]>
Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
2b442ac8 LP |
1 | /*-*- Mode: C; c-basic-offset: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*-*/ |
2 | ||
3 | /*** | |
4 | This file is part of systemd. | |
5 | ||
6 | Copyright 2015 Lennart Poettering | |
7 | ||
8 | systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it | |
9 | under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by | |
10 | the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or | |
11 | (at your option) any later version. | |
12 | ||
13 | systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but | |
14 | WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of | |
15 | MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU | |
16 | Lesser General Public License for more details. | |
17 | ||
18 | You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License | |
19 | along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. | |
20 | ***/ | |
21 | ||
22 | #include <gcrypt.h> | |
23 | ||
24 | #include "alloc-util.h" | |
25 | #include "dns-domain.h" | |
72667f08 | 26 | #include "hexdecoct.h" |
2b442ac8 LP |
27 | #include "resolved-dns-dnssec.h" |
28 | #include "resolved-dns-packet.h" | |
24710c48 | 29 | #include "string-table.h" |
2b442ac8 LP |
30 | |
31 | /* Open question: | |
32 | * | |
33 | * How does the DNSSEC canonical form of a hostname with a label | |
34 | * containing a dot look like, the way DNS-SD does it? | |
35 | * | |
2cd87277 LP |
36 | * TODO: |
37 | * | |
3ecc3df8 | 38 | * - wildcard zones compatibility (NSEC/NSEC3 wildcard check is missing) |
bb1fa242 | 39 | * - multi-label zone compatibility |
3e92a719 | 40 | * - cname/dname compatibility |
160fbda9 | 41 | * - nxdomain on qname |
6f8a2c68 | 42 | * - per-interface DNSSEC setting |
2cd87277 | 43 | * |
2b442ac8 LP |
44 | * */ |
45 | ||
46 | #define VERIFY_RRS_MAX 256 | |
47 | #define MAX_KEY_SIZE (32*1024) | |
48 | ||
896c5672 LP |
49 | /* Permit a maximum clock skew of 1h 10min. This should be enough to deal with DST confusion */ |
50 | #define SKEW_MAX (1*USEC_PER_HOUR + 10*USEC_PER_MINUTE) | |
51 | ||
a8f158b9 LP |
52 | /* Maximum number of NSEC3 iterations we'll do. */ |
53 | #define NSEC3_ITERATIONS_MAX 2048 | |
54 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
55 | /* |
56 | * The DNSSEC Chain of trust: | |
57 | * | |
58 | * Normal RRs are protected via RRSIG RRs in combination with DNSKEY RRs, all in the same zone | |
59 | * DNSKEY RRs are either protected like normal RRs, or via a DS from a zone "higher" up the tree | |
60 | * DS RRs are protected like normal RRs | |
61 | * | |
62 | * Example chain: | |
63 | * Normal RR → RRSIG/DNSKEY+ → DS → RRSIG/DNSKEY+ → DS → ... → DS → RRSIG/DNSKEY+ → DS | |
64 | */ | |
65 | ||
0638401a LP |
66 | static void initialize_libgcrypt(void) { |
67 | const char *p; | |
68 | ||
69 | if (gcry_control(GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED_P)) | |
70 | return; | |
71 | ||
72 | p = gcry_check_version("1.4.5"); | |
73 | assert(p); | |
74 | ||
75 | gcry_control(GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM); | |
76 | gcry_control(GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0); | |
77 | } | |
78 | ||
0c857028 | 79 | uint16_t dnssec_keytag(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, bool mask_revoke) { |
2b442ac8 | 80 | const uint8_t *p; |
0c857028 | 81 | uint32_t sum, f; |
2b442ac8 LP |
82 | size_t i; |
83 | ||
84 | /* The algorithm from RFC 4034, Appendix B. */ | |
85 | ||
86 | assert(dnskey); | |
87 | assert(dnskey->key->type == DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY); | |
88 | ||
0c857028 LP |
89 | f = (uint32_t) dnskey->dnskey.flags; |
90 | ||
91 | if (mask_revoke) | |
92 | f &= ~DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE; | |
93 | ||
94 | sum = f + ((((uint32_t) dnskey->dnskey.protocol) << 8) + (uint32_t) dnskey->dnskey.algorithm); | |
2b442ac8 LP |
95 | |
96 | p = dnskey->dnskey.key; | |
97 | ||
98 | for (i = 0; i < dnskey->dnskey.key_size; i++) | |
99 | sum += (i & 1) == 0 ? (uint32_t) p[i] << 8 : (uint32_t) p[i]; | |
100 | ||
101 | sum += (sum >> 16) & UINT32_C(0xFFFF); | |
102 | ||
103 | return sum & UINT32_C(0xFFFF); | |
104 | } | |
105 | ||
106 | static int rr_compare(const void *a, const void *b) { | |
107 | DnsResourceRecord **x = (DnsResourceRecord**) a, **y = (DnsResourceRecord**) b; | |
108 | size_t m; | |
109 | int r; | |
110 | ||
111 | /* Let's order the RRs according to RFC 4034, Section 6.3 */ | |
112 | ||
113 | assert(x); | |
114 | assert(*x); | |
115 | assert((*x)->wire_format); | |
116 | assert(y); | |
117 | assert(*y); | |
118 | assert((*y)->wire_format); | |
119 | ||
85aeaccc | 120 | m = MIN(DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(*x), DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(*y)); |
