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db9ecf05 | 1 | /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ |
0fa2cac4 | 2 | |
845707aa | 3 | #include "cpio.h" |
e6d7dc9a | 4 | #include "device-path-util.h" |
33bc9b75 | 5 | #include "devicetree.h" |
37fa3690 | 6 | #include "graphics.h" |
0fa2cac4 | 7 | #include "linux.h" |
d4cbada2 | 8 | #include "measure.h" |
4ac79c2b | 9 | #include "memory-util-fundamental.h" |
0a1d8ac7 | 10 | #include "part-discovery.h" |
d4cbada2 | 11 | #include "pe.h" |
5080a60a | 12 | #include "proto/shell-parameters.h" |
0a1d8ac7 | 13 | #include "random-seed.h" |
c9bebec8 | 14 | #include "sbat.h" |
ce0f078f | 15 | #include "secure-boot.h" |
05c9f9c2 | 16 | #include "shim.h" |
cf0fbc49 | 17 | #include "splash.h" |
e0e1f4f7 | 18 | #include "tpm2-pcr.h" |
46c5a138 | 19 | #include "uki.h" |
cf0fbc49 | 20 | #include "util.h" |
2afeaf16 | 21 | #include "version.h" |
717af0de | 22 | #include "vmm.h" |
0fa2cac4 KS |
23 | |
24 | /* magic string to find in the binary image */ | |
898e9edc | 25 | DECLARE_NOALLOC_SECTION(".sdmagic", "#### LoaderInfo: systemd-stub " GIT_VERSION " ####"); |
0fa2cac4 | 26 | |
c9bebec8 LB |
27 | DECLARE_SBAT(SBAT_STUB_SECTION_TEXT); |
28 | ||
845707aa | 29 | static EFI_STATUS combine_initrd( |
dede50a7 | 30 | EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS initrd_base, size_t initrd_size, |
23002b45 | 31 | const void * const extra_initrds[], const size_t extra_initrd_sizes[], size_t n_extra_initrds, |
dede50a7 | 32 | Pages *ret_initr_pages, size_t *ret_initrd_size) { |
845707aa | 33 | |
dede50a7 | 34 | size_t n; |
845707aa | 35 | |
09173c91 | 36 | assert(ret_initr_pages); |
845707aa LP |
37 | assert(ret_initrd_size); |
38 | ||
f3b6f333 | 39 | /* Combines four initrds into one, by simple concatenation in memory */ |
845707aa | 40 | |
b4e7df4a | 41 | n = ALIGN4(initrd_size); /* main initrd might not be padded yet */ |
845707aa | 42 | |
23002b45 LP |
43 | for (size_t i = 0; i < n_extra_initrds; i++) { |
44 | if (!extra_initrds[i]) | |
45 | continue; | |
f3b6f333 | 46 | |
dede50a7 | 47 | if (n > SIZE_MAX - extra_initrd_sizes[i]) |
845707aa LP |
48 | return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; |
49 | ||
23002b45 | 50 | n += extra_initrd_sizes[i]; |
845707aa LP |
51 | } |
52 | ||
09173c91 | 53 | _cleanup_pages_ Pages pages = xmalloc_pages( |
845707aa LP |
54 | AllocateMaxAddress, |
55 | EfiLoaderData, | |
56 | EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES(n), | |
09173c91 JJ |
57 | UINT32_MAX /* Below 4G boundary. */); |
58 | uint8_t *p = PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_TO_POINTER(pages.addr); | |
845707aa | 59 | if (initrd_base != 0) { |
dede50a7 | 60 | size_t pad; |
845707aa LP |
61 | |
62 | /* Order matters, the real initrd must come first, since it might include microcode updates | |
63 | * which the kernel only looks for in the first cpio archive */ | |
515581d6 | 64 | p = mempcpy(p, PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_TO_POINTER(initrd_base), initrd_size); |
845707aa | 65 | |
b4e7df4a | 66 | pad = ALIGN4(initrd_size) - initrd_size; |
845707aa | 67 | if (pad > 0) { |
4ac79c2b | 68 | memzero(p, pad); |
845707aa LP |
69 | p += pad; |
70 | } | |
71 | } | |
72 | ||
23002b45 LP |
73 | for (size_t i = 0; i < n_extra_initrds; i++) { |
74 | if (!extra_initrds[i]) | |
75 | continue; | |
76 | ||
77 | p = mempcpy(p, extra_initrds[i], extra_initrd_sizes[i]); | |
78 | } | |
845707aa | 79 | |
09173c91 | 80 | assert(PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_TO_POINTER(pages.addr + n) == p); |
845707aa | 81 | |
09173c91 | 82 | *ret_initr_pages = pages; |
845707aa | 83 | *ret_initrd_size = n; |
09173c91 | 84 | pages.n_pages = 0; |
845707aa LP |
85 | |
86 | return EFI_SUCCESS; | |
87 | } | |
88 | ||
b30a43df | 89 | static void export_variables(EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL *loaded_image) { |
46d33672 LP |
90 | static const uint64_t stub_features = |
91 | EFI_STUB_FEATURE_REPORT_BOOT_PARTITION | /* We set LoaderDevicePartUUID */ | |
92 | EFI_STUB_FEATURE_PICK_UP_CREDENTIALS | /* We pick up credentials from the boot partition */ | |
93 | EFI_STUB_FEATURE_PICK_UP_SYSEXTS | /* We pick up system extensions from the boot partition */ | |
94 | EFI_STUB_FEATURE_THREE_PCRS | /* We can measure kernel image, parameters and sysext */ | |
0a1d8ac7 | 95 | EFI_STUB_FEATURE_RANDOM_SEED | /* We pass a random seed to the kernel */ |
92bb46c4 LP |
96 | EFI_STUB_FEATURE_CMDLINE_ADDONS | /* We pick up .cmdline addons */ |
97 | EFI_STUB_FEATURE_CMDLINE_SMBIOS | /* We support extending kernel cmdline from SMBIOS Type #11 */ | |
68f85761 | 98 | EFI_STUB_FEATURE_DEVICETREE_ADDONS | /* We pick up .dtb addons */ |
46d33672 LP |
99 | 0; |
100 | ||
5a186322 LP |
101 | assert(loaded_image); |
102 | ||
103 | /* Export the device path this image is started from, if it's not set yet */ | |
8e760b3f JJ |
