/*
- * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
+/* We need to use some engine deprecated APIs */
+#define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
+
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <openssl/trace.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-#include "internal/rand_int.h"
+#include "crypto/rand.h"
+#include "crypto/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
-#include "rand_lcl.h"
+#include "rand_local.h"
#include "e_os.h"
-#ifndef FIPS_MODE
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+# include "crypto/rand_pool.h"
+# include "prov/seeding.h"
+
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
/* non-NULL if default_RAND_meth is ENGINE-provided */
static ENGINE *funct_ref;
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_engine_lock;
# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_meth_lock;
static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth;
+# endif
static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
static int rand_inited = 0;
-#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
-
-int rand_fork_count;
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
-/*
- * IMPORTANT NOTE: It is not currently possible to use this code
- * because we are not sure about the amount of randomness it provides.
- * Some SP900 tests have been run, but there is internal skepticism.
- * So for now this code is not used.
- */
-# error "RDTSC enabled? Should not be possible!"
-
-/*
- * Acquire entropy from high-speed clock
- *
- * Since we get some randomness from the low-order bits of the
- * high-speed clock, it can help.
- *
- * Returns the total entropy count, if it exceeds the requested
- * entropy count. Otherwise, returns an entropy count of 0.
- */
-size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- unsigned char c;
- int i;
-
- if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 4)) != 0) {
- for (i = 0; i < TSC_READ_COUNT; i++) {
- c = (unsigned char)(OPENSSL_rdtsc() & 0xFF);
- rand_pool_add(pool, &c, 1, 4);
- }
- }
- return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
-size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
-size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
-
-extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
-
-/*
- * Acquire entropy using Intel-specific cpu instructions
- *
- * Uses the RDSEED instruction if available, otherwise uses
- * RDRAND if available.
- *
- * For the differences between RDSEED and RDRAND, and why RDSEED
- * is the preferred choice, see https://goo.gl/oK3KcN
- *
- * Returns the total entropy count, if it exceeds the requested
- * entropy count. Otherwise, returns an entropy count of 0.
- */
-size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- size_t bytes_needed;
- unsigned char *buffer;
-
- bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
- if (bytes_needed > 0) {
- buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
-
- if (buffer != NULL) {
- /* Whichever comes first, use RDSEED, RDRAND or nothing */
- if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] & (1 << 18)) != 0) {
- if (OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes(buffer, bytes_needed)
- == bytes_needed) {
- rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed);
- }
- } else if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))) != 0) {
- if (OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes(buffer, bytes_needed)
- == bytes_needed) {
- rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed);
- }
- } else {
- rand_pool_add_end(pool, 0, 0);
- }
- }
- }
-
- return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-}
-#endif
-
-
-/*
- * Implements the get_entropy() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
- *
- * If the DRBG has a parent, then the required amount of entropy input
- * is fetched using the parent's RAND_DRBG_generate().
- *
- * Otherwise, the entropy is polled from the system entropy sources
- * using rand_pool_acquire_entropy().
- *
- * If a random pool has been added to the DRBG using RAND_add(), then
- * its entropy will be used up first.
- */
-size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
- unsigned char **pout,
- int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
- int prediction_resistance)
-{
- size_t ret = 0;
- size_t entropy_available = 0;
- RAND_POOL *pool;
-
- if (drbg->parent != NULL && drbg->strength > drbg->parent->strength) {
- /*
- * We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
- * 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
- */
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GET_ENTROPY, RAND_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (drbg->seed_pool != NULL) {
- pool = drbg->seed_pool;
- pool->entropy_requested = entropy;
- } else {
- pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, min_len, max_len);
- if (pool == NULL)
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (drbg->parent != NULL) {
- size_t bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
- unsigned char *buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
-
- if (buffer != NULL) {
- size_t bytes = 0;
-
- /*
- * Get random from parent, include our state as additional input.
- * Our lock is already held, but we need to lock our parent before
- * generating bits from it. (Note: taking the lock will be a no-op
- * if locking if drbg->parent->lock == NULL.)
