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a672a02a SL |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
3 | * | |
4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use | |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8 | */ | |
9 | ||
10 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
11 | #include <openssl/params.h> | |
12 | #include <openssl/core_numbers.h> | |
13 | #include <openssl/core_names.h> | |
14 | #include "internal/rand_int.h" | |
15 | #include "internal/provider_algs.h" | |
16 | #include "internal/provider_ctx.h" | |
17 | #include "internal/providercommonerr.h" | |
18 | #include "ciphers_locl.h" | |
19 | ||
20 | /* TODO(3.0) Figure out what flags are really needed */ | |
21 | #define AEAD_GCM_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 \ | |
22 | | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER \ | |
23 | | EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT \ | |
24 | | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY) | |
25 | ||
26 | static OSSL_OP_cipher_encrypt_init_fn gcm_einit; | |
27 | static OSSL_OP_cipher_decrypt_init_fn gcm_dinit; | |
92d9d0ae RL |
28 | static OSSL_OP_cipher_get_ctx_params_fn gcm_get_ctx_params; |
29 | static OSSL_OP_cipher_set_ctx_params_fn gcm_set_ctx_params; | |
a672a02a SL |
30 | static OSSL_OP_cipher_cipher_fn gcm_cipher; |
31 | static OSSL_OP_cipher_update_fn gcm_stream_update; | |
32 | static OSSL_OP_cipher_final_fn gcm_stream_final; | |
33 | ||
34 | static int gcm_tls_init(PROV_GCM_CTX *dat, unsigned char *aad, size_t aad_len); | |
35 | static int gcm_tls_iv_set_fixed(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *iv, | |
36 | size_t len); | |
37 | static int gcm_tls_cipher(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *padlen, | |
38 | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); | |
39 | static int gcm_cipher_internal(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, | |
40 | size_t *padlen, const unsigned char *in, | |
41 | size_t len); | |
42 | ||
43 | static void gcm_initctx(void *provctx, PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, size_t keybits, | |
44 | const PROV_GCM_HW *hw, size_t ivlen_min) | |
45 | { | |
46 | ctx->pad = 1; | |
47 | ctx->mode = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE; | |
48 | ctx->taglen = -1; | |
49 | ctx->tls_aad_len = -1; | |
50 | ctx->ivlen_min = ivlen_min; | |
51 | ctx->ivlen = (EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN); | |
52 | ctx->keylen = keybits / 8; | |
53 | ctx->hw = hw; | |
54 | ctx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx); | |
55 | } | |
56 | ||
57 | static void gcm_deinitctx(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx) | |
58 | { | |
59 | OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->iv, sizeof(ctx->iv)); | |
60 | } | |
61 | ||
62 | static int gcm_init(void *vctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, | |
63 | const unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen, int enc) | |
64 | { | |
65 | PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_GCM_CTX *)vctx; | |
66 | ||
67 | ctx->enc = enc; | |
68 | ||
69 | if (iv != NULL) { | |
70 | if (ivlen < ctx->ivlen_min || ivlen > sizeof(ctx->iv)) { | |
f73eb733 | 71 | PROVerr(0, PROV_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH); |
a672a02a SL |
72 | return 0; |
73 | } | |
74 | ctx->ivlen = ivlen; | |
75 | memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, ctx->ivlen); | |
76 | ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_BUFFERED; | |
77 | } | |
78 | ||
79 | if (key != NULL) { | |
80 | if (keylen != ctx->keylen) { | |
f73eb733 | 81 | PROVerr(0, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
a672a02a SL |
82 | return 0; |
83 | } | |
84 | return ctx->hw->setkey(ctx, key, ctx->keylen); | |
85 | } | |
86 | return 1; | |
87 | } | |
88 | ||
89 | static int gcm_einit(void *vctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, | |
90 | const unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen) | |
91 | { | |
