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license: LGPL-2.1+ -> LGPL-2.1-or-later
[thirdparty/systemd.git] / src / core / namespace.c
CommitLineData
db9ecf05 1/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
15ae422b
LP
2
3#include <errno.h>
e08f94ac 4#include <linux/loop.h>
07630cea 5#include <sched.h>
15ae422b 6#include <stdio.h>
07630cea 7#include <sys/mount.h>
07630cea 8#include <unistd.h>
25e870b5 9#include <linux/fs.h>
15ae422b 10
b5efdb8a 11#include "alloc-util.h"
10404d52 12#include "base-filesystem.h"
7f112f50 13#include "dev-setup.h"
3ffd4af2 14#include "fd-util.h"
e5f10caf 15#include "format-util.h"
d944dc95 16#include "fs-util.h"
e908468b 17#include "label.h"
b3d13314 18#include "list.h"
915e6d16 19#include "loop-util.h"
07630cea 20#include "loopback-setup.h"
07630cea 21#include "mkdir.h"
4349cd7c 22#include "mount-util.h"
049af8ad 23#include "mountpoint-util.h"
0cb8e3d1 24#include "namespace-util.h"
3ffd4af2 25#include "namespace.h"
d8b4d14d 26#include "nulstr-util.h"
07630cea 27#include "path-util.h"
d7b8eec7 28#include "selinux-util.h"
2583fbea 29#include "socket-util.h"
760877e9 30#include "sort-util.h"
36ce7110 31#include "stat-util.h"
8b43440b 32#include "string-table.h"
07630cea
LP
33#include "string-util.h"
34#include "strv.h"
a652f050 35#include "tmpfile-util.h"
affb60b1 36#include "umask-util.h"
ee104e11 37#include "user-util.h"
15ae422b 38
737ba3c8 39#define DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS (MS_NOSUID|MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NOEXEC)
40
c17ec25e 41typedef enum MountMode {
15ae422b
LP
42 /* This is ordered by priority! */
43 INACCESSIBLE,
b3d13314 44 MOUNT_IMAGES,
d2d6c096
LP
45 BIND_MOUNT,
46 BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE,
ac0930c8 47 PRIVATE_TMP,
56a13a49 48 PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY,
7f112f50 49 PRIVATE_DEV,
5d997827 50 BIND_DEV,
6c47cd7d 51 EMPTY_DIR,
5d997827
LP
52 SYSFS,
53 PROCFS,
54 READONLY,
59eeb84b 55 READWRITE,
2abd4e38 56 TMPFS,
1e05071d 57 READWRITE_IMPLICIT, /* Should have the lowest priority. */
5beb8688 58 _MOUNT_MODE_MAX,
c17ec25e 59} MountMode;
15ae422b 60
34de407a 61typedef struct MountEntry {
5327c910 62 const char *path_const; /* Memory allocated on stack or static */
cfbeb4ef 63 MountMode mode:5;
5327c910
LP
64 bool ignore:1; /* Ignore if path does not exist? */
65 bool has_prefix:1; /* Already is prefixed by the root dir? */
cfbeb4ef 66 bool read_only:1; /* Shall this mount point be read-only? */
9ce4e4b0 67 bool nosuid:1; /* Shall set MS_NOSUID on the mount itself */
088696fe 68 bool applied:1; /* Already applied */
55fe7432 69 char *path_malloc; /* Use this instead of 'path_const' if we had to allocate memory */
b3d13314 70 const char *source_const; /* The source path, for bind mounts or images */
d2d6c096 71 char *source_malloc;
2abd4e38
YW
72 const char *options_const;/* Mount options for tmpfs */
73 char *options_malloc;
74 unsigned long flags; /* Mount flags used by EMPTY_DIR and TMPFS. Do not include MS_RDONLY here, but please use read_only. */
088696fe 75 unsigned n_followed;
427353f6 76 LIST_HEAD(MountOptions, image_options);
34de407a 77} MountEntry;
15ae422b 78
5d997827 79/* If MountAPIVFS= is used, let's mount /sys and /proc into the it, but only as a fallback if the user hasn't mounted
3fe91079 80 * something there already. These mounts are hence overridden by any other explicitly configured mounts. */
5d997827
LP
81static const MountEntry apivfs_table[] = {
82 { "/proc", PROCFS, false },
83 { "/dev", BIND_DEV, false },
84 { "/sys", SYSFS, false },
85};
f471b2af 86
11a30cec 87/* ProtectKernelTunables= option and the related filesystem APIs */
34de407a 88static const MountEntry protect_kernel_tunables_table[] = {
1e05071d
YW
89 { "/proc/acpi", READONLY, true },
90 { "/proc/apm", READONLY, true }, /* Obsolete API, there's no point in permitting access to this, ever */
91 { "/proc/asound", READONLY, true },
92 { "/proc/bus", READONLY, true },
93 { "/proc/fs", READONLY, true },
94 { "/proc/irq", READONLY, true },
95 { "/proc/kallsyms", INACCESSIBLE, true },
96 { "/proc/kcore", INACCESSIBLE, true },
97 { "/proc/latency_stats", READONLY, true },
98 { "/proc/mtrr", READONLY, true },
99 { "/proc/scsi", READONLY, true },
4e399953 100 { "/proc/sys", READONLY, true },
1e05071d
YW
101 { "/proc/sysrq-trigger", READONLY, true },
102 { "/proc/timer_stats", READONLY, true },
103 { "/sys", READONLY, false },
104 { "/sys/fs/bpf", READONLY, true },
105 { "/sys/fs/cgroup", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* READONLY is set by ProtectControlGroups= option */
106 { "/sys/fs/selinux", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true },
107 { "/sys/kernel/debug", READONLY, true },
108 { "/sys/kernel/tracing", READONLY, true },
11a30cec
DH
109};
110
c575770b 111/* ProtectKernelModules= option */
34de407a 112static const MountEntry protect_kernel_modules_table[] = {
349cc4a5 113#if HAVE_SPLIT_USR
c6232fb0 114 { "/lib/modules", INACCESSIBLE, true },
c575770b 115#endif
c6232fb0 116 { "/usr/lib/modules", INACCESSIBLE, true },
c575770b
DH
117};
118
94a7b275
KK
119/* ProtectKernelLogs= option */
120static const MountEntry protect_kernel_logs_table[] = {
121 { "/proc/kmsg", INACCESSIBLE, true },
122 { "/dev/kmsg", INACCESSIBLE, true },
123};
124
b6c432ca
DH
125/*
126 * ProtectHome=read-only table, protect $HOME and $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR and rest of
127 * system should be protected by ProtectSystem=
128 */
34de407a 129static const MountEntry protect_home_read_only_table[] = {
c6232fb0
LP
130 { "/home", READONLY, true },
131 { "/run/user", READONLY, true },
132 { "/root", READONLY, true },
b6c432ca
DH
133};
134
e4da7d8c
YW
135/* ProtectHome=tmpfs table */
136static const MountEntry protect_home_tmpfs_table[] = {
7d85383e
TM
137 { "/home", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
138 { "/run/user", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
139 { "/root", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0700" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
e4da7d8c
YW
140};
141
b6c432ca 142/* ProtectHome=yes table */
34de407a 143static const MountEntry protect_home_yes_table[] = {
c6232fb0
LP
144 { "/home", INACCESSIBLE, true },
145 { "/run/user", INACCESSIBLE, true },
146 { "/root", INACCESSIBLE, true },
b6c432ca
DH
147};
148
f471b2af 149/* ProtectSystem=yes table */
34de407a 150static const MountEntry protect_system_yes_table[] = {
c6232fb0
LP
151 { "/usr", READONLY, false },
152 { "/boot", READONLY, true },
153 { "/efi", READONLY, true },
7486f305
AB
154#if HAVE_SPLIT_USR
155 { "/lib", READONLY, true },
156 { "/lib64", READONLY, true },
157 { "/bin", READONLY, true },
671f0f8d 158# if HAVE_SPLIT_BIN
7486f305 159 { "/sbin", READONLY, true },
671f0f8d 160# endif
7486f305 161#endif
f471b2af
DH
162};
163
164/* ProtectSystem=full includes ProtectSystem=yes */
34de407a 165static const MountEntry protect_system_full_table[] = {
c6232fb0
LP
166 { "/usr", READONLY, false },
167 { "/boot", READONLY, true },
168 { "/efi", READONLY, true },
169 { "/etc", READONLY, false },
7486f305
AB
170#if HAVE_SPLIT_USR
171 { "/lib", READONLY, true },
172 { "/lib64", READONLY, true },
173 { "/bin", READONLY, true },
671f0f8d 174# if HAVE_SPLIT_BIN
7486f305 175 { "/sbin", READONLY, true },
671f0f8d 176# endif
7486f305 177#endif
f471b2af
DH
178};
179
180/*
181 * ProtectSystem=strict table. In this strict mode, we mount everything
182 * read-only, except for /proc, /dev, /sys which are the kernel API VFS,
183 * which are left writable, but PrivateDevices= + ProtectKernelTunables=
184 * protect those, and these options should be fully orthogonal.
185 * (And of course /home and friends are also left writable, as ProtectHome=
186 * shall manage those, orthogonally).