- */
- rand_drbg_lock(drbg->parent);
- if (RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg->parent,
- buffer, bytes_needed,
- prediction_resistance,
- NULL, 0) != 0)
- bytes = bytes_needed;
- drbg->reseed_next_counter
- = tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_prop_counter);
- rand_drbg_unlock(drbg->parent);
-
- rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
- entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
- }
-
- } else {
- /* Get entropy by polling system entropy sources. */
- entropy_available = rand_pool_acquire_entropy(pool);
- }
-
- if (entropy_available > 0) {
- ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
- *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
- }
- if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL)
- rand_pool_free(pool);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Implements the cleanup_entropy() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
- *
- */
-void rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
- unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
-{
- if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL)
- OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
-}
-
-/*
- * Generate additional data that can be used for the drbg. The data does
- * not need to contain entropy, but it's useful if it contains at least
- * some bits that are unpredictable.
- *
- * Returns 0 on failure.
- *
- * On success it allocates a buffer at |*pout| and returns the length of
- * the data. The buffer should get freed using OPENSSL_secure_clear_free().
- */
-size_t rand_drbg_get_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char **pout)
-{
- size_t ret = 0;
-
- if (rand_pool_add_additional_data(pool) == 0)
- goto err;
-
- ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
- *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
-
- err:
- return ret;
-}
-
-void rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *out)
-{
- rand_pool_reattach(pool, out);
-}
-
-void rand_fork(void)
-{
- rand_fork_count++;
-}
-
-#ifndef FIPS_MODE
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init)
{
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
return 0;
# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
rand_meth_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
if (rand_meth_lock == NULL)
goto err;
+# endif
if (!rand_pool_init())
goto err;
return 1;
err:
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
rand_meth_lock = NULL;
+# endif
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
rand_engine_lock = NULL;
void rand_cleanup_int(void)
{
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth;
if (!rand_inited)
if (meth != NULL && meth->cleanup != NULL)
meth->cleanup();
RAND_set_rand_method(NULL);
+# endif
rand_pool_cleanup();
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
rand_engine_lock = NULL;
# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
rand_meth_lock = NULL;
+# endif
rand_inited = 0;
}
-/* TODO(3.0): Do we need to handle this somehow in the FIPS module? */
/*
* RAND_close_seed_files() ensures that any seed file descriptors are
- * closed after use.
+ * closed after use. This only applies to libcrypto/default provider,
+ * it does not apply to other providers.
*/
void RAND_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
{
*/
int RAND_poll(void)
{
- int ret = 0;
-
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+ int ret = meth == RAND_OpenSSL();
- if (meth == RAND_OpenSSL()) {
- /* fill random pool and seed the master DRBG */
- RAND_DRBG *drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_master();
-
- if (drbg == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- rand_drbg_lock(drbg);
- ret = rand_drbg_restart(drbg, NULL, 0, 0);
- rand_drbg_unlock(drbg);
-
- return ret;
-
- } else {
- RAND_POOL *pool = NULL;
+ if (meth == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (!ret) {
/* fill random pool and seed the current legacy RNG */
- pool = rand_pool_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH,
- (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH + 7) / 8,
- RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH);
+ RAND_POOL *pool = rand_pool_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH, 1,
+ (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH + 7) / 8,
+ RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH);
+
if (pool == NULL)
return 0;
- if (rand_pool_acquire_entropy(pool) == 0)
+ if (ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(pool) == 0)
goto err;
if (meth->add == NULL
goto err;
ret = 1;
-
err:
rand_pool_free(pool);
}
-
return ret;
+# else
+ static const char salt[] = "polling";
+
+ RAND_seed(salt, sizeof(salt));
+ return 1;
+# endif
}
-#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
-/*
- * Allocate memory and initialize a new random pool
- */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth)
+{
+ if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
+ return 0;
-RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
+ if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock))
+ return 0;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ ENGINE_finish(funct_ref);
+ funct_ref = NULL;
+# endif
+ default_RAND_meth = meth;
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
{
- RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool));
+ const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
- if (pool == NULL) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
return NULL;
- }
- pool->min_len = min_len;
- pool->max_len = (max_len > RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH) ?
- RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH : max_len;
+ if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock))
+ return NULL;
+ if (default_RAND_meth == NULL) {
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ ENGINE *e;
- pool->buffer = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(pool->max_len);
- if (pool->buffer == NULL) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
+ /* If we have an engine that can do RAND, use it. */
+ if ((e = ENGINE_get_default_RAND()) != NULL
+ && (tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(e)) != NULL) {
+ funct_ref = e;
+ default_RAND_meth = tmp_meth;
+ } else {
+ ENGINE_finish(e);
+ default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth;
+ }
+# else
+ default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth;
+# endif
}
+ tmp_meth = default_RAND_meth;
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
+ return tmp_meth;
+}
- pool->entropy_requested = entropy_requested;
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE)
+int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine)
+{
+ const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
- return pool;
+ if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
+ return 0;
-err:
- OPENSSL_free(pool);
- return NULL;
+ if (engine != NULL) {
+ if (!ENGINE_init(engine))
+ return 0;
+ tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(engine);
+ if (tmp_meth == NULL) {
+ ENGINE_finish(engine);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_engine_lock)) {
+ ENGINE_finish(engine);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* This function releases any prior ENGINE so call it first */
+ RAND_set_rand_method(tmp_meth);
+ funct_ref = engine;
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_engine_lock);
+ return 1;
}
+# endif
+# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0 */
-/*
- * Attach new random pool to the given buffer
- *
- * This function is intended to be used only for feeding random data
- * provided by RAND_add() and RAND_seed() into the <master> DRBG.
- */
-RAND_POOL *rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len,
- size_t entropy)
+void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num)
{
- RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool));
+ EVP_RAND_CTX *drbg;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- if (pool == NULL) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ATTACH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return NULL;
+ if (meth != NULL && meth->seed != NULL) {
+ meth->seed(buf, num);
+ return;
}
+# endif
- /*
- * The const needs to be cast away, but attached buffers will not be
- * modified (in contrary to allocated buffers which are zeroed and
- * freed in the end).
- */
- pool->buffer = (unsigned char *) buffer;
- pool->len = len;
+ drbg = RAND_get0_primary(NULL);
+ if (drbg != NULL && num > 0)
+ EVP_RAND_reseed(drbg, 0, NULL, 0, buf, num);
+}
- pool->attached = 1;
+void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
+{
+ EVP_RAND_CTX *drbg;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- pool->min_len = pool->max_len = pool->len;
- pool->entropy = entropy;
+ if (meth != NULL && meth->add != NULL) {
+ meth->add(buf, num, randomness);
+ return;
+ }
+# endif
+ drbg = RAND_get0_primary(NULL);
+ if (drbg != NULL && num > 0)
+ EVP_RAND_reseed(drbg, 0, NULL, 0, buf, num);
+}
+
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_1_1_0)
+int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- return pool;
+ if (meth != NULL && meth->pseudorand != NULL)
+ return meth->pseudorand(buf, num);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+ return -1;
}
+# endif
-/*
- * Free |pool|, securely erasing its buffer.
- */
-void rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool)
+int RAND_status(void)
{
- if (pool == NULL)
- return;
+ EVP_RAND_CTX *rand;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- /*
- * Although it would be advisable from a cryptographical viewpoint,
- * we are not allowed to clear attached buffers, since they are passed
- * to rand_pool_attach() as `const unsigned char*`.
- * (see corresponding comment in rand_pool_attach()).
- */
- if (!pool->attached)
- OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->max_len);
- OPENSSL_free(pool);
+ if (meth != NULL && meth != RAND_OpenSSL())
+ return meth->status != NULL ? meth->status() : 0;
+# endif
+
+ if ((rand = RAND_get0_primary(NULL)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return EVP_RAND_state(rand) == EVP_RAND_STATE_READY;
}
+# else /* !FIPS_MODULE */
-/*
- * Return the |pool|'s buffer to the caller (readonly).
- */
-const unsigned char *rand_pool_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool)
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
{
- return pool->buffer;
+ return NULL;
}
+# endif
+#endif /* !FIPS_MODULE */
/*
- * Return the |pool|'s entropy to the caller.
+ * This function is not part of RAND_METHOD, so if we're not using
+ * the default method, then just call RAND_bytes(). Otherwise make
+ * sure we're instantiated and use the private DRBG.