92 | return gcm_init(vctx, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, 1); | |
93 | } | |
94 | ||
95 | static int gcm_dinit(void *vctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, | |
96 | const unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen) | |
97 | { | |
98 | return gcm_init(vctx, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, 0); | |
99 | } | |
100 | ||
92d9d0ae | 101 | static int gcm_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[]) |
a672a02a SL |
102 | { |
103 | PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_GCM_CTX *)vctx; | |
104 | OSSL_PARAM *p; | |
105 | size_t sz; | |
106 | ||
107 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IVLEN); | |
108 | if (p != NULL) { | |
109 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, ctx->ivlen)) | |
110 | return 0; | |
111 | } | |
112 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN); | |
113 | if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, ctx->keylen)) { | |
114 | PROVerr(0, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER); | |
115 | return 0; | |
116 | } | |
117 | ||
118 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IV); | |
119 | if (p != NULL) { | |
120 | if (ctx->iv_gen != 1 && ctx->iv_gen_rand != 1) | |
121 | return 0; | |
122 | if (ctx->ivlen != (int)p->data_size) { | |
f73eb733 | 123 | PROVerr(0, PROV_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH); |
a672a02a SL |
124 | return 0; |
125 | } | |
126 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, ctx->iv, ctx->ivlen)) { | |
127 | PROVerr(0, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER); | |
128 | return 0; | |
129 | } | |
130 | } | |
131 | ||
132 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_PAD); | |
133 | if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, ctx->tls_aad_pad_sz)) { | |
134 | PROVerr(0, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER); | |
135 | return 0; | |
136 | } | |
137 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAG); | |
138 | if (p != NULL) { | |
139 | sz = p->data_size; | |
140 | if (sz == 0 || sz > EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN || !ctx->enc || ctx->taglen < 0) { | |
141 | PROVerr(0, PROV_R_INVALID_TAG); | |
142 | return 0; | |
143 | } | |
144 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, ctx->buf, sz)) { | |
145 | PROVerr(0, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER); | |
146 | return 0; | |
147 | } | |
148 | } | |
149 | return 1; | |
150 | } | |
151 | ||
92d9d0ae | 152 | static int gcm_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) |
a672a02a SL |
153 | { |
154 | PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_GCM_CTX *)vctx; | |
155 | const OSSL_PARAM *p; | |
156 | size_t sz; | |
157 | void *vp; | |
158 | ||
159 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAG); | |
160 | if (p != NULL) { | |
161 | vp = ctx->buf; | |
162 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, &vp, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN, &sz)) { | |
163 | PROVerr(0, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); | |
164 | return 0; | |
165 | } | |
166 | if (sz == 0 || ctx->enc) { | |
167 | PROVerr(0, PROV_R_INVALID_TAG); | |
168 | return 0; | |
169 | } | |
170 | ctx->taglen = sz; | |
171 | } | |
172 | ||
173 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_IVLEN); | |
174 | if (p != NULL) { | |
175 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &sz)) { | |
176 | PROVerr(0, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); | |
177 | return 0; | |
178 | } | |
179 | if (sz == 0 || sz > sizeof(ctx->iv)) { | |
f73eb733 | 180 | PROVerr(0, PROV_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH); |
a672a02a SL |
181 | return 0; |
182 | } | |
183 | ctx->ivlen = sz; | |
184 | } | |
185 | ||
186 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TLS1_AAD); | |
187 | if (p != NULL) { | |
188 | if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_STRING) { | |
189 | PROVerr(0, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); | |