187 */
34de407a 188static const MountEntry protect_system_strict_table[] = {
1e05071d
YW
189 { "/", READONLY, false },
190 { "/proc", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */
191 { "/sys", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */
192 { "/dev", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* PrivateDevices= */
193 { "/home", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
194 { "/run/user", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
195 { "/root", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
f471b2af
DH
196};
197
5beb8688
YW
198static const char * const mount_mode_table[_MOUNT_MODE_MAX] = {
199 [INACCESSIBLE] = "inaccessible",
200 [BIND_MOUNT] = "bind",
201 [BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE] = "rbind",
202 [PRIVATE_TMP] = "private-tmp",
203 [PRIVATE_DEV] = "private-dev",
204 [BIND_DEV] = "bind-dev",
205 [EMPTY_DIR] = "empty",
206 [SYSFS] = "sysfs",
207 [PROCFS] = "procfs",
208 [READONLY] = "read-only",
209 [READWRITE] = "read-write",
210 [TMPFS] = "tmpfs",
b3d13314 211 [MOUNT_IMAGES] = "mount-images",
5beb8688
YW
212 [READWRITE_IMPLICIT] = "rw-implicit",
213};
214
215DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(mount_mode, MountMode);
216
34de407a 217static const char *mount_entry_path(const MountEntry *p) {
f0a4feb0
DH
218 assert(p);
219
5327c910
LP
220 /* Returns the path of this bind mount. If the malloc()-allocated ->path_buffer field is set we return that,
221 * otherwise the stack/static ->path field is returned. */
f0a4feb0 222
5327c910 223 return p->path_malloc ?: p->path_const;
f0a4feb0
DH
224}
225
34de407a 226static bool mount_entry_read_only(const MountEntry *p) {
cfbeb4ef
LP
227 assert(p);
228
56a13a49 229 return p->read_only || IN_SET(p->mode, READONLY, INACCESSIBLE, PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY);
cfbeb4ef
LP
230}
231
d2d6c096
LP
232static const char *mount_entry_source(const MountEntry *p) {
233 assert(p);
234
235 return p->source_malloc ?: p->source_const;
236}
237
2abd4e38
YW
238static const char *mount_entry_options(const MountEntry *p) {
239 assert(p);
240
241 return p->options_malloc ?: p->options_const;
242}
243
1eb7e08e
LP
244static void mount_entry_done(MountEntry *p) {
245 assert(p);
246
247 p->path_malloc = mfree(p->path_malloc);
248 p->source_malloc = mfree(p->source_malloc);
2abd4e38 249 p->options_malloc = mfree(p->options_malloc);
427353f6 250 p->image_options = mount_options_free_all(p->image_options);
1eb7e08e
LP
251}
252
d18aff04 253static int append_access_mounts(MountEntry **p, char **strv, MountMode mode, bool forcibly_require_prefix) {
15ae422b
LP
254 char **i;
255
613b411c
LP
256 assert(p);
257
1e05071d 258 /* Adds a list of user-supplied READWRITE/READWRITE_IMPLICIT/READONLY/INACCESSIBLE entries */
5327c910 259
15ae422b 260 STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) {
5327c910
LP
261 bool ignore = false, needs_prefix = false;
262 const char *e = *i;
15ae422b 263
5327c910
LP
264 /* Look for any prefixes */
265 if (startswith(e, "-")) {
266 e++;
9c94d52e 267 ignore = true;
ea92ae33 268 }
5327c910
LP
269 if (startswith(e, "+")) {
270 e++;
271 needs_prefix = true;
272 }
ea92ae33 273
baaa35ad
ZJS
274 if (!path_is_absolute(e))
275 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
276 "Path is not absolute: %s", e);
15ae422b 277
34de407a 278 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
5327c910
LP
279 .path_const = e,
280 .mode = mode,
281 .ignore = ignore,
d18aff04 282 .has_prefix = !needs_prefix && !forcibly_require_prefix,
5327c910 283 };
15ae422b
LP
284 }
285
286 return 0;
287}
288
6c47cd7d
LP
289static int append_empty_dir_mounts(MountEntry **p, char **strv) {
290 char **i;
291
292 assert(p);
293
294 /* Adds tmpfs mounts to provide readable but empty directories. This is primarily used to implement the
295 * "/private/" boundary directories for DynamicUser=1. */
296
297 STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) {
298
299 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
300 .path_const = *i,
301 .mode = EMPTY_DIR,
302 .ignore = false,
6c47cd7d 303 .read_only = true,
7d85383e 304 .options_const = "mode=755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST,
2abd4e38 305 .flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME,
6c47cd7d
LP
306 };
307 }
308
309 return 0;
310}
311
da6053d0
LP
312static int append_bind_mounts(MountEntry **p, const BindMount *binds, size_t n) {
313 size_t i;
d2d6c096
LP
314
315 assert(p);
316
317 for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
318 const BindMount *b = binds + i;
319
320 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
321 .path_const = b->destination,
322 .mode = b->recursive ? BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE : BIND_MOUNT,
323 .read_only = b->read_only,
9ce4e4b0 324 .nosuid = b->nosuid,
d2d6c096 325 .source_const = b->source,
4ca763a9 326 .ignore = b->ignore_enoent,
d2d6c096
LP
327 };
328 }
329
330 return 0;
331}
332
b3d13314
LB
333static int append_mount_images(MountEntry **p, const MountImage *mount_images, size_t n) {
334 assert(p);
335
336 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
337 const MountImage *m = mount_images + i;
338
339 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
340 .path_const = m->destination,
341 .mode = MOUNT_IMAGES,
342 .source_const = m->source,
427353f6 343 .image_options = m->mount_options,
b3d13314
LB
344 .ignore = m->ignore_enoent,
345 };
346 }
347
348 return 0;
349}
350
da6053d0 351static int append_tmpfs_mounts(MountEntry **p, const TemporaryFileSystem *tmpfs, size_t n) {
2abd4e38
YW
352 assert(p);
353
b67ec8e5 354 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
2abd4e38
YW
355 const TemporaryFileSystem *t = tmpfs + i;
356 _cleanup_free_ char *o = NULL, *str = NULL;
ad8e66dc 357 unsigned long flags;
2abd4e38 358 bool ro = false;
b67ec8e5 359 int r;
2abd4e38 360
baaa35ad
ZJS
361 if (!path_is_absolute(t->path))
362 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
363 "Path is not absolute: %s",
364 t->path);
2abd4e38 365
b67ec8e5 366 str = strjoin("mode=0755" NESTED_TMPFS_LIMITS ",", t->options);
ad8e66dc
AJ
367 if (!str)
368 return -ENOMEM;
2abd4e38 369
ad8e66dc
AJ
370 r = mount_option_mangle(str, MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME, &flags, &o);
371 if (r < 0)
372 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse mount option '%s': %m", str);
2abd4e38 373
ad8e66dc
AJ
374 ro = flags & MS_RDONLY;
375 if (ro)
376 flags ^= MS_RDONLY;
2abd4e38
YW
377
378 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
379 .path_const = t->path,
380 .mode = TMPFS,
381 .read_only = ro,
ad8e66dc 382 .options_malloc = TAKE_PTR(o),
2abd4e38
YW
383 .flags = flags,
384 };
2abd4e38
YW
385 }
386
387 return 0;
388}
389
da6053d0
LP
390static int append_static_mounts(MountEntry **p, const MountEntry *mounts, size_t n, bool ignore_protect) {
391 size_t i;
11a30cec
DH
392
393 assert(p);
f471b2af 394 assert(mounts);
11a30cec 395
5327c910 396 /* Adds a list of static pre-defined entries */
f471b2af 397
5327c910 398 for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
34de407a
LP
399 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
400 .path_const = mount_entry_path(mounts+i),
5327c910
LP
401 .mode = mounts[i].mode,
402 .ignore = mounts[i].ignore || ignore_protect,
403 };
f471b2af
DH
404
405 return 0;
406}
407
34de407a 408static int append_protect_home(MountEntry **p, ProtectHome protect_home, bool ignore_protect) {
c575770b
DH
409 assert(p);
410
5327c910 411 switch (protect_home) {
b6c432ca 412
5327c910 413 case PROTECT_HOME_NO:
b6c432ca
DH
414 return 0;
415
b6c432ca 416 case PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY:
5327c910
LP
417 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_read_only_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table), ignore_protect);
418
e4da7d8c
YW
419 case PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS:
420 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_tmpfs_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table), ignore_protect);
421
b6c432ca 422 case PROTECT_HOME_YES:
5327c910
LP
423 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table), ignore_protect);
424
b6c432ca 425 default:
5327c910 426 assert_not_reached("Unexpected ProtectHome= value");
b6c432ca 427 }
b6c432ca
DH
428}
429
34de407a 430static int append_protect_system(MountEntry **p, ProtectSystem protect_system, bool ignore_protect) {
f471b2af
DH
431 assert(p);
432
5327c910
LP
433 switch (protect_system) {
434
435 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO:
f471b2af
DH
436 return 0;
437
f471b2af 438 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT:
5327c910
LP
439 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_strict_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table), ignore_protect);
440
f471b2af 441 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES:
5327c910
LP
442 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table), ignore_protect);
443
f471b2af 444 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL:
5327c910
LP
445 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_full_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table), ignore_protect);
446
f471b2af 447 default:
5327c910 448 assert_not_reached("Unexpected ProtectSystem= value");
f471b2af 449 }
11a30cec
DH
450}
451
93bab288 452static int mount_path_compare(const MountEntry *a, const MountEntry *b) {
a0827e2b 453 int d;
15ae422b 454
6ee1a919 455 /* If the paths are not equal, then order prefixes first */
93bab288 456 d = path_compare(mount_entry_path(a), mount_entry_path(b));
6ee1a919
LP
457 if (d != 0)
458 return d;
15ae422b 459
6ee1a919 460 /* If the paths are equal, check the mode */
93bab288 461 return CMP((int) a->mode, (int) b->mode);
15ae422b
LP
462}
463
da6053d0
LP
464static int prefix_where_needed(MountEntry *m, size_t n, const char *root_directory) {
465 size_t i;
5327c910 466
4a756839 467 /* Prefixes all paths in the bind mount table with the root directory if the entry needs that. */
5327c910
LP
468
469 for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
470 char *s;
471
472 if (m[i].has_prefix)
473 continue;
474
c6134d3e 475 s = path_join(root_directory, mount_entry_path(m+i));
5327c910
LP
476 if (!s)
477 return -ENOMEM;
478
e282f51f 479 free_and_replace(m[i].path_malloc, s);
5327c910
LP
480 m[i].has_prefix = true;
481 }
482
483 return 0;
484}
485
da6053d0 486static void drop_duplicates(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
34de407a 487 MountEntry *f, *t, *previous;
15ae422b 488
c17ec25e 489 assert(m);
15ae422b 490 assert(n);
15ae422b 491
fe3c2583
LP
492 /* Drops duplicate entries. Expects that the array is properly ordered already. */
493
1d54cd5d 494 for (f = m, t = m, previous = NULL; f < m + *n; f++) {
15ae422b 495
fe3c2583 496 /* The first one wins (which is the one with the more restrictive mode), see mount_path_compare()
088696fe
LP
497 * above. Note that we only drop duplicates that haven't been mounted yet. */
498 if (previous &&
499 path_equal(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(previous)) &&
500 !f->applied && !previous->applied) {
5beb8688 501 log_debug("%s (%s) is duplicate.", mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode));
34de407a 502 previous->read_only = previous->read_only || mount_entry_read_only(f); /* Propagate the read-only flag to the remaining entry */
1eb7e08e 503 mount_entry_done(f);
15ae422b 504 continue;
fe3c2583 505 }
15ae422b 506
e2d7c1a0 507 *t = *f;
15ae422b 508 previous = t;
fe3c2583
LP
509 t++;
510 }
511
512 *n = t - m;
513}
514
da6053d0 515static void drop_inaccessible(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
34de407a 516 MountEntry *f, *t;
fe3c2583
LP
517 const char *clear = NULL;
518
519 assert(m);
520 assert(n);
521
522 /* Drops all entries obstructed by another entry further up the tree. Expects that the array is properly
523 * ordered already. */
524
1d54cd5d 525 for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
fe3c2583
LP
526
527 /* If we found a path set for INACCESSIBLE earlier, and this entry has it as prefix we should drop
528 * it, as inaccessible paths really should drop the entire subtree. */
34de407a
LP
529 if (clear && path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), clear)) {
530 log_debug("%s is masked by %s.", mount_entry_path(f), clear);
1eb7e08e 531 mount_entry_done(f);
fe3c2583
LP
532 continue;
533 }
15ae422b 534
34de407a 535 clear = f->mode == INACCESSIBLE ? mount_entry_path(f) : NULL;
fe3c2583
LP
536
537 *t = *f;
15ae422b
LP
538 t++;
539 }
540
c17ec25e 541 *n = t - m;
15ae422b
LP
542}
543
da6053d0 544static void drop_nop(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
34de407a 545 MountEntry *f, *t;
7648a565
LP
546
547 assert(m);
548 assert(n);
549
550 /* Drops all entries which have an immediate parent that has the same type, as they are redundant. Assumes the
551 * list is ordered by prefixes. */
552
1d54cd5d 553 for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
7648a565 554
1e05071d
YW
555 /* Only suppress such subtrees for READONLY, READWRITE and READWRITE_IMPLICIT entries */
556 if (IN_SET(f->mode, READONLY, READWRITE, READWRITE_IMPLICIT)) {
34de407a 557 MountEntry *p;
7648a565
LP
558 bool found = false;
559
560 /* Now let's find the first parent of the entry we are looking at. */
561 for (p = t-1; p >= m; p--) {
34de407a 562 if (path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(p))) {
7648a565
LP
563 found = true;
564 break;
565 }
566 }
567
568 /* We found it, let's see if it's the same mode, if so, we can drop this entry */
569 if (found && p->mode == f->mode) {
5beb8688
YW
570 log_debug("%s (%s) is made redundant by %s (%s)",
571 mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode),
572 mount_entry_path(p), mount_mode_to_string(p->mode));
1eb7e08e 573 mount_entry_done(f);
7648a565
LP
574 continue;
575 }
576 }
577
578 *t = *f;
579 t++;
580 }
581
582 *n = t - m;
583}
584
da6053d0 585static void drop_outside_root(const char *root_directory, MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
34de407a 586 MountEntry *f, *t;
cd2902c9
LP
587
588 assert(m);
589 assert(n);
590
1d54cd5d 591 /* Nothing to do */
cd2902c9
LP
592 if (!root_directory)
593 return;
594
595 /* Drops all mounts that are outside of the root directory. */
596
1d54cd5d 597 for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
cd2902c9 598
34de407a
LP
599 if (!path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), root_directory)) {
600 log_debug("%s is outside of root directory.", mount_entry_path(f));
1eb7e08e 601 mount_entry_done(f);
cd2902c9
LP
602 continue;
603 }
604
605 *t = *f;
606 t++;
607 }
608
609 *n = t - m;
610}
611
b2a60844
LP
612static int clone_device_node(
613 const char *d,
614 const char *temporary_mount,
615 bool *make_devnode) {
616
617 _cleanup_free_ char *sl = NULL;
618 const char *dn, *bn, *t;
b5e99f23
ДГ
619 struct stat st;
620 int r;
621
414b304b 622 if (stat(d, &st) < 0) {
b2a60844
LP
623 if (errno == ENOENT) {
624 log_debug_errno(errno, "Device node '%s' to clone does not exist, ignoring.", d);
af984e13 625 return -ENXIO;
b2a60844
LP
626 }
627
628 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to stat() device node '%s' to clone, ignoring: %m", d);
b5e99f23
ДГ
629 }
630
631 if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode) &&
baaa35ad
ZJS
632 !S_ISCHR(st.st_mode))
633 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
634 "Device node '%s' to clone is not a device node, ignoring.",
635 d);
b5e99f23 636
6f7f3a33 637 dn = strjoina(temporary_mount, d);
b5e99f23 638
b2a60844 639 /* First, try to create device node properly */
16498617
CB
640 if (*make_devnode) {
641 mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(d, st.st_mode);
642 r = mknod(dn, st.st_mode, st.st_rdev);
643 mac_selinux_create_file_clear();
b2a60844
LP
644 if (r >= 0)
645 goto add_symlink;
16498617
CB
646 if (errno != EPERM)
647 return log_debug_errno(errno, "mknod failed for %s: %m", d);
648
b2a60844 649 /* This didn't work, let's not try this again for the next iterations. */
16498617
CB
650 *make_devnode = false;
651 }
652
2aed63f4 653 /* We're about to fall back to bind-mounting the device
1acf344d
CG
654 * node. So create a dummy bind-mount target.
