_const_num(coeffs); | |
141 | ||
142 | /* | |
4f2271d5 | 143 | * It's permissible to have zero primes, i.e. no CRT params. |
645a541a RL |
144 | * Otherwise, there must be at least two, as many exponents, |
145 | * and one coefficient less. | |
146 | */ | |
147 | if (numprimes != 0 | |
148 | && (numprimes < 2 || numexps < 2 || numcoeffs < 1)) | |
149 | goto err; | |
645a541a | 150 | |
26a8f2ac RL |
151 | if (!ossl_param_build_set_bn(bld, params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D, |
152 | rsa_d) | |
153 | || !ossl_param_build_set_multi_key_bn(bld, params, | |
23b2fc0b P |
154 | ossl_rsa_mp_factor_names, |
155 | factors) | |
26a8f2ac | 156 | || !ossl_param_build_set_multi_key_bn(bld, params, |
23b2fc0b | 157 | ossl_rsa_mp_exp_names, exps) |
26a8f2ac | 158 | || !ossl_param_build_set_multi_key_bn(bld, params, |
23b2fc0b P |
159 | ossl_rsa_mp_coeff_names, |
160 | coeffs)) | |
645a541a | 161 | goto err; |
26a8f2ac RL |
162 | } |
163 | ||
4f2271d5 SL |
164 | #if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS) |
165 | /* The acvp test results are not meant for export so check for bld == NULL */ | |
166 | if (bld == NULL) | |
4158b0dc | 167 | ossl_rsa_acvp_test_get_params(rsa, params); |
4f2271d5 | 168 | #endif |
645a541a RL |
169 | ret = 1; |
170 | err: | |
171 | sk_BIGNUM_const_free(factors); | |
172 | sk_BIGNUM_const_free(exps); | |
173 | sk_BIGNUM_const_free(coeffs); | |
174 | return ret; | |
175 | } | |
15671090 | 176 | |
23b2fc0b P |
177 | int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_todata(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss, |
178 | OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, OSSL_PARAM params[]) | |
15671090 | 179 | { |
23b2fc0b P |
180 | if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) { |
181 | int hashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss); | |
182 | int maskgenalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(pss); | |
183 | int maskgenhashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss); | |
184 | int saltlen = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss); | |
185 | int default_hashalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(NULL); | |
186 | int default_maskgenalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(NULL); | |
187 | int default_maskgenhashalg_nid = | |
188 | ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(NULL); | |
15671090 RL |
189 | const char *mdname = |
190 | (hashalg_nid == default_hashalg_nid | |
23b2fc0b | 191 | ? NULL : ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(hashalg_nid)); |
15671090 RL |
192 | const char *mgfname = |
193 | (maskgenalg_nid == default_maskgenalg_nid | |
23b2fc0b | 194 | ? NULL : ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(maskgenalg_nid)); |
15671090 RL |
195 | const char *mgf1mdname = |
196 | (maskgenhashalg_nid == default_maskgenhashalg_nid | |
23b2fc0b | 197 | ? NULL : ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(maskgenhashalg_nid)); |
15671090 RL |
198 | const char *key_md = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST; |
199 | const char *key_mgf = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MASKGENFUNC; | |
200 | const char *key_mgf1_md = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MGF1_DIGEST; | |
201 | const char *key_saltlen = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN; | |
202 | ||
203 | /* | |
204 | * To ensure that the key isn't seen as unrestricted by the recipient, | |
205 | * we make sure that at least one PSS-related parameter is passed, even | |
206 | * if it has a default value; saltlen. | |
207 | */ | |
208 | if ((mdname != NULL | |
209 | && !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, params, key_md, mdname)) | |
210 | || (mgfname != NULL | |
211 | && !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, params, | |
212 | key_mgf, mgfname)) | |
213 | || (mgf1mdname != NULL | |
214 | && !ossl_param_build_set_utf8_string(bld, params, | |
215 | key_mgf1_md, mgf1mdname)) | |
216 | || (!ossl_param_build_set_int(bld, params, key_saltlen, saltlen))) | |
217 | return 0; | |
218 | } | |
219 | return 1; | |
220 | } | |
221 | ||
23b2fc0b | 222 | int ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_fromdata(RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss_params, |
bbde8566 | 223 | int *defaults_set, |
23b2fc0b | 224 | const OSSL_PARAM params[], |
b4250010 | 225 | OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx) |
15671090 RL |
226 | { |
227 | const OSSL_PARAM *param_md, *param_mgf, *param_mgf1md, *param_saltlen; | |
719523c7 SL |
228 | const OSSL_PARAM *param_propq; |
229 | const char *propq = NULL; | |
15671090 RL |
230 | EVP_MD *md = NULL, *mgf1md = NULL; |
231 | int saltlen; | |
232 | int ret = 0; | |
233 | ||
