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a672a02a SL |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
3 | * | |
4 | * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use | |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8 | */ | |
9 | ||
e1178600 SL |
10 | /* Dispatch functions for gcm mode */ |
11 | ||
604e884b RL |
12 | #include "prov/ciphercommon.h" |
13 | #include "prov/cipher_gcm.h" | |
ddd21319 | 14 | #include "prov/providercommonerr.h" |
25f2138b | 15 | #include "crypto/rand.h" |
ddd21319 | 16 | #include "prov/provider_ctx.h" |
a672a02a SL |
17 | |
18 | static int gcm_tls_init(PROV_GCM_CTX *dat, unsigned char *aad, size_t aad_len); | |
19 | static int gcm_tls_iv_set_fixed(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *iv, | |
20 | size_t len); | |
21 | static int gcm_tls_cipher(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *padlen, | |
22 | const unsigned char *in, size_t len); | |
23 | static int gcm_cipher_internal(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, | |
24 | size_t *padlen, const unsigned char *in, | |
25 | size_t len); | |
26 | ||
e1178600 SL |
27 | void gcm_initctx(void *provctx, PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, size_t keybits, |
28 | const PROV_GCM_HW *hw, size_t ivlen_min) | |
a672a02a SL |
29 | { |
30 | ctx->pad = 1; | |
31 | ctx->mode = EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE; | |
1c3ace68 SL |
32 | ctx->taglen = UNINITIALISED_SIZET; |
33 | ctx->tls_aad_len = UNINITIALISED_SIZET; | |
a672a02a SL |
34 | ctx->ivlen_min = ivlen_min; |
35 | ctx->ivlen = (EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN); | |
36 | ctx->keylen = keybits / 8; | |
37 | ctx->hw = hw; | |
38 | ctx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx); | |
39 | } | |
40 | ||
a672a02a SL |
41 | static int gcm_init(void *vctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, |
42 | const unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen, int enc) | |
43 | { | |
44 | PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_GCM_CTX *)vctx; | |
45 | ||
46 | ctx->enc = enc; | |
47 | ||
48 | if (iv != NULL) { | |
49 | if (ivlen < ctx->ivlen_min || ivlen > sizeof(ctx->iv)) { | |
784883fc | 50 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH); |
a672a02a SL |
51 | return 0; |
52 | } | |
53 | ctx->ivlen = ivlen; | |
089cb623 | 54 | memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, ivlen); |
a672a02a SL |
55 | ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_BUFFERED; |
56 | } | |
57 | ||
58 | if (key != NULL) { | |
59 | if (keylen != ctx->keylen) { | |
784883fc | 60 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); |
a672a02a SL |
61 | return 0; |
62 | } | |
63 | return ctx->hw->setkey(ctx, key, ctx->keylen); | |
64 | } | |
65 | return 1; | |
66 | } | |
67 | ||
e1178600 SL |
68 | int gcm_einit(void *vctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, |
69 | const unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen) | |
a672a02a SL |
70 | { |
71 | return gcm_init(vctx, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, 1); | |
72 | } | |
73 | ||
e1178600 SL |
74 | int gcm_dinit(void *vctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, |
75 | const unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen) | |
a672a02a SL |
76 | { |
77 | return gcm_init(vctx, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, 0); | |
78 | } | |
79 | ||
e1178600 | 80 | int gcm_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[]) |
a672a02a SL |
81 | { |
82 | PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_GCM_CTX *)vctx; | |
83 | OSSL_PARAM *p; | |
84 | size_t sz; | |
85 | ||
86 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IVLEN); | |
1c3ace68 | 87 | if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, ctx->ivlen)) { |
3bfe9005 SL |
88 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER); |
89 | return 0; | |
a672a02a SL |
90 | } |
91 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN); | |
1c3ace68 | 92 | if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, ctx->keylen)) { |
