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846e33c7 | 1 | /* |
9d75dce3 | 2 | * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
aa8f3d76 | 3 | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved |
c80149d9 | 4 | * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. |
8c74b5e5 | 5 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
6 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
7 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
8 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
9 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8c74b5e5 | 10 | */ |
846e33c7 | 11 | |
d02b48c6 | 12 | #include <stdio.h> |
fc24f0bf | 13 | #include <time.h> |
dee0cc10 | 14 | #include <assert.h> |
8ba708e5 | 15 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 16 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
ec577822 BM |
17 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
18 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
19 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
20 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
dbad1690 | 21 | #include <openssl/md5.h> |
3c27208f | 22 | #include <openssl/dh.h> |
d095b68d | 23 | #include <openssl/bn.h> |
3c27208f | 24 | #include <openssl/engine.h> |
4ff1a526 | 25 | #include <internal/cryptlib.h> |
f9b3bff6 | 26 | |
597c51bc | 27 | static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); |
e46f2334 MC |
28 | static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); |
29 | ||
7ab09630 | 30 | static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s); |
a455d0f6 | 31 | static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s); |
d45ba43d | 32 | static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, |
ae2f7b37 | 33 | WPACKET *pkt); |
ea262260 | 34 | |
61ae935a MC |
35 | /* |
36 | * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not? | |
37 | * | |
38 | * Return values are: | |
39 | * 1: Yes | |
40 | * 0: No | |
41 | */ | |
7ab09630 | 42 | static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s) |
61ae935a MC |
43 | { |
44 | /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ | |
b7fa1f98 | 45 | if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION |
a230b26e EK |
46 | && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) |
47 | || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) | |
61ae935a MC |
48 | return 0; |
49 | ||
50 | return 1; | |
51 | } | |
52 | ||
53 | /* | |
a455d0f6 | 54 | * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not? |
61ae935a MC |
55 | * |
56 | * Return values are: | |
57 | * 1: Yes | |
58 | * 0: No | |
59 | */ | |
a455d0f6 | 60 | static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s) |
61ae935a MC |
61 | { |
62 | long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
63 | ||
64 | /* | |
65 | * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral | |
a455d0f6 | 66 | * ciphersuite or for SRP |
61ae935a | 67 | */ |
a455d0f6 MC |
68 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK |
69 | | SSL_kSRP)) { | |
70 | return 1; | |
61ae935a MC |
71 | } |
72 | ||
a455d0f6 | 73 | return 0; |
61ae935a MC |
74 | } |
75 | ||
0f1e51ea MC |
76 | /* |
77 | * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed | |
78 | * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the | |
79 | * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The | |
80 | * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
81 | * | |
94ed2c67 MC |
82 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
83 | * (transition not allowed) | |
0f1e51ea MC |
84 | */ |
85 | static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) | |
86 | { | |
87 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
88 | ||
89 | /* | |
90 | * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't | |
91 | * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by | |
92 | * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() | |
93 | */ | |
94 | ||
95 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
96 | default: | |
97 | break; | |
98 | ||
3847d426 MC |
99 | case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: |
100 | /* | |
101 | * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only | |
102 | * thing we can get now is a ServerHello. | |
103 | */ | |
104 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { | |
105 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; | |
106 | return 1; | |
107 | } | |
108 | break; | |
109 | ||
0f1e51ea | 110 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: |
e46f2334 MC |
111 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) { |
112 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; | |
113 | return 1; | |
114 | } | |
115 | break; | |
116 | ||
117 | case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: | |
0f1e51ea | 118 | if (s->hit) { |
92760c21 MC |
119 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
120 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
121 | return 1; |
122 | } | |
123 | } else { | |
92760c21 MC |
124 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { |
125 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; | |
126 | return 1; | |
f5ca0b04 MC |
127 | } |
128 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
0f1e51ea MC |
129 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; |
130 | return 1; | |
131 | } | |
132 | } | |
133 | break; | |
134 | ||
92760c21 MC |
135 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: |
136 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
137 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; | |
138 | return 1; | |
139 | } | |
140 | break; | |
141 | ||
0f1e51ea | 142 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
143 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { |
144 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY; | |
145 | return 1; | |
146 | } | |
147 | break; | |
148 | ||
149 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: | |
0f1e51ea MC |
150 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
151 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; | |
152 | return 1; | |
153 | } | |
154 | break; | |
cc2455bf MC |
155 | |
156 | case TLS_ST_OK: | |
157 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { | |
158 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; | |
159 | return 1; | |
160 | } | |
e1c3de44 MC |
161 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) { |
162 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE; | |
163 | return 1; | |
164 | } | |
9d75dce3 TS |
165 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { |
166 | #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION | |
167 | # error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message. | |
168 | #endif | |
169 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) { | |
170 | s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED; | |
171 | /* | |
172 | * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the | |
173 | * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding | |
174 | * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the | |
175 | * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished? | |
176 | */ | |
177 | if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { | |
178 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
179 | return 0; | |
180 | } | |
181 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; | |
182 | return 1; | |
183 | } | |
184 | } | |
cc2455bf | 185 | break; |
0f1e51ea MC |
186 | } |
187 | ||
0f1e51ea | 188 | /* No valid transition found */ |
0f1e51ea MC |
189 | return 0; |
190 | } | |
191 | ||
61ae935a | 192 | /* |
8481f583 MC |
193 | * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed |
194 | * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the | |
195 | * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The | |
196 | * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
61ae935a | 197 | * |
94ed2c67 MC |
198 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
199 | * (transition not allowed) | |
61ae935a | 200 | */ |
8481f583 | 201 | int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) |
61ae935a | 202 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 203 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
a455d0f6 | 204 | int ske_expected; |
61ae935a | 205 | |
0f1e51ea | 206 | /* |
3847d426 MC |
207 | * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version |
208 | * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later. | |
0f1e51ea | 209 | */ |
f5ca0b04 | 210 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
5abeaf35 MC |
211 | if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt)) |
212 | goto err; | |
213 | return 1; | |
214 | } | |
0f1e51ea | 215 | |
a230b26e | 216 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
217 | default: |
218 | break; | |
219 | ||
61ae935a MC |
220 | case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: |
221 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { | |
222 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; | |
223 | return 1; | |
224 | } | |
225 | ||
226 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
227 | if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { | |
228 | st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; | |
229 | return 1; | |
230 | } | |
231 | } | |
232 | break; | |
233 | ||
d7f8783f | 234 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
4004ce5f MC |
235 | /* |
236 | * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early | |
237 | * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a | |
238 | * HelloRetryRequest. | |
239 | */ | |
240 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { | |
241 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; | |
242 | return 1; | |
243 | } | |
4004ce5f MC |
244 | break; |
245 | ||
61ae935a MC |
246 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: |
247 | if (s->hit) { | |
aff8c126 | 248 | if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { |
61ae935a MC |
249 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { |
250 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; | |
251 | return 1; | |
252 | } | |
253 | } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
254 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; | |
255 | return 1; | |
256 | } | |
257 | } else { | |
258 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { | |
259 | st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; | |
260 | return 1; | |
ad3819c2 | 261 | } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION |
aff8c126 RS |
262 | && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL |
263 | && s->session->ext.tick != NULL | |
a230b26e | 264 | && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
ad3819c2 MC |
265 | /* |
266 | * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session | |
267 | * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on | |
268 | * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if | |
269 | * the server is resuming. | |
270 | */ | |
271 | s->hit = 1; | |
272 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; | |
273 | return 1; | |
61ae935a | 274 | } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth |
a230b26e | 275 | & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { |
61ae935a MC |
276 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { |
277 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; | |
278 | return 1; | |
279 | } | |
280 | } else { | |
a455d0f6 | 281 | ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); |
a455d0f6 MC |
282 | /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ |
283 | if (ske_expected | |
a230b26e EK |
284 | || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) |
285 | && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { | |
a455d0f6 MC |
286 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { |
287 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; | |
288 | return 1; | |
289 | } | |
290 | } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST | |
a230b26e EK |
291 | && cert_req_allowed(s)) { |
292 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; | |
293 | return 1; | |
a455d0f6 | 294 | } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { |
a230b26e EK |
295 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; |
296 | return 1; | |
61ae935a MC |
297 | } |
298 | } | |
299 | } | |
300 | break; | |
301 | ||
302 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: | |
bb1aaab4 MC |
303 | /* |
304 | * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if | |
aff8c126 | 305 | * |ext.status_expected| is set |
bb1aaab4 | 306 | */ |
aff8c126 | 307 | if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { |
bb1aaab4 MC |
308 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS; |
309 | return 1; | |
a455d0f6 MC |
310 | } |
311 | /* Fall through */ | |
312 | ||
313 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: | |
314 | ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); | |
a455d0f6 | 315 | /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ |
a230b26e EK |
316 | if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) |
317 | && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { | |
61ae935a MC |
318 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { |
319 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; | |
320 | return 1; | |
61ae935a | 321 | } |
672f3337 | 322 | goto err; |
61ae935a | 323 | } |
a455d0f6 | 324 | /* Fall through */ |
61ae935a | 325 | |
a455d0f6 MC |
326 | case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: |
327 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { | |
328 | if (cert_req_allowed(s)) { | |
61ae935a MC |
329 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; |
330 | return 1; | |
61ae935a | 331 | } |
672f3337 | 332 | goto err; |
61ae935a | 333 | } |
a455d0f6 | 334 | /* Fall through */ |
61ae935a MC |
335 | |
336 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: | |
337 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { | |
338 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; | |
339 | return 1; | |
340 | } | |
341 | break; | |
342 | ||
343 | case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: | |
aff8c126 | 344 | if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { |
c45d6b2b DB |
345 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { |
346 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; | |
347 | return 1; | |
348 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
349 | } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
350 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; | |
351 | return 1; | |
352 | } | |
353 | break; | |
354 | ||
355 | case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: | |
356 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
357 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; | |
358 | return 1; | |
359 | } | |
360 | break; | |
361 | ||
362 | case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: | |
363 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
364 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; | |
365 | return 1; | |
366 | } | |
367 | break; | |
c7f47786 MC |
368 | |
369 | case TLS_ST_OK: | |
4004ce5f | 370 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) { |
c7f47786 MC |
371 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ; |
372 | return 1; | |
373 | } | |
374 | break; | |
61ae935a MC |
375 | } |
376 | ||
672f3337 | 377 | err: |
61ae935a | 378 | /* No valid transition found */ |
f20404fc MC |
379 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
380 | BIO *rbio; | |
381 | ||
382 | /* | |
383 | * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably | |
384 | * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it. | |
385 | */ | |
386 | s->init_num = 0; | |
387 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
388 | rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); | |
389 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio); | |
390 | BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); | |
391 | return 0; | |
392 | } | |
f63a17d6 MC |
393 | SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, |
394 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, | |
395 | SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
61ae935a MC |
396 | return 0; |
397 | } | |
398 | ||
399 | /* | |
0f1e51ea MC |
400 | * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to |
401 | * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the | |
402 | * server. | |
0f1e51ea MC |
403 | */ |
404 | static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s) | |
405 | { | |
406 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
407 | ||
408 | /* | |
3847d426 MC |
409 | * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated |
410 | * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by | |
411 | * ossl_statem_client_write_transition(). | |
0f1e51ea MC |
412 | */ |
413 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
e43e6b19 TS |
414 | default: |
415 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
416 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
417 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION, | |
418 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
419 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; | |
420 | ||
9d75dce3 TS |
421 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: |
422 | if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { | |
423 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; | |
424 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
425 | } | |
1bf4cb0f MC |
426 | /* |
427 | * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after | |
428 | * we already sent close_notify | |
429 | */ | |
430 | if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) { | |
431 | /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */ | |
432 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
433 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION, | |
434 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
435 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; | |
436 | } | |
437 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
438 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
0f1e51ea | 439 | |
92760c21 | 440 | case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: |
ef6c191b MC |
441 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY |
442 | || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) | |
d7f8783f | 443 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END; |
4d02f870 | 444 | else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 |
fc7129dc | 445 | && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE) |
4d02f870 | 446 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; |
564547e4 MC |
447 | else |
448 | st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT | |
449 | : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; | |
450 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
451 | ||
d7f8783f | 452 | case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: |
ef6c191b MC |
453 | if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) { |
454 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; | |
455 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
456 | } | |
457 | /* Fall through */ | |
458 | ||
459 | case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: | |
4d02f870 | 460 | case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: |
94ed2c67 | 461 | st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT |
92760c21 | 462 | : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; |
0f1e51ea MC |
463 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
464 | ||
465 | case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: | |
466 | /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */ | |
94ed2c67 | 467 | st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY |
92760c21 | 468 | : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; |
0f1e51ea MC |
469 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
470 | ||
471 | case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: | |
0f1e51ea MC |
472 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; |
473 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
474 | ||
e1c3de44 | 475 | case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: |
5bf47933 MC |
476 | if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { |
477 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE; | |
478 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
479 | } | |
480 | /* Fall through */ | |
481 | ||
9412b3ad | 482 | case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: |
cc2455bf | 483 | case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: |
0f1e51ea | 484 | case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: |
94ed2c67 | 485 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; |
94ed2c67 | 486 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
cc2455bf MC |
487 | |
488 | case TLS_ST_OK: | |
9412b3ad MC |
489 | if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { |
490 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE; | |
491 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
492 | } | |
493 | ||
494 | /* Try to read from the server instead */ | |
cc2455bf | 495 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; |
0f1e51ea MC |
496 | } |
497 | } | |
498 | ||
499 | /* | |
500 | * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to | |
501 | * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server. | |
61ae935a | 502 | */ |
8481f583 | 503 | WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 504 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 505 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 506 | |
0f1e51ea MC |
507 | /* |
508 | * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what | |
509 | * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until | |
510 | * later | |
511 | */ | |
f5ca0b04 | 512 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) |