*/
-size_t rand_pool_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
+int RAND_priv_bytes_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
- return pool->entropy;
+ EVP_RAND_CTX *rand;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+
+ if (meth != NULL && meth != RAND_OpenSSL()) {
+ if (meth->bytes != NULL)
+ return meth->bytes(buf, num);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ rand = RAND_get0_private(ctx);
+ if (rand != NULL)
+ return EVP_RAND_generate(rand, buf, num, 0, 0, NULL, 0);
+
+ return 0;
}
-/*
- * Return the |pool|'s buffer length to the caller.
- */
-size_t rand_pool_length(RAND_POOL *pool)
+int RAND_priv_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
- return pool->len;
+ return RAND_priv_bytes_ex(NULL, buf, num);
}
-/*
- * Detach the |pool| buffer and return it to the caller.
- * It's the responsibility of the caller to free the buffer
- * using OPENSSL_secure_clear_free() or to re-attach it
- * again to the pool using rand_pool_reattach().
- */
-unsigned char *rand_pool_detach(RAND_POOL *pool)
+int RAND_bytes_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
- unsigned char *ret = pool->buffer;
- pool->buffer = NULL;
- pool->entropy = 0;
- return ret;
+ EVP_RAND_CTX *rand;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+
+ if (meth != NULL && meth != RAND_OpenSSL()) {
+ if (meth->bytes != NULL)
+ return meth->bytes(buf, num);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ rand = RAND_get0_public(ctx);
+ if (rand != NULL)
+ return EVP_RAND_generate(rand, buf, num, 0, 0, NULL, 0);
+
+ return 0;
}
-/*
- * Re-attach the |pool| buffer. It is only allowed to pass
- * the |buffer| which was previously detached from the same pool.
- */
-void rand_pool_reattach(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *buffer)
+int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
- pool->buffer = buffer;
- OPENSSL_cleanse(pool->buffer, pool->len);
- pool->len = 0;
+ return RAND_bytes_ex(NULL, buf, num);
}
-/*
- * If |entropy_factor| bits contain 1 bit of entropy, how many bytes does one
- * need to obtain at least |bits| bits of entropy?
- */
-#define ENTROPY_TO_BYTES(bits, entropy_factor) \
- (((bits) * (entropy_factor) + 7) / 8)
+typedef struct rand_global_st {
+ /*
+ * The three shared DRBG instances
+ *
+ * There are three shared DRBG instances: <primary>, <public>, and
+ * <private>. The <public> and <private> DRBGs are secondary ones.
+ * These are used for non-secret (e.g. nonces) and secret
+ * (e.g. private keys) data respectively.
+ */
+ CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
+ EVP_RAND_CTX *seed;
+
+ /*
+ * The <primary> DRBG
+ *
+ * Not used directly by the application, only for reseeding the two other
+ * DRBGs. It reseeds itself by pulling either randomness from os entropy
+ * sources or by consuming randomness which was added by RAND_add().
+ *
+ * The <primary> DRBG is a global instance which is accessed concurrently by
+ * all threads. The necessary locking is managed automatically by its child
+ * DRBG instances during reseeding.
+ */
+ EVP_RAND_CTX *primary;
+
+ /*
+ * The <public> DRBG
+ *
+ * Used by default for generating random bytes using RAND_bytes().
+ *
+ * The <public> secondary DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance
+ * per thread.
+ */
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL public;
+
+ /*
+ * The <private> DRBG
+ *
+ * Used by default for generating private keys using RAND_priv_bytes()
+ *
+ * The <private> secondary DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one
+ * instance per thread.
+ */
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL private;
+
+ /* Which RNG is being used by default and it's configuration settings */
+ char *rng_name;
+ char *rng_cipher;
+ char *rng_digest;
+ char *rng_propq;
+
+ /* Allow the randomness source to be changed */
+ char *seed_name;
+ char *seed_propq;
+} RAND_GLOBAL;
/*
- * Checks whether the |pool|'s entropy is available to the caller.
- * This is the case when entropy count and buffer length are high enough.
- * Returns
- *
- * |entropy| if the entropy count and buffer size is large enough
- * 0 otherwise
+ * Initialize the OSSL_LIB_CTX global DRBGs on first use.
+ * Returns the allocated global data on success or NULL on failure.
*/
-size_t rand_pool_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool)
+static void *rand_ossl_ctx_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
{
- if (pool->entropy < pool->entropy_requested)
- return 0;
+ RAND_GLOBAL *dgbl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dgbl));
- if (pool->len < pool->min_len)
- return 0;
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
+ return NULL;
- return pool->entropy;
-}
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ /*
+ * We need to ensure that base libcrypto thread handling has been
+ * initialised.