2b442ac8 | 121 | |
85aeaccc | 122 | r = memcmp(DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA(*x), DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA(*y), m); |
2b442ac8 LP |
123 | if (r != 0) |
124 | return r; | |
125 | ||
85aeaccc | 126 | if (DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(*x) < DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(*y)) |
2b442ac8 | 127 | return -1; |
85aeaccc | 128 | else if (DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(*x) > DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(*y)) |
2b442ac8 LP |
129 | return 1; |
130 | ||
131 | return 0; | |
132 | } | |
133 | ||
ea3a892f | 134 | static int dnssec_rsa_verify_raw( |
2b442ac8 LP |
135 | const char *hash_algorithm, |
136 | const void *signature, size_t signature_size, | |
137 | const void *data, size_t data_size, | |
138 | const void *exponent, size_t exponent_size, | |
139 | const void *modulus, size_t modulus_size) { | |
140 | ||
141 | gcry_sexp_t public_key_sexp = NULL, data_sexp = NULL, signature_sexp = NULL; | |
142 | gcry_mpi_t n = NULL, e = NULL, s = NULL; | |
143 | gcry_error_t ge; | |
144 | int r; | |
145 | ||
146 | assert(hash_algorithm); | |
147 | ||
148 | ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&s, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, signature, signature_size, NULL); | |
149 | if (ge != 0) { | |
150 | r = -EIO; | |
151 | goto finish; | |
152 | } | |
153 | ||
154 | ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&e, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, exponent, exponent_size, NULL); | |
155 | if (ge != 0) { | |
156 | r = -EIO; | |
157 | goto finish; | |
158 | } | |
159 | ||
160 | ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&n, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, modulus, modulus_size, NULL); | |
161 | if (ge != 0) { | |
162 | r = -EIO; | |
163 | goto finish; | |
164 | } | |
165 | ||
166 | ge = gcry_sexp_build(&signature_sexp, | |
167 | NULL, | |
168 | "(sig-val (rsa (s %m)))", | |
169 | s); | |
170 | ||
171 | if (ge != 0) { | |
172 | r = -EIO; | |
173 | goto finish; | |
174 | } | |
175 | ||
176 | ge = gcry_sexp_build(&data_sexp, | |
177 | NULL, | |
178 | "(data (flags pkcs1) (hash %s %b))", | |
179 | hash_algorithm, | |
180 | (int) data_size, | |
181 | data); | |
182 | if (ge != 0) { | |
183 | r = -EIO; | |
184 | goto finish; | |
185 | } | |
186 | ||
187 | ge = gcry_sexp_build(&public_key_sexp, | |
188 | NULL, | |
189 | "(public-key (rsa (n %m) (e %m)))", | |
190 | n, | |
191 | e); | |
192 | if (ge != 0) { | |
193 | r = -EIO; | |
194 | goto finish; | |
195 | } | |
196 | ||
197 | ge = gcry_pk_verify(signature_sexp, data_sexp, public_key_sexp); | |
d12bf2bd | 198 | if (gpg_err_code(ge) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE) |
2b442ac8 | 199 | r = 0; |
d12bf2bd LP |
200 | else if (ge != 0) { |
201 | log_debug("RSA signature check failed: %s", gpg_strerror(ge)); | |
2b442ac8 | 202 | r = -EIO; |
d12bf2bd | 203 | } else |
2b442ac8 LP |
204 | r = 1; |
205 | ||
206 | finish: | |
207 | if (e) | |
208 | gcry_mpi_release(e); | |
209 | if (n) | |
210 | gcry_mpi_release(n); | |
211 | if (s) | |
212 | gcry_mpi_release(s); | |
213 | ||
214 | if (public_key_sexp) | |
215 | gcry_sexp_release(public_key_sexp); | |
216 | if (signature_sexp) | |
217 | gcry_sexp_release(signature_sexp); | |
218 | if (data_sexp) | |
219 | gcry_sexp_release(data_sexp); | |
220 | ||
221 | return r; | |
222 | } | |
223 | ||
ea3a892f LP |
224 | static int dnssec_rsa_verify( |
225 | const char *hash_algorithm, | |
226 | const void *hash, size_t hash_size, | |
227 | DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, | |
228 | DnsResourceRecord *dnskey) { | |
229 | ||
230 | size_t exponent_size, modulus_size; | |
231 | void *exponent, *modulus; | |
232 | ||
233 | assert(hash_algorithm); | |
234 | assert(hash); | |
235 | assert(hash_size > 0); | |
236 | assert(rrsig); | |
237 | assert(dnskey); | |
238 | ||
239 | if (*(uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key == 0) { | |
240 | /* exponent is > 255 bytes long */ | |
241 | ||
242 | exponent = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 3; | |
243 | exponent_size = | |
ac04adbe TG |
244 | ((size_t) (((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[1]) << 8) | |
245 | ((size_t) ((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[2]); | |
ea3a892f LP |
246 | |
247 | if (exponent_size < 256) | |
248 | return -EINVAL; | |
249 | ||
250 | if (3 + exponent_size >= dnskey->dnskey.key_size) | |
251 | return -EINVAL; | |
252 | ||
253 | modulus = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 3 + exponent_size; | |
254 | modulus_size = dnskey->dnskey.key_size - 3 - exponent_size; | |
255 | ||
256 | } else { | |
257 | /* exponent is <= 255 bytes long */ | |