190 | return 0; | |
191 | } | |
192 | sz = gcm_tls_init(ctx, p->data, p->data_size); | |
193 | if (sz == 0) { | |
194 | PROVerr(0, PROV_R_INVALID_AAD); | |
195 | return 0; | |
196 | } | |
197 | ctx->tls_aad_pad_sz = sz; | |
198 | } | |
199 | ||
200 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TLS1_IV_FIXED); | |
201 | if (p != NULL) { | |
202 | if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_STRING) { | |
203 | PROVerr(0, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); | |
204 | return 0; | |
205 | } | |
206 | if (gcm_tls_iv_set_fixed(ctx, p->data, p->data_size) == 0) { | |
207 | PROVerr(0, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); | |
208 | return 0; | |
209 | } | |
210 | } | |
211 | ||
e9c116eb SL |
212 | /* |
213 | * TODO(3.0) Temporary solution to address fuzz test crash, which will be | |
214 | * reworked once the discussion in PR #9510 is resolved. i.e- We need a | |
215 | * general solution for handling missing parameters inside set_params and | |
216 | * get_params methods. | |
217 | */ | |
218 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN); | |
219 | if (p != NULL) { | |
220 | int keylen; | |
221 | ||
222 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &keylen)) { | |
223 | PROVerr(0, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); | |
224 | return 0; | |
225 | } | |
226 | /* The key length can not be modified for gcm mode */ | |
227 | if (keylen != (int)ctx->keylen) | |
228 | return 0; | |
229 | } | |
230 | ||
a672a02a SL |
231 | return 1; |
232 | } | |
233 | ||
234 | static int gcm_stream_update(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl, | |
235 | size_t outsize, const unsigned char *in, | |
236 | size_t inl) | |
237 | { | |
238 | PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_GCM_CTX *)vctx; | |
239 | ||
240 | if (outsize < inl) { | |
241 | PROVerr(0, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); | |
242 | return -1; | |
243 | } | |
244 | ||
245 | if (gcm_cipher_internal(ctx, out, outl, in, inl) <= 0) { | |
246 | PROVerr(0, PROV_R_CIPHER_OPERATION_FAILED); | |
247 | return -1; | |
248 | } | |
249 | return 1; | |
250 | } | |
251 | ||
252 | static int gcm_stream_final(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl, | |
253 | size_t outsize) | |
254 | { | |
255 | PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_GCM_CTX *)vctx; | |
256 | int i; | |
257 | ||
258 | i = gcm_cipher_internal(ctx, out, outl, NULL, 0); | |
259 | if (i <= 0) | |
260 | return 0; | |
261 | ||
262 | *outl = 0; | |
263 | return 1; | |
264 | } | |
265 | ||
266 | static int gcm_cipher(void *vctx, | |
267 | unsigned char *out, size_t *outl, size_t outsize, | |
268 | const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) | |
269 | { | |
270 | PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_GCM_CTX *)vctx; | |
271 | ||
272 | if (outsize < inl) { | |
273 | PROVerr(0, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); | |
274 | return -1; | |
275 | } | |
276 | ||
277 | if (gcm_cipher_internal(ctx, out, outl, in, inl) <= 0) | |
278 | return -1; | |
279 | ||
280 | *outl = inl; | |
281 | return 1; | |
282 | } | |
283 | ||
284 | /* | |
285 | * See SP800-38D (GCM) Section 8 "Uniqueness requirement on IVS and keys" | |
286 | * | |
287 | * See also 8.2.2 RBG-based construction. | |
288 | * Random construction consists of a free field (which can be NULL) and a | |
289 | * random field which will use a DRBG that can return at least 96 bits of | |
290 | * entropy strength. (The DRBG must be seeded by the FIPS module). | |
291 | */ | |
292 | static int gcm_iv_generate(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, int offset) | |
293 | { | |
294 | int sz = ctx->ivlen - offset; | |
295 | ||
296 | /* Must be at least 96 bits */ | |
297 | if (sz <= 0 || ctx->ivlen < GCM_IV_DEFAULT_SIZE) | |
298 | return 0; | |
299 | ||
300 | /* Use DRBG to generate random iv */ | |
301 | if (rand_bytes_ex(ctx->libctx, ctx->iv + offset, sz) <= 0) | |
302 | return 0; | |
