updated RFCs/drafts

[thirdparty/strongswan.git] / doc / standards / draft-hoffman-ikev2bis-03.txt

Network Working Group                                         C. Kaufman
Internet-Draft                                                 Microsoft
Obsoletes: 4306, 4718                                         P. Hoffman
(if approved)                                             VPN Consortium
Intended status: Standards Track                               P. Eronen
Expires: August 28, 2008                                           Nokia
                                                       February 25, 2008


                 Internet Key Exchange Protocol: IKEv2
                       draft-hoffman-ikev2bis-03

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 28, 2008.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

Abstract

   This document describes version 2 of the Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
   protocol.  It is a restatement of RFC 4306, and includes all of the
   clarifications from RFC 4718.





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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.1.  Usage Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       1.1.1.  Security Gateway to Security Gateway Tunnel . . . . .   6
       1.1.2.  Endpoint-to-Endpoint Transport  . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       1.1.3.  Endpoint to Security Gateway Tunnel . . . . . . . . .   8
       1.1.4.  Other Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     1.2.  The Initial Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     1.3.  The CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       1.3.1.  Creating New CHILD_SAs with the CREATE_CHILD_SA
               Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       1.3.2.  Rekeying IKE_SAs with the CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange  .  14
       1.3.3.  Rekeying CHILD_SAs with the CREATE_CHILD_SA
               Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     1.4.  The INFORMATIONAL Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     1.5.  Informational Messages outside of an IKE_SA . . . . . . .  17
     1.6.  Requirements Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     1.7.  Differences Between RFC 4306 and This Document  . . . . .  18
   2.  IKE Protocol Details and Variations . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     2.1.  Use of Retransmission Timers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     2.2.  Use of Sequence Numbers for Message ID  . . . . . . . . .  21
     2.3.  Window Size for Overlapping Requests  . . . . . . . . . .  21
     2.4.  State Synchronization and Connection Timeouts . . . . . .  23
     2.5.  Version Numbers and Forward Compatibility . . . . . . . .  25
     2.6.  Cookies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       2.6.1.  Interaction of COOKIE and INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD  . . . .  29
     2.7.  Cryptographic Algorithm Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     2.8.  Rekeying  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
       2.8.1.  Simultaneous CHILD_SA rekeying  . . . . . . . . . . .  33
       2.8.2.  Rekeying the IKE_SA Versus Reauthentication . . . . .  35
     2.9.  Traffic Selector Negotiation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
       2.9.1.  Traffic Selectors Violating Own Policy  . . . . . . .  38
     2.10. Nonces  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     2.11. Address and Port Agility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     2.12. Reuse of Diffie-Hellman Exponentials  . . . . . . . . . .  40
     2.13. Generating Keying Material  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
     2.14. Generating Keying Material for the IKE_SA . . . . . . . .  42
     2.15. Authentication of the IKE_SA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
     2.16. Extensible Authentication Protocol Methods  . . . . . . .  44
     2.17. Generating Keying Material for CHILD_SAs  . . . . . . . .  46
     2.18. Rekeying IKE_SAs Using a CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange . . . .  47
     2.19. Requesting an Internal Address on a Remote Network  . . .  48
       2.19.1. Configuration Payloads  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
     2.20. Requesting the Peer's Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
     2.21. Error Handling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
     2.22. IPComp  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
     2.23. NAT Traversal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54



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     2.24. Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN)  . . . . . . . . .  57
   3.  Header and Payload Formats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
     3.1.  The IKE Header  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
     3.2.  Generic Payload Header  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
     3.3.  Security Association Payload  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
       3.3.1.  Proposal Substructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
       3.3.2.  Transform Substructure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
       3.3.3.  Valid Transform Types by Protocol . . . . . . . . . .  69
       3.3.4.  Mandatory Transform IDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70
       3.3.5.  Transform Attributes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
       3.3.6.  Attribute Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
     3.4.  Key Exchange Payload  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
     3.5.  Identification Payloads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74
     3.6.  Certificate Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77
     3.7.  Certificate Request Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79
     3.8.  Authentication Payload  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
     3.9.  Nonce Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  82
     3.10. Notify Payload  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  83
       3.10.1. Notify Message Types  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  84
     3.11. Delete Payload  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  87
     3.12. Vendor ID Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  89
     3.13. Traffic Selector Payload  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  90
       3.13.1. Traffic Selector  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  91
     3.14. Encrypted Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  93
     3.15. Configuration Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  95
       3.15.1. Configuration Attributes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  96
       3.15.2. Meaning of INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET/INTERNAL_IP6_SUBNET  .  99
       3.15.3. Configuration payloads for IPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . 101
       3.15.4. Address Assignment Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
     3.16. Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Payload  . . . . 102
   4.  Conformance Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
     5.1.  Traffic selector authorization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
   Appendix A.  Summary of changes from IKEv1  . . . . . . . . . . . 115
   Appendix B.  Diffie-Hellman Groups  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
     B.1.  Group 1 - 768 Bit MODP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
     B.2.  Group 2 - 1024 Bit MODP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
   Appendix C.  Exchanges and Payloads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
     C.1.  IKE_SA_INIT Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
     C.2.  IKE_AUTH Exchange without EAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
     C.3.  IKE_AUTH Exchange with EAP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
     C.4.  CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange for Creating or Rekeying
           CHILD_SAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121



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     C.5.  CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange for Rekeying the IKE_SA  . . . . 121
     C.6.  INFORMATIONAL Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
   Appendix D.  Changes Between Internet Draft Versions  . . . . . . 121
     D.1.  Changes from IKEv2 to draft -00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
     D.2.  Changes from draft -00 to draft -01 . . . . . . . . . . . 122
     D.3.  Changes from draft -00 to draft -01 . . . . . . . . . . . 124
     D.4.  Changes from draft -01 to draft -02 . . . . . . . . . . . 124
     D.5.  Changes from draft -02 to draft -03 . . . . . . . . . . . 125
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements  . . . . . . . . . 129









































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1.  Introduction

   {{ An introduction to the differences between RFC 4306 [IKEV2] and
   this document is given at the end of Section 1.  It is put there
   (instead of here) to preserve the section numbering of RFC 4306. }}

   IP Security (IPsec) provides confidentiality, data integrity, access
   control, and data source authentication to IP datagrams.  These
   services are provided by maintaining shared state between the source
   and the sink of an IP datagram.  This state defines, among other
   things, the specific services provided to the datagram, which
   cryptographic algorithms will be used to provide the services, and
   the keys used as input to the cryptographic algorithms.

   Establishing this shared state in a manual fashion does not scale
   well.  Therefore, a protocol to establish this state dynamically is
   needed.  This memo describes such a protocol -- the Internet Key
   Exchange (IKE).  Version 1 of IKE was defined in RFCs 2407 [DOI],
   2408 [ISAKMP], and 2409 [IKEV1].  IKEv2 was defined in [IKEV2] and
   clarified in [Clarif].  This single document is intended to replace
   all of those RFCs.

   IKE performs mutual authentication between two parties and
   establishes an IKE security association (SA) that includes shared
   secret information that can be used to efficiently establish SAs for
   Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [ESP] and/or Authentication
   Header (AH) [AH] and a set of cryptographic algorithms to be used by
   the SAs to protect the traffic that they carry.  In this document,
   the term "suite" or "cryptographic suite" refers to a complete set of
   algorithms used to protect an SA.  An initiator proposes one or more
   suites by listing supported algorithms that can be combined into
   suites in a mix-and-match fashion.  IKE can also negotiate use of IP
   Compression (IPComp) [IPCOMP] in connection with an ESP and/or AH SA.
   We call the IKE SA an "IKE_SA".  The SAs for ESP and/or AH that get
   set up through that IKE_SA we call "CHILD_SAs".

   All IKE communications consist of pairs of messages: a request and a
   response.  The pair is called an "exchange".  We call the first
   messages establishing an IKE_SA IKE_SA_INIT and IKE_AUTH exchanges
   and subsequent IKE exchanges CREATE_CHILD_SA or INFORMATIONAL
   exchanges.  In the common case, there is a single IKE_SA_INIT
   exchange and a single IKE_AUTH exchange (a total of four messages) to
   establish the IKE_SA and the first CHILD_SA.  In exceptional cases,
   there may be more than one of each of these exchanges.  In all cases,
   all IKE_SA_INIT exchanges MUST complete before any other exchange
   type, then all IKE_AUTH exchanges MUST complete, and following that
   any number of CREATE_CHILD_SA and INFORMATIONAL exchanges may occur
   in any order.  In some scenarios, only a single CHILD_SA is needed



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   between the IPsec endpoints, and therefore there would be no
   additional exchanges.  Subsequent exchanges MAY be used to establish
   additional CHILD_SAs between the same authenticated pair of endpoints
   and to perform housekeeping functions.

   IKE message flow always consists of a request followed by a response.
   It is the responsibility of the requester to ensure reliability.  If
   the response is not received within a timeout interval, the requester
   needs to retransmit the request (or abandon the connection).

   The first request/response of an IKE session (IKE_SA_INIT) negotiates
   security parameters for the IKE_SA, sends nonces, and sends Diffie-
   Hellman values.

   The second request/response (IKE_AUTH) transmits identities, proves
   knowledge of the secrets corresponding to the two identities, and
   sets up an SA for the first (and often only) AH and/or ESP CHILD_SA.

   The types of subsequent exchanges are CREATE_CHILD_SA (which creates
   a CHILD_SA) and INFORMATIONAL (which deletes an SA, reports error
   conditions, or does other housekeeping).  Every request requires a
   response.  An INFORMATIONAL request with no payloads (other than the
   empty Encrypted payload required by the syntax) is commonly used as a
   check for liveness.  These subsequent exchanges cannot be used until
   the initial exchanges have completed.

   In the description that follows, we assume that no errors occur.
   Modifications to the flow should errors occur are described in
   Section 2.21.

1.1.  Usage Scenarios

   IKE is expected to be used to negotiate ESP and/or AH SAs in a number
   of different scenarios, each with its own special requirements.

1.1.1.  Security Gateway to Security Gateway Tunnel

                +-+-+-+-+-+            +-+-+-+-+-+
                |         | IPsec      |         |
   Protected    |Tunnel   | tunnel     |Tunnel   |     Protected
   Subnet   <-->|Endpoint |<---------->|Endpoint |<--> Subnet
                |         |            |         |
                +-+-+-+-+-+            +-+-+-+-+-+

          Figure 1:  Security Gateway to Security Gateway Tunnel

   In this scenario, neither endpoint of the IP connection implements
   IPsec, but network nodes between them protect traffic for part of the



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   way.  Protection is transparent to the endpoints, and depends on
   ordinary routing to send packets through the tunnel endpoints for
   processing.  Each endpoint would announce the set of addresses
   "behind" it, and packets would be sent in tunnel mode where the inner
   IP header would contain the IP addresses of the actual endpoints.

1.1.2.  Endpoint-to-Endpoint Transport

   +-+-+-+-+-+                                          +-+-+-+-+-+
   |         |                 IPsec transport          |         |
   |Protected|                or tunnel mode SA         |Protected|
   |Endpoint |<---------------------------------------->|Endpoint |
   |         |                                          |         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+                                          +-+-+-+-+-+

                    Figure 2:  Endpoint to Endpoint

   In this scenario, both endpoints of the IP connection implement
   IPsec, as required of hosts in [IPSECARCH].  Transport mode will
   commonly be used with no inner IP header.  If there is an inner IP
   header, the inner addresses will be the same as the outer addresses.
   A single pair of addresses will be negotiated for packets to be
   protected by this SA.  These endpoints MAY implement application
   layer access controls based on the IPsec authenticated identities of
   the participants.  This scenario enables the end-to-end security that
   has been a guiding principle for the Internet since [ARCHPRINC],
   [TRANSPARENCY], and a method of limiting the inherent problems with
   complexity in networks noted by [ARCHGUIDEPHIL].  Although this
   scenario may not be fully applicable to the IPv4 Internet, it has
   been deployed successfully in specific scenarios within intranets
   using IKEv1.  It should be more broadly enabled during the transition
   to IPv6 and with the adoption of IKEv2.

   It is possible in this scenario that one or both of the protected
   endpoints will be behind a network address translation (NAT) node, in
   which case the tunneled packets will have to be UDP encapsulated so
   that port numbers in the UDP headers can be used to identify
   individual endpoints "behind" the NAT (see Section 2.23).













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1.1.3.  Endpoint to Security Gateway Tunnel

   +-+-+-+-+-+                          +-+-+-+-+-+
   |         |         IPsec            |         |     Protected
   |Protected|         tunnel           |Tunnel   |     Subnet
   |Endpoint |<------------------------>|Endpoint |<--- and/or
   |         |                          |         |     Internet
   +-+-+-+-+-+                          +-+-+-+-+-+

              Figure 3:  Endpoint to Security Gateway Tunnel

   In this scenario, a protected endpoint (typically a portable roaming
   computer) connects back to its corporate network through an IPsec-
   protected tunnel.  It might use this tunnel only to access
   information on the corporate network, or it might tunnel all of its
   traffic back through the corporate network in order to take advantage
   of protection provided by a corporate firewall against Internet-based
   attacks.  In either case, the protected endpoint will want an IP
   address associated with the security gateway so that packets returned
   to it will go to the security gateway and be tunneled back.  This IP
   address may be static or may be dynamically allocated by the security
   gateway. {{ Clarif-6.1 }} In support of the latter case, IKEv2
   includes a mechanism (namely, configuration payloads) for the
   initiator to request an IP address owned by the security gateway for
   use for the duration of its SA.

   In this scenario, packets will use tunnel mode.  On each packet from
   the protected endpoint, the outer IP header will contain the source
   IP address associated with its current location (i.e., the address
   that will get traffic routed to the endpoint directly), while the
   inner IP header will contain the source IP address assigned by the
   security gateway (i.e., the address that will get traffic routed to
   the security gateway for forwarding to the endpoint).  The outer
   destination address will always be that of the security gateway,
   while the inner destination address will be the ultimate destination
   for the packet.

   In this scenario, it is possible that the protected endpoint will be
   behind a NAT.  In that case, the IP address as seen by the security
   gateway will not be the same as the IP address sent by the protected
   endpoint, and packets will have to be UDP encapsulated in order to be
   routed properly.

1.1.4.  Other Scenarios

   Other scenarios are possible, as are nested combinations of the
   above.  One notable example combines aspects of 1.1.1 and 1.1.3.  A
   subnet may make all external accesses through a remote security



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   gateway using an IPsec tunnel, where the addresses on the subnet are
   routed to the security gateway by the rest of the Internet.  An
   example would be someone's home network being virtually on the
   Internet with static IP addresses even though connectivity is
   provided by an ISP that assigns a single dynamically assigned IP
   address to the user's security gateway (where the static IP addresses
   and an IPsec relay are provided by a third party located elsewhere).

1.2.  The Initial Exchanges

   Communication using IKE always begins with IKE_SA_INIT and IKE_AUTH
   exchanges (known in IKEv1 as Phase 1).  These initial exchanges
   normally consist of four messages, though in some scenarios that
   number can grow.  All communications using IKE consist of request/
   response pairs.  We'll describe the base exchange first, followed by
   variations.  The first pair of messages (IKE_SA_INIT) negotiate
   cryptographic algorithms, exchange nonces, and do a Diffie-Hellman
   exchange [DH].

   The second pair of messages (IKE_AUTH) authenticate the previous
   messages, exchange identities and certificates, and establish the
   first CHILD_SA.  Parts of these messages are encrypted and integrity
   protected with keys established through the IKE_SA_INIT exchange, so
   the identities are hidden from eavesdroppers and all fields in all
   the messages are authenticated.

   In the following descriptions, the payloads contained in the message
   are indicated by names as listed below.

   Notation    Payload
   -----------------------------------------
   AUTH        Authentication
   CERT        Certificate
   CERTREQ     Certificate Request
   CP          Configuration
   D           Delete
   E           Encrypted
   EAP         Extensible Authentication
   HDR         IKE Header
   IDi         Identification - Initiator
   IDr         Identification - Responder
   KE          Key Exchange
   Ni, Nr      Nonce
   N           Notify
   SA          Security Association
   TSi         Traffic Selector - Initiator
   TSr         Traffic Selector - Responder
   V           Vendor ID



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   The details of the contents of each payload are described in section
   3.  Payloads that may optionally appear will be shown in brackets,
   such as [CERTREQ], indicate that optionally a certificate request
   payload can be included.

   The initial exchanges are as follows:

   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni  -->

   HDR contains the Security Parameter Indexes (SPIs), version numbers,
   and flags of various sorts.  The SAi1 payload states the
   cryptographic algorithms the initiator supports for the IKE_SA.  The
   KE payload sends the initiator's Diffie-Hellman value.  Ni is the
   initiator's nonce.

                                <--  HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ]

   The responder chooses a cryptographic suite from the initiator's
   offered choices and expresses that choice in the SAr1 payload,
   completes the Diffie-Hellman exchange with the KEr payload, and sends
   its nonce in the Nr payload.

   At this point in the negotiation, each party can generate SKEYSEED,
   from which all keys are derived for that IKE_SA.  All but the headers
   of all the messages that follow are encrypted and integrity
   protected.  The keys used for the encryption and integrity protection
   are derived from SKEYSEED and are known as SK_e (encryption) and SK_a
   (authentication, a.k.a. integrity protection).  A separate SK_e and
   SK_a is computed for each direction.  In addition to the keys SK_e
   and SK_a derived from the DH value for protection of the IKE_SA,
   another quantity SK_d is derived and used for derivation of further
   keying material for CHILD_SAs.  The notation SK { ... } indicates
   that these payloads are encrypted and integrity protected using that
   direction's SK_e and SK_a.

   HDR, SK {IDi, [CERT,] [CERTREQ,]
       [IDr,] AUTH, SAi2,
       TSi, TSr}  -->

   The initiator asserts its identity with the IDi payload, proves
   knowledge of the secret corresponding to IDi and integrity protects
   the contents of the first message using the AUTH payload (see
   Section 2.15).  It might also send its certificate(s) in CERT
   payload(s) and a list of its trust anchors in CERTREQ payload(s).  If
   any CERT payloads are included, the first certificate provided MUST
   contain the public key used to verify the AUTH field.  The optional



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   payload IDr enables the initiator to specify which of the responder's
   identities it wants to talk to.  This is useful when the machine on
   which the responder is running is hosting multiple identities at the
   same IP address.  The initiator begins negotiation of a CHILD_SA
   using the SAi2 payload.  The final fields (starting with SAi2) are
   described in the description of the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange.

                                <--  HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT,] AUTH,
                                         SAr2, TSi, TSr}

   The responder asserts its identity with the IDr payload, optionally
   sends one or more certificates (again with the certificate containing
   the public key used to verify AUTH listed first), authenticates its
   identity and protects the integrity of the second message with the
   AUTH payload, and completes negotiation of a CHILD_SA with the
   additional fields described below in the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange.

   The recipients of messages 3 and 4 MUST verify that all signatures
   and MACs are computed correctly and that the names in the ID payloads
   correspond to the keys used to generate the AUTH payload.

   {{ Clarif-4.2}} If creating the CHILD_SA during the IKE_AUTH exchange
   fails for some reason, the IKE_SA is still created as usual.  The
   list of responses in the IKE_AUTH exchange that do not prevent an
   IKE_SA from being set up include at least the following:
   NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN, TS_UNACCEPTABLE, SINGLE_PAIR_REQUIRED,
   INTERNAL_ADDRESS_FAILURE, and FAILED_CP_REQUIRED.

   {{ Clarif-4.3 }} Note that IKE_AUTH messages do not contain KEi/KEr
   or Ni/Nr payloads.  Thus, the SA payloads in the IKE_AUTH exchange
   cannot contain Transform Type 4 (Diffie-Hellman Group) with any value
   other than NONE.  Implementations SHOULD omit the whole transform
   substructure instead of sending value NONE.

1.3.  The CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange

   {{ This is a heavy rewrite of most of this section.  The major
   organization changes are described in Clarif-4.1 and Clarif-5.1. }}

   The CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange is used to create new CHILD_SAs and to
   rekey both IKE_SAs and CHILD_SAs.  This exchange consists of a single
   request/response pair, and some of its function was referred to as a
   phase 2 exchange in IKEv1.  It MAY be initiated by either end of the
   IKE_SA after the initial exchanges are completed.

   All messages following the initial exchange are cryptographically
   protected using the cryptographic algorithms and keys negotiated in
   the first two messages of the IKE exchange.  These subsequent



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   messages use the syntax of the Encrypted Payload described in
   Section 3.14.  All subsequent messages include an Encrypted Payload,
   even if they are referred to in the text as "empty".  For both
   messages in the CREATE_CHILD_SA, the message following the header is
   encrypted and the message including the header is integrity protected
   using the cryptographic algorithms negotiated for the IKE_SA.

   The CREATE_CHILD_SA is also used for rekeying IKE_SAs and CHILD_SAs.
   An SA is rekeyed by creating a new SA and then deleting the old one.
   This section describes the first part of rekeying, the creation of
   new SAs; Section 2.8 covers the mechanics of rekeying, including
   moving traffic from old to new SAs and the deletion of the old SAs.
   The two sections must be read together to understand the entire
   process of rekeying.

   Either endpoint may initiate a CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange, so in this
   section the term initiator refers to the endpoint initiating this
   exchange.  An implementation MAY refuse all CREATE_CHILD_SA requests
   within an IKE_SA.

   The CREATE_CHILD_SA request MAY optionally contain a KE payload for
   an additional Diffie-Hellman exchange to enable stronger guarantees
   of forward secrecy for the CHILD_SA.  The keying material for the
   CHILD_SA is a function of SK_d established during the establishment
   of the IKE_SA, the nonces exchanged during the CREATE_CHILD_SA
   exchange, and the Diffie-Hellman value (if KE payloads are included
   in the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange).

   If a CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange includes a KEi payload, at least one of
   the SA offers MUST include the Diffie-Hellman group of the KEi.  The
   Diffie-Hellman group of the KEi MUST be an element of the group the
   initiator expects the responder to accept (additional Diffie-Hellman
   groups can be proposed).  If the responder selects a proposal using a
   different Diffie-Hellman group (other than NONE), the responder MUST
   reject the request and indicate its preferred Diffie-Hellman group in
   the INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD Notification payload. {{ 3.10.1-17 }} There
   are two octets of data associated with this notification: the
   accepted D-H Group number in big endian order.  In the case of such a
   rejection, the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange fails, and the initiator will
   probably retry the exchange with a Diffie-Hellman proposal and KEi in
   the group that the responder gave in the INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD.

   {{ 3.10.1-35 }} The responder sends a NO_ADDITIONAL_SAS notification
   to indicate that a CREATE_CHILD_SA request is unacceptable because
   the responder is unwilling to accept any more CHILD_SAs on this
   IKE_SA.  Some minimal implementations may only accept a single
   CHILD_SA setup in the context of an initial IKE exchange and reject
   any subsequent attempts to add more.



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1.3.1.  Creating New CHILD_SAs with the CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange

   A CHILD_SA may be created by sending a CREATE_CHILD_SA request.  The
   CREATE_CHILD_SA request for creating a new CHILD_SA is:

   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   HDR, SK {SA, Ni, [KEi],
              TSi, TSr}  -->

   The initiator sends SA offer(s) in the SA payload, a nonce in the Ni
   payload, optionally a Diffie-Hellman value in the KEi payload, and
   the proposed traffic selectors for the proposed CHILD_SA in the TSi
   and TSr payloads.

   The CREATE_CHILD_SA response for creating a new CHILD_SA is:

                                <--  HDR, SK {SA, Nr, [KEr],
                                         TSi, TSr}

   The responder replies (using the same Message ID to respond) with the
   accepted offer in an SA payload, and a Diffie-Hellman value in the
   KEr payload if KEi was included in the request and the selected
   cryptographic suite includes that group.

   The traffic selectors for traffic to be sent on that SA are specified
   in the TS payloads in the response, which may be a subset of what the
   initiator of the CHILD_SA proposed.

   {{ 3.10.1-16391 }} The USE_TRANSPORT_MODE notification MAY be
   included in a request message that also includes an SA payload
   requesting a CHILD_SA.  It requests that the CHILD_SA use transport
   mode rather than tunnel mode for the SA created.  If the request is
   accepted, the response MUST also include a notification of type
   USE_TRANSPORT_MODE.  If the responder declines the request, the
   CHILD_SA will be established in tunnel mode.  If this is unacceptable
   to the initiator, the initiator MUST delete the SA.  Note: Except
   when using this option to negotiate transport mode, all CHILD_SAs
   will use tunnel mode.

   {{ 3.10.1-16394 }} The ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED notification
   asserts that the sending endpoint will NOT accept packets that
   contain Traffic Flow Confidentiality (TFC) padding over the CHILD_SA
   being negotiated. {{ Clarif-4.5 }} If neither endpoint accepts TFC
   padding, this notification is included in both the request and the
   response.  If this notification is included in only one of the
   messages, TFC padding can still be sent in the other direction.




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   {{ 3.10.1-16395 }} The NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO notification is used
   for fragmentation control.  See [IPSECARCH] for a fuller explanation.
   {{ Clarif-4.6 }} Sending non-first fragments is enabled only if
   NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO notification is included in both the request
   proposing an SA and the response accepting it.  If the peer rejects
   the proposal of the SA, the peer only omits NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO
   notification from the response, but does not reject the whole
   CHILD_SA creation.

1.3.2.  Rekeying IKE_SAs with the CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange

   The CREATE_CHILD_SA request for rekeying an IKE_SA is:

   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   HDR, SK {SA, Ni, [KEi]} -->

   The initiator sends SA offer(s) in the SA payload, a nonce in the Ni
   payload, and a Diffie-Hellman value in the KEi payload.  The KEi
   payload SHOULD be included.  New initiator and responder SPIs are
   supplied in the SPI fields.

   The CREATE_CHILD_SA response for rekeying an IKE_SA is:

                                <--  HDR, SK {SA, Nr,[KEr]}

   The responder replies (using the same Message ID to respond) with the
   accepted offer in an SA payload, and a Diffie-Hellman value in the
   KEr payload if the selected cryptographic suite includes that group.

   The new IKE_SA has its message counters set to 0, regardless of what
   they were in the earlier IKE_SA.  The window size starts at 1 for any
   new IKE_SA.

1.3.3.  Rekeying CHILD_SAs with the CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange

   The CREATE_CHILD_SA request for rekeying a CHILD_SA is:

   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   HDR, SK {N, SA, Ni, [KEi],
       TSi, TSr}   -->

   The initiator sends SA offer(s) in the SA payload, a nonce in the Ni
   payload, optionally a Diffie-Hellman value in the KEi payload, and
   the proposed traffic selectors for the proposed CHILD_SA in the TSi
   and TSr payloads.




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   {{ 3.10.1-16393 }} The REKEY_SA notification MUST be included in a
   CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange if the purpose of the exchange is to replace
   an existing ESP or AH SA. {{ Clarif-5.4 }} The SA being rekeyed is
   identified by the SPI field in the Notify payload; this is the SPI
   the exchange initiator would expect in inbound ESP or AH packets.
   There is no data associated with this Notify type.

   The CREATE_CHILD_SA response for rekeying a CHILD_SA is:

                                <--  HDR, SK {SA, Nr, [KEr],
                                         Si, TSr}

   The responder replies (using the same Message ID to respond) with the
   accepted offer in an SA payload, and a Diffie-Hellman value in the
   KEr payload if KEi was included in the request and the selected
   cryptographic suite includes that group.

   The traffic selectors for traffic to be sent on that SA are specified
   in the TS payloads in the response, which may be a subset of what the
   initiator of the CHILD_SA proposed.

1.4.  The INFORMATIONAL Exchange

   At various points during the operation of an IKE_SA, peers may desire
   to convey control messages to each other regarding errors or
   notifications of certain events.  To accomplish this, IKE defines an
   INFORMATIONAL exchange.  INFORMATIONAL exchanges MUST ONLY occur
   after the initial exchanges and are cryptographically protected with
   the negotiated keys.

   Control messages that pertain to an IKE_SA MUST be sent under that
   IKE_SA.  Control messages that pertain to CHILD_SAs MUST be sent
   under the protection of the IKE_SA which generated them (or its
   successor if the IKE_SA was replaced for the purpose of rekeying).

   Messages in an INFORMATIONAL exchange contain zero or more
   Notification, Delete, and Configuration payloads.  The Recipient of
   an INFORMATIONAL exchange request MUST send some response (else the
   Sender will assume the message was lost in the network and will
   retransmit it).  That response MAY be a message with no payloads.
   The request message in an INFORMATIONAL exchange MAY also contain no
   payloads.  This is the expected way an endpoint can ask the other
   endpoint to verify that it is alive.

   {{ Clarif-5.6 }} ESP and AH SAs always exist in pairs, with one SA in
   each direction.  When an SA is closed, both members of the pair MUST
   be closed (that is, deleted).  Each endpoint MUST close its incoming
   SAs and allow the other endpoint to close the other SA in each pair.



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   To delete an SA, an INFORMATIONAL exchange with one or more delete
   payloads is sent listing the SPIs (as they would be expected in the
   headers of inbound packets) of the SAs to be deleted.  The recipient
   MUST close the designated SAs. {{ Clarif-5.7 }} Note that one never
   sends delete payloads for the two sides of an SA in a single message.
   If there are many SAs to delete at the same time, one includes delete
   payloads for in inbound half of each SA pair in your Informational
   exchange.