104 | if (efivar_get_raw(MAKE_GUID_PTR(LOADER), u"LoaderDevicePartUUID", NULL, NULL) != EFI_SUCCESS) { |
105 | _cleanup_free_ char16_t *uuid = disk_get_part_uuid(loaded_image->DeviceHandle); | |
106 | if (uuid) | |
19f08504 | 107 | efivar_set(MAKE_GUID_PTR(LOADER), u"LoaderDevicePartUUID", uuid, 0); |
8e760b3f | 108 | } |
5a186322 LP |
109 | |
110 | /* If LoaderImageIdentifier is not set, assume the image with this stub was loaded directly from the | |
111 | * UEFI firmware without any boot loader, and hence set the LoaderImageIdentifier ourselves. Note | |
112 | * that some boot chain loaders neither set LoaderImageIdentifier nor make FilePath available to us, | |
113 | * in which case there's simple nothing to set for us. (The UEFI spec doesn't really say who's wrong | |
114 | * here, i.e. whether FilePath may be NULL or not, hence handle this gracefully and check if FilePath | |
115 | * is non-NULL explicitly.) */ | |
19f08504 | 116 | if (efivar_get_raw(MAKE_GUID_PTR(LOADER), u"LoaderImageIdentifier", NULL, NULL) != EFI_SUCCESS && |
5a186322 | 117 | loaded_image->FilePath) { |
3639d1b0 | 118 | _cleanup_free_ char16_t *s = NULL; |
616a80fe | 119 | if (device_path_to_str(loaded_image->FilePath, &s) == EFI_SUCCESS) |
19f08504 | 120 | efivar_set(MAKE_GUID_PTR(LOADER), u"LoaderImageIdentifier", s, 0); |
5a186322 LP |
121 | } |
122 | ||
123 | /* if LoaderFirmwareInfo is not set, let's set it */ | |
19f08504 | 124 | if (efivar_get_raw(MAKE_GUID_PTR(LOADER), u"LoaderFirmwareInfo", NULL, NULL) != EFI_SUCCESS) { |
3639d1b0 | 125 | _cleanup_free_ char16_t *s = NULL; |
2f3c3b0b | 126 | s = xasprintf("%ls %u.%02u", ST->FirmwareVendor, ST->FirmwareRevision >> 16, ST->FirmwareRevision & 0xffff); |
19f08504 | 127 | efivar_set(MAKE_GUID_PTR(LOADER), u"LoaderFirmwareInfo", s, 0); |
5a186322 LP |
128 | } |
129 | ||
130 | /* ditto for LoaderFirmwareType */ | |
19f08504 | 131 | if (efivar_get_raw(MAKE_GUID_PTR(LOADER), u"LoaderFirmwareType", NULL, NULL) != EFI_SUCCESS) { |
3639d1b0 | 132 | _cleanup_free_ char16_t *s = NULL; |
2f3c3b0b | 133 | s = xasprintf("UEFI %u.%02u", ST->Hdr.Revision >> 16, ST->Hdr.Revision & 0xffff); |
19f08504 | 134 | efivar_set(MAKE_GUID_PTR(LOADER), u"LoaderFirmwareType", s, 0); |
5a186322 LP |
135 | } |
136 | ||
46d33672 | 137 | |
24120e40 LP |
138 | /* add StubInfo (this is one is owned by the stub, hence we unconditionally override this with our |
139 | * own data) */ | |
19f08504 | 140 | (void) efivar_set(MAKE_GUID_PTR(LOADER), u"StubInfo", u"systemd-stub " GIT_VERSION, 0); |
46d33672 | 141 | |
19f08504 | 142 | (void) efivar_set_uint64_le(MAKE_GUID_PTR(LOADER), u"StubFeatures", stub_features, 0); |
5a186322 LP |
143 | } |
144 | ||
b17f3b3d JJ |
145 | static bool use_load_options( |
146 | EFI_HANDLE stub_image, | |
147 | EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL *loaded_image, | |
148 | bool have_cmdline, | |
149 | char16_t **ret) { | |
150 | ||
151 | assert(stub_image); | |
152 | assert(loaded_image); | |
153 | assert(ret); | |
154 | ||
155 | /* We only allow custom command lines if we aren't in secure boot or if no cmdline was baked into | |
fab0eeb7 EGE |
156 | * the stub image. |
157 | * We also don't allow it if we are in confidential vms and secureboot is on. */ | |
158 | if (secure_boot_enabled() && (have_cmdline || is_confidential_vm())) | |
b17f3b3d JJ |
159 | return false; |
160 | ||
161 | /* We also do a superficial check whether first character of passed command line | |
162 | * is printable character (for compat with some Dell systems which fill in garbage?). */ | |
163 | if (loaded_image->LoadOptionsSize < sizeof(char16_t) || ((char16_t *) loaded_image->LoadOptions)[0] <= 0x1F) | |
164 | return false; | |
165 | ||
166 | /* The UEFI shell registers EFI_SHELL_PARAMETERS_PROTOCOL onto images it runs. This lets us know that | |
167 | * LoadOptions starts with the stub binary path which we want to strip off. */ | |
168 | EFI_SHELL_PARAMETERS_PROTOCOL *shell; | |
19f08504 | 169 | if (BS->HandleProtocol(stub_image, MAKE_GUID_PTR(EFI_SHELL_PARAMETERS_PROTOCOL), (void **) &shell) |
b17f3b3d JJ |
170 | != EFI_SUCCESS) { |
171 | /* Not running from EFI shell, use entire LoadOptions. Note that LoadOptions is a void*, so | |
172 | * it could be anything! */ | |
173 | *ret = xstrndup16(loaded_image->LoadOptions, loaded_image->LoadOptionsSize / sizeof(char16_t)); | |
174 | mangle_stub_cmdline(*ret); | |
175 | return true; | |
176 | } | |
177 | ||
178 | if (shell->Argc < 2) | |
179 | /* No arguments were provided? Then we fall back to built-in cmdline. */ | |
180 | return false; | |
181 | ||
182 | /* Assemble the command line ourselves without our stub path. */ | |
183 | *ret = xstrdup16(shell->Argv[1]); | |
184 | for (size_t i = 2; i < shell->Argc; i++) { | |
185 | _cleanup_free_ char16_t *old = *ret; | |
2f3c3b0b | 186 | *ret = xasprintf("%ls %ls", old, shell->Argv[i]); |
b17f3b3d JJ |
187 | } |
188 | ||