303 | ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_BUFFERED; | |
304 | ctx->iv_gen_rand = 1; | |
305 | return 1; | |
306 | } | |
307 | ||
308 | static int gcm_cipher_internal(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, | |
309 | size_t *padlen, const unsigned char *in, | |
310 | size_t len) | |
311 | { | |
312 | size_t olen = 0; | |
313 | int rv = 0; | |
314 | const PROV_GCM_HW *hw = ctx->hw; | |
315 | ||
316 | if (ctx->tls_aad_len >= 0) | |
317 | return gcm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, padlen, in, len); | |
318 | ||
319 | if (!ctx->key_set || ctx->iv_state == IV_STATE_FINISHED) | |
320 | goto err; | |
321 | ||
322 | /* | |
323 | * FIPS requires generation of AES-GCM IV's inside the FIPS module. | |
324 | * The IV can still be set externally (the security policy will state that | |
325 | * this is not FIPS compliant). There are some applications | |
326 | * where setting the IV externally is the only option available. | |
327 | */ | |
328 | if (ctx->iv_state == IV_STATE_UNINITIALISED) { | |
329 | if (!ctx->enc || !gcm_iv_generate(ctx, 0)) | |
330 | goto err; | |
331 | } | |
332 | ||
333 | if (ctx->iv_state == IV_STATE_BUFFERED) { | |
334 | if (!hw->setiv(ctx, ctx->iv, ctx->ivlen)) | |
335 | goto err; | |
336 | ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_COPIED; | |
337 | } | |
338 | ||
339 | if (in != NULL) { | |
340 | /* The input is AAD if out is NULL */ | |
341 | if (out == NULL) { | |
342 | if (!hw->aadupdate(ctx, in, len)) | |
343 | goto err; | |
344 | } else { | |
345 | /* The input is ciphertext OR plaintext */ | |
346 | if (!hw->cipherupdate(ctx, in, len, out)) | |
347 | goto err; | |
348 | } | |
349 | } else { | |
350 | /* Finished when in == NULL */ | |
351 | if (!hw->cipherfinal(ctx, ctx->buf)) | |
352 | goto err; | |
353 | ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_FINISHED; /* Don't reuse the IV */ | |
354 | goto finish; | |
355 | } | |
356 | olen = len; | |
357 | finish: | |
358 | rv = 1; | |
359 | err: | |
360 | *padlen = olen; | |
361 | return rv; | |
362 | } | |
363 | ||
364 | static int gcm_tls_init(PROV_GCM_CTX *dat, unsigned char *aad, size_t aad_len) | |
365 | { | |
366 | unsigned char *buf; | |
367 | size_t len; | |
368 | ||
369 | if (aad_len != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) | |
370 | return 0; | |
371 | ||
372 | /* Save the aad for later use. */ | |
373 | buf = dat->buf; | |
374 | memcpy(buf, aad, aad_len); | |
375 | dat->tls_aad_len = aad_len; | |
376 | dat->tls_enc_records = 0; | |
377 | ||
378 | len = buf[aad_len - 2] << 8 | buf[aad_len - 1]; | |
379 | /* Correct length for explicit iv. */ | |
380 | if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN) | |
381 | return 0; | |
382 | len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
383 | ||
384 | /* If decrypting correct for tag too. */ | |
385 | if (!dat->enc) { | |
386 | if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN) | |
387 | return 0; | |
388 | len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; | |
389 | } | |
390 | buf[aad_len - 2] = (unsigned char)(len >> 8); | |
391 | buf[aad_len - 1] = (unsigned char)(len & 0xff); | |
392 | /* Extra padding: tag appended to record. */ | |
393 | return EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; | |
394 | } | |
395 | ||
396 | static int gcm_tls_iv_set_fixed(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *iv, | |
397 | size_t len) | |
398 | { | |
399 | /* Special case: -1 length restores whole IV */ | |
400 | if (len == (size_t)-1) { | |
401 | memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, ctx->ivlen); | |
402 | ctx->iv_gen = 1; | |
403 | ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_BUFFERED; | |
404 | return 1; | |
405 | } | |
406 | /* Fixed field must be at least 4 bytes and invocation field at least 8 */ | |
407 | if ((len < EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN) | |
408 | || (ctx->ivlen - (int)len) < EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN) | |
409 | return 0; | |
410 | if (len > 0) | |