784883fc | 93 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER); |
a672a02a SL |
94 | return 0; |
95 | } | |
dc64dc2e SL |
96 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAGLEN); |
97 | if (p != NULL) { | |
98 | size_t taglen = (ctx->taglen != UNINITIALISED_SIZET) ? ctx->taglen : | |
99 | GCM_TAG_MAX_SIZE; | |
100 | ||
101 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, taglen)) { | |
102 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER); | |
103 | return 0; | |
104 | } | |
105 | } | |
a672a02a SL |
106 | |
107 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_IV); | |
108 | if (p != NULL) { | |
109 | if (ctx->iv_gen != 1 && ctx->iv_gen_rand != 1) | |
110 | return 0; | |
1c3ace68 | 111 | if (ctx->ivlen != p->data_size) { |
784883fc | 112 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH); |
a672a02a SL |
113 | return 0; |
114 | } | |
115 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, ctx->iv, ctx->ivlen)) { | |
784883fc | 116 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER); |
a672a02a SL |
117 | return 0; |
118 | } | |
119 | } | |
120 | ||
121 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_PAD); | |
122 | if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, ctx->tls_aad_pad_sz)) { | |
784883fc | 123 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER); |
a672a02a SL |
124 | return 0; |
125 | } | |
126 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAG); | |
127 | if (p != NULL) { | |
128 | sz = p->data_size; | |
1c3ace68 SL |
129 | if (sz == 0 |
130 | || sz > EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN | |
131 | || !ctx->enc | |
132 | || ctx->taglen == UNINITIALISED_SIZET) { | |
784883fc | 133 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_TAG); |
a672a02a SL |
134 | return 0; |
135 | } | |
136 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, ctx->buf, sz)) { | |
784883fc | 137 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_SET_PARAMETER); |
a672a02a SL |
138 | return 0; |
139 | } | |
140 | } | |
dc64dc2e | 141 | |
a672a02a SL |
142 | return 1; |
143 | } | |
144 | ||
e1178600 | 145 | int gcm_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) |
a672a02a SL |
146 | { |
147 | PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_GCM_CTX *)vctx; | |
148 | const OSSL_PARAM *p; | |
149 | size_t sz; | |
150 | void *vp; | |
151 | ||
152 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TAG); | |
153 | if (p != NULL) { | |
154 | vp = ctx->buf; | |
155 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, &vp, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN, &sz)) { | |
784883fc | 156 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); |
a672a02a SL |
157 | return 0; |
158 | } | |
159 | if (sz == 0 || ctx->enc) { | |
784883fc | 160 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_TAG); |
a672a02a SL |
161 | return 0; |
162 | } | |
163 | ctx->taglen = sz; | |
164 | } | |
165 | ||
166 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_IVLEN); | |
167 | if (p != NULL) { | |
168 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &sz)) { | |
784883fc | 169 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); |
a672a02a SL |
170 | return 0; |
171 | } | |
172 | if (sz == 0 || sz > sizeof(ctx->iv)) { | |
784883fc | 173 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_IV_LENGTH); |
a672a02a SL |
174 | return 0; |
175 | } | |
176 | ctx->ivlen = sz; | |
177 | } | |
178 | ||
179 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TLS1_AAD); | |
180 | if (p != NULL) { | |
181 | if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_STRING) { | |
784883fc | 182 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); |
a672a02a SL |
183 | return 0; |
184 | } | |
185 | sz = gcm_tls_init(ctx, p->data, p->data_size); | |
186 | if (sz == 0) { | |
784883fc | 187 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_AAD); |
a672a02a SL |
188 | return 0; |
189 | } | |
190 | ctx->tls_aad_pad_sz = sz; | |
191 | } | |
192 | ||