+ */
+ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_BASE_ONLY, NULL);
+#endif
-/*
- * Returns the (remaining) amount of entropy needed to fill
- * the random pool.
- */
+ dgbl->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+ if (dgbl->lock == NULL)
+ goto err1;
-size_t rand_pool_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
- if (pool->entropy < pool->entropy_requested)
- return pool->entropy_requested - pool->entropy;
+ if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&dgbl->private, NULL))
+ goto err1;
- return 0;
-}
+ if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&dgbl->public, NULL))
+ goto err2;
-/*
- * Returns the number of bytes needed to fill the pool, assuming
- * the input has 1 / |entropy_factor| entropy bits per data bit.
- * In case of an error, 0 is returned.
- */
+ return dgbl;
-size_t rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_factor)
+ err2:
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->private);
+ err1:
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(dgbl->lock);
+ OPENSSL_free(dgbl);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void rand_ossl_ctx_free(void *vdgbl)
{
- size_t bytes_needed;
- size_t entropy_needed = rand_pool_entropy_needed(pool);
+ RAND_GLOBAL *dgbl = vdgbl;
- if (entropy_factor < 1) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_BYTES_NEEDED, RAND_R_ARGUMENT_OUT_OF_RANGE);
- return 0;
- }
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
+ return;
- bytes_needed = ENTROPY_TO_BYTES(entropy_needed, entropy_factor);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(dgbl->lock);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->private);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->public);
+ EVP_RAND_CTX_free(dgbl->primary);
+ EVP_RAND_CTX_free(dgbl->seed);
+ OPENSSL_free(dgbl->rng_name);
+ OPENSSL_free(dgbl->rng_cipher);
+ OPENSSL_free(dgbl->rng_digest);
+ OPENSSL_free(dgbl->rng_propq);
+ OPENSSL_free(dgbl->seed_name);
+ OPENSSL_free(dgbl->seed_propq);
- if (bytes_needed > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
- /* not enough space left */
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_BYTES_NEEDED, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW);
- return 0;
- }
+ OPENSSL_free(dgbl);
+}
- if (pool->len < pool->min_len &&
- bytes_needed < pool->min_len - pool->len)
- /* to meet the min_len requirement */
- bytes_needed = pool->min_len - pool->len;
+static const OSSL_LIB_CTX_METHOD rand_drbg_ossl_ctx_method = {
+ rand_ossl_ctx_new,
+ rand_ossl_ctx_free,
+};
- return bytes_needed;
+static RAND_GLOBAL *rand_get_global(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
+{
+ return ossl_lib_ctx_get_data(libctx, OSSL_LIB_CTX_DRBG_INDEX,
+ &rand_drbg_ossl_ctx_method);
}
-/* Returns the remaining number of bytes available */
-size_t rand_pool_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool)
+static void rand_delete_thread_state(void *arg)
{
- return pool->max_len - pool->len;
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx = arg;
+ RAND_GLOBAL *dgbl = rand_get_global(ctx);
+ EVP_RAND_CTX *rand;
+
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ rand = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->public, NULL);
+ EVP_RAND_CTX_free(rand);
+
+ rand = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->private, NULL);
+ EVP_RAND_CTX_free(rand);
}
-/*
- * Add random bytes to the random pool.
- *
- * It is expected that the |buffer| contains |len| bytes of
- * random input which contains at least |entropy| bits of
- * randomness.
- *
- * Returns 1 if the added amount is adequate, otherwise 0
- */
-int rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
- const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy)
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+static EVP_RAND_CTX *rand_new_seed(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx)
{
- if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD, RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
- return 0;
- }
+ EVP_RAND *rand;
+ RAND_GLOBAL *dgbl = rand_get_global(libctx);
+ EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx;
+ char *name;
- if (pool->buffer == NULL) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
+ name = dgbl->seed_name != NULL ? dgbl->seed_name : "SEED-SRC";
+ rand = EVP_RAND_fetch(libctx, name, dgbl->seed_propq);
+ if (rand == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_R_UNABLE_TO_FETCH_DRBG);
+ return NULL;
}
-
- if (len > 0) {
- memcpy(pool->buffer + pool->len, buffer, len);
- pool->len += len;
- pool->entropy += entropy;
+ ctx = EVP_RAND_CTX_new(rand, NULL);
+ EVP_RAND_free(rand);
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_DRBG);
+ return NULL;
}
-
- return 1;
+ if (!EVP_RAND_instantiate(ctx, 0, 0, NULL, 0, NULL)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG);
+ EVP_RAND_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ctx;
}
+#endif
-/*
- * Start to add random bytes to the random pool in-place.