655 * Do not prepare device-node SELinux label (see issue 13762) */
16498617 656 r = mknod(dn, S_IFREG, 0);
16498617 657 if (r < 0 && errno != EEXIST)
b2a60844 658 return log_debug_errno(errno, "mknod() fallback failed for '%s': %m", d);
16498617 659
21935150
LP
660 /* Fallback to bind-mounting: The assumption here is that all used device nodes carry standard
661 * properties. Specifically, the devices nodes we bind-mount should either be owned by root:root or
662 * root:tty (e.g. /dev/tty, /dev/ptmx) and should not carry ACLs. */
663 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, d, dn, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
664 if (r < 0)
665 return r;
b2a60844
LP
666
667add_symlink:
668 bn = path_startswith(d, "/dev/");
669 if (!bn)
670 return 0;
671
672 /* Create symlinks like /dev/char/1:9 → ../urandom */
cbc056c8
ZJS
673 if (asprintf(&sl, "%s/dev/%s/%u:%u",
674 temporary_mount,
675 S_ISCHR(st.st_mode) ? "char" : "block",
676 major(st.st_rdev), minor(st.st_rdev)) < 0)
b2a60844
LP
677 return log_oom();
678
679 (void) mkdir_parents(sl, 0755);
680
681 t = strjoina("../", bn);
b2a60844 682 if (symlink(t, sl) < 0)
2e4a4fae 683 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to symlink '%s' to '%s', ignoring: %m", t, sl);
b5e99f23 684
af984e13 685 return 0;
b5e99f23
ДГ
686}
687
5d997827 688static int mount_private_dev(MountEntry *m) {
7f112f50
LP
689 static const char devnodes[] =
690 "/dev/null\0"
691 "/dev/zero\0"
692 "/dev/full\0"
693 "/dev/random\0"
694 "/dev/urandom\0"
695 "/dev/tty\0";
696
2b85f4e1 697 char temporary_mount[] = "/tmp/namespace-dev-XXXXXX";
63cc4c31 698 const char *d, *dev = NULL, *devpts = NULL, *devshm = NULL, *devhugepages = NULL, *devmqueue = NULL, *devlog = NULL, *devptmx = NULL;
16498617 699 bool can_mknod = true;
7f112f50
LP
700 _cleanup_umask_ mode_t u;
701 int r;
702
703 assert(m);
704
705 u = umask(0000);
706
2b85f4e1 707 if (!mkdtemp(temporary_mount))
2e4a4fae 708 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create temporary directory '%s': %m", temporary_mount);
2b85f4e1 709
63c372cb 710 dev = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev");
dc751688 711 (void) mkdir(dev, 0755);
21935150
LP
712 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "tmpfs", dev, "tmpfs", DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS, "mode=755" TMPFS_LIMITS_DEV);
713 if (r < 0)
2b85f4e1 714 goto fail;
21935150 715
c3151977
TM
716 r = label_fix_container(dev, "/dev", 0);
717 if (r < 0) {
718 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to fix label of '%s' as /dev: %m", dev);
719 goto fail;
720 }
2b85f4e1 721
63c372cb 722 devpts = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/pts");
dc751688 723 (void) mkdir(devpts, 0755);
21935150
LP
724 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/pts", devpts, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
725 if (r < 0)
2b85f4e1 726 goto fail;
2b85f4e1 727
2e4a4fae
YW
728 /* /dev/ptmx can either be a device node or a symlink to /dev/pts/ptmx.
729 * When /dev/ptmx a device node, /dev/pts/ptmx has 000 permissions making it inaccessible.
730 * Thus, in that case make a clone.
731 * In nspawn and other containers it will be a symlink, in that case make it a symlink. */
36ce7110 732 r = is_symlink("/dev/ptmx");
2e4a4fae
YW
733 if (r < 0) {
734 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect whether /dev/ptmx is a symlink or not: %m");
3164e3cb 735 goto fail;
2e4a4fae 736 } else if (r > 0) {
414b304b
ДГ
737 devptmx = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/ptmx");
738 if (symlink("pts/ptmx", devptmx) < 0) {
2e4a4fae 739 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create a symlink '%s' to pts/ptmx: %m", devptmx);
414b304b
ДГ
740 goto fail;
741 }
742 } else {
16498617 743 r = clone_device_node("/dev/ptmx", temporary_mount, &can_mknod);
152c475f
LP
744 if (r < 0)
745 goto fail;
414b304b 746 }
e06b6479 747
63c372cb 748 devshm = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/shm");
8d953682 749 (void) mkdir(devshm, 0755);
21935150
LP
750 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/shm", devshm, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
751 if (r < 0)
2b85f4e1 752 goto fail;
2b85f4e1 753
63c372cb 754 devmqueue = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/mqueue");
dc751688 755 (void) mkdir(devmqueue, 0755);
21935150 756 (void) mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/mqueue", devmqueue, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
2b85f4e1 757
63c372cb 758 devhugepages = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/hugepages");
dc751688 759 (void) mkdir(devhugepages, 0755);
21935150 760 (void) mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/hugepages", devhugepages, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
2b85f4e1 761
63c372cb 762 devlog = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/log");
2e4a4fae
YW
763 if (symlink("/run/systemd/journal/dev-log", devlog) < 0)
764 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create a symlink '%s' to /run/systemd/journal/dev-log, ignoring: %m", devlog);
82d25240 765
7f112f50 766 NULSTR_FOREACH(d, devnodes) {
16498617 767 r = clone_device_node(d, temporary_mount, &can_mknod);
37b22b3b 768 /* ENXIO means the *source* is not a device file, skip creation in that case */
af984e13 769 if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO)
2b85f4e1 770 goto fail;
7f112f50
LP
771 }
772
2e4a4fae
YW
773 r = dev_setup(temporary_mount, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID);
774 if (r < 0)
105a1a36 775 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set up basic device tree at '%s', ignoring: %m", temporary_mount);
7f112f50 776
ee818b89
AC
777 /* Create the /dev directory if missing. It is more likely to be
778 * missing when the service is started with RootDirectory. This is
779 * consistent with mount units creating the mount points when missing.