193 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_AEAD_TLS1_IV_FIXED); | |
194 | if (p != NULL) { | |
195 | if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_STRING) { | |
784883fc | 196 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); |
a672a02a SL |
197 | return 0; |
198 | } | |
199 | if (gcm_tls_iv_set_fixed(ctx, p->data, p->data_size) == 0) { | |
784883fc | 200 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); |
a672a02a SL |
201 | return 0; |
202 | } | |
203 | } | |
204 | ||
e9c116eb SL |
205 | /* |
206 | * TODO(3.0) Temporary solution to address fuzz test crash, which will be | |
207 | * reworked once the discussion in PR #9510 is resolved. i.e- We need a | |
208 | * general solution for handling missing parameters inside set_params and | |
209 | * get_params methods. | |
210 | */ | |
211 | p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN); | |
212 | if (p != NULL) { | |
1c3ace68 | 213 | size_t keylen; |
e9c116eb | 214 | |
1c3ace68 | 215 | if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &keylen)) { |
784883fc | 216 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER); |
e9c116eb SL |
217 | return 0; |
218 | } | |
219 | /* The key length can not be modified for gcm mode */ | |
1c3ace68 | 220 | if (keylen != ctx->keylen) |
e9c116eb SL |
221 | return 0; |
222 | } | |
223 | ||
a672a02a SL |
224 | return 1; |
225 | } | |
226 | ||
e1178600 SL |
227 | int gcm_stream_update(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl, |
228 | size_t outsize, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) | |
a672a02a SL |
229 | { |
230 | PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_GCM_CTX *)vctx; | |
231 | ||
232 | if (outsize < inl) { | |
784883fc | 233 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); |
a672a02a SL |
234 | return -1; |
235 | } | |
236 | ||
237 | if (gcm_cipher_internal(ctx, out, outl, in, inl) <= 0) { | |
784883fc | 238 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_CIPHER_OPERATION_FAILED); |
a672a02a SL |
239 | return -1; |
240 | } | |
241 | return 1; | |
242 | } | |
243 | ||
e1178600 SL |
244 | int gcm_stream_final(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl, |
245 | size_t outsize) | |
a672a02a SL |
246 | { |
247 | PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_GCM_CTX *)vctx; | |
248 | int i; | |
249 | ||
250 | i = gcm_cipher_internal(ctx, out, outl, NULL, 0); | |
251 | if (i <= 0) | |
252 | return 0; | |
253 | ||
254 | *outl = 0; | |
255 | return 1; | |
256 | } | |
257 | ||
e1178600 SL |
258 | int gcm_cipher(void *vctx, |
259 | unsigned char *out, size_t *outl, size_t outsize, | |
260 | const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) | |
a672a02a SL |
261 | { |
262 | PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx = (PROV_GCM_CTX *)vctx; | |
263 | ||
264 | if (outsize < inl) { | |
784883fc | 265 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); |
a672a02a SL |
266 | return -1; |
267 | } | |
268 | ||
269 | if (gcm_cipher_internal(ctx, out, outl, in, inl) <= 0) | |
270 | return -1; | |
271 | ||
272 | *outl = inl; | |
273 | return 1; | |
274 | } | |
275 | ||
276 | /* | |
277 | * See SP800-38D (GCM) Section 8 "Uniqueness requirement on IVS and keys" | |
278 | * | |
279 | * See also 8.2.2 RBG-based construction. | |
280 | * Random construction consists of a free field (which can be NULL) and a | |
281 | * random field which will use a DRBG that can return at least 96 bits of | |
282 | * entropy strength. (The DRBG must be seeded by the FIPS module). | |
283 | */ | |
284 | static int gcm_iv_generate(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, int offset) | |
285 | { | |
286 | int sz = ctx->ivlen - offset; | |
287 | ||
288 | /* Must be at least 96 bits */ | |
289 | if (sz <= 0 || ctx->ivlen < GCM_IV_DEFAULT_SIZE) | |
290 | return 0; | |
291 | ||
292 | /* Use DRBG to generate random iv */ | |
293 | if (rand_bytes_ex(ctx->libctx, ctx->iv + offset, sz) <= 0) | |
294 | return 0; | |
295 | ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_BUFFERED; | |