   Normally, the reply in the INFORMATIONAL exchange will contain delete
   payloads for the paired SAs going in the other direction.  There is
   one exception.  If by chance both ends of a set of SAs independently
   decide to close them, each may send a delete payload and the two
   requests may cross in the network.  If a node receives a delete
   request for SAs for which it has already issued a delete request, it
   MUST delete the outgoing SAs while processing the request and the
   incoming SAs while processing the response.  In that case, the
   responses MUST NOT include delete payloads for the deleted SAs, since
   that would result in duplicate deletion and could in theory delete
   the wrong SA.

   {{ Demoted the SHOULD }} Half-closed ESP or AH connections are
   anomalous, and a node with auditing capability should probably audit
   their existence if they persist.  Note that this specification
   nowhere specifies time periods, so it is up to individual endpoints
   to decide how long to wait.  A node MAY refuse to accept incoming
   data on half-closed connections but MUST NOT unilaterally close them
   and reuse the SPIs.  If connection state becomes sufficiently messed
   up, a node MAY close the IKE_SA; doing so will implicitly close all
   SAs negotiated under it.  It can then rebuild the SAs it needs on a
   clean base under a new IKE_SA. {{ Clarif-5.8 }} The response to a
   request that deletes the IKE_SA is an empty Informational response.

   The INFORMATIONAL exchange is defined as:

   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   HDR, SK {[N,] [D,]
       [CP,] ...}  -->
                                <--  HDR, SK {[N,] [D,]
                                         [CP], ...}

   The processing of an INFORMATIONAL exchange is determined by its
   component payloads.







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1.5.  Informational Messages outside of an IKE_SA

   If an encrypted IKE request packet arrives on port 500 or 4500 with
   an unrecognized SPI, it could be because the receiving node has
   recently crashed and lost state or because of some other system
   malfunction or attack.  If the receiving node has an active IKE_SA to
   the IP address from whence the packet came, it MAY send a
   notification of the wayward packet over that IKE_SA in an
   INFORMATIONAL exchange.  If it does not have such an IKE_SA, it MAY
   send an Informational message without cryptographic protection to the
   source IP address.  Such a message is not part of an informational
   exchange, and the receiving node MUST NOT respond to it.  Doing so
   could cause a message loop.

   {{ 3.10.1-11 }} The INVALID_SPI notification MAY be sent in an IKE
   INFORMATIONAL exchange when a node receives an ESP or AH packet with
   an invalid SPI.  The Notification Data contains the SPI of the
   invalid packet.  This usually indicates a node has rebooted and
   forgotten an SA.  If this Informational Message is sent outside the
   context of an IKE_SA, it should only be used by the recipient as a
   "hint" that something might be wrong (because it could easily be
   forged).

   {{ Clarif-7.7 }} There are two cases when such a one-way notification
   is sent: INVALID_IKE_SPI and INVALID_SPI.  These notifications are
   sent outside of an IKE_SA.  Note that such notifications are
   explicitly not Informational exchanges; these are one-way messages
   that must not be responded to.  In case of INVALID_IKE_SPI, the
   message sent is a response message, and thus it is sent to the IP
   address and port from whence it came with the same IKE SPIs and the
   Message ID copied.  In case of INVALID_SPI, however, there are no IKE
   SPI values that would be meaningful to the recipient of such a
   notification.  Using zero values or random values are both
   acceptable.

1.6.  Requirements Terminology

   Definitions of the primitive terms in this document (such as Security
   Association or SA) can be found in [IPSECARCH]. {{ Clarif-7.2 }} It
   should be noted that parts of IKEv2 rely on some of the processing
   rules in [IPSECARCH], as described in various sections of this
   document.

   Keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT" and
   "MAY" that appear in this document are to be interpreted as described
   in [MUSTSHOULD].





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1.7.  Differences Between RFC 4306 and This Document

   {{ Added this entire section, including this recursive remark. }}

   This document contains clarifications and amplifications to IKEv2
   [IKEV2].  The clarifications are mostly based on [Clarif].  The
   changes listed in that document were discussed in the IPsec Working
   Group and, after the Working Group was disbanded, on the IPsec
   mailing list.  That document contains detailed explanations of areas
   that were unclear in IKEv2, and is thus useful to implementers of
   IKEv2.

   The protocol described in this document retains the same major
   version number (2) and minor version number (0) as was used in RFC
   4306.

   This document makes the figures and references a bit more regular
   than in [IKEV2].

   IKEv2 developers have noted that the SHOULD-level requirements are
   often unclear in that they don't say when it is OK to not obey the
   requirements.  They also have noted that there are MUST-level
   requirements that are not related to interoperability.  This document
   has more explanation of some of these requirements.  All non-
   capitalized uses of the words SHOULD and MUST now mean their normal
   English sense, not the interoperability sense of [MUSTSHOULD].

   IKEv2 (and IKEv1) developers have noted that there is a great deal of
   material in the tables of codes in Section 3.10.1.  This leads to
   implementers not having all the needed information in the main body
   of the docment.  Much of the material from those tables has been
   moved into the associated parts of the main body of the document.

   In the body of this document, notes that are enclosed in double curly
   braces {{ such as this }} point out changes from IKEv2.  Changes that
   come from [Clarif] are marked with the section from that document,
   such as "{{ Clarif-2.10 }}".  Changes that come from moving
   descriptive text out of the tables in Section 3.10.1 are marked with
   that number and the message type that contained the text, such as "{{
   3.10.1-16384 }}".

   This document removes discussion of nesting AH and ESP.  This was a
   mistake in RFC 4306 caused by the lag between finishing RFC 4306 and
   RFC 4301.  Basically, IKEv2 is based on RFC 4301, which does not
   include "SA bundles" that were part of RFC 2401.  While a single
   packet can go through IPsec processing multiple times, each of these
   passes uses a separate SA, and the passes are coordinated by the
   forwarding tables.  In IKEv2, each of these SAs has to be created



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   using a separate CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange.

   This document removes discussion of the INTERNAL_ADDRESS_EXPIRY
   configuration attribute because its implementation was very
   problematic.  Implementations that conform to this document MUST
   ignore proposals that have configuration attribute type 5, the old
   value for INTERNAL_ADDRESS_EXPIRY.

   This document adds the restriction in Section 2.13 that all PRFs used
   with IKEv2 MUST take variable-sized keys.  This should not affect any
   implementations because there were no standardized PRFs that have
   fixed-size keys.

   A later version of this document may have all the {{ }} comments
   removed from the body of the document and instead appear in an
   appendix.


2.  IKE Protocol Details and Variations

   IKE normally listens and sends on UDP port 500, though IKE messages
   may also be received on UDP port 4500 with a slightly different
   format (see Section 2.23).  Since UDP is a datagram (unreliable)
   protocol, IKE includes in its definition recovery from transmission
   errors, including packet loss, packet replay, and packet forgery.
   IKE is designed to function so long as (1) at least one of a series
   of retransmitted packets reaches its destination before timing out;
   and (2) the channel is not so full of forged and replayed packets so
   as to exhaust the network or CPU capacities of either endpoint.  Even
   in the absence of those minimum performance requirements, IKE is
   designed to fail cleanly (as though the network were broken).

   Although IKEv2 messages are intended to be short, they contain
   structures with no hard upper bound on size (in particular, X.509
   certificates), and IKEv2 itself does not have a mechanism for
   fragmenting large messages.  IP defines a mechanism for fragmentation
   of oversize UDP messages, but implementations vary in the maximum
   message size supported.  Furthermore, use of IP fragmentation opens
   an implementation to denial of service attacks [DOSUDPPROT].
   Finally, some NAT and/or firewall implementations may block IP
   fragments.

   All IKEv2 implementations MUST be able to send, receive, and process
   IKE messages that are up to 1280 octets long, and they SHOULD be able
   to send, receive, and process messages that are up to 3000 octets
   long. {{ Demoted the SHOULD }} IKEv2 implementations need to be aware
   of the maximum UDP message size supported and MAY shorten messages by
   leaving out some certificates or cryptographic suite proposals if



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   that will keep messages below the maximum.  Use of the "Hash and URL"
   formats rather than including certificates in exchanges where
   possible can avoid most problems. {{ Demoted the SHOULD }}
   Implementations and configuration need to keep in mind, however, that
   if the URL lookups are possible only after the IPsec SA is
   established, recursion issues could prevent this technique from
   working.

   {{ Clarif-7.5 }} The UDP payload of all packets containing IKE
   messages sent on port 4500 MUST begin with the prefix of four zeros;
   otherwise, the receiver won't know how to handle them.

2.1.  Use of Retransmission Timers

   All messages in IKE exist in pairs: a request and a response.  The
   setup of an IKE_SA normally consists of two request/response pairs.
   Once the IKE_SA is set up, either end of the security association may
   initiate requests at any time, and there can be many requests and
   responses "in flight" at any given moment.  But each message is
   labeled as either a request or a response, and for each request/
   response pair one end of the security association is the initiator
   and the other is the responder.

   For every pair of IKE messages, the initiator is responsible for
   retransmission in the event of a timeout.  The responder MUST never
   retransmit a response unless it receives a retransmission of the
   request.  In that event, the responder MUST ignore the retransmitted
   request except insofar as it triggers a retransmission of the
   response.  The initiator MUST remember each request until it receives
   the corresponding response.  The responder MUST remember each
   response until it receives a request whose sequence number is larger
   than or equal to the sequence number in the response plus its window
   size (see Section 2.3).

   IKE is a reliable protocol, in the sense that the initiator MUST
   retransmit a request until either it receives a corresponding reply
   OR it deems the IKE security association to have failed and it
   discards all state associated with the IKE_SA and any CHILD_SAs
   negotiated using that IKE_SA.

   {{ Clarif-2.3 }} Retransmissions of the IKE_SA_INIT request require
   some special handling.  When a responder receives an IKE_SA_INIT
   request, it has to determine whether the packet is retransmission
   belonging to an existing "half-open" IKE_SA (in which case the
   responder retransmits the same response), or a new request (in which
   case the responder creates a new IKE_SA and sends a fresh response),
   or it belongs to an existing IKE_SA where the IKE_AUTH request has
   been already received (in which case the responder ignores it).



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   It is not sufficient to use the initiator's SPI and/or IP address to
   differentiate between these three cases because two different peers
   behind a single NAT could choose the same initiator SPI.  Instead, a
   robust responder will do the IKE_SA lookup using the whole packet,
   its hash, or the Ni payload.

2.2.  Use of Sequence Numbers for Message ID

   Every IKE message contains a Message ID as part of its fixed header.
   This Message ID is used to match up requests and responses, and to
   identify retransmissions of messages.

   The Message ID is a 32-bit quantity, which is zero for the
   IKE_SA_INIT messages (including retries of the message due to
   responses such as COOKIE and INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD {{ Clarif-2.2 }}),
   and incremented for each subsequent exchange.  Thus, the first pair
   of IKE_AUTH messages will have ID of 1, the second (when EAP is used)
   will be 2, and so on. {{ Clarif-3.10 }}

   Each endpoint in the IKE Security Association maintains two "current"
   Message IDs: the next one to be used for a request it initiates and
   the next one it expects to see in a request from the other end.
   These counters increment as requests are generated and received.
   Responses always contain the same message ID as the corresponding
   request.  That means that after the initial exchange, each integer n
   may appear as the message ID in four distinct messages: the nth
   request from the original IKE initiator, the corresponding response,
   the nth request from the original IKE responder, and the
   corresponding response.  If the two ends make very different numbers
   of requests, the Message IDs in the two directions can be very
   different.  There is no ambiguity in the messages, however, because
   the (I)nitiator and (R)esponse bits in the message header specify
   which of the four messages a particular one is.

   Note that Message IDs are cryptographically protected and provide
   protection against message replays.  In the unlikely event that
   Message IDs grow too large to fit in 32 bits, the IKE_SA MUST be
   closed.  Rekeying an IKE_SA resets the sequence numbers.

2.3.  Window Size for Overlapping Requests

   In order to maximize IKE throughput, an IKE endpoint MAY issue
   multiple requests before getting a response to any of them if the
   other endpoint has indicated its ability to handle such requests.
   For simplicity, an IKE implementation MAY choose to process requests
   strictly in order and/or wait for a response to one request before
   issuing another.  Certain rules must be followed to ensure
   interoperability between implementations using different strategies.



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   After an IKE_SA is set up, either end can initiate one or more
   requests.  These requests may pass one another over the network.  An
   IKE endpoint MUST be prepared to accept and process a request while
   it has a request outstanding in order to avoid a deadlock in this
   situation. {{ Downgraded the SHOULD }} An IKE endpoint may also
   accept and process multiple requests while it has a request
   outstanding.

   {{ 3.10.1-16385 }} The SET_WINDOW_SIZE notification asserts that the
   sending endpoint is capable of keeping state for multiple outstanding
   exchanges, permitting the recipient to send multiple requests before
   getting a response to the first.  The data associated with a
   SET_WINDOW_SIZE notification MUST be 4 octets long and contain the
   big endian representation of the number of messages the sender
   promises to keep.  The window size is always one until the initial
   exchanges complete.

   An IKE endpoint MUST wait for a response to each of its messages
   before sending a subsequent message unless it has received a
   SET_WINDOW_SIZE Notify message from its peer informing it that the
   peer is prepared to maintain state for multiple outstanding messages
   in order to allow greater throughput.

   An IKE endpoint MUST NOT exceed the peer's stated window size for
   transmitted IKE requests.  In other words, if the responder stated
   its window size is N, then when the initiator needs to make a request
   X, it MUST wait until it has received responses to all requests up
   through request X-N.  An IKE endpoint MUST keep a copy of (or be able
   to regenerate exactly) each request it has sent until it receives the
   corresponding response.  An IKE endpoint MUST keep a copy of (or be
   able to regenerate exactly) the number of previous responses equal to
   its declared window size in case its response was lost and the
   initiator requests its retransmission by retransmitting the request.

   An IKE endpoint supporting a window size greater than one ought to be
   capable of processing incoming requests out of order to maximize
   performance in the event of network failures or packet reordering.

   {{ Clarif-7.3 }} The window size is normally a (possibly
   configurable) property of a particular implementation, and is not
   related to congestion control (unlike the window size in TCP, for
   example).  In particular, it is not defined what the responder should
   do when it receives a SET_WINDOW_SIZE notification containing a
   smaller value than is currently in effect.  Thus, there is currently
   no way to reduce the window size of an existing IKE_SA; you can only
   increase it.  When rekeying an IKE_SA, the new IKE_SA starts with
   window size 1 until it is explicitly increased by sending a new
   SET_WINDOW_SIZE notification.



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   {{ 3.10.1-9 }}The INVALID_MESSAGE_ID notification is sent when an IKE
   message ID outside the supported window is received.  This Notify
   MUST NOT be sent in a response; the invalid request MUST NOT be
   acknowledged.  Instead, inform the other side by initiating an
   INFORMATIONAL exchange with Notification data containing the four
   octet invalid message ID.  Sending this notification is optional, and
   notifications of this type MUST be rate limited.

2.4.  State Synchronization and Connection Timeouts

   An IKE endpoint is allowed to forget all of its state associated with
   an IKE_SA and the collection of corresponding CHILD_SAs at any time.
   This is the anticipated behavior in the event of an endpoint crash
   and restart.  It is important when an endpoint either fails or
   reinitializes its state that the other endpoint detect those
   conditions and not continue to waste network bandwidth by sending
   packets over discarded SAs and having them fall into a black hole.

   {{ 3.10.1-16384 }} The INITIAL_CONTACT notification asserts that this
   IKE_SA is the only IKE_SA currently active between the authenticated
   identities.  It MAY be sent when an IKE_SA is established after a
   crash, and the recipient MAY use this information to delete any other
   IKE_SAs it has to the same authenticated identity without waiting for
   a timeout.  This notification MUST NOT be sent by an entity that may
   be replicated (e.g., a roaming user's credentials where the user is
   allowed to connect to the corporate firewall from two remote systems
   at the same time). {{ Clarif-7.9 }} The INITIAL_CONTACT notification,
   if sent, MUST be in the first IKE_AUTH request, not as a separate
   exchange afterwards; however, receiving parties need to deal with it
   in other requests.

   Since IKE is designed to operate in spite of Denial of Service (DoS)
   attacks from the network, an endpoint MUST NOT conclude that the
   other endpoint has failed based on any routing information (e.g.,
   ICMP messages) or IKE messages that arrive without cryptographic
   protection (e.g., Notify messages complaining about unknown SPIs).
   An endpoint MUST conclude that the other endpoint has failed only
   when repeated attempts to contact it have gone unanswered for a
   timeout period or when a cryptographically protected INITIAL_CONTACT
   notification is received on a different IKE_SA to the same
   authenticated identity. {{ Demoted the SHOULD }} An endpoint should
   suspect that the other endpoint has failed based on routing
   information and initiate a request to see whether the other endpoint
   is alive.  To check whether the other side is alive, IKE specifies an
   empty INFORMATIONAL message that (like all IKE requests) requires an
   acknowledgement (note that within the context of an IKE_SA, an
   "empty" message consists of an IKE header followed by an Encrypted
   payload that contains no payloads).  If a cryptographically protected



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   message has been received from the other side recently, unprotected
   notifications MAY be ignored.  Implementations MUST limit the rate at
   which they take actions based on unprotected messages.

   Numbers of retries and lengths of timeouts are not covered in this
   specification because they do not affect interoperability.  It is
   suggested that messages be retransmitted at least a dozen times over
   a period of at least several minutes before giving up on an SA, but
   different environments may require different rules.  To be a good
   network citizen, retranmission times MUST increase exponentially to
   avoid flooding the network and making an existing congestion
   situation worse.  If there has only been outgoing traffic on all of
   the SAs associated with an IKE_SA, it is essential to confirm
   liveness of the other endpoint to avoid black holes.  If no
   cryptographically protected messages have been received on an IKE_SA
   or any of its CHILD_SAs recently, the system needs to perform a
   liveness check in order to prevent sending messages to a dead peer.
   Receipt of a fresh cryptographically protected message on an IKE_SA
   or any of its CHILD_SAs ensures liveness of the IKE_SA and all of its
   CHILD_SAs.  Note that this places requirements on the failure modes
   of an IKE endpoint.  An implementation MUST NOT continue sending on
   any SA if some failure prevents it from receiving on all of the
   associated SAs.  If CHILD_SAs can fail independently from one another
   without the associated IKE_SA being able to send a delete message,
   then they MUST be negotiated by separate IKE_SAs.

   There is a Denial of Service attack on the initiator of an IKE_SA
   that can be avoided if the initiator takes the proper care.  Since
   the first two messages of an SA setup are not cryptographically
   protected, an attacker could respond to the initiator's message
   before the genuine responder and poison the connection setup attempt.
   To prevent this, the initiator MAY be willing to accept multiple
   responses to its first message, treat each as potentially legitimate,
   respond to it, and then discard all the invalid half-open connections
   when it receives a valid cryptographically protected response to any
   one of its requests.  Once a cryptographically valid response is
   received, all subsequent responses should be ignored whether or not
   they are cryptographically valid.

   Note that with these rules, there is no reason to negotiate and agree
   upon an SA lifetime.  If IKE presumes the partner is dead, based on
   repeated lack of acknowledgement to an IKE message, then the IKE SA
   and all CHILD_SAs set up through that IKE_SA are deleted.

   An IKE endpoint may at any time delete inactive CHILD_SAs to recover
   resources used to hold their state.  If an IKE endpoint chooses to
   delete CHILD_SAs, it MUST send Delete payloads to the other end
   notifying it of the deletion.  It MAY similarly time out the IKE_SA.



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   {{ Clarified the SHOULD }} Closing the IKE_SA implicitly closes all
   associated CHILD_SAs.  In this case, an IKE endpoint SHOULD send a
   Delete payload indicating that it has closed the IKE_SA unless the
   other endpoint is no longer responding.

2.5.  Version Numbers and Forward Compatibility

   This document describes version 2.0 of IKE, meaning the major version
   number is 2 and the minor version number is 0. {{ Restated the
   relationship to RFC 4306 }} This document is a clarification of
   [IKEV2].  It is likely that some implementations will want to support
   version 1.0 and version 2.0, and in the future, other versions.

   The major version number should be incremented only if the packet
   formats or required actions have changed so dramatically that an
   older version node would not be able to interoperate with a newer
   version node if it simply ignored the fields it did not understand
   and took the actions specified in the older specification.  The minor
   version number indicates new capabilities, and MUST be ignored by a
   node with a smaller minor version number, but used for informational
   purposes by the node with the larger minor version number.  For
   example, it might indicate the ability to process a newly defined
   notification message.  The node with the larger minor version number
   would simply note that its correspondent would not be able to
   understand that message and therefore would not send it.

   {{ 3.10.1-5 }} If an endpoint receives a message with a higher major
   version number, it MUST drop the message and SHOULD send an
   unauthenticated notification message of type INVALID_MAJOR_VERSION
   containing the highest (closest) version number it supports.  If an
   endpoint supports major version n, and major version m, it MUST
   support all versions between n and m.  If it receives a message with
   a major version that it supports, it MUST respond with that version
   number.  In order to prevent two nodes from being tricked into
   corresponding with a lower major version number than the maximum that
   they both support, IKE has a flag that indicates that the node is
   capable of speaking a higher major version number.

   Thus, the major version number in the IKE header indicates the
   version number of the message, not the highest version number that
   the transmitter supports.  If the initiator is capable of speaking
   versions n, n+1, and n+2, and the responder is capable of speaking
   versions n and n+1, then they will negotiate speaking n+1, where the
   initiator will set a flag indicating its ability to speak a higher
   version.  If they mistakenly (perhaps through an active attacker
   sending error messages) negotiate to version n, then both will notice
   that the other side can support a higher version number, and they
   MUST break the connection and reconnect using version n+1.



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   Note that IKEv1 does not follow these rules, because there is no way
   in v1 of noting that you are capable of speaking a higher version
   number.  So an active attacker can trick two v2-capable nodes into
   speaking v1. {{ Demoted the SHOULD }} When a v2-capable node
   negotiates down to v1, it should note that fact in its logs.

   Also for forward compatibility, all fields marked RESERVED MUST be
   set to zero by an implementation running version 2.0, and their
   content MUST be ignored by an implementation running version 2.0 ("Be
   conservative in what you send and liberal in what you receive").  In
   this way, future versions of the protocol can use those fields in a
   way that is guaranteed to be ignored by implementations that do not
   understand them.  Similarly, payload types that are not defined are
   reserved for future use; implementations of a version where they are
   undefined MUST skip over those payloads and ignore their contents.

   IKEv2 adds a "critical" flag to each payload header for further
   flexibility for forward compatibility.  If the critical flag is set
   and the payload type is unrecognized, the message MUST be rejected
   and the response to the IKE request containing that payload MUST
   include a Notify payload UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PAYLOAD, indicating an
   unsupported critical payload was included. {{ 3.10.1-1 }} In that
   Notify payload, the notification data contains the one-octet payload
   type.  If the critical flag is not set and the payload type is
   unsupported, that payload MUST be ignored.  Payloads sent in IKE
   response messages MUST NOT have the critical flag set.  Note that the
   critical flag applies only to the payload type, not the contents.  If
   the payload type is recognized, but the payload contains something
   which is not (such as an unknown transform inside an SA payload, or
   an unknown Notify Message Type inside a Notify payload), the critical
   flag is ignored.

   NOTE TO IMPLEMENTERS: Does anyone require that the payloads be in the
   order shown in the figures in Section 2?  Can we eliminate the
   requirement in the following paragraph?  If not, we will probably
   have to add a new appendix with the order, but there is no reason to
   do that if no one actually cares. {{ Remove this paragraph before the
   document is finalized, of course. }}

   {{ Demoted the SHOULD in the second clause }}Although new payload
   types may be added in the future and may appear interleaved with the
   fields defined in this specification, implementations MUST send the
   payloads defined in this specification in the order shown in the
   figures in Section 2; implementations are explicitly allowed to
   reject as invalid a message with those payloads in any other order.






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2.6.  Cookies

   The term "cookies" originates with Karn and Simpson [PHOTURIS] in
   Photuris, an early proposal for key management with IPsec, and it has
   persisted.  The Internet Security Association and Key Management
   Protocol (ISAKMP) [ISAKMP] fixed message header includes two eight-
   octet fields titled "cookies", and that syntax is used by both IKEv1
   and IKEv2, although in IKEv2 they are referred to as the "IKE SPI"
   and there is a new separate field in a Notify payload holding the
   cookie.  The initial two eight-octet fields in the header are used as
   a connection identifier at the beginning of IKE packets. {{ Demoted
   the SHOULD }} Each endpoint chooses one of the two SPIs and needs to
   choose them so as to be unique identifiers of an IKE_SA.  An SPI
   value of zero is special and indicates that the remote SPI value is
   not yet known by the sender.

   Unlike ESP and AH where only the recipient's SPI appears in the
   header of a message, in IKE the sender's SPI is also sent in every
   message.  Since the SPI chosen by the original initiator of the
   IKE_SA is always sent first, an endpoint with multiple IKE_SAs open
   that wants to find the appropriate IKE_SA using the SPI it assigned
   must look at the I(nitiator) Flag bit in the header to determine
   whether it assigned the first or the second eight octets.

   In the first message of an initial IKE exchange, the initiator will
   not know the responder's SPI value and will therefore set that field
   to zero.

   An expected attack against IKE is state and CPU exhaustion, where the
   target is flooded with session initiation requests from forged IP
   addresses.  This attack can be made less effective if an
   implementation of a responder uses minimal CPU and commits no state
   to an SA until it knows the initiator can receive packets at the
   address from which it claims to be sending them.

   When a responder detects a large number of half-open IKE_SAs, it
   SHOULD reply to IKE_SA_INIT requests with a response containing the
   COOKIE notification. {{ 3.10.1-16390 }} The data associated with this
   notification MUST be between 1 and 64 octets in length (inclusive),
   and its generation is described later in this section.  If the
   IKE_SA_INIT response includes the COOKIE notification, the initiator
   MUST then retry the IKE_SA_INIT request, and include the COOKIE
   notification containing the received data as the first payload, and
   all other payloads unchanged.  The initial exchange will then be as
   follows:






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   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   HDR(A,0), SAi1, KEi, Ni  -->
                                <--  HDR(A,0), N(COOKIE)
   HDR(A,0), N(COOKIE), SAi1,
       KEi, Ni  -->
                                <--  HDR(A,B), SAr1, KEr,
                                         Nr, [CERTREQ]
   HDR(A,B), SK {IDi, [CERT,]
       [CERTREQ,] [IDr,] AUTH,
       SAi2, TSi, TSr}  -->
                                <--  HDR(A,B), SK {IDr, [CERT,]
                                         AUTH, SAr2, TSi, TSr}

   The first two messages do not affect any initiator or responder state
   except for communicating the cookie.  In particular, the message
   sequence numbers in the first four messages will all be zero and the
   message sequence numbers in the last two messages will be one.  'A'
   is the SPI assigned by the initiator, while 'B' is the SPI assigned
   by the responder.

   {{ Demoted the SHOULD }} An IKE implementation should implement its
   responder cookie generation in such a way as to not require any saved
   state to recognize its valid cookie when the second IKE_SA_INIT
   message arrives.  The exact algorithms and syntax they use to
   generate cookies do not affect interoperability and hence are not
   specified here.  The following is an example of how an endpoint could
   use cookies to implement limited DOS protection.

   A good way to do this is to set the responder cookie to be:

   Cookie = <VersionIDofSecret> | Hash(Ni | IPi | SPIi | <secret>)

   where <secret> is a randomly generated secret known only to the
   responder and periodically changed and | indicates concatenation.
   <VersionIDofSecret> should be changed whenever <secret> is
   regenerated.  The cookie can be recomputed when the IKE_SA_INIT
   arrives the second time and compared to the cookie in the received
   message.  If it matches, the responder knows that the cookie was
   generated since the last change to <secret> and that IPi must be the
   same as the source address it saw the first time.  Incorporating SPIi
   into the calculation ensures that if multiple IKE_SAs are being set
   up in parallel they will all get different cookies (assuming the
   initiator chooses unique SPIi's).  Incorporating Ni into the hash
   ensures that an attacker who sees only message 2 can't successfully
   forge a message 3.

   If a new value for <secret> is chosen while there are connections in



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   the process of being initialized, an IKE_SA_INIT might be returned
   with other than the current <VersionIDofSecret>.  The responder in
   that case MAY reject the message by sending another response with a
   new cookie or it MAY keep the old value of <secret> around for a
   short time and accept cookies computed from either one. {{ Demoted
   the SHOULD NOT }} The responder should not accept cookies
   indefinitely after <secret> is changed, since that would defeat part
   of the denial of service protection. {{ Demoted the SHOULD }} The
   responder should change the value of <secret> frequently, especially
   if under attack.

   {{ Clarif-2.1 }} In addition to cookies, there are several cases
   where the IKE_SA_INIT exchange does not result in the creation of an
   IKE_SA (such as INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD or NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN).  In such a
   case, sending a zero value for the Responder's SPI is correct.  If
   the responder sends a non-zero responder SPI, the initiator should
   not reject the response for only that reason.

   {{ Clarif-2.5 }} When one party receives an IKE_SA_INIT request
   containing a cookie whose contents do not match the value expected,
   that party MUST ignore the cookie and process the message as if no
   cookie had been included; usually this means sending a response
   containing a new cookie.

2.6.1.  Interaction of COOKIE and INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD

   {{ This section added by Clarif-2.4 }}

   There are two common reasons why the initiator may have to retry the
   IKE_SA_INIT exchange: the responder requests a cookie or wants a
   different Diffie-Hellman group than was included in the KEi payload.
   If the initiator receives a cookie from the responder, the initiator
   needs to decide whether or not to include the cookie in only the next
   retry of the IKE_SA_INIT request, or in all subsequent retries as
   well.