0f1e51ea MC |
513 | return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s); |
514 | ||
a230b26e | 515 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
516 | default: |
517 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
a2c2e000 MC |
518 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
519 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION, | |
520 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
521 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; |
522 | ||
a230b26e | 523 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
c7f47786 MC |
524 | if (!s->renegotiate) { |
525 | /* | |
526 | * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have | |
527 | * received a message from the server. Better read it. | |
528 | */ | |
529 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
530 | } | |
018fcbec BE |
531 | /* Renegotiation */ |
532 | /* fall thru */ | |
a230b26e EK |
533 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE: |
534 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; | |
535 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 536 | |
a230b26e | 537 | case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: |
49e7fe12 MC |
538 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) { |
539 | /* | |
540 | * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't | |
541 | * actually selected a version yet. | |
542 | */ | |
066904cc MC |
543 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) |
544 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; | |
545 | else | |
546 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; | |
49e7fe12 MC |
547 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
548 | } | |
a230b26e EK |
549 | /* |
550 | * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what | |
551 | * we will be sent | |
552 | */ | |
553 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
61ae935a | 554 | |
597c51bc | 555 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: |
318d3c0e MC |
556 | /* |
557 | * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a | |
558 | * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one | |
559 | * because we did early data. | |
560 | */ | |
561 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 | |
562 | && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) | |
563 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; | |
564 | else | |
565 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; | |
a2b97bdf MC |
566 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
567 | ||
d7f8783f | 568 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: |
4004ce5f MC |
569 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; |
570 | ||
a230b26e EK |
571 | case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
572 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; | |
573 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 574 | |
a230b26e EK |
575 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: |
576 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) | |
577 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; | |
578 | else | |
61ae935a | 579 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; |
a230b26e | 580 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a | 581 | |
a230b26e EK |
582 | case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: |
583 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; | |
584 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 585 | |
a230b26e EK |
586 | case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: |
587 | /* | |
588 | * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is | |
589 | * sent, but no verify packet is sent | |
590 | */ | |
591 | /* | |
592 | * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH | |
593 | * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We | |
594 | * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's | |
595 | * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate. | |
596 | */ | |
597 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) { | |
598 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY; | |
599 | } else { | |
61ae935a | 600 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; |
a230b26e EK |
601 | } |
602 | if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { | |
603 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; | |
604 | } | |
605 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 606 | |
a230b26e EK |
607 | case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: |
608 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; | |
609 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
610 | ||
611 | case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: | |
318d3c0e MC |
612 | if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { |
613 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; | |
614 | } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) { | |
066904cc MC |
615 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; |
616 | } else { | |
61ae935a | 617 | #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) |
a230b26e | 618 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; |
066904cc MC |
619 | #else |
620 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen) | |
621 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO; | |
622 | else | |
623 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; | |
61ae935a | 624 | #endif |
066904cc | 625 | } |
a230b26e | 626 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a MC |
627 | |
628 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) | |
a230b26e EK |
629 | case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: |
630 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; | |
631 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a MC |
632 | #endif |
633 | ||
a230b26e EK |
634 | case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: |
635 | if (s->hit) { | |
636 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
a230b26e EK |
637 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
638 | } else { | |
639 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
640 | } | |
61ae935a | 641 | |
a230b26e EK |
642 | case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: |
643 | if (s->hit) { | |
644 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; | |
645 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
646 | } else { | |
647 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
a230b26e EK |
648 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
649 | } | |
c7f47786 MC |
650 | |
651 | case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ: | |
652 | /* | |
653 | * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more | |
654 | * convenient time. | |
655 | */ | |
656 | if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) { | |
657 | if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 658 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
c7f47786 MC |
659 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; |
660 | } | |
661 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; | |
662 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
663 | } | |
664 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
c7f47786 | 665 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a MC |
666 | } |
667 | } | |
668 | ||
669 | /* | |
670 | * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from | |
671 | * the client to the server. | |
672 | */ | |
8481f583 | 673 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 674 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 675 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 676 | |
a230b26e | 677 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
678 | default: |
679 | /* No pre work to be done */ | |
680 | break; | |
681 | ||
61ae935a MC |
682 | case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: |
683 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
684 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
685 | /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */ | |
2c4a056f | 686 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
f63a17d6 | 687 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2c4a056f MC |
688 | return WORK_ERROR; |
689 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
690 | } |
691 | break; | |
692 | ||
61ae935a MC |
693 | case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: |
694 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
695 | if (s->hit) { | |
696 | /* | |
697 | * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these | |
698 | * messages unless we need to. | |
699 | */ | |
700 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
701 | } | |
702 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
a2c2e000 MC |
703 | if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { |
704 | /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ | |
61ae935a | 705 | return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); |
a2c2e000 | 706 | } |
61ae935a MC |
707 | #endif |
708 | } | |
f3b3d7f0 | 709 | break; |
61ae935a | 710 | |
d7f8783f | 711 | case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: |
ef6c191b MC |
712 | /* |
713 | * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not | |
714 | * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press | |
715 | * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here. | |
716 | */ | |
717 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING | |
718 | || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE) | |
719 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
720 | /* Fall through */ | |
721 | ||
722 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: | |
2a8db717 MC |
723 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1); |
724 | ||
61ae935a | 725 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
a2c2e000 | 726 | /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ |
2a8db717 | 727 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1); |
61ae935a MC |
728 | } |
729 | ||
730 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
731 | } | |
732 | ||
733 | /* | |
734 | * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the | |
735 | * client to the server. | |
736 | */ | |
8481f583 | 737 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 738 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 739 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a MC |
740 | |
741 | s->init_num = 0; | |
742 | ||
a230b26e | 743 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
744 | default: |
745 | /* No post work to be done */ | |
746 | break; | |
747 | ||
61ae935a | 748 | case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: |
6cb42265 | 749 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING |
5cc807da | 750 | && s->max_early_data > 0) { |
6cb42265 MC |
751 | /* |
752 | * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change | |
753 | * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead | |
754 | * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly. | |
755 | */ | |
5cc807da | 756 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) { |
5cc807da MC |
757 | if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s, |
758 | SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { | |
759 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
760 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
761 | } | |
a2c2e000 | 762 | } |
5cc807da MC |
763 | /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */ |
764 | } else if (!statem_flush(s)) { | |
765 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
766 | } | |
767 | ||
768 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
769 | /* Treat the next message as the first packet */ | |
770 | s->first_packet = 1; | |
6cb42265 | 771 | } |
61ae935a MC |
772 | break; |
773 | ||
ef6c191b MC |
774 | case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: |
775 | /* | |
776 | * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing | |
777 | * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server. | |
778 | */ | |
779 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
780 | s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; | |
781 | break; | |
782 | ||
61ae935a | 783 | case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: |
a2c2e000 MC |
784 | if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) { |
785 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
61ae935a | 786 | return WORK_ERROR; |
a2c2e000 | 787 | } |
61ae935a MC |
788 | break; |
789 | ||
790 | case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: | |
318d3c0e | 791 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) |
4d02f870 | 792 | break; |
066904cc MC |
793 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING |
794 | && s->max_early_data > 0) { | |
795 | /* | |
796 | * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change | |
797 | * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead | |
798 | * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly. | |
799 | */ | |
800 | if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s, | |
801 | SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) | |
802 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
803 | break; | |
804 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
805 | s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; |
806 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
807 | s->session->compress_meth = 0; | |
808 | #else | |
809 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) | |
810 | s->session->compress_meth = 0; | |
811 | else | |
812 | s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; | |
813 | #endif | |
a2c2e000 MC |
814 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { |
815 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
61ae935a | 816 | return WORK_ERROR; |
a2c2e000 | 817 | } |
61ae935a MC |
818 | |
819 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
a2c2e000 MC |
820 | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { |
821 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
61ae935a | 822 | return WORK_ERROR; |
a2c2e000 | 823 | } |
61ae935a MC |
824 | |
825 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
826 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
827 | if (s->hit) { | |
828 | /* | |
829 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
830 | * no SCTP used. | |
831 | */ | |
832 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
833 | 0, NULL); | |
834 | } | |
835 | #endif | |
836 | ||
837 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); | |
838 | } | |
839 | break; | |
840 | ||
841 | case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: | |
842 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
843 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) { | |
844 | /* | |
845 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
846 | * no SCTP used. | |
847 | */ | |
848 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
849 | 0, NULL); | |
850 | } | |
851 | #endif | |
852 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
853 | return WORK_MORE_B; | |
92760c21 MC |
854 | |
855 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
9d75dce3 | 856 | if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
857 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
858 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
859 | } | |
9d75dce3 TS |
860 | if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { |
861 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
862 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { | |
863 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
864 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
865 | } | |
866 | } | |
92760c21 | 867 | } |
61ae935a | 868 | break; |
9412b3ad MC |
869 | |
870 | case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: | |
871 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
872 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
a2c2e000 MC |
873 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) { |
874 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
57389a32 | 875 | return WORK_ERROR; |
a2c2e000 | 876 | } |
9412b3ad | 877 | break; |
61ae935a MC |
878 | } |
879 | ||
880 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
881 | } | |
882 | ||
883 | /* | |
6392fb8e MC |
884 | * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the |
885 | * client | |
61ae935a MC |
886 | * |
887 | * Valid return values are: | |
888 | * 1: Success | |
889 | * 0: Error | |
890 | */ | |
6392fb8e | 891 | int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
a15c953f | 892 | confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) |
61ae935a | 893 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 894 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 895 | |
4a01c59f MC |
896 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
897 | default: | |
898 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
899 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
900 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE, | |
901 | SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE); | |
4a01c59f MC |
902 | return 0; |
903 | ||
904 | case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: | |
5923ad4b | 905 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
6392fb8e | 906 | *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
4a01c59f | 907 | else |
6392fb8e MC |
908 | *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
909 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; | |
4a01c59f MC |
910 | break; |
911 | ||
912 | case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: | |
6392fb8e MC |
913 | *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello; |
914 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO; | |
4a01c59f MC |
915 | break; |
916 | ||
ef6c191b MC |
917 | case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: |
918 | *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data; | |
919 | *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; | |
920 | break; | |
921 | ||
922 | case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: | |
923 | *confunc = NULL; | |
924 | *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY; | |
925 | break; | |
926 | ||
4a01c59f | 927 | case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: |
6392fb8e MC |
928 | *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate; |
929 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; | |
4a01c59f MC |
930 | break; |
931 | ||
932 | case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: | |
6392fb8e MC |
933 | *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange; |
934 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; | |
4a01c59f MC |
935 | break; |
936 | ||
937 | case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: | |
d8bc1399 | 938 | *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify; |
6392fb8e | 939 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; |
4a01c59f | 940 | break; |
61ae935a MC |
941 | |
942 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) | |
4a01c59f | 943 | case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: |
6392fb8e MC |
944 | *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto; |
945 | *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; | |
4a01c59f | 946 | break; |
61ae935a | 947 | #endif |
4a01c59f | 948 | case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: |
6392fb8e MC |
949 | *confunc = tls_construct_finished; |
950 | *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; | |
4a01c59f | 951 | break; |
9412b3ad MC |
952 | |
953 | case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: | |
954 | *confunc = tls_construct_key_update; | |
955 | *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE; | |
956 | break; | |
4a01c59f | 957 | } |
5923ad4b | 958 | |
5923ad4b | 959 | return 1; |
61ae935a MC |
960 | } |
961 | ||
962 | /* | |
963 | * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are | |
964 | * reading. Excludes the message header. | |
965 | */ | |
eda75751 | 966 | size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 967 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 968 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 969 | |
a230b26e | 970 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
971 | default: |
972 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
973 | return 0; | |
974 | ||
a230b26e EK |
975 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: |
976 | return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 977 | |
a230b26e EK |
978 | case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
979 | return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 980 | |
a230b26e EK |
981 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: |
982 | return s->max_cert_list; | |
61ae935a | 983 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
984 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: |
985 | return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
986 | ||
a230b26e EK |
987 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: |
988 | return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 989 | |
a230b26e EK |
990 | case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: |
991 | return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 992 | |
a230b26e EK |
993 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: |
994 | /* | |
995 | * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In | |
996 | * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured | |
997 | * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs | |
998 | */ | |
999 | return s->max_cert_list; | |
61ae935a | 1000 | |
a230b26e EK |
1001 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: |
1002 | return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 1003 | |
a230b26e EK |
1004 | case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: |
1005 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