234 | if (pss_params == NULL) | |
235 | return 0; | |
719523c7 SL |
236 | param_propq = |
237 | OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST_PROPS); | |
15671090 RL |
238 | param_md = |
239 | OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DIGEST); | |
240 | param_mgf = | |
241 | OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MASKGENFUNC); | |
242 | param_mgf1md = | |
243 | OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MGF1_DIGEST); | |
244 | param_saltlen = | |
245 | OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN); | |
246 | ||
719523c7 SL |
247 | if (param_propq != NULL) { |
248 | if (param_propq->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) | |
249 | propq = param_propq->data; | |
250 | } | |
15671090 RL |
251 | /* |
252 | * If we get any of the parameters, we know we have at least some | |
253 | * restrictions, so we start by setting default values, and let each | |
254 | * parameter override their specific restriction data. | |
255 | */ | |
bbde8566 TM |
256 | if (!*defaults_set |
257 | && (param_md != NULL || param_mgf != NULL || param_mgf1md != NULL | |
258 | || param_saltlen != NULL)) { | |
23b2fc0b | 259 | if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(pss_params)) |
15671090 | 260 | return 0; |
bbde8566 TM |
261 | *defaults_set = 1; |
262 | } | |
15671090 RL |
263 | |
264 | if (param_mgf != NULL) { | |
23b2fc0b | 265 | int default_maskgenalg_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenalg(NULL); |
15671090 RL |
266 | const char *mgfname = NULL; |
267 | ||
268 | if (param_mgf->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) | |
269 | mgfname = param_mgf->data; | |
270 | else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(param_mgf, &mgfname)) | |
271 | return 0; | |
272 | ||
273 | /* TODO Revisit this if / when a new MGF algorithm appears */ | |
274 | if (strcasecmp(param_mgf->data, | |
23b2fc0b | 275 | ossl_rsa_mgf_nid2name(default_maskgenalg_nid)) != 0) |
15671090 RL |
276 | return 0; |
277 | } | |
278 | ||
279 | /* | |
280 | * We're only interested in the NIDs that correspond to the MDs, so the | |
281 | * exact propquery is unimportant in the EVP_MD_fetch() calls below. | |
282 | */ | |
283 | ||
284 | if (param_md != NULL) { | |
285 | const char *mdname = NULL; | |
286 | ||
287 | if (param_md->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) | |
288 | mdname = param_md->data; | |
289 | else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(param_mgf, &mdname)) | |
290 | goto err; | |
291 | ||
719523c7 | 292 | if ((md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, mdname, propq)) == NULL |
23b2fc0b P |
293 | || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(pss_params, |
294 | ossl_rsa_oaeppss_md2nid(md))) | |
15671090 RL |
295 | goto err; |
296 | } | |
297 | ||
298 | if (param_mgf1md != NULL) { | |
299 | const char *mgf1mdname = NULL; | |
300 | ||
301 | if (param_mgf1md->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) | |
302 | mgf1mdname = param_mgf1md->data; | |
303 | else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr(param_mgf, &mgf1mdname)) | |
304 | goto err; | |
305 | ||
719523c7 | 306 | if ((mgf1md = EVP_MD_fetch(libctx, mgf1mdname, propq)) == NULL |
23b2fc0b P |
307 | || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg( |
308 | pss_params, ossl_rsa_oaeppss_md2nid(mgf1md))) | |
15671090 RL |
309 | goto err; |
310 | } | |
311 | ||
312 | if (param_saltlen != NULL) { | |
313 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(param_saltlen, &saltlen) | |
23b2fc0b | 314 | || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(pss_params, saltlen)) |
15671090 RL |
315 | goto err; |
316 | } | |
317 | ||
318 | ret = 1; | |
319 | ||
320 | err: | |
321 | EVP_MD_free(md); | |
322 | EVP_MD_free(mgf1md); | |
323 | return ret; | |
324 | } | |
cf333799 | 325 | |
b247113c TM |
326 | int ossl_rsa_is_foreign(const RSA *rsa) |
327 | { | |
328 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE | |
329 | if (rsa->engine != NULL || RSA_get_method(rsa) != RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL()) | |
330 | return 1; | |
331 | #endif | |
332 | return 0; | |
333 | } | |
334 | ||
4a9fe33c TM |
335 | static ossl_inline int rsa_bn_dup_check(BIGNUM **out, const BIGNUM *f) |
336 | { | |
337 | if (f != NULL && (*out = BN_dup(f)) == NULL) | |
338 | return 0; | |
339 | return 1; | |
340 | } | |
341 | ||
b4f447c0 | 342 | RSA *ossl_rsa_dup(const RSA *rsa, int selection) |
4a9fe33c TM |
343 | { |
344 | RSA *dupkey = NULL; | |
345 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE | |
346 | int pnum, i; | |
b247113c | 347 | #endif |
4a9fe33c TM |
348 | |
349 | /* Do not try to duplicate foreign RSA keys */ | |
b247113c | 350 | if (ossl_rsa_is_foreign(rsa)) |
4a9fe33c | 351 | return NULL; |