258 | ||
259 | exponent = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 1; | |
260 | exponent_size = (size_t) ((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[0]; | |
261 | ||
262 | if (exponent_size <= 0) | |
263 | return -EINVAL; | |
264 | ||
265 | if (1 + exponent_size >= dnskey->dnskey.key_size) | |
266 | return -EINVAL; | |
267 | ||
268 | modulus = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 1 + exponent_size; | |
269 | modulus_size = dnskey->dnskey.key_size - 1 - exponent_size; | |
270 | } | |
271 | ||
272 | return dnssec_rsa_verify_raw( | |
273 | hash_algorithm, | |
274 | rrsig->rrsig.signature, rrsig->rrsig.signature_size, | |
275 | hash, hash_size, | |
276 | exponent, exponent_size, | |
277 | modulus, modulus_size); | |
278 | } | |
279 | ||
e0240c64 LP |
280 | static int dnssec_ecdsa_verify_raw( |
281 | const char *hash_algorithm, | |
282 | const char *curve, | |
283 | const void *signature_r, size_t signature_r_size, | |
284 | const void *signature_s, size_t signature_s_size, | |
285 | const void *data, size_t data_size, | |
286 | const void *key, size_t key_size) { | |
287 | ||
288 | gcry_sexp_t public_key_sexp = NULL, data_sexp = NULL, signature_sexp = NULL; | |
289 | gcry_mpi_t q = NULL, r = NULL, s = NULL; | |
290 | gcry_error_t ge; | |
291 | int k; | |
292 | ||
293 | assert(hash_algorithm); | |
294 | ||
295 | ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&r, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, signature_r, signature_r_size, NULL); | |
296 | if (ge != 0) { | |
297 | k = -EIO; | |
298 | goto finish; | |
299 | } | |
300 | ||
301 | ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&s, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, signature_s, signature_s_size, NULL); | |
302 | if (ge != 0) { | |
303 | k = -EIO; | |
304 | goto finish; | |
305 | } | |
306 | ||
307 | ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&q, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, key, key_size, NULL); | |
308 | if (ge != 0) { | |
309 | k = -EIO; | |
310 | goto finish; | |
311 | } | |
312 | ||
313 | ge = gcry_sexp_build(&signature_sexp, | |
314 | NULL, | |
315 | "(sig-val (ecdsa (r %m) (s %m)))", | |
316 | r, | |
317 | s); | |
318 | if (ge != 0) { | |
319 | k = -EIO; | |
320 | goto finish; | |
321 | } | |
322 | ||
323 | ge = gcry_sexp_build(&data_sexp, | |
324 | NULL, | |
325 | "(data (flags rfc6979) (hash %s %b))", | |
326 | hash_algorithm, | |
327 | (int) data_size, | |
328 | data); | |
329 | if (ge != 0) { | |
330 | k = -EIO; | |
331 | goto finish; | |
332 | } | |
333 | ||
334 | ge = gcry_sexp_build(&public_key_sexp, | |
335 | NULL, | |
336 | "(public-key (ecc (curve %s) (q %m)))", | |
337 | curve, | |
338 | q); | |
339 | if (ge != 0) { | |
340 | k = -EIO; | |
341 | goto finish; | |
342 | } | |
343 | ||
344 | ge = gcry_pk_verify(signature_sexp, data_sexp, public_key_sexp); | |
345 | if (gpg_err_code(ge) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE) | |
346 | k = 0; | |
347 | else if (ge != 0) { | |
348 | log_debug("ECDSA signature check failed: %s", gpg_strerror(ge)); | |
349 | k = -EIO; | |
350 | } else | |
351 | k = 1; | |
352 | finish: | |
353 | if (r) | |
354 | gcry_mpi_release(r); | |
355 | if (s) | |
356 | gcry_mpi_release(s); | |
357 | if (q) | |
358 | gcry_mpi_release(q); | |
359 | ||
360 | if (public_key_sexp) | |
361 | gcry_sexp_release(public_key_sexp); | |
362 | if (signature_sexp) | |
363 | gcry_sexp_release(signature_sexp); | |
364 | if (data_sexp) | |
365 | gcry_sexp_release(data_sexp); | |
366 | ||
367 | return k; | |
368 | } | |
369 | ||
370 | static int dnssec_ecdsa_verify( | |
371 | const char *hash_algorithm, | |
372 | int algorithm, | |
373 | const void *hash, size_t hash_size, | |
374 | DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, | |
375 | DnsResourceRecord *dnskey) { | |
376 | ||
377 | const char *curve; | |
378 | size_t key_size; | |
379 | uint8_t *q; | |
380 | ||
381 | assert(hash); | |
382 | assert(hash_size); | |
383 | assert(rrsig); | |
384 | assert(dnskey); | |
385 | ||
386 | if (algorithm == DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP256SHA256) { | |
387 | key_size = 32; | |
388 | curve = "NIST P-256"; | |
389 | } else if (algorithm == DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP384SHA384) { | |
390 | key_size = 48; | |
391 | curve = "NIST P-384"; | |
392 | } else | |
393 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
394 | ||
395 | if (dnskey->dnskey.key_size != key_size * 2) | |
396 | return -EINVAL; | |
397 | ||
398 | if (rrsig->rrsig.signature_size != key_size * 2) | |
399 | return -EINVAL; | |
400 | ||
401 | q = alloca(key_size*2 + 1); | |
402 | q[0] = 0x04; /* Prepend 0x04 to indicate an uncompressed key */ | |
403 | memcpy(q+1, dnskey->dnskey.key, key_size*2); | |