1006 | return 3; | |
1007 | return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 1008 | |
a230b26e EK |
1009 | case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: |
1010 | return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 1011 | |
a230b26e EK |
1012 | case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: |
1013 | return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; | |
e46f2334 MC |
1014 | |
1015 | case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: | |
1016 | return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH; | |
e1c3de44 MC |
1017 | |
1018 | case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: | |
1019 | return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 1020 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1021 | } |
1022 | ||
1023 | /* | |
1024 | * Process a message that the client has been received from the server. | |
1025 | */ | |
8481f583 | 1026 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
61ae935a | 1027 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1028 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1029 | |
a230b26e | 1030 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1031 | default: |
1032 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
a2c2e000 MC |
1033 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
1034 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE, | |
1035 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1036 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
1037 | ||
a230b26e EK |
1038 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: |
1039 | return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1040 | |
a230b26e EK |
1041 | case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
1042 | return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1043 | |
a230b26e EK |
1044 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: |
1045 | return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1046 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
1047 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: |
1048 | return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); | |
1049 | ||
a230b26e EK |
1050 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: |
1051 | return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1052 | |
a230b26e EK |
1053 | case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: |
1054 | return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1055 | |
a230b26e EK |
1056 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: |
1057 | return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1058 | |
a230b26e EK |
1059 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: |
1060 | return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1061 | |
a230b26e EK |
1062 | case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: |
1063 | return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1064 | |
a230b26e EK |
1065 | case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: |
1066 | return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1067 | |
a230b26e EK |
1068 | case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: |
1069 | return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); | |
e46f2334 | 1070 | |
c7f47786 MC |
1071 | case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ: |
1072 | return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt); | |
1073 | ||
e46f2334 MC |
1074 | case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: |
1075 | return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt); | |
e1c3de44 MC |
1076 | |
1077 | case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: | |
1078 | return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1079 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1080 | } |
1081 | ||
1082 | /* | |
1083 | * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message | |
1084 | * from the server | |
1085 | */ | |
8481f583 | 1086 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 1087 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1088 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1089 | |
a230b26e | 1090 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1091 | default: |
1092 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
a2c2e000 MC |
1093 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
1094 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE, | |
1095 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1096 | return WORK_ERROR; |
1097 | ||
e4562014 | 1098 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: |
05c4f1d5 MC |
1099 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: |
1100 | return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst); | |
61ae935a | 1101 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1102 | } |
1103 | ||
7cea05dc | 1104 | int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 1105 | { |
2c7b4dbc | 1106 | unsigned char *p; |
ec60ccc1 MC |
1107 | size_t sess_id_len; |
1108 | int i, protverr; | |
09b6c2ef | 1109 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
0f113f3e MC |
1110 | SSL_COMP *comp; |
1111 | #endif | |
b9908bf9 | 1112 | SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; |
a5816a5a | 1113 | unsigned char *session_id; |
0f113f3e | 1114 | |
7cea05dc | 1115 | if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { |
2c7b4dbc | 1116 | /* Should not happen */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
1117 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
1118 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 1119 | return 0; |
2c7b4dbc | 1120 | } |
0f113f3e | 1121 | |
b9908bf9 | 1122 | /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */ |
4fa52141 VD |
1123 | protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s); |
1124 | if (protverr != 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1125 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1126 | protverr); | |
7cea05dc | 1127 | return 0; |
4fa52141 | 1128 | } |
0f113f3e | 1129 | |
e586eac8 | 1130 | if (sess == NULL |
4fd12788 | 1131 | || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL) |
e586eac8 | 1132 | || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) { |
fc7129dc MC |
1133 | if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE |
1134 | && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 1135 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
7cea05dc | 1136 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 1137 | } |
b9908bf9 MC |
1138 | } |
1139 | /* else use the pre-loaded session */ | |
0f113f3e | 1140 | |
b9908bf9 | 1141 | p = s->s3->client_random; |
0f113f3e | 1142 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
1143 | /* |
1144 | * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are | |
1145 | * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify | |
1146 | */ | |
1147 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1148 | size_t idx; | |
1149 | i = 1; | |
1150 | for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) { | |
1151 | if (p[idx]) { | |
1152 | i = 0; | |
1153 | break; | |
0f113f3e | 1154 | } |
0f113f3e | 1155 | } |
751b26b1 | 1156 | } else { |
fc7129dc | 1157 | i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE); |
751b26b1 | 1158 | } |
0f113f3e | 1159 | |
f7f2a01d | 1160 | if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random), |
f63a17d6 MC |
1161 | DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) { |
1162 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1163 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 1164 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 1165 | } |
b9908bf9 | 1166 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
1167 | /*- |
1168 | * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from | |
1169 | * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version | |
1170 | * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also | |
1171 | * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can | |
1172 | * choke if we initially report a higher version then | |
1173 | * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This | |
1174 | * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it | |
1175 | * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports | |
1176 | * 1.0. | |
1177 | * | |
1178 | * Possible scenario with previous logic: | |
1179 | * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 | |
1180 | * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 | |
1181 | * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. | |
8483a003 | 1182 | * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0. |
b9908bf9 MC |
1183 | * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. |
1184 | * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now | |
1185 | * know that is maximum server supports. | |
1186 | * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret | |
1187 | * containing version 1.0. | |
1188 | * | |
1189 | * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the | |
1190 | * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely | |
1191 | * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't | |
1192 | * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with | |
1193 | * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using | |
1194 | * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to | |
1195 | * the negotiated version. | |
cd998837 MC |
1196 | * |
1197 | * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the | |
16bce0e0 | 1198 | * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions. |
b9908bf9 | 1199 | */ |
7acb8b64 | 1200 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version) |
7cea05dc | 1201 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1202 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1203 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 1204 | return 0; |
2c7b4dbc | 1205 | } |
b9908bf9 MC |
1206 | |
1207 | /* Session ID */ | |
a5816a5a MC |
1208 | session_id = s->session->session_id; |
1209 | if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) { | |
1210 | if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION | |
1211 | && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) { | |
1212 | sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id); | |
1213 | s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len; | |
1214 | session_id = s->tmp_session_id; | |
fc7129dc | 1215 | if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE |
16cfc2c9 | 1216 | && RAND_bytes(s->tmp_session_id, sess_id_len) <= 0) { |
a5816a5a MC |
1217 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
1218 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1219 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1220 | return 0; | |
1221 | } | |
1222 | } else { | |
1223 | sess_id_len = 0; | |
1224 | } | |
1225 | } else { | |
dee0cc10 | 1226 | assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id)); |
ec60ccc1 | 1227 | sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length; |
a5816a5a MC |
1228 | if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) { |
1229 | s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len; | |
1230 | memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len); | |
1231 | } | |
1232 | } | |
dee0cc10 | 1233 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) |
a5816a5a | 1234 | || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id, |
ec60ccc1 | 1235 | sess_id_len)) |
7cea05dc | 1236 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1237 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1238 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 1239 | return 0; |
b9908bf9 | 1240 | } |
0f113f3e | 1241 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
1242 | /* cookie stuff for DTLS */ |
1243 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
2c7b4dbc | 1244 | if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie) |
7cea05dc | 1245 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie, |
b2b3024e | 1246 | s->d1->cookie_len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1247 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1248 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 1249 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 1250 | } |
b9908bf9 MC |
1251 | } |
1252 | ||
1253 | /* Ciphers supported */ | |
7cea05dc | 1254 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1255 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1256 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 1257 | return 0; |
2c7b4dbc | 1258 | } |
635c8f77 | 1259 | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1260 | if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) { |
1261 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
7cea05dc | 1262 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 1263 | } |
7cea05dc | 1264 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1265 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1266 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 1267 | return 0; |
b9908bf9 | 1268 | } |
0f113f3e | 1269 | |
b9908bf9 | 1270 | /* COMPRESSION */ |
7cea05dc | 1271 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1272 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1273 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 1274 | return 0; |
2c7b4dbc MC |
1275 | } |
1276 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
c19602b5 MC |
1277 | if (ssl_allow_compression(s) |
1278 | && s->ctx->comp_methods | |
1279 | && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) { | |
2c7b4dbc MC |
1280 | int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); |
1281 | for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) { | |
1282 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i); | |
7cea05dc | 1283 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1284 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
1285 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1286 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 1287 | return 0; |
2c7b4dbc MC |
1288 | } |
1289 | } | |
b9908bf9 | 1290 | } |
09b6c2ef | 1291 | #endif |
2c7b4dbc | 1292 | /* Add the NULL method */ |
7cea05dc | 1293 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1294 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1295 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7cea05dc | 1296 | return 0; |
2c7b4dbc | 1297 | } |
761772d7 | 1298 | |
b9908bf9 | 1299 | /* TLS extensions */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
1300 | if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) { |
1301 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
7cea05dc | 1302 | return 0; |
b9908bf9 | 1303 | } |
0f113f3e | 1304 | |
b9908bf9 | 1305 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 1306 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1307 | |
be3583fa | 1308 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
8ba708e5 | 1309 | { |
cb150cbc | 1310 | size_t cookie_len; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1311 | PACKET cookiepkt; |
1312 | ||
1313 | if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2) | |
a230b26e | 1314 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1315 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, |
1316 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1317 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
8ba708e5 MC |
1318 | } |
1319 | ||
1320 | cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt); | |
1321 | if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1322 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, |
1323 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
1324 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
8ba708e5 MC |
1325 | } |
1326 | ||
1327 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1328 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, |
1329 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1330 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
8ba708e5 MC |
1331 | } |
1332 | s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len; | |
1333 | ||
1334 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; | |
8ba708e5 MC |
1335 | } |
1336 | ||
11c67eea | 1337 | static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars) |
b9908bf9 MC |
1338 | { |
1339 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; | |
1340 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
11c67eea MC |
1341 | int i; |
1342 | ||
1343 | c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0); | |
1344 | if (c == NULL) { | |
1345 | /* unknown cipher */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1346 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, |
1347 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); | |
11c67eea MC |
1348 | return 0; |
1349 | } | |
1350 | /* | |
1351 | * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello, | |
1352 | * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error. | |
1353 | */ | |
8af91fd9 | 1354 | if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1355 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, |
1356 | SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); | |
11c67eea MC |
1357 | return 0; |
1358 | } | |
1359 | ||
1360 | sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); | |
1361 | i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c); | |
1362 | if (i < 0) { | |
1363 | /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1364 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, |
1365 | SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); | |
11c67eea MC |
1366 | return 0; |
1367 | } | |
1368 | ||
1369 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL | |
1370 | && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) { | |
1371 | /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1372 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, |
1373 | SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); | |
11c67eea MC |
1374 | return 0; |
1375 | } | |
1376 | ||
1377 | /* | |
1378 | * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher | |
1379 | * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is | |
1380 | * set and use it for comparison. | |
1381 | */ | |
1382 | if (s->session->cipher != NULL) | |
1383 | s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; | |
1384 | if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) { | |
a055a881 MC |
1385 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
1386 | /* | |
1387 | * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different | |
1388 | * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same. | |
1389 | */ | |
1390 | if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2) | |
1391 | != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1392 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
1393 | SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, | |
1394 | SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED); | |
a055a881 MC |
1395 | return 0; |
1396 | } | |
1397 | } else { | |
1398 | /* | |
1399 | * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same | |
1400 | * ciphersuite. | |
1401 | */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1402 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, |
1403 | SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); | |
a055a881 MC |
1404 | return 0; |
1405 | } | |
11c67eea MC |
1406 | } |
1407 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; | |
1408 | ||
1409 | return 1; | |
1410 | } | |
1411 | ||
1412 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
1413 | { | |
332eb390 | 1414 | PACKET session_id, extpkt; |
b9908bf9 | 1415 | size_t session_id_len; |
b6981744 | 1416 | const unsigned char *cipherchars; |
597c51bc | 1417 | int hrr = 0; |
b9908bf9 | 1418 | unsigned int compression; |
4fa52141 | 1419 | unsigned int sversion; |
3434f40b | 1420 | unsigned int context; |
332eb390 | 1421 | RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL; |
b9908bf9 MC |
1422 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
1423 | SSL_COMP *comp; | |
1424 | #endif | |
1425 | ||
4fa52141 | 1426 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1427 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, |
1428 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1429 | goto err; | |
4fa52141 | 1430 | } |
50932c4a | 1431 | |
c3043dcd | 1432 | /* load the server random */ |
597c51bc MC |
1433 | if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION |
1434 | && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION | |
1435 | && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1436 | && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) { | |
fc7129dc MC |
1437 | s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING; |
1438 | hrr = 1; | |
597c51bc MC |
1439 | if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { |
1440 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1441 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1442 | goto err; | |
1443 | } | |
1444 | } else { | |
1445 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { | |
1446 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1447 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1448 | goto err; | |
1449 | } | |
c3043dcd MC |
1450 | } |
1451 | ||
88050dd1 MC |
1452 | /* Get the session-id. */ |
1453 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) { | |
1454 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1455 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
f63a17d6 | 1456 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1457 | } |
88050dd1 MC |
1458 | session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id); |
1459 | if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id) | |
1460 | || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) { | |
1461 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1462 | SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); | |
f63a17d6 | 1463 | goto err; |
524420d8 MC |
1464 | } |
1465 | ||