4a9fe33c TM |
352 | |
353 | if ((dupkey = ossl_rsa_new_with_ctx(rsa->libctx)) == NULL) | |
354 | return NULL; | |
355 | ||
b4f447c0 TM |
356 | /* public key */ |
357 | if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) != 0) { | |
358 | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->n, rsa->n)) | |
359 | goto err; | |
360 | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->e, rsa->e)) | |
361 | goto err; | |
362 | } | |
4a9fe33c | 363 | |
b4f447c0 TM |
364 | if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0) { |
365 | ||
366 | /* private key */ | |
367 | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->d, rsa->d)) | |
368 | goto err; | |
369 | ||
370 | /* factors and crt params */ | |
371 | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->p, rsa->p)) | |
372 | goto err; | |
373 | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->q, rsa->q)) | |
374 | goto err; | |
375 | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->dmp1, rsa->dmp1)) | |
376 | goto err; | |
377 | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->dmq1, rsa->dmq1)) | |
378 | goto err; | |
379 | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&dupkey->iqmp, rsa->iqmp)) | |
380 | goto err; | |
381 | } | |
4a9fe33c TM |
382 | |
383 | dupkey->version = rsa->version; | |
384 | dupkey->flags = rsa->flags; | |
b4f447c0 | 385 | /* we always copy the PSS parameters regardless of selection */ |
4a9fe33c TM |
386 | dupkey->pss_params = rsa->pss_params; |
387 | ||
388 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE | |
389 | /* multiprime */ | |
b4f447c0 TM |
390 | if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0 |
391 | && (pnum = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos)) > 0) { | |
4a9fe33c TM |
392 | dupkey->prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum); |
393 | for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { | |
394 | const RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL; | |
395 | RSA_PRIME_INFO *duppinfo = NULL; | |
396 | ||
397 | if ((duppinfo = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*duppinfo))) == NULL) { | |
398 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
399 | goto err; | |
400 | } | |
401 | /* push first so cleanup in error case works */ | |
402 | (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(dupkey->prime_infos, duppinfo); | |
403 | ||
404 | pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i); | |
405 | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&duppinfo->r, pinfo->r)) | |
406 | goto err; | |
407 | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&duppinfo->d, pinfo->d)) | |
408 | goto err; | |
409 | if (!rsa_bn_dup_check(&duppinfo->t, pinfo->t)) | |
410 | goto err; | |
411 | } | |
412 | if (!ossl_rsa_multip_calc_product(dupkey)) | |
413 | goto err; | |
414 | } | |
415 | ||
416 | if (rsa->pss != NULL) { | |
417 | dupkey->pss = RSA_PSS_PARAMS_dup(rsa->pss); | |
418 | if (rsa->pss->maskGenAlgorithm != NULL | |
419 | && dupkey->pss->maskGenAlgorithm == NULL) { | |
420 | dupkey->pss->maskHash = ossl_x509_algor_mgf1_decode(rsa->pss->maskGenAlgorithm); | |
421 | if (dupkey->pss->maskHash == NULL) | |
422 | goto err; | |
423 | } | |
424 | } | |
425 | if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, | |
426 | &dupkey->ex_data, &rsa->ex_data)) | |
427 | goto err; | |
428 | #endif | |
429 | ||
430 | return dupkey; | |
431 | ||
432 | err: | |
433 | RSA_free(dupkey); | |
434 | return NULL; | |
435 | } | |
436 | ||
cf333799 RL |
437 | #ifndef FIPS_MODULE |
438 | RSA_PSS_PARAMS *ossl_rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg) | |
439 | { | |
440 | RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss; | |
441 | ||
442 | pss = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS), | |
443 | alg->parameter); | |
444 | ||
445 | if (pss == NULL) | |
446 | return NULL; | |
447 | ||
448 | if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm != NULL) { | |
449 | pss->maskHash = ossl_x509_algor_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenAlgorithm); | |
450 | if (pss->maskHash == NULL) { | |
451 | RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); | |
452 | return NULL; | |
453 | } | |
454 | } | |
455 | ||
456 | return pss; | |
457 | } | |
458 | ||
459 | static int ossl_rsa_sync_to_pss_params_30(RSA *rsa) | |
460 | { | |
461 | const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *legacy_pss = NULL; | |
462 | RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss = NULL; | |
463 | ||
464 | if (rsa != NULL | |
465 | && (legacy_pss = RSA_get0_pss_params(rsa)) != NULL | |
466 | && (pss = ossl_rsa_get0_pss_params_30(rsa)) != NULL) { | |
467 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL, *mgf1md = NULL; | |
468 | int md_nid, mgf1md_nid, saltlen, trailerField; | |