- *
- * Reserves the next |len| bytes for adding random bytes in-place
- * and returns a pointer to the buffer.
- * The caller is allowed to copy up to |len| bytes into the buffer.
- * If |len| == 0 this is considered a no-op and a NULL pointer
- * is returned without producing an error message.
- *
- * After updating the buffer, rand_pool_add_end() needs to be called
- * to finish the udpate operation (see next comment).
- */
-unsigned char *rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
+static EVP_RAND_CTX *rand_new_drbg(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, EVP_RAND_CTX *parent,
+ unsigned int reseed_interval,
+ time_t reseed_time_interval)
{
- if (len == 0)
- return NULL;
+ EVP_RAND *rand;
+ RAND_GLOBAL *dgbl = rand_get_global(libctx);
+ EVP_RAND_CTX *ctx;
+ OSSL_PARAM params[7], *p = params;
+ char *name, *cipher;
- if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_BEGIN, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW);
+ name = dgbl->rng_name != NULL ? dgbl->rng_name : "CTR-DRBG";
+ rand = EVP_RAND_fetch(libctx, name, dgbl->rng_propq);
+ if (rand == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_R_UNABLE_TO_FETCH_DRBG);
return NULL;
}
-
- if (pool->buffer == NULL) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_BEGIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ctx = EVP_RAND_CTX_new(rand, parent);
+ EVP_RAND_free(rand);
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_R_UNABLE_TO_CREATE_DRBG);
return NULL;
}
- return pool->buffer + pool->len;
+ /*
+ * Rather than trying to decode the DRBG settings, just pass them through
+ * and rely on the other end to ignore those it doesn't care about.
+ */
+ cipher = dgbl->rng_cipher != NULL ? dgbl->rng_cipher : "AES-256-CTR";
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_CIPHER,
+ cipher, 0);
+ if (dgbl->rng_digest != NULL)
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_DIGEST,
+ dgbl->rng_digest, 0);
+ if (dgbl->rng_propq != NULL)
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_PROPERTIES,
+ dgbl->rng_propq, 0);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ALG_PARAM_MAC, "HMAC", 0);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_REQUESTS,
+ &reseed_interval);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_time_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL,
+ &reseed_time_interval);
+ *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+ if (!EVP_RAND_instantiate(ctx, 0, 0, NULL, 0, params)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG);
+ EVP_RAND_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ctx;
}
/*
- * Finish to add random bytes to the random pool in-place.
+ * Get the primary random generator.
+ * Returns pointer to its EVP_RAND_CTX on success, NULL on failure.
*
- * Finishes an in-place update of the random pool started by
- * rand_pool_add_begin() (see previous comment).
- * It is expected that |len| bytes of random input have been added
- * to the buffer which contain at least |entropy| bits of randomness.
- * It is allowed to add less bytes than originally reserved.