73999b62 | 1466 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1467 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, |
1468 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1469 | goto err; | |
fc5ce51d EK |
1470 | } |
1471 | ||
88050dd1 MC |
1472 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) { |
1473 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1474 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1475 | goto err; | |
4ff65f77 MC |
1476 | } |
1477 | ||
1478 | /* TLS extensions */ | |
597c51bc | 1479 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) { |
4ff65f77 | 1480 | PACKET_null_init(&extpkt); |
26b9172a MC |
1481 | } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt) |
1482 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1483 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, |
1484 | SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
1485 | goto err; | |
4ff65f77 MC |
1486 | } |
1487 | ||
597c51bc MC |
1488 | if (!hrr) { |
1489 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, | |
1490 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | |
1491 | | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1492 | &extensions, NULL, 1)) { | |
1493 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1494 | goto err; | |
1495 | } | |
1496 | ||
1497 | if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) { | |
1498 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1499 | goto err; | |
1500 | } | |
88050dd1 MC |
1501 | } |
1502 | ||
597c51bc MC |
1503 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) { |
1504 | if (compression != 0) { | |
1505 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1506 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1507 | SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); | |
1508 | goto err; | |
1509 | } | |
1510 | ||
1511 | if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len | |
1512 | || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id, | |
1513 | session_id_len) != 0) { | |
1514 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1515 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID); | |
1516 | goto err; | |
1517 | } | |
1518 | } | |
1519 | ||
1520 | if (hrr) { | |
1521 | if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) { | |
1522 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1523 | goto err; | |
1524 | } | |
1525 | ||
1526 | return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt); | |
88050dd1 MC |
1527 | } |
1528 | ||
1529 | /* | |
1530 | * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions | |
1531 | * are appropriate for this version. | |
1532 | */ | |
fe874d27 MC |
1533 | context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO |
1534 | : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO; | |
88050dd1 MC |
1535 | if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) { |
1536 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1537 | SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); | |
1538 | goto err; | |
1539 | } | |
1540 | ||
4ff65f77 MC |
1541 | s->hit = 0; |
1542 | ||
1543 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
a5816a5a MC |
1544 | /* |
1545 | * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of | |
1546 | * the message must be on a record boundary. | |
1547 | */ | |
1548 | if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
1549 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, | |
1550 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1551 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
1552 | goto err; | |
1553 | } | |
1554 | ||
4ff65f77 MC |
1555 | /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */ |
1556 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk, | |
fe874d27 | 1557 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, |
88050dd1 | 1558 | extensions, NULL, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1559 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
1560 | goto err; | |
1561 | } | |
4ff65f77 | 1562 | } else { |
8c1a5343 | 1563 | /* |
4ff65f77 MC |
1564 | * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared |
1565 | * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption. | |
1566 | * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs. | |
1567 | * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs) | |
1568 | * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application | |
1569 | * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether | |
1570 | * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session | |
1571 | * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we | |
1572 | * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake | |
1573 | * message to see if the server wants to resume. | |
8c1a5343 | 1574 | */ |
4ff65f77 MC |
1575 | if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION |
1576 | && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) { | |
1577 | const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; | |
1578 | /* | |
1579 | * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for | |
1580 | * backwards compat reasons | |
1581 | */ | |
1582 | int master_key_length; | |
1583 | master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); | |
1584 | if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, | |
1585 | &master_key_length, | |
1586 | NULL, &pref_cipher, | |
1587 | s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) | |
1588 | && master_key_length > 0) { | |
1589 | s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; | |
1590 | s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? | |
60d685d1 | 1591 | pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0); |
4ff65f77 | 1592 | } else { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1593 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
1594 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1595 | goto err; | |
4ff65f77 | 1596 | } |
0f113f3e | 1597 | } |
4ff65f77 MC |
1598 | |
1599 | if (session_id_len != 0 | |
1600 | && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length | |
1601 | && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id, | |
1602 | session_id_len) == 0) | |
1603 | s->hit = 1; | |
50932c4a MC |
1604 | } |
1605 | ||
4ff65f77 | 1606 | if (s->hit) { |
0f113f3e | 1607 | if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length |
4ff65f77 | 1608 | || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) { |
0f113f3e | 1609 | /* actually a client application bug */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
1610 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
1611 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1612 | SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); | |
1613 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 1614 | } |
6e3d0153 | 1615 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 1616 | /* |
6e3d0153 | 1617 | * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server |
4ff65f77 | 1618 | * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION. |
6e3d0153 EK |
1619 | * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID, |
1620 | * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be | |
1621 | * overwritten if the server refuses resumption. | |
0f113f3e | 1622 | */ |
4ff65f77 MC |
1623 | if (s->session->session_id_length > 0 |
1624 | || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
1625 | && s->session->ext.tick_identity | |
1626 | != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) { | |
9ef9088c | 1627 | tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss); |
0f113f3e | 1628 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1629 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
1630 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1631 | } |
1632 | } | |
50932c4a | 1633 | |
ccae4a15 | 1634 | s->session->ssl_version = s->version; |
a5816a5a MC |
1635 | /* |
1636 | * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can | |
1637 | * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an | |
1638 | * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be | |
1639 | * used for resumption. | |
1640 | */ | |
1641 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
1642 | s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len; | |
1643 | /* session_id_len could be 0 */ | |
1644 | if (session_id_len > 0) | |
1645 | memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id), | |
1646 | session_id_len); | |
1647 | } | |
0f113f3e | 1648 | } |
fc5ce51d | 1649 | |
ccae4a15 FI |
1650 | /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */ |
1651 | if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1652 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, |
1653 | SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH); | |
1654 | goto err; | |
ccae4a15 | 1655 | } |
0f113f3e | 1656 | /* |
3eb2aff4 KR |
1657 | * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed |
1658 | * version. | |
1659 | */ | |
1660 | s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version; | |
1661 | s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version; | |
0f113f3e | 1662 | |
11c67eea | 1663 | if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1664 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
1665 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1666 | } |
1667 | ||
09b6c2ef | 1668 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
fc5ce51d | 1669 | if (compression != 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1670 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, |
1671 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); | |
1672 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1673 | } |
1674 | /* | |
1675 | * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session | |
1676 | * using compression. | |
1677 | */ | |
1678 | if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1679 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, |
1680 | SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); | |
1681 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 1682 | } |
09b6c2ef | 1683 | #else |
fc5ce51d | 1684 | if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) { |
f63a17d6 | 1685 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, |
dd5a4279 | 1686 | SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED); |
f63a17d6 | 1687 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1688 | } |
fc5ce51d | 1689 | if (compression == 0) |
0f113f3e MC |
1690 | comp = NULL; |
1691 | else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1692 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, |
1693 | SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED); | |
1694 | goto err; | |
fc5ce51d EK |
1695 | } else { |
1696 | comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression); | |
1697 | } | |
0f113f3e | 1698 | |
fc5ce51d | 1699 | if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1700 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, |
1701 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); | |
1702 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1703 | } else { |
1704 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; | |
1705 | } | |
09b6c2ef | 1706 | #endif |
761772d7 | 1707 | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1708 | if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) { |
1709 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1710 | goto err; | |
1711 | } | |
332eb390 | 1712 | |
8723588e MC |
1713 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
1714 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { | |
1715 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
1716 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
1717 | ||
1718 | /* | |
1719 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
1720 | * no SCTP used. | |
1721 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
1722 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
1723 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
8723588e MC |
1724 | |
1725 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, | |
a230b26e EK |
1726 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), |
1727 | labelbuffer, | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1728 | sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { |
1729 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1730 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1731 | goto err; | |
1732 | } | |
8723588e MC |
1733 | |
1734 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), | |
1735 | BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, | |
1736 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
1737 | } | |
1738 | #endif | |
1739 | ||
92760c21 MC |
1740 | /* |
1741 | * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise | |
1742 | * we're done with this message | |
1743 | */ | |
1744 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
1745 | && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) | |
92760c21 MC |
1746 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
1747 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1748 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
1749 | goto err; | |
92760c21 MC |
1750 | } |
1751 | ||
1b0286a3 | 1752 | OPENSSL_free(extensions); |
b9908bf9 | 1753 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
f63a17d6 | 1754 | err: |
1b0286a3 | 1755 | OPENSSL_free(extensions); |
b9908bf9 | 1756 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 1757 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1758 | |
597c51bc MC |
1759 | static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, |
1760 | PACKET *extpkt) | |
3847d426 | 1761 | { |
3847d426 | 1762 | RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL; |
3847d426 | 1763 | |
d4504fe5 MC |
1764 | /* |
1765 | * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and | |
1766 | * should not be used. | |
1767 | */ | |
1768 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
1769 | s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; | |
1770 | ||
597c51bc | 1771 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, |
f63a17d6 | 1772 | &extensions, NULL, 1) |
fe874d27 | 1773 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, |
f63a17d6 MC |
1774 | extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) { |
1775 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1776 | goto err; | |
1777 | } | |
3847d426 MC |
1778 | |
1779 | OPENSSL_free(extensions); | |
66d4bf6b MC |
1780 | extensions = NULL; |
1781 | ||
f5d270ca BK |
1782 | if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 |
1783 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) | |
1784 | && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL | |
1785 | #endif | |
1786 | ) { | |
66d4bf6b MC |
1787 | /* |
1788 | * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next | |
1789 | * ClientHello will not change | |
1790 | */ | |
f63a17d6 | 1791 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
597c51bc MC |
1792 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, |
1793 | SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR); | |
f63a17d6 | 1794 | goto err; |
66d4bf6b | 1795 | } |
3847d426 | 1796 | |
11c67eea MC |
1797 | /* |
1798 | * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with | |
1799 | * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1. | |
1800 | */ | |
43054d3d | 1801 | if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1802 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
1803 | goto err; | |
11c67eea MC |
1804 | } |
1805 | ||
1806 | /* | |
1807 | * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done | |
1808 | * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the | |
1809 | * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now | |
1810 | * for HRR messages. | |
1811 | */ | |
1812 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
1813 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1814 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
1815 | goto err; | |
11c67eea MC |
1816 | } |
1817 | ||
3847d426 | 1818 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
f63a17d6 | 1819 | err: |
3847d426 MC |
1820 | OPENSSL_free(extensions); |
1821 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
1822 | } | |
1823 | ||
be3583fa | 1824 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 1825 | { |
f63a17d6 | 1826 | int i; |
eb5fd03b | 1827 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
b9908bf9 MC |
1828 | unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len; |
1829 | X509 *x = NULL; | |
b6981744 | 1830 | const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; |
b9908bf9 MC |
1831 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; |
1832 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
7f6b466b | 1833 | size_t chainidx, certidx; |
e96e0f8e | 1834 | unsigned int context = 0; |
7f6b466b | 1835 | const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu; |
0f113f3e MC |
1836 | |
1837 | if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1838 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, |
1839 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
cc273a93 | 1840 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1841 | } |
1842 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
1843 | if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context)) |
1844 | || context != 0 | |
1845 | || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len) | |
1a281aab MC |
1846 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len |
1847 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1848 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, |
1849 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1850 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 1851 | } |
d805a57b | 1852 | for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) { |
73999b62 | 1853 | if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len) |
a230b26e | 1854 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1855 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
1856 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, | |
1857 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1858 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1859 | } |
1860 | ||
df758a85 MC |
1861 | certstart = certbytes; |
1862 | x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len); | |
0f113f3e | 1863 | if (x == NULL) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1864 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, |
1865 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
1866 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 1867 | } |
df758a85 | 1868 | if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1869 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
1870 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, | |
1871 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1872 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 1873 | } |
e96e0f8e MC |
1874 | |
1875 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
1876 | RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; | |
1877 | PACKET extensions; | |
1878 | ||
1879 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1880 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
1881 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, | |
1882 | SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
1883 | goto err; | |
e96e0f8e | 1884 | } |
fe874d27 MC |
1885 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, |
1886 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts, | |
f63a17d6 | 1887 | NULL, chainidx == 0) |
8e1634ec | 1888 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, |
f63a17d6 | 1889 | rawexts, x, chainidx, |
8e1634ec | 1890 | PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { |
5ee289ea | 1891 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); |
f63a17d6 MC |
1892 | /* SSLfatal already called */ |
1893 | goto err; | |
5ee289ea MC |
1894 | } |
1895 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
1896 | } |
1897 | ||
0f113f3e | 1898 | if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
1899 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
1900 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, | |
1901 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
cc273a93 | 1902 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1903 | } |
1904 | x = NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1905 | } |
1906 | ||
1907 | i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); | |
c8e2f98c MC |
1908 | /* |
1909 | * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order | |
1910 | * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place. | |
1911 | * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set | |
1912 | * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes | |
1913 | * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was | |
1914 | * reverted because at least one application *only* set | |
1915 | * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused | |
1916 | * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did | |
1917 | * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags | |
1918 | * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the | |
1919 | * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is | |
1920 | * set. The *documented* interface remains the same. | |
1921 | */ | |
1922 | if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) { | |
c6d38183 | 1923 | SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result), |
f63a17d6 MC |
1924 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, |
1925 | SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); | |
1926 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1927 | } |
1928 | ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ | |
1929 | if (i > 1) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1930 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
1931 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i); | |