404 | ||
405 | return dnssec_ecdsa_verify_raw( | |
406 | hash_algorithm, | |
407 | curve, | |
408 | rrsig->rrsig.signature, key_size, | |
409 | (uint8_t*) rrsig->rrsig.signature + key_size, key_size, | |
410 | hash, hash_size, | |
411 | q, key_size*2+1); | |
412 | } | |
413 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
414 | static void md_add_uint8(gcry_md_hd_t md, uint8_t v) { |
415 | gcry_md_write(md, &v, sizeof(v)); | |
416 | } | |
417 | ||
418 | static void md_add_uint16(gcry_md_hd_t md, uint16_t v) { | |
419 | v = htobe16(v); | |
420 | gcry_md_write(md, &v, sizeof(v)); | |
421 | } | |
422 | ||
423 | static void md_add_uint32(gcry_md_hd_t md, uint32_t v) { | |
424 | v = htobe32(v); | |
425 | gcry_md_write(md, &v, sizeof(v)); | |
426 | } | |
427 | ||
2a326321 LP |
428 | static int dnssec_rrsig_expired(DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, usec_t realtime) { |
429 | usec_t expiration, inception, skew; | |
430 | ||
431 | assert(rrsig); | |
432 | assert(rrsig->key->type == DNS_TYPE_RRSIG); | |
433 | ||
434 | if (realtime == USEC_INFINITY) | |
435 | realtime = now(CLOCK_REALTIME); | |
436 | ||
437 | expiration = rrsig->rrsig.expiration * USEC_PER_SEC; | |
438 | inception = rrsig->rrsig.inception * USEC_PER_SEC; | |
439 | ||
440 | if (inception > expiration) | |
2a44bec4 | 441 | return -EKEYREJECTED; |
2a326321 | 442 | |
896c5672 LP |
443 | /* Permit a certain amount of clock skew of 10% of the valid |
444 | * time range. This takes inspiration from unbound's | |
445 | * resolver. */ | |
2a326321 | 446 | skew = (expiration - inception) / 10; |
896c5672 LP |
447 | if (skew > SKEW_MAX) |
448 | skew = SKEW_MAX; | |
2a326321 LP |
449 | |
450 | if (inception < skew) | |
451 | inception = 0; | |
452 | else | |
453 | inception -= skew; | |
454 | ||
455 | if (expiration + skew < expiration) | |
456 | expiration = USEC_INFINITY; | |
457 | else | |
458 | expiration += skew; | |
459 | ||
460 | return realtime < inception || realtime > expiration; | |
461 | } | |
462 | ||
ca994e85 | 463 | static int algorithm_to_gcrypt_md(uint8_t algorithm) { |
fbf1a66d | 464 | |
6af47493 LP |
465 | /* Translates a DNSSEC signature algorithm into a gcrypt |
466 | * digest identifier. | |
467 | * | |
468 | * Note that we implement all algorithms listed as "Must | |
469 | * implement" and "Recommended to Implement" in RFC6944. We | |
470 | * don't implement any algorithms that are listed as | |
471 | * "Optional" or "Must Not Implement". Specifically, we do not | |
472 | * implement RSAMD5, DSASHA1, DH, DSA-NSEC3-SHA1, and | |
473 | * GOST-ECC. */ | |
fbf1a66d LP |
474 | |
475 | switch (algorithm) { | |
476 | ||
477 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1: | |
478 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1_NSEC3_SHA1: | |
479 | return GCRY_MD_SHA1; | |
480 | ||
481 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256: | |
e0240c64 | 482 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP256SHA256: |
fbf1a66d LP |
483 | return GCRY_MD_SHA256; |
484 | ||
e0240c64 LP |
485 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP384SHA384: |
486 | return GCRY_MD_SHA384; | |
487 | ||
fbf1a66d LP |
488 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA512: |
489 | return GCRY_MD_SHA512; | |
490 | ||
491 | default: | |
492 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
493 | } | |
494 | } | |
495 | ||
2a326321 LP |
496 | int dnssec_verify_rrset( |
497 | DnsAnswer *a, | |
0c857028 | 498 | const DnsResourceKey *key, |
2a326321 LP |
499 | DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, |
500 | DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, | |
547973de LP |
501 | usec_t realtime, |
502 | DnssecResult *result) { | |
2a326321 | 503 | |
2b442ac8 | 504 | uint8_t wire_format_name[DNS_WIRE_FOMAT_HOSTNAME_MAX]; |
ea3a892f LP |
505 | size_t hash_size; |
506 | void *hash; | |
2b442ac8 LP |
507 | DnsResourceRecord **list, *rr; |
508 | gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL; | |
ca994e85 | 509 | int r, md_algorithm; |
2b442ac8 | 510 | size_t k, n = 0; |
2b442ac8 LP |
511 | |
512 | assert(key); | |
513 | assert(rrsig); | |
514 | assert(dnskey); | |
547973de | 515 | assert(result); |
2a326321 LP |
516 | assert(rrsig->key->type == DNS_TYPE_RRSIG); |
517 | assert(dnskey->key->type == DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY); | |
2b442ac8 LP |
518 | |
519 | /* Verifies the the RRSet matching the specified "key" in "a", | |
520 | * using the signature "rrsig" and the key "dnskey". It's | |
521 | * assumed the RRSIG and DNSKEY match. */ | |
522 | ||
ca994e85 LP |
523 | md_algorithm = algorithm_to_gcrypt_md(rrsig->rrsig.algorithm); |
524 | if (md_algorithm == -EOPNOTSUPP) { | |
203f1b35 LP |
525 | *result = DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM; |