411 | memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, len); | |
412 | if (ctx->enc | |
413 | && rand_bytes_ex(ctx->libctx, ctx->iv + len, ctx->ivlen - len) <= 0) | |
414 | return 0; | |
415 | ctx->iv_gen = 1; | |
416 | ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_BUFFERED; | |
417 | return 1; | |
418 | } | |
419 | ||
420 | /* increment counter (64-bit int) by 1 */ | |
421 | static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter) | |
422 | { | |
423 | int n = 8; | |
424 | unsigned char c; | |
425 | ||
426 | do { | |
427 | --n; | |
428 | c = counter[n]; | |
429 | ++c; | |
430 | counter[n] = c; | |
431 | if (c > 0) | |
432 | return; | |
433 | } while (n > 0); | |
434 | } | |
435 | ||
436 | /* | |
437 | * Handle TLS GCM packet format. This consists of the last portion of the IV | |
438 | * followed by the payload and finally the tag. On encrypt generate IV, | |
439 | * encrypt payload and write the tag. On verify retrieve IV, decrypt payload | |
440 | * and verify tag. | |
441 | */ | |
442 | static int gcm_tls_cipher(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *padlen, | |
443 | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) | |
444 | { | |
445 | int rv = 0, arg = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
446 | size_t plen = 0; | |
447 | unsigned char *tag = NULL; | |
448 | ||
449 | if (!ctx->key_set) | |
450 | goto err; | |
451 | ||
452 | /* Encrypt/decrypt must be performed in place */ | |
453 | if (out != in || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) | |
454 | goto err; | |
455 | ||
456 | /* | |
457 | * Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness | |
458 | * Requirements from SP 800-38D". The requirements is for one party to the | |
459 | * communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys. We do this on the encrypting | |
460 | * side only. | |
461 | */ | |
462 | if (ctx->enc && ++ctx->tls_enc_records == 0) { | |
463 | PROVerr(0, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS); | |
464 | goto err; | |
465 | } | |
466 | ||
467 | if (ctx->iv_gen == 0) | |
468 | goto err; | |
469 | /* | |
470 | * Set IV from start of buffer or generate IV and write to start of | |
471 | * buffer. | |
472 | */ | |
473 | if (ctx->enc) { | |
474 | if (!ctx->hw->setiv(ctx, ctx->iv, ctx->ivlen)) | |
475 | goto err; | |
476 | if (arg > ctx->ivlen) | |
477 | arg = ctx->ivlen; | |
478 | memcpy(out, ctx->iv + ctx->ivlen - arg, arg); | |
479 | /* | |
480 | * Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and so no need | |
481 | * to check wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes. | |
482 | */ | |
483 | ctr64_inc(ctx->iv + ctx->ivlen - 8); | |
484 | } else { | |
485 | memcpy(ctx->iv + ctx->ivlen - arg, out, arg); | |
486 | if (!ctx->hw->setiv(ctx, ctx->iv, ctx->ivlen)) | |
487 | goto err; | |
488 | } | |
489 | ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_COPIED; | |
490 | ||
491 | /* Fix buffer and length to point to payload */ | |
492 | in += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
493 | out += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
494 | len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; | |
495 | ||
496 | tag = ctx->enc ? out + len : (unsigned char *)in + len; | |
497 | if (!ctx->hw->oneshot(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->tls_aad_len, in, len, out, tag, | |
498 | EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) { | |
499 | if (!ctx->enc) | |
500 | OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); | |
501 | goto err; | |
502 | } | |
503 | if (ctx->enc) | |
504 | plen = len + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; | |
505 | else | |
506 | plen = len; | |
507 | ||
508 | rv = 1; | |
509 | err: | |
510 | ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_FINISHED; | |
511 | ctx->tls_aad_len = -1; | |
512 | *padlen = plen; | |
513 | return rv; | |
514 | } | |
515 | ||
516 | #define IMPLEMENT_cipher(alg, lcmode, UCMODE, flags, kbits, blkbits, ivbits) \ | |