780 */
34de407a 781 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
ee818b89 782
9e5f8252 783 /* Unmount everything in old /dev */
2e4a4fae
YW
784 r = umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0);
785 if (r < 0)
786 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to unmount directories below '%s', ignoring: %m", mount_entry_path(m));
787
21935150
LP
788 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, dev, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL);
789 if (r < 0)
2b85f4e1 790 goto fail;
7f112f50 791
1019a48f
LP
792 (void) rmdir(dev);
793 (void) rmdir(temporary_mount);
7f112f50 794
2b85f4e1 795 return 0;
7f112f50 796
2b85f4e1
LP
797fail:
798 if (devpts)
21935150 799 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devpts, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
7f112f50 800
2b85f4e1 801 if (devshm)
21935150 802 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devshm, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
7f112f50 803
2b85f4e1 804 if (devhugepages)
21935150 805 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devhugepages, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
7f112f50 806
2b85f4e1 807 if (devmqueue)
21935150 808 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devmqueue, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
7f112f50 809
21935150 810 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, dev, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1019a48f
LP
811 (void) rmdir(dev);
812 (void) rmdir(temporary_mount);
7f112f50 813
2b85f4e1 814 return r;
7f112f50
LP
815}
816
2a2969fd 817static int mount_bind_dev(const MountEntry *m) {
5d997827
LP
818 int r;
819
820 assert(m);
821
822 /* Implements the little brother of mount_private_dev(): simply bind mounts the host's /dev into the service's
823 * /dev. This is only used when RootDirectory= is set. */
824
645767d6
LP
825 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
826
5d997827
LP
827 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0);
828 if (r < 0)
829 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /dev is already mounted: %m");
830 if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /dev is already a mount point */
831 return 0;
832
21935150
LP
833 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
834 if (r < 0)
835 return r;
5d997827
LP
836
837 return 1;
838}
839
2a2969fd 840static int mount_sysfs(const MountEntry *m) {
5d997827
LP
841 int r;
842
843 assert(m);
844
645767d6
LP
845 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
846
5d997827
LP
847 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0);
848 if (r < 0)
849 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /sys is already mounted: %m");
850 if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /sys is already a mount point */
851 return 0;
852
853 /* Bind mount the host's version so that we get all child mounts of it, too. */
21935150
LP
854 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/sys", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
855 if (r < 0)
856 return r;
5d997827
LP
857
858 return 1;
859}
860
4e399953
LP
861static int mount_procfs(const MountEntry *m, const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
862 const char *entry_path;
21935150 863 int r;
5d997827
LP
864
865 assert(m);
4e399953 866 assert(ns_info);
5d997827 867
4e399953 868 entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
645767d6 869
4e399953
LP
870 /* Mount a new instance, so that we get the one that matches our user namespace, if we are running in
871 * one. i.e we don't reuse existing mounts here under any condition, we want a new instance owned by
872 * our user namespace and with our hidepid= settings applied. Hence, let's get rid of everything
873 * mounted on /proc/ first. */
5d997827 874
4e399953
LP
875 (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
876 (void) umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
877
878 if (ns_info->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
879 ns_info->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL) {
880 _cleanup_free_ char *opts = NULL;
881
882 /* Starting with kernel 5.8 procfs' hidepid= logic is truly per-instance (previously it
883 * pretended to be per-instance but actually was per-namespace), hence let's make use of it
884 * if requested. To make sure this logic succeeds only on kernels where hidepid= is
885 * per-instance, we'll exclusively use the textual value for hidepid=, since support was
886 * added in the same commit: if it's supported it is thus also per-instance. */
887
888 opts = strjoin("hidepid=",
889 ns_info->protect_proc == PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ? "off" :
890 protect_proc_to_string(ns_info->protect_proc),
891 ns_info->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID ? ",subset=pid" : "");
892 if (!opts)
893 return -ENOMEM;
894
21935150
LP
895 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "proc", entry_path, "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, opts);
896 if (r < 0) {
897 if (r != -EINVAL)
898 return r;
4e399953
LP
899
900 /* If this failed with EINVAL then this likely means the textual hidepid= stuff is
901 * not supported by the kernel, and thus the per-instance hidepid= neither, which
902 * means we really don't want to use it, since it would affect our host's /proc
903 * mount. Hence let's gracefully fallback to a classic, unrestricted version. */
904 } else
905 return 1;
906 }
907
21935150
LP
908 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "proc", entry_path, "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, NULL);
909 if (r < 0)
910 return r;
5d997827
LP
911
912 return 1;
913}
914
2abd4e38 915static int mount_tmpfs(const MountEntry *m) {
df6b900a 916 const char *entry_path, *inner_path;
abad72be 917 int r;
abad72be 918
6c47cd7d
LP
919 assert(m);
920
df6b900a
LP
921 entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
922 inner_path = m->path_const;
923
2abd4e38 924 /* First, get rid of everything that is below if there is anything. Then, overmount with our new tmpfs */
6c47cd7d 925
abad72be
CG
926 (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
927 (void) umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
6c47cd7d 928
21935150
LP
929 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "tmpfs", entry_path, "tmpfs", m->flags, mount_entry_options(m));
930 if (r < 0)
931 return r;
abad72be 932
df6b900a 933 r = label_fix_container(entry_path, inner_path, 0);
abad72be 934 if (r < 0)
df6b900a 935 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to fix label of '%s' as '%s': %m", entry_path, inner_path);
6c47cd7d
LP
936
937 return 1;
938}
939
b3d13314
LB
940static int mount_images(const MountEntry *m) {
941 _cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp) LoopDevice *loop_device = NULL;
942 _cleanup_(decrypted_image_unrefp) DecryptedImage *decrypted_image = NULL;
943 _cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp) DissectedImage *dissected_image = NULL;
aee36b4e 944 _cleanup_(verity_settings_done) VeritySettings verity = VERITY_SETTINGS_DEFAULT;
89e62e0b 945 DissectImageFlags dissect_image_flags;
b3d13314
LB
946 int r;
947
89e62e0b
LP
948 assert(m);
949
950 r = verity_settings_load(&verity, mount_entry_source(m), NULL, NULL);
b3d13314
LB
951 if (r < 0)
952 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to load root hash: %m");
b3d13314 953
89e62e0b
LP
954 dissect_image_flags =
955 (m->read_only ? DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY : 0) |
956 (verity.data_path ? DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE : 0);
957
958 r = loop_device_make_by_path(
959 mount_entry_source(m),
960 m->read_only ? O_RDONLY : -1 /* < 0 means writable if possible, read-only as fallback */,
961 verity.data_path ? 0 : LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN,
962 &loop_device);
b3d13314
LB
963 if (r < 0)
964 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create loop device for image: %m");
965
89e62e0b
LP
966 r = dissect_image(
967 loop_device->fd,
968 &verity,
969 m->image_options,
970 dissect_image_flags,
971 &dissected_image);
b3d13314 972 /* No partition table? Might be a single-filesystem image, try again */
89e62e0b
LP
973 if (!verity.data_path && r == -ENOPKG)
974 r = dissect_image(
975 loop_device->fd,
976 &verity,
977 m->image_options,
978 dissect_image_flags|DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE,
979 &dissected_image);
b3d13314
LB
980 if (r < 0)
981 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to dissect image: %m");
982
89e62e0b
LP
983 r = dissected_image_decrypt(
984 dissected_image,
985 NULL,
986 &verity,
987 dissect_image_flags,
988 &decrypted_image);
b3d13314
LB
989 if (r < 0)
990 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to decrypt dissected image: %m");
991
992 r = mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
993 if (r < 0)
994 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create destination directory %s: %m", mount_entry_path(m));
995 r = umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0);
996 if (r < 0)
997 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to umount under destination directory %s: %m", mount_entry_path(m));
998
999 r = dissected_image_mount(dissected_image, mount_entry_path(m), UID_INVALID, dissect_image_flags);
1000 if (r < 0)
1001 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount image: %m");
1002
1003 if (decrypted_image) {
1004 r = decrypted_image_relinquish(decrypted_image);
1005 if (r < 0)
1006 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to relinquish decrypted image: %m");
1007 }
1008
1009 loop_device_relinquish(loop_device);
1010
1011 return 1;
1012}
1013
088696fe 1014static int follow_symlink(
d2d6c096 1015 const char *root_directory,
088696fe 1016 MountEntry *m) {
d2d6c096 1017
088696fe 1018 _cleanup_free_ char *target = NULL;
8fceda93
LP
1019 int r;
1020
088696fe
LP
1021 /* Let's chase symlinks, but only one step at a time. That's because depending where the symlink points we
1022 * might need to change the order in which we mount stuff. Hence: let's normalize piecemeal, and do one step at
1023 * a time by specifying CHASE_STEP. This function returns 0 if we resolved one step, and > 0 if we reached the
1024 * end and already have a fully normalized name. */
8fceda93 1025
a5648b80 1026 r = chase_symlinks(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, CHASE_STEP|CHASE_NONEXISTENT, &target, NULL);
088696fe
LP
1027 if (r < 0)
1028 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to chase symlinks '%s': %m", mount_entry_path(m));
1029 if (r > 0) /* Reached the end, nothing more to resolve */
1030 return 1;
8fceda93 1031
baaa35ad
ZJS
1032 if (m->n_followed >= CHASE_SYMLINKS_MAX) /* put a boundary on things */
1033 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP),
1034 "Symlink loop on '%s'.",
1035 mount_entry_path(m));
8fceda93 1036
088696fe 1037 log_debug("Followed mount entry path symlink %s → %s.", mount_entry_path(m), target);
8fceda93 1038
088696fe
LP
1039 free_and_replace(m->path_malloc, target);
1040 m->has_prefix = true;
8fceda93 1041
088696fe
LP
1042 m->n_followed ++;
1043
1044 return 0;
8fceda93
LP
1045}
1046
ac0930c8 1047static int apply_mount(
8fceda93 1048 const char *root_directory,
4e399953
LP
1049 MountEntry *m,
1050 const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
ac0930c8 1051
e5f10caf 1052 _cleanup_free_ char *inaccessible = NULL;
a227a4be 1053 bool rbind = true, make = false;
15ae422b 1054 const char *what;
15ae422b 1055 int r;