526 | return 0; | |
527 | } | |
ca994e85 LP |
528 | if (md_algorithm < 0) |
529 | return md_algorithm; | |
2b442ac8 | 530 | |
2a326321 LP |
531 | r = dnssec_rrsig_expired(rrsig, realtime); |
532 | if (r < 0) | |
533 | return r; | |
547973de LP |
534 | if (r > 0) { |
535 | *result = DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED; | |
536 | return 0; | |
537 | } | |
2a326321 | 538 | |
2b442ac8 LP |
539 | /* Collect all relevant RRs in a single array, so that we can look at the RRset */ |
540 | list = newa(DnsResourceRecord *, a->n_rrs); | |
541 | ||
542 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, a) { | |
543 | r = dns_resource_key_equal(key, rr->key); | |
544 | if (r < 0) | |
545 | return r; | |
546 | if (r == 0) | |
547 | continue; | |
548 | ||
549 | /* We need the wire format for ordering, and digest calculation */ | |
550 | r = dns_resource_record_to_wire_format(rr, true); | |
551 | if (r < 0) | |
552 | return r; | |
553 | ||
554 | list[n++] = rr; | |
935a999f TG |
555 | |
556 | if (n > VERIFY_RRS_MAX) | |
557 | return -E2BIG; | |
2b442ac8 LP |
558 | } |
559 | ||
560 | if (n <= 0) | |
561 | return -ENODATA; | |
562 | ||
563 | /* Bring the RRs into canonical order */ | |
6c5e8fbf | 564 | qsort_safe(list, n, sizeof(DnsResourceRecord*), rr_compare); |
2b442ac8 LP |
565 | |
566 | /* OK, the RRs are now in canonical order. Let's calculate the digest */ | |
fbf1a66d | 567 | initialize_libgcrypt(); |
2b442ac8 | 568 | |
ca994e85 | 569 | hash_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(md_algorithm); |
fbf1a66d | 570 | assert(hash_size > 0); |
2b442ac8 | 571 | |
ca994e85 | 572 | gcry_md_open(&md, md_algorithm, 0); |
2b442ac8 LP |
573 | if (!md) |
574 | return -EIO; | |
575 | ||
576 | md_add_uint16(md, rrsig->rrsig.type_covered); | |
577 | md_add_uint8(md, rrsig->rrsig.algorithm); | |
578 | md_add_uint8(md, rrsig->rrsig.labels); | |
579 | md_add_uint32(md, rrsig->rrsig.original_ttl); | |
580 | md_add_uint32(md, rrsig->rrsig.expiration); | |
581 | md_add_uint32(md, rrsig->rrsig.inception); | |
582 | md_add_uint16(md, rrsig->rrsig.key_tag); | |
583 | ||
584 | r = dns_name_to_wire_format(rrsig->rrsig.signer, wire_format_name, sizeof(wire_format_name), true); | |
585 | if (r < 0) | |
586 | goto finish; | |
587 | gcry_md_write(md, wire_format_name, r); | |
588 | ||
589 | for (k = 0; k < n; k++) { | |
e7ff0e0b | 590 | const char *suffix; |
2b442ac8 LP |
591 | size_t l; |
592 | rr = list[k]; | |
593 | ||
e7ff0e0b LP |
594 | r = dns_name_suffix(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), rrsig->rrsig.labels, &suffix); |
595 | if (r < 0) | |
596 | goto finish; | |
597 | if (r > 0) /* This is a wildcard! */ | |
598 | gcry_md_write(md, (uint8_t[]) { 1, '*'}, 2); | |
599 | ||
600 | r = dns_name_to_wire_format(suffix, wire_format_name, sizeof(wire_format_name), true); | |
2b442ac8 LP |
601 | if (r < 0) |
602 | goto finish; | |
603 | gcry_md_write(md, wire_format_name, r); | |
604 | ||
605 | md_add_uint16(md, rr->key->type); | |
606 | md_add_uint16(md, rr->key->class); | |
607 | md_add_uint32(md, rrsig->rrsig.original_ttl); | |
608 | ||
85aeaccc | 609 | l = DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(rr); |
2b442ac8 LP |
610 | assert(l <= 0xFFFF); |
611 | ||
612 | md_add_uint16(md, (uint16_t) l); | |
85aeaccc | 613 | gcry_md_write(md, DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA(rr), l); |
2b442ac8 LP |
614 | } |
615 | ||
616 | hash = gcry_md_read(md, 0); | |
617 | if (!hash) { | |
618 | r = -EIO; | |
619 | goto finish; | |
620 | } | |
621 | ||
e0240c64 LP |
622 | switch (rrsig->rrsig.algorithm) { |
623 | ||
624 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1: | |
625 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1_NSEC3_SHA1: | |
626 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256: | |
627 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA512: | |
628 | r = dnssec_rsa_verify( | |
ca994e85 | 629 | gcry_md_algo_name(md_algorithm), |
e0240c64 LP |
630 | hash, hash_size, |
631 | rrsig, | |
632 | dnskey); | |
633 | break; | |
634 | ||
635 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP256SHA256: | |
636 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP384SHA384: | |
637 | r = dnssec_ecdsa_verify( | |
ca994e85 | 638 | gcry_md_algo_name(md_algorithm), |
e0240c64 LP |
639 | rrsig->rrsig.algorithm, |
640 | hash, hash_size, | |
641 | rrsig, | |
642 | dnskey); | |
643 | break; | |
644 | } | |
645 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
646 | if (r < 0) |
647 | goto finish; | |
648 | ||
547973de LP |
649 | *result = r ? DNSSEC_VALIDATED : DNSSEC_INVALID; |
650 | r = 0; | |
2b442ac8 LP |
651 | |
652 | finish: | |
653 | gcry_md_close(md); | |
654 | return r; | |
655 | } | |
656 | ||