   If the initiator includes the cookie only in the next retry, one
   additional roundtrip may be needed in some cases.  An additional
   roundtrip is needed also if the initiator includes the cookie in all
   retries, but the responder does not support this.  For instance, if
   the responder includes the SAi1 and KEi payloads in cookie
   calculation, it will reject the request by sending a new cookie.

   If both peers support including the cookie in all retries, a slightly
   shorter exchange can happen.  Implementations SHOULD support this
   shorter exchange, but MUST NOT fail if other implementations do not
   support this shorter exchange.




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2.7.  Cryptographic Algorithm Negotiation

   The payload type known as "SA" indicates a proposal for a set of
   choices of IPsec protocols (IKE, ESP, and/or AH) for the SA as well
   as cryptographic algorithms associated with each protocol.

   An SA payload consists of one or more proposals. {{ Clarif-7.13 }}
   Each proposal includes one protocol.  Each protocol contains one or
   more transforms -- each specifying a cryptographic algorithm.  Each
   transform contains zero or more attributes (attributes are needed
   only if the transform identifier does not completely specify the
   cryptographic algorithm).

   This hierarchical structure was designed to efficiently encode
   proposals for cryptographic suites when the number of supported
   suites is large because multiple values are acceptable for multiple
   transforms.  The responder MUST choose a single suite, which may be
   any subset of the SA proposal following the rules below:

   {{ Clarif-7.13 }} Each proposal contains one protocol.  If a proposal
   is accepted, the SA response MUST contain the same protocol.  The
   responder MUST accept a single proposal or reject them all and return
   an error. {{ 3.10.1-14 }} The error is given in a notification of
   type NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN.

   Each IPsec protocol proposal contains one or more transforms.  Each
   transform contains a transform type.  The accepted cryptographic
   suite MUST contain exactly one transform of each type included in the
   proposal.  For example: if an ESP proposal includes transforms
   ENCR_3DES, ENCR_AES w/keysize 128, ENCR_AES w/keysize 256,
   AUTH_HMAC_MD5, and AUTH_HMAC_SHA, the accepted suite MUST contain one
   of the ENCR_ transforms and one of the AUTH_ transforms.  Thus, six
   combinations are acceptable.

   Since the initiator sends its Diffie-Hellman value in the
   IKE_SA_INIT, it must guess the Diffie-Hellman group that the
   responder will select from its list of supported groups.  If the
   initiator guesses wrong, the responder will respond with a Notify
   payload of type INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD indicating the selected group.  In
   this case, the initiator MUST retry the IKE_SA_INIT with the
   corrected Diffie-Hellman group.  The initiator MUST again propose its
   full set of acceptable cryptographic suites because the rejection
   message was unauthenticated and otherwise an active attacker could
   trick the endpoints into negotiating a weaker suite than a stronger
   one that they both prefer.

   {{ Clarif-2.1 }} When the IKE_SA_INIT exchange does not result in the
   creation of an IKE_SA due to INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD, NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN,



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   or COOKIE (see Section 2.6), the responder's SPI will be zero.
   However, if the responder sends a non-zero responder SPI, the
   initiator should not reject the response for only that reason.

2.8.  Rekeying

   {{ Demoted the SHOULD }} IKE, ESP, and AH security associations use
   secret keys that should be used only for a limited amount of time and
   to protect a limited amount of data.  This limits the lifetime of the
   entire security association.  When the lifetime of a security
   association expires, the security association MUST NOT be used.  If
   there is demand, new security associations MAY be established.
   Reestablishment of security associations to take the place of ones
   that expire is referred to as "rekeying".

   To allow for minimal IPsec implementations, the ability to rekey SAs
   without restarting the entire IKE_SA is optional.  An implementation
   MAY refuse all CREATE_CHILD_SA requests within an IKE_SA.  If an SA
   has expired or is about to expire and rekeying attempts using the
   mechanisms described here fail, an implementation MUST close the
   IKE_SA and any associated CHILD_SAs and then MAY start new ones. {{
   Demoted the SHOULD }} Implementations may wish to support in-place
   rekeying of SAs, since doing so offers better performance and is
   likely to reduce the number of packets lost during the transition.

   To rekey a CHILD_SA within an existing IKE_SA, create a new,
   equivalent SA (see Section 2.17 below), and when the new one is
   established, delete the old one.  To rekey an IKE_SA, establish a new
   equivalent IKE_SA (see Section 2.18 below) with the peer to whom the
   old IKE_SA is shared using a CREATE_CHILD_SA within the existing
   IKE_SA.  An IKE_SA so created inherits all of the original IKE_SA's
   CHILD_SAs, and the new IKE_SA is used for all control messages needed
   to maintain those CHILD_SAs.  The old IKE_SA is then deleted, and the
   Delete payload to delete itself MUST be the last request sent over
   the old IKE_SA.

   {{ Demoted the SHOULD }} SAs should be rekeyed proactively, i.e., the
   new SA should be established before the old one expires and becomes
   unusable.  Enough time should elapse between the time the new SA is
   established and the old one becomes unusable so that traffic can be
   switched over to the new SA.

   A difference between IKEv1 and IKEv2 is that in IKEv1 SA lifetimes
   were negotiated.  In IKEv2, each end of the SA is responsible for
   enforcing its own lifetime policy on the SA and rekeying the SA when
   necessary.  If the two ends have different lifetime policies, the end
   with the shorter lifetime will end up always being the one to request
   the rekeying.  If an SA has been inactive for a long time and if an



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   endpoint would not initiate the SA in the absence of traffic, the
   endpoint MAY choose to close the SA instead of rekeying it when its
   lifetime expires. {{ Demoted the SHOULD }} It should do so if there
   has been no traffic since the last time the SA was rekeyed.

   Note that IKEv2 deliberately allows parallel SAs with the same
   traffic selectors between common endpoints.  One of the purposes of
   this is to support traffic quality of service (QoS) differences among
   the SAs (see [DIFFSERVFIELD], [DIFFSERVARCH], and section 4.1 of
   [DIFFTUNNEL]).  Hence unlike IKEv1, the combination of the endpoints
   and the traffic selectors may not uniquely identify an SA between
   those endpoints, so the IKEv1 rekeying heuristic of deleting SAs on
   the basis of duplicate traffic selectors SHOULD NOT be used.

   {{ Demoted the SHOULD }} The node that initiated the surviving
   rekeyed SA should delete the replaced SA after the new one is
   established.

   There are timing windows -- particularly in the presence of lost
   packets -- where endpoints may not agree on the state of an SA.  The
   responder to a CREATE_CHILD_SA MUST be prepared to accept messages on
   an SA before sending its response to the creation request, so there
   is no ambiguity for the initiator.  The initiator MAY begin sending
   on an SA as soon as it processes the response.  The initiator,
   however, cannot receive on a newly created SA until it receives and
   processes the response to its CREATE_CHILD_SA request.  How, then, is
   the responder to know when it is OK to send on the newly created SA?

   From a technical correctness and interoperability perspective, the
   responder MAY begin sending on an SA as soon as it sends its response
   to the CREATE_CHILD_SA request.  In some situations, however, this
   could result in packets unnecessarily being dropped, so an
   implementation MAY defer such sending.

   The responder can be assured that the initiator is prepared to
   receive messages on an SA if either (1) it has received a
   cryptographically valid message on the new SA, or (2) the new SA
   rekeys an existing SA and it receives an IKE request to close the
   replaced SA.  When rekeying an SA, the responder continues to send
   traffic on the old SA until one of those events occurs.  When
   establishing a new SA, the responder MAY defer sending messages on a
   new SA until either it receives one or a timeout has occurred. {{
   Demoted the SHOULD }} If an initiator receives a message on an SA for
   which it has not received a response to its CREATE_CHILD_SA request,
   it interprets that as a likely packet loss and retransmits the
   CREATE_CHILD_SA request.  An initiator MAY send a dummy message on a
   newly created SA if it has no messages queued in order to assure the
   responder that the initiator is ready to receive messages.



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   {{ Clarif-5.9 }} Throughout this document, "initiator" refers to the
   party who initiated the exchange being described, and "original
   initiator" refers to the party who initiated the whole IKE_SA.  The
   "original initiator" always refers to the party who initiated the
   exchange which resulted in the current IKE_SA.  In other words, if
   the "original responder" starts rekeying the IKE_SA, that party
   becomes the "original initiator" of the new IKE_SA.

2.8.1.  Simultaneous CHILD_SA rekeying

   {{ The first two paragraphs were moved, and the rest was added, based
   on Clarif-5.11 }}

   If the two ends have the same lifetime policies, it is possible that
   both will initiate a rekeying at the same time (which will result in
   redundant SAs).  To reduce the probability of this happening, the
   timing of rekeying requests SHOULD be jittered (delayed by a random
   amount of time after the need for rekeying is noticed).

   This form of rekeying may temporarily result in multiple similar SAs
   between the same pairs of nodes.  When there are two SAs eligible to
   receive packets, a node MUST accept incoming packets through either
   SA.  If redundant SAs are created though such a collision, the SA
   created with the lowest of the four nonces used in the two exchanges
   SHOULD be closed by the endpoint that created it. {{ Clarif-5.10 }}
   "Lowest" means an octet-by-octet, lexicographical comparison (instead
   of, for instance, comparing the nonces as large integers).  In other
   words, start by comparing the first octet; if they're equal, move to
   the next octet, and so on.  If you reach the end of one nonce, that
   nonce is the lower one.

   The following is an explanation on the impact this has on
   implementations.  Assume that hosts A and B have an existing IPsec SA
   pair with SPIs (SPIa1,SPIb1), and both start rekeying it at the same
   time:

   Host A                            Host B
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   send req1: N(REKEY_SA,SPIa1),
       SA(..,SPIa2,..),Ni1,..  -->
                                <--  send req2: N(REKEY_SA,SPIb1),
                                         SA(..,SPIb2,..),Ni2
   recv req2 <--

   At this point, A knows there is a simultaneous rekeying going on.
   However, it cannot yet know which of the exchanges will have the
   lowest nonce, so it will just note the situation and respond as
   usual.



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   send resp2: SA(..,SPIa3,..),
        Nr1,..  -->
                                -->  recv req1

   Now B also knows that simultaneous rekeying is going on.  It responds
   as usual.

                               <--  send resp1: SA(..,SPIb3,..),
                                        Nr2,..
   recv resp1 <--
                               -->  recv resp2

   At this point, there are three CHILD_SA pairs between A and B (the
   old one and two new ones).  A and B can now compare the nonces.
   Suppose that the lowest nonce was Nr1 in message resp2; in this case,
   B (the sender of req2) deletes the redundant new SA, and A (the node
   that initiated the surviving rekeyed SA), deletes the old one.

   send req3: D(SPIa1) -->
                                <--  send req4: D(SPIb2)
                                -->  recv req3
                                <--  send resp3: D(SPIb1)
   recv req4 <--
   send resp4: D(SPIa3) -->

   The rekeying is now finished.

   However, there is a second possible sequence of events that can
   happen if some packets are lost in the network, resulting in
   retransmissions.  The rekeying begins as usual, but A's first packet
   (req1) is lost.

   Host A                            Host B
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   send req1: N(REKEY_SA,SPIa1),
       SA(..,SPIa2,..),
       Ni1,..  -->  (lost)
                                <--  send req2: N(REKEY_SA,SPIb1),
                                         SA(..,SPIb2,..),Ni2
   recv req2 <--
   send resp2: SA(..,SPIa3,..),
       Nr1,.. -->
                                -->  recv resp2
                                <--  send req3: D(SPIb1)
   recv req3 <--
   send resp3: D(SPIa1) -->
                                -->  recv resp3




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   From B's point of view, the rekeying is now completed, and since it
   has not yet received A's req1, it does not even know that there was
   simultaneous rekeying.  However, A will continue retransmitting the
   message, and eventually it will reach B.

   resend req1 -->
                                -->  recv req1

   To B, it looks like A is trying to rekey an SA that no longer exists;
   thus, B responds to the request with something non-fatal such as
   NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN.

                                <--  send resp1: N(NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN)
   recv resp1 <--

   When A receives this error, it already knows there was simultaneous
   rekeying, so it can ignore the error message.

2.8.2.   Rekeying the IKE_SA Versus Reauthentication

   {{ Added this section from Clarif-5.2 }}

   Rekeying the IKE_SA and reauthentication are different concepts in
   IKEv2.  Rekeying the IKE_SA establishes new keys for the IKE_SA and
   resets the Message ID counters, but it does not authenticate the
   parties again (no AUTH or EAP payloads are involved).

   Although rekeying the IKE_SA may be important in some environments,
   reauthentication (the verification that the parties still have access
   to the long-term credentials) is often more important.

   IKEv2 does not have any special support for reauthentication.
   Reauthentication is done by creating a new IKE_SA from scratch (using
   IKE_SA_INIT/IKE_AUTH exchanges, without any REKEY_SA notify
   payloads), creating new CHILD_SAs within the new IKE_SA (without
   REKEY_SA notify payloads), and finally deleting the old IKE_SA (which
   deletes the old CHILD_SAs as well).

   This means that reauthentication also establishes new keys for the
   IKE_SA and CHILD_SAs.  Therefore, while rekeying can be performed
   more often than reauthentication, the situation where "authentication
   lifetime" is shorter than "key lifetime" does not make sense.

   While creation of a new IKE_SA can be initiated by either party
   (initiator or responder in the original IKE_SA), the use of EAP
   authentication and/or configuration payloads means in practice that
   reauthentication has to be initiated by the same party as the
   original IKE_SA.  IKEv2 does not currently allow the responder to



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   request reauthentication in this case; however, there are extensions
   that add this functionality such as [REAUTH].

2.9.  Traffic Selector Negotiation

   {{ Clarif-7.2 }} When an RFC4301-compliant IPsec subsystem receives
   an IP packet and matches a "protect" selector in its Security Policy
   Database (SPD), the subsystem protects that packet with IPsec.  When
   no SA exists yet, it is the task of IKE to create it.  Maintenance of
   a system's SPD is outside the scope of IKE (see [PFKEY] for an
   example protocol), though some implementations might update their SPD
   in connection with the running of IKE (for an example scenario, see
   Section 1.1.3).

   Traffic Selector (TS) payloads allow endpoints to communicate some of
   the information from their SPD to their peers.  TS payloads specify
   the selection criteria for packets that will be forwarded over the
   newly set up SA.  This can serve as a consistency check in some
   scenarios to assure that the SPDs are consistent.  In others, it
   guides the dynamic update of the SPD.

   Two TS payloads appear in each of the messages in the exchange that
   creates a CHILD_SA pair.  Each TS payload contains one or more
   Traffic Selectors.  Each Traffic Selector consists of an address
   range (IPv4 or IPv6), a port range, and an IP protocol ID.

   The first of the two TS payloads is known as TSi (Traffic Selector-
   initiator).  The second is known as TSr (Traffic Selector-responder).
   TSi specifies the source address of traffic forwarded from (or the
   destination address of traffic forwarded to) the initiator of the
   CHILD_SA pair.  TSr specifies the destination address of the traffic
   forwarded to (or the source address of the traffic forwarded from)
   the responder of the CHILD_SA pair.  For example, if the original
   initiator requests the creation of a CHILD_SA pair, and wishes to
   tunnel all traffic from subnet 192.0.1.* on the initiator's side to
   subnet 192.0.2.* on the responder's side, the initiator would include
   a single traffic selector in each TS payload.  TSi would specify the
   address range (192.0.1.0 - 192.0.1.255) and TSr would specify the
   address range (192.0.2.0 - 192.0.2.255).  Assuming that proposal was
   acceptable to the responder, it would send identical TS payloads
   back.  (Note: The IP address range 192.0.2.* has been reserved for
   use in examples in RFCs and similar documents.  This document needed
   two such ranges, and so also used 192.0.1.*.  This should not be
   confused with any actual address.)

   IKEv2 allows the responder to choose a subset of the traffic proposed
   by the initiator.  This could happen when the configurations of the
   two endpoints are being updated but only one end has received the new



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   information.  Since the two endpoints may be configured by different
   people, the incompatibility may persist for an extended period even
   in the absence of errors.  It also allows for intentionally different
   configurations, as when one end is configured to tunnel all addresses
   and depends on the other end to have the up-to-date list.

   When the responder chooses a subset of the traffic proposed by the
   initiator, it narrows the traffic selectors to some subset of the
   initiator's proposal (provided the set does not become the null set).

   To enable the responder to choose the appropriate range in this case,
   if the initiator has requested the SA due to a data packet, the
   initiator SHOULD include as the first traffic selector in each of TSi
   and TSr a very specific traffic selector including the addresses in
   the packet triggering the request.  In the example, the initiator
   would include in TSi two traffic selectors: the first containing the
   address range (192.0.1.43 - 192.0.1.43) and the source port and IP
   protocol from the packet and the second containing (192.0.1.0 -
   192.0.1.255) with all ports and IP protocols.  The initiator would
   similarly include two traffic selectors in TSr.  If the initiator
   creates the CHILD_SA pair not in response to an arriving packet, but
   rather, say, upon startup, then there may be no specific addresses
   the initiator prefers for the initial tunnel over any other.  In that
   case, the first values in TSi and TSr can be ranges rather than
   specific values.

   The responder performs the narrowing as follows: {{ Clarif-4.10 }}

   o  If the responder's policy does not allow it to accept any part of
      the proposed traffic selectors, it responds with TS_UNACCEPTABLE.

   o  If the responder's policy allows the entire set of traffic covered
      by TSi and TSr, no narrowing is necessary, and the responder can
      return the same TSi and TSr values.

   o  If the responder's policy allows it to accept the first selector
      of TSi and TSr, then the responder MUST narrow the traffic
      selectors to a subset that includes the initiator's first choices.
      In this example above, the responder might respond with TSi being
      (192.0.1.43 - 192.0.1.43) with all ports and IP protocols.

   o  If the responder's policy does not allow it to accept the first
      selector of TSi and TSr, the responder narrows to an acceptable
      subset of TSi and TSr.

   When narrowing is done, there may be several subsets that are
   acceptable but their union is not.  In this case, the responder
   arbitrarily chooses one of them, and MAY include an



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   ADDITIONAL_TS_POSSIBLE notification in the response. {{ 3.10.1-16386
   }} The ADDITIONAL_TS_POSSIBLE notification asserts that the responder
   narrowed the proposed traffic selectors but that other traffic
   selectors would also have been acceptable, though only in a separate
   SA.  There is no data associated with this Notify type.  This case
   will occur only when the initiator and responder are configured
   differently from one another.  If the initiator and responder agree
   on the granularity of tunnels, the initiator will never request a
   tunnel wider than the responder will accept. {{ Demoted the SHOULD }}
   Such misconfigurations should be recorded in error logs.

   It is possible for the responder's policy to contain multiple smaller
   ranges, all encompassed by the initiator's traffic selector, and with
   the responder's policy being that each of those ranges should be sent
   over a different SA.  Continuing the example above, the responder
   might have a policy of being willing to tunnel those addresses to and
   from the initiator, but might require that each address pair be on a
   separately negotiated CHILD_SA.  If the initiator generated its
   request in response to an incoming packet from 192.0.1.43 to
   192.0.2.123, there would be no way for the responder to determine
   which pair of addresses should be included in this tunnel, and it
   would have to make a guess or reject the request with a status of
   SINGLE_PAIR_REQUIRED.

   {{ 3.10.1-34 }} The SINGLE_PAIR_REQUIRED error indicates that a
   CREATE_CHILD_SA request is unacceptable because its sender is only
   willing to accept traffic selectors specifying a single pair of
   addresses.  The requestor is expected to respond by requesting an SA
   for only the specific traffic it is trying to forward.

   {{ Clarif-4.11 }} Few implementations will have policies that require
   separate SAs for each address pair.  Because of this, if only some
   parts of the TSi and TSr proposed by the initiator are acceptable to
   the responder, responders SHOULD narrow the selectors to an
   acceptable subset rather than use SINGLE_PAIR_REQUIRED.

2.9.1.  Traffic Selectors Violating Own Policy

   {{ Clarif-4.12 }}

   When creating a new SA, the initiator needs to avoid proposing
   traffic selectors that violate its own policy.  If this rule is not
   followed, valid traffic may be dropped.

   This is best illustrated by an example.  Suppose that host A has a
   policy whose effect is that traffic to 192.0.1.66 is sent via host B
   encrypted using AES, and traffic to all other hosts in 192.0.1.0/24
   is also sent via B, but must use 3DES.  Suppose also that host B



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   accepts any combination of AES and 3DES.

   If host A now proposes an SA that uses 3DES, and includes TSr
   containing (192.0.1.0-192.0.1.255), this will be accepted by host B.
   Now, host B can also use this SA to send traffic from 192.0.1.66, but
   those packets will be dropped by A since it requires the use of AES
   for those traffic.  Even if host A creates a new SA only for
   192.0.1.66 that uses AES, host B may freely continue to use the first
   SA for the traffic.  In this situation, when proposing the SA, host A
   should have followed its own policy, and included a TSr containing
   ((192.0.1.0-192.0.1.65),(192.0.1.67-192.0.1.255)) instead.

   In general, if (1) the initiator makes a proposal "for traffic X
   (TSi/TSr), do SA", and (2) for some subset X' of X, the initiator
   does not actually accept traffic X' with SA, and (3) the initiator
   would be willing to accept traffic X' with some SA' (!=SA), valid
   traffic can be unnecessarily dropped since the responder can apply
   either SA or SA' to traffic X'.

2.10.  Nonces

   The IKE_SA_INIT messages each contain a nonce.  These nonces are used
   as inputs to cryptographic functions.  The CREATE_CHILD_SA request
   and the CREATE_CHILD_SA response also contain nonces.  These nonces
   are used to add freshness to the key derivation technique used to
   obtain keys for CHILD_SA, and to ensure creation of strong pseudo-
   random bits from the Diffie-Hellman key.  Nonces used in IKEv2 MUST
   be randomly chosen, MUST be at least 128 bits in size, and MUST be at
   least half the key size of the negotiated prf. ("prf" refers to
   "pseudo-random function", one of the cryptographic algorithms
   negotiated in the IKE exchange.) {{ Clarif-7.4 }} However, the
   initiator chooses the nonce before the outcome of the negotiation is
   known.  Because of that, the nonce has to be long enough for all the
   PRFs being proposed.  If the same random number source is used for
   both keys and nonces, care must be taken to ensure that the latter
   use does not compromise the former.

2.11.  Address and Port Agility

   IKE runs over UDP ports 500 and 4500, and implicitly sets up ESP and
   AH associations for the same IP addresses it runs over.  The IP
   addresses and ports in the outer header are, however, not themselves
   cryptographically protected, and IKE is designed to work even through
   Network Address Translation (NAT) boxes.  An implementation MUST
   accept incoming requests even if the source port is not 500 or 4500,
   and MUST respond to the address and port from which the request was
   received.  It MUST specify the address and port at which the request
   was received as the source address and port in the response.  IKE



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   functions identically over IPv4 or IPv6.

2.12.  Reuse of Diffie-Hellman Exponentials

   IKE generates keying material using an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
   exchange in order to gain the property of "perfect forward secrecy".
   This means that once a connection is closed and its corresponding
   keys are forgotten, even someone who has recorded all of the data
   from the connection and gets access to all of the long-term keys of
   the two endpoints cannot reconstruct the keys used to protect the
   conversation without doing a brute force search of the session key
   space.

   Achieving perfect forward secrecy requires that when a connection is
   closed, each endpoint MUST forget not only the keys used by the
   connection but also any information that could be used to recompute
   those keys.  In particular, it MUST forget the secrets used in the
   Diffie-Hellman calculation and any state that may persist in the
   state of a pseudo-random number generator that could be used to
   recompute the Diffie-Hellman secrets.

   Since the computing of Diffie-Hellman exponentials is computationally
   expensive, an endpoint may find it advantageous to reuse those
   exponentials for multiple connection setups.  There are several
   reasonable strategies for doing this.  An endpoint could choose a new
   exponential only periodically though this could result in less-than-
   perfect forward secrecy if some connection lasts for less than the
   lifetime of the exponential.  Or it could keep track of which
   exponential was used for each connection and delete the information
   associated with the exponential only when some corresponding
   connection was closed.  This would allow the exponential to be reused
   without losing perfect forward secrecy at the cost of maintaining
   more state.

   Decisions as to whether and when to reuse Diffie-Hellman exponentials
   is a private decision in the sense that it will not affect
   interoperability.  An implementation that reuses exponentials MAY
   choose to remember the exponential used by the other endpoint on past
   exchanges and if one is reused to avoid the second half of the
   calculation.

2.13.  Generating Keying Material

   In the context of the IKE_SA, four cryptographic algorithms are
   negotiated: an encryption algorithm, an integrity protection
   algorithm, a Diffie-Hellman group, and a pseudo-random function
   (prf).  The pseudo-random function is used for the construction of
   keying material for all of the cryptographic algorithms used in both



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   the IKE_SA and the CHILD_SAs.

   We assume that each encryption algorithm and integrity protection
   algorithm uses a fixed-size key and that any randomly chosen value of
   that fixed size can serve as an appropriate key.  For algorithms that
   accept a variable length key, a fixed key size MUST be specified as
   part of the cryptographic transform negotiated (see Section 3.3.5 for
   the defintion of the Key Length transform attribute).  For algorithms
   for which not all values are valid keys (such as DES or 3DES with key
   parity), the algorithm by which keys are derived from arbitrary
   values MUST be specified by the cryptographic transform.  For
   integrity protection functions based on Hashed Message Authentication
   Code (HMAC), the fixed key size is the size of the output of the
   underlying hash function.

   It is assumed that pseudo-random functions (PRFs) accept keys of any
   length, but have a preferred key size.  The preferred key size is
   used as the length of SK_d, SK_pi, and SK_pr (see Section 2.14).  For
   PRFs based on the HMAC construction, the preferred key size is equal
   to the length of the output of the underlying hash function.  Other
   types of PRFs MUST specify their preferred key size.

   Keying material will always be derived as the output of the
   negotiated prf algorithm.  Since the amount of keying material needed
   may be greater than the size of the output of the prf algorithm, we
   will use the prf iteratively.  We will use the terminology prf+ to
   describe the function that outputs a pseudo-random stream based on
   the inputs to a prf as follows: (where | indicates concatenation)

   prf+ (K,S) = T1 | T2 | T3 | T4 | ...

   where:
   T1 = prf (K, S | 0x01)
   T2 = prf (K, T1 | S | 0x02)
   T3 = prf (K, T2 | S | 0x03)
   T4 = prf (K, T3 | S | 0x04)

   continuing as needed to compute all required keys.  The keys are
   taken from the output string without regard to boundaries (e.g., if
   the required keys are a 256-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
   key and a 160-bit HMAC key, and the prf function generates 160 bits,
   the AES key will come from T1 and the beginning of T2, while the HMAC
   key will come from the rest of T2 and the beginning of T3).

   The constant concatenated to the end of each string feeding the prf
   is a single octet. prf+ in this document is not defined beyond 255
   times the size of the prf output.




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2.14.  Generating Keying Material for the IKE_SA

   The shared keys are computed as follows.  A quantity called SKEYSEED
   is calculated from the nonces exchanged during the IKE_SA_INIT
   exchange and the Diffie-Hellman shared secret established during that
   exchange.  SKEYSEED is used to calculate seven other secrets: SK_d
   used for deriving new keys for the CHILD_SAs established with this
   IKE_SA; SK_ai and SK_ar used as a key to the integrity protection
   algorithm for authenticating the component messages of subsequent
   exchanges; SK_ei and SK_er used for encrypting (and of course
   decrypting) all subsequent exchanges; and SK_pi and SK_pr, which are
   used when generating an AUTH payload.  The lengths of SK_d, SK_pi,
   and SK_pr are the preferred key length of the agreed-to PRF.

   SKEYSEED and its derivatives are computed as follows:

   SKEYSEED = prf(Ni | Nr, g^ir)

   {SK_d | SK_ai | SK_ar | SK_ei | SK_er | SK_pi | SK_pr }
                   = prf+ (SKEYSEED, Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr )

   (indicating that the quantities SK_d, SK_ai, SK_ar, SK_ei, SK_er,
   SK_pi, and SK_pr are taken in order from the generated bits of the
   prf+). g^ir is the shared secret from the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
   exchange. g^ir is represented as a string of octets in big endian
   order padded with zeros if necessary to make it the length of the
   modulus.  Ni and Nr are the nonces, stripped of any headers.  For
   historical backwards-compatibility reasons, there are two PRFs that
   are treated specially in this calculation.  If the negotiated PRF is
   AES-XCBC-PRF-128 [RFC4434] or AES-CMAC-PRF-128 [RFC4615], only the
   first 64 bits of Ni and the first 64 bits of Nr are used in the
   calculation.

   The two directions of traffic flow use different keys.  The keys used
   to protect messages from the original initiator are SK_ai and SK_ei.
   The keys used to protect messages in the other direction are SK_ar
   and SK_er.