15ae422b 1056
c17ec25e 1057 assert(m);
4e399953 1058 assert(ns_info);
15ae422b 1059
34de407a 1060 log_debug("Applying namespace mount on %s", mount_entry_path(m));
fe3c2583 1061
c17ec25e 1062 switch (m->mode) {
15ae422b 1063
160cfdbe 1064 case INACCESSIBLE: {
e5f10caf
AZ
1065 _cleanup_free_ char *tmp = NULL;
1066 const char *runtime_dir;
160cfdbe 1067 struct stat target;
6d313367
LP
1068
1069 /* First, get rid of everything that is below if there
1070 * is anything... Then, overmount it with an
c4b41707 1071 * inaccessible path. */
34de407a 1072 (void) umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0);
6d313367 1073
088696fe
LP
1074 if (lstat(mount_entry_path(m), &target) < 0) {
1075 if (errno == ENOENT && m->ignore)
1076 return 0;
1077
cbc056c8
ZJS
1078 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to lstat() %s to determine what to mount over it: %m",
1079 mount_entry_path(m));
088696fe 1080 }
15ae422b 1081
e5f10caf 1082 if (geteuid() == 0)
48b747fa 1083 runtime_dir = "/run";
e5f10caf 1084 else {
48b747fa
LP
1085 if (asprintf(&tmp, "/run/user/" UID_FMT, geteuid()) < 0)
1086 return -ENOMEM;
e5f10caf
AZ
1087
1088 runtime_dir = tmp;
1089 }
1090
1091 r = mode_to_inaccessible_node(runtime_dir, target.st_mode, &inaccessible);
1092 if (r < 0)
baaa35ad
ZJS
1093 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP),
1094 "File type not supported for inaccessible mounts. Note that symlinks are not allowed");
e5f10caf 1095 what = inaccessible;
c4b41707 1096 break;
160cfdbe 1097 }
fe3c2583 1098
15ae422b 1099 case READONLY:
15ae422b 1100 case READWRITE:
1e05071d 1101 case READWRITE_IMPLICIT:
8fceda93 1102 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, 0);
088696fe
LP
1103 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1104 return 0;
d944dc95 1105 if (r < 0)
cbc056c8
ZJS
1106 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to determine whether %s is already a mount point: %m",
1107 mount_entry_path(m));
1108 if (r > 0) /* Nothing to do here, it is already a mount. We just later toggle the MS_RDONLY
1109 * bit for the mount point if needed. */
6b7c9f8b 1110 return 0;
6b7c9f8b 1111 /* This isn't a mount point yet, let's make it one. */
34de407a 1112 what = mount_entry_path(m);
6b7c9f8b 1113 break;
15ae422b 1114
d2d6c096
LP
1115 case BIND_MOUNT:
1116 rbind = false;
d2d6c096 1117
4831981d 1118 _fallthrough_;
088696fe
LP
1119 case BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE: {
1120 _cleanup_free_ char *chased = NULL;
5d997827 1121
cbc056c8
ZJS
1122 /* Since mount() will always follow symlinks we chase the symlinks on our own first. Note
1123 * that bind mount source paths are always relative to the host root, hence we pass NULL as
1124 * root directory to chase_symlinks() here. */
088696fe 1125
a5648b80 1126 r = chase_symlinks(mount_entry_source(m), NULL, CHASE_TRAIL_SLASH, &chased, NULL);
088696fe
LP
1127 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore) {
1128 log_debug_errno(r, "Path %s does not exist, ignoring.", mount_entry_source(m));
1129 return 0;
1130 }
1131 if (r < 0)
1132 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to follow symlinks on %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m));
1133
1134 log_debug("Followed source symlinks %s → %s.", mount_entry_source(m), chased);
1135
1136 free_and_replace(m->source_malloc, chased);
d2d6c096
LP
1137
1138 what = mount_entry_source(m);
a227a4be 1139 make = true;
d2d6c096 1140 break;
088696fe 1141 }
d2d6c096 1142
6c47cd7d 1143 case EMPTY_DIR:
2abd4e38
YW
1144 case TMPFS:
1145 return mount_tmpfs(m);
6c47cd7d 1146
ac0930c8 1147 case PRIVATE_TMP:
56a13a49 1148 case PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY:
89bd586c 1149 what = mount_entry_source(m);
a227a4be 1150 make = true;
15ae422b 1151 break;
e364ad06 1152
d6797c92 1153 case PRIVATE_DEV:
5d997827
LP
1154 return mount_private_dev(m);
1155
1156 case BIND_DEV:
1157 return mount_bind_dev(m);
1158
1159 case SYSFS:
1160 return mount_sysfs(m);
1161
1162 case PROCFS:
4e399953 1163 return mount_procfs(m, ns_info);
d6797c92 1164
b3d13314
LB
1165 case MOUNT_IMAGES:
1166 return mount_images(m);
1167
e364ad06
LP
1168 default:
1169 assert_not_reached("Unknown mode");
15ae422b
LP
1170 }
1171
ac0930c8 1172 assert(what);
15ae422b 1173
21935150
LP
1174 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL);
1175 if (r < 0) {
a227a4be 1176 bool try_again = false;
a227a4be
LP
1177
1178 if (r == -ENOENT && make) {
1179 struct stat st;
1180
cbc056c8
ZJS
1181 /* Hmm, either the source or the destination are missing. Let's see if we can create
1182 the destination, then try again. */
a227a4be 1183
e8717862 1184 if (stat(what, &st) < 0)
5dc60faa 1185 log_error_errno(errno, "Mount point source '%s' is not accessible: %m", what);
e8717862
LP
1186 else {
1187 int q;
a227a4be
LP
1188
1189 (void) mkdir_parents(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1190
1191 if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
e8717862 1192 q = mkdir(mount_entry_path(m), 0755) < 0 ? -errno : 0;
a227a4be 1193 else
e8717862
LP
1194 q = touch(mount_entry_path(m));
1195
1196 if (q < 0)
cbc056c8
ZJS
1197 log_error_errno(q, "Failed to create destination mount point node '%s': %m",
1198 mount_entry_path(m));
e8717862
LP
1199 else
1200 try_again = true;
a227a4be
LP
1201 }
1202 }
1203
21935150
LP
1204 if (try_again)
1205 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL);
a227a4be 1206 if (r < 0)
5dc60faa 1207 return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to mount %s to %s: %m", what, mount_entry_path(m));
a227a4be 1208 }
6b7c9f8b 1209
34de407a 1210 log_debug("Successfully mounted %s to %s", what, mount_entry_path(m));
6b7c9f8b 1211 return 0;
ac0930c8 1212}
15ae422b 1213
6b000af4 1214static int make_read_only(const MountEntry *m, char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
9ce4e4b0 1215 unsigned long new_flags = 0, flags_mask = 0;
763a260a 1216 bool submounts = false;
6b7c9f8b 1217 int r = 0;
15ae422b 1218
c17ec25e 1219 assert(m);
ac9de0b3 1220 assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
ac0930c8 1221
9ce4e4b0
LP
1222 if (mount_entry_read_only(m) || m->mode == PRIVATE_DEV) {
1223 new_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
1224 flags_mask |= MS_RDONLY;
1225 }
1226
1227 if (m->nosuid) {
1228 new_flags |= MS_NOSUID;
1229 flags_mask |= MS_NOSUID;
1230 }
1231
1232 if (flags_mask == 0) /* No Change? */
6b7c9f8b
LP
1233 return 0;
1234
9ce4e4b0
LP
1235 /* We generally apply these changes recursively, except for /dev, and the cases we know there's
1236 * nothing further down. Set /dev readonly, but not submounts like /dev/shm. Also, we only set the
1237 * per-mount read-only flag. We can't set it on the superblock, if we are inside a user namespace
1238 * and running Linux <= 4.17. */
1239 submounts =
1240 mount_entry_read_only(m) &&
1241 !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS);
1242 if (submounts)
6b000af4 1243 r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
9ce4e4b0 1244 else
7cce68e1 1245 r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, proc_self_mountinfo);
9ce4e4b0 1246
867189b5
LP
1247 /* Not that we only turn on the MS_RDONLY flag here, we never turn it off. Something that was marked
1248 * read-only already stays this way. This improves compatibility with container managers, where we
1249 * won't attempt to undo read-only mounts already applied. */
ac0930c8 1250
8fceda93 1251 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
867189b5 1252 return 0;
763a260a 1253 if (r < 0)
9ce4e4b0 1254 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
763a260a 1255 submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
763a260a 1256 return 0;
d944dc95
LP
1257}
1258
9b68367b 1259static bool namespace_info_mount_apivfs(const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
5d997827
LP
1260 assert(ns_info);
1261
9c988f93
DH
1262 /*
1263 * ProtectControlGroups= and ProtectKernelTunables= imply MountAPIVFS=,
1264 * since to protect the API VFS mounts, they need to be around in the
9b68367b 1265 * first place...
9c988f93 1266 */
5d997827 1267
9b68367b
YW
1268 return ns_info->mount_apivfs ||
1269 ns_info->protect_control_groups ||
4e399953
LP
1270 ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables ||
1271 ns_info->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
1272 ns_info->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL;
5d997827
LP
1273}
1274
da6053d0 1275static size_t namespace_calculate_mounts(
bb0ff3fb 1276 const NamespaceInfo *ns_info,
2652c6c1
DH
1277 char** read_write_paths,
1278 char** read_only_paths,
1279 char** inaccessible_paths,
6c47cd7d 1280 char** empty_directories,
da6053d0
LP
1281 size_t n_bind_mounts,
1282 size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
b3d13314 1283 size_t n_mount_images,
2652c6c1
DH
1284 const char* tmp_dir,
1285 const char* var_tmp_dir,
bbb4e7f3 1286 const char *creds_path,
52b3d652 1287 const char* log_namespace) {
2652c6c1 1288
da6053d0
LP
1289 size_t protect_home_cnt;
1290 size_t protect_system_cnt =
52b3d652 1291 (ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT ?
f471b2af 1292 ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table) :
52b3d652 1293 ((ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL) ?
f471b2af 1294 ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table) :
52b3d652 1295 ((ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES) ?
f471b2af
DH
1296 ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table) : 0)));
1297
b6c432ca 1298 protect_home_cnt =
52b3d652 1299 (ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_YES ?
b6c432ca 1300 ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table) :
52b3d652 1301 ((ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY) ?
e4da7d8c 1302 ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table) :
52b3d652 1303 ((ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS) ?
e4da7d8c 1304 ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table) : 0)));
b6c432ca 1305
2652c6c1
DH
1306 return !!tmp_dir + !!var_tmp_dir +
1307 strv_length(read_write_paths) +
1308 strv_length(read_only_paths) +
1309 strv_length(inaccessible_paths) +
6c47cd7d 1310 strv_length(empty_directories) +
d2d6c096 1311 n_bind_mounts +
b3d13314 1312 n_mount_images +
2abd4e38 1313 n_temporary_filesystems +
c575770b
DH
1314 ns_info->private_dev +
1315 (ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_table) : 0) +
c575770b 1316 (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table) : 0) +
94a7b275
KK
1317 (ns_info->protect_kernel_logs ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_table) : 0) +
1318 (ns_info->protect_control_groups ? 1 : 0) +
5d997827 1319 protect_home_cnt + protect_system_cnt +
aecd5ac6 1320 (ns_info->protect_hostname ? 2 : 0) +
91dd5f7c 1321 (namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info) ? ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table) : 0) +
bbb4e7f3 1322 (creds_path ? 2 : 1) +
91dd5f7c 1323 !!log_namespace;
2652c6c1
DH
1324}
1325
da6053d0 1326static void normalize_mounts(const char *root_directory, MountEntry *mounts, size_t *n_mounts) {
9b68367b 1327 assert(root_directory);
f8b64b57
LP
1328 assert(n_mounts);
1329 assert(mounts || *n_mounts == 0);
1330
93bab288 1331 typesafe_qsort(mounts, *n_mounts, mount_path_compare);
f8b64b57
LP
1332
1333 drop_duplicates(mounts, n_mounts);
1334 drop_outside_root(root_directory, mounts, n_mounts);
1335 drop_inaccessible(mounts, n_mounts);
1336 drop_nop(mounts, n_mounts);
1337}
1338
c8c535d5
LP
1339static bool root_read_only(
1340 char **read_only_paths,
1341 ProtectSystem protect_system) {