0c857028 | 657 | int dnssec_rrsig_match_dnskey(DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, bool revoked_ok) { |
2b442ac8 LP |
658 | |
659 | assert(rrsig); | |
660 | assert(dnskey); | |
661 | ||
662 | /* Checks if the specified DNSKEY RR matches the key used for | |
663 | * the signature in the specified RRSIG RR */ | |
664 | ||
665 | if (rrsig->key->type != DNS_TYPE_RRSIG) | |
666 | return -EINVAL; | |
667 | ||
668 | if (dnskey->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) | |
669 | return 0; | |
670 | if (dnskey->key->class != rrsig->key->class) | |
671 | return 0; | |
672 | if ((dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_ZONE_KEY) == 0) | |
673 | return 0; | |
0c857028 | 674 | if (!revoked_ok && (dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE)) |
28b8191e | 675 | return 0; |
2b442ac8 LP |
676 | if (dnskey->dnskey.protocol != 3) |
677 | return 0; | |
678 | if (dnskey->dnskey.algorithm != rrsig->rrsig.algorithm) | |
679 | return 0; | |
680 | ||
0c857028 | 681 | if (dnssec_keytag(dnskey, false) != rrsig->rrsig.key_tag) |
2b442ac8 LP |
682 | return 0; |
683 | ||
15accc27 | 684 | return dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(dnskey->key), rrsig->rrsig.signer); |
2b442ac8 LP |
685 | } |
686 | ||
105e1512 | 687 | int dnssec_key_match_rrsig(const DnsResourceKey *key, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig) { |
e7ff0e0b LP |
688 | int r; |
689 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
690 | assert(key); |
691 | assert(rrsig); | |
692 | ||
693 | /* Checks if the specified RRSIG RR protects the RRSet of the specified RR key. */ | |
694 | ||
695 | if (rrsig->key->type != DNS_TYPE_RRSIG) | |
696 | return 0; | |
697 | if (rrsig->key->class != key->class) | |
698 | return 0; | |
699 | if (rrsig->rrsig.type_covered != key->type) | |
700 | return 0; | |
701 | ||
e7ff0e0b LP |
702 | /* Make sure signer is a parent of the RRset */ |
703 | r = dns_name_endswith(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rrsig->key), rrsig->rrsig.signer); | |
704 | if (r <= 0) | |
705 | return r; | |
706 | ||
707 | /* Make sure the owner name has at least as many labels as the "label" fields indicates. */ | |
708 | r = dns_name_count_labels(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rrsig->key)); | |
709 | if (r < 0) | |
710 | return r; | |
711 | if (r < rrsig->rrsig.labels) | |
712 | return 0; | |
713 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
714 | return dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rrsig->key), DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key)); |
715 | } | |
716 | ||
ee3d6aff LP |
717 | static int dnssec_fix_rrset_ttl(DnsAnswer *a, const DnsResourceKey *key, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, usec_t realtime) { |
718 | DnsResourceRecord *rr; | |
719 | int r; | |
720 | ||
721 | assert(key); | |
722 | assert(rrsig); | |
723 | ||
724 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, a) { | |
725 | r = dns_resource_key_equal(key, rr->key); | |
726 | if (r < 0) | |
727 | return r; | |
728 | if (r == 0) | |
729 | continue; | |
730 | ||
731 | /* Pick the TTL as the minimum of the RR's TTL, the | |
732 | * RR's original TTL according to the RRSIG and the | |
733 | * RRSIG's own TTL, see RFC 4035, Section 5.3.3 */ | |
734 | rr->ttl = MIN3(rr->ttl, rrsig->rrsig.original_ttl, rrsig->ttl); | |
735 | rr->expiry = rrsig->rrsig.expiration * USEC_PER_SEC; | |
736 | } | |
737 | ||
738 | return 0; | |
739 | } | |
740 | ||
2a326321 LP |
741 | int dnssec_verify_rrset_search( |
742 | DnsAnswer *a, | |
0c857028 | 743 | const DnsResourceKey *key, |
2a326321 | 744 | DnsAnswer *validated_dnskeys, |
547973de LP |
745 | usec_t realtime, |
746 | DnssecResult *result) { | |
2a326321 | 747 | |
203f1b35 | 748 | bool found_rrsig = false, found_invalid = false, found_expired_rrsig = false, found_unsupported_algorithm = false; |
2b442ac8 LP |
749 | DnsResourceRecord *rrsig; |
750 | int r; | |
751 | ||
752 | assert(key); | |
547973de | 753 | assert(result); |
2b442ac8 | 754 | |
105e1512 | 755 | /* Verifies all RRs from "a" that match the key "key" against DNSKEYs in "validated_dnskeys" */ |
2b442ac8 LP |
756 | |
757 | if (!a || a->n_rrs <= 0) | |
758 | return -ENODATA; | |
759 | ||
760 | /* Iterate through each RRSIG RR. */ | |
761 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rrsig, a) { | |
762 | DnsResourceRecord *dnskey; | |
105e1512 | 763 | DnsAnswerFlags flags; |
2b442ac8 | 764 | |
203f1b35 | 765 | /* Is this an RRSIG RR that applies to RRs matching our key? */ |
2b442ac8 LP |
766 | r = dnssec_key_match_rrsig(key, rrsig); |
767 | if (r < 0) | |
768 | return r; | |
769 | if (r == 0) | |
770 | continue; | |
771 | ||
772 | found_rrsig = true; | |
773 | ||
547973de | 774 | /* Look for a matching key */ |
