--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
+ * internal use.
+ */
+#include "internal/deprecated.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/params.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/nelem.h"
+#include "internal/sizes.h"
+#include "crypto/rsa.h"
+#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "prov/implementations.h"
+#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
+
+static OSSL_OP_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_signature_init;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_signature_init;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_signature_init;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_signverify_init;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_signverify_init;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_md_params;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_md_params;
+static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
+
+static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = {
+ { RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, "pkcs1" },
+ { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, "sslv23" },
+ { RSA_NO_PADDING, "none" },
+ { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oaep" }, /* Correct spelling first */
+ { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oeap" },
+ { RSA_X931_PADDING, "x931" },
+ { RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, "pss" },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+/*
+ * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface.
+ * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes RSA structures, so
+ * we use that here too.
+ */
+
+typedef struct {
+ OPENSSL_CTX *libctx;
+ RSA *rsa;
+
+ /*
+ * Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0)
+ * Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify
+ * operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again
+ * by their Final function.
+ */
+ unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1;
+
+ /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature agorithm */
+ unsigned char aid[128];
+ size_t aid_len;
+
+ /* main digest */
+ EVP_MD *md;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
+ int mdnid;
+ char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
+
+ /* RSA padding mode */
+ int pad_mode;
+ /* message digest for MGF1 */
+ EVP_MD *mgf1_md;
+ char mgf1_mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
+ /* PSS salt length */
+ int saltlen;
+ /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
+ int min_saltlen;
+
+ /* Temp buffer */
+ unsigned char *tbuf;
+
+} PROV_RSA_CTX;
+
+static size_t rsa_get_md_size(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
+{
+ if (prsactx->md != NULL)
+ return EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int rsa_get_md_nid(const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+ /*
+ * Because the RSA library deals with NIDs, we need to translate.
+ * We do so using EVP_MD_is_a(), and therefore need a name to NID
+ * map.
+ */
+ static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = {
+ { NID_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1 },
+ { NID_sha224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_224 },
+ { NID_sha256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256 },
+ { NID_sha384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_384 },
+ { NID_sha512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512 },
+ { NID_md5, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5 },
+ { NID_md5_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5_SHA1 },
+ { NID_md2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD2 },
+ { NID_md4, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD4 },
+ { NID_mdc2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2 },
+ { NID_ripemd160, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_RIPEMD160 },
+ { NID_sha3_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_224 },
+ { NID_sha3_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_256 },
+ { NID_sha3_384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_384 },
+ { NID_sha3_512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_512 },
+ };
+ size_t i;
+ int mdnid = NID_undef;
+
+ if (md == NULL)
+ goto end;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid); i++) {
+ if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, name_to_nid[i].ptr)) {
+ mdnid = (int)name_to_nid[i].id;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (mdnid == NID_undef)
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
+
+ end:
+ return mdnid;
+}
+
+static int rsa_check_padding(int mdnid, int padding)
+{
+ if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
+ if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX));
+
+ if (prsactx == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
+ prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
+ return prsactx;
+}
+
+/* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
+#define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1)
+
+static int rsa_signature_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+
+ if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa))
+ return 0;
+
+ RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
+ prsactx->rsa = vrsa;
+ if (RSA_get0_pss_params(prsactx->rsa) != NULL)
+ prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
+ else
+ prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+ /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
+ prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
+ prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
+ const char *mdprops)
+{
+ if (mdname != NULL) {
+ EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
+ int md_nid = rsa_get_md_nid(md);
+ size_t algorithmidentifier_len = 0;
+ const unsigned char *algorithmidentifier = NULL;
+
+ if (md == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)) {
+ EVP_MD_free(md);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
+ EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
+ ctx->md = NULL;
+ ctx->mdctx = NULL;
+ ctx->mdname[0] = '\0';
+ ctx->aid[0] = '\0';
+ ctx->aid_len = 0;
+
+ algorithmidentifier =
+ rsa_algorithmidentifier_encoding(md_nid, &algorithmidentifier_len);
+
+ ctx->md = md;
+ ctx->mdnid = md_nid;
+ OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname));
+ if (algorithmidentifier != NULL) {
+ memcpy(ctx->aid, algorithmidentifier, algorithmidentifier_len);
+ ctx->aid_len = algorithmidentifier_len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
+ const char *props)
+{
+ if (ctx->mgf1_mdname[0] != '\0')
+ EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
+
+ if ((ctx->mgf1_md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, props)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int setup_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
+ return 1;
+ if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(ctx->rsa))) == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void clean_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
+}
+
+static void free_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
+ ctx->tbuf = NULL;
+}
+
+static int rsa_sign(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+ int ret;
+ size_t rsasize = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