1342
1343 /* Determine whether the root directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. */
1344
1345 if (protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT)
1346 return true;
1347
de46b2be 1348 if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/"))
c8c535d5
LP
1349 return true;
1350
1351 return false;
1352}
1353
1354static bool home_read_only(
1355 char** read_only_paths,
1356 char** inaccessible_paths,
1357 char** empty_directories,
1358 const BindMount *bind_mounts,
1359 size_t n_bind_mounts,
1360 const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems,
1361 size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
1362 ProtectHome protect_home) {
1363
1364 size_t i;
1365
1366 /* Determine whether the /home directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. Yes,
1367 * this is a bit sloppy, since we don't bother checking for cases where / is affected by multiple
1368 * settings. */
1369
1370 if (protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO)
1371 return true;
1372
de46b2be
TM
1373 if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/home") ||
1374 prefixed_path_strv_contains(inaccessible_paths, "/home") ||
1375 prefixed_path_strv_contains(empty_directories, "/home"))
c8c535d5
LP
1376 return true;
1377
1378 for (i = 0; i < n_temporary_filesystems; i++)
1379 if (path_equal(temporary_filesystems[i].path, "/home"))
1380 return true;
1381
1382 /* If /home is overmounted with some dir from the host it's not writable. */
1383 for (i = 0; i < n_bind_mounts; i++)
1384 if (path_equal(bind_mounts[i].destination, "/home"))
1385 return true;
1386
1387 return false;
1388}
1389
89e62e0b
LP
1390static int verity_settings_prepare(
1391 VeritySettings *verity,
1392 const char *root_image,
1393 const void *root_hash,
1394 size_t root_hash_size,
1395 const char *root_hash_path,
1396 const void *root_hash_sig,
1397 size_t root_hash_sig_size,
1398 const char *root_hash_sig_path,
1399 const char *verity_data_path) {
1400
1401 int r;
1402
1403 assert(verity);
1404
1405 if (root_hash) {
1406 void *d;
1407
1408 d = memdup(root_hash, root_hash_size);
1409 if (!d)
1410 return -ENOMEM;
1411
1412 free_and_replace(verity->root_hash, d);
1413 verity->root_hash_size = root_hash_size;
aee36b4e 1414 verity->designator = PARTITION_ROOT;
89e62e0b
LP
1415 }
1416
1417 if (root_hash_sig) {
1418 void *d;
1419
1420 d = memdup(root_hash_sig, root_hash_sig_size);
1421 if (!d)
1422 return -ENOMEM;
1423
1424 free_and_replace(verity->root_hash_sig, d);
1425 verity->root_hash_sig_size = root_hash_sig_size;
aee36b4e 1426 verity->designator = PARTITION_ROOT;
89e62e0b
LP
1427 }
1428
1429 if (verity_data_path) {
1430 r = free_and_strdup(&verity->data_path, verity_data_path);
1431 if (r < 0)
1432 return r;
1433 }
1434
1435 r = verity_settings_load(
1436 verity,
1437 root_image,
1438 root_hash_path,
1439 root_hash_sig_path);
1440 if (r < 0)
1441 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to load root hash: %m");
1442
1443 return 0;
1444}
1445
613b411c 1446int setup_namespace(
ee818b89 1447 const char* root_directory,
915e6d16 1448 const char* root_image,
18d73705 1449 const MountOptions *root_image_options,
bb0ff3fb 1450 const NamespaceInfo *ns_info,
2a624c36
AP
1451 char** read_write_paths,
1452 char** read_only_paths,
1453 char** inaccessible_paths,
6c47cd7d 1454 char** empty_directories,
d2d6c096 1455 const BindMount *bind_mounts,
da6053d0 1456 size_t n_bind_mounts,
2abd4e38 1457 const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems,
da6053d0 1458 size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
b3d13314
LB
1459 const MountImage *mount_images,
1460 size_t n_mount_images,
a004cb4c
LP
1461 const char* tmp_dir,
1462 const char* var_tmp_dir,
bbb4e7f3 1463 const char *creds_path,
91dd5f7c 1464 const char *log_namespace,
915e6d16 1465 unsigned long mount_flags,
0389f4fa
LB
1466 const void *root_hash,
1467 size_t root_hash_size,
1468 const char *root_hash_path,
d4d55b0d
LB
1469 const void *root_hash_sig,
1470 size_t root_hash_sig_size,
1471 const char *root_hash_sig_path,
89e62e0b 1472 const char *verity_data_path,
7cc5ef5f
ZJS
1473 DissectImageFlags dissect_image_flags,
1474 char **error_path) {
15ae422b 1475
915e6d16 1476 _cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp) LoopDevice *loop_device = NULL;
78ebe980 1477 _cleanup_(decrypted_image_unrefp) DecryptedImage *decrypted_image = NULL;
915e6d16 1478 _cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp) DissectedImage *dissected_image = NULL;
aee36b4e 1479 _cleanup_(verity_settings_done) VeritySettings verity = VERITY_SETTINGS_DEFAULT;
5f7a690a 1480 MountEntry *m = NULL, *mounts = NULL;
d18aff04 1481 bool require_prefix = false;
9b68367b 1482 const char *root;
89e62e0b
LP
1483 size_t n_mounts;
1484 int r;
15ae422b 1485
915e6d16
LP
1486 assert(ns_info);
1487
613b411c 1488 if (mount_flags == 0)
c17ec25e 1489 mount_flags = MS_SHARED;
ac0930c8 1490
915e6d16
LP
1491 if (root_image) {
1492 dissect_image_flags |= DISSECT_IMAGE_REQUIRE_ROOT;
1493
c8c535d5
LP
1494 /* Make the whole image read-only if we can determine that we only access it in a read-only fashion. */
1495 if (root_read_only(read_only_paths,
52b3d652 1496 ns_info->protect_system) &&
c8c535d5
LP
1497 home_read_only(read_only_paths, inaccessible_paths, empty_directories,
1498 bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts, temporary_filesystems, n_temporary_filesystems,
52b3d652 1499 ns_info->protect_home) &&
c9ef8573 1500 strv_isempty(read_write_paths))
915e6d16
LP
1501 dissect_image_flags |= DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY;
1502
89e62e0b
LP
1503 r = verity_settings_prepare(
1504 &verity,
1505 root_image,
1506 root_hash, root_hash_size, root_hash_path,
1507 root_hash_sig, root_hash_sig_size, root_hash_sig_path,
1508 verity_data_path);
915e6d16 1509 if (r < 0)
89e62e0b
LP
1510 return r;
1511
1512 SET_FLAG(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE, verity.data_path);
915e6d16 1513
89e62e0b
LP
1514 r = loop_device_make_by_path(
1515 root_image,
1516 FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY) ? O_RDONLY : -1 /* < 0 means writable if possible, read-only as fallback */,
1517 FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE) ? 0 : LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN,
1518 &loop_device);
78ebe980 1519 if (r < 0)
89e62e0b
LP
1520 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create loop device for root image: %m");
1521
1522 r = dissect_image(
1523 loop_device->fd,
1524 &verity,
1525 root_image_options,
1526 dissect_image_flags,
1527 &dissected_image);
78ebe980 1528 if (r < 0)
763a260a 1529 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to dissect image: %m");
78ebe980 1530
89e62e0b
LP
1531 r = dissected_image_decrypt(
1532 dissected_image,
1533 NULL,
1534 &verity,
1535 dissect_image_flags,
1536 &decrypted_image);
915e6d16 1537 if (r < 0)
763a260a 1538 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to decrypt dissected image: %m");
915e6d16
LP
1539 }
1540
e908468b
LP
1541 if (root_directory)
1542 root = root_directory;
0722b359
JS
1543 else {
1544 /* Always create the mount namespace in a temporary directory, instead of operating
1545 * directly in the root. The temporary directory prevents any mounts from being
1546 * potentially obscured my other mounts we already applied.
1547 * We use the same mount point for all images, which is safe, since they all live
1548 * in their own namespaces after all, and hence won't see each other. */
e908468b
LP
1549
1550 root = "/run/systemd/unit-root";
1551 (void) mkdir_label(root, 0700);
d18aff04 1552 require_prefix = true;
0722b359 1553 }
e908468b 1554
cfbeb4ef
LP
1555 n_mounts = namespace_calculate_mounts(
1556 ns_info,
1557 read_write_paths,
1558 read_only_paths,
1559 inaccessible_paths,
6c47cd7d 1560 empty_directories,
f5c52a77 1561 n_bind_mounts,
2abd4e38 1562 n_temporary_filesystems,
b3d13314 1563 n_mount_images,
cfbeb4ef 1564 tmp_dir, var_tmp_dir,
bbb4e7f3 1565 creds_path,
52b3d652 1566 log_namespace);
613b411c 1567
f0a4feb0 1568 if (n_mounts > 0) {
5f7a690a
LP
1569 m = mounts = new0(MountEntry, n_mounts);
1570 if (!mounts)
1571 return -ENOMEM;
1572
d18aff04 1573 r = append_access_mounts(&m, read_write_paths, READWRITE, require_prefix);
613b411c 1574 if (r < 0)
f0a4feb0 1575 goto finish;
613b411c 1576
d18aff04 1577 r = append_access_mounts(&m, read_only_paths, READONLY, require_prefix);
613b411c 1578 if (r < 0)
f0a4feb0 1579 goto finish;
613b411c 1580
d18aff04 1581 r = append_access_mounts(&m, inaccessible_paths, INACCESSIBLE, require_prefix);
613b411c 1582 if (r < 0)
f0a4feb0 1583 goto finish;
7ff7394d 1584
6c47cd7d
LP
1585 r = append_empty_dir_mounts(&m, empty_directories);
1586 if (r < 0)
1587 goto finish;
1588
d2d6c096
LP
1589 r = append_bind_mounts(&m, bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts);
1590 if (r < 0)
1591 goto finish;
1592
2abd4e38
YW
1593 r = append_tmpfs_mounts(&m, temporary_filesystems, n_temporary_filesystems);
1594 if (r < 0)
1595 goto finish;
1596
613b411c 1597 if (tmp_dir) {
56a13a49
ZJS
1598 bool ro = streq(tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
1599
34de407a 1600 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
5327c910 1601 .path_const = "/tmp",
56a13a49 1602 .mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP,
89bd586c 1603 .source_const = tmp_dir,
5327c910 1604 };
613b411c 1605 }
7ff7394d 1606
613b411c 1607 if (var_tmp_dir) {
56a13a49
ZJS
1608 bool ro = streq(var_tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
1609
34de407a 1610 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
5327c910 1611 .path_const = "/var/tmp",
56a13a49 1612 .mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP,
89bd586c 1613 .source_const = var_tmp_dir,
5327c910 1614 };
7ff7394d 1615 }
ac0930c8 1616
b3d13314
LB
1617 r = append_mount_images(&m, mount_images, n_mount_images);
1618 if (r < 0)
1619 goto finish;
1620
d46b79bb 1621 if (ns_info->private_dev)
34de407a 1622 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
5327c910
LP
1623 .path_const = "/dev",
1624 .mode = PRIVATE_DEV,
9ce4e4b0 1625 .flags = DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS,
5327c910 1626 };
7f112f50 1627
c575770b 1628 if (ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables) {
cbc056c8
ZJS
1629 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
1630 protect_kernel_tunables_table,
1631 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_table),
1632 ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
c575770b 1633 if (r < 0)
f0a4feb0 1634 goto finish;
c575770b
DH
1635 }
1636
1637 if (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules) {
cbc056c8
ZJS
1638 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
1639 protect_kernel_modules_table,
1640 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table),
1641 ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
c575770b 1642 if (r < 0)
f0a4feb0 1643 goto finish;
c575770b 1644 }
59eeb84b 1645
94a7b275 1646 if (ns_info->protect_kernel_logs) {
cbc056c8
ZJS
1647 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
1648 protect_kernel_logs_table,
1649 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_table),
1650 ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
94a7b275
KK
1651 if (r < 0)
1652 goto finish;
1653 }
1654
d46b79bb 1655 if (ns_info->protect_control_groups)
34de407a 1656 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
5327c910
LP
1657 .path_const = "/sys/fs/cgroup",
1658 .mode = READONLY,
1659 };
59eeb84b 1660
52b3d652 1661 r = append_protect_home(&m, ns_info->protect_home, ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