105e1512 | 775 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(dnskey, flags, validated_dnskeys) { |
547973de | 776 | DnssecResult one_result; |
2b442ac8 | 777 | |
105e1512 LP |
778 | if ((flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED) == 0) |
779 | continue; | |
780 | ||
203f1b35 | 781 | /* Is this a DNSKEY RR that matches they key of our RRSIG? */ |
0c857028 | 782 | r = dnssec_rrsig_match_dnskey(rrsig, dnskey, false); |
2b442ac8 LP |
783 | if (r < 0) |
784 | return r; | |
785 | if (r == 0) | |
786 | continue; | |
787 | ||
2a326321 LP |
788 | /* Take the time here, if it isn't set yet, so |
789 | * that we do all validations with the same | |
790 | * time. */ | |
791 | if (realtime == USEC_INFINITY) | |
792 | realtime = now(CLOCK_REALTIME); | |
793 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
794 | /* Yay, we found a matching RRSIG with a matching |
795 | * DNSKEY, awesome. Now let's verify all entries of | |
796 | * the RRSet against the RRSIG and DNSKEY | |
797 | * combination. */ | |
798 | ||
547973de | 799 | r = dnssec_verify_rrset(a, key, rrsig, dnskey, realtime, &one_result); |
203f1b35 | 800 | if (r < 0) |
2b442ac8 | 801 | return r; |
203f1b35 LP |
802 | |
803 | switch (one_result) { | |
804 | ||
805 | case DNSSEC_VALIDATED: | |
806 | /* Yay, the RR has been validated, | |
ee3d6aff LP |
807 | * return immediately, but fix up the expiry */ |
808 | r = dnssec_fix_rrset_ttl(a, key, rrsig, realtime); | |
809 | if (r < 0) | |
810 | return r; | |
811 | ||
547973de LP |
812 | *result = DNSSEC_VALIDATED; |
813 | return 0; | |
2b442ac8 | 814 | |
203f1b35 LP |
815 | case DNSSEC_INVALID: |
816 | /* If the signature is invalid, let's try another | |
817 | key and/or signature. After all they | |
818 | key_tags and stuff are not unique, and | |
819 | might be shared by multiple keys. */ | |
820 | found_invalid = true; | |
821 | continue; | |
822 | ||
823 | case DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM: | |
824 | /* If the key algorithm is | |
825 | unsupported, try another | |
826 | RRSIG/DNSKEY pair, but remember we | |
827 | encountered this, so that we can | |
828 | return a proper error when we | |
829 | encounter nothing better. */ | |
830 | found_unsupported_algorithm = true; | |
831 | continue; | |
832 | ||
833 | case DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED: | |
834 | /* If the signature is expired, try | |
835 | another one, but remember it, so | |
836 | that we can return this */ | |
837 | found_expired_rrsig = true; | |
838 | continue; | |
839 | ||
840 | default: | |
841 | assert_not_reached("Unexpected DNSSEC validation result"); | |
842 | } | |
2b442ac8 LP |
843 | } |
844 | } | |
845 | ||
203f1b35 LP |
846 | if (found_expired_rrsig) |
847 | *result = DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED; | |
848 | else if (found_unsupported_algorithm) | |
849 | *result = DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM; | |
850 | else if (found_invalid) | |
547973de LP |
851 | *result = DNSSEC_INVALID; |
852 | else if (found_rrsig) | |
853 | *result = DNSSEC_MISSING_KEY; | |
854 | else | |
855 | *result = DNSSEC_NO_SIGNATURE; | |
2b442ac8 | 856 | |
547973de | 857 | return 0; |
2b442ac8 LP |
858 | } |
859 | ||
105e1512 LP |
860 | int dnssec_has_rrsig(DnsAnswer *a, const DnsResourceKey *key) { |
861 | DnsResourceRecord *rr; | |
862 | int r; | |
863 | ||
864 | /* Checks whether there's at least one RRSIG in 'a' that proctects RRs of the specified key */ | |
865 | ||
866 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, a) { | |
867 | r = dnssec_key_match_rrsig(key, rr); | |
868 | if (r < 0) | |
869 | return r; | |
870 | if (r > 0) | |
871 | return 1; | |
872 | } | |
873 | ||
874 | return 0; | |
875 | } | |
876 | ||
2b442ac8 | 877 | int dnssec_canonicalize(const char *n, char *buffer, size_t buffer_max) { |
2b442ac8 LP |
878 | size_t c = 0; |
879 | int r; | |
880 | ||
881 | /* Converts the specified hostname into DNSSEC canonicalized | |
882 | * form. */ | |
883 | ||
884 | if (buffer_max < 2) | |
885 | return -ENOBUFS; | |
886 | ||
887 | for (;;) { | |
888 | size_t i; | |
889 | ||
890 | r = dns_label_unescape(&n, buffer, buffer_max); | |
891 | if (r < 0) | |
892 | return r; | |
893 | if (r == 0) | |
894 | break; | |
895 | if (r > 0) { | |
896 | int k; | |
897 | ||
898 | /* DNSSEC validation is always done on the ASCII version of the label */ | |
899 | k = dns_label_apply_idna(buffer, r, buffer, buffer_max); | |
900 | if (k < 0) | |
901 | return k; | |
902 | if (k > 0) | |
903 | r = k; | |
904 | } | |
905 | ||
906 | if (buffer_max < (size_t) r + 2) | |
907 | return -ENOBUFS; | |
908 | ||
909 | /* The DNSSEC canonical form is not clear on what to | |
910 | * do with dots appearing in labels, the way DNS-SD | |
911 | * does it. Refuse it for now. */ | |