189 | mangle_stub_cmdline(*ret); | |
190 | return true; | |
191 | } | |
192 | ||
05c9f9c2 LB |
193 | static EFI_STATUS load_addons_from_dir( |
194 | EFI_FILE *root, | |
195 | const char16_t *prefix, | |
196 | char16_t ***items, | |
197 | size_t *n_items, | |
198 | size_t *n_allocated) { | |
199 | ||
200 | _cleanup_(file_closep) EFI_FILE *extra_dir = NULL; | |
201 | _cleanup_free_ EFI_FILE_INFO *dirent = NULL; | |
202 | size_t dirent_size = 0; | |
203 | EFI_STATUS err; | |
204 | ||
205 | assert(root); | |
206 | assert(prefix); | |
207 | assert(items); | |
208 | assert(n_items); | |
209 | assert(n_allocated); | |
210 | ||
211 | err = open_directory(root, prefix, &extra_dir); | |
212 | if (err == EFI_NOT_FOUND) | |
213 | /* No extra subdir, that's totally OK */ | |
214 | return EFI_SUCCESS; | |
215 | if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) | |
216 | return log_error_status(err, "Failed to open addons directory '%ls': %m", prefix); | |
217 | ||
218 | for (;;) { | |
219 | _cleanup_free_ char16_t *d = NULL; | |
220 | ||
221 | err = readdir(extra_dir, &dirent, &dirent_size); | |
222 | if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) | |
223 | return log_error_status(err, "Failed to read addons directory of loaded image: %m"); | |
224 | if (!dirent) /* End of directory */ | |
225 | break; | |
226 | ||
227 | if (dirent->FileName[0] == '.') | |
228 | continue; | |
229 | if (FLAGS_SET(dirent->Attribute, EFI_FILE_DIRECTORY)) | |
230 | continue; | |
231 | if (!is_ascii(dirent->FileName)) | |
232 | continue; | |
233 | if (strlen16(dirent->FileName) > 255) /* Max filename size on Linux */ | |
234 | continue; | |
235 | if (!endswith_no_case(dirent->FileName, u".addon.efi")) | |
236 | continue; | |
237 | ||
238 | d = xstrdup16(dirent->FileName); | |
239 | ||
240 | if (*n_items + 2 > *n_allocated) { | |
241 | /* We allocate 16 entries at a time, as a matter of optimization */ | |
242 | if (*n_items > (SIZE_MAX / sizeof(uint16_t)) - 16) /* Overflow check, just in case */ | |
243 | return log_oom(); | |
244 | ||
245 | size_t m = *n_items + 16; | |
246 | *items = xrealloc(*items, *n_allocated * sizeof(uint16_t *), m * sizeof(uint16_t *)); | |
247 | *n_allocated = m; | |
248 | } | |
249 | ||
250 | (*items)[(*n_items)++] = TAKE_PTR(d); | |
251 | (*items)[*n_items] = NULL; /* Let's always NUL terminate, to make freeing via strv_free() easy */ | |
252 | } | |
253 | ||
254 | return EFI_SUCCESS; | |
05c9f9c2 LB |
255 | } |
256 | ||
68f85761 | 257 | static void cmdline_append_and_measure_addons( |
3e6f010e LB |
258 | char16_t *cmdline_global, |
259 | char16_t *cmdline_uki, | |
68f85761 LB |
260 | char16_t **cmdline_append, |
261 | bool *ret_parameters_measured) { | |
262 | ||
3e6f010e | 263 | _cleanup_free_ char16_t *tmp = NULL, *merged = NULL; |
68f85761 LB |
264 | bool m = false; |
265 | ||
266 | assert(cmdline_append); | |
267 | assert(ret_parameters_measured); | |
268 | ||
3e6f010e LB |
269 | if (isempty(cmdline_global) && isempty(cmdline_uki)) |
270 | return; | |
271 | ||
272 | merged = xasprintf("%ls%ls%ls", | |
273 | strempty(cmdline_global), | |
274 | isempty(cmdline_global) || isempty(cmdline_uki) ? u"" : u" ", | |
275 | strempty(cmdline_uki)); | |
68f85761 | 276 | |
3e6f010e LB |
277 | mangle_stub_cmdline(merged); |
278 | ||
279 | if (isempty(merged)) | |
68f85761 LB |
280 | return; |
281 | ||
3e6f010e | 282 | (void) tpm_log_load_options(merged, &m); |
68f85761 LB |
283 | *ret_parameters_measured = m; |
284 | ||
285 | tmp = TAKE_PTR(*cmdline_append); | |
3e6f010e | 286 | *cmdline_append = xasprintf("%ls%ls%ls", strempty(tmp), isempty(tmp) ? u"" : u" ", merged); |
68f85761 LB |
287 | } |
288 | ||
289 | static void dtb_install_addons( | |
290 | struct devicetree_state *dt_state, | |
291 | void **dt_bases, | |
292 | size_t *dt_sizes, | |
293 | char16_t **dt_filenames, | |
294 | size_t n_dts, | |
295 | bool *ret_parameters_measured) { | |
296 | ||
297 | int parameters_measured = -1; | |
298 | EFI_STATUS err; | |
299 | ||
300 | assert(dt_state); | |
301 | assert(n_dts == 0 || (dt_bases && dt_sizes && dt_filenames)); | |
302 | assert(ret_parameters_measured); | |
303 | ||
304 | for (size_t i = 0; i < n_dts; ++i) { | |
305 | err = devicetree_install_from_memory(dt_state, dt_bases[i], dt_sizes[i]); | |
306 | if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) | |
307 | log_error_status(err, "Error loading addon devicetree, ignoring: %m"); | |
308 | else { | |
309 | bool m = false; | |
310 | ||
311 | err = tpm_log_tagged_event( | |
312 | TPM2_PCR_KERNEL_CONFIG, | |
313 | POINTER_TO_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS(dt_bases[i]), | |
314 | dt_sizes[i], | |
83ee462c | 315 | DEVICETREE_ADDON_EVENT_TAG_ID, |
68f85761 LB |
316 | dt_filenames[i], |
317 | &m); | |
318 | if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) | |
319 | return (void) log_error_status( | |
320 | err, | |
321 | "Unable to add measurement of DTB addon #%zu to PCR %i: %m", | |