2.15.  Authentication of the IKE_SA

   When not using extensible authentication (see Section 2.16), the
   peers are authenticated by having each sign (or MAC using a shared
   secret as the key) a block of data.  For the responder, the octets to
   be signed start with the first octet of the first SPI in the header
   of the second message (IKE_SA_INIT response) and end with the last
   octet of the last payload in the second message.  Appended to this
   (for purposes of computing the signature) are the initiator's nonce
   Ni (just the value, not the payload containing it), and the value



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   prf(SK_pr,IDr') where IDr' is the responder's ID payload excluding
   the fixed header.  Note that neither the nonce Ni nor the value
   prf(SK_pr,IDr') are transmitted.  Similarly, the initiator signs the
   first message (IKE_SA_INIT request), starting with the first octet of
   the first SPI in the header and ending with the last octet of the
   last payload.  Appended to this (for purposes of computing the
   signature) are the responder's nonce Nr, and the value
   prf(SK_pi,IDi').  In the above calculation, IDi' and IDr' are the
   entire ID payloads excluding the fixed header.  It is critical to the
   security of the exchange that each side sign the other side's nonce.

   {{ Clarif-3.1 }}

   The initiator's signed octets can be described as:

   InitiatorSignedOctets = RealMessage1 | NonceRData | MACedIDForI
   GenIKEHDR = [ four octets 0 if using port 4500 ] | RealIKEHDR
   RealIKEHDR =  SPIi | SPIr |  . . . | Length
   RealMessage1 = RealIKEHDR | RestOfMessage1
   NonceRPayload = PayloadHeader | NonceRData
   InitiatorIDPayload = PayloadHeader | RestOfIDPayload
   RestOfInitIDPayload = IDType | RESERVED | InitIDData
   MACedIDForI = prf(SK_pi, RestOfInitIDPayload)

   The responder's signed octets can be described as:

   ResponderSignedOctets = RealMessage2 | NonceIData | MACedIDForR
   GenIKEHDR = [ four octets 0 if using port 4500 ] | RealIKEHDR
   RealIKEHDR =  SPIi | SPIr |  . . . | Length
   RealMessage2 = RealIKEHDR | RestOfMessage2
   NonceIPayload = PayloadHeader | NonceIData
   ResponderIDPayload = PayloadHeader | RestOfIDPayload
   RestOfRespIDPayload = IDType | RESERVED | InitIDData
   MACedIDForR = prf(SK_pr, RestOfRespIDPayload)

   Note that all of the payloads are included under the signature,
   including any payload types not defined in this document.  If the
   first message of the exchange is sent twice (the second time with a
   responder cookie and/or a different Diffie-Hellman group), it is the
   second version of the message that is signed.

   Optionally, messages 3 and 4 MAY include a certificate, or
   certificate chain providing evidence that the key used to compute a
   digital signature belongs to the name in the ID payload.  The
   signature or MAC will be computed using algorithms dictated by the
   type of key used by the signer, and specified by the Auth Method
   field in the Authentication payload.  There is no requirement that
   the initiator and responder sign with the same cryptographic



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   algorithms.  The choice of cryptographic algorithms depends on the
   type of key each has.  In particular, the initiator may be using a
   shared key while the responder may have a public signature key and
   certificate.  It will commonly be the case (but it is not required)
   that if a shared secret is used for authentication that the same key
   is used in both directions.

   Note that it is a common but typically insecure practice to have a
   shared key derived solely from a user-chosen password without
   incorporating another source of randomness.  This is typically
   insecure because user-chosen passwords are unlikely to have
   sufficient unpredictability to resist dictionary attacks and these
   attacks are not prevented in this authentication method.
   (Applications using password-based authentication for bootstrapping
   and IKE_SA should use the authentication method in Section 2.16,
   which is designed to prevent off-line dictionary attacks.) {{ Demoted
   the SHOULD }} The pre-shared key needs to contain as much
   unpredictability as the strongest key being negotiated.  In the case
   of a pre-shared key, the AUTH value is computed as:

   AUTH = prf(prf(Shared Secret,"Key Pad for IKEv2"), <msg octets>)

   where the string "Key Pad for IKEv2" is 17 ASCII characters without
   null termination.  The shared secret can be variable length.  The pad
   string is added so that if the shared secret is derived from a
   password, the IKE implementation need not store the password in
   cleartext, but rather can store the value prf(Shared Secret,"Key Pad
   for IKEv2"), which could not be used as a password equivalent for
   protocols other than IKEv2.  As noted above, deriving the shared
   secret from a password is not secure.  This construction is used
   because it is anticipated that people will do it anyway.  The
   management interface by which the Shared Secret is provided MUST
   accept ASCII strings of at least 64 octets and MUST NOT add a null
   terminator before using them as shared secrets.  It MUST also accept
   a hex encoding of the Shared Secret.  The management interface MAY
   accept other encodings if the algorithm for translating the encoding
   to a binary string is specified.

2.16.  Extensible Authentication Protocol Methods

   In addition to authentication using public key signatures and shared
   secrets, IKE supports authentication using methods defined in RFC
   3748 [EAP].  Typically, these methods are asymmetric (designed for a
   user authenticating to a server), and they may not be mutual. {{ In
   the next sentence, changed "public key signature based" to "strong"
   }} For this reason, these protocols are typically used to
   authenticate the initiator to the responder and MUST be used in
   conjunction with a strong authentication of the responder to the



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   initiator.  These methods are often associated with mechanisms
   referred to as "Legacy Authentication" mechanisms.

   While this memo references [EAP] with the intent that new methods can
   be added in the future without updating this specification, some
   simpler variations are documented here and in Section 3.16.  [EAP]
   defines an authentication protocol requiring a variable number of
   messages.  Extensible Authentication is implemented in IKE as
   additional IKE_AUTH exchanges that MUST be completed in order to
   initialize the IKE_SA.

   An initiator indicates a desire to use extensible authentication by
   leaving out the AUTH payload from message 3.  By including an IDi
   payload but not an AUTH payload, the initiator has declared an
   identity but has not proven it.  If the responder is willing to use
   an extensible authentication method, it will place an Extensible
   Authentication Protocol (EAP) payload in message 4 and defer sending
   SAr2, TSi, and TSr until initiator authentication is complete in a
   subsequent IKE_AUTH exchange.  In the case of a minimal extensible
   authentication, the initial SA establishment will appear as follows:

   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni  -->
                                <--  HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ]
   HDR, SK {IDi, [CERTREQ,]
       [IDr,] SAi2,
       TSi, TSr}  -->
                                <--  HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT,] AUTH,
                                         EAP }
   HDR, SK {EAP}  -->
                                <--  HDR, SK {EAP (success)}
   HDR, SK {AUTH}  -->
                                <--  HDR, SK {AUTH, SAr2, TSi, TSr }

   {{ Clarif-3.10 }} As described in Section 2.2, when EAP is used, each
   pair of IKE_SA initial setup messages will have their message numbers
   incremented; the first pair of AUTH messages will have an ID of 1,
   the second will be 2, and so on.

   For EAP methods that create a shared key as a side effect of
   authentication, that shared key MUST be used by both the initiator
   and responder to generate AUTH payloads in messages 7 and 8 using the
   syntax for shared secrets specified in Section 2.15.  The shared key
   from EAP is the field from the EAP specification named MSK.  The
   shared key generated during an IKE exchange MUST NOT be used for any
   other purpose.




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   EAP methods that do not establish a shared key SHOULD NOT be used, as
   they are subject to a number of man-in-the-middle attacks [EAPMITM]
   if these EAP methods are used in other protocols that do not use a
   server-authenticated tunnel.  Please see the Security Considerations
   section for more details.  If EAP methods that do not generate a
   shared key are used, the AUTH payloads in messages 7 and 8 MUST be
   generated using SK_pi and SK_pr, respectively.

   {{ Demoted the SHOULD }} The initiator of an IKE_SA using EAP needs
   to be capable of extending the initial protocol exchange to at least
   ten IKE_AUTH exchanges in the event the responder sends notification
   messages and/or retries the authentication prompt.  Once the protocol
   exchange defined by the chosen EAP authentication method has
   successfully terminated, the responder MUST send an EAP payload
   containing the Success message.  Similarly, if the authentication
   method has failed, the responder MUST send an EAP payload containing
   the Failure message.  The responder MAY at any time terminate the IKE
   exchange by sending an EAP payload containing the Failure message.

   Following such an extended exchange, the EAP AUTH payloads MUST be
   included in the two messages following the one containing the EAP
   Success message.

   {{ Clarif-3.5 }} When the initiator authentication uses EAP, it is
   possible that the contents of the IDi payload is used only for AAA
   routing purposes and selecting which EAP method to use.  This value
   may be different from the identity authenticated by the EAP method.
   It is important that policy lookups and access control decisions use
   the actual authenticated identity.  Often the EAP server is
   implemented in a separate AAA server that communicates with the IKEv2
   responder.  In this case, the authenticated identity has to be sent
   from the AAA server to the IKEv2 responder.

2.17.  Generating Keying Material for CHILD_SAs

   A single CHILD_SA is created by the IKE_AUTH exchange, and additional
   CHILD_SAs can optionally be created in CREATE_CHILD_SA exchanges.
   Keying material for them is generated as follows:

   KEYMAT = prf+(SK_d, Ni | Nr)

   Where Ni and Nr are the nonces from the IKE_SA_INIT exchange if this
   request is the first CHILD_SA created or the fresh Ni and Nr from the
   CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange if this is a subsequent creation.

   For CREATE_CHILD_SA exchanges including an optional Diffie-Hellman
   exchange, the keying material is defined as:




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   KEYMAT = prf+(SK_d, g^ir (new) | Ni | Nr )

   where g^ir (new) is the shared secret from the ephemeral Diffie-
   Hellman exchange of this CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange (represented as an
   octet string in big endian order padded with zeros in the high-order
   bits if necessary to make it the length of the modulus).

   For ESP and AH, a single CHILD_SA negotiation results in two security
   associations (one in each direction).  Keying material MUST be taken
   from the expanded KEYMAT in the following order:

   o  The encryption key (if any) for the SA carrying data from the
      initiator to the responder.

   o  The authentication key (if any) for the SA carrying data from the
      initiator to the responder.

   o  The encryption key (if any) for the SA carrying data from the
      responder to the initiator.

   o  The authentication key (if any) for the SA carrying data from the
      responder to the initiator.

   Each cryptographic algorithm takes a fixed number of bits of keying
   material specified as part of the algorithm, or negotiated in SA
   payloads (see Section 2.13 for description of key lengths, and
   Section 3.3.5 for the definition of the Key Length transform
   attribute).

2.18.  Rekeying IKE_SAs Using a CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange

   The CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange can be used to rekey an existing IKE_SA
   (see Section 2.8). {{ Clarif-5.3 }} New initiator and responder SPIs
   are supplied in the SPI fields in the Proposal structures inside the
   Security Association (SA) payloads (not the SPI fields in the IKE
   header).  The TS payloads are omitted when rekeying an IKE_SA.
   SKEYSEED for the new IKE_SA is computed using SK_d from the existing
   IKE_SA as follows:

   SKEYSEED = prf(SK_d (old), [g^ir (new)] | Ni | Nr)

   where g^ir (new) is the shared secret from the ephemeral Diffie-
   Hellman exchange of this CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange (represented as an
   octet string in big endian order padded with zeros if necessary to
   make it the length of the modulus) and Ni and Nr are the two nonces
   stripped of any headers.

   {{ Clarif-5.5 }} The old and new IKE_SA may have selected a different



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   PRF.  Because the rekeying exchange belongs to the old IKE_SA, it is
   the old IKE_SA's PRF that is used.

   {{ Clarif-5.12}} The main purpose of rekeying the IKE_SA is to ensure
   that the compromise of old keying material does not provide
   information about the current keys, or vice versa.  Therefore,
   implementations SHOULD perform a new Diffie-Hellman exchange when
   rekeying the IKE_SA.  In other words, an initiator SHOULD NOT propose
   the value "NONE" for the D-H transform, and a responder SHOULD NOT
   accept such a proposal.  This means that a succesful exchange
   rekeying the IKE_SA always includes the KEi/KEr payloads.

   The new IKE_SA MUST reset its message counters to 0.

   SK_d, SK_ai, SK_ar, SK_ei, and SK_er are computed from SKEYSEED as
   specified in Section 2.14.

2.19.  Requesting an Internal Address on a Remote Network

   Most commonly occurring in the endpoint-to-security-gateway scenario,
   an endpoint may need an IP address in the network protected by the
   security gateway and may need to have that address dynamically
   assigned.  A request for such a temporary address can be included in
   any request to create a CHILD_SA (including the implicit request in
   message 3) by including a CP payload.

   This function provides address allocation to an IPsec Remote Access
   Client (IRAC) trying to tunnel into a network protected by an IPsec
   Remote Access Server (IRAS).  Since the IKE_AUTH exchange creates an
   IKE_SA and a CHILD_SA, the IRAC MUST request the IRAS-controlled
   address (and optionally other information concerning the protected
   network) in the IKE_AUTH exchange.  The IRAS may procure an address
   for the IRAC from any number of sources such as a DHCP/BOOTP server
   or its own address pool.

   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
    HDR, SK {IDi, [CERT,]
       [CERTREQ,] [IDr,] AUTH,
       CP(CFG_REQUEST), SAi2,
       TSi, TSr}  -->
                                <--  HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT,] AUTH,
                                         CP(CFG_REPLY), SAr2,
                                         TSi, TSr}

   In all cases, the CP payload MUST be inserted before the SA payload.
   In variations of the protocol where there are multiple IKE_AUTH
   exchanges, the CP payloads MUST be inserted in the messages



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   containing the SA payloads.

   CP(CFG_REQUEST) MUST contain at least an INTERNAL_ADDRESS attribute
   (either IPv4 or IPv6) but MAY contain any number of additional
   attributes the initiator wants returned in the response.

   {{ 3.10.1-37 }} The FAILED_CP_REQUIRED notification is sent by
   responder in the case where CP(CFG_REQUEST) was expected but not
   received, and so is a conflict with locally configured policy.  There
   is no associated data.

   For example, message from initiator to responder:

   CP(CFG_REQUEST)=
     INTERNAL_ADDRESS()
   TSi = (0, 0-65535,0.0.0.0-255.255.255.255)
   TSr = (0, 0-65535,0.0.0.0-255.255.255.255)

   NOTE: Traffic Selectors contain (protocol, port range, address
   range).

   Message from responder to initiator:

   CP(CFG_REPLY)=
     INTERNAL_ADDRESS(192.0.2.202)
     INTERNAL_NETMASK(255.255.255.0)
     INTERNAL_SUBNET(192.0.2.0/255.255.255.0)
   TSi = (0, 0-65535,192.0.2.202-192.0.2.202)
   TSr = (0, 0-65535,192.0.2.0-192.0.2.255)

   All returned values will be implementation dependent.  As can be seen
   in the above example, the IRAS MAY also send other attributes that
   were not included in CP(CFG_REQUEST) and MAY ignore the non-
   mandatory attributes that it does not support.

   The responder MUST NOT send a CFG_REPLY without having first received
   a CP(CFG_REQUEST) from the initiator, because we do not want the IRAS
   to perform an unnecessary configuration lookup if the IRAC cannot
   process the REPLY.  In the case where the IRAS's configuration
   requires that CP be used for a given identity IDi, but IRAC has
   failed to send a CP(CFG_REQUEST), IRAS MUST fail the request, and
   terminate the IKE exchange with a FAILED_CP_REQUIRED error.

2.19.1.  Configuration Payloads

   Editor's note: some of this sub-section is redundant and will go away
   in the next version of the document.




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   In support of the scenario described in Section 1.1.3, an initiator
   may request that the responder assign an IP address and tell the
   initiator what it is. {{ Clarif-6.1 }} That request is done using
   configuration payloads, not traffic selectors.  An address in a TSi
   payload in a response does not mean that the responder has assigned
   that address to the initiator: it only means that if packets matching
   these traffic selectors are sent by the initiator, IPsec processing
   can be performed as agreed for this SA.

   Configuration payloads are of type CFG_REQUEST/CFG_REPLY or CFG_SET/
   CFG_ACK (see CFG Type in the payload description below).  CFG_REQUEST
   and CFG_SET payloads may optionally be added to any IKE request.  The
   IKE response MUST include either a corresponding CFG_REPLY or CFG_ACK
   or a Notify payload with an error type indicating why the request
   could not be honored.  An exception is that a minimal implementation
   MAY ignore all CFG_REQUEST and CFG_SET payloads, so a response
   message without a corresponding CFG_REPLY or CFG_ACK MUST be accepted
   as an indication that the request was not supported.

   "CFG_REQUEST/CFG_REPLY" allows an IKE endpoint to request information
   from its peer.  If an attribute in the CFG_REQUEST Configuration
   Payload is not zero-length, it is taken as a suggestion for that
   attribute.  The CFG_REPLY Configuration Payload MAY return that
   value, or a new one.  It MAY also add new attributes and not include
   some requested ones.  Requestors MUST ignore returned attributes that
   they do not recognize.

   Some attributes MAY be multi-valued, in which case multiple attribute
   values of the same type are sent and/or returned.  Generally, all
   values of an attribute are returned when the attribute is requested.
   For some attributes (in this version of the specification only
   internal addresses), multiple requests indicates a request that
   multiple values be assigned.  For these attributes, the number of
   values returned SHOULD NOT exceed the number requested.

   If the data type requested in a CFG_REQUEST is not recognized or not
   supported, the responder MUST NOT return an error type but rather
   MUST either send a CFG_REPLY that MAY be empty or a reply not
   containing a CFG_REPLY payload at all.  Error returns are reserved
   for cases where the request is recognized but cannot be performed as
   requested or the request is badly formatted.

   "CFG_SET/CFG_ACK" allows an IKE endpoint to push configuration data
   to its peer.  In this case, the CFG_SET Configuration Payload
   contains attributes the initiator wants its peer to alter.  The
   responder MUST return a Configuration Payload if it accepted any of
   the configuration data and it MUST contain the attributes that the
   responder accepted with zero-length data.  Those attributes that it



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   did not accept MUST NOT be in the CFG_ACK Configuration Payload.  If
   no attributes were accepted, the responder MUST return either an
   empty CFG_ACK payload or a response message without a CFG_ACK
   payload.  There are currently no defined uses for the CFG_SET/CFG_ACK
   exchange, though they may be used in connection with extensions based
   on Vendor IDs.  An minimal implementation of this specification MAY
   ignore CFG_SET payloads.

   {{ Demoted the SHOULD }} Extensions via the CP payload should not be
   used for general purpose management.  Its main intent is to provide a
   bootstrap mechanism to exchange information within IPsec from IRAS to
   IRAC.  While it MAY be useful to use such a method to exchange
   information between some Security Gateways (SGW) or small networks,
   existing management protocols such as DHCP [DHCP], RADIUS [RADIUS],
   SNMP, or LDAP [LDAP] should be preferred for enterprise management as
   well as subsequent information exchanges.

2.20.  Requesting the Peer's Version

   An IKE peer wishing to inquire about the other peer's IKE software
   version information MAY use the method below.  This is an example of
   a configuration request within an INFORMATIONAL exchange, after the
   IKE_SA and first CHILD_SA have been created.

   An IKE implementation MAY decline to give out version information
   prior to authentication or even after authentication to prevent
   trolling in case some implementation is known to have some security
   weakness.  In that case, it MUST either return an empty string or no
   CP payload if CP is not supported.

   Initiator                         Responder
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   HDR, SK{CP(CFG_REQUEST)}  -->
                                <--  HDR, SK{CP(CFG_REPLY)}

   CP(CFG_REQUEST)=
     APPLICATION_VERSION("")

   CP(CFG_REPLY) APPLICATION_VERSION("foobar v1.3beta, (c) Foo Bar
     Inc.")

2.21.  Error Handling

   There are many kinds of errors that can occur during IKE processing.
   If a request is received that is badly formatted or unacceptable for
   reasons of policy (e.g., no matching cryptographic algorithms), the
   response MUST contain a Notify payload indicating the error.  If an
   error occurs outside the context of an IKE request (e.g., the node is



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   getting ESP messages on a nonexistent SPI), the node SHOULD initiate
   an INFORMATIONAL exchange with a Notify payload describing the
   problem.

   Errors that occur before a cryptographically protected IKE_SA is
   established must be handled very carefully.  There is a trade-off
   between wanting to be helpful in diagnosing a problem and responding
   to it and wanting to avoid being a dupe in a denial of service attack
   based on forged messages.

   If a node receives a message on UDP port 500 or 4500 outside the
   context of an IKE_SA known to it (and not a request to start one), it
   may be the result of a recent crash of the node.  If the message is
   marked as a response, the node MAY audit the suspicious event but
   MUST NOT respond.  If the message is marked as a request, the node
   MAY audit the suspicious event and MAY send a response.  If a
   response is sent, the response MUST be sent to the IP address and
   port from whence it came with the same IKE SPIs and the Message ID
   copied.  The response MUST NOT be cryptographically protected and
   MUST contain a Notify payload indicating INVALID_IKE_SPI. {{ 3.10.1-4
   }} The INVALID_IKE_SPI notification indicates an IKE message was
   received with an unrecognized destination SPI; this usually indicates
   that the recipient has rebooted and forgotten the existence of an
   IKE_SA.

   A node receiving such an unprotected Notify payload MUST NOT respond
   and MUST NOT change the state of any existing SAs.  The message might
   be a forgery or might be a response the genuine correspondent was
   tricked into sending. {{ Demoted two SHOULDs }} A node should treat
   such a message (and also a network message like ICMP destination
   unreachable) as a hint that there might be problems with SAs to that
   IP address and should initiate a liveness test for any such IKE_SA.
   An implementation SHOULD limit the frequency of such tests to avoid
   being tricked into participating in a denial of service attack.

   A node receiving a suspicious message from an IP address with which
   it has an IKE_SA MAY send an IKE Notify payload in an IKE
   INFORMATIONAL exchange over that SA. {{ Demoted the SHOULD }} The
   recipient MUST NOT change the state of any SAs as a result, but may
   wish to audit the event to aid in diagnosing malfunctions.  A node
   MUST limit the rate at which it will send messages in response to
   unprotected messages.

2.22.  IPComp

   Use of IP compression [IPCOMP] can be negotiated as part of the setup
   of a CHILD_SA.  While IP compression involves an extra header in each
   packet and a compression parameter index (CPI), the virtual



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   "compression association" has no life outside the ESP or AH SA that
   contains it.  Compression associations disappear when the
   corresponding ESP or AH SA goes away.  It is not explicitly mentioned
   in any DELETE payload.

   Negotiation of IP compression is separate from the negotiation of
   cryptographic parameters associated with a CHILD_SA.  A node
   requesting a CHILD_SA MAY advertise its support for one or more
   compression algorithms through one or more Notify payloads of type
   IPCOMP_SUPPORTED.  This notification may be included only in a
   message containing an SA payload negotiating a CHILD_SA and indicates
   a willingness by its sender to use IPComp on this SA.  The response
   MAY indicate acceptance of a single compression algorithm with a
   Notify payload of type IPCOMP_SUPPORTED.  These payloads MUST NOT
   occur in messages that do not contain SA payloads.

   {{ 3.10.1-16387 }}The data associated with this notification includes
   a two-octet IPComp CPI followed by a one-octet transform ID
   optionally followed by attributes whose length and format are defined
   by that transform ID.  A message proposing an SA may contain multiple
   IPCOMP_SUPPORTED notifications to indicate multiple supported
   algorithms.  A message accepting an SA may contain at most one.

   The transform IDs currently defined are:

   Name              Number   Defined In
   -------------------------------------
   RESERVED          0
   IPCOMP_OUI        1
   IPCOMP_DEFLATE    2        RFC 2394
   IPCOMP_LZS        3        RFC 2395
   IPCOMP_LZJH       4        RFC 3051
   RESERVED TO IANA  5-240
   PRIVATE USE       241-255

   Although there has been discussion of allowing multiple compression
   algorithms to be accepted and to have different compression
   algorithms available for the two directions of a CHILD_SA,
   implementations of this specification MUST NOT accept an IPComp
   algorithm that was not proposed, MUST NOT accept more than one, and
   MUST NOT compress using an algorithm other than one proposed and
   accepted in the setup of the CHILD_SA.

   A side effect of separating the negotiation of IPComp from
   cryptographic parameters is that it is not possible to propose
   multiple cryptographic suites and propose IP compression with some of
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2.23.  NAT Traversal

   Network Address Translation (NAT) gateways are a controversial
   subject.  This section briefly describes what they are and how they
   are likely to act on IKE traffic.  Many people believe that NATs are
   evil and that we should not design our protocols so as to make them
   work better.  IKEv2 does specify some unintuitive processing rules in
   order that NATs are more likely to work.

   NATs exist primarily because of the shortage of IPv4 addresses,
   though there are other rationales.  IP nodes that are "behind" a NAT
   have IP addresses that are not globally unique, but rather are
   assigned from some space that is unique within the network behind the
   NAT but that are likely to be reused by nodes behind other NATs.
   Generally, nodes behind NATs can communicate with other nodes behind
   the same NAT and with nodes with globally unique addresses, but not
   with nodes behind other NATs.  There are exceptions to that rule.
   When those nodes make connections to nodes on the real Internet, the
   NAT gateway "translates" the IP source address to an address that
   will be routed back to the gateway.  Messages to the gateway from the
   Internet have their destination addresses "translated" to the
   internal address that will route the packet to the correct endnode.

   NATs are designed to be "transparent" to endnodes.  Neither software
   on the node behind the NAT nor the node on the Internet requires
   modification to communicate through the NAT.  Achieving this
   transparency is more difficult with some protocols than with others.
   Protocols that include IP addresses of the endpoints within the
   payloads of the packet will fail unless the NAT gateway understands
   the protocol and modifies the internal references as well as those in
   the headers.  Such knowledge is inherently unreliable, is a network
   layer violation, and often results in subtle problems.

   Opening an IPsec connection through a NAT introduces special
   problems.  If the connection runs in transport mode, changing the IP
   addresses on packets will cause the checksums to fail and the NAT
   cannot correct the checksums because they are cryptographically
   protected.  Even in tunnel mode, there are routing problems because
   transparently translating the addresses of AH and ESP packets
   requires special logic in the NAT and that logic is heuristic and
   unreliable in nature.  For that reason, IKEv2 can negotiate UDP
   encapsulation of IKE and ESP packets.  This encoding is slightly less
   efficient but is easier for NATs to process.  In addition, firewalls
   may be configured to pass IPsec traffic over UDP but not ESP/AH or
   vice versa.

   It is a common practice of NATs to translate TCP and UDP port numbers
   as well as addresses and use the port numbers of inbound packets to



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   decide which internal node should get a given packet.  For this
   reason, even though IKE packets MUST be sent from and to UDP port
   500, they MUST be accepted coming from any port and responses MUST be
   sent to the port from whence they came.  This is because the ports
   may be modified as the packets pass through NATs.  Similarly, IP
   addresses of the IKE endpoints are generally not included in the IKE
   payloads because the payloads are cryptographically protected and
   could not be transparently modified by NATs.

   Port 4500 is reserved for UDP-encapsulated ESP and IKE.  When working
   through a NAT, it is generally better to pass IKE packets over port
   4500 because some older NATs handle IKE traffic on port 500 cleverly
   in an attempt to transparently establish IPsec connections between
   endpoints that don't handle NAT traversal themselves.  Such NATs may
   interfere with the straightforward NAT traversal envisioned by this
   document. {{ Clarif-7.6 }} An IPsec endpoint that discovers a NAT
   between it and its correspondent MUST send all subsequent traffic
   from port 4500, which NATs should not treat specially (as they might
   with port 500).

   The specific requirements for supporting NAT traversal [NATREQ] are
   listed below.  Support for NAT traversal is optional.  In this
   section only, requirements listed as MUST apply only to
   implementations supporting NAT traversal.

   o  IKE MUST listen on port 4500 as well as port 500.  IKE MUST
      respond to the IP address and port from which packets arrived.

   o  Both IKE initiator and responder MUST include in their IKE_SA_INIT
      packets Notify payloads of type NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP and
      NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP.  Those payloads can be used to
      detect if there is NAT between the hosts, and which end is behind
      the NAT.  The location of the payloads in the IKE_SA_INIT packets
      are just after the Ni and Nr payloads (before the optional CERTREQ
      payload).

   o  {{ 3.10.1-16388 }} The data associated with the
      NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP notification is a SHA-1 digest of the SPIs
      (in the order they appear in the header), IP address, and port on
      which this packet was sent.  There MAY be multiple
      NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP payloads in a message if the sender does
      not know which of several network attachments will be used to send
      the packet.

   o  {{ 3.10.1-16389 }} The data associated with the
      NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP notification is a SHA-1 digest of the
      SPIs (in the order they appear in the header), IP address, and
      port to which this packet was sent.