469 | RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params; | |
470 | ||
471 | /* | |
472 | * We don't care about the validity of the fields here, we just | |
473 | * want to synchronise values. Verifying here makes it impossible | |
474 | * to even read a key with invalid values, making it hard to test | |
475 | * a bad situation. | |
476 | * | |
477 | * Other routines use ossl_rsa_pss_get_param(), so the values will | |
478 | * be checked, eventually. | |
479 | */ | |
480 | if (!ossl_rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(legacy_pss, &md, &mgf1md, | |
481 | &saltlen, &trailerField)) | |
482 | return 0; | |
ed576acd TM |
483 | md_nid = EVP_MD_get_type(md); |
484 | mgf1md_nid = EVP_MD_get_type(mgf1md); | |
cf333799 RL |
485 | if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(&pss_params) |
486 | || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(&pss_params, md_nid) | |
487 | || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg(&pss_params, | |
488 | mgf1md_nid) | |
489 | || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(&pss_params, saltlen) | |
490 | || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_trailerfield(&pss_params, | |
491 | trailerField)) | |
492 | return 0; | |
493 | *pss = pss_params; | |
494 | } | |
495 | return 1; | |
496 | } | |
497 | ||
498 | int ossl_rsa_pss_get_param_unverified(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, | |
499 | const EVP_MD **pmd, const EVP_MD **pmgf1md, | |
500 | int *psaltlen, int *ptrailerField) | |
501 | { | |
502 | RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params; | |
503 | ||
504 | /* Get the defaults from the ONE place */ | |
505 | (void)ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(&pss_params); | |
506 | ||
507 | if (pss == NULL) | |
508 | return 0; | |
509 | *pmd = ossl_x509_algor_get_md(pss->hashAlgorithm); | |
510 | if (*pmd == NULL) | |
511 | return 0; | |
512 | *pmgf1md = ossl_x509_algor_get_md(pss->maskHash); | |
513 | if (*pmgf1md == NULL) | |
514 | return 0; | |
515 | if (pss->saltLength) | |
516 | *psaltlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->saltLength); | |
517 | else | |
518 | *psaltlen = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(&pss_params); | |
519 | if (pss->trailerField) | |
520 | *ptrailerField = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField); | |
521 | else | |
522 | *ptrailerField = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_trailerfield(&pss_params);; | |
523 | ||
524 | return 1; | |
525 | } | |
526 | ||
527 | int ossl_rsa_param_decode(RSA *rsa, const X509_ALGOR *alg) | |
528 | { | |
529 | RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss; | |
530 | const ASN1_OBJECT *algoid; | |
531 | const void *algp; | |
532 | int algptype; | |
533 | ||
534 | X509_ALGOR_get0(&algoid, &algptype, &algp, alg); | |
535 | if (OBJ_obj2nid(algoid) != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) | |
536 | return 1; | |
537 | if (algptype == V_ASN1_UNDEF) | |
538 | return 1; | |
539 | if (algptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) { | |
540 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS); | |
541 | return 0; | |
542 | } | |
543 | if ((pss = ossl_rsa_pss_decode(alg)) == NULL | |
544 | || !ossl_rsa_set0_pss_params(rsa, pss)) { | |
545 | RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss); | |
546 | return 0; | |
547 | } | |
548 | if (!ossl_rsa_sync_to_pss_params_30(rsa)) | |
549 | return 0; | |
550 | return 1; | |
551 | } | |
552 | ||
553 | RSA *ossl_rsa_key_from_pkcs8(const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf, | |
554 | OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq) | |
555 | { | |
556 | const unsigned char *p; | |
557 | RSA *rsa; | |
558 | int pklen; | |
559 | const X509_ALGOR *alg; | |
560 | ||
561 | if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &alg, p8inf)) | |
562 | return 0; | |
563 | rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &p, pklen); | |
564 | if (rsa == NULL) { | |
565 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); | |
566 | return NULL; | |
567 | } | |
568 | if (!ossl_rsa_param_decode(rsa, alg)) { | |
569 | RSA_free(rsa); | |
570 | return NULL; | |
571 | } | |
572 | ||
573 | RSA_clear_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK); | |
574 | switch (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm)) { | |
575 | case EVP_PKEY_RSA: | |
576 | RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA); | |
577 | break; | |
578 | case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS: | |
579 | RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS); | |
580 | break; | |
581 | default: | |
582 | /* Leave the type bits zero */ | |
583 | break; | |
584 | } | |
585 | ||
586 | return rsa; | |
587 | } | |
588 | #endif |