b6c432ca 1662 if (r < 0)
f0a4feb0 1663 goto finish;
417116f2 1664
52b3d652 1665 r = append_protect_system(&m, ns_info->protect_system, false);
f471b2af 1666 if (r < 0)
f0a4feb0 1667 goto finish;
417116f2 1668
9b68367b 1669 if (namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info)) {
cbc056c8
ZJS
1670 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
1671 apivfs_table,
1672 ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table),
1673 ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
5d997827
LP
1674 if (r < 0)
1675 goto finish;
1676 }
1677
aecd5ac6
TM
1678 if (ns_info->protect_hostname) {
1679 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
1680 .path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/hostname",
1681 .mode = READONLY,
1682 };
1683 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
1684 .path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/domainname",
1685 .mode = READONLY,
1686 };
1687 }
1688
bbb4e7f3
LP
1689 if (creds_path) {
1690 /* If our service has a credentials store configured, then bind that one in, but hide
1691 * everything else. */
1692
1693 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
1694 .path_const = "/run/credentials",
1695 .mode = TMPFS,
1696 .read_only = true,
1697 .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST,
1698 .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC,
1699 };
1700
1701 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
1702 .path_const = creds_path,
1703 .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
1704 .read_only = true,
1705 .source_const = creds_path,
1706 };
1707 } else {
1708 /* If our service has no credentials store configured, then make the whole
1709 * credentials tree inaccessible wholesale. */
1710
1711 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
1712 .path_const = "/run/credentials",
1713 .mode = INACCESSIBLE,
1714 .ignore = true,
1715 };
1716 }
1717
91dd5f7c
LP
1718 if (log_namespace) {
1719 _cleanup_free_ char *q;
1720
1721 q = strjoin("/run/systemd/journal.", log_namespace);
1722 if (!q) {
1723 r = -ENOMEM;
1724 goto finish;
1725 }
1726
1727 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
1728 .path_const = "/run/systemd/journal",
1729 .mode = BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE,
1730 .read_only = true,
1731 .source_malloc = TAKE_PTR(q),
1732 };
1733 }
1734
f0a4feb0 1735 assert(mounts + n_mounts == m);
ac0930c8 1736
5327c910 1737 /* Prepend the root directory where that's necessary */
e908468b 1738 r = prefix_where_needed(mounts, n_mounts, root);
5327c910
LP
1739 if (r < 0)
1740 goto finish;
1741
839f1877 1742 normalize_mounts(root, mounts, &n_mounts);
15ae422b
LP
1743 }
1744
1beab8b0
LP
1745 /* All above is just preparation, figuring out what to do. Let's now actually start doing something. */
1746
d944dc95 1747 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) < 0) {
763a260a 1748 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to unshare the mount namespace: %m");
1beab8b0 1749 if (IN_SET(r, -EACCES, -EPERM, -EOPNOTSUPP, -ENOSYS))
cbc056c8
ZJS
1750 /* If the kernel doesn't support namespaces, or when there's a MAC or seccomp filter
1751 * in place that doesn't allow us to create namespaces (or a missing cap), then
1752 * propagate a recognizable error back, which the caller can use to detect this case
1753 * (and only this) and optionally continue without namespacing applied. */
1beab8b0
LP
1754 r = -ENOANO;
1755
d944dc95
LP
1756 goto finish;
1757 }
1e4e94c8 1758
9b68367b
YW
1759 /* Remount / as SLAVE so that nothing now mounted in the namespace
1760 * shows up in the parent */
1761 if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_SLAVE|MS_REC, NULL) < 0) {
763a260a 1762 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' as SLAVE: %m");
9b68367b 1763 goto finish;
ee818b89
AC
1764 }
1765
915e6d16 1766 if (root_image) {
e908468b 1767 /* A root image is specified, mount it to the right place */
2d3a5a73 1768 r = dissected_image_mount(dissected_image, root, UID_INVALID, dissect_image_flags);
763a260a
YW
1769 if (r < 0) {
1770 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root image: %m");
915e6d16 1771 goto finish;
763a260a 1772 }
915e6d16 1773
07ce7407
TM
1774 if (decrypted_image) {
1775 r = decrypted_image_relinquish(decrypted_image);
763a260a
YW
1776 if (r < 0) {
1777 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to relinquish decrypted image: %m");
07ce7407 1778 goto finish;
763a260a 1779 }
07ce7407 1780 }
78ebe980 1781
915e6d16
LP
1782 loop_device_relinquish(loop_device);
1783
1784 } else if (root_directory) {
1785
e908468b
LP
1786 /* A root directory is specified. Turn its directory into bind mount, if it isn't one yet. */
1787 r = path_is_mount_point(root, NULL, AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW);
763a260a
YW
1788 if (r < 0) {
1789 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect that %s is a mount point or not: %m", root);
d944dc95 1790 goto finish;
763a260a 1791 }
8f1ad200 1792 if (r == 0) {
21935150
LP
1793 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, root, root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
1794 if (r < 0)
8f1ad200 1795 goto finish;
d944dc95 1796 }
e908468b 1797
9b68367b 1798 } else {
e908468b 1799 /* Let's mount the main root directory to the root directory to use */
21935150
LP
1800 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/", root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
1801 if (r < 0)
e908468b 1802 goto finish;
ee818b89 1803 }
c2c13f2d 1804
4e0c20de
LP
1805 /* Try to set up the new root directory before mounting anything else there. */
1806 if (root_image || root_directory)
1807 (void) base_filesystem_create(root, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID);
1808
f0a4feb0 1809 if (n_mounts > 0) {
ac9de0b3 1810 _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *proc_self_mountinfo = NULL;
6b000af4 1811 _cleanup_free_ char **deny_list = NULL;
da6053d0 1812 size_t j;
6b7c9f8b 1813
cbc056c8
ZJS
1814 /* Open /proc/self/mountinfo now as it may become unavailable if we mount anything on top of
1815 * /proc. For example, this is the case with the option: 'InaccessiblePaths=/proc'. */
ac9de0b3
TR
1816 proc_self_mountinfo = fopen("/proc/self/mountinfo", "re");
1817 if (!proc_self_mountinfo) {
763a260a 1818 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to open /proc/self/mountinfo: %m");
7cc5ef5f
ZJS
1819 if (error_path)
1820 *error_path = strdup("/proc/self/mountinfo");
ac9de0b3
TR
1821 goto finish;
1822 }
1823
088696fe
LP
1824 /* First round, establish all mounts we need */
1825 for (;;) {
1826 bool again = false;
1827
1828 for (m = mounts; m < mounts + n_mounts; ++m) {
1829
1830 if (m->applied)
1831 continue;
1832
1833 r = follow_symlink(root, m);
7cc5ef5f
ZJS
1834 if (r < 0) {
1835 if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
1836 *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
088696fe 1837 goto finish;
7cc5ef5f 1838 }
088696fe 1839 if (r == 0) {
cbc056c8
ZJS
1840 /* We hit a symlinked mount point. The entry got rewritten and might
1841 * point to a very different place now. Let's normalize the changed
1842 * list, and start from the beginning. After all to mount the entry
1843 * at the new location we might need some other mounts first */
088696fe
LP
1844 again = true;
1845 break;
1846 }
1847
4e399953 1848 r = apply_mount(root, m, ns_info);
7cc5ef5f
ZJS
1849 if (r < 0) {
1850 if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
1851 *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
088696fe 1852 goto finish;
7cc5ef5f 1853 }
088696fe
LP
1854
1855 m->applied = true;
1856 }
1857
1858 if (!again)
1859 break;
1860
839f1877 1861 normalize_mounts(root, mounts, &n_mounts);
c2c13f2d 1862 }
15ae422b 1863
6b000af4
LP
1864 /* Create a deny list we can pass to bind_mount_recursive() */
1865 deny_list = new(char*, n_mounts+1);
1866 if (!deny_list) {
5f7a690a
LP
1867 r = -ENOMEM;
1868 goto finish;
1869 }
f0a4feb0 1870 for (j = 0; j < n_mounts; j++)
6b000af4
LP
1871 deny_list[j] = (char*) mount_entry_path(mounts+j);
1872 deny_list[j] = NULL;
6b7c9f8b
LP
1873
1874 /* Second round, flip the ro bits if necessary. */
f0a4feb0 1875 for (m = mounts; m < mounts + n_mounts; ++m) {
6b000af4 1876 r = make_read_only(m, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
7cc5ef5f
ZJS
1877 if (r < 0) {
1878 if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m))
1879 *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
d944dc95 1880 goto finish;
7cc5ef5f 1881 }
c2c13f2d 1882 }
15ae422b
LP
1883 }
1884
9b68367b
YW
1885 /* MS_MOVE does not work on MS_SHARED so the remount MS_SHARED will be done later */
1886 r = mount_move_root(root);
763a260a
YW
1887 if (r < 0) {
1888 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root with MS_MOVE: %m");
9b68367b 1889 goto finish;
763a260a 1890 }
ee818b89 1891
55fe7432 1892 /* Remount / as the desired mode. Note that this will not
c2c13f2d
LP
1893 * reestablish propagation from our side to the host, since
1894 * what's disconnected is disconnected. */
d944dc95 1895 if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, mount_flags | MS_REC, NULL) < 0) {
763a260a 1896 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' with desired mount flags: %m");
d944dc95
LP
1897 goto finish;
1898 }
15ae422b 1899
d944dc95 1900 r = 0;
15ae422b 1901
d944dc95 1902finish:
0cd41757
LP
1903 if (n_mounts > 0)
1904 for (m = mounts; m < mounts + n_mounts; m++)
1905 mount_entry_done(m);
613b411c 1906
5f7a690a
LP
1907 free(mounts);
1908
613b411c
LP
1909 return r;
1910}
1911
da6053d0
LP
1912void bind_mount_free_many(BindMount *b, size_t n) {
1913 size_t i;
d2d6c096
LP
1914
1915 assert(b || n == 0);
1916
1917 for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
1918 free(b[i].source);
1919 free(b[i].destination);
1920 }
1921
1922 free(b);
1923}
1924
da6053d0 1925int bind_mount_add(BindMount **b, size_t *n, const BindMount *item) {
d2d6c096
LP
1926 _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL;
1927 BindMount *c;
1928
1929 assert(b);
1930 assert(n);
1931 assert(item);
1932
1933 s = strdup(item->source);
1934 if (!s)
1935 return -ENOMEM;
1936
1937 d = strdup(item->destination);
1938 if (!d)
1939 return -ENOMEM;
1940
aa484f35 1941 c = reallocarray(*b, *n + 1, sizeof(BindMount));
d2d6c096
LP
1942 if (!c)
1943 return -ENOMEM;
1944
1945 *b = c;
1946
1947 c[(*n) ++] = (BindMount) {
1cc6c93a
YW
1948 .source = TAKE_PTR(s),
1949 .destination = TAKE_PTR(d),
d2d6c096 1950 .read_only = item->read_only,
9ce4e4b0 1951 .nosuid = item->nosuid,
d2d6c096
LP
1952 .recursive = item->recursive,
1953 .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent,
1954 };
1955
d2d6c096
LP
1956 return 0;
1957}
1958
b3d13314
LB
1959MountImage* mount_image_free_many(MountImage *m, size_t *n) {
1960 size_t i;
1961
1962 assert(n);
1963 assert(m || *n == 0);
1964
1965 for (i = 0; i < *n; i++) {
1966 free(m[i].source);
1967 free(m[i].destination);
427353f6 1968 mount_options_free_all(m[i].mount_options);
b3d13314
LB
1969 }
1970
1971 free(m);
1972 *n = 0;
1973 return NULL;
1974}
1975
1976int mount_image_add(MountImage **m, size_t *n, const MountImage *item) {
1977 _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL;
427353f6
LB
1978 _cleanup_(mount_options_free_allp) MountOptions *options = NULL;
1979 MountOptions *i;
b3d13314
LB
1980 MountImage *c;
1981
1982 assert(m);
1983 assert(n);
1984 assert(item);
1985
1986 s = strdup(item->source);
1987 if (!s)
1988 return -ENOMEM;
1989
1990 d = strdup(item->destination);
1991 if (!d)