1932 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1933 | } |
1934 | ||
c34b0f99 | 1935 | s->session->peer_chain = sk; |
0f113f3e MC |
1936 | /* |
1937 | * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate, | |
d4d78943 | 1938 | * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c |
0f113f3e MC |
1939 | */ |
1940 | x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); | |
1941 | sk = NULL; | |
0f113f3e | 1942 | |
8382fd3a | 1943 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); |
0f113f3e | 1944 | |
55a9a16f | 1945 | if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) { |
0f113f3e | 1946 | x = NULL; |
f63a17d6 MC |
1947 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, |
1948 | SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); | |
1949 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1950 | } |
1951 | ||
7f6b466b | 1952 | if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) { |
0f113f3e | 1953 | x = NULL; |
f63a17d6 MC |
1954 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
1955 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, | |
1956 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); | |
1957 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 1958 | } |
05b8486e DSH |
1959 | /* |
1960 | * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3 | |
1961 | * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate | |
1962 | * type. | |
1963 | */ | |
1964 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
7f6b466b | 1965 | if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) { |
05b8486e | 1966 | x = NULL; |
f63a17d6 MC |
1967 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, |
1968 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, | |
1969 | SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); | |
1970 | goto err; | |
05b8486e | 1971 | } |
0f113f3e | 1972 | } |
7f6b466b | 1973 | s->session->peer_type = certidx; |
55a9a16f MC |
1974 | |
1975 | X509_free(s->session->peer); | |
05f0fb9f | 1976 | X509_up_ref(x); |
55a9a16f | 1977 | s->session->peer = x; |
0f113f3e | 1978 | s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; |
0f113f3e | 1979 | x = NULL; |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
1980 | |
1981 | /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ | |
1982 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
1983 | && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
1984 | sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash), | |
1985 | &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
1986 | /* SSLfatal() already called */; |
1987 | goto err; | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
1988 | } |
1989 | ||
b9908bf9 | 1990 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
66696478 | 1991 | |
cc273a93 | 1992 | err: |
0f113f3e MC |
1993 | X509_free(x); |
1994 | sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); | |
b9908bf9 | 1995 | return ret; |
0f113f3e | 1996 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1997 | |
a2c2e000 | 1998 | static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
02a74590 MC |
1999 | { |
2000 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK | |
7dc1c647 | 2001 | PACKET psk_identity_hint; |
02a74590 | 2002 | |
7dc1c647 MC |
2003 | /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */ |
2004 | ||
2005 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2006 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2007 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
7dc1c647 MC |
2008 | return 0; |
2009 | } | |
2010 | ||
2011 | /* | |
2012 | * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in | |
2013 | * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of | |
2014 | * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK | |
2015 | * identity. | |
2016 | */ | |
2017 | if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2018 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
2019 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, | |
2020 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
7dc1c647 MC |
2021 | return 0; |
2022 | } | |
02a74590 | 2023 | |
7dc1c647 MC |
2024 | if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) { |
2025 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); | |
2026 | s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL; | |
2027 | } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint, | |
a230b26e | 2028 | &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2029 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2030 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7dc1c647 MC |
2031 | return 0; |
2032 | } | |
2033 | ||
2034 | return 1; | |
2035 | #else | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2036 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2037 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
7dc1c647 | 2038 | return 0; |
02a74590 MC |
2039 | #endif |
2040 | } | |
2041 | ||
a2c2e000 | 2042 | static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) |
25c6c10c MC |
2043 | { |
2044 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
2045 | PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub; | |
2046 | ||
2047 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) | |
2048 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) | |
2049 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt) | |
2050 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2051 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, |
2052 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
25c6c10c MC |
2053 | return 0; |
2054 | } | |
2055 | ||
348240c6 | 2056 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */ |
25c6c10c MC |
2057 | if ((s->srp_ctx.N = |
2058 | BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), | |
348240c6 | 2059 | (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL |
25c6c10c MC |
2060 | || (s->srp_ctx.g = |
2061 | BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), | |
348240c6 | 2062 | (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL |
25c6c10c MC |
2063 | || (s->srp_ctx.s = |
2064 | BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt), | |
348240c6 | 2065 | (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL |
25c6c10c MC |
2066 | || (s->srp_ctx.B = |
2067 | BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub), | |
348240c6 | 2068 | (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2069 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, |
2070 | ERR_R_BN_LIB); | |
25c6c10c MC |
2071 | return 0; |
2072 | } | |
2073 | ||
a2c2e000 MC |
2074 | if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) { |
2075 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
25c6c10c MC |
2076 | return 0; |
2077 | } | |
2078 | ||
2079 | /* We must check if there is a certificate */ | |
a230b26e | 2080 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS)) |
25c6c10c MC |
2081 | *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); |
2082 | ||
2083 | return 1; | |
2084 | #else | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2085 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, |
2086 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
25c6c10c MC |
2087 | return 0; |
2088 | #endif | |
2089 | } | |
2090 | ||
a2c2e000 | 2091 | static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) |
e01a610d MC |
2092 | { |
2093 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH | |
2094 | PACKET prime, generator, pub_key; | |
2095 | EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL; | |
2096 | ||
2097 | DH *dh = NULL; | |
2098 | BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL; | |
2099 | ||
26505153 RL |
2100 | int check_bits = 0; |
2101 | ||
e01a610d MC |
2102 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) |
2103 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) | |
2104 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2105 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, |
2106 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
e01a610d MC |
2107 | return 0; |
2108 | } | |
2109 | ||
2110 | peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
2111 | dh = DH_new(); | |
2112 | ||
2113 | if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2114 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, |
2115 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
e01a610d MC |
2116 | goto err; |
2117 | } | |
2118 | ||
348240c6 MC |
2119 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */ |
2120 | p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL); | |
2121 | g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), | |
2122 | NULL); | |
2123 | bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), | |
2124 | (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL); | |
e01a610d | 2125 | if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2126 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, |
2127 | ERR_R_BN_LIB); | |
e01a610d MC |
2128 | goto err; |
2129 | } | |
2130 | ||
69687aa8 | 2131 | /* test non-zero pubkey */ |
26505153 | 2132 | if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2133 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, |
2134 | SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); | |
e01a610d MC |
2135 | goto err; |
2136 | } | |
2137 | ||
2138 | if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2139 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, |
2140 | ERR_R_BN_LIB); | |
e01a610d MC |
2141 | goto err; |
2142 | } | |
2143 | p = g = NULL; | |
2144 | ||
26505153 | 2145 | if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2146 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, |
2147 | SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); | |
26505153 RL |
2148 | goto err; |
2149 | } | |
2150 | ||
e01a610d | 2151 | if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2152 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, |
2153 | ERR_R_BN_LIB); | |
e01a610d MC |
2154 | goto err; |
2155 | } | |
2156 | bnpub_key = NULL; | |
2157 | ||
2158 | if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2159 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, |
2160 | SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
e01a610d MC |
2161 | goto err; |
2162 | } | |
2163 | ||
2164 | if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2165 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, |
2166 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
e01a610d MC |
2167 | goto err; |
2168 | } | |
2169 | ||
2170 | s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp; | |
2171 | ||
2172 | /* | |
2173 | * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with | |
2174 | * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this | |
2175 | */ | |
a230b26e | 2176 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS)) |
e01a610d MC |
2177 | *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); |
2178 | /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ | |
2179 | ||
2180 | return 1; | |
2181 | ||
2182 | err: | |
2183 | BN_free(p); | |
2184 | BN_free(g); | |
2185 | BN_free(bnpub_key); | |
2186 | DH_free(dh); | |
2187 | EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp); | |
2188 | ||
2189 | return 0; | |
2190 | #else | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2191 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, |
2192 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e01a610d MC |
2193 | return 0; |
2194 | #endif | |
2195 | } | |
2196 | ||
a2c2e000 | 2197 | static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2198 | { |
2199 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
2200 | PACKET encoded_pt; | |
6447e818 | 2201 | unsigned int curve_type, curve_id; |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2202 | |
2203 | /* | |
2204 | * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH | |
6447e818 | 2205 | * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2206 | * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. |
2207 | */ | |
6447e818 | 2208 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2209 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, |
2210 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2211 | return 0; |
2212 | } | |
2213 | /* | |
6447e818 DSH |
2214 | * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not |
2215 | * server has sent an invalid curve. | |
ff74aeb1 | 2216 | */ |
dcf8b01f MC |
2217 | if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE |
2218 | || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2219 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, |
2220 | SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); | |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2221 | return 0; |
2222 | } | |
2223 | ||
6447e818 | 2224 | if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2225 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, |
2226 | SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); | |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2227 | return 0; |
2228 | } | |
2229 | ||
ff74aeb1 | 2230 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2231 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, |
2232 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2233 | return 0; |
2234 | } | |
2235 | ||
ec24630a DSH |
2236 | if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp, |
2237 | PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), | |
2238 | PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2239 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, |
2240 | SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); | |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2241 | return 0; |
2242 | } | |
2243 | ||
2244 | /* | |
2245 | * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign | |
2246 | * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA | |
2247 | * and ECDSA. | |
2248 | */ | |
2249 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) | |
2250 | *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); | |
2251 | else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA) | |
2252 | *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); | |
2253 | /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ | |
2254 | ||
2255 | return 1; | |
2256 | #else | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2257 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, |
2258 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
ff74aeb1 MC |
2259 | return 0; |
2260 | #endif | |
2261 | } | |
2262 | ||
be3583fa | 2263 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 2264 | { |
e1e588ac | 2265 | long alg_k; |
b9908bf9 | 2266 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
fe3066ee MC |
2267 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL; |
2268 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; | |
73999b62 | 2269 | PACKET save_param_start, signature; |
b9908bf9 | 2270 | |
b9908bf9 MC |
2271 | alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
2272 | ||
73999b62 | 2273 | save_param_start = *pkt; |
8d92c1f8 | 2274 | |
3260adf1 | 2275 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) |
61dd9f7a DSH |
2276 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp); |
2277 | s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL; | |
3260adf1 | 2278 | #endif |
d02b48c6 | 2279 | |
7689082b | 2280 | if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2281 | if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) { |
2282 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
7dc1c647 | 2283 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 2284 | } |
7689082b DSH |
2285 | } |
2286 | ||
2287 | /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */ | |
2288 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { | |
25c6c10c | 2289 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2290 | if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) { |
2291 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0f113f3e | 2292 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 2293 | } |
e01a610d | 2294 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2295 | if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) { |
2296 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
e01a610d | 2297 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 2298 | } |
ff74aeb1 | 2299 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2300 | if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) { |
2301 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
ff74aeb1 | 2302 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 2303 | } |
0f113f3e | 2304 | } else if (alg_k) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2305 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2306 | SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
e1e588ac | 2307 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2308 | } |
0f113f3e | 2309 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2310 | /* if it was signed, check the signature */ |
2311 | if (pkey != NULL) { | |
32942870 | 2312 | PACKET params; |
be8dba2c MC |
2313 | int maxsig; |
2314 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2315 | unsigned char *tbs; |
2316 | size_t tbslen; | |
2317 | int rv; | |
e1e588ac | 2318 | |
32942870 EK |
2319 | /* |
2320 | * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference | |
2321 | * equals the length of the parameters. | |
2322 | */ | |
2323 | if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms, | |
2324 | PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) - | |
73999b62 | 2325 | PACKET_remaining(pkt))) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2326 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2327 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e1e588ac | 2328 | goto err; |
32942870 EK |
2329 | } |
2330 | ||
0f113f3e | 2331 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
703bcee0 | 2332 | unsigned int sigalg; |
703bcee0 MC |
2333 | |
2334 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2335 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2336 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
e1e588ac | 2337 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2338 | } |
f63a17d6 MC |
2339 | if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) { |
2340 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
0f113f3e | 2341 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2342 | } |
f365a3e2 | 2343 | } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2344 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2345 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f365a3e2 | 2346 | goto err; |
32942870 | 2347 | } |
0f113f3e | 2348 | |
b2021556 | 2349 | if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2350 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2351 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
b2021556 DSH |
2352 | goto err; |
2353 | } | |
44f23cd2 RS |
2354 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG |
2355 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) | |
5a4481f0 PY |
2356 | fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", |
2357 | md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
44f23cd2 | 2358 | #endif |
f365a3e2 | 2359 | |
73999b62 MC |
2360 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature) |
2361 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2362 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2363 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
e1e588ac | 2364 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2365 | } |
be8dba2c MC |
2366 | maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
2367 | if (maxsig < 0) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2368 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2369 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e1e588ac | 2370 | goto err; |
8098fc56 | 2371 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
2372 | |
2373 | /* | |
8098fc56 | 2374 | * Check signature length |
0f113f3e | 2375 | */ |
be8dba2c | 2376 | if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) { |
0f113f3e | 2377 | /* wrong packet length */ |
a2c2e000 | 2378 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
a230b26e | 2379 | SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); |
e1e588ac MC |
2380 | goto err; |
2381 | } | |
2382 | ||
2383 | md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
2384 | if (md_ctx == NULL) { | |
a2c2e000 | 2385 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
dd5a4279 | 2386 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
e1e588ac | 2387 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2388 | } |
e1e588ac | 2389 | |
fe3066ee | 2390 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2391 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2392 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
fe3066ee MC |
2393 | goto err; |
2394 | } | |
5554facb | 2395 | if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { |
fe3066ee | 2396 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 |
91410d40 | 2397 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, |
968ae5b3 | 2398 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2399 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2400 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
fe3066ee MC |
2401 | goto err; |
2402 | } | |
2403 | } | |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2404 | tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms), |
2405 | PACKET_remaining(¶ms)); | |
2406 | if (tbslen == 0) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2407 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
e1e588ac | 2408 | goto err; |
192e4bbb | 2409 | } |
72ceb6a6 DSH |
2410 | |
2411 | rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature), | |
2412 | PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen); | |
2413 | OPENSSL_free(tbs); | |
cfba0675 | 2414 | if (rv <= 0) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2415 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2416 | SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