322 | i, | |
323 | TPM2_PCR_KERNEL_CONFIG); | |
324 | ||
325 | parameters_measured = parameters_measured < 0 ? m : (parameters_measured && m); | |
326 | } | |
327 | } | |
328 | ||
329 | *ret_parameters_measured = parameters_measured; | |
330 | } | |
331 | ||
332 | static void dt_bases_free(void **dt_bases, size_t n_dt) { | |
333 | assert(dt_bases || n_dt == 0); | |
334 | ||
335 | for (size_t i = 0; i < n_dt; ++i) | |
336 | free(dt_bases[i]); | |
337 | ||
338 | free(dt_bases); | |
339 | } | |
340 | ||
341 | static void dt_filenames_free(char16_t **dt_filenames, size_t n_dt) { | |
342 | assert(dt_filenames || n_dt == 0); | |
343 | ||
344 | for (size_t i = 0; i < n_dt; ++i) | |
345 | free(dt_filenames[i]); | |
346 | ||
347 | free(dt_filenames); | |
348 | } | |
349 | ||
350 | static EFI_STATUS load_addons( | |
05c9f9c2 LB |
351 | EFI_HANDLE stub_image, |
352 | EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL *loaded_image, | |
353 | const char16_t *prefix, | |
354 | const char *uname, | |
68f85761 LB |
355 | char16_t **ret_cmdline, |
356 | void ***ret_dt_bases, | |
357 | size_t **ret_dt_sizes, | |
358 | char16_t ***ret_dt_filenames, | |
359 | size_t *ret_n_dt) { | |
05c9f9c2 | 360 | |
68f85761 | 361 | _cleanup_free_ size_t *dt_sizes = NULL; |
05c9f9c2 LB |
362 | _cleanup_(strv_freep) char16_t **items = NULL; |
363 | _cleanup_(file_closep) EFI_FILE *root = NULL; | |
68f85761 LB |
364 | _cleanup_free_ char16_t *cmdline = NULL; |
365 | size_t n_items = 0, n_allocated = 0, n_dt = 0; | |
366 | char16_t **dt_filenames = NULL; | |
367 | void **dt_bases = NULL; | |
05c9f9c2 LB |
368 | EFI_STATUS err; |
369 | ||
370 | assert(stub_image); | |
371 | assert(loaded_image); | |
372 | assert(prefix); | |
68f85761 LB |
373 | assert(!!ret_dt_bases == !!ret_dt_sizes); |
374 | assert(!!ret_dt_bases == !!ret_n_dt); | |
375 | assert(!!ret_dt_filenames == !!ret_n_dt); | |
05c9f9c2 LB |
376 | |
377 | if (!loaded_image->DeviceHandle) | |
378 | return EFI_SUCCESS; | |
379 | ||
68f85761 LB |
380 | CLEANUP_ARRAY(dt_bases, n_dt, dt_bases_free); |
381 | CLEANUP_ARRAY(dt_filenames, n_dt, dt_filenames_free); | |
382 | ||
05c9f9c2 LB |
383 | err = open_volume(loaded_image->DeviceHandle, &root); |
384 | if (err == EFI_UNSUPPORTED) | |
385 | /* Error will be unsupported if the bootloader doesn't implement the file system protocol on | |
386 | * its file handles. */ | |
387 | return EFI_SUCCESS; | |
388 | if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) | |
389 | return log_error_status(err, "Unable to open root directory: %m"); | |
390 | ||
391 | err = load_addons_from_dir(root, prefix, &items, &n_items, &n_allocated); | |
392 | if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) | |
393 | return err; | |
394 | ||
395 | if (n_items == 0) | |
396 | return EFI_SUCCESS; /* Empty directory */ | |
397 | ||
398 | /* Now, sort the files we found, to make this uniform and stable (and to ensure the TPM measurements | |
399 | * are not dependent on read order) */ | |
400 | sort_pointer_array((void**) items, n_items, (compare_pointer_func_t) strcmp16); | |
401 | ||
402 | for (size_t i = 0; i < n_items; i++) { | |
403 | size_t addrs[_UNIFIED_SECTION_MAX] = {}, szs[_UNIFIED_SECTION_MAX] = {}; | |
404 | _cleanup_free_ EFI_DEVICE_PATH *addon_path = NULL; | |
405 | _cleanup_(unload_imagep) EFI_HANDLE addon = NULL; | |
406 | EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL *loaded_addon = NULL; | |
407 | _cleanup_free_ char16_t *addon_spath = NULL; | |
408 | ||
409 | addon_spath = xasprintf("%ls\\%ls", prefix, items[i]); | |
410 | err = make_file_device_path(loaded_image->DeviceHandle, addon_spath, &addon_path); | |
411 | if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) | |
412 | return log_error_status(err, "Error making device path for %ls: %m", addon_spath); | |
413 | ||
414 | /* By using shim_load_image, we cover both the case where the PE files are signed with MoK | |
415 | * and with DB, and running with or without shim. */ | |
416 | err = shim_load_image(stub_image, addon_path, &addon); | |
417 | if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) { | |
418 | log_error_status(err, | |
419 | "Failed to read '%ls' from '%ls', ignoring: %m", | |
420 | items[i], | |
421 | addon_spath); | |
422 | continue; | |
423 | } | |
424 | ||
425 | err = BS->HandleProtocol(addon, | |
426 | MAKE_GUID_PTR(EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL), | |
427 | (void **) &loaded_addon); | |
428 | if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) | |
429 | return log_error_status(err, "Failed to find protocol in %ls: %m", items[i]); | |
430 | ||
431 | err = pe_memory_locate_sections(loaded_addon->ImageBase, unified_sections, addrs, szs); | |
68f85761 LB |
432 | if (err != EFI_SUCCESS || |
433 | (szs[UNIFIED_SECTION_CMDLINE] == 0 && szs[UNIFIED_SECTION_DTB] == 0)) { | |
05c9f9c2 LB |
434 | if (err == EFI_SUCCESS) |