*/
-int rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy)
+EVP_RAND_CTX *RAND_get0_primary(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx)
{
- if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_END, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (len > 0) {
- pool->len += len;
- pool->entropy += entropy;
- }
+ RAND_GLOBAL *dgbl = rand_get_global(ctx);
+ EVP_RAND_CTX *ret;
- return 1;
-}
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
+ return NULL;
-#ifndef FIPS_MODE
-int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth)
-{
- if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
- return 0;
+ if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(dgbl->lock))
+ return NULL;
- CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- ENGINE_finish(funct_ref);
- funct_ref = NULL;
-# endif
- default_RAND_meth = meth;
- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
- return 1;
-}
-#endif
+ ret = dgbl->primary;
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(dgbl->lock);
-const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
-{
-#ifdef FIPS_MODE
- return NULL;
-#else
- const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ return ret;
- if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
+ if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(dgbl->lock))
return NULL;
- CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock);
- if (default_RAND_meth == NULL) {
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- ENGINE *e;
+ ret = dgbl->primary;
+ if (ret != NULL) {
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(dgbl->lock);
+ return ret;
+ }
- /* If we have an engine that can do RAND, use it. */
- if ((e = ENGINE_get_default_RAND()) != NULL
- && (tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(e)) != NULL) {
- funct_ref = e;
- default_RAND_meth = tmp_meth;
- } else {
- ENGINE_finish(e);
- default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth;
- }
-# else
- default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth;
-# endif
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+ if (dgbl->seed == NULL) {
+ ERR_set_mark();
+ dgbl->seed = rand_new_seed(ctx);
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
}
- tmp_meth = default_RAND_meth;
- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
- return tmp_meth;
#endif
+
+ ret = dgbl->primary = rand_new_drbg(ctx, dgbl->seed,
+ PRIMARY_RESEED_INTERVAL,
+ PRIMARY_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL);
+ /*
+ * The primary DRBG may be shared between multiple threads so we must
+ * enable locking.
+ */
+ if (ret != NULL && !EVP_RAND_enable_locking(ret)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_UNABLE_TO_ENABLE_LOCKING);
+ EVP_RAND_CTX_free(ret);
+ ret = dgbl->primary = NULL;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(dgbl->lock);
+
+ return ret;
}
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
-int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine)
+/*
+ * Get the public random generator.
+ * Returns pointer to its EVP_RAND_CTX on success, NULL on failure.
+ */
+EVP_RAND_CTX *RAND_get0_public(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx)
{
- const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
+ RAND_GLOBAL *dgbl = rand_get_global(ctx);
+ EVP_RAND_CTX *rand, *primary;
- if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
- return 0;
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
+ return NULL;
- if (engine != NULL) {
- if (!ENGINE_init(engine))
- return 0;
- tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(engine);
- if (tmp_meth == NULL) {
- ENGINE_finish(engine);
- return 0;
- }
+ rand = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public);
+ if (rand == NULL) {
+ primary = RAND_get0_primary(ctx);
+ if (primary == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ctx = ossl_lib_ctx_get_concrete(ctx);
+ /*
+ * If the private is also NULL then this is the first time we've
+ * used this thread.
+ */
+ if (CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private) == NULL
+ && !ossl_init_thread_start(NULL, ctx, rand_delete_thread_state))
+ return NULL;
+ rand = rand_new_drbg(ctx, primary, SECONDARY_RESEED_INTERVAL,
+ SECONDARY_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->public, rand);
}
- CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_engine_lock);
- /* This function releases any prior ENGINE so call it first */
- RAND_set_rand_method(tmp_meth);
- funct_ref = engine;
- CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_engine_lock);
- return 1;
+ return rand;
}
-#endif
-void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num)
+/*
+ * Get the private random generator.
+ * Returns pointer to its EVP_RAND_CTX on success, NULL on failure.
+ */
+EVP_RAND_CTX *RAND_get0_private(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx)
{
- const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+ RAND_GLOBAL *dgbl = rand_get_global(ctx);
+ EVP_RAND_CTX *rand, *primary;
- if (meth->seed != NULL)
- meth->seed(buf, num);
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ rand = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private);
+ if (rand == NULL) {
+ primary = RAND_get0_primary(ctx);
+ if (primary == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ctx = ossl_lib_ctx_get_concrete(ctx);
+ /*
+ * If the public is also NULL then this is the first time we've
+ * used this thread.
+ */
+ if (CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public) == NULL
+ && !ossl_init_thread_start(NULL, ctx, rand_delete_thread_state))
+ return NULL;
+ rand = rand_new_drbg(ctx, primary, SECONDARY_RESEED_INTERVAL,
+ SECONDARY_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->private, rand);
+ }
+ return rand;
}
-void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+static int random_set_string(char **p, const char *s)
{
- const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+ char *d = NULL;
- if (meth->add != NULL)
- meth->add(buf, num, randomness);
+ if (s != NULL) {
+ d = OPENSSL_strdup(s);
+ if (d == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(*p);
+ *p = d;
+ return 1;
}
/*
- * This function is not part of RAND_METHOD, so if we're not using
- * the default method, then just call RAND_bytes(). Otherwise make
- * sure we're instantiated and use the private DRBG.