e1e588ac | 2417 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2418 | } |
e1e588ac | 2419 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
fe3066ee | 2420 | md_ctx = NULL; |
0f113f3e | 2421 | } else { |
7689082b | 2422 | /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */ |
e1e588ac | 2423 | if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) |
a230b26e | 2424 | && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) { |
0f113f3e | 2425 | /* Might be wrong key type, check it */ |
e1e588ac | 2426 | if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2427 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2428 | SSL_R_BAD_DATA); | |
e1e588ac | 2429 | } |
a2c2e000 | 2430 | /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */ |
0f113f3e MC |
2431 | goto err; |
2432 | } | |
2433 | /* still data left over */ | |
73999b62 | 2434 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2435 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2436 | SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); | |
e1e588ac | 2437 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
2438 | } |
2439 | } | |
e1e588ac | 2440 | |
b9908bf9 | 2441 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
0f113f3e | 2442 | err: |
fe3066ee | 2443 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
b9908bf9 | 2444 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 2445 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2446 | |
be3583fa | 2447 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 2448 | { |
32f66107 DSH |
2449 | size_t i; |
2450 | ||
2451 | /* Clear certificate validity flags */ | |
2452 | for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) | |
2453 | s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0; | |
0f113f3e | 2454 | |
03f44b97 | 2455 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
32f66107 DSH |
2456 | PACKET reqctx, extensions; |
2457 | RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; | |
03f44b97 | 2458 | |
1bf4cb0f MC |
2459 | if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) { |
2460 | /* | |
2461 | * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3 | |
2462 | * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so | |
2463 | * we just ignore it | |
2464 | */ | |
2465 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; | |
2466 | } | |
2467 | ||
03f44b97 DSH |
2468 | /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */ |
2469 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype); | |
2470 | s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL; | |
2471 | s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0; | |
9d75dce3 TS |
2472 | OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context); |
2473 | s->pha_context = NULL; | |
32f66107 | 2474 | |
9d75dce3 TS |
2475 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) || |
2476 | !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2477 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
2478 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2479 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2480 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
03f44b97 | 2481 | } |
32f66107 DSH |
2482 | |
2483 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2484 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
2485 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2486 | SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
2487 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
32f66107 DSH |
2488 | } |
2489 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, | |
fe874d27 | 2490 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, |
f63a17d6 | 2491 | &rawexts, NULL, 1) |
fe874d27 | 2492 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, |
f63a17d6 MC |
2493 | rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) { |
2494 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
32f66107 | 2495 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); |
f63a17d6 | 2496 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
32f66107 DSH |
2497 | } |
2498 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); | |
2499 | if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2500 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2501 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2502 | SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
2503 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
32f66107 | 2504 | } |
03f44b97 DSH |
2505 | } else { |
2506 | PACKET ctypes; | |
75c13e78 | 2507 | |
03f44b97 DSH |
2508 | /* get the certificate types */ |
2509 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2510 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
2511 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2512 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2513 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
03f44b97 DSH |
2514 | } |
2515 | ||
2516 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2517 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2518 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2519 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2520 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
03f44b97 | 2521 | } |
ac112332 | 2522 | |
32f66107 DSH |
2523 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
2524 | PACKET sigalgs; | |
703bcee0 | 2525 | |
32f66107 | 2526 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) { |
848a950b | 2527 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
f63a17d6 MC |
2528 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, |
2529 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2530 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
32f66107 | 2531 | } |
ac112332 | 2532 | |
c589c34e BK |
2533 | /* |
2534 | * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility | |
2535 | * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field. | |
2536 | */ | |
2537 | if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2538 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2539 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2540 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); | |
2541 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
32f66107 DSH |
2542 | } |
2543 | if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2544 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2545 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2546 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2547 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
32f66107 | 2548 | } |
0f113f3e | 2549 | } |
0f113f3e | 2550 | |
32f66107 | 2551 | /* get the CA RDNs */ |
f63a17d6 MC |
2552 | if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) { |
2553 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2554 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2555 | } | |
03f44b97 DSH |
2556 | } |
2557 | ||
2558 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
848a950b | 2559 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, |
f63a17d6 MC |
2560 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, |
2561 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2562 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
03f44b97 | 2563 | } |
0f113f3e | 2564 | |
0f113f3e MC |
2565 | /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ |
2566 | s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1; | |
0f113f3e | 2567 | |
e4562014 MC |
2568 | /* |
2569 | * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until | |
2570 | * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because | |
2571 | * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message | |
2572 | * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that | |
2573 | * SSL_get_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in | |
2574 | * client_cert_cb. | |
2575 | */ | |
2576 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) | |
2577 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; | |
2578 | ||
f63a17d6 | 2579 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
0f113f3e MC |
2580 | } |
2581 | ||
be3583fa | 2582 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 2583 | { |
b9908bf9 | 2584 | unsigned int ticklen; |
9ac6244b | 2585 | unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0; |
ec60ccc1 | 2586 | unsigned int sess_len; |
de1df7e9 | 2587 | RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL; |
9b6a8254 | 2588 | PACKET nonce; |
b9908bf9 | 2589 | |
6cf2dbd9 MC |
2590 | PACKET_null_init(&nonce); |
2591 | ||
73999b62 | 2592 | if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint) |
9b6a8254 MC |
2593 | || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
2594 | && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add) | |
6cf2dbd9 | 2595 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce))) |
a230b26e | 2596 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen) |
10bda8f8 MC |
2597 | || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen) |
2598 | : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2599 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, |
2600 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2601 | goto err; | |
e711da71 EK |
2602 | } |
2603 | ||
de1df7e9 MC |
2604 | /* |
2605 | * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty | |
2606 | * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never | |
2607 | * be 0 here in that instance | |
2608 | */ | |
e711da71 | 2609 | if (ticklen == 0) |
c9de4a20 | 2610 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
e711da71 | 2611 | |
150840b9 MC |
2612 | /* |
2613 | * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise | |
2614 | * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions, | |
2615 | * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every | |
2616 | * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive | |
2617 | * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session | |
2618 | * cache. | |
2619 | */ | |
2620 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) { | |
98ece4ee | 2621 | SSL_SESSION *new_sess; |
1f156321 | 2622 | |
98ece4ee MC |
2623 | /* |
2624 | * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new | |
2625 | * one | |
2626 | */ | |
5d61491c | 2627 | if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2628 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2629 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
2630 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2631 | goto err; | |
5d61491c MC |
2632 | } |
2633 | ||
1f156321 MC |
2634 | if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0 |
2635 | && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
2636 | /* | |
2637 | * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that | |
2638 | * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the | |
2639 | * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails | |
2640 | */ | |
2641 | SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); | |
2642 | } | |
2643 | ||
98ece4ee MC |
2644 | SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); |
2645 | s->session = new_sess; | |
2646 | } | |
2647 | ||
fc24f0bf MC |
2648 | /* |
2649 | * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard - | |
2650 | * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok. | |
2651 | */ | |
2652 | s->session->time = (long)time(NULL); | |
2653 | ||
aff8c126 RS |
2654 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick); |
2655 | s->session->ext.tick = NULL; | |
2656 | s->session->ext.ticklen = 0; | |
e711da71 | 2657 | |
aff8c126 RS |
2658 | s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); |
2659 | if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2660 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, |
2661 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
0f113f3e MC |
2662 | goto err; |
2663 | } | |
aff8c126 | 2664 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2665 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, |
2666 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2667 | goto err; | |
561e12bb | 2668 | } |
e711da71 | 2669 | |
aff8c126 | 2670 | s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint; |
fc24f0bf | 2671 | s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add; |
aff8c126 | 2672 | s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen; |
de1df7e9 MC |
2673 | |
2674 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
2675 | PACKET extpkt; | |
2676 | ||
2677 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt) | |
1cde0259 MC |
2678 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
2679 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, | |
2680 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
2681 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2682 | goto err; | |
2683 | } | |
2684 | ||
2685 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, | |
2686 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts, | |
2687 | NULL, 1) | |
fe874d27 MC |
2688 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, |
2689 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2690 | exts, NULL, 0, 1)) { |
2691 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2692 | goto err; | |
de1df7e9 MC |
2693 | } |
2694 | } | |
2695 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
2696 | /* |
2697 | * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set | |
2698 | * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in | |
2699 | * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work | |
2700 | * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The | |
2701 | * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is | |
2702 | * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption. | |
2703 | * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions | |
2704 | * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is | |
2705 | * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket. | |
2706 | */ | |
ec60ccc1 MC |
2707 | /* |
2708 | * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int | |
2709 | * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t | |
2710 | */ | |
aff8c126 | 2711 | if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen, |
ec60ccc1 | 2712 | s->session->session_id, &sess_len, |
d166ed8c | 2713 | EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2714 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, |
2715 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
d166ed8c DSH |
2716 | goto err; |
2717 | } | |
ec60ccc1 | 2718 | s->session->session_id_length = sess_len; |
4cb00457 | 2719 | s->session->not_resumable = 0; |
de1df7e9 MC |
2720 | |
2721 | /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */ | |
2722 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
4ff1a526 MC |
2723 | const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); |
2724 | int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md); | |
2725 | size_t hashlen; | |
2726 | static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption"; | |
2727 | ||
2728 | /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */ | |
2729 | if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) { | |
2730 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2731 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
2732 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2733 | goto err; | |
2734 | } | |
2735 | hashlen = (size_t)hashleni; | |
2736 | ||
2737 | if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret, | |
2738 | nonce_label, | |
2739 | sizeof(nonce_label) - 1, | |
6cf2dbd9 MC |
2740 | PACKET_data(&nonce), |
2741 | PACKET_remaining(&nonce), | |
4ff1a526 | 2742 | s->session->master_key, |
0fb2815b | 2743 | hashlen, 1)) { |
4ff1a526 MC |
2744 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
2745 | goto err; | |
2746 | } | |
2747 | s->session->master_key_length = hashlen; | |
2748 | ||
33d93417 | 2749 | OPENSSL_free(exts); |
de1df7e9 MC |
2750 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); |
2751 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; | |
2752 | } | |
2753 | ||
b9908bf9 | 2754 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
0f113f3e | 2755 | err: |
33d93417 | 2756 | OPENSSL_free(exts); |
b9908bf9 | 2757 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 2758 | } |
67c8e7f4 | 2759 | |
f63e4288 MC |
2760 | /* |
2761 | * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to | |
f63a17d6 | 2762 | * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure |
f63e4288 | 2763 | */ |
f63a17d6 | 2764 | int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 2765 | { |
8b0e934a | 2766 | size_t resplen; |
b9908bf9 | 2767 | unsigned int type; |
b9908bf9 | 2768 | |
73999b62 | 2769 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type) |
a230b26e | 2770 | || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2771 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, |
2772 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); | |
f63e4288 | 2773 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2774 | } |
56a26ce3 MC |
2775 | if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen) |
2776 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2777 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, |
2778 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
f63e4288 | 2779 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2780 | } |
8cbfcc70 RS |
2781 | s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen); |
2782 | if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2783 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, |
2784 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
f63e4288 | 2785 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2786 | } |
8cbfcc70 | 2787 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2788 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, |
2789 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
f63e4288 | 2790 | return 0; |
ac63710a | 2791 | } |
8cbfcc70 | 2792 | s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen; |
f63e4288 MC |
2793 | |
2794 | return 1; | |
2795 | } | |
2faa1b48 | 2796 | |
f63e4288 MC |
2797 | |
2798 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
2799 | { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2800 | if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { |
2801 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
f63e4288 MC |
2802 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
2803 | } | |
2804 | ||
b9908bf9 | 2805 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
0f113f3e | 2806 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2807 | |
7776a36c MC |
2808 | /* |
2809 | * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the | |
2810 | * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message. | |
6530c490 MC |
2811 | * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0 |
2812 | * on failure. | |
7776a36c | 2813 | */ |
f63a17d6 | 2814 | int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s) |
b9908bf9 | 2815 | { |
a455d0f6 MC |
2816 | /* |
2817 | * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from | |
2818 | * the server | |
2819 | */ | |
2820 | if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2821 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
7776a36c | 2822 | return 0; |
a455d0f6 MC |
2823 | } |
2824 | ||
bb1aaab4 | 2825 | /* |
aff8c126 RS |
2826 | * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and |
2827 | * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status | |
bb1aaab4 MC |
2828 | * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise |
2829 | */ | |
aff8c126 RS |
2830 | if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing |
2831 | && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { | |
2832 | int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg); | |
2833 | ||
bb1aaab4 | 2834 | if (ret == 0) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
2835 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE, |
2836 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT, | |
2837 | SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); | |
7776a36c | 2838 | return 0; |
bb1aaab4 MC |
2839 | } |
2840 | if (ret < 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2841 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
2842 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT, | |
dd5a4279 | 2843 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
7776a36c | 2844 | return 0; |
bb1aaab4 MC |
2845 | } |
2846 | } | |
ed29e82a RP |
2847 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT |
2848 | if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { | |
43341433 VD |
2849 | /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */ |
2850 | if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { | |
f63a17d6 | 2851 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
7776a36c | 2852 | return 0; |
ed29e82a RP |
2853 | } |
2854 | } | |
2855 | #endif | |
2856 | ||
7776a36c MC |
2857 | return 1; |
2858 | } | |
2859 | ||
2860 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
2861 | { | |
7776a36c MC |
2862 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { |
2863 | /* should contain no data */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2864 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, |
2865 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2866 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
7776a36c MC |
2867 | } |
2868 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
2869 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { | |
2870 | if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
2871 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, |
2872 | SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC); | |
2873 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
7776a36c MC |
2874 | } |
2875 | } | |
2876 | #endif | |
2877 | ||
f63a17d6 MC |
2878 | if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { |
2879 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2880 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2881 | } | |
7776a36c | 2882 | |
bd79bcb4 | 2883 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; |
0f113f3e | 2884 | } |
176f31dd | 2885 | |
a2c2e000 | 2886 | static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2887 | { |
7689082b | 2888 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
13c0ec4a MC |
2889 | int ret = 0; |
2890 | /* | |
2891 | * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a | |
2892 | * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating | |
2893 | * strnlen. | |
2894 | */ | |
2895 | char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; | |
2896 | size_t identitylen = 0; | |
2897 | unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; | |
2898 | unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL; | |
2899 | char *tmpidentity = NULL; | |
2900 | size_t psklen = 0; | |
2901 | ||
2902 | if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2903 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2904 | SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2905 | goto err; |
2906 | } | |
d02b48c6 | 2907 | |
13c0ec4a | 2908 | memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); |
d02b48c6 | 2909 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2910 | psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint, |
2911 | identity, sizeof(identity) - 1, | |
2912 | psk, sizeof(psk)); | |
7689082b | 2913 | |
13c0ec4a | 2914 | if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2915 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
2916 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2917 | goto err; |
2918 | } else if (psklen == 0) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2919 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
2920 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, | |
2921 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2922 | goto err; |
2923 | } | |
7689082b | 2924 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2925 | identitylen = strlen(identity); |
2926 | if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2927 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2928 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2929 | goto err; |
2930 | } | |
7689082b | 2931 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2932 | tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); |
2933 | tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity); | |
2934 | if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2935 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2936 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2937 | goto err; |
2938 | } | |
7689082b | 2939 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2940 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); |
2941 | s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk; | |
2942 | s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; | |
2943 | tmppsk = NULL; | |
2944 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); | |
2945 | s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity; | |
2946 | tmpidentity = NULL; | |
f1ec23c0 | 2947 | |
b2b3024e | 2948 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
2949 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2950 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f1ec23c0 MC |
2951 | goto err; |
2952 | } | |
7689082b | 2953 | |
13c0ec4a | 2954 | ret = 1; |
0bce0b02 | 2955 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2956 | err: |
2957 | OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); | |
2958 | OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity)); | |
2959 | OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen); | |
2960 | OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen); | |
d02b48c6 | 2961 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2962 | return ret; |
2963 | #else | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2964 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
2965 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
13c0ec4a | 2966 | return 0; |
b9908bf9 | 2967 | #endif |
13c0ec4a | 2968 | } |
b9908bf9 | 2969 | |
a2c2e000 | 2970 | static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
13c0ec4a | 2971 | { |
bc36ee62 | 2972 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
f1ec23c0 | 2973 | unsigned char *encdata = NULL; |
13c0ec4a MC |
2974 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; |
2975 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; | |
2976 | size_t enclen; | |
2977 | unsigned char *pms = NULL; | |
2978 | size_t pmslen = 0; | |
b9908bf9 | 2979 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2980 | if (s->session->peer == NULL) { |
2981 | /* | |
2982 | * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. | |
2983 | */ | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2984 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, |
2985 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2986 | return 0; |
2987 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2988 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2989 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); |
2990 | if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2991 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, |
2992 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2993 | return 0; |
2994 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2995 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
2996 | pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; |
2997 | pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); | |
2998 | if (pms == NULL) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
2999 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, |
3000 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
13c0ec4a MC |
3001 | return 0; |
3002 | } | |
0bce0b02 | 3003 | |
13c0ec4a MC |
3004 | pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8; |
3005 | pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; | |
348240c6 | 3006 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ |
16cfc2c9 | 3007 | if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
3008 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, |
3009 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
13c0ec4a MC |
3010 | goto err; |
3011 | } | |
0f113f3e | 3012 | |
13c0ec4a | 3013 | /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ |
f1ec23c0 | 3014 | if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
3015 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, |
3016 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f1ec23c0 MC |
3017 | goto err; |
3018 | } | |
13c0ec4a MC |
3019 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); |
3020 | if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0 | |
3021 | || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3022 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, |
3023 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
13c0ec4a MC |
3024 | goto err; |
3025 | } | |
f1ec23c0 MC |
3026 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata) |
3027 | || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3028 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, |
3029 | SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); | |
13c0ec4a MC |
3030 | goto err; |
3031 | } | |
13c0ec4a MC |
3032 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); |
3033 | pctx = NULL; | |
0f113f3e | 3034 | |
13c0ec4a | 3035 | /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ |
f1ec23c0 | 3036 | if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
3037 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, |
3038 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f1ec23c0 | 3039 | goto err; |
b9908bf9 | 3040 | } |
13c0ec4a | 3041 | |
2faa1b48 | 3042 | /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */ |
a2c2e000 MC |
3043 | if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) { |
3044 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2faa1b48 | 3045 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 3046 | } |
2faa1b48 | 3047 | |
26fb4b03 RS |
3048 | s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; |
3049 | s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen; | |
3050 | ||
13c0ec4a MC |
3051 | return 1; |
3052 | err: | |
3053 | OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); | |
3054 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); | |
3055 | ||
3056 | return 0; | |
3057 | #else | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3058 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, |
3059 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
13c0ec4a | 3060 | return 0; |
f9b3bff6 | 3061 | #endif |
13c0ec4a MC |
3062 | } |
3063 | ||
a2c2e000 | 3064 | static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
a8c1c704 MC |
3065 | { |
3066 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH | |
3067 | DH *dh_clnt = NULL; | |
3068 | const BIGNUM *pub_key; | |
3069 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; | |
f1ec23c0 | 3070 | unsigned char *keybytes = NULL; |
a8c1c704 MC |
3071 | |
3072 | skey = s->s3->peer_tmp; | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3073 | if (skey == NULL) { |
3074 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, | |
3075 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f1ec23c0 | 3076 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 3077 | } |
f1ec23c0 | 3078 | |
0a699a07 | 3079 | ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey); |
a2c2e000 MC |
3080 | if (ckey == NULL) { |
3081 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, | |
3082 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
b599ce3b | 3083 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 3084 | } |
b599ce3b | 3085 | |
a8c1c704 MC |
3086 | dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); |
3087 | ||
a2c2e000 MC |
3088 | if (dh_clnt == NULL) { |
3089 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, | |
3090 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3091 | goto err; | |
3092 | } | |
3093 | ||
3094 | if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) { | |
3095 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
f1ec23c0 | 3096 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 3097 | } |
a8c1c704 MC |
3098 | |
3099 | /* send off the data */ | |
3100 | DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL); | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3101 | if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), |
3102 | &keybytes)) { | |
3103 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, | |
3104 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f1ec23c0 | 3105 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 3106 | } |
f1ec23c0 MC |
3107 | |
3108 | BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes); | |
a8c1c704 MC |
3109 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); |
3110 | ||
3111 | return 1; | |
f1ec23c0 MC |
3112 | err: |
3113 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); | |
f9f674eb MC |
3114 | return 0; |
3115 | #else | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3116 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, |
3117 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
a8c1c704 | 3118 | return 0; |
f9f674eb | 3119 | #endif |
a8c1c704 MC |
3120 | } |
3121 | ||
a2c2e000 | 3122 | static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
67ad5aab MC |
3123 | { |
3124 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
3125 | unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; | |
348240c6 | 3126 | size_t encoded_pt_len = 0; |
67ad5aab | 3127 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; |
f1ec23c0 | 3128 | int ret = 0; |
67ad5aab MC |
3129 | |
3130 | skey = s->s3->peer_tmp; | |
ec24630a | 3131 | if (skey == NULL) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
3132 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, |
3133 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
67ad5aab MC |
3134 | return 0; |
3135 | } | |
3136 | ||
0a699a07 | 3137 | ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey); |
b599ce3b | 3138 | if (ckey == NULL) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
3139 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, |
3140 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
b599ce3b MC |
3141 | goto err; |
3142 | } | |
67ad5aab | 3143 | |
0f1e51ea | 3144 | if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) { |
a2c2e000 | 3145 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
67ad5aab MC |
3146 | goto err; |
3147 | } | |
3148 | ||
3149 | /* Generate encoding of client key */ | |
ec24630a | 3150 | encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint); |
67ad5aab MC |
3151 | |
3152 | if (encoded_pt_len == 0) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3153 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, |
3154 | ERR_R_EC_LIB); | |
67ad5aab MC |
3155 | goto err; |
3156 | } | |
3157 | ||
b2b3024e | 3158 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
3159 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, |
3160 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f1ec23c0 MC |
3161 | goto err; |
3162 | } | |
67ad5aab | 3163 | |
f1ec23c0 | 3164 | ret = 1; |
67ad5aab | 3165 | err: |
f1ec23c0 | 3166 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
67ad5aab | 3167 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); |
f1ec23c0 | 3168 | return ret; |
67ad5aab | 3169 | #else |
a2c2e000 MC |
3170 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, |
3171 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
67ad5aab MC |
3172 | return 0; |
3173 | #endif | |
3174 | } | |
3175 | ||
a2c2e000 | 3176 | static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e00e0b3d MC |
3177 | { |
3178 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
3179 | /* GOST key exchange message creation */ | |
3180 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL; | |
3181 | X509 *peer_cert; | |
3182 | size_t msglen; | |
3183 | unsigned int md_len; | |
3184 | unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256]; | |
3185 | EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL; | |
3186 | int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94; | |
3187 | unsigned char *pms = NULL; | |
3188 | size_t pmslen = 0; | |
3189 | ||
3190 | if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0) | |
3191 | dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256; | |
3192 | ||
3193 | /* | |
1ee4b98e | 3194 | * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it |
e00e0b3d MC |
3195 | */ |
3196 | peer_cert = s->session->peer; | |
3197 | if (!peer_cert) { | |
a2c2e000 | 3198 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, |
e00e0b3d MC |
3199 | SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER); |
3200 | return 0; | |
3201 | } | |
3202 | ||
3203 | pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL); | |
3204 | if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3205 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, |
3206 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
e00e0b3d MC |
3207 | return 0; |
3208 | } | |
3209 | /* | |
3210 | * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key | |
3211 | * parameters match those of server certificate, use | |
3212 | * certificate key for key exchange | |
3213 | */ | |
3214 | ||
3215 | /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */ | |
3216 | pmslen = 32; | |
3217 | pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); | |
3218 | if (pms == NULL) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3219 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, |
3220 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2f3930bc | 3221 | goto err; |
e00e0b3d MC |
3222 | } |
3223 | ||
3224 | if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 | |
348240c6 MC |
3225 | /* Generate session key |
3226 | * TODO(size_t): Convert this function | |
3227 | */ | |
16cfc2c9 | 3228 | || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
3229 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, |
3230 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e00e0b3d MC |
3231 | goto err; |
3232 | }; | |
e00e0b3d MC |
3233 | /* |
3234 | * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context | |
3235 | * data | |
3236 | */ | |
3237 | ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
3238 | if (ukm_hash == NULL | |
a230b26e EK |
3239 | || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0 |
3240 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random, | |
3241 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 | |
3242 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random, | |
3243 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 | |
3244 | || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3245 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, |
3246 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e00e0b3d MC |
3247 | goto err; |
3248 | } | |
3249 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); | |
3250 | ukm_hash = NULL; | |
3251 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, | |
3252 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3253 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, |
3254 | SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); | |
e00e0b3d MC |
3255 | goto err; |
3256 | } | |
3257 | /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */ | |
3258 | /* | |
3259 | * Encapsulate it into sequence | |
3260 | */ | |
e00e0b3d MC |
3261 | msglen = 255; |
3262 | if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3263 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, |
3264 | SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); | |
e00e0b3d MC |
3265 | goto err; |
3266 | } | |
f1ec23c0 | 3267 | |
08029dfa MC |
3268 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) |
3269 | || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81)) | |
b2b3024e | 3270 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
3271 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, |
3272 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
f1ec23c0 | 3273 | goto err; |
e00e0b3d | 3274 | } |
f1ec23c0 | 3275 | |
e00e0b3d MC |
3276 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); |
3277 | s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; | |
3278 | s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen; | |
3279 | ||
3280 | return 1; | |
3281 | err: | |
3282 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); | |
3283 | OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); | |
3284 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); | |
3285 | return 0; | |
3286 | #else | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3287 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, |
3288 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e00e0b3d MC |
3289 | return 0; |
3290 | #endif | |
3291 | } | |
3292 | ||
a2c2e000 | 3293 | static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
840a2bf8 | 3294 | { |
8b9546c7 | 3295 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
f1ec23c0 MC |
3296 | unsigned char *abytes = NULL; |
3297 | ||
3298 | if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL | |
b2b3024e MC |
3299 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A), |
3300 | &abytes)) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3301 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, |
3302 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
840a2bf8 MC |
3303 | return 0; |
3304 | } | |
f1ec23c0 MC |
3305 | BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes); |
3306 | ||
840a2bf8 MC |
3307 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); |
3308 | s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); | |
3309 | if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3310 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, |
3311 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
840a2bf8 MC |
3312 | return 0; |
3313 | } | |
3314 | ||
3315 | return 1; | |
3316 | #else | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3317 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, |
3318 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
840a2bf8 MC |
3319 | return 0; |
3320 | #endif | |
3321 | } | |
3322 | ||
7cea05dc | 3323 | int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
13c0ec4a | 3324 | { |
13c0ec4a | 3325 | unsigned long alg_k; |
13c0ec4a | 3326 | |
f1ec23c0 | 3327 | alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
13c0ec4a | 3328 | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3329 | /* |
3330 | * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so | |
3331 | * no need to do so here. | |
3332 | */ | |
13c0ec4a | 3333 | if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) |
a2c2e000 | 3334 | && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) |
13c0ec4a MC |
3335 | goto err; |
3336 | ||
f1ec23c0 | 3337 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { |
a2c2e000 | 3338 | if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) |
13c0ec4a | 3339 | goto err; |
a8c1c704 | 3340 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
a2c2e000 | 3341 | if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) |
b9908bf9 | 3342 | goto err; |
67ad5aab | 3343 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
a2c2e000 | 3344 | if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) |
ce0c1f2b | 3345 | goto err; |
e00e0b3d | 3346 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { |
a2c2e000 | 3347 | if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt)) |
a71edf3b | 3348 | goto err; |
840a2bf8 | 3349 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { |
a2c2e000 | 3350 | if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt)) |
69f68237 | 3351 | goto err; |
4a424545 | 3352 | } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