435 | err = EFI_NOT_FOUND; | |
436 | log_error_status(err, | |
68f85761 | 437 | "Unable to locate embedded .cmdline/.dtb sections in %ls, ignoring: %m", |
05c9f9c2 LB |
438 | items[i]); |
439 | continue; | |
440 | } | |
441 | ||
442 | /* We want to enforce that addons are not UKIs, i.e.: they must not embed a kernel. */ | |
443 | if (szs[UNIFIED_SECTION_LINUX] > 0) { | |
444 | log_error_status(EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER, "%ls is a UKI, not an addon, ignoring: %m", items[i]); | |
445 | continue; | |
446 | } | |
447 | ||
448 | /* Also enforce that, in case it is specified, .uname matches as a quick way to allow | |
449 | * enforcing compatibility with a specific UKI only */ | |
450 | if (uname && szs[UNIFIED_SECTION_UNAME] > 0 && | |
451 | !strneq8(uname, | |
452 | (char *)loaded_addon->ImageBase + addrs[UNIFIED_SECTION_UNAME], | |
453 | szs[UNIFIED_SECTION_UNAME])) { | |
454 | log_error(".uname mismatch between %ls and UKI, ignoring", items[i]); | |
455 | continue; | |
456 | } | |
457 | ||
68f85761 LB |
458 | if (ret_cmdline && szs[UNIFIED_SECTION_CMDLINE] > 0) { |
459 | _cleanup_free_ char16_t *tmp = TAKE_PTR(cmdline), | |
460 | *extra16 = xstrn8_to_16((char *)loaded_addon->ImageBase + addrs[UNIFIED_SECTION_CMDLINE], | |
461 | szs[UNIFIED_SECTION_CMDLINE]); | |
462 | cmdline = xasprintf("%ls%ls%ls", strempty(tmp), isempty(tmp) ? u"" : u" ", extra16); | |
463 | } | |
464 | ||
465 | if (ret_dt_bases && szs[UNIFIED_SECTION_DTB] > 0) { | |
466 | dt_sizes = xrealloc(dt_sizes, | |
467 | n_dt * sizeof(size_t), | |
468 | (n_dt + 1) * sizeof(size_t)); | |
469 | dt_sizes[n_dt] = szs[UNIFIED_SECTION_DTB]; | |
05c9f9c2 | 470 | |
68f85761 LB |
471 | dt_bases = xrealloc(dt_bases, |
472 | n_dt * sizeof(void *), | |
473 | (n_dt + 1) * sizeof(void *)); | |
474 | dt_bases[n_dt] = xmemdup((uint8_t*)loaded_addon->ImageBase + addrs[UNIFIED_SECTION_DTB], | |
475 | dt_sizes[n_dt]); | |
05c9f9c2 | 476 | |
68f85761 LB |
477 | dt_filenames = xrealloc(dt_filenames, |
478 | n_dt * sizeof(char16_t *), | |
479 | (n_dt + 1) * sizeof(char16_t *)); | |
480 | dt_filenames[n_dt] = xstrdup16(items[i]); | |
481 | ||
482 | ++n_dt; | |
483 | } | |
484 | } | |
05c9f9c2 | 485 | |
68f85761 LB |
486 | if (ret_cmdline && !isempty(cmdline)) |
487 | *ret_cmdline = TAKE_PTR(cmdline); | |
05c9f9c2 | 488 | |
68f85761 LB |
489 | if (ret_n_dt && n_dt > 0) { |
490 | *ret_dt_filenames = TAKE_PTR(dt_filenames); | |
491 | *ret_dt_bases = TAKE_PTR(dt_bases); | |
492 | *ret_dt_sizes = TAKE_PTR(dt_sizes); | |
493 | *ret_n_dt = n_dt; | |
05c9f9c2 LB |
494 | } |
495 | ||
496 | return EFI_SUCCESS; | |
497 | } | |
498 | ||
31a131bb | 499 | static EFI_STATUS run(EFI_HANDLE image) { |
23002b45 | 500 | _cleanup_free_ void *credential_initrd = NULL, *global_credential_initrd = NULL, *sysext_initrd = NULL, *pcrsig_initrd = NULL, *pcrpkey_initrd = NULL; |
927ebebe | 501 | size_t credential_initrd_size = 0, global_credential_initrd_size = 0, sysext_initrd_size = 0, pcrsig_initrd_size = 0, pcrpkey_initrd_size = 0; |
68f85761 LB |
502 | void **dt_bases_addons_global = NULL, **dt_bases_addons_uki = NULL; |
503 | char16_t **dt_filenames_addons_global = NULL, **dt_filenames_addons_uki = NULL; | |
504 | _cleanup_free_ size_t *dt_sizes_addons_global = NULL, *dt_sizes_addons_uki = NULL; | |
505 | size_t linux_size, initrd_size, dt_size, n_dts_addons_global = 0, n_dts_addons_uki = 0; | |
33bc9b75 MR |
506 | EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS linux_base, initrd_base, dt_base; |
507 | _cleanup_(devicetree_cleanup) struct devicetree_state dt_state = {}; | |
b30a43df | 508 | EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL *loaded_image; |
927ebebe | 509 | size_t addrs[_UNIFIED_SECTION_MAX] = {}, szs[_UNIFIED_SECTION_MAX] = {}; |
68f85761 | 510 | _cleanup_free_ char16_t *cmdline = NULL, *cmdline_addons_global = NULL, *cmdline_addons_uki = NULL; |
72c97c19 | 511 | int sections_measured = -1, parameters_measured = -1; |
05c9f9c2 | 512 | _cleanup_free_ char *uname = NULL; |
de7ad6d4 | 513 | bool sysext_measured = false, m; |
0a1d8ac7 | 514 | uint64_t loader_features = 0; |
0fa2cac4 KS |
515 | EFI_STATUS err; |
516 | ||
b4eb2de7 | 517 | err = BS->HandleProtocol(image, MAKE_GUID_PTR(EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL), (void **) &loaded_image); |
2a5e4fe4 | 518 | if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) |
c2c62035 | 519 | return log_error_status(err, "Error getting a LoadedImageProtocol handle: %m"); |
0fa2cac4 | 520 | |
c7fda707 L |
521 | if (loaded_image->DeviceHandle && /* Handle case, where bootloader doesn't support DeviceHandle. */ |
522 | (efivar_get_uint64_le(MAKE_GUID_PTR(LOADER), u"LoaderFeatures", &loader_features) != EFI_SUCCESS || | |
523 | !FLAGS_SET(loader_features, EFI_LOADER_FEATURE_RANDOM_SEED))) { | |
0a1d8ac7 JD |
524 | _cleanup_(file_closep) EFI_FILE *esp_dir = NULL; |
525 | ||