296 | ctx->iv_gen_rand = 1; | |
297 | return 1; | |
298 | } | |
299 | ||
300 | static int gcm_cipher_internal(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, | |
301 | size_t *padlen, const unsigned char *in, | |
302 | size_t len) | |
303 | { | |
304 | size_t olen = 0; | |
305 | int rv = 0; | |
306 | const PROV_GCM_HW *hw = ctx->hw; | |
307 | ||
1c3ace68 | 308 | if (ctx->tls_aad_len != UNINITIALISED_SIZET) |
a672a02a SL |
309 | return gcm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, padlen, in, len); |
310 | ||
311 | if (!ctx->key_set || ctx->iv_state == IV_STATE_FINISHED) | |
312 | goto err; | |
313 | ||
314 | /* | |
315 | * FIPS requires generation of AES-GCM IV's inside the FIPS module. | |
316 | * The IV can still be set externally (the security policy will state that | |
317 | * this is not FIPS compliant). There are some applications | |
318 | * where setting the IV externally is the only option available. | |
319 | */ | |
320 | if (ctx->iv_state == IV_STATE_UNINITIALISED) { | |
321 | if (!ctx->enc || !gcm_iv_generate(ctx, 0)) | |
322 | goto err; | |
323 | } | |
324 | ||
325 | if (ctx->iv_state == IV_STATE_BUFFERED) { | |
326 | if (!hw->setiv(ctx, ctx->iv, ctx->ivlen)) | |
327 | goto err; | |
328 | ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_COPIED; | |
329 | } | |
330 | ||
331 | if (in != NULL) { | |
332 | /* The input is AAD if out is NULL */ | |
333 | if (out == NULL) { | |
334 | if (!hw->aadupdate(ctx, in, len)) | |
335 | goto err; | |
336 | } else { | |
337 | /* The input is ciphertext OR plaintext */ | |
338 | if (!hw->cipherupdate(ctx, in, len, out)) | |
339 | goto err; | |
340 | } | |
341 | } else { | |
2e9645c8 SL |
342 | /* The tag must be set before actually decrypting data */ |
343 | if (!ctx->enc && ctx->taglen == UNINITIALISED_SIZET) | |
344 | goto err; | |
a672a02a SL |
345 | if (!hw->cipherfinal(ctx, ctx->buf)) |
346 | goto err; | |
347 | ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_FINISHED; /* Don't reuse the IV */ | |
348 | goto finish; | |
349 | } | |
350 | olen = len; | |
351 | finish: | |
352 | rv = 1; | |
353 | err: | |
354 | *padlen = olen; | |
355 | return rv; | |
356 | } | |
357 | ||
358 | static int gcm_tls_init(PROV_GCM_CTX *dat, unsigned char *aad, size_t aad_len) | |
359 | { | |
360 | unsigned char *buf; | |
361 | size_t len; | |
362 | ||
363 | if (aad_len != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) | |
364 | return 0; | |
365 | ||
366 | /* Save the aad for later use. */ | |
367 | buf = dat->buf; | |
368 | memcpy(buf, aad, aad_len); | |
369 | dat->tls_aad_len = aad_len; | |
370 | dat->tls_enc_records = 0; | |
371 | ||
372 | len = buf[aad_len - 2] << 8 | buf[aad_len - 1]; | |
373 | /* Correct length for explicit iv. */ | |
374 | if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN) | |
375 | return 0; | |
376 | len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
377 | ||
378 | /* If decrypting correct for tag too. */ | |
379 | if (!dat->enc) { | |
380 | if (len < EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN) | |
381 | return 0; | |
382 | len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; | |
383 | } | |
384 | buf[aad_len - 2] = (unsigned char)(len >> 8); | |
385 | buf[aad_len - 1] = (unsigned char)(len & 0xff); | |
386 | /* Extra padding: tag appended to record. */ | |
387 | return EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; | |
388 | } | |
389 | ||
390 | static int gcm_tls_iv_set_fixed(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *iv, | |
391 | size_t len) | |
392 | { | |
393 | /* Special case: -1 length restores whole IV */ | |
394 | if (len == (size_t)-1) { | |
395 | memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, ctx->ivlen); | |
396 | ctx->iv_gen = 1; | |
397 | ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_BUFFERED; | |
398 | return 1; | |
399 | } | |
400 | /* Fixed field must be at least 4 bytes and invocation field at least 8 */ | |
401 | if ((len < EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN) | |