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   o  {{ 3.10.1-16388 }} {{ 3.10.1-16389 }} The recipient of either the
      NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP or NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP
      notification MAY compare the supplied value to a SHA-1 hash of the
      SPIs, source IP address, and port, and if they don't match it
      SHOULD enable NAT traversal.  In the case of a mismatching
      NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP hash, the recipient MAY reject the
      connection attempt if NAT traversal is not supported.  In the case
      of a mismatching NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP hash, it means that
      the system receiving the NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP payload is
      behind a NAT and that system SHOULD start sending keepalive
      packets as defined in [UDPENCAPS]; alternately, it MAY reject the
      connection attempt if NAT traversal is not supported.

   o  If none of the NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP payload(s) received matches
      the expected value of the source IP and port found from the IP
      header of the packet containing the payload, it means that the
      system sending those payloads is behind NAT (i.e., someone along
      the route changed the source address of the original packet to
      match the address of the NAT box).  In this case, the system
      receiving the payloads should allow dynamic update of the other
      systems' IP address, as described later.

   o  If the NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP payload received does not
      match the hash of the destination IP and port found from the IP
      header of the packet containing the payload, it means that the
      system receiving the NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP payload is
      behind a NAT.  In this case, that system SHOULD start sending
      keepalive packets as explained in [UDPENCAPS].

   o  The IKE initiator MUST check these payloads if present and if they
      do not match the addresses in the outer packet MUST tunnel all
      future IKE and ESP packets associated with this IKE_SA over UDP
      port 4500.

   o  To tunnel IKE packets over UDP port 4500, the IKE header has four
      octets of zero prepended and the result immediately follows the
      UDP header.  To tunnel ESP packets over UDP port 4500, the ESP
      header immediately follows the UDP header.  Since the first four
      octets of the ESP header contain the SPI, and the SPI cannot
      validly be zero, it is always possible to distinguish ESP and IKE
      messages.

   o  Implementations MUST process received UDP-encapsulated ESP packets
      even when no NAT was detected.

   o  The original source and destination IP address required for the
      transport mode TCP and UDP packet checksum fixup (see [UDPENCAPS])
      are obtained from the Traffic Selectors associated with the



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      exchange.  In the case of NAT traversal, the Traffic Selectors
      MUST contain exactly one IP address, which is then used as the
      original IP address.

   o  There are cases where a NAT box decides to remove mappings that
      are still alive (for example, the keepalive interval is too long,
      or the NAT box is rebooted).  To recover in these cases, hosts
      that are not behind a NAT SHOULD send all packets (including
      retransmission packets) to the IP address and port from the last
      valid authenticated packet from the other end (i.e., dynamically
      update the address).  A host behind a NAT SHOULD NOT do this
      because it opens a DoS attack possibility.  Any authenticated IKE
      packet or any authenticated UDP-encapsulated ESP packet can be
      used to detect that the IP address or the port has changed.

   Note that similar but probably not identical actions will likely be
   needed to make IKE work with Mobile IP, but such processing is not
   addressed by this document.

2.24.  Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN)

   When IPsec tunnels behave as originally specified in [IPSECARCH-OLD],
   ECN usage is not appropriate for the outer IP headers because tunnel
   decapsulation processing discards ECN congestion indications to the
   detriment of the network.  ECN support for IPsec tunnels for IKEv1-
   based IPsec requires multiple operating modes and negotiation (see
   [ECN]).  IKEv2 simplifies this situation by requiring that ECN be
   usable in the outer IP headers of all tunnel-mode IPsec SAs created
   by IKEv2.  Specifically, tunnel encapsulators and decapsulators for
   all tunnel-mode SAs created by IKEv2 MUST support the ECN full-
   functionality option for tunnels specified in [ECN] and MUST
   implement the tunnel encapsulation and decapsulation processing
   specified in [IPSECARCH] to prevent discarding of ECN congestion
   indications.


3.  Header and Payload Formats

   In the tables in this section, some cryptographic primitives and
   configuation attributes are marked as "UNSPECIFIED".  These are items
   for which there are no known specifications and therefore
   interoperability is currently impossible.  A future specification may
   describe their use, but until such specification is made,
   implementations SHOULD NOT attempt to use items marked as
   "UNSPECIFIED" in implementations that are meant to be interoperable.






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3.1.  The IKE Header

   IKE messages use UDP ports 500 and/or 4500, with one IKE message per
   UDP datagram.  Information from the beginning of the packet through
   the UDP header is largely ignored except that the IP addresses and
   UDP ports from the headers are reversed and used for return packets.
   When sent on UDP port 500, IKE messages begin immediately following
   the UDP header.  When sent on UDP port 4500, IKE messages have
   prepended four octets of zero.  These four octets of zero are not
   part of the IKE message and are not included in any of the length
   fields or checksums defined by IKE.  Each IKE message begins with the
   IKE header, denoted HDR in this memo.  Following the header are one
   or more IKE payloads each identified by a "Next Payload" field in the
   preceding payload.  Payloads are processed in the order in which they
   appear in an IKE message by invoking the appropriate processing
   routine according to the "Next Payload" field in the IKE header and
   subsequently according to the "Next Payload" field in the IKE payload
   itself until a "Next Payload" field of zero indicates that no
   payloads follow.  If a payload of type "Encrypted" is found, that
   payload is decrypted and its contents parsed as additional payloads.
   An Encrypted payload MUST be the last payload in a packet and an
   Encrypted payload MUST NOT contain another Encrypted payload.

   The Recipient SPI in the header identifies an instance of an IKE
   security association.  It is therefore possible for a single instance
   of IKE to multiplex distinct sessions with multiple peers.

   All multi-octet fields representing integers are laid out in big
   endian order (also known as "most significant byte first", or
   "network byte order").

   The format of the IKE header is shown in Figure 4.



















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                        1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                       IKE_SA Initiator's SPI                  |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                       IKE_SA Responder's SPI                  |
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Next Payload | MjVer | MnVer | Exchange Type |     Flags     |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                          Message ID                           |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                            Length                             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                    Figure 4:  IKE Header Format

   o  Initiator's SPI (8 octets) - A value chosen by the initiator to
      identify a unique IKE security association.  This value MUST NOT
      be zero.

   o  Responder's SPI (8 octets) - A value chosen by the responder to
      identify a unique IKE security association.  This value MUST be
      zero in the first message of an IKE Initial Exchange (including
      repeats of that message including a cookie). {{ The phrase "and
      MUST NOT be zero in any other message" was removed; Clarif-2.1 }}

   o  Next Payload (1 octet) - Indicates the type of payload that
      immediately follows the header.  The format and value of each
      payload are defined below.

   o  Major Version (4 bits) - Indicates the major version of the IKE
      protocol in use.  Implementations based on this version of IKE
      MUST set the Major Version to 2.  Implementations based on
      previous versions of IKE and ISAKMP MUST set the Major Version to
      1.  Implementations based on this version of IKE MUST reject or
      ignore messages containing a version number greater than 2.

   o  Minor Version (4 bits) - Indicates the minor version of the IKE
      protocol in use.  Implementations based on this version of IKE
      MUST set the Minor Version to 0.  They MUST ignore the minor
      version number of received messages.

   o  Exchange Type (1 octet) - Indicates the type of exchange being
      used.  This constrains the payloads sent in each message and
      orderings of messages in an exchange.




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      Exchange Type             Value
      ----------------------------------
      RESERVED                  0-33
      IKE_SA_INIT               34
      IKE_AUTH                  35
      CREATE_CHILD_SA           36
      INFORMATIONAL             37
      RESERVED TO IANA          38-239
      PRIVATE USE               240-255

   o  Flags (1 octet) - Indicates specific options that are set for the
      message.  Presence of options are indicated by the appropriate bit
      in the flags field being set.  The bits are defined LSB first, so
      bit 0 would be the least significant bit of the Flags octet.  In
      the description below, a bit being 'set' means its value is '1',
      while 'cleared' means its value is '0'.

      *  X(reserved) (bits 0-2) - These bits MUST be cleared when
         sending and MUST be ignored on receipt.

      *  I(nitiator) (bit 3 of Flags) - This bit MUST be set in messages
         sent by the original initiator of the IKE_SA and MUST be
         cleared in messages sent by the original responder.  It is used
         by the recipient to determine which eight octets of the SPI
         were generated by the recipient.

      *  V(ersion) (bit 4 of Flags) - This bit indicates that the
         transmitter is capable of speaking a higher major version
         number of the protocol than the one indicated in the major
         version number field.  Implementations of IKEv2 must clear this
         bit when sending and MUST ignore it in incoming messages.

      *  R(esponse) (bit 5 of Flags) - This bit indicates that this
         message is a response to a message containing the same message
         ID.  This bit MUST be cleared in all request messages and MUST
         be set in all responses.  An IKE endpoint MUST NOT generate a
         response to a message that is marked as being a response.

      *  X(reserved) (bits 6-7 of Flags) - These bits MUST be cleared
         when sending and MUST be ignored on receipt.

   o  Message ID (4 octets) - Message identifier used to control
      retransmission of lost packets and matching of requests and
      responses.  It is essential to the security of the protocol
      because it is used to prevent message replay attacks.  See
      Section 2.1 and Section 2.2.





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   o  Length (4 octets) - Length of total message (header + payloads) in
      octets.

3.2.  Generic Payload Header

   Each IKE payload defined in Section 3.3 through Section 3.16 begins
   with a generic payload header, shown in Figure 5.  Figures for each
   payload below will include the generic payload header, but for
   brevity the description of each field will be omitted.

                        1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Next Payload  |C|  RESERVED   |         Payload Length        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                      Figure 5:  Generic Payload Header

   The Generic Payload Header fields are defined as follows:

   o  Next Payload (1 octet) - Identifier for the payload type of the
      next payload in the message.  If the current payload is the last
      in the message, then this field will be 0.  This field provides a
      "chaining" capability whereby additional payloads can be added to
      a message by appending it to the end of the message and setting
      the "Next Payload" field of the preceding payload to indicate the
      new payload's type.  An Encrypted payload, which must always be
      the last payload of a message, is an exception.  It contains data
      structures in the format of additional payloads.  In the header of
      an Encrypted payload, the Next Payload field is set to the payload
      type of the first contained payload (instead of 0).  The payload
      type values are:



















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      Next Payload Type                Notation  Value
      --------------------------------------------------
      No Next Payload                             0
      RESERVED                                    1-32
      Security Association             SA         33
      Key Exchange                     KE         34
      Identification - Initiator       IDi        35
      Identification - Responder       IDr        36
      Certificate                      CERT       37
      Certificate Request              CERTREQ    38
      Authentication                   AUTH       39
      Nonce                            Ni, Nr     40
      Notify                           N          41
      Delete                           D          42
      Vendor ID                        V          43
      Traffic Selector - Initiator     TSi        44
      Traffic Selector - Responder     TSr        45
      Encrypted                        E          46
      Configuration                    CP         47
      Extensible Authentication        EAP        48
      RESERVED TO IANA                            49-127
      PRIVATE USE                                 128-255

      (Payload type values 1-32 should not be assigned in the
      future so that there is no overlap with the code assignments
      for IKEv1.)

   o  Critical (1 bit) - MUST be set to zero if the sender wants the
      recipient to skip this payload if it does not understand the
      payload type code in the Next Payload field of the previous
      payload.  MUST be set to one if the sender wants the recipient to
      reject this entire message if it does not understand the payload
      type.  MUST be ignored by the recipient if the recipient
      understands the payload type code.  MUST be set to zero for
      payload types defined in this document.  Note that the critical
      bit applies to the current payload rather than the "next" payload
      whose type code appears in the first octet.  The reasoning behind
      not setting the critical bit for payloads defined in this document
      is that all implementations MUST understand all payload types
      defined in this document and therefore must ignore the Critical
      bit's value.  Skipped payloads are expected to have valid Next
      Payload and Payload Length fields.

   o  RESERVED (7 bits) - MUST be sent as zero; MUST be ignored on
      receipt.

   o  Payload Length (2 octets) - Length in octets of the current
      payload, including the generic payload header.



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   {{ Clarif-7.10 }} Many payloads contain fields marked as "RESERVED".
   Some payloads in IKEv2 (and historically in IKEv1) are not aligned to
   4-octet boundaries.

3.3.  Security Association Payload

   The Security Association Payload, denoted SA in this memo, is used to
   negotiate attributes of a security association.  Assembly of Security
   Association Payloads requires great peace of mind.  An SA payload MAY
   contain multiple proposals.  If there is more than one, they MUST be
   ordered from most preferred to least preferred.  Each proposal
   contains a single IPsec protocol (where a protocol is IKE, ESP, or
   AH), each protocol MAY contain multiple transforms, and each
   transform MAY contain multiple attributes.  When parsing an SA, an
   implementation MUST check that the total Payload Length is consistent
   with the payload's internal lengths and counts.  Proposals,
   Transforms, and Attributes each have their own variable length
   encodings.  They are nested such that the Payload Length of an SA
   includes the combined contents of the SA, Proposal, Transform, and
   Attribute information.  The length of a Proposal includes the lengths
   of all Transforms and Attributes it contains.  The length of a
   Transform includes the lengths of all Attributes it contains.

   The syntax of Security Associations, Proposals, Transforms, and
   Attributes is based on ISAKMP; however the semantics are somewhat
   different.  The reason for the complexity and the hierarchy is to
   allow for multiple possible combinations of algorithms to be encoded
   in a single SA.  Sometimes there is a choice of multiple algorithms,
   whereas other times there is a combination of algorithms.  For
   example, an initiator might want to propose using ESP with either
   (3DES and HMAC_MD5) or (AES and HMAC_SHA1).

   One of the reasons the semantics of the SA payload has changed from
   ISAKMP and IKEv1 is to make the encodings more compact in common
   cases.

   The Proposal structure contains within it a Proposal # and an IPsec
   protocol ID.  Each structure MUST have a proposal number one (1)
   greater than the previous structure.  The first Proposal in the
   initiator's SA payload MUST have a Proposal # of one (1).  A proposal
   of AH or ESP would have two proposal structures, one for AH with
   Proposal #1 and one for ESP with Proposal #2.

   Each Proposal/Protocol structure is followed by one or more transform
   structures.  The number of different transforms is generally
   determined by the Protocol.  AH generally has two transforms:
   Extended Sequence Numbers (ESN) and an integrity check algorithm.
   ESP generally has three: ESN, an encryption algorithm and an



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   integrity check algorithm.  IKE generally has four transforms: a
   Diffie-Hellman group, an integrity check algorithm, a prf algorithm,
   and an encryption algorithm.  If an algorithm that combines
   encryption and integrity protection is proposed, it MUST be proposed
   as an encryption algorithm and an integrity protection algorithm MUST
   NOT be proposed.  For each Protocol, the set of permissible
   transforms is assigned transform ID numbers, which appear in the
   header of each transform.

   If there are multiple transforms with the same Transform Type, the
   proposal is an OR of those transforms.  If there are multiple
   Transforms with different Transform Types, the proposal is an AND of
   the different groups.  For example, to propose ESP with (3DES or AES-
   CBC) and (HMAC_MD5 or HMAC_SHA), the ESP proposal would contain two
   Transform Type 1 candidates (one for 3DES and one for AEC-CBC) and
   two Transform Type 3 candidates (one for HMAC_MD5 and one for
   HMAC_SHA).  This effectively proposes four combinations of
   algorithms.  If the initiator wanted to propose only a subset of
   those, for example (3DES and HMAC_MD5) or (IDEA and HMAC_SHA), there
   is no way to encode that as multiple transforms within a single
   Proposal.  Instead, the initiator would have to construct two
   different Proposals, each with two transforms.

   A given transform MAY have one or more Attributes.  Attributes are
   necessary when the transform can be used in more than one way, as
   when an encryption algorithm has a variable key size.  The transform
   would specify the algorithm and the attribute would specify the key
   size.  Most transforms do not have attributes.  A transform MUST NOT
   have multiple attributes of the same type.  To propose alternate
   values for an attribute (for example, multiple key sizes for the AES
   encryption algorithm), and implementation MUST include multiple
   Transforms with the same Transform Type each with a single Attribute.

   Note that the semantics of Transforms and Attributes are quite
   different from those in IKEv1.  In IKEv1, a single Transform carried
   multiple algorithms for a protocol with one carried in the Transform
   and the others carried in the Attributes.

                        1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Next Payload  |C|  RESERVED   |         Payload Length        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                          <Proposals>                          ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+




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            Figure 6:  Security Association Payload

   o  Proposals (variable) - One or more proposal substructures.

   The payload type for the Security Association Payload is thirty three
   (33).

3.3.1.  Proposal Substructure

                        1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | 0 (last) or 2 |   RESERVED    |         Proposal Length       |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Proposal #    |  Protocol ID  |    SPI Size   |# of Transforms|
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ~                        SPI (variable)                         ~
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                        <Transforms>                           ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

            Figure 7:  Proposal Substructure

   o  0 (last) or 2 (more) (1 octet) - Specifies whether this is the
      last Proposal Substructure in the SA.  This syntax is inherited
      from ISAKMP, but is unnecessary because the last Proposal could be
      identified from the length of the SA.  The value (2) corresponds
      to a Payload Type of Proposal in IKEv1, and the first four octets
      of the Proposal structure are designed to look somewhat like the
      header of a Payload.

   o  RESERVED (1 octet) - MUST be sent as zero; MUST be ignored on
      receipt.

   o  Proposal Length (2 octets) - Length of this proposal, including
      all transforms and attributes that follow.

   o  Proposal # (1 octet) - When a proposal is made, the first proposal
      in an SA payload MUST be #1, and subsequent proposals MUST be one
      more than the previous proposal (indicating an OR of the two
      proposals).  When a proposal is accepted, the proposal number in
      the SA payload MUST match the number on the proposal sent that was
      accepted.

   o  Protocol ID (1 octet) - Specifies the IPsec protocol identifier
      for the current negotiation.  The defined values are:



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      Protocol                Protocol ID
      -----------------------------------
      RESERVED                0
      IKE                     1
      AH                      2
      ESP                     3
      RESERVED TO IANA        4-200
      PRIVATE USE             201-255

   o  SPI Size (1 octet) - For an initial IKE_SA negotiation, this field
      MUST be zero; the SPI is obtained from the outer header.  During
      subsequent negotiations, it is equal to the size, in octets, of
      the SPI of the corresponding protocol (8 for IKE, 4 for ESP and
      AH).

   o  # of Transforms (1 octet) - Specifies the number of transforms in
      this proposal.

   o  SPI (variable) - The sending entity's SPI.  Even if the SPI Size
      is not a multiple of 4 octets, there is no padding applied to the
      payload.  When the SPI Size field is zero, this field is not
      present in the Security Association payload.

   o  Transforms (variable) - One or more transform substructures.

3.3.2.  Transform Substructure

                        1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | 0 (last) or 3 |   RESERVED    |        Transform Length       |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |Transform Type |   RESERVED    |          Transform ID         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                      Transform Attributes                     ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

            Figure 8:  Transform Substructure

   o  0 (last) or 3 (more) (1 octet) - Specifies whether this is the
      last Transform Substructure in the Proposal.  This syntax is
      inherited from ISAKMP, but is unnecessary because the last
      Proposal could be identified from the length of the SA.  The value
      (3) corresponds to a Payload Type of Transform in IKEv1, and the
      first four octets of the Transform structure are designed to look
      somewhat like the header of a Payload.



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   o  RESERVED - MUST be sent as zero; MUST be ignored on receipt.

   o  Transform Length - The length (in octets) of the Transform
      Substructure including Header and Attributes.

   o  Transform Type (1 octet) - The type of transform being specified
      in this transform.  Different protocols support different
      transform types.  For some protocols, some of the transforms may
      be optional.  If a transform is optional and the initiator wishes
      to propose that the transform be omitted, no transform of the
      given type is included in the proposal.  If the initiator wishes
      to make use of the transform optional to the responder, it
      includes a transform substructure with transform ID = 0 as one of
      the options.

   o  Transform ID (2 octets) - The specific instance of the transform
      type being proposed.

   The tranform type values are:

   Description                     Trans.  Used In
                                   Type
   ------------------------------------------------------------------
   RESERVED                        0
   Encryption Algorithm (ENCR)     1       IKE and ESP
   Pseudo-random Function (PRF)    2       IKE
   Integrity Algorithm (INTEG)     3       IKE*, AH, optional in ESP
   Diffie-Hellman Group (D-H)      4       IKE, optional in AH & ESP
   Extended Sequence Numbers (ESN) 5       AH and ESP
   RESERVED TO IANA                6-240
   PRIVATE USE                     241-255

   (*) Negotiating an integrity algorithm is mandatory for the
   Encrypted payload format specified in this document. Future
   documents may specify additional formats based on authenticated
   encryption, in which case a separate integrity algorithm is not
   negotiated.

   For Transform Type 1 (Encryption Algorithm), defined Transform IDs
   are:











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   Name                 Number      Defined In
   ---------------------------------------------------
   RESERVED             0
   ENCR_DES_IV64        1           (UNSPECIFIED)
   ENCR_DES             2           (RFC2405), [DES]
   ENCR_3DES            3           (RFC2451)
   ENCR_RC5             4           (RFC2451)
   ENCR_IDEA            5           (RFC2451), [IDEA]
   ENCR_CAST            6           (RFC2451)
   ENCR_BLOWFISH        7           (RFC2451)
   ENCR_3IDEA           8           (UNSPECIFIED)
   ENCR_DES_IV32        9           (UNSPECIFIED)
   RESERVED             10
   ENCR_NULL            11          (RFC2410)
   ENCR_AES_CBC         12          (RFC3602)
   ENCR_AES_CTR         13          (RFC3686)
   RESERVED TO IANA     14-1023
   PRIVATE USE          1024-65535

   For Transform Type 2 (Pseudo-random Function), defined Transform IDs
   are:

   Name                        Number    Defined In
   ------------------------------------------------------
   RESERVED                    0
   PRF_HMAC_MD5                1         (RFC2104), [MD5]
   PRF_HMAC_SHA1               2         (RFC2104), [SHA]
   PRF_HMAC_TIGER              3         (UNSPECIFIED)
   PRF_AES128_XCBC             4         (RFC4434)
   RESERVED TO IANA            5-1023
   PRIVATE USE                 1024-65535

   For Transform Type 3 (Integrity Algorithm), defined Transform IDs
   are:

   Name                 Number   Defined In
   ----------------------------------------
   NONE                 0
   AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96     1        (RFC2403)
   AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96    2        (RFC2404)
   AUTH_DES_MAC         3        (UNSPECIFIED)
   AUTH_KPDK_MD5        4        (UNSPECIFIED)
   AUTH_AES_XCBC_96     5        (RFC3566)
   RESERVED TO IANA     6-1023
   PRIVATE USE          1024-65535

   For Transform Type 4 (Diffie-Hellman Group), defined Transform IDs
   are:



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   Name               Number     Defined in
   ----------------------------------------
   NONE               0
   768 Bit MODP       1          Appendix B
   1024 Bit MODP      2          Appendix B
   RESERVED TO IANA   3-4
   1536-bit MODP      5          [ADDGROUP]
   RESERVED TO IANA   6-13
   2048-bit MODP      14         [ADDGROUP]
   3072-bit MODP      15         [ADDGROUP]
   4096-bit MODP      16         [ADDGROUP]
   6144-bit MODP      17         [ADDGROUP]
   8192-bit MODP      18         [ADDGROUP]
   RESERVED TO IANA   19-1023
   PRIVATE USE        1024-65535

   For Transform Type 5 (Extended Sequence Numbers), defined Transform
   IDs are:

   Name                               Number
   --------------------------------------------
   No Extended Sequence Numbers       0
   Extended Sequence Numbers          1
   RESERVED                           2 - 65535

   {{ Clarif-4.4 }} Note that an initiator who supports ESNs will
   usually include two ESN transforms, with values "0" and "1", in its
   proposals.  A proposal containing a single ESN transform with value
   "1" means that using normal (non-extended) sequence numbers is not
   acceptable.

3.3.3.  Valid Transform Types by Protocol

   The number and type of transforms that accompany an SA payload are
   dependent on the protocol in the SA itself.  An SA payload proposing
   the establishment of an SA has the following mandatory and optional
   transform types.  A compliant implementation MUST understand all
   mandatory and optional types for each protocol it supports (though it
   need not accept proposals with unacceptable suites).  A proposal MAY
   omit the optional types if the only value for them it will accept is
   NONE.










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   Protocol    Mandatory Types          Optional Types
   ---------------------------------------------------
   IKE         ENCR, PRF, INTEG*, D-H
   ESP         ENCR, ESN                INTEG, D-H
   AH          INTEG, ESN               D-H

   (*) Negotiating an integrity algorithm is mandatory for the
   Encrypted payload format specified in this document. Future
   documents may specify additional formats based on authenticated
   encryption, in which case a separate integrity algorithm is not
   negotiated.

3.3.4.  Mandatory Transform IDs

   The specification of suites that MUST and SHOULD be supported for
   interoperability has been removed from this document because they are
   likely to change more rapidly than this document evolves.

   An important lesson learned from IKEv1 is that no system should only
   implement the mandatory algorithms and expect them to be the best
   choice for all customers.  For example, at the time that this
   document was written, many IKEv1 implementers were starting to
   migrate to AES in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode for Virtual
   Private Network (VPN) applications.  Many IPsec systems based on
   IKEv2 will implement AES, additional Diffie-Hellman groups, and
   additional hash algorithms, and some IPsec customers already require
   these algorithms in addition to the ones listed above.

   It is likely that IANA will add additional transforms in the future,
   and some users may want to use private suites, especially for IKE
   where implementations should be capable of supporting different
   parameters, up to certain size limits.  In support of this goal, all
   implementations of IKEv2 SHOULD include a management facility that
   allows specification (by a user or system administrator) of Diffie-
   Hellman (DH) parameters (the generator, modulus, and exponent lengths
   and values) for new DH groups.  Implementations SHOULD provide a
   management interface through which these parameters and the
   associated transform IDs may be entered (by a user or system
   administrator), to enable negotiating such groups.

   All implementations of IKEv2 MUST include a management facility that
   enables a user or system administrator to specify the suites that are
   acceptable for use with IKE.  Upon receipt of a payload with a set of
   transform IDs, the implementation MUST compare the transmitted
   transform IDs against those locally configured via the management
   controls, to verify that the proposed suite is acceptable based on
   local policy.  The implementation MUST reject SA proposals that are
   not authorized by these IKE suite controls.  Note that cryptographic



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   suites that MUST be implemented need not be configured as acceptable
   to local policy.

3.3.5.  Transform Attributes

   Each transform in a Security Association payload may include
   attributes that modify or complete the specification of the
   transform.  The set of valid attributes depends on the transform.
   Currently, only a single attribute type is defined: the Key Length
   attribute is used by certain encryption transforms with variable-
   length keys (see below for details).

   The attributes are type/value pairs and are defined below.
   Attributes can have a value with a fixed two-octet length or a
   variable-length value.  For the latter, the attribute is encoded as
   type/length/value.

                        1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |A|       Attribute Type        |    AF=0  Attribute Length     |
   |F|                             |    AF=1  Attribute Value      |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                   AF=0  Attribute Value                       |
   |                   AF=1  Not Transmitted                       |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                   Figure 9:  Data Attributes

   o  Attribute Format (AF) (1 bit) - Indicates whether the data
      attribute follow the Type/Length/Value (TLV) format or a shortened
      Type/Value (TV) format.  If the AF bit is zero (0), then the
      attribute uses TLV format; if the AF bit is one (1), the TV format
      (with two-byte value) is used.

   o  Attribute Type (15 bits) - Unique identifier for each type of
      attribute (see below).

   o  Attribute Value (variable length) - Value of the Attribute
      associated with the Attribute Type.  If the AF bit is a zero (0),
      this field has a variable length defined by the Attribute Length
      field.  If the AF bit is a one (1), the Attribute Value has a
      length of 2 octets.

   Note that the only currently defined attribute type (Key Length) is
   fixed length; the variable-length encoding specification is included
   only for future extensions.  Attributes described as fixed length
   MUST NOT be encoded using the variable-length encoding.  Variable-



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   length attributes MUST NOT be encoded as fixed-length even if their
   value can fit into two octets.  NOTE: This is a change from IKEv1,
   where increased flexibility may have simplified the composer of
   messages but certainly complicated the parser.

   Attribute Type         Value         Attribute Format
   ------------------------------------------------------------
   RESERVED               0-13
   Key Length (in bits)   14            TV
   RESERVED               15-17
   RESERVED TO IANA       18-16383
   PRIVATE USE            16384-32767

   Values 0-13 and 15-17 were used in a similar context in IKEv1, and
   should not be assigned except to matching values.

   The Key Length attribute specifies the key length in bits (MUST use
   network byte order) for certain transforms as follows: {{ Clarif-7.11
   }}

   o  The Key Length attribute MUST NOT be used with transforms that use
      a fixed length key.  This includes, e.g., ENCR_DES, ENCR_IDEA, and
      all the Type 2 (Pseudo-random function) and Type 3 (Integrity
      Algorithm) transforms specified in this document.  It is
      recommended that future Type 2 or 3 transforms do not use this
      attribute.

   o  Some transforms specify that the Key Length attribute MUST be
      always included (omitting the attribute is not allowed, and
      proposals not containing it MUST be rejected).  This includes,
      e.g., ENCR_AES_CBC and ENCR_AES_CTR.

   o  Some transforms allow variable-length keys, but also specify a
      default key length if the attribute is not included.  These
      transforms include, e.g., ENCR_RC5 and ENCR_BLOWFISH.

   Implementation note: To further interoperability and to support
   upgrading endpoints independently, implementers of this protocol
   SHOULD accept values that they deem to supply greater security.  For
   instance, if a peer is configured to accept a variable-length cipher
   with a key length of X bits and is offered that cipher with a larger
   key length, the implementation SHOULD accept the offer if it supports
   use of the longer key.

   Support of this capability allows a responder to express a concept of
   "at least" a certain level of security -- "a key length of _at least_
   X bits for cipher Y".  However, as the attribute is always returned
   unchanged (see Section 3.3.6), an initiator willing to accept



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   multiple key lengths has to include multiple transforms with the same
   Transform Type, each with different Key Length attribute.

3.3.6.  Attribute Negotiation

   During security association negotiation initiators present offers to
   responders.  Responders MUST select a single complete set of
   parameters from the offers (or reject all offers if none are
   acceptable).  If there are multiple proposals, the responder MUST
   choose a single proposal.  If the selected proposal has multiple
   Transforms with the same type, the responder MUST choose a single
   one.  Any attributes of a selected transform MUST be returned
   unmodified.  The initiator of an exchange MUST check that the
   accepted offer is consistent with one of its proposals, and if not
   that response MUST be rejected.