19f08504 | 526 | err = partition_open(MAKE_GUID_PTR(ESP), loaded_image->DeviceHandle, NULL, &esp_dir); |
0a1d8ac7 JD |
527 | if (err == EFI_SUCCESS) /* Non-fatal on failure, so that we still boot without it. */ |
528 | (void) process_random_seed(esp_dir); | |
529 | } | |
530 | ||
6017eee9 LP |
531 | err = pe_memory_locate_sections(loaded_image->ImageBase, unified_sections, addrs, szs); |
532 | if (err != EFI_SUCCESS || szs[UNIFIED_SECTION_LINUX] == 0) { | |
2a5e4fe4 | 533 | if (err == EFI_SUCCESS) |
65ff3d26 | 534 | err = EFI_NOT_FOUND; |
c2c62035 | 535 | return log_error_status(err, "Unable to locate embedded .linux section: %m"); |
65ff3d26 | 536 | } |
0fa2cac4 | 537 | |
68f85761 LB |
538 | CLEANUP_ARRAY(dt_bases_addons_global, n_dts_addons_global, dt_bases_free); |
539 | CLEANUP_ARRAY(dt_bases_addons_uki, n_dts_addons_uki, dt_bases_free); | |
540 | CLEANUP_ARRAY(dt_filenames_addons_global, n_dts_addons_global, dt_filenames_free); | |
541 | CLEANUP_ARRAY(dt_filenames_addons_uki, n_dts_addons_uki, dt_filenames_free); | |
542 | ||
543 | /* Now that we have the UKI sections loaded, also load global first and then local (per-UKI) | |
544 | * addons. The data is loaded at once, and then used later. */ | |
545 | err = load_addons( | |
546 | image, | |
547 | loaded_image, | |
548 | u"\\loader\\addons", | |
549 | uname, | |
550 | &cmdline_addons_global, | |
551 | &dt_bases_addons_global, | |
552 | &dt_sizes_addons_global, | |
553 | &dt_filenames_addons_global, | |
554 | &n_dts_addons_global); | |
555 | if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) | |
556 | log_error_status(err, "Error loading global addons, ignoring: %m"); | |
557 | ||
c7fda707 | 558 | /* Some bootloaders always pass NULL in FilePath, so we need to check for it here. */ |
ec43827b LP |
559 | _cleanup_free_ char16_t *dropin_dir = get_extra_dir(loaded_image->FilePath); |
560 | if (dropin_dir) { | |
c7fda707 L |
561 | err = load_addons( |
562 | image, | |
563 | loaded_image, | |
564 | dropin_dir, | |
565 | uname, | |
566 | &cmdline_addons_uki, | |
567 | &dt_bases_addons_uki, | |
568 | &dt_sizes_addons_uki, | |
569 | &dt_filenames_addons_uki, | |
570 | &n_dts_addons_uki); | |
571 | if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) | |
572 | log_error_status(err, "Error loading UKI-specific addons, ignoring: %m"); | |
573 | } | |
68f85761 | 574 | |
72c97c19 LP |
575 | /* Measure all "payload" of this PE image into a separate PCR (i.e. where nothing else is written |
576 | * into so far), so that we have one PCR that we can nicely write policies against because it | |
577 | * contains all static data of this image, and thus can be easily be pre-calculated. */ | |
6017eee9 | 578 | for (UnifiedSection section = 0; section < _UNIFIED_SECTION_MAX; section++) { |
df7ee6f8 LP |
579 | |
580 | if (!unified_section_measure(section)) /* shall not measure? */ | |
581 | continue; | |
72c97c19 LP |
582 | |
583 | if (szs[section] == 0) /* not found */ | |
584 | continue; | |
585 | ||
df7ee6f8 LP |
586 | m = false; |
587 | ||
72c97c19 LP |
588 | /* First measure the name of the section */ |
589 | (void) tpm_log_event_ascii( | |
2099cd62 | 590 | TPM2_PCR_KERNEL_BOOT, |
6017eee9 LP |
591 | POINTER_TO_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS(unified_sections[section]), |
592 | strsize8(unified_sections[section]), /* including NUL byte */ | |
593 | unified_sections[section], | |
72c97c19 LP |
594 | &m); |
595 | ||
596 | sections_measured = sections_measured < 0 ? m : (sections_measured && m); | |
597 | ||
598 | /* Then measure the data of the section */ | |
599 | (void) tpm_log_event_ascii( | |
2099cd62 | 600 | TPM2_PCR_KERNEL_BOOT, |
72c97c19 LP |
601 | POINTER_TO_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS(loaded_image->ImageBase) + addrs[section], |
602 | szs[section], | |
6017eee9 | 603 | unified_sections[section], |
72c97c19 LP |
604 | &m); |
605 | ||
606 | sections_measured = sections_measured < 0 ? m : (sections_measured && m); | |
607 | } | |
608 | ||
609 | /* After we are done, set an EFI variable that tells userspace this was done successfully, and encode | |
610 | * in it which PCR was used. */ | |
611 | if (sections_measured > 0) | |
2099cd62 | 612 | (void) efivar_set_uint_string(MAKE_GUID_PTR(LOADER), u"StubPcrKernelImage", TPM2_PCR_KERNEL_BOOT, 0); |
72c97c19 | 613 | |
94b81afb | 614 | /* Show splash screen as early as possible */ |
957dfcc9 | 615 | graphics_splash((const uint8_t*) loaded_image->ImageBase + addrs[UNIFIED_SECTION_SPLASH], szs[UNIFIED_SECTION_SPLASH]); |
94b81afb | 616 | |
05c9f9c2 LB |
617 | if (szs[UNIFIED_SECTION_UNAME] > 0) |
618 | uname = xstrndup8((char *)loaded_image->ImageBase + addrs[UNIFIED_SECTION_UNAME], | |
619 | szs[UNIFIED_SECTION_UNAME]); | |
620 | ||
b17f3b3d | 621 | if (use_load_options(image, loaded_image, szs[UNIFIED_SECTION_CMDLINE] > 0, &cmdline)) { |
e6e24af5 LP |
622 | /* Let's measure the passed kernel command line into the TPM. Note that this possibly |