402 | || (ctx->ivlen - (int)len) < EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN) | |
403 | return 0; | |
404 | if (len > 0) | |
405 | memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, len); | |
406 | if (ctx->enc | |
407 | && rand_bytes_ex(ctx->libctx, ctx->iv + len, ctx->ivlen - len) <= 0) | |
408 | return 0; | |
409 | ctx->iv_gen = 1; | |
410 | ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_BUFFERED; | |
411 | return 1; | |
412 | } | |
413 | ||
414 | /* increment counter (64-bit int) by 1 */ | |
415 | static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter) | |
416 | { | |
417 | int n = 8; | |
418 | unsigned char c; | |
419 | ||
420 | do { | |
421 | --n; | |
422 | c = counter[n]; | |
423 | ++c; | |
424 | counter[n] = c; | |
425 | if (c > 0) | |
426 | return; | |
427 | } while (n > 0); | |
428 | } | |
429 | ||
430 | /* | |
431 | * Handle TLS GCM packet format. This consists of the last portion of the IV | |
432 | * followed by the payload and finally the tag. On encrypt generate IV, | |
433 | * encrypt payload and write the tag. On verify retrieve IV, decrypt payload | |
434 | * and verify tag. | |
435 | */ | |
436 | static int gcm_tls_cipher(PROV_GCM_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *padlen, | |
437 | const unsigned char *in, size_t len) | |
438 | { | |
1c3ace68 SL |
439 | int rv = 0; |
440 | size_t arg = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
a672a02a SL |
441 | size_t plen = 0; |
442 | unsigned char *tag = NULL; | |
443 | ||
444 | if (!ctx->key_set) | |
445 | goto err; | |
446 | ||
447 | /* Encrypt/decrypt must be performed in place */ | |
448 | if (out != in || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) | |
449 | goto err; | |
450 | ||
451 | /* | |
452 | * Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness | |
453 | * Requirements from SP 800-38D". The requirements is for one party to the | |
454 | * communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys. We do this on the encrypting | |
455 | * side only. | |
456 | */ | |
457 | if (ctx->enc && ++ctx->tls_enc_records == 0) { | |
784883fc | 458 | ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS); |
a672a02a SL |
459 | goto err; |
460 | } | |
461 | ||
462 | if (ctx->iv_gen == 0) | |
463 | goto err; | |
464 | /* | |
465 | * Set IV from start of buffer or generate IV and write to start of | |
466 | * buffer. | |
467 | */ | |
468 | if (ctx->enc) { | |
469 | if (!ctx->hw->setiv(ctx, ctx->iv, ctx->ivlen)) | |
470 | goto err; | |
471 | if (arg > ctx->ivlen) | |
472 | arg = ctx->ivlen; | |
473 | memcpy(out, ctx->iv + ctx->ivlen - arg, arg); | |
474 | /* | |
475 | * Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and so no need | |
476 | * to check wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes. | |
477 | */ | |
478 | ctr64_inc(ctx->iv + ctx->ivlen - 8); | |
479 | } else { | |
480 | memcpy(ctx->iv + ctx->ivlen - arg, out, arg); | |
481 | if (!ctx->hw->setiv(ctx, ctx->iv, ctx->ivlen)) | |
482 | goto err; | |
483 | } | |
484 | ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_COPIED; | |
485 | ||
486 | /* Fix buffer and length to point to payload */ | |
487 | in += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
488 | out += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
489 | len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; | |
490 | ||
491 | tag = ctx->enc ? out + len : (unsigned char *)in + len; | |
492 | if (!ctx->hw->oneshot(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->tls_aad_len, in, len, out, tag, | |
493 | EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) { | |
494 | if (!ctx->enc) | |
495 | OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len); | |
496 | goto err; | |
497 | } | |
498 | if (ctx->enc) | |
499 | plen = len + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; | |
500 | else | |
501 | plen = len; | |
502 | ||
503 | rv = 1; | |
504 | err: | |
505 | ctx->iv_state = IV_STATE_FINISHED; | |
1c3ace68 | 506 | ctx->tls_aad_len = UNINITIALISED_SIZET; |
a672a02a SL |
507 | *padlen = plen; |
508 | return rv; | |
509 | } |