+ size_t mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
+
+ if (sig == NULL) {
+ *siglen = rsasize;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (sigsize < (size_t)rsasize)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (mdsize != 0) {
+ if (tbslen != mdsize) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2)) {
+ unsigned int sltmp;
+
+ if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
+ "only PKCS#1 padding supported with MDC2");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
+ prsactx->rsa);
+
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = sltmp;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
+ case RSA_X931_PADDING:
+ if ((size_t)RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) < tbslen + 1) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(prsactx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
+ prsactx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid);
+ ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, prsactx->tbuf,
+ sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
+ clean_tbuf(prsactx);
+ break;
+
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ {
+ unsigned int sltmp;
+
+ ret = RSA_sign(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
+ prsactx->rsa);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = sltmp;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
+ /* Check PSS restrictions */
+ if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
+ switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
+ case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
+ if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* FALLTHRU */
+ default:
+ if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
+ && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
+ return 0;
+ if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa,
+ prsactx->tbuf, tbs,
+ prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
+ prsactx->saltlen)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), prsactx->tbuf,
+ sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
+ clean_tbuf(prsactx);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
+ "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, prsactx->rsa,
+ prsactx->pad_mode);
+ }
+
+#ifdef LEGACY_MODE
+ end:
+#endif
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *siglen = ret;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx,
+ unsigned char *rout,
+ size_t *routlen,
+ size_t routsize,
+ const unsigned char *sig,
+ size_t siglen)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (rout == NULL) {
+ *routlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
+ switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
+ case RSA_X931_PADDING:
+ if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
+ return 0;
+ ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
+ RSA_X931_PADDING);
+ if (ret < 1) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret--;
+ if (prsactx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ret != EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ "Should be %d, but got %d",
+ EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md), ret);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *routlen = ret;
+ if (routsize < (size_t)ret) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret);
+ break;
+
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ {
+ size_t sltmp;
+
+ ret = int_rsa_verify(prsactx->mdnid, NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
+ sig, siglen, prsactx->rsa);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = sltmp;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
+ "Only X.931 or PKCS#1 v1.5 padding allowed");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, prsactx->rsa,
+ prsactx->pad_mode);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ *routlen = ret;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
+ const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+ size_t rslen;
+
+ if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
+ switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ if (!RSA_verify(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen,
+ prsactx->rsa)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ case RSA_X931_PADDING:
+ if (rsa_verify_recover(prsactx, NULL, &rslen, 0, sig, siglen) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
+ {
+ int ret;
+ size_t mdsize;
+
+ /* Check PSS restrictions */
+ if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
+ switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
+ case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
+ return 0;
+ case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
+ if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV,
+ PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* FALLTHRU */
+ default:
+ if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
+ && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We need to check this for the RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1()
+ * call
+ */
+ mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
+ if (tbslen != mdsize) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ "Should be %d, but got %d",
+ mdsize, tbslen);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
+ return 0;
+ ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf,
+ prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, tbs,
+ prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
+ prsactx->tbuf,
+ prsactx->saltlen);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+ default:
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
+ "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
+ return 0;
+ rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
+ prsactx->pad_mode);
+ if (rslen == 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, prsactx->tbuf, rslen))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int rsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
+ const char *props, void *vrsa)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+
+ prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
+ if (!rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa)
+ || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, props))
+ return 0;
+
+ prsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
+ goto error;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(prsactx->mdctx, prsactx->md, NULL))
+ goto error;
+
+ return 1;
+
+ error:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
+ EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
+ prsactx->mdctx = NULL;
+ prsactx->md = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int rsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *data,
+ size_t datalen)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+
+ if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ return EVP_DigestUpdate(prsactx->mdctx, data, datalen);
+}
+
+int rsa_digest_sign_final(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
+ size_t sigsize)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+ unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int dlen = 0;
+
+ prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
+ if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields
+ * are ignored. Defer to rsa_sign.