623 | * duplicates what we already did in the boot menu, if that was already used. However, since | |
624 | * we want the boot menu to support an EFI binary, and want to this stub to be usable from | |
625 | * any boot menu, let's measure things anyway. */ | |
599fe002 | 626 | m = false; |
927ebebe | 627 | (void) tpm_log_load_options(cmdline, &m); |
599fe002 | 628 | parameters_measured = m; |
927ebebe JJ |
629 | } else if (szs[UNIFIED_SECTION_CMDLINE] > 0) { |
630 | cmdline = xstrn8_to_16( | |
631 | (char *) loaded_image->ImageBase + addrs[UNIFIED_SECTION_CMDLINE], | |
632 | szs[UNIFIED_SECTION_CMDLINE]); | |
633 | mangle_stub_cmdline(cmdline); | |
0fa2cac4 KS |
634 | } |
635 | ||
05c9f9c2 | 636 | /* If we have any extra command line to add via PE addons, load them now and append, and |
3e6f010e | 637 | * measure the additions together, after the embedded options, but before the smbios ones, |
05c9f9c2 LB |
638 | * so that the order is reversed from "most hardcoded" to "most dynamic". The global addons are |
639 | * loaded first, and the image-specific ones later, for the same reason. */ | |
3e6f010e | 640 | cmdline_append_and_measure_addons(cmdline_addons_global, cmdline_addons_uki, &cmdline, &m); |
05c9f9c2 LB |
641 | parameters_measured = parameters_measured < 0 ? m : (parameters_measured && m); |
642 | ||
4b1153cf DB |
643 | /* SMBIOS OEM Strings data is controlled by the host admin and not covered |
644 | * by the VM attestation, so MUST NOT be trusted when in a confidential VM */ | |
645 | if (!is_confidential_vm()) { | |
646 | const char *extra = smbios_find_oem_string("io.systemd.stub.kernel-cmdline-extra"); | |
647 | if (extra) { | |
648 | _cleanup_free_ char16_t *tmp = TAKE_PTR(cmdline), *extra16 = xstr8_to_16(extra); | |
649 | cmdline = xasprintf("%ls %ls", tmp, extra16); | |
650 | ||
651 | /* SMBIOS strings are measured in PCR1, but we also want to measure them in our specific | |
652 | * PCR12, as firmware-owned PCRs are very difficult to use as they'll contain unpredictable | |
653 | * measurements that are not under control of the machine owner. */ | |
654 | m = false; | |
655 | (void) tpm_log_load_options(extra16, &m); | |
656 | parameters_measured = parameters_measured < 0 ? m : (parameters_measured && m); | |
657 | } | |
717af0de DDM |
658 | } |
659 | ||
5a186322 | 660 | export_variables(loaded_image); |
1aa15def | 661 | |
599fe002 LP |
662 | if (pack_cpio(loaded_image, |
663 | NULL, | |
a083aed0 | 664 | u".cred", |
599fe002 LP |
665 | ".extra/credentials", |
666 | /* dir_mode= */ 0500, | |
667 | /* access_mode= */ 0400, | |
2099cd62 | 668 | /* tpm_pcr= */ TPM2_PCR_KERNEL_CONFIG, |
a083aed0 | 669 | u"Credentials initrd", |
599fe002 LP |
670 | &credential_initrd, |
671 | &credential_initrd_size, | |
672 | &m) == EFI_SUCCESS) | |
673 | parameters_measured = parameters_measured < 0 ? m : (parameters_measured && m); | |
674 | ||
675 | if (pack_cpio(loaded_image, | |
a083aed0 JJ |
676 | u"\\loader\\credentials", |
677 | u".cred", | |
599fe002 LP |
678 | ".extra/global_credentials", |
679 | /* dir_mode= */ 0500, | |
680 | /* access_mode= */ 0400, | |
2099cd62 | 681 | /* tpm_pcr= */ TPM2_PCR_KERNEL_CONFIG, |
a083aed0 | 682 | u"Global credentials initrd", |
599fe002 LP |
683 | &global_credential_initrd, |
684 | &global_credential_initrd_size, | |
685 | &m) == EFI_SUCCESS) | |
686 | parameters_measured = parameters_measured < 0 ? m : (parameters_measured && m); | |
f3b6f333 | 687 | |
de7ad6d4 LP |
688 | if (pack_cpio(loaded_image, |
689 | NULL, | |
a083aed0 | 690 | u".raw", |
de7ad6d4 LP |
691 | ".extra/sysext", |
692 | /* dir_mode= */ 0555, | |
693 | /* access_mode= */ 0444, | |
2099cd62 | 694 | /* tpm_pcr= */ TPM2_PCR_SYSEXTS, |
a083aed0 | 695 | u"System extension initrd", |
de7ad6d4 LP |
696 | &sysext_initrd, |
697 | &sysext_initrd_size, | |
698 | &m) == EFI_SUCCESS) | |
699 | sysext_measured = m; | |
599fe002 | 700 | |
68f85761 LB |
701 | dt_size = szs[UNIFIED_SECTION_DTB]; |
702 | dt_base = dt_size != 0 ? POINTER_TO_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS(loaded_image->ImageBase) + addrs[UNIFIED_SECTION_DTB] : 0; | |
703 | ||
704 | /* First load the base device tree, then fix it up using addons - global first, then per-UKI. */ | |
705 | if (dt_size > 0) { | |
706 | err = devicetree_install_from_memory( | |
707 | &dt_state, PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_TO_POINTER(dt_base), dt_size); | |
708 | if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) | |
709 | log_error_status(err, "Error loading embedded devicetree: %m"); | |
710 | } | |
711 | ||
712 | dtb_install_addons(&dt_state, | |
713 | dt_bases_addons_global, | |
714 | dt_sizes_addons_global, | |
715 | dt_filenames_addons_global, | |
716 | n_dts_addons_global, | |
717 | &m); | |
718 | parameters_measured = parameters_measured < 0 ? m : (parameters_measured && m); | |
719 | dtb_install_addons(&dt_state, | |