+ * Load the DRBG definitions from a configuration file.
*/
-int rand_priv_bytes_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *buf, int num)
+static int random_conf_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf)
{
- RAND_DRBG *drbg;
- int ret;
- const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *elist;
+ CONF_VALUE *cval;
+ RAND_GLOBAL *dgbl = rand_get_global(cnf->libctx);
+ int i, r = 1;
- if (meth != RAND_OpenSSL())
- return meth->bytes(buf, num);
+ OSSL_TRACE1(CONF, "Loading random module: section %s\n",
+ CONF_imodule_get_value(md));
- drbg = OPENSSL_CTX_get0_private_drbg(ctx);
- if (drbg == NULL)
+ /* Value is a section containing RANDOM configuration */
+ elist = NCONF_get_section(cnf, CONF_imodule_get_value(md));
+ if (elist == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, CRYPTO_R_RANDOM_SECTION_ERROR);
return 0;
+ }
- ret = RAND_DRBG_bytes(drbg, buf, num);
- return ret;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(elist); i++) {
+ cval = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(elist, i);
+ if (strcasecmp(cval->name, "random") == 0) {
+ if (!random_set_string(&dgbl->rng_name, cval->value))
+ return 0;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(cval->name, "cipher") == 0) {
+ if (!random_set_string(&dgbl->rng_cipher, cval->value))
+ return 0;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(cval->name, "digest") == 0) {
+ if (!random_set_string(&dgbl->rng_digest, cval->value))
+ return 0;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(cval->name, "properties") == 0) {
+ if (!random_set_string(&dgbl->rng_propq, cval->value))
+ return 0;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(cval->name, "seed") == 0) {
+ if (!random_set_string(&dgbl->seed_name, cval->value))
+ return 0;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(cval->name, "seed_properties") == 0) {
+ if (!random_set_string(&dgbl->seed_propq, cval->value))
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO,
+ CRYPTO_R_UNKNOWN_NAME_IN_RANDOM_SECTION,
+ "name=%s, value=%s", cval->name, cval->value);
+ r = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return r;
}
-int RAND_priv_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
-{
- return rand_priv_bytes_ex(NULL, buf, num);
-}
-int rand_bytes_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *buf, int num)
+static void random_conf_deinit(CONF_IMODULE *md)
{
- RAND_DRBG *drbg;
- int ret;
- const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
-
- if (meth != RAND_OpenSSL()) {
- if (meth->bytes != NULL)
- return meth->bytes(buf, num);
- RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES_EX, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
- return -1;
- }
-
- drbg = OPENSSL_CTX_get0_public_drbg(ctx);
- if (drbg == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- ret = RAND_DRBG_bytes(drbg, buf, num);
- return ret;
+ OSSL_TRACE(CONF, "Cleaned up random\n");
}
-int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+void ossl_random_add_conf_module(void)
{
- return rand_bytes_ex(NULL, buf, num);
+ OSSL_TRACE(CONF, "Adding config module 'random'\n");
+ CONF_module_add("random", random_conf_init, random_conf_deinit);
}
-#if !OPENSSL_API_1_1_0 && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
-int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+int RAND_set_DRBG_type(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const char *drbg, const char *propq,
+ const char *cipher, const char *digest)
{
- const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+ RAND_GLOBAL *dgbl = rand_get_global(ctx);
- if (meth->pseudorand != NULL)
- return meth->pseudorand(buf, num);
- return -1;
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (dgbl->primary != NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return random_set_string(&dgbl->rng_name, drbg)
+ && random_set_string(&dgbl->rng_propq, propq)
+ && random_set_string(&dgbl->rng_cipher, cipher)
+ && random_set_string(&dgbl->rng_digest, digest);
}
-#endif
-int RAND_status(void)
+int RAND_set_seed_source_type(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, const char *seed,
+ const char *propq)
{
- const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+ RAND_GLOBAL *dgbl = rand_get_global(ctx);
- if (meth->status != NULL)
- return meth->status();
- return 0;
+ if (dgbl == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (dgbl->primary != NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return random_set_string(&dgbl->seed_name, seed)
+ && random_set_string(&dgbl->seed_propq, propq);
}
+
+#endif
projects / thirdparty / openssl.git / blobdiff