517 | static OSSL_OP_cipher_get_params_fn alg##_##kbits##_##lcmode##_get_params; \ | |
518 | static int alg##_##kbits##_##lcmode##_get_params(OSSL_PARAM params[]) \ | |
519 | { \ | |
520 | return aes_get_params(params, EVP_CIPH_##UCMODE##_MODE, flags, \ | |
521 | kbits, blkbits, ivbits); \ | |
522 | } \ | |
523 | static OSSL_OP_cipher_newctx_fn alg##kbits##gcm_newctx; \ | |
524 | static void *alg##kbits##gcm_newctx(void *provctx) \ | |
525 | { \ | |
526 | return alg##_gcm_newctx(provctx, kbits); \ | |
527 | } \ | |
528 | const OSSL_DISPATCH alg##kbits##gcm_functions[] = { \ | |
529 | { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_INIT, (void (*)(void))gcm_einit }, \ | |
530 | { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_DECRYPT_INIT, (void (*)(void))gcm_dinit }, \ | |
531 | { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_UPDATE, (void (*)(void))gcm_stream_update }, \ | |
532 | { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_FINAL, (void (*)(void))gcm_stream_final }, \ | |
533 | { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_CIPHER, (void (*)(void))gcm_cipher }, \ | |
534 | { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void)) alg##kbits##gcm_newctx }, \ | |
535 | { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_FREECTX, (void (*)(void)) alg##_gcm_freectx }, \ | |
536 | { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GET_PARAMS, \ | |
537 | (void (*)(void)) alg##_##kbits##_##lcmode##_get_params }, \ | |
92d9d0ae RL |
538 | { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GET_CTX_PARAMS, \ |
539 | (void (*)(void))gcm_get_ctx_params }, \ | |
540 | { OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_SET_CTX_PARAMS, \ | |
541 | (void (*)(void))gcm_set_ctx_params }, \ | |
a672a02a SL |
542 | { 0, NULL } \ |
543 | } | |
544 | ||
545 | static void *aes_gcm_newctx(void *provctx, size_t keybits) | |
546 | { | |
547 | PROV_AES_GCM_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); | |
548 | ||
549 | if (ctx != NULL) | |
550 | gcm_initctx(provctx, (PROV_GCM_CTX *)ctx, keybits, | |
551 | PROV_AES_HW_gcm(keybits), 8); | |
552 | return ctx; | |
553 | } | |
554 | ||
555 | static OSSL_OP_cipher_freectx_fn aes_gcm_freectx; | |
556 | static void aes_gcm_freectx(void *vctx) | |
557 | { | |
558 | PROV_AES_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_AES_GCM_CTX *)vctx; | |
559 | ||
560 | gcm_deinitctx((PROV_GCM_CTX *)ctx); | |
561 | OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); | |
562 | } | |
563 | ||
564 | /* aes128gcm_functions */ | |
565 | IMPLEMENT_cipher(aes, gcm, GCM, AEAD_GCM_FLAGS, 128, 8, 96); | |
566 | /* aes192gcm_functions */ | |
567 | IMPLEMENT_cipher(aes, gcm, GCM, AEAD_GCM_FLAGS, 192, 8, 96); | |
568 | /* aes256gcm_functions */ | |
569 | IMPLEMENT_cipher(aes, gcm, GCM, AEAD_GCM_FLAGS, 256, 8, 96); | |
570 | ||
571 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ARIA) && !defined(FIPS_MODE) | |
572 | ||
573 | static void *aria_gcm_newctx(void *provctx, size_t keybits) | |
574 | { | |
575 | PROV_ARIA_GCM_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); | |
576 | ||
577 | if (ctx != NULL) | |
578 | gcm_initctx(provctx, (PROV_GCM_CTX *)ctx, keybits, | |
579 | PROV_ARIA_HW_gcm(keybits), 4); | |
580 | return ctx; | |
581 | } | |
582 | ||
583 | static OSSL_OP_cipher_freectx_fn aria_gcm_freectx; | |
584 | static void aria_gcm_freectx(void *vctx) | |
585 | { | |
586 | PROV_ARIA_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ARIA_GCM_CTX *)vctx; | |
587 | ||
588 | gcm_deinitctx((PROV_GCM_CTX *)ctx); | |
589 | OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); | |
590 | } | |
591 | ||
592 | /* aria128gcm_functions */ | |
593 | IMPLEMENT_cipher(aria, gcm, GCM, AEAD_GCM_FLAGS, 128, 8, 96); | |
594 | /* aria192gcm_functions */ | |
595 | IMPLEMENT_cipher(aria, gcm, GCM, AEAD_GCM_FLAGS, 192, 8, 96); | |
596 | /* aria256gcm_functions */ | |
597 | IMPLEMENT_cipher(aria, gcm, GCM, AEAD_GCM_FLAGS, 256, 8, 96); | |
598 | ||
599 | #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ARIA) && !defined(FIPS_MODE) */ |