720 | dt_bases_addons_uki, | |
721 | dt_sizes_addons_uki, | |
722 | dt_filenames_addons_uki, | |
723 | n_dts_addons_uki, | |
724 | &m); | |
725 | parameters_measured = parameters_measured < 0 ? m : (parameters_measured && m); | |
726 | ||
599fe002 | 727 | if (parameters_measured > 0) |
2099cd62 | 728 | (void) efivar_set_uint_string(MAKE_GUID_PTR(LOADER), u"StubPcrKernelParameters", TPM2_PCR_KERNEL_CONFIG, 0); |
de7ad6d4 | 729 | if (sysext_measured) |
2099cd62 | 730 | (void) efivar_set_uint_string(MAKE_GUID_PTR(LOADER), u"StubPcrInitRDSysExts", TPM2_PCR_SYSEXTS, 0); |
845707aa | 731 | |
23002b45 LP |
732 | /* If the PCR signature was embedded in the PE image, then let's wrap it in a cpio and also pass it |
733 | * to the kernel, so that it can be read from /.extra/tpm2-pcr-signature.json. Note that this section | |
734 | * is not measured, neither as raw section (see above), nor as cpio (here), because it is the | |
5dcb9c3c | 735 | * signature of expected PCR values, i.e. its input are PCR measurements, and hence it shouldn't |
23002b45 LP |
736 | * itself be input for PCR measurements. */ |
737 | if (szs[UNIFIED_SECTION_PCRSIG] > 0) | |
738 | (void) pack_cpio_literal( | |
739 | (uint8_t*) loaded_image->ImageBase + addrs[UNIFIED_SECTION_PCRSIG], | |
740 | szs[UNIFIED_SECTION_PCRSIG], | |
741 | ".extra", | |
a083aed0 | 742 | u"tpm2-pcr-signature.json", |
23002b45 LP |
743 | /* dir_mode= */ 0555, |
744 | /* access_mode= */ 0444, | |
d84bdadb | 745 | /* tpm_pcr= */ UINT32_MAX, |
23002b45 LP |
746 | /* tpm_description= */ NULL, |
747 | &pcrsig_initrd, | |
748 | &pcrsig_initrd_size, | |
749 | /* ret_measured= */ NULL); | |
750 | ||
751 | /* If the public key used for the PCR signatures was embedded in the PE image, then let's wrap it in | |
752 | * a cpio and also pass it to the kernel, so that it can be read from | |
753 | * /.extra/tpm2-pcr-public-key.pem. This section is already measure above, hence we won't measure the | |
754 | * cpio. */ | |
755 | if (szs[UNIFIED_SECTION_PCRPKEY] > 0) | |
756 | (void) pack_cpio_literal( | |
757 | (uint8_t*) loaded_image->ImageBase + addrs[UNIFIED_SECTION_PCRPKEY], | |
758 | szs[UNIFIED_SECTION_PCRPKEY], | |
759 | ".extra", | |
a083aed0 | 760 | u"tpm2-pcr-public-key.pem", |
23002b45 LP |
761 | /* dir_mode= */ 0555, |
762 | /* access_mode= */ 0444, | |
d84bdadb | 763 | /* tpm_pcr= */ UINT32_MAX, |
23002b45 LP |
764 | /* tpm_description= */ NULL, |
765 | &pcrpkey_initrd, | |
766 | &pcrpkey_initrd_size, | |
767 | /* ret_measured= */ NULL); | |
768 | ||
6017eee9 LP |
769 | linux_size = szs[UNIFIED_SECTION_LINUX]; |
770 | linux_base = POINTER_TO_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS(loaded_image->ImageBase) + addrs[UNIFIED_SECTION_LINUX]; | |
5b5d365d | 771 | |
6017eee9 LP |
772 | initrd_size = szs[UNIFIED_SECTION_INITRD]; |
773 | initrd_base = initrd_size != 0 ? POINTER_TO_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS(loaded_image->ImageBase) + addrs[UNIFIED_SECTION_INITRD] : 0; | |
37fa3690 | 774 | |
09173c91 | 775 | _cleanup_pages_ Pages initrd_pages = {}; |
64650de7 | 776 | if (credential_initrd || global_credential_initrd || sysext_initrd || pcrsig_initrd || pcrpkey_initrd) { |
845707aa LP |
777 | /* If we have generated initrds dynamically, let's combine them with the built-in initrd. */ |
778 | err = combine_initrd( | |
779 | initrd_base, initrd_size, | |
23002b45 LP |
780 | (const void*const[]) { |
781 | credential_initrd, | |
782 | global_credential_initrd, | |
783 | sysext_initrd, | |
784 | pcrsig_initrd, | |
785 | pcrpkey_initrd, | |
786 | }, | |
787 | (const size_t[]) { | |
788 | credential_initrd_size, | |
789 | global_credential_initrd_size, | |
790 | sysext_initrd_size, | |
791 | pcrsig_initrd_size, | |
792 | pcrpkey_initrd_size, | |
793 | }, | |
794 | 5, | |
09173c91 | 795 | &initrd_pages, &initrd_size); |
2a5e4fe4 | 796 | if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) |
845707aa LP |
797 | return err; |
798 | ||
09173c91 JJ |
799 | initrd_base = initrd_pages.addr; |
800 | ||
845707aa | 801 | /* Given these might be large let's free them explicitly, quickly. */ |
f3b6f333 AV |
802 | credential_initrd = mfree(credential_initrd); |
803 | global_credential_initrd = mfree(global_credential_initrd); | |
804 | sysext_initrd = mfree(sysext_initrd); | |
23002b45 LP |
805 | pcrsig_initrd = mfree(pcrsig_initrd); |
806 | pcrpkey_initrd = mfree(pcrpkey_initrd); | |
845707aa | 807 | } |
0fa2cac4 | 808 | |
927ebebe | 809 | err = linux_exec(image, cmdline, |
dc467928 | 810 | PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_TO_POINTER(linux_base), linux_size, |
a6089431 | 811 | PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_TO_POINTER(initrd_base), initrd_size); |
e5a1b8f9 | 812 | graphics_mode(false); |
a529d818 | 813 | return err; |
0fa2cac4 | 814 | } |
6ac54809 | 815 | |
31a131bb | 816 | DEFINE_EFI_MAIN_FUNCTION(run, "systemd-stub", /*wait_for_debugger=*/false); |