1992 return -ENOMEM;
1993
427353f6
LB
1994 LIST_FOREACH(mount_options, i, item->mount_options) {
1995 _cleanup_(mount_options_free_allp) MountOptions *o;
1996
1997 o = new(MountOptions, 1);
1998 if (!o)
1999 return -ENOMEM;
2000
2001 *o = (MountOptions) {
2002 .partition_designator = i->partition_designator,
2003 .options = strdup(i->options),
2004 };
2005 if (!o->options)
2006 return -ENOMEM;
2007
2008 LIST_APPEND(mount_options, options, TAKE_PTR(o));
2009 }
2010
b3d13314
LB
2011 c = reallocarray(*m, *n + 1, sizeof(MountImage));
2012 if (!c)
2013 return -ENOMEM;
2014
2015 *m = c;
2016
2017 c[(*n) ++] = (MountImage) {
2018 .source = TAKE_PTR(s),
2019 .destination = TAKE_PTR(d),
427353f6 2020 .mount_options = TAKE_PTR(options),
b3d13314
LB
2021 .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent,
2022 };
2023
2024 return 0;
2025}
2026
da6053d0
LP
2027void temporary_filesystem_free_many(TemporaryFileSystem *t, size_t n) {
2028 size_t i;
2abd4e38
YW
2029
2030 assert(t || n == 0);
2031
2032 for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
2033 free(t[i].path);
2034 free(t[i].options);
2035 }
2036
2037 free(t);
2038}
2039
2040int temporary_filesystem_add(
2041 TemporaryFileSystem **t,
da6053d0 2042 size_t *n,
2abd4e38
YW
2043 const char *path,
2044 const char *options) {
2045
2046 _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL, *o = NULL;
2047 TemporaryFileSystem *c;
2048
2049 assert(t);
2050 assert(n);
2051 assert(path);
2052
2053 p = strdup(path);
2054 if (!p)
2055 return -ENOMEM;
2056
2057 if (!isempty(options)) {
2058 o = strdup(options);
2059 if (!o)
2060 return -ENOMEM;
2061 }
2062
aa484f35 2063 c = reallocarray(*t, *n + 1, sizeof(TemporaryFileSystem));
2abd4e38
YW
2064 if (!c)
2065 return -ENOMEM;
2066
2067 *t = c;
2068
2069 c[(*n) ++] = (TemporaryFileSystem) {
1cc6c93a
YW
2070 .path = TAKE_PTR(p),
2071 .options = TAKE_PTR(o),
2abd4e38
YW
2072 };
2073
2abd4e38
YW
2074 return 0;
2075}
2076
a652f050
JR
2077static int make_tmp_prefix(const char *prefix) {
2078 _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
2079 int r;
2080
2081 /* Don't do anything unless we know the dir is actually missing */
2082 r = access(prefix, F_OK);
2083 if (r >= 0)
2084 return 0;
2085 if (errno != ENOENT)
2086 return -errno;
2087
2088 r = mkdir_parents(prefix, 0755);
2089 if (r < 0)
2090 return r;
2091
2092 r = tempfn_random(prefix, NULL, &t);
2093 if (r < 0)
2094 return r;
2095
2096 if (mkdir(t, 0777) < 0)
2097 return -errno;
2098
2099 if (chmod(t, 01777) < 0) {
2100 r = -errno;
2101 (void) rmdir(t);
2102 return r;
2103 }
2104
2105 if (rename(t, prefix) < 0) {
2106 r = -errno;
2107 (void) rmdir(t);
2108 return r == -EEXIST ? 0 : r; /* it's fine if someone else created the dir by now */
2109 }
2110
2111 return 0;
2112
2113}
2114
56a13a49 2115static int setup_one_tmp_dir(const char *id, const char *prefix, char **path, char **tmp_path) {
613b411c 2116 _cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL;
19cd4e19 2117 _cleanup_free_ char *y = NULL;
6b46ea73
LP
2118 char bid[SD_ID128_STRING_MAX];
2119 sd_id128_t boot_id;
56a13a49 2120 bool rw = true;
6b46ea73 2121 int r;
613b411c
LP
2122
2123 assert(id);
2124 assert(prefix);
2125 assert(path);
2126
6b46ea73
LP
2127 /* We include the boot id in the directory so that after a
2128 * reboot we can easily identify obsolete directories. */
2129
2130 r = sd_id128_get_boot(&boot_id);
2131 if (r < 0)
2132 return r;
2133
605405c6 2134 x = strjoin(prefix, "/systemd-private-", sd_id128_to_string(boot_id, bid), "-", id, "-XXXXXX");
613b411c
LP
2135 if (!x)
2136 return -ENOMEM;
2137
a652f050
JR
2138 r = make_tmp_prefix(prefix);
2139 if (r < 0)
2140 return r;
2141
613b411c 2142 RUN_WITH_UMASK(0077)
56a13a49
ZJS
2143 if (!mkdtemp(x)) {
2144 if (errno == EROFS || ERRNO_IS_DISK_SPACE(errno))
2145 rw = false;
2146 else
2147 return -errno;
2148 }
613b411c 2149
56a13a49 2150 if (rw) {
19cd4e19 2151 y = strjoin(x, "/tmp");
2152 if (!y)
2153 return -ENOMEM;
2154
2155 RUN_WITH_UMASK(0000) {
2156 if (mkdir(y, 0777 | S_ISVTX) < 0)
2157 return -errno;
2158 }
2159
2160 r = label_fix_container(y, prefix, 0);
56a13a49
ZJS
2161 if (r < 0)
2162 return r;
19cd4e19 2163
2164 if (tmp_path)
2165 *tmp_path = TAKE_PTR(y);
56a13a49
ZJS
2166 } else {
2167 /* Trouble: we failed to create the directory. Instead of failing, let's simulate /tmp being
2168 * read-only. This way the service will get the EROFS result as if it was writing to the real
2169 * file system. */
2170 r = mkdir_p(RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY, 0500);
2171 if (r < 0)
2172 return r;
613b411c 2173
3f181262
LP
2174 r = free_and_strdup(&x, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
2175 if (r < 0)
2176 return r;
c17ec25e 2177 }
15ae422b 2178
1cc6c93a 2179 *path = TAKE_PTR(x);
613b411c
LP
2180 return 0;
2181}
2182
2183int setup_tmp_dirs(const char *id, char **tmp_dir, char **var_tmp_dir) {
56a13a49
ZJS
2184 _cleanup_(namespace_cleanup_tmpdirp) char *a = NULL;
2185 _cleanup_(rmdir_and_freep) char *a_tmp = NULL;
2186 char *b;
613b411c
LP
2187 int r;
2188
2189 assert(id);
2190 assert(tmp_dir);
2191 assert(var_tmp_dir);
2192
56a13a49 2193 r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/tmp", &a, &a_tmp);
613b411c
LP
2194 if (r < 0)
2195 return r;
2196
56a13a49
ZJS
2197 r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/var/tmp", &b, NULL);
2198 if (r < 0)
613b411c 2199 return r;
613b411c 2200
56a13a49
ZJS
2201 a_tmp = mfree(a_tmp); /* avoid rmdir */
2202 *tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(a);
2203 *var_tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(b);
613b411c
LP
2204
2205 return 0;
2206}
2207
2caa38e9 2208int setup_netns(const int netns_storage_socket[static 2]) {
613b411c 2209 _cleanup_close_ int netns = -1;
3ee897d6 2210 int r, q;
613b411c
LP
2211
2212 assert(netns_storage_socket);
2213 assert(netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0);
2214 assert(netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0);
2215
2216 /* We use the passed socketpair as a storage buffer for our
76cd584b
LP
2217 * namespace reference fd. Whatever process runs this first
2218 * shall create a new namespace, all others should just join
2219 * it. To serialize that we use a file lock on the socket
2220 * pair.
613b411c
LP
2221 *
2222 * It's a bit crazy, but hey, works great! */
2223
2224 if (lockf(netns_storage_socket[0], F_LOCK, 0) < 0)
2225 return -errno;
2226
3ee897d6
LP
2227 netns = receive_one_fd(netns_storage_socket[0], MSG_DONTWAIT);
2228 if (netns == -EAGAIN) {
44ffcbae 2229 /* Nothing stored yet, so let's create a new namespace. */
613b411c
LP
2230
2231 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNET) < 0) {
2232 r = -errno;
2233 goto fail;
2234 }
2235
44ffcbae 2236 (void) loopback_setup();
613b411c
LP
2237
2238 netns = open("/proc/self/ns/net", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
2239 if (netns < 0) {
2240 r = -errno;
2241 goto fail;
2242 }
2243
2244 r = 1;
613b411c 2245
3ee897d6
LP
2246 } else if (netns < 0) {
2247 r = netns;
2248 goto fail;
613b411c 2249
3ee897d6
LP
2250 } else {
2251 /* Yay, found something, so let's join the namespace */
613b411c
LP
2252 if (setns(netns, CLONE_NEWNET) < 0) {
2253 r = -errno;
2254 goto fail;
2255 }
2256
2257 r = 0;
2258 }
2259
3ee897d6
LP
2260 q = send_one_fd(netns_storage_socket[1], netns, MSG_DONTWAIT);
2261 if (q < 0) {
2262 r = q;
613b411c
LP
2263 goto fail;
2264 }
2265
2266fail:
fe048ce5 2267 (void) lockf(netns_storage_socket[0], F_ULOCK, 0);
15ae422b
LP
2268 return r;
2269}
417116f2 2270
2caa38e9 2271int open_netns_path(const int netns_storage_socket[static 2], const char *path) {
51af7fb2
LP
2272 _cleanup_close_ int netns = -1;
2273 int q, r;
2274
2275 assert(netns_storage_socket);
2276 assert(netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0);
2277 assert(netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0);
2278 assert(path);
2279
2280 /* If the storage socket doesn't contain a netns fd yet, open one via the file system and store it in
2281 * it. This is supposed to be called ahead of time, i.e. before setup_netns() which will allocate a
2282 * new anonymous netns if needed. */
2283
2284 if (lockf(netns_storage_socket[0], F_LOCK, 0) < 0)
2285 return -errno;
2286
2287 netns = receive_one_fd(netns_storage_socket[0], MSG_DONTWAIT);
2288 if (netns == -EAGAIN) {
2289 /* Nothing stored yet. Open the file from the file system. */
2290
2291 netns = open(path, O_RDONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC);
2292 if (netns < 0) {
2293 r = -errno;
2294 goto fail;
2295 }
2296
2297 r = fd_is_network_ns(netns);
2298 if (r == 0) { /* Not a netns? Refuse early. */
2299 r = -EINVAL;
2300 goto fail;
2301 }
2302 if (r < 0 && r != -EUCLEAN) /* EUCLEAN: we don't know */
2303 goto fail;
2304
2305 r = 1;
2306
2307 } else if (netns < 0) {
2308 r = netns;
2309 goto fail;
2310 } else
2311 r = 0; /* Already allocated */
2312
2313 q = send_one_fd(netns_storage_socket[1], netns, MSG_DONTWAIT);
2314 if (q < 0) {
2315 r = q;
2316 goto fail;
2317 }
2318
2319fail:
2320 (void) lockf(netns_storage_socket[0], F_ULOCK, 0);
2321 return r;
2322}
2323
6e2d7c4f
MS
2324bool ns_type_supported(NamespaceType type) {
2325 const char *t, *ns_proc;
2326
0fa5b831
LP
2327 t = namespace_type_to_string(type);
2328 if (!t) /* Don't know how to translate this? Then it's not supported */
6e2d7c4f
MS
2329 return false;
2330
6e2d7c4f 2331 ns_proc = strjoina("/proc/self/ns/", t);
6e2d7c4f
MS
2332 return access(ns_proc, F_OK) == 0;
2333}
2334
1b8689f9 2335static const char *const protect_home_table[_PROTECT_HOME_MAX] = {
cbc056c8
ZJS
2336 [PROTECT_HOME_NO] = "no",
2337 [PROTECT_HOME_YES] = "yes",
1b8689f9 2338 [PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY] = "read-only",
cbc056c8 2339 [PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS] = "tmpfs",
417116f2
LP
2340};
2341
1e8c7bd5 2342DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_home, ProtectHome, PROTECT_HOME_YES);
5e1c6154 2343
1b8689f9 2344static const char *const protect_system_table[_PROTECT_SYSTEM_MAX] = {
cbc056c8
ZJS
2345 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO] = "no",
2346 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES] = "yes",
2347 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL] = "full",
3f815163 2348 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT] = "strict",
1b8689f9
LP
2349};
2350
1e8c7bd5 2351DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_system, ProtectSystem, PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES);
03c791aa 2352
6e2d7c4f 2353static const char* const namespace_type_table[] = {
cbc056c8 2354 [NAMESPACE_MOUNT] = "mnt",
6e2d7c4f 2355 [NAMESPACE_CGROUP] = "cgroup",
cbc056c8
ZJS
2356 [NAMESPACE_UTS] = "uts",
2357 [NAMESPACE_IPC] = "ipc",
2358 [NAMESPACE_USER] = "user",
2359 [NAMESPACE_PID] = "pid",
2360 [NAMESPACE_NET] = "net",
6e2d7c4f
MS
2361};
2362
2363DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(namespace_type, NamespaceType);
4e399953
LP
2364
2365static const char* const protect_proc_table[_PROTECT_PROC_MAX] = {
2366 [PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT] = "default",
2367 [PROTECT_PROC_NOACCESS] = "noaccess",
2368 [PROTECT_PROC_INVISIBLE] = "invisible",
2369 [PROTECT_PROC_PTRACEABLE] = "ptraceable",
2370};
2371
2372DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(protect_proc, ProtectProc);
2373
2374static const char* const proc_subset_table[_PROC_SUBSET_MAX] = {
2375 [PROC_SUBSET_ALL] = "all",
2376 [PROC_SUBSET_PID] = "pid",
2377};
2378
2379DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(proc_subset, ProcSubset);