   If the responder receives a proposal that contains a Transform Type
   it does not understand, or a proposal that is missing a mandatory
   Transform Type, it MUST consider this proposal unacceptable; however,
   other proposals in the same SA payload are processed as usual.
   Similarly, if the responder receives a transform that contains a
   Transform Attribute it does not understand, it MUST consider this
   transform unacceptable; other transforms with the same Transform Type
   are processed as usual.  This allows new Transform Types and
   Transform Attributes to be defined in the future.

   Negotiating Diffie-Hellman groups presents some special challenges.
   SA offers include proposed attributes and a Diffie-Hellman public
   number (KE) in the same message.  If in the initial exchange the
   initiator offers to use one of several Diffie-Hellman groups, it
   SHOULD pick the one the responder is most likely to accept and
   include a KE corresponding to that group.  If the guess turns out to
   be wrong, the responder will indicate the correct group in the
   response and the initiator SHOULD pick an element of that group for
   its KE value when retrying the first message.  It SHOULD, however,
   continue to propose its full supported set of groups in order to
   prevent a man-in-the-middle downgrade attack.

3.4.  Key Exchange Payload

   The Key Exchange Payload, denoted KE in this memo, is used to
   exchange Diffie-Hellman public numbers as part of a Diffie-Hellman
   key exchange.  The Key Exchange Payload consists of the IKE generic
   payload header followed by the Diffie-Hellman public value itself.







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                        1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Next Payload  |C|  RESERVED   |         Payload Length        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |          DH Group #           |           RESERVED            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                       Key Exchange Data                       ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

             Figure 10:  Key Exchange Payload Format

   A key exchange payload is constructed by copying one's Diffie-Hellman
   public value into the "Key Exchange Data" portion of the payload.
   The length of the Diffie-Hellman public value MUST be equal to the
   length of the prime modulus over which the exponentiation was
   performed, prepending zero bits to the value if necessary.

   The DH Group # identifies the Diffie-Hellman group in which the Key
   Exchange Data was computed (see Section 3.3.2).  If the selected
   proposal uses a different Diffie-Hellman group (other than NONE), the
   message MUST be rejected with a Notify payload of type
   INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD.

   The payload type for the Key Exchange payload is thirty four (34).

3.5.  Identification Payloads

   The Identification Payloads, denoted IDi and IDr in this memo, allow
   peers to assert an identity to one another.  This identity may be
   used for policy lookup, but does not necessarily have to match
   anything in the CERT payload; both fields may be used by an
   implementation to perform access control decisions. {{ Clarif-7.1 }}
   When using the ID_IPV4_ADDR/ID_IPV6_ADDR identity types in IDi/IDr
   payloads, IKEv2 does not require this address to match the address in
   the IP header of IKEv2 packets, or anything in the TSi/TSr payloads.
   The contents of IDi/IDr is used purely to fetch the policy and
   authentication data related to the other party.

   NOTE: In IKEv1, two ID payloads were used in each direction to hold
   Traffic Selector (TS) information for data passing over the SA.  In
   IKEv2, this information is carried in TS payloads (see Section 3.13).

   The Identification Payload consists of the IKE generic payload header
   followed by identification fields as follows:




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                        1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Next Payload  |C|  RESERVED   |         Payload Length        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   ID Type     |                 RESERVED                      |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                   Identification Data                         ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

            Figure 11:  Identification Payload Format

   o  ID Type (1 octet) - Specifies the type of Identification being
      used.

   o  RESERVED - MUST be sent as zero; MUST be ignored on receipt.

   o  Identification Data (variable length) - Value, as indicated by the
      Identification Type.  The length of the Identification Data is
      computed from the size in the ID payload header.

   The payload types for the Identification Payload are thirty five (35)
   for IDi and thirty six (36) for IDr.

   The following table lists the assigned values for the Identification
   Type field:























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   ID Type                           Value
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   RESERVED                            0

   ID_IPV4_ADDR                        1
       A single four (4) octet IPv4 address.

   ID_FQDN                             2
       A fully-qualified domain name string.  An example of a ID_FQDN
       is, "example.com".  The string MUST not contain any terminators
       (e.g., NULL, CR, etc.). All characters in the ID_FQDN are ASCII;
        for an "internationalized domain name", the syntax is as defined
       in [IDNA], for example "xn--tmonesimerkki-bfbb.example.net".

   ID_RFC822_ADDR                      3
       A fully-qualified RFC822 email address string, An example of a
       ID_RFC822_ADDR is, "jsmith@example.com".  The string MUST not
       contain any terminators.

   RESERVED TO IANA                    4

   ID_IPV6_ADDR                        5
       A single sixteen (16) octet IPv6 address.

   RESERVED TO IANA                    6 - 8

   ID_DER_ASN1_DN                      9
       The binary Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) encoding of an
       ASN.1 X.500 Distinguished Name [X.501].

   ID_DER_ASN1_GN                      10
       The binary DER encoding of an ASN.1 X.500 GeneralName [X.509].

   ID_KEY_ID                           11
       An opaque octet stream which may be used to pass vendor-
       specific information necessary to do certain proprietary
       types of identification.

   RESERVED TO IANA                    12-200

   PRIVATE USE                         201-255

   Two implementations will interoperate only if each can generate a
   type of ID acceptable to the other.  To assure maximum
   interoperability, implementations MUST be configurable to send at
   least one of ID_IPV4_ADDR, ID_FQDN, ID_RFC822_ADDR, or ID_KEY_ID, and
   MUST be configurable to accept all of these types.  Implementations
   SHOULD be capable of generating and accepting all of these types.



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   IPv6-capable implementations MUST additionally be configurable to
   accept ID_IPV6_ADDR.  IPv6-only implementations MAY be configurable
   to send only ID_IPV6_ADDR.

   {{ Clarif-3.4 }} EAP [EAP] does not mandate the use of any particular
   type of identifier, but often EAP is used with Network Access
   Identifiers (NAIs) defined in [NAI].  Although NAIs look a bit like
   email addresses (e.g., "joe@example.com"), the syntax is not exactly
   the same as the syntax of email address in [MAILFORMAT].  For those
   NAIs that include the realm component, the ID_RFC822_ADDR
   identification type SHOULD be used.  Responder implementations should
   not attempt to verify that the contents actually conform to the exact
   syntax given in [MAILFORMAT], but instead should accept any
   reasonable-looking NAI.  For NAIs that do not include the realm
   component,the ID_KEY_ID identification type SHOULD be used.

3.6.  Certificate Payload

   The Certificate Payload, denoted CERT in this memo, provides a means
   to transport certificates or other authentication-related information
   via IKE.  Certificate payloads SHOULD be included in an exchange if
   certificates are available to the sender unless the peer has
   indicated an ability to retrieve this information from elsewhere
   using an HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP_SUPPORTED Notify payload.  Note that the
   term "Certificate Payload" is somewhat misleading, because not all
   authentication mechanisms use certificates and data other than
   certificates may be passed in this payload.

   The Certificate Payload is defined as follows:

                        1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Next Payload  |C|  RESERVED   |         Payload Length        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Cert Encoding |                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                                               |
   ~                       Certificate Data                        ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

             Figure 12:  Certificate Payload Format

   o  Certificate Encoding (1 octet) - This field indicates the type of
      certificate or certificate-related information contained in the
      Certificate Data field.





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      Certificate Encoding                 Value
      ----------------------------------------------------
      RESERVED                             0
      PKCS #7 wrapped X.509 certificate    1   UNSPECIFIED
      PGP Certificate                      2   UNSPECIFIED
      DNS Signed Key                       3   UNSPECIFIED
      X.509 Certificate - Signature        4
      Kerberos Token                       6   UNSPECIFIED
      Certificate Revocation List (CRL)    7
      Authority Revocation List (ARL)      8
      SPKI Certificate                     9   UNSPECIFIED
      X.509 Certificate - Attribute        10
      Raw RSA Key                          11
      Hash and URL of X.509 certificate    12
      Hash and URL of X.509 bundle         13
      RESERVED to IANA                     14 - 200
      PRIVATE USE                          201 - 255

   o  Certificate Data (variable length) - Actual encoding of
      certificate data.  The type of certificate is indicated by the
      Certificate Encoding field.

   The payload type for the Certificate Payload is thirty seven (37).

   Specific syntax for some of the certificate type codes above is not
   defined in this document.  The types whose syntax is defined in this
   document are:

   o  X.509 Certificate - Signature (4) contains a DER encoded X.509
      certificate whose public key is used to validate the sender's AUTH
      payload.

   o  Certificate Revocation List (7) contains a DER encoded X.509
      certificate revocation list.

   o  {{ Added "DER-encoded RSAPublicKey structure" from Clarif-3.6 }}
      Raw RSA Key (11) contains a PKCS #1 encoded RSA key, that is, a
      DER-encoded RSAPublicKey structure (see [RSA] and [PKCS1]).

   o  Hash and URL encodings (12-13) allow IKE messages to remain short
      by replacing long data structures with a 20 octet SHA-1 hash (see
      [SHA]) of the replaced value followed by a variable-length URL
      that resolves to the DER encoded data structure itself.  This
      improves efficiency when the endpoints have certificate data
      cached and makes IKE less subject to denial of service attacks
      that become easier to mount when IKE messages are large enough to
      require IP fragmentation [DOSUDPPROT].




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   Use the following ASN.1 definition for an X.509 bundle:

   CertBundle
     { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
       security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
       id-mod-cert-bundle(34) }

   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
   BEGIN

   IMPORTS
     Certificate, CertificateList
     FROM PKIX1Explicit88
        { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
          internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
          id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18) } ;

   CertificateOrCRL ::= CHOICE {
     cert [0] Certificate,
     crl  [1] CertificateList }

   CertificateBundle ::= SEQUENCE OF CertificateOrCRL

   END

   Implementations MUST be capable of being configured to send and
   accept up to four X.509 certificates in support of authentication,
   and also MUST be capable of being configured to send and accept the
   two Hash and URL formats (with HTTP URLs).  Implementations SHOULD be
   capable of being configured to send and accept Raw RSA keys.  If
   multiple certificates are sent, the first certificate MUST contain
   the public key used to sign the AUTH payload.  The other certificates
   may be sent in any order.

3.7.  Certificate Request Payload

   The Certificate Request Payload, denoted CERTREQ in this memo,
   provides a means to request preferred certificates via IKE and can
   appear in the IKE_INIT_SA response and/or the IKE_AUTH request.
   Certificate Request payloads MAY be included in an exchange when the
   sender needs to get the certificate of the receiver.  If multiple CAs
   are trusted and the cert encoding does not allow a list, then
   multiple Certificate Request payloads SHOULD be transmitted.

   The Certificate Request Payload is defined as follows:






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                        1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Next Payload  |C|  RESERVED   |         Payload Length        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Cert Encoding |                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                                               |
   ~                    Certification Authority                    ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

         Figure 13:  Certificate Request Payload Format

   o  Certificate Encoding (1 octet) - Contains an encoding of the type
      or format of certificate requested.  Values are listed in
      Section 3.6.

   o  Certification Authority (variable length) - Contains an encoding
      of an acceptable certification authority for the type of
      certificate requested.

   The payload type for the Certificate Request Payload is thirty eight
   (38).

   The Certificate Encoding field has the same values as those defined
   in Section 3.6.  The Certification Authority field contains an
   indicator of trusted authorities for this certificate type.  The
   Certification Authority value is a concatenated list of SHA-1 hashes
   of the public keys of trusted Certification Authorities (CAs).  Each
   is encoded as the SHA-1 hash of the Subject Public Key Info element
   (see section 4.1.2.7 of [PKIX]) from each Trust Anchor certificate.
   The twenty-octet hashes are concatenated and included with no other
   formatting.

   {{ Clarif-3.6 }} The contents of the "Certification Authority" field
   are defined only for X.509 certificates, which are types 4, 10, 12,
   and 13.  Other values SHOULD NOT be used until standards-track
   specifications that specify their use are published.

   Note that the term "Certificate Request" is somewhat misleading, in
   that values other than certificates are defined in a "Certificate"
   payload and requests for those values can be present in a Certificate
   Request Payload.  The syntax of the Certificate Request payload in
   such cases is not defined in this document.

   The Certificate Request Payload is processed by inspecting the "Cert
   Encoding" field to determine whether the processor has any
   certificates of this type.  If so, the "Certification Authority"



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   field is inspected to determine if the processor has any certificates
   that can be validated up to one of the specified certification
   authorities.  This can be a chain of certificates.

   If an end-entity certificate exists that satisfies the criteria
   specified in the CERTREQ, a certificate or certificate chain SHOULD
   be sent back to the certificate requestor if the recipient of the
   CERTREQ:

   o  is configured to use certificate authentication,

   o  is allowed to send a CERT payload,

   o  has matching CA trust policy governing the current negotiation,
      and

   o  has at least one time-wise and usage appropriate end-entity
      certificate chaining to a CA provided in the CERTREQ.

   Certificate revocation checking must be considered during the
   chaining process used to select a certificate.  Note that even if two
   peers are configured to use two different CAs, cross-certification
   relationships should be supported by appropriate selection logic.

   The intent is not to prevent communication through the strict
   adherence of selection of a certificate based on CERTREQ, when an
   alternate certificate could be selected by the sender that would
   still enable the recipient to successfully validate and trust it
   through trust conveyed by cross-certification, CRLs, or other out-of-
   band configured means.  Thus, the processing of a CERTREQ should be
   seen as a suggestion for a certificate to select, not a mandated one.
   If no certificates exist, then the CERTREQ is ignored.  This is not
   an error condition of the protocol.  There may be cases where there
   is a preferred CA sent in the CERTREQ, but an alternate might be
   acceptable (perhaps after prompting a human operator).

   {{ 3.10.1-16392 }} The HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP_SUPPORTED notification MAY be
   included in any message that can include a CERTREQ payload and
   indicates that the sender is capable of looking up certificates based
   on an HTTP-based URL (and hence presumably would prefer to receive
   certificate specifications in that format).

3.8.  Authentication Payload

   The Authentication Payload, denoted AUTH in this memo, contains data
   used for authentication purposes.  The syntax of the Authentication
   data varies according to the Auth Method as specified below.




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   The Authentication Payload is defined as follows:

                        1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Next Payload  |C|  RESERVED   |         Payload Length        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Auth Method   |                RESERVED                       |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                      Authentication Data                      ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

              Figure 14:  Authentication Payload Format

   o  Auth Method (1 octet) - Specifies the method of authentication
      used.  Values defined are:

      *  RSA Digital Signature (1) - Computed as specified in
         Section 2.15 using an RSA private key with RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
         signature scheme specified in [PKCS1] (implementors should note
         that IKEv1 used a different method for RSA signatures) {{
         Clarif-3.3 }}. {{ Clarif-3.2 }} To promote interoperability,
         implementations that support this type SHOULD support
         signatures that use SHA-1 as the hash function and SHOULD use
         SHA-1 as the default hash function when generating signatures.

      *  Shared Key Message Integrity Code (2) - Computed as specified
         in Section 2.15 using the shared key associated with the
         identity in the ID payload and the negotiated prf function

      *  DSS Digital Signature (3) - Computed as specified in
         Section 2.15 using a DSS private key (see [DSS]) over a SHA-1
         hash.

      *  The values 0 and 4-200 are reserved to IANA.  The values 201-
         255 are available for private use.

   o  Authentication Data (variable length) - see Section 2.15.

   The payload type for the Authentication Payload is thirty nine (39).

3.9.  Nonce Payload

   The Nonce Payload, denoted Ni and Nr in this memo for the initiator's
   and responder's nonce respectively, contains random data used to
   guarantee liveness during an exchange and protect against replay



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   attacks.

   The Nonce Payload is defined as follows:

                        1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Next Payload  |C|  RESERVED   |         Payload Length        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                            Nonce Data                         ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                Figure 15:  Nonce Payload Format

   o  Nonce Data (variable length) - Contains the random data generated
      by the transmitting entity.

   The payload type for the Nonce Payload is forty (40).

   The size of a Nonce MUST be between 16 and 256 octets inclusive.
   Nonce values MUST NOT be reused.

3.10.  Notify Payload

   The Notify Payload, denoted N in this document, is used to transmit
   informational data, such as error conditions and state transitions,
   to an IKE peer.  A Notify Payload may appear in a response message
   (usually specifying why a request was rejected), in an INFORMATIONAL
   Exchange (to report an error not in an IKE request), or in any other
   message to indicate sender capabilities or to modify the meaning of
   the request.

   The Notify Payload is defined as follows:
















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                        1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Next Payload  |C|  RESERVED   |         Payload Length        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  Protocol ID  |   SPI Size    |      Notify Message Type      |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                Security Parameter Index (SPI)                 ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                       Notification Data                       ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

            Figure 16:  Notify Payload Format

   o  Protocol ID (1 octet) - If this notification concerns an existing
      SA whose SPI is given the SPI field, this field indicates the type
      of that SA.  For notifications concerning IPsec SAs this field
      MUST contain either (2) to indicate AH or (3) to indicate ESP. {{
      Clarif-7.8 }} Of the notifications defined in this document, the
      SPI is included only with INVALID_SELECTORS and REKEY_SA.  If the
      SPI field is empty, this field MUST be sent as zero and MUST be
      ignored on receipt.  All other values for this field are reserved
      to IANA for future assignment.

   o  SPI Size (1 octet) - Length in octets of the SPI as defined by the
      IPsec protocol ID or zero if no SPI is applicable.  For a
      notification concerning the IKE_SA, the SPI Size MUST be zero.

   o  Notify Message Type (2 octets) - Specifies the type of
      notification message.

   o  SPI (variable length) - Security Parameter Index.

   o  Notification Data (variable length) - Informational or error data
      transmitted in addition to the Notify Message Type.  Values for
      this field are type specific (see below).

   The payload type for the Notify Payload is forty one (41).

3.10.1.  Notify Message Types

   Notification information can be error messages specifying why an SA
   could not be established.  It can also be status data that a process
   managing an SA database wishes to communicate with a peer process.



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   The table below lists the Notification messages and their
   corresponding values.  The number of different error statuses was
   greatly reduced from IKEv1 both for simplification and to avoid
   giving configuration information to probers.

   Types in the range 0 - 16383 are intended for reporting errors.  An
   implementation receiving a Notify payload with one of these types
   that it does not recognize in a response MUST assume that the
   corresponding request has failed entirely. {{ Demoted the SHOULD }}
   Unrecognized error types in a request and status types in a request
   or response MUST be ignored, and they should be logged.

   Notify payloads with status types MAY be added to any message and
   MUST be ignored if not recognized.  They are intended to indicate
   capabilities, and as part of SA negotiation are used to negotiate
   non-cryptographic parameters.

   NOTIFY messages: error types              Value
   -------------------------------------------------------------------

   RESERVED                                  0

   UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PAYLOAD              1
       See Section 2.5.

   INVALID_IKE_SPI                           4
       See Section 2.21.

   INVALID_MAJOR_VERSION                     5
       See Section 2.5.

   INVALID_SYNTAX                            7
       Indicates the IKE message that was received was invalid because
       some type, length, or value was out of range or because the
       request was rejected for policy reasons. To avoid a denial of
       service attack using forged messages, this status may only be
       returned for and in an encrypted packet if the message ID and
       cryptographic checksum were valid. To avoid leaking information
       to someone probing a node, this status MUST be sent in response
       to any error not covered by one of the other status types.
       {{ Demoted the SHOULD }} To aid debugging, more detailed error
       information should be written to a console or log.

   INVALID_MESSAGE_ID                        9
       See Section 2.3.

   INVALID_SPI                              11
       See Section 1.5.



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   NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN                       14
       See Section 2.7.

   INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD                       17
       See Section 1.3.

   AUTHENTICATION_FAILED                    24
       Sent in the response to an IKE_AUTH message when for some reason
       the authentication failed. There is no associated data.

   SINGLE_PAIR_REQUIRED                     34
       See Section 2.9.

   NO_ADDITIONAL_SAS                        35
       See Section 1.3.

   INTERNAL_ADDRESS_FAILURE                 36
       See Section 3.15.4.

   FAILED_CP_REQUIRED                       37
       See Section 2.19.

   TS_UNACCEPTABLE                          38
       See Section 2.9.

   INVALID_SELECTORS                        39
       MAY be sent in an IKE INFORMATIONAL exchange when a node receives
       an ESP or AH packet whose selectors do not match those of the SA
       on which it was delivered (and that caused the packet to be
       dropped). The Notification Data contains the start of the
       offending packet (as in ICMP messages) and the SPI field of the
       notification is set to match the SPI of the IPsec SA.

   RESERVED TO IANA                         40-8191

   PRIVATE USE                              8192-16383















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   NOTIFY messages: status types            Value
   -------------------------------------------------------------------

   INITIAL_CONTACT                          16384
       See Section 2.4.

   SET_WINDOW_SIZE                          16385
       See Section 2.3.

   ADDITIONAL_TS_POSSIBLE                   16386
       See Section 2.9.

   IPCOMP_SUPPORTED                         16387
       See Section 2.22.

   NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP                  16388
       See Section 2.23.

   NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP             16389
       See Section 2.23.

   COOKIE                                   16390
       See Section 2.6.

   USE_TRANSPORT_MODE                       16391
       See Section 1.3.1.

   HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP_SUPPORTED               16392
       See Section 3.6.

   REKEY_SA                                 16393
       See Section 1.3.3.

   ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED            16394
       See Section 1.3.1.

   NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO                 16395
       See Section 1.3.1.

   RESERVED TO IANA                         16396-40959

   PRIVATE USE                              40960-65535

3.11.  Delete Payload

   The Delete Payload, denoted D in this memo, contains a protocol
   specific security association identifier that the sender has removed
   from its security association database and is, therefore, no longer



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   valid.  Figure 17 shows the format of the Delete Payload.  It is
   possible to send multiple SPIs in a Delete payload; however, each SPI
   MUST be for the same protocol.  Mixing of protocol identifiers MUST
   NOT be performed in the Delete payload.  It is permitted, however, to
   include multiple Delete payloads in a single INFORMATIONAL exchange
   where each Delete payload lists SPIs for a different protocol.

   Deletion of the IKE_SA is indicated by a protocol ID of 1 (IKE) but
   no SPIs.  Deletion of a CHILD_SA, such as ESP or AH, will contain the
   IPsec protocol ID of that protocol (2 for AH, 3 for ESP), and the SPI
   is the SPI the sending endpoint would expect in inbound ESP or AH
   packets.

   The Delete Payload is defined as follows:

                        1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Next Payload  |C|  RESERVED   |         Payload Length        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Protocol ID   |   SPI Size    |           # of SPIs           |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~               Security Parameter Index(es) (SPI)              ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

               Figure 17:  Delete Payload Format

   o  Protocol ID (1 octet) - Must be 1 for an IKE_SA, 2 for AH, or 3
      for ESP.

   o  SPI Size (1 octet) - Length in octets of the SPI as defined by the
      protocol ID.  It MUST be zero for IKE (SPI is in message header)
      or four for AH and ESP.

   o  # of SPIs (2 octets) - The number of SPIs contained in the Delete
      payload.  The size of each SPI is defined by the SPI Size field.

   o  Security Parameter Index(es) (variable length) - Identifies the
      specific security association(s) to delete.  The length of this
      field is determined by the SPI Size and # of SPIs fields.

   The payload type for the Delete Payload is forty two (42).







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3.12.  Vendor ID Payload

   The Vendor ID Payload, denoted V in this memo, contains a vendor
   defined constant.  The constant is used by vendors to identify and
   recognize remote instances of their implementations.  This mechanism
   allows a vendor to experiment with new features while maintaining
   backward compatibility.

   A Vendor ID payload MAY announce that the sender is capable of
   accepting certain extensions to the protocol, or it MAY simply
   identify the implementation as an aid in debugging.  A Vendor ID
   payload MUST NOT change the interpretation of any information defined
   in this specification (i.e., the critical bit MUST be set to 0).
   Multiple Vendor ID payloads MAY be sent.  An implementation is NOT
   REQUIRED to send any Vendor ID payload at all.

   A Vendor ID payload may be sent as part of any message.  Reception of
   a familiar Vendor ID payload allows an implementation to make use of
   Private USE numbers described throughout this memo-- private
   payloads, private exchanges, private notifications, etc.  Unfamiliar
   Vendor IDs MUST be ignored.

   Writers of Internet-Drafts who wish to extend this protocol MUST
   define a Vendor ID payload to announce the ability to implement the
   extension in the Internet-Draft.  It is expected that Internet-Drafts
   that gain acceptance and are standardized will be given "magic
   numbers" out of the Future Use range by IANA, and the requirement to
   use a Vendor ID will go away.

   The Vendor ID Payload fields are defined as follows:

                        1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Next Payload  |C|  RESERVED   |         Payload Length        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                        Vendor ID (VID)                        ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

              Figure 18:  Vendor ID Payload Format

   o  Vendor ID (variable length) - It is the responsibility of the
      person choosing the Vendor ID to assure its uniqueness in spite of
      the absence of any central registry for IDs.  Good practice is to
      include a company name, a person name, or some such.  If you want
      to show off, you might include the latitude and longitude and time



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      where you were when you chose the ID and some random input.  A
      message digest of a long unique string is preferable to the long
      unique string itself.

   The payload type for the Vendor ID Payload is forty three (43).

3.13.  Traffic Selector Payload

   The Traffic Selector Payload, denoted TS in this memo, allows peers
   to identify packet flows for processing by IPsec security services.
   The Traffic Selector Payload consists of the IKE generic payload
   header followed by individual traffic selectors as follows:

                        1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Next Payload  |C|  RESERVED   |         Payload Length        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Number of TSs |                 RESERVED                      |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                       <Traffic Selectors>                     ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

            Figure 19:  Traffic Selectors Payload Format

   o  Number of TSs (1 octet) - Number of traffic selectors being
      provided.

   o  RESERVED - This field MUST be sent as zero and MUST be ignored on
      receipt.

   o  Traffic Selectors (variable length) - One or more individual
      traffic selectors.

   The length of the Traffic Selector payload includes the TS header and
   all the traffic selectors.

   The payload type for the Traffic Selector payload is forty four (44)
   for addresses at the initiator's end of the SA and forty five (45)
   for addresses at the responder's end.

   {{ Clarif-4.7 }} There is no requirement that TSi and TSr contain the
   same number of individual traffic selectors.  Thus, they are
   interpreted as follows: a packet matches a given TSi/TSr if it
   matches at least one of the individual selectors in TSi, and at least
   one of the individual selectors in TSr.



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   For instance, the following traffic selectors:

   TSi = ((17, 100, 192.0.1.66-192.0.1.66),
          (17, 200, 192.0.1.66-192.0.1.66))
   TSr = ((17, 300, 0.0.0.0-255.255.255.255),
          (17, 400, 0.0.0.0-255.255.255.255))

   would match UDP packets from 192.0.1.66 to anywhere, with any of the
   four combinations of source/destination ports (100,300), (100,400),
   (200,300), and (200, 400).

   Thus, some types of policies may require several CHILD_SA pairs.  For
   instance, a policy matching only source/destination ports (100,300)
   and (200,400), but not the other two combinations, cannot be
   negotiated as a single CHILD_SA pair.

3.13.1.  Traffic Selector

                        1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   TS Type     |IP Protocol ID*|       Selector Length         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |           Start Port*         |           End Port*           |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                         Starting Address*                     ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                         Ending Address*                       ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

               Figure 20: Traffic Selector

   *Note: All fields other than TS Type and Selector Length depend on
   the TS Type.  The fields shown are for TS Types 7 and 8, the only two
   values currently defined.

   o  TS Type (one octet) - Specifies the type of traffic selector.

   o  IP protocol ID (1 octet) - Value specifying an associated IP
      protocol ID (e.g., UDP/TCP/ICMP).  A value of zero means that the
      protocol ID is not relevant to this traffic selector-- the SA can
      carry all protocols.





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   o  Selector Length - Specifies the length of this Traffic Selector
      Substructure including the header.

   o  Start Port (2 octets) - Value specifying the smallest port number
      allowed by this Traffic Selector.  For protocols for which port is
      undefined, or if all ports are allowed, this field MUST be zero.
      For the ICMP protocol, the two one-octet fields Type and Code are
      treated as a single 16-bit integer (with Type in the most
      significant eight bits and Code in the least significant eight
      bits) port number for the purposes of filtering based on this
      field.

   o  End Port (2 octets) - Value specifying the largest port number
      allowed by this Traffic Selector.  For protocols for which port is
      undefined, or if all ports are allowed, this field MUST be 65535.
      For the ICMP protocol, the two one-octet fields Type and Code are
      treated as a single 16-bit integer (with Type in the most
      significant eight bits and Code in the least significant eight
      bits) port number for the purposed of filtering based on this
      field.

   o  Starting Address - The smallest address included in this Traffic
      Selector (length determined by TS type).

   o  Ending Address - The largest address included in this Traffic
      Selector (length determined by TS type).

   Systems that are complying with [IPSECARCH] that wish to indicate
   "ANY" ports MUST set the start port to 0 and the end port to 65535;
   note that according to [IPSECARCH], "ANY" includes "OPAQUE".  Systems
   working with [IPSECARCH] that wish to indicate "OPAQUE" ports, but
   not "ANY" ports, MUST set the start port to 65535 and the end port to
   0.

   {{ Added from Clarif-4.8 }} The traffic selector types 7 and 8 can
   also refer to ICMP type and code fields.  Note, however, that ICMP
   packets do not have separate source and destination port fields.  The
   method for specifying the traffic selectors for ICMP is shown by
   example in Section 4.4.1.3 of [IPSECARCH].