3353 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3354 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
b9908bf9 MC |
3355 | goto err; |
3356 | } | |
3357 | ||
b9908bf9 | 3358 | return 1; |
0f113f3e | 3359 | err: |
0bce0b02 | 3360 | OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen); |
76106e60 | 3361 | s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL; |
7689082b DSH |
3362 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
3363 | OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); | |
3364 | s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; | |
0f113f3e | 3365 | #endif |
b9908bf9 MC |
3366 | return 0; |
3367 | } | |
3368 | ||
3369 | int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s) | |
3370 | { | |
3371 | unsigned char *pms = NULL; | |
3372 | size_t pmslen = 0; | |
3373 | ||
6f137370 MC |
3374 | pms = s->s3->tmp.pms; |
3375 | pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen; | |
3376 | ||
b9908bf9 MC |
3377 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
3378 | /* Check for SRP */ | |
3379 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { | |
3380 | if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) { | |
a2c2e000 | 3381 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
b9908bf9 MC |
3382 | goto err; |
3383 | } | |
3384 | return 1; | |
3385 | } | |
3386 | #endif | |
b9908bf9 MC |
3387 | |
3388 | if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { | |
a2c2e000 MC |
3389 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3390 | SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
b9908bf9 MC |
3391 | goto err; |
3392 | } | |
3393 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) { | |
a2c2e000 | 3394 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
6f137370 MC |
3395 | /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */ |
3396 | pms = NULL; | |
3397 | pmslen = 0; | |
b9908bf9 MC |
3398 | goto err; |
3399 | } | |
6f137370 MC |
3400 | pms = NULL; |
3401 | pmslen = 0; | |
473483d4 MC |
3402 | |
3403 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
3404 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
3405 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
3406 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
3407 | ||
3408 | /* | |
3409 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP | |
3410 | * used. | |
3411 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
3412 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
3413 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
473483d4 MC |
3414 | |
3415 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, | |
a230b26e | 3416 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, |
a2c2e000 MC |
3417 | sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { |
3418 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
dd5a4279 MC |
3419 | SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, |
3420 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
473483d4 | 3421 | goto err; |
a2c2e000 | 3422 | } |
473483d4 MC |
3423 | |
3424 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, | |
3425 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
3426 | } | |
3427 | #endif | |
3428 | ||
b9908bf9 MC |
3429 | return 1; |
3430 | err: | |
3431 | OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); | |
3432 | s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL; | |
3433 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 3434 | } |
d02b48c6 | 3435 | |
0f113f3e MC |
3436 | /* |
3437 | * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check | |
3438 | * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client | |
3439 | * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B. | |
0d609395 DSH |
3440 | */ |
3441 | static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s) | |
0f113f3e | 3442 | { |
0f113f3e | 3443 | /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */ |
f63a17d6 | 3444 | if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL) |
0f113f3e MC |
3445 | return 0; |
3446 | /* | |
3447 | * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also | |
3448 | * adjusts suite B digest if necessary. | |
3449 | */ | |
3450 | if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT && | |
3451 | !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2)) | |
3452 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3453 | return 1; |
3454 | } | |
0d609395 | 3455 | |
be3583fa | 3456 | WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
0f113f3e MC |
3457 | { |
3458 | X509 *x509 = NULL; | |
3459 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
3460 | int i; | |
3461 | ||
b9908bf9 | 3462 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { |
0f113f3e MC |
3463 | /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */ |
3464 | if (s->cert->cert_cb) { | |
3465 | i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); | |
3466 | if (i < 0) { | |
3467 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
b9908bf9 | 3468 | return WORK_MORE_A; |
0f113f3e MC |
3469 | } |
3470 | if (i == 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3471 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3472 | SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
3473 | SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); | |
eb5fd03b | 3474 | return WORK_ERROR; |
0f113f3e MC |
3475 | } |
3476 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
3477 | } | |
9d75dce3 TS |
3478 | if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) { |
3479 | if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { | |
3480 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; | |
3481 | } | |
b9908bf9 | 3482 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
9d75dce3 | 3483 | } |
b9908bf9 MC |
3484 | |
3485 | /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */ | |
3486 | wst = WORK_MORE_B; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3487 | } |
3488 | ||
3489 | /* We need to get a client cert */ | |
b9908bf9 | 3490 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { |
0f113f3e MC |
3491 | /* |
3492 | * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
3493 | * return(-1); We then get retied later | |
3494 | */ | |
0f113f3e MC |
3495 | i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); |
3496 | if (i < 0) { | |
3497 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
b9908bf9 | 3498 | return WORK_MORE_B; |
0f113f3e MC |
3499 | } |
3500 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
3501 | if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
3502 | if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey)) |
3503 | i = 0; | |
3504 | } else if (i == 1) { | |
3505 | i = 0; | |
b9908bf9 | 3506 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3507 | SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); |
3508 | } | |
3509 | ||
222561fe | 3510 | X509_free(x509); |
25aaa98a | 3511 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
0f113f3e MC |
3512 | if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) |
3513 | i = 0; | |
3514 | if (i == 0) { | |
3515 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
3516 | s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; | |
3517 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); | |
b9908bf9 | 3518 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
0f113f3e MC |
3519 | } else { |
3520 | s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2; | |
124037fd | 3521 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
f63a17d6 | 3522 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ |
eb5fd03b | 3523 | return WORK_ERROR; |
dab18ab5 | 3524 | } |
0f113f3e MC |
3525 | } |
3526 | } | |
3527 | ||
9d75dce3 TS |
3528 | if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) |
3529 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; | |
b9908bf9 | 3530 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
0f113f3e MC |
3531 | } |
3532 | ||
b9908bf9 | 3533 | /* Shouldn't ever get here */ |
a2c2e000 MC |
3534 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
3535 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
b9908bf9 MC |
3536 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3537 | } | |
3538 | ||
7cea05dc | 3539 | int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 3540 | { |
9d75dce3 TS |
3541 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
3542 | if (s->pha_context == NULL) { | |
3543 | /* no context available, add 0-length context */ | |
3544 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { | |
3545 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3546 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3547 | return 0; | |
3548 | } | |
3549 | } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) { | |
3550 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3551 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3552 | return 0; | |
3553 | } | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3554 | } |
3555 | if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, | |
3556 | (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL | |
3557 | : s->cert->key)) { | |
3558 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3559 | return 0; | |
f7e393be MC |
3560 | } |
3561 | ||
3562 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
3563 | && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) | |
3564 | && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
3565 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) { | |
c31ad0bb | 3566 | /* |
a2c2e000 | 3567 | * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent |
f63a17d6 | 3568 | * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash. |
c31ad0bb | 3569 | */ |
f63a17d6 | 3570 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
dd5a4279 | 3571 | SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); |
c31ad0bb | 3572 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 3573 | } |
b9908bf9 MC |
3574 | |
3575 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3576 | } |
3577 | ||
36d16f8e | 3578 | int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) |
0f113f3e | 3579 | { |
dd24857b DSH |
3580 | const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu; |
3581 | size_t idx; | |
0f113f3e | 3582 | long alg_k, alg_a; |
d02b48c6 | 3583 | |
0f113f3e MC |
3584 | alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
3585 | alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
d02b48c6 | 3586 | |
0f113f3e | 3587 | /* we don't have a certificate */ |
dd24857b DSH |
3588 | if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT)) |
3589 | return 1; | |
d02b48c6 | 3590 | |
0f113f3e | 3591 | /* This is the passed certificate */ |
dd24857b | 3592 | clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx); |
d02b48c6 | 3593 | |
dd24857b DSH |
3594 | /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */ |
3595 | if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3596 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
3597 | SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, | |
3598 | SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT); | |
3599 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 3600 | } |
0f113f3e | 3601 | |
dd24857b DSH |
3602 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
3603 | if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) { | |
3604 | if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s)) | |
3605 | return 1; | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3606 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
3607 | SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); | |
3608 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 3609 | } |
d02b48c6 | 3610 | #endif |
bc36ee62 | 3611 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
dd24857b | 3612 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3613 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, |
3614 | SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, | |
3615 | SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); | |
3616 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 3617 | } |
79df9d62 | 3618 | #endif |
bc36ee62 | 3619 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
fb79abe3 | 3620 | if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3621 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, |
3622 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3623 | return 0; | |
0f113f3e | 3624 | } |
d02b48c6 RE |
3625 | #endif |
3626 | ||
dd24857b | 3627 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
3628 | } |
3629 | ||
e481f9b9 | 3630 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
7cea05dc | 3631 | int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
b9908bf9 | 3632 | { |
15e6be6c MC |
3633 | size_t len, padding_len; |
3634 | unsigned char *padding = NULL; | |
15e6be6c | 3635 | |
aff8c126 | 3636 | len = s->ext.npn_len; |
b9908bf9 | 3637 | padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); |
15e6be6c | 3638 | |
aff8c126 | 3639 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len) |
7cea05dc | 3640 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) { |
a2c2e000 MC |
3641 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, |
3642 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3643 | return 0; | |
15e6be6c MC |
3644 | } |
3645 | ||
3646 | memset(padding, 0, padding_len); | |
3647 | ||
b9908bf9 MC |
3648 | return 1; |
3649 | } | |
6434abbf | 3650 | #endif |
368888bc | 3651 | |
c7f47786 MC |
3652 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
3653 | { | |
3654 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { | |
3655 | /* should contain no data */ | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3656 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, |
3657 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
c7f47786 MC |
3658 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
3659 | } | |
3660 | ||
db0f35dd TS |
3661 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) { |
3662 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
3663 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; | |
3664 | } | |
3665 | ||
c7f47786 | 3666 | /* |
1f04f23e MC |
3667 | * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for |
3668 | * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will | |
3669 | * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a | |
3670 | * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable | |
3671 | * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd. | |
c7f47786 MC |
3672 | */ |
3673 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
3674 | SSL_renegotiate(s); | |
3675 | else | |
3676 | SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s); | |
3677 | ||
3678 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; | |
3679 | } | |
3680 | ||
e46f2334 MC |
3681 | static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
3682 | { | |
e46f2334 | 3683 | PACKET extensions; |
3434f40b | 3684 | RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; |
e46f2334 | 3685 | |
26b9172a MC |
3686 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions) |
3687 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3688 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, |
3689 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
e46f2334 MC |
3690 | goto err; |
3691 | } | |
3692 | ||
fe874d27 MC |
3693 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, |
3694 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts, | |
f63a17d6 | 3695 | NULL, 1) |
fe874d27 | 3696 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, |
f63a17d6 MC |
3697 | rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) { |
3698 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3434f40b | 3699 | goto err; |
f63a17d6 | 3700 | } |
3434f40b | 3701 | |
1b0286a3 | 3702 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); |
e46f2334 MC |
3703 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
3704 | ||
3705 | err: | |
1b0286a3 | 3706 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); |
e46f2334 MC |
3707 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
3708 | } | |
3709 | ||
368888bc | 3710 | int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) |
0f113f3e MC |
3711 | { |
3712 | int i = 0; | |
368888bc | 3713 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
0f113f3e MC |
3714 | if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) { |
3715 | i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s, | |
3716 | SSL_get_client_CA_list(s), | |
3717 | px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); | |
3718 | if (i != 0) | |
3719 | return i; | |
3720 | } | |
3721 | #endif | |
3722 | if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb) | |
3723 | i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey); | |
3724 | return i; | |
3725 | } | |
d45ba43d | 3726 | |
ae2f7b37 | 3727 | int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt) |
d45ba43d | 3728 | { |
2c7b4dbc | 3729 | int i; |
aafec89c | 3730 | size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0; |
d45ba43d | 3731 | int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate; |
1d0c08b4 | 3732 | |
d45ba43d | 3733 | /* Set disabled masks for this session */ |
1d0c08b4 MC |
3734 | if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) { |
3735 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, | |
3736 | SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); | |
3737 | return 0; | |
3738 | } | |
d45ba43d | 3739 | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3740 | if (sk == NULL) { |
3741 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, | |
3742 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
26a7d938 | 3743 | return 0; |
f63a17d6 | 3744 | } |
d45ba43d | 3745 | |
2c7b4dbc MC |
3746 | #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH |
3747 | # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6 | |
3748 | # error Max cipher length too short | |
3749 | # endif | |
3750 | /* | |
3751 | * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround | |
3752 | * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we | |
3753 | * use TLS v1.2 | |
3754 | */ | |
3755 | if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
3756 | maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1; | |
3757 | else | |
3758 | #endif | |
3759 | /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */ | |
3760 | maxlen = 0xfffe; | |
3761 | ||
3762 | if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) | |
3763 | maxlen -= 2; | |
3764 | if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) | |
3765 | maxlen -= 2; | |
3766 | ||
3767 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) { | |
3768 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
3769 | ||
d45ba43d MC |
3770 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); |
3771 | /* Skip disabled ciphers */ | |
8af91fd9 | 3772 | if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0)) |
d45ba43d | 3773 | continue; |
2c7b4dbc MC |
3774 | |
3775 | if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) { | |
f63a17d6 MC |
3776 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, |
3777 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2c7b4dbc MC |
3778 | return 0; |
3779 | } | |
3780 | ||
aafec89c MC |
3781 | /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */ |
3782 | if (!maxverok) { | |
3783 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
3784 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver) | |
3785 | && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)) | |
3786 | maxverok = 1; | |
3787 | } else { | |
3788 | if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver | |
3789 | && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver) | |
3790 | maxverok = 1; | |
3791 | } | |
3792 | } | |
3793 | ||
2c7b4dbc | 3794 | totlen += len; |
d45ba43d | 3795 | } |
2c7b4dbc | 3796 | |
aafec89c | 3797 | if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3798 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, |
3799 | SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); | |
aafec89c MC |
3800 | |
3801 | if (!maxverok) | |
3802 | ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " | |
3803 | "SSL/TLS version"); | |
3804 | ||
2c7b4dbc MC |
3805 | return 0; |
3806 | } | |
3807 | ||
3808 | if (totlen != 0) { | |
d45ba43d MC |
3809 | if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) { |
3810 | static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { | |
bbb4ceb8 | 3811 | 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 |
d45ba43d | 3812 | }; |
2c7b4dbc | 3813 | if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3814 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3815 | SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2c7b4dbc MC |
3816 | return 0; |
3817 | } | |
d45ba43d MC |
3818 | } |
3819 | if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) { | |
3820 | static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { | |
bbb4ceb8 | 3821 | 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 |
d45ba43d | 3822 | }; |
2c7b4dbc | 3823 | if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) { |
f63a17d6 MC |
3824 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3825 | SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2c7b4dbc MC |
3826 | return 0; |
3827 | } | |
d45ba43d MC |
3828 | } |
3829 | } | |
3830 | ||
2c7b4dbc | 3831 | return 1; |
d45ba43d | 3832 | } |
ef6c191b MC |
3833 | |
3834 | int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
3835 | { | |
3836 | if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY | |
3837 | && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) { | |
635c8f77 MC |
3838 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, |
3839 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, | |
3840 | ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); | |
ef6c191b MC |
3841 | return 0; |
3842 | } | |
3843 | ||
3844 | s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING; | |
3845 | return 1; | |
3846 | } |