+ */
+ if (sig != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
+ * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
+ * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
+ */
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return rsa_sign(vprsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen);
+}
+
+
+int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig,
+ size_t siglen)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+ unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int dlen = 0;
+
+ prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
+ if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
+ * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
+ * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
+ */
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
+ return 0;
+
+ return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
+}
+
+static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+
+ if (prsactx == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
+ EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
+ EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md);
+ free_tbuf(prsactx);
+
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(prsactx));
+}
+
+static void *rsa_dupctx(void *vprsactx)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx;
+
+ dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
+ if (dstctx == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ *dstctx = *srcctx;
+ dstctx->rsa = NULL;
+ dstctx->md = NULL;
+ dstctx->mdctx = NULL;
+ dstctx->tbuf = NULL;
+
+ if (srcctx->rsa != NULL && !RSA_up_ref(srcctx->rsa))
+ goto err;
+ dstctx->rsa = srcctx->rsa;
+
+ if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md))
+ goto err;
+ dstctx->md = srcctx->md;
+
+ if (srcctx->mgf1_md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->mgf1_md))
+ goto err;
+ dstctx->mgf1_md = srcctx->mgf1_md;
+
+ if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) {
+ dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL
+ || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return dstctx;
+ err:
+ rsa_freectx(dstctx);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+ OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+ if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID);
+ if (p != NULL
+ && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, prsactx->aid, prsactx->aid_len))
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
+ if (p != NULL)
+ switch (p->data_type) {
+ case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER:
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->pad_mode))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
+ {
+ int i;
+ const char *word = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
+ if (prsactx->pad_mode == (int)padding_item[i].id) {
+ word = padding_item[i].ptr;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (word != NULL) {
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, word))
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
+ if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mdname))
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
+ if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mgf1_mdname))
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER) {
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->saltlen))
+ return 0;
+ } else if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
+ case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "digest"))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX:
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "max"))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "auto"))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d", prsactx->saltlen)
+ <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+};
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ return known_gettable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+
+ if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
+ /* Not allowed during certain operations */
+ if (p != NULL && !prsactx->flag_allow_md)
+ return 0;
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
+ char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
+ OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
+ OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES);
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
+ return 0;
+ if (propsp != NULL
+ && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* TODO(3.0) PSS check needs more work */
+ if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
+ /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
+ if (prsactx->md == NULL || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname))
+ return 1;
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* non-PSS code follows */
+ if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, mdprops))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ int pad_mode = 0;
+
+ switch (p->data_type) {
+ case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &pad_mode))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
+ {
+ int i;
+
+ if (p->data == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(p->data, padding_item[i].ptr) == 0) {
+ pad_mode = padding_item[i].id;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (pad_mode) {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+ /*
+ * OAEP padding is for asymmetric cipher only so is not compatible
+ * with signature use.
+ */
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
+ PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
+ "OAEP padding not allowed for signing / verifying");
+ return 0;
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
+ if (prsactx->mdname[0] == '\0')
+ rsa_setup_md(prsactx, "SHA1", "");
+ goto cont;
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ case RSA_X931_PADDING:
+ if (RSA_get0_pss_params(prsactx->rsa) != NULL) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
+ PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
+ "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ cont:
+ if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx->mdnid, pad_mode))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+ prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ int saltlen;
+
+ if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED,
+ "PSS saltlen can only be specified if "
+ "PSS padding has been specified first");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (p->data_type) {
+ case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &saltlen))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
+ if (strcmp(p->data, "digest") == 0)
+ saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
+ else if (strcmp(p->data, "max") == 0)
+ saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
+ else if (strcmp(p->data, "auto") == 0)
+ saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
+ else
+ saltlen = atoi(p->data);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX seems curiously named in this check.
+ * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently
+ * lowest saltlen number possible.
+ */
+ if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ prsactx->saltlen = saltlen;
+ }
+
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
+ char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
+ const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
+ OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
+ OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES);
+
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
+ return 0;
+ if (propsp != NULL
+ && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* TODO(3.0) PSS check needs more work */
+ if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
+ /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
+ if (prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL
+ || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mdname))
+ return 1;
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* non-PSS code follows */
+ if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, mdprops))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
+ OSSL_PARAM_END
+};
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx
+ * params if the ctx is being used for a DigestSign/DigestVerify? In that
+ * case it is not allowed to set the digest size/digest name because the
+ * digest is explicitly set as part of the init.
+ */
+ return known_settable_ctx_params;
+}
+
+static int rsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+
+ if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+
+ if (prsactx->md == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
+}
+
+static int rsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+
+ if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
+}
+
+static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
+{
+ PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+
+ if (prsactx->md == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
+}
+
+const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_signature_functions[] = {
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_init },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_final },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_init },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_final },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_freectx },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_dupctx },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_md_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_md_params },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
+ (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_md_params },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
projects / thirdparty / openssl.git / blobdiff