   {{ Added from Clarif-4.9 }} Traffic selectors can use IP Protocol ID
   135 to match the IPv6 mobility header [MIPV6].  This document does
   not specify how to represent the "MH Type" field in traffic
   selectors, although it is likely that a different document will
   specify this in the future.  Note that [IPSECARCH] says that the IPv6
   mobility header (MH) message type is placed in the most significant
   eight bits of the 16-bit local port selector.  The direction
   semantics of TSi/TSr port fields are the same as for ICMP.



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   The following table lists the assigned values for the Traffic
   Selector Type field and the corresponding Address Selector Data.

   TS Type                            Value
   -------------------------------------------------------------------
   RESERVED                            0-6

   TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE                  7

       A range of IPv4 addresses, represented by two four-octet
       values. The first value is the beginning IPv4 address
       (inclusive) and the second value is the ending IPv4 address
       (inclusive). All addresses falling between the two specified
       addresses are considered to be within the list.

   TS_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE                  8

       A range of IPv6 addresses, represented by two sixteen-octet
       values. The first value is the beginning IPv6 address
       (inclusive) and the second value is the ending IPv6 address
       (inclusive). All addresses falling between the two specified
       addresses are considered to be within the list.

   RESERVED TO IANA                    9-240
   PRIVATE USE                         241-255

3.14.  Encrypted Payload

   The Encrypted Payload, denoted SK{...} or E in this memo, contains
   other payloads in encrypted form.  The Encrypted Payload, if present
   in a message, MUST be the last payload in the message.  Often, it is
   the only payload in the message.

   The algorithms for encryption and integrity protection are negotiated
   during IKE_SA setup, and the keys are computed as specified in
   Section 2.14 and Section 2.18.

   This document specifies the cryptographic processing of Encrypted
   payloads using a block cipher in CBC mode and an integrity check
   algorithm that computes a fixed-length checksum over a variable size
   message.  The design is modeled after the ESP algorithms described in
   RFCs 2104 [HMAC], 4303 [ESP], and 2451 [ESPCBC].  This document
   completely specifies the cryptographic processing of IKE data, but
   those documents should be consulted for design rationale.  Future
   documents may specify the processing of Encrypted payloads for other
   types of transforms, such as counter mode encryption and
   authenticated encryption algorithms.  Peers MUST NOT negotiate
   transforms for which no such specification exists.



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   The payload type for an Encrypted payload is forty six (46).  The
   Encrypted Payload consists of the IKE generic payload header followed
   by individual fields as follows:

                        1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Next Payload  |C|  RESERVED   |         Payload Length        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                     Initialization Vector                     |
   |         (length is block size for encryption algorithm)       |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ~                    Encrypted IKE Payloads                     ~
   +               +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |               |             Padding (0-255 octets)            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                               |  Pad Length   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   ~                    Integrity Checksum Data                    ~
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

            Figure 21:  Encrypted Payload Format

   o  Next Payload - The payload type of the first embedded payload.
      Note that this is an exception in the standard header format,
      since the Encrypted payload is the last payload in the message and
      therefore the Next Payload field would normally be zero.  But
      because the content of this payload is embedded payloads and there
      was no natural place to put the type of the first one, that type
      is placed here.

   o  Payload Length - Includes the lengths of the header, IV, Encrypted
      IKE Payloads, Padding, Pad Length, and Integrity Checksum Data.

   o  Initialization Vector - The length of the initialization vector
      (IV) is equal to the block length of the underlying encryption
      algorithm.  Senders MUST select a new unpredictable IV for every
      message; recipients MUST accept any value.  The reader is
      encouraged to consult [MODES] for advice on IV generation.  In
      particular, using the final ciphertext block of the previous
      message is not considered unpredictable.

   o  IKE Payloads are as specified earlier in this section.  This field
      is encrypted with the negotiated cipher.

   o  Padding MAY contain any value chosen by the sender, and MUST have
      a length that makes the combination of the Payloads, the Padding,
      and the Pad Length to be a multiple of the encryption block size.



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      This field is encrypted with the negotiated cipher.

   o  Pad Length is the length of the Padding field.  The sender SHOULD
      set the Pad Length to the minimum value that makes the combination
      of the Payloads, the Padding, and the Pad Length a multiple of the
      block size, but the recipient MUST accept any length that results
      in proper alignment.  This field is encrypted with the negotiated
      cipher.

   o  Integrity Checksum Data is the cryptographic checksum of the
      entire message starting with the Fixed IKE Header through the Pad
      Length.  The checksum MUST be computed over the encrypted message.
      Its length is determined by the integrity algorithm negotiated.

3.15.  Configuration Payload

   The Configuration payload, denoted CP in this document, is used to
   exchange configuration information between IKE peers.  The exchange
   is for an IRAC to request an internal IP address from an IRAS and to
   exchange other information of the sort that one would acquire with
   Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) if the IRAC were directly
   connected to a LAN.

   The Configuration Payload is defined as follows:

                        1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Next Payload  |C| RESERVED    |         Payload Length        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   CFG Type    |                    RESERVED                   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                   Configuration Attributes                    ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

            Figure 22:  Configuration Payload Format

   The payload type for the Configuration Payload is forty seven (47).

   o  CFG Type (1 octet) - The type of exchange represented by the
      Configuration Attributes.








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      CFG Type           Value
      --------------------------
      RESERVED           0
      CFG_REQUEST        1
      CFG_REPLY          2
      CFG_SET            3
      CFG_ACK            4
      RESERVED TO IANA   5-127
      PRIVATE USE        128-255

   o  RESERVED (3 octets) - MUST be sent as zero; MUST be ignored on
      receipt.

   o  Configuration Attributes (variable length) - These are type length
      values specific to the Configuration Payload and are defined
      below.  There may be zero or more Configuration Attributes in this
      payload.

3.15.1.  Configuration Attributes

                        1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |R|         Attribute Type      |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                             Value                             ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

            Figure 23:  Configuration Attribute Format

   o  Reserved (1 bit) - This bit MUST be set to zero and MUST be
      ignored on receipt.

   o  Attribute Type (15 bits) - A unique identifier for each of the
      Configuration Attribute Types.

   o  Length (2 octets) - Length in octets of Value.

   o  Value (0 or more octets) - The variable-length value of this
      Configuration Attribute.  The following attribute types have been
      defined:








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                                      Multi-
      Attribute Type           Value  Valued  Length
      -------------------------------------------------------
      RESERVED                 0
      INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS     1      YES*    0 or 4 octets
      INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK     2      NO      0 or 4 octets
      INTERNAL_IP4_DNS         3      YES     0 or 4 octets
      INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS        4      YES     0 or 4 octets
      RESERVED                 5
      INTERNAL_IP4_DHCP        6      YES     0 or 4 octets
      APPLICATION_VERSION      7      NO      0 or more
      INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS     8      YES*    0 or 17 octets
      RESERVED                 9
      INTERNAL_IP6_DNS         10     YES     0 or 16 octets
      INTERNAL_IP6_NBNS        11     YES     0 or 16 octets
      INTERNAL_IP6_DHCP        12     YES     0 or 16 octets
      INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET      13     YES     0 or 8 octets
      SUPPORTED_ATTRIBUTES     14     NO      Multiple of 2
      INTERNAL_IP6_SUBNET      15     YES     17 octets
      RESERVED TO IANA         16-16383
      PRIVATE USE              16384-32767

      * These attributes may be multi-valued on return only if
        multiple values were requested.

   o  INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS, INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS - An address on the
      internal network, sometimes called a red node address or private
      address and MAY be a private address on the Internet. {{
      Clarif-6.2}} In a request message, the address specified is a
      requested address (or a zero-length address if no specific address
      is requested).  If a specific address is requested, it likely
      indicates that a previous connection existed with this address and
      the requestor would like to reuse that address.  With IPv6, a
      requestor MAY supply the low-order address octets it wants to use.
      Multiple internal addresses MAY be requested by requesting
      multiple internal address attributes.  The responder MAY only send
      up to the number of addresses requested.  The INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS
      is made up of two fields: the first is a 16-octet IPv6 address,
      and the second is a one-octet prefix-length as defined in
      [ADDRIPV6].  The requested address is valid until there are no
      IKE_SAs between the peers.

   o  INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK - The internal network's netmask.  Only one
      netmask is allowed in the request and reply messages (e.g.,
      255.255.255.0), and it MUST be used only with an
      INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS attribute. {{ Clarif-6.4 }}
      INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK in a CFG_REPLY means roughly the same thing
      as INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET containing the same information ("send



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      traffic to these addresses through me"), but also implies a link
      boundary.  For instance, the client could use its own address and
      the netmask to calculate the broadcast address of the link.  An
      empty INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK attribute can be included in a
      CFG_REQUEST to request this information (although the gateway can
      send the information even when not requested).  Non-empty values
      for this attribute in a CFG_REQUEST do not make sense and thus
      MUST NOT be included.

   o  INTERNAL_IP4_DNS, INTERNAL_IP6_DNS - Specifies an address of a DNS
      server within the network.  Multiple DNS servers MAY be requested.
      The responder MAY respond with zero or more DNS server attributes.

   o  INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS - Specifies an address of a NetBios Name Server
      (WINS) within the network.  Multiple NBNS servers MAY be
      requested.  The responder MAY respond with zero or more NBNS
      server attributes.

   o  INTERNAL_IP6_NBNS - {{ Clarif-6.6 }} NetBIOS is not defined for
      IPv6; therefore, INTERNAL_IP6_NBNS is also unspecified and is only
      retained for compatibility with RFC 4306.

   o  INTERNAL_IP4_DHCP, INTERNAL_IP6_DHCP - Instructs the host to send
      any internal DHCP requests to the address contained within the
      attribute.  Multiple DHCP servers MAY be requested.  The responder
      MAY respond with zero or more DHCP server attributes.

   o  APPLICATION_VERSION - The version or application information of
      the IPsec host.  This is a string of printable ASCII characters
      that is NOT null terminated.

   o  INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET - The protected sub-networks that this edge-
      device protects.  This attribute is made up of two fields: the
      first being an IP address and the second being a netmask.
      Multiple sub-networks MAY be requested.  The responder MAY respond
      with zero or more sub-network attributes.

   o  SUPPORTED_ATTRIBUTES - When used within a Request, this attribute
      MUST be zero-length and specifies a query to the responder to
      reply back with all of the attributes that it supports.  The
      response contains an attribute that contains a set of attribute
      identifiers each in 2 octets.  The length divided by 2 (octets)
      would state the number of supported attributes contained in the
      response.

   o  INTERNAL_IP6_SUBNET - The protected sub-networks that this edge-
      device protects.  This attribute is made up of two fields: the
      first is a 16-octet IPv6 address, and the second is a one-octet



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      prefix-length as defined in [ADDRIPV6].  Multiple sub-networks MAY
      be requested.  The responder MAY respond with zero or more sub-
      network attributes.

   Note that no recommendations are made in this document as to how an
   implementation actually figures out what information to send in a
   reply.  That is, we do not recommend any specific method of an IRAS
   determining which DNS server should be returned to a requesting IRAC.

3.15.2.  Meaning of INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET/INTERNAL_IP6_SUBNET

   {{ Section added based on Clarif-6.3 }}

   INTERNAL_IP4/6_SUBNET attributes can indicate additional subnets,
   ones that need one or more separate SAs, that can be reached through
   the gateway that announces the attributes.  INTERNAL_IP4/6_SUBNET
   attributes may also express the gateway's policy about what traffic
   should be sent through the gateway; the client can choose whether
   other traffic (covered by TSr, but not in INTERNAL_IP4/6_SUBNET) is
   sent through the gateway or directly to the destination.  Thus,
   traffic to the addresses listed in the INTERNAL_IP4/6_SUBNET
   attributes should be sent through the gateway that announces the
   attributes.  If there are no existing IPsec SAs whose traffic
   selectors cover the address in question, new SAs need to be created.

   For instance, if there are two subnets, 192.0.1.0/26 and
   192.0.2.0/24, and the client's request contains the following:

   CP(CFG_REQUEST) =
     INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS()
   TSi = (0, 0-65535, 0.0.0.0-255.255.255.255)
   TSr = (0, 0-65535, 0.0.0.0-255.255.255.255)

   then a valid response could be the following (in which TSr and
   INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET contain the same information):

   CP(CFG_REPLY) =
     INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS(192.0.1.234)
     INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET(192.0.1.0/255.255.255.192)
     INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET(192.0.2.0/255.255.255.0)
   TSi = (0, 0-65535, 192.0.1.234-192.0.1.234)
   TSr = ((0, 0-65535, 192.0.1.0-192.0.1.63),
          (0, 0-65535, 192.0.2.0-192.0.2.255))

   In these cases, the INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET does not really carry any
   useful information.

   A different possible reply would have been this:



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   CP(CFG_REPLY) =
     INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS(192.0.1.234)
     INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET(192.0.1.0/255.255.255.192)
     INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET(192.0.2.0/255.255.255.0)
   TSi = (0, 0-65535, 192.0.1.234-192.0.1.234)
   TSr = (0, 0-65535, 0.0.0.0-255.255.255.255)

   That reply would mean that the client can send all its traffic
   through the gateway, but the gateway does not mind if the client
   sends traffic not included by INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET directly to the
   destination (without going through the gateway).

   A different situation arises if the gateway has a policy that
   requires the traffic for the two subnets to be carried in separate
   SAs.  Then a response like this would indicate to the client that if
   it wants access to the second subnet, it needs to create a separate
   SA:

   CP(CFG_REPLY) =
     INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS(192.0.1.234)
     INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET(192.0.1.0/255.255.255.192)
     INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET(192.0.2.0/255.255.255.0)
   TSi = (0, 0-65535, 192.0.1.234-192.0.1.234)
   TSr = (0, 0-65535, 192.0.1.0-192.0.1.63)

   INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET can also be useful if the client's TSr included
   only part of the address space.  For instance, if the client requests
   the following:

   CP(CFG_REQUEST) =
     INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS()
   TSi = (0, 0-65535, 0.0.0.0-255.255.255.255)
   TSr = (0, 0-65535, 192.0.2.155-192.0.2.155)

   then the gateway's reply might be:

   CP(CFG_REPLY) =
     INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS(192.0.1.234)
     INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET(192.0.1.0/255.255.255.192)
     INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET(192.0.2.0/255.255.255.0)
   TSi = (0, 0-65535, 192.0.1.234-192.0.1.234)
   TSr = (0, 0-65535, 192.0.2.155-192.0.2.155)

   Because the meaning of INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET/INTERNAL_IP6_SUBNET is in
   CFG_REQUESTs is unclear, they cannot be used reliably in
   CFG_REQUESTs.





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3.15.3.  Configuration payloads for IPv6

   {{ Added this section from Clarif-6.5 }}

   The configuration payloads for IPv6 are based on the corresponding
   IPv4 payloads, and do not fully follow the "normal IPv6 way of doing
   things".  In particular, IPv6 stateless autoconfiguration or router
   advertisement messages are not used; neither is neighbor discovery.

   A client can be assigned an IPv6 address using the
   INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS configuration payload.  A minimal exchange might
   look like this:

   CP(CFG_REQUEST) =
     INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS()
     INTERNAL_IP6_DNS()
   TSi = (0, 0-65535, :: - FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)
   TSr = (0, 0-65535, :: - FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)

   CP(CFG_REPLY) =
     INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS(2001:DB8:0:1:2:3:4:5/64)
     INTERNAL_IP6_DNS(2001:DB8:99:88:77:66:55:44)
   TSi = (0, 0-65535, 2001:DB8:0:1:2:3:4:5 - 2001:DB8:0:1:2:3:4:5)
   TSr = (0, 0-65535, :: - FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)

   The client MAY send a non-empty INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS attribute in the
   CFG_REQUEST to request a specific address or interface identifier.
   The gateway first checks if the specified address is acceptable, and
   if it is, returns that one.  If the address was not acceptable, the
   gateway attempts to use the interface identifier with some other
   prefix; if even that fails, the gateway selects another interface
   identifier.

   The INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS attribute also contains a prefix length
   field.  When used in a CFG_REPLY, this corresponds to the
   INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK attribute in the IPv4 case.

   Although this approach to configuring IPv6 addresses is reasonably
   simple, it has some limitations.  IPsec tunnels configured using
   IKEv2 are not fully-featured "interfaces" in the IPv6 addressing
   architecture sense [IPV6ADDR].  In particular, they do not
   necessarily have link-local addresses, and this may complicate the
   use of protocols that assume them, such as [MLDV2].

3.15.4.  Address Assignment Failures

   {{ Added this section from Clarif-6.8 }}




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   If the responder encounters an error while attempting to assign an IP
   address to the initiator during the processing of a Configuration
   Payload, it responds with an INTERNAL_ADDRESS_FAILURE notification.
   {{ 3.10.1-36 }} If this error is generated within an IKE_AUTH
   exchange, no CHILD_SA will be created.  However, there are some more
   complex error cases.

   If the responder does not support configuration payloads at all, it
   can simply ignore all configuration payloads.  This type of
   implementation never sends INTERNAL_ADDRESS_FAILURE notifications.
   If the initiator requires the assignment of an IP address, it will
   treat a response without CFG_REPLY as an error.

   The initiator may request a particular type of address (IPv4 or IPv6)
   that the responder does not support, even though the responder
   supports configuration payloads.  In this case, the responder simply
   ignores the type of address it does not support and processes the
   rest of the request as usual.

   If the initiator requests multiple addresses of a type that the
   responder supports, and some (but not all) of the requests fail, the
   responder replies with the successful addresses only.  The responder
   sends INTERNAL_ADDRESS_FAILURE only if no addresses can be assigned.

3.16.  Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Payload

   The Extensible Authentication Protocol Payload, denoted EAP in this
   memo, allows IKE_SAs to be authenticated using the protocol defined
   in RFC 3748 [EAP] and subsequent extensions to that protocol.  The
   full set of acceptable values for the payload is defined elsewhere,
   but a short summary of RFC 3748 is included here to make this
   document stand alone in the common cases.

                        1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Next Payload  |C|  RESERVED   |         Payload Length        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ~                       EAP Message                             ~
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                   Figure 24:  EAP Payload Format

   The payload type for an EAP Payload is forty eight (48).





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                        1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Code      | Identifier    |           Length              |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Type      | Type_Data...
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-

                   Figure 25:  EAP Message Format

   o  Code (1 octet) indicates whether this message is a Request (1),
      Response (2), Success (3), or Failure (4).

   o  Identifier (1 octet) is used in PPP to distinguish replayed
      messages from repeated ones.  Since in IKE, EAP runs over a
      reliable protocol, it serves no function here.  In a response
      message, this octet MUST be set to match the identifier in the
      corresponding request.  In other messages, this field MAY be set
      to any value.

   o  Length (2 octets) is the length of the EAP message and MUST be
      four less than the Payload Length of the encapsulating payload.

   o  Type (1 octet) is present only if the Code field is Request (1) or
      Response (2).  For other codes, the EAP message length MUST be
      four octets and the Type and Type_Data fields MUST NOT be present.
      In a Request (1) message, Type indicates the data being requested.
      In a Response (2) message, Type MUST either be Nak or match the
      type of the data requested.  The following types are defined in
      RFC 3748:

      1  Identity
      2  Notification
      3  Nak (Response Only)
      4  MD5-Challenge
      5  One-Time Password (OTP)
      6  Generic Token Card

   o  Type_Data (Variable Length) varies with the Type of Request and
      the associated Response.  For the documentation of the EAP
      methods, see [EAP].

   {{ Demoted the SHOULD NOT and SHOULD }} Note that since IKE passes an
   indication of initiator identity in message 3 of the protocol, the
   responder should not send EAP Identity requests.  The initiator may,
   however, respond to such requests if it receives them.





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4.  Conformance Requirements

   In order to assure that all implementations of IKEv2 can
   interoperate, there are "MUST support" requirements in addition to
   those listed elsewhere.  Of course, IKEv2 is a security protocol, and
   one of its major functions is to allow only authorized parties to
   successfully complete establishment of SAs.  So a particular
   implementation may be configured with any of a number of restrictions
   concerning algorithms and trusted authorities that will prevent
   universal interoperability.

   IKEv2 is designed to permit minimal implementations that can
   interoperate with all compliant implementations.  There are a series
   of optional features that can easily be ignored by a particular
   implementation if it does not support that feature.  Those features
   include:

   o  Ability to negotiate SAs through a NAT and tunnel the resulting
      ESP SA over UDP.

   o  Ability to request (and respond to a request for) a temporary IP
      address on the remote end of a tunnel.

   o  Ability to support various types of legacy authentication.

   o  Ability to support window sizes greater than one.

   o  Ability to establish multiple ESP and/or AH SAs within a single
      IKE_SA.

   o  Ability to rekey SAs.

   To assure interoperability, all implementations MUST be capable of
   parsing all payload types (if only to skip over them) and to ignore
   payload types that it does not support unless the critical bit is set
   in the payload header.  If the critical bit is set in an unsupported
   payload header, all implementations MUST reject the messages
   containing those payloads.

   Every implementation MUST be capable of doing four-message
   IKE_SA_INIT and IKE_AUTH exchanges establishing two SAs (one for IKE,
   one for ESP and/or AH).  Implementations MAY be initiate-only or
   respond-only if appropriate for their platform.  Every implementation
   MUST be capable of responding to an INFORMATIONAL exchange, but a
   minimal implementation MAY respond to any INFORMATIONAL message with
   an empty INFORMATIONAL reply (note that within the context of an
   IKE_SA, an "empty" message consists of an IKE header followed by an
   Encrypted payload with no payloads contained in it).  A minimal



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   implementation MAY support the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange only in so
   far as to recognize requests and reject them with a Notify payload of
   type NO_ADDITIONAL_SAS.  A minimal implementation need not be able to
   initiate CREATE_CHILD_SA or INFORMATIONAL exchanges.  When an SA
   expires (based on locally configured values of either lifetime or
   octets passed), and implementation MAY either try to renew it with a
   CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange or it MAY delete (close) the old SA and
   create a new one.  If the responder rejects the CREATE_CHILD_SA
   request with a NO_ADDITIONAL_SAS notification, the implementation
   MUST be capable of instead deleting the old SA and creating a new
   one.

   Implementations are not required to support requesting temporary IP
   addresses or responding to such requests.  If an implementation does
   support issuing such requests, it MUST include a CP payload in
   message 3 containing at least a field of type INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS or
   INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS.  All other fields are optional.  If an
   implementation supports responding to such requests, it MUST parse
   the CP payload of type CFG_REQUEST in message 3 and recognize a field
   of type INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS or INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS.  If it supports
   leasing an address of the appropriate type, it MUST return a CP
   payload of type CFG_REPLY containing an address of the requested
   type. {{ Demoted the SHOULD }} The responder may include any other
   related attributes.

   A minimal IPv4 responder implementation will ignore the contents of
   the CP payload except to determine that it includes an
   INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS attribute and will respond with the address and
   other related attributes regardless of whether the initiator
   requested them.

   A minimal IPv4 initiator will generate a CP payload containing only
   an INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS attribute and will parse the response
   ignoring attributes it does not know how to use.

   For an implementation to be called conforming to this specification,
   it MUST be possible to configure it to accept the following:

   o  PKIX Certificates containing and signed by RSA keys of size 1024
      or 2048 bits, where the ID passed is any of ID_KEY_ID, ID_FQDN,
      ID_RFC822_ADDR, or ID_DER_ASN1_DN.

   o  Shared key authentication where the ID passed is any of ID_KEY_ID,
      ID_FQDN, or ID_RFC822_ADDR.

   o  Authentication where the responder is authenticated using PKIX
      Certificates and the initiator is authenticated using shared key
      authentication.



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5.  Security Considerations

   While this protocol is designed to minimize disclosure of
   configuration information to unauthenticated peers, some such
   disclosure is unavoidable.  One peer or the other must identify
   itself first and prove its identity first.  To avoid probing, the
   initiator of an exchange is required to identify itself first, and
   usually is required to authenticate itself first.  The initiator can,
   however, learn that the responder supports IKE and what cryptographic
   protocols it supports.  The responder (or someone impersonating the
   responder) can probe the initiator not only for its identity, but
   using CERTREQ payloads may be able to determine what certificates the
   initiator is willing to use.

   Use of EAP authentication changes the probing possibilities somewhat.
   When EAP authentication is used, the responder proves its identity
   before the initiator does, so an initiator that knew the name of a
   valid initiator could probe the responder for both its name and
   certificates.

   Repeated rekeying using CREATE_CHILD_SA without additional Diffie-
   Hellman exchanges leaves all SAs vulnerable to cryptanalysis of a
   single key or overrun of either endpoint.  Implementers should take
   note of this fact and set a limit on CREATE_CHILD_SA exchanges
   between exponentiations.  This memo does not prescribe such a limit.

   The strength of a key derived from a Diffie-Hellman exchange using
   any of the groups defined here depends on the inherent strength of
   the group, the size of the exponent used, and the entropy provided by
   the random number generator used.  Due to these inputs, it is
   difficult to determine the strength of a key for any of the defined
   groups.  Diffie-Hellman group number two, when used with a strong
   random number generator and an exponent no less than 200 bits, is
   common for use with 3DES.  Group five provides greater security than
   group two.  Group one is for historic purposes only and does not
   provide sufficient strength except for use with DES, which is also
   for historic use only.  Implementations should make note of these
   estimates when establishing policy and negotiating security
   parameters.

   Note that these limitations are on the Diffie-Hellman groups
   themselves.  There is nothing in IKE that prohibits using stronger
   groups nor is there anything that will dilute the strength obtained
   from stronger groups (limited by the strength of the other algorithms
   negotiated including the prf function).  In fact, the extensible
   framework of IKE encourages the definition of more groups; use of
   elliptical curve groups may greatly increase strength using much
   smaller numbers.



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   It is assumed that all Diffie-Hellman exponents are erased from
   memory after use.  In particular, these exponents MUST NOT be derived
   from long-lived secrets like the seed to a pseudo-random generator
   that is not erased after use.

   The strength of all keys is limited by the size of the output of the
   negotiated prf function.  For this reason, a prf function whose
   output is less than 128 bits (e.g., 3DES-CBC) MUST NOT be used with
   this protocol.

   The security of this protocol is critically dependent on the
   randomness of the randomly chosen parameters.  These should be
   generated by a strong random or properly seeded pseudo-random source
   (see [RANDOMNESS]).  Implementers should take care to ensure that use
   of random numbers for both keys and nonces is engineered in a fashion
   that does not undermine the security of the keys.

   For information on the rationale of many of the cryptographic design
   choices in this protocol, see [SIGMA] and [SKEME].  Though the
   security of negotiated CHILD_SAs does not depend on the strength of
   the encryption and integrity protection negotiated in the IKE_SA,
   implementations MUST NOT negotiate NONE as the IKE integrity
   protection algorithm or ENCR_NULL as the IKE encryption algorithm.

   When using pre-shared keys, a critical consideration is how to assure
   the randomness of these secrets.  The strongest practice is to ensure
   that any pre-shared key contain as much randomness as the strongest
   key being negotiated.  Deriving a shared secret from a password,
   name, or other low-entropy source is not secure.  These sources are
   subject to dictionary and social engineering attacks, among others.

   The NAT_DETECTION_*_IP notifications contain a hash of the addresses
   and ports in an attempt to hide internal IP addresses behind a NAT.
   Since the IPv4 address space is only 32 bits, and it is usually very
   sparse, it would be possible for an attacker to find out the internal
   address used behind the NAT box by trying all possible IP addresses
   and trying to find the matching hash.  The port numbers are normally
   fixed to 500, and the SPIs can be extracted from the packet.  This
   reduces the number of hash calculations to 2^32.  With an educated
   guess of the use of private address space, the number of hash
   calculations is much smaller.  Designers should therefore not assume
   that use of IKE will not leak internal address information.

   When using an EAP authentication method that does not generate a
   shared key for protecting a subsequent AUTH payload, certain man-in-
   the-middle and server impersonation attacks are possible [EAPMITM].
   These vulnerabilities occur when EAP is also used in protocols that
   are not protected with a secure tunnel.  Since EAP is a general-



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   purpose authentication protocol, which is often used to provide
   single-signon facilities, a deployed IPsec solution that relies on an
   EAP authentication method that does not generate a shared key (also
   known as a non-key-generating EAP method) can become compromised due
   to the deployment of an entirely unrelated application that also
   happens to use the same non-key-generating EAP method, but in an
   unprotected fashion.  Note that this vulnerability is not limited to
   just EAP, but can occur in other scenarios where an authentication
   infrastructure is reused.  For example, if the EAP mechanism used by
   IKEv2 utilizes a token authenticator, a man-in-the-middle attacker
   could impersonate the web server, intercept the token authentication
   exchange, and use it to initiate an IKEv2 connection.  For this
   reason, use of non-key-generating EAP methods SHOULD be avoided where
   possible.  Where they are used, it is extremely important that all
   usages of these EAP methods SHOULD utilize a protected tunnel, where
   the initiator validates the responder's certificate before initiating
   the EAP exchange. {{ Demoted the SHOULD }} Implementers should
   describe the vulnerabilities of using non-key-generating EAP methods
   in the documentation of their implementations so that the
   administrators deploying IPsec solutions are aware of these dangers.

   An implementation using EAP MUST also use strong authentication of
   the server to the client before the EAP exchange begins, even if the
   EAP method offers mutual authentication.  This avoids having
   additional IKEv2 protocol variations and protects the EAP data from
   active attackers.

   If the messages of IKEv2 are long enough that IP-level fragmentation
   is necessary, it is possible that attackers could prevent the
   exchange from completing by exhausting the reassembly buffers.  The
   chances of this can be minimized by using the Hash and URL encodings
   instead of sending certificates (see Section 3.6).  Additional
   mitigations are discussed in [DOSUDPPROT].

5.1.  Traffic selector authorization

   {{ Added this section from Clarif-4.13 }}

   IKEv2 relies on information in the Peer Authorization Database (PAD)
   when determining what kind of IPsec SAs a peer is allowed to create.
   This process is described in [IPSECARCH] Section 4.4.3.  When a peer
   requests the creation of an IPsec SA with some traffic selectors, the
   PAD must contain "Child SA Authorization Data" linking the identity
   authenticated by IKEv2 and the addresses permitted for traffic
   selectors.

   For example, the PAD might be configured so that authenticated
   identity "sgw23.example.com" is allowed to create IPsec SAs for



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   192.0.2.0/24, meaning this security gateway is a valid
   "representative" for these addresses.  Host-to-host IPsec requires
   similar entries, linking, for example, "fooserver4.example.com" with
   192.0.1.66/32, meaning this identity a valid "owner" or
   "representative" of the address in question.

   As noted in [IPSECARCH], "It is necessary to impose these constraints
   on creation of child SAs to prevent an authenticated peer from
   spoofing IDs associated with other, legitimate peers."  In the
   example given above, a correct configuration of the PAD prevents
   sgw23 from creating IPsec SAs with address 192.0.1.66, and prevents
   fooserver4 from creating IPsec SAs with addresses from 192.0.2.0/24.

   It is important to note that simply sending IKEv2 packets using some
   particular address does not imply a permission to create IPsec SAs
   with that address in the traffic selectors.  For example, even if
   sgw23 would be able to spoof its IP address as 192.0.1.66, it could
   not create IPsec SAs matching fooserver4's traffic.

   The IKEv2 specification does not specify how exactly IP address
   assignment using configuration payloads interacts with the PAD.  Our
   interpretation is that when a security gateway assigns an address
   using configuration payloads, it also creates a temporary PAD entry
   linking the authenticated peer identity and the newly allocated inner
   address.

   It has been recognized that configuring the PAD correctly may be
   difficult in some environments.  For instance, if IPsec is used
   between a pair of hosts whose addresses are allocated dynamically
   using DHCP, it is extremely difficult to ensure that the PAD
   specifies the correct "owner" for each IP address.  This would
   require a mechanism to securely convey address assignments from the
   DHCP server, and link them to identities authenticated using IKEv2.

   Due to this limitation, some vendors have been known to configure
   their PADs to allow an authenticated peer to create IPsec SAs with
   traffic selectors containing the same address that was used for the
   IKEv2 packets.  In environments where IP spoofing is possible (i.e.,
   almost everywhere) this essentially allows any peer to create IPsec
   SAs with any traffic selectors.  This is not an appropriate or secure
   configuration in most circumstances.  See [H2HIPSEC] for an extensive
   discussion about this issue, and the limitations of host-to-host
   IPsec in general.


6.  IANA Considerations

   {{ This section was changed to not re-define any new IANA registries.



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   }}

   [IKEV2] defined many field types and values.  IANA has already
   registered those types and values, so the are not listed here again.
   No new types or values are registered in this document.  However,
   IANA should update all references to RFC 4306 to point to this
   document.


7.  Acknowledgements

   The individuals on the IPsec mailing list was very helpful in both
   pointing out where clarifications and changes were needed, as well as
   in reviewing the clarifications suggested by others.

   The acknowledgements from the IKEv2 document were:

   This document is a collaborative effort of the entire IPsec WG.  If
   there were no limit to the number of authors that could appear on an
   RFC, the following, in alphabetical order, would have been listed:
   Bill Aiello, Stephane Beaulieu, Steve Bellovin, Sara Bitan, Matt
   Blaze, Ran Canetti, Darren Dukes, Dan Harkins, Paul Hoffman, John
   Ioannidis, Charlie Kaufman, Steve Kent, Angelos Keromytis, Tero
   Kivinen, Hugo Krawczyk, Andrew Krywaniuk, Radia Perlman, Omer
   Reingold, and Michael Richardson.  Many other people contributed to
   the design.  It is an evolution of IKEv1, ISAKMP, and the IPsec DOI,
   each of which has its own list of authors.  Hugh Daniel suggested the
   feature of having the initiator, in message 3, specify a name for the
   responder, and gave the feature the cute name "You Tarzan, Me Jane".
   David Faucher and Valery Smyzlov helped refine the design of the
   traffic selector negotiation.

   This paragraph lists references that appear only in figures.  The
   section is only here to keep the 'xml2rfc' program happy, and needs
   to be removed when the document is published.  Feel free to ignore
   it.  [DES] [IDEA] [MD5] [X.501] [X.509]


8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [ADDGROUP]
              Kivinen, T. and M. Kojo, "More Modular Exponential (MODP)
              Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",
              RFC 3526, May 2003.

   [ADDRIPV6]



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              Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "Internet Protocol Version 6
              (IPv6) Addressing Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006.

   [EAP]      Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
              Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
              RFC 3748, June 2004.

   [ECN]      Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition
              of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP",
              RFC 3168, September 2001.

   [ESPCBC]   Pereira, R. and R. Adams, "The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher
              Algorithms", RFC 2451, November 1998.

   [IPSECARCH]
              Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.

   [MUSTSHOULD]
              Bradner, S., "Key Words for use in RFCs to indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [PKCS1]    Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
              Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
              Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.

   [PKIX]     Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
              X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
              Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
              April 2002.

   [RFC4434]  Hoffman, P., "The AES-XCBC-PRF-128 Algorithm for the
              Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE)", RFC 4434,
              February 2006.

   [RFC4615]  Song, J., Poovendran, R., Lee, J., and T. Iwata, "The
              Advanced Encryption Standard-Cipher-based Message
              Authentication Code-Pseudo-Random Function-128 (AES-CMAC-
              PRF-128) Algorithm for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol
              (IKE)", RFC 4615, August 2006.

   [UDPENCAPS]
              Huttunen, A., Swander, B., Volpe, V., DiBurro, L., and M.
              Stenberg, "UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets",
              RFC 3948, January 2005.






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8.2.  Informative References

   [AH]       Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
              December 2005.

   [ARCHGUIDEPHIL]
              Bush, R. and D. Meyer, "Some Internet Architectural
              Guidelines and Philosophy", RFC 3439, December 2002.

   [ARCHPRINC]
              Carpenter, B., "Architectural Principles of the Internet",
              RFC 1958, June 1996.

   [Clarif]   Eronen, P. and P. Hoffman, "IKEv2 Clarifications and
              Implementation Guidelines", RFC 4718, October 2006.

   [DES]      American National Standards Institute, "American National
              Standard for Information Systems-Data Link Encryption",
              ANSI X3.106, 1983.

   [DH]       Diffie, W. and M. Hellman, "New Directions in
              Cryptography", IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
              V.IT-22 n. 6, June 1977.

   [DHCP]     Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
              RFC 2131, March 1997.

   [DIFFSERVARCH]
              Blake, S., Black, D., Carlson, M., Davies, E., Wang, Z.,
              and W. Weiss, "An Architecture for Differentiated
              Services", RFC 2475.

   [DIFFSERVFIELD]
              Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F., and D. Black,
              "Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS
              Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers", RFC 2474,
              December 1998.

   [DIFFTUNNEL]
              Black, D., "Differentiated Services and Tunnels",
              RFC 2983, October 2000.

   [DOI]      Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain of
              Interpretation for ISAKMP", RFC 2407, November 1998.

   [DOSUDPPROT]
              C. Kaufman, R. Perlman, and B. Sommerfeld, "DoS protection
              for UDP-based protocols", ACM Conference on Computer and



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              Communications Security , October 2003.

   [DSS]      National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
              Department of Commerce, "Digital Signature Standard",
              FIPS 186, May 1994.

   [EAPMITM]  N. Asokan, V. Nierni, and K. Nyberg, "Man-in-the-Middle in
              Tunneled Authentication Protocols", November 2002,
              <http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/163>.

   [ESP]      Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4303, December 2005.

   [EXCHANGEANALYSIS]
              R. Perlman and C. Kaufman, "Analysis of the IPsec key
              exchange Standard", WET-ICE Security Conference, MIT ,
              2001,
              <http://sec.femto.org/wetice-2001/papers/radia-paper.pdf>.

   [H2HIPSEC]
              Aura, T., Roe, M., and A. Mohammed, "Experiences with
              Host-to-Host IPsec", 13th International Workshop on
              Security Protocols, Cambridge, UK, April 2005.

   [HMAC]     Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
              February 1997.

   [IDEA]     X. Lai, "On the Design and Security of Block Ciphers", ETH
              Series in Information Processing, v. 1, Konstanz: Hartung-
              Gorre Verlag, 1992.

   [IDNA]     Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P., and A. Costello,
              "Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (IDNA)",
              RFC 3490, March 2003.

   [IKEV1]    Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
              (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.

   [IKEV2]    Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
              RFC 4306, December 2005.

   [IPCOMP]   Shacham, A., Monsour, B., Pereira, R., and M. Thomas, "IP
              Payload Compression Protocol (IPComp)", RFC 3173,
              September 2001.

   [IPSECARCH-OLD]
              Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the



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              Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.

   [IPV6ADDR]
              Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "Internet Protocol Version 6
              (IPv6) Addressing Architecture", RFC 3513, April 2003.

   [ISAKMP]   Maughan, D., Schneider, M., and M. Schertler, "Internet
              Security Association and Key Management Protocol
              (ISAKMP)", RFC 2408, November 1998.

   [LDAP]     Wahl, M., Howes, T., and S. Kille, "Lightweight Directory
              Access Protocol (v3)", RFC 2251, December 1997.

   [MAILFORMAT]
              Resnick, P., "Internet Message Format", RFC 2822,
              April 2001.

   [MD5]      Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
              April 1992.

   [MIPV6]    Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support
              in IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.

   [MLDV2]    Vida, R. and L. Costa, "Multicast Listener Discovery
              Version 2 (MLDv2) for IPv6", RFC 3810, June 2004.

   [MODES]    National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
              Department of Commerce, "Recommendation for Block Cipher
              Modes of Operation", SP 800-38A, 2001.

   [NAI]      Aboba, B. and M. Beadles, "The Network Access Identifier",
              RFC 2486, January 1999.

   [NATREQ]   Aboba, B. and W. Dixon, "IPsec-Network Address Translation
              (NAT) Compatibility Requirements", RFC 3715, March 2004.

   [OAKLEY]   Orman, H., "The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol",
              RFC 2412, November 1998.

   [PFKEY]    McDonald, D., Metz, C., and B. Phan, "PF_KEY Key
              Management API, Version 2", RFC 2367, July 1998.

   [PHOTURIS]
              Karn, P. and W. Simpson, "Photuris: Session-Key Management
              Protocol", RFC 2522, March 1999.

   [RADIUS]   Rigney, C., Rubens, A., Simpson, W., and S. Willens,
              "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",



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              RFC 2138, April 1997.

   [RANDOMNESS]
              Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
              Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.

   [REAUTH]   Nir, Y., "Repeated Authentication in Internet Key Exchange
              (IKEv2) Protocol", RFC 4478, April 2006.

   [RSA]      R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman, "A Method for
              Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key
              Cryptosystems", February 1978.

   [SHA]      National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
              Department of Commerce, "Secure Hash Standard",
              FIPS 180-1, May 1994.

   [SIGMA]    H. Krawczyk, "SIGMA: the `SIGn-and-MAc' Approach to
              Authenticated Diffie-Hellman and its Use in the IKE
              Protocols", Advances in Cryptography - CRYPTO 2003
              Proceedings LNCS 2729, 2003, <http://
              www.informatik.uni-trier.de/~ley/db/conf/crypto/
              crypto2003.html>.

   [SKEME]    H. Krawczyk, "SKEME: A Versatile Secure Key Exchange
              Mechanism for Internet", IEEE Proceedings of the 1996
              Symposium on Network and Distributed Systems Security ,
              1996.

   [TRANSPARENCY]
              Carpenter, B., "Internet Transparency", RFC 2775,
              February 2000.

   [X.501]    ITU-T, "Recommendation X.501: Information Technology -
              Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Models",
              1993.

   [X.509]    ITU-T, "Recommendation X.509 (1997 E): Information
              Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory:
              Authentication Framework", 1997.


Appendix A.  Summary of changes from IKEv1

   The goals of this revision to IKE are:






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   1.   To define the entire IKE protocol in a single document,
        replacing RFCs 2407, 2408, and 2409 and incorporating subsequent
        changes to support NAT Traversal, Extensible Authentication, and
        Remote Address acquisition;

   2.   To simplify IKE by replacing the eight different initial
        exchanges with a single four-message exchange (with changes in
        authentication mechanisms affecting only a single AUTH payload
        rather than restructuring the entire exchange) see
        [EXCHANGEANALYSIS];

   3.   To remove the Domain of Interpretation (DOI), Situation (SIT),
        and Labeled Domain Identifier fields, and the Commit and
        Authentication only bits;

   4.   To decrease IKE's latency in the common case by making the
        initial exchange be 2 round trips (4 messages), and allowing the
        ability to piggyback setup of a CHILD_SA on that exchange;

   5.   To replace the cryptographic syntax for protecting the IKE
        messages themselves with one based closely on ESP to simplify
        implementation and security analysis;

   6.   To reduce the number of possible error states by making the
        protocol reliable (all messages are acknowledged) and sequenced.
        This allows shortening CREATE_CHILD_SA exchanges from 3 messages
        to 2;

   7.   To increase robustness by allowing the responder to not do
        significant processing until it receives a message proving that
        the initiator can receive messages at its claimed IP address;

   8.   To fix cryptographic weaknesses such as the problem with
        symmetries in hashes used for authentication documented by Tero
        Kivinen;

   9.   To specify Traffic Selectors in their own payloads type rather
        than overloading ID payloads, and making more flexible the
        Traffic Selectors that may be specified;

   10.  To specify required behavior under certain error conditions or
        when data that is not understood is received in order to make it
        easier to make future revisions in a way that does not break
        backwards compatibility;

   11.  To simplify and clarify how shared state is maintained in the
        presence of network failures and Denial of Service attacks; and




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   12.  To maintain existing syntax and magic numbers to the extent
        possible to make it likely that implementations of IKEv1 can be
        enhanced to support IKEv2 with minimum effort.


Appendix B.  Diffie-Hellman Groups

   There are two Diffie-Hellman groups defined here for use in IKE.
   These groups were generated by Richard Schroeppel at the University
   of Arizona.  Properties of these primes are described in [OAKLEY].

   The strength supplied by group one may not be sufficient for the
   mandatory-to-implement encryption algorithm and is here for historic
   reasons.

   Additional Diffie-Hellman groups have been defined in [ADDGROUP].

B.1.  Group 1 - 768 Bit MODP

   This group is assigned id 1 (one).

   The prime is: 2^768 - 2 ^704 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^638 pi] + 149686 }
   Its hexadecimal value is:

   FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1
   29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD
   EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245
   E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A63A3620 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF

   The generator is 2.

B.2.  Group 2 - 1024 Bit MODP

   This group is assigned id 2 (two).

   The prime is 2^1024 - 2^960 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^894 pi] + 129093 }.
   Its hexadecimal value is:

   FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1
   29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD
   EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245
   E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED
   EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE65381
   FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF

   The generator is 2.





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Appendix C.  Exchanges and Payloads

   {{ Clarif-AppA }}

   This appendix contains a short summary of the IKEv2 exchanges, and
   what payloads can appear in which message.  This appendix is purely
   informative; if it disagrees with the body of this document, the
   other text is considered correct.

   Vendor-ID (V) payloads may be included in any place in any message.
   This sequence here shows what are the most logical places for them.

C.1.  IKE_SA_INIT Exchange

   request             --> [N(COOKIE)],
                           SA, KE, Ni,
                           [N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP)+,
                            N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)],
                           [V+]

   normal response     <-- SA, KE, Nr,
   (no cookie)             [N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
                            N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)],
                           [[N(HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP_SUPPORTED)], CERTREQ+],
                           [V+]


























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C.2.  IKE_AUTH Exchange without EAP

   request             --> IDi, [CERT+],
                           [N(INITIAL_CONTACT)],
                           [[N(HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP_SUPPORTED)], CERTREQ+],
                           [IDr],
                           AUTH,
                           [CP(CFG_REQUEST)],
                           [N(IPCOMP_SUPPORTED)+],
                           [N(USE_TRANSPORT_MODE)],
                           [N(ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED)],
                           [N(NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)],
                           SA, TSi, TSr,
                           [V+]

   response            <-- IDr, [CERT+],
                           AUTH,
                           [CP(CFG_REPLY)],
                           [N(IPCOMP_SUPPORTED)],
                           [N(USE_TRANSPORT_MODE)],
                           [N(ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED)],
                           [N(NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)],
                           SA, TSi, TSr,
                           [N(ADDITIONAL_TS_POSSIBLE)],
                           [V+]


























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C.3.  IKE_AUTH Exchange with EAP

   first request       --> IDi,
                           [N(INITIAL_CONTACT)],
                           [[N(HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP_SUPPORTED)], CERTREQ+],
                           [IDr],
                           [CP(CFG_REQUEST)],
                           [N(IPCOMP_SUPPORTED)+],
                           [N(USE_TRANSPORT_MODE)],
                           [N(ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED)],
                           [N(NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)],
                           SA, TSi, TSr,
                           [V+]

   first response      <-- IDr, [CERT+], AUTH,
                           EAP,
                           [V+]

                     / --> EAP
   repeat 1..N times |
                     \ <-- EAP

   last request        --> AUTH

   last response       <-- AUTH,
                           [CP(CFG_REPLY)],
                           [N(IPCOMP_SUPPORTED)],
                           [N(USE_TRANSPORT_MODE)],
                           [N(ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED)],
                           [N(NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)],
                           SA, TSi, TSr,
                           [N(ADDITIONAL_TS_POSSIBLE)],
                           [V+]


















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C.4.  CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange for Creating or Rekeying CHILD_SAs

   request             --> [N(REKEY_SA)],
                           [CP(CFG_REQUEST)],
                           [N(IPCOMP_SUPPORTED)+],
                           [N(USE_TRANSPORT_MODE)],
                           [N(ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED)],
                           [N(NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)],
                           SA, Ni, [KEi], TSi, TSr

   response            <-- [CP(CFG_REPLY)],
                           [N(IPCOMP_SUPPORTED)],
                           [N(USE_TRANSPORT_MODE)],
                           [N(ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED)],
                           [N(NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO)],
                           SA, Nr, [KEr], TSi, TSr,
                           [N(ADDITIONAL_TS_POSSIBLE)]

C.5.  CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange for Rekeying the IKE_SA

   request             --> SA, Ni, [KEi]

   response            <-- SA, Nr, [KEr]

C.6.  INFORMATIONAL Exchange

   request             --> [N+],
                           [D+],
                           [CP(CFG_REQUEST)]

   response            <-- [N+],
                           [D+],
                           [CP(CFG_REPLY)]


Appendix D.  Changes Between Internet Draft Versions

   This section will be removed before publication as an RFC, but should
   be left intact until then so that reviewers can follow what has
   changed.

D.1.  Changes from IKEv2 to draft -00

   There were a zillion additions from RFC 4718.  These are noted with
   "{{ Clarif-nn }}".

   Cleaned up many of the figures.  Made the table headings consistent.
   Made some tables easier to read by removing blank spaces.  Removed



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   the "reserved to IANA" and "private use" text wording and moved it
   into the tables.

   Changed many SHOULD requirements to better match RFC 2119.  These are
   also marked with comments such as "{{ Demoted the SHOULD }}".

   In Section 2.16, changed the MUST requirement of authenticating the
   responder from "public key signature based" to "strong" because that
   is what most current IKEv2 implementations do, and it better matches
   the actual security requirement.

D.2.  Changes from draft -00 to draft -01

   The most significant technical change was to make KE optional but
   strongly recommended in Section 1.3.2.

   Updated all references to the IKEv2 Clarifications document to RFC
   4718.

   Moved a lot of the protocol description out of the long tables in
   Section 3.10.1 into the body of the document.  These are noted with
   "{{ 3.10.1-nnnn }}", where "nnnn" is the notification type number.

   Made some table changes based on suggestions from Alfred Hoenes.

   Changed "byte" to "octet" in many places.

   Removed discussion of ESP+AH bundles in many places, and added a
   paragraph about it in Section 1.7.

   Removed the discussion of INTERNAL_ADDRESS_EXPIRY in many places, and
   added a paragraph about it in Section 1.7.

   Moved Clarif-7.10 from Section 1.2 to Section 3.2.

   In the figure in Section 1.3.2, made KEi optional, and added text
   saying "The KEi payload SHOULD be included."

   In the figure in Section 1.3.2, maked KEr optional, and removed text
   saying "KEi and KEr are required for rekeying an IKE_SA."

   In Section 1.4, clarified that the half-closed connections being
   discussed are AH and ESP.

   Rearranged the end of Section 1.7, and added the new notation for
   moving text out of 3.10.1.

   Clarified the wording in the second paragraph of Section 2.2.  This



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   allowd the removal of the fourth paragraph, which previously had
   Clarif-2.2 in it.

   In section 2.5, removed "or later" from "version 2.0".

   Added the question for implementers about payload order at the end of
   Section 2.5.

   Corrected Section 2.7 based on Clarif-7-13 to say that you can't do
   ESP and AH at one time.

   In Section 2.8, clarified the wording about how to replace an IKE_SA.

   Clarified the text in the last many paragraphs in Section 2.9.  Also
   moved some text from near the beginning of 2.9 to the beginning of
   2.9.1.

   Removed some redundant text in Section 2.9 concerning creating a
   CHILD_SA pair not in response to an arriving packet.

   Added the following to the end of the first paragraph of Section
   2.14: "The lengths of SK_d, SK_pi, and SK_pr are the key length of
   the agreed-to PRF."

   Added the restriction in Section 2.15 that all PRFs used with IKEv2
   MUST take variable-sized keys.

   In Section 2.17, removed "If multiple IPsec protocols are negotiated,
   keying material is taken in the order in which the protocol headers
   will appear in the encapsulated packet" because multiple IPsec
   protocols cannot be negotiated at one time.

   Added the material from Clarif-5.12 to Section 2.18.

   Changed "hash of" to "expected value of" in Section 2.23.

   In the bulleted list in Section 2.23, replaced "this end" with a
   clearer description of which system is being discussed.

   Added the paragraph at the beginning of Section 3 about
   interoperability and UNSPECIFIED values ("In the tables in this
   section...").

   Fixed Section 3.3 to not include proposal that include both AH and
   ESP.  Ditto for the "Proposal #" bullet in Section 3.3.1.

   In the description of ID_FQDN in Section 3.5, added "All characters
   in the ID_FQDN are ASCII; this follows that for an "internationalized



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   domain name" as defined in [IDNA]."

   In Section 3.8, shortened and clarified the description of "RSA
   Digital Signature".

   In Section 3.10, shortened and clarified the description of "Protocol
   ID".

   In Section 3.15, "The requested address is valid until the expiry
   time defined with the INTERNAL_ADDRESS_EXPIRY attribute or there are
   no IKE_SAs between the peers" is shortened to just "The requested
   address is valid until there are no IKE_SAs between the peers."

   In Section 3.15.1, changed "INTERNAL_IP6_NBNS" to unspecified.

   Made [ADDRIPV6] an informative reference instead of a normative
   reference and updated it.

   Made [PKCS1] a normative reference instead of an informative
   reference and changed the pointer to RFC 3447.

D.3.  Changes from draft -00 to draft -01

   In Section 1.5, added "request" to first sentence to make it "If an
   encrypted IKE request packet arrives on port 500 or 4500 with an
   unrecognized SPI...".

   In Section 3.3, fifth paragraph, upped the number of transforms for
   AH and ESP by one each to account for ESN, which is now mandatory.

   In Section 2.1, added "or equal to" in "The responder MUST remember
   each response until it receives a request whose sequence number is
   larger than or equal to the sequence number in the response plus its
   window size."

   In Section 2.18, removed " Note that this may not work if the new
   IKE_SA's PRF has a fixed key size because the output of the PRF may
   not be of the correct size." because it is no longer relevant.

D.4.  Changes from draft -01 to draft -02

   Many grammatical fixes.

   In Section 1.2, reworded Clarif-4.3 to be clearer.

   In Section 1.3.3, reworded 3.10.1-16393 and Clarif-5.4 to remove
   redundant text.




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   In Section 2.13, replaced text about variable length keys with
   clearer explanation and requirement on non-HMAC PRFs.  Also added
   "preferred" to Section 2.14 for the key length, and removed redundant
   text.

   In Section 2.14, removed the "half and half" description and replaced
   it with exceptions for RFC4434 and RFC4615.

   Removed the now-redundant "All PRFs used with IKEv2 MUST take
   variable-sized keys" from Section 2.15.

   In Section 2.15, added "(IKE_SA_INIT response)" after "of the second
   message" and "(IKE_SA_INIT request)" after "the first message".

   In Section 2.17, simplified because there are no more bundles.  "A
   single CHILD_SA negotiation may result in multiple security
   associations.  ESP and AH SAs exist in pairs (one in each
   direction)." becomes "For ESP and AH, a single CHILD_SA negotiation
   results in two security associations (one in each direction)."

   In section 3.3, made the example of combinations of algorithms and
   the contents of the first proposal clearer.

   Added Clarif-4.4 to the ned of Section 3.3.2.

   Reordered Section 3.3.5 and added Clarif-7.11.

   Clarified Section 3.3.6 about choosing a single proposal.  Also added
   second paragraph about transforms not understood, and clarified third
   paragraph about picking D-H groups.

   Moved 3.10.1-16392 from Section 3.6 to 3.7.

   In Section 3.10, clarified 3.10.1-16394.

   Updated Section 6 to indicate that there is nothing new for IANA in
   this spec.  Also removed the definition of "Expert Review" from
   Section 1.6 for the same reason.

   In Appendix A, removed "and not commit any state to an exchange until
   the initiator can be cryptographically authenticated" because that
   was only true in an earlier version of IKEv2.

D.5.  Changes from draft -02 to draft -03

   In Section 1.3, changed "If the responder rejects the Diffie-Hellman
   group of the KEi payload, the responder MUST reject the request and
   indicate its preferred Diffie-Hellman group in the INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD



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   Notification payload." to "If the responder selects a proposal using
   a different Diffie-Hellman group (other than NONE), the responder
   MUST reject the request and indicate its preferred Diffie-Hellman
   group in the INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD Notification payload.

   In Section 2.3, added the last two paragraphs covering why you
   initiator's SPI and/or IP to differentiate if this is a "half-open"
   IKE_SA or a new request.  Also removed similar text from Section 2.2.

   In Section 2.5, added "Payloads sent in IKE response messages MUST
   NOT have the critical flag set.  Note that the critical flag applies
   only to the payload type, not the contents.  If the payload type is
   recognized, but the payload contains something which is not (such as
   an unknown transform inside an SA payload, or an unknown Notify
   Message Type inside a Notify payload), the critical flag is ignored."

   In Section 2.6, moved the text about {{ 3.10.1-16390 }} later in the
   section.  Also reworded the text to make it clearer what the COOKIE
   is for.

   Moved text from {{ Clarif-2.1 }} from Section 2.6 to Section 2.7.

   In Section 2.13, added "(see Section 3.3.5 for the defintion of the
   Key Length transform attribute)".

   In Section 2.17, change the description of the keying material from
   the list with two bullets to a clearer list.

   In Section 2.23, added "Implementations MUST process received UDP-
   encapsulated ESP packets even when no NAT was detected."

   In Section 3.3, changed "Each proposal may contain a" to "Each
   proposal contains a".

   Added the asterisks to the tranform type table in Section 3.3.2 and
   the types table in 3.3.3 to foreshadow future developments.

   In Section 3.3.2, changed the following algorithms to (UNSPECIFIED)
   because the RFCs listed didn't really specify how to implement them
   in an interoperable fashion:











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   Encryption Algorithms
   ENCR_DES_IV64        1           (RFC1827)
   ENCR_3IDEA           8           (RFC2451)
   ENCR_DES_IV32        9
   Pseudo-random Functions
   PRF_HMAC_TIGER              3         (RFC2104)
   Integrity Algorithms
   AUTH_DES_MAC         3
   AUTH_KPDK_MD5        4        (RFC1826)

   In Section 3.4, added "(other than NONE)" to the second-to-last
   paragraph.

   Rewrote the third paragraph of Section 3.14 to talk about other
   modes, and to clarify which encryption and integrity protection we
   are talking about.

   Changed the "Initialization Vector" bullet in Section 3.14 to specify
   better what is needed for the IV.  Upgraded the SHOULDs to MUSTs.
   Also added the reference for [MODES].

   In Section 5, in the second-to-last paragraph, changed "a public-key-
   based" to "strong" to match the wording in Section 2.16.


Authors' Addresses

   Charlie Kaufman
   Microsoft
   1 Microsoft Way
   Redmond, WA  98052
   US

   Phone: 1-425-707-3335
   Email: charliek@microsoft.com


   Paul Hoffman
   VPN Consortium
   127 Segre Place
   Santa Cruz, CA  95060
   US

   Phone: 1-831-426-9827
   Email: paul.hoffman@vpnc.org






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   Pasi Eronen
   Nokia Research Center
   P.O. Box 407
   FIN-00045 Nokia Group
   Finland

   Email: pasi.eronen@nokia.com












































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