912 | ||
913 | if (memchr(buffer, '.', r)) | |
914 | return -EINVAL; | |
915 | ||
916 | for (i = 0; i < (size_t) r; i ++) { | |
917 | if (buffer[i] >= 'A' && buffer[i] <= 'Z') | |
918 | buffer[i] = buffer[i] - 'A' + 'a'; | |
919 | } | |
920 | ||
921 | buffer[r] = '.'; | |
922 | ||
923 | buffer += r + 1; | |
924 | c += r + 1; | |
925 | ||
926 | buffer_max -= r + 1; | |
927 | } | |
928 | ||
929 | if (c <= 0) { | |
930 | /* Not even a single label: this is the root domain name */ | |
931 | ||
932 | assert(buffer_max > 2); | |
933 | buffer[0] = '.'; | |
934 | buffer[1] = 0; | |
935 | ||
936 | return 1; | |
937 | } | |
938 | ||
939 | return (int) c; | |
940 | } | |
941 | ||
ca994e85 | 942 | static int digest_to_gcrypt_md(uint8_t algorithm) { |
a1972a91 | 943 | |
fbf1a66d | 944 | /* Translates a DNSSEC digest algorithm into a gcrypt digest identifier */ |
a1972a91 LP |
945 | |
946 | switch (algorithm) { | |
947 | ||
948 | case DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA1: | |
949 | return GCRY_MD_SHA1; | |
950 | ||
951 | case DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA256: | |
952 | return GCRY_MD_SHA256; | |
953 | ||
af22c65b LP |
954 | case DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA384: |
955 | return GCRY_MD_SHA384; | |
956 | ||
a1972a91 LP |
957 | default: |
958 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
959 | } | |
960 | } | |
961 | ||
0c857028 | 962 | int dnssec_verify_dnskey(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, DnsResourceRecord *ds, bool mask_revoke) { |
2b442ac8 | 963 | char owner_name[DNSSEC_CANONICAL_HOSTNAME_MAX]; |
a1972a91 LP |
964 | gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL; |
965 | size_t hash_size; | |
ca994e85 | 966 | int md_algorithm, r; |
2b442ac8 | 967 | void *result; |
2b442ac8 LP |
968 | |
969 | assert(dnskey); | |
970 | assert(ds); | |
971 | ||
972 | /* Implements DNSKEY verification by a DS, according to RFC 4035, section 5.2 */ | |
973 | ||
974 | if (dnskey->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) | |
975 | return -EINVAL; | |
976 | if (ds->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DS) | |
977 | return -EINVAL; | |
978 | if ((dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_ZONE_KEY) == 0) | |
979 | return -EKEYREJECTED; | |
0c857028 LP |
980 | if (!mask_revoke && (dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE)) |
981 | return -EKEYREJECTED; | |
2b442ac8 LP |
982 | if (dnskey->dnskey.protocol != 3) |
983 | return -EKEYREJECTED; | |
984 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
985 | if (dnskey->dnskey.algorithm != ds->ds.algorithm) |
986 | return 0; | |
0c857028 | 987 | if (dnssec_keytag(dnskey, mask_revoke) != ds->ds.key_tag) |
2b442ac8 LP |
988 | return 0; |
989 | ||
0638401a LP |
990 | initialize_libgcrypt(); |
991 | ||
ca994e85 LP |
992 | md_algorithm = digest_to_gcrypt_md(ds->ds.digest_type); |
993 | if (md_algorithm < 0) | |
994 | return md_algorithm; | |
2b442ac8 | 995 | |
ca994e85 | 996 | hash_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(md_algorithm); |
a1972a91 | 997 | assert(hash_size > 0); |
2b442ac8 | 998 | |
a1972a91 LP |
999 | if (ds->ds.digest_size != hash_size) |
1000 | return 0; | |
2b442ac8 | 1001 | |
a1972a91 LP |
1002 | r = dnssec_canonicalize(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(dnskey->key), owner_name, sizeof(owner_name)); |
1003 | if (r < 0) | |
1004 | return r; | |
2b442ac8 | 1005 | |
ca994e85 | 1006 | gcry_md_open(&md, md_algorithm, 0); |
2b442ac8 LP |
1007 | if (!md) |
1008 | return -EIO; | |
1009 | ||
2b442ac8 | 1010 | gcry_md_write(md, owner_name, r); |
0c857028 LP |
1011 | if (mask_revoke) |
1012 | md_add_uint16(md, dnskey->dnskey.flags & ~DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE); | |
1013 | else | |
1014 | md_add_uint16(md, dnskey->dnskey.flags); | |
2b442ac8 LP |
1015 | md_add_uint8(md, dnskey->dnskey.protocol); |
1016 | md_add_uint8(md, dnskey->dnskey.algorithm); | |
1017 | gcry_md_write(md, dnskey->dnskey.key, dnskey->dnskey.key_size); | |
1018 | ||
1019 | result = gcry_md_read(md, 0); | |
1020 | if (!result) { | |
1021 | r = -EIO; | |
1022 | goto finish; | |
1023 | } | |
1024 | ||
1025 | r = memcmp(result, ds->ds.digest, ds->ds.digest_size) != 0; | |
1026 | ||
1027 | finish: | |
1028 | gcry_md_close(md); | |
1029 | return r; | |
1030 | } | |
24710c48 | 1031 | |
547973de LP |
1032 | int dnssec_verify_dnskey_search(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, DnsAnswer *validated_ds) { |
1033 | DnsResourceRecord *ds; | |
105e1512 | 1034 | DnsAnswerFlags flags; |
547973de LP |
1035 | int r; |
1036 | ||
1037 | assert(dnskey); | |
1038 | ||
1039 | if (dnskey->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) | |
1040 | return 0; | |
1041 | ||
105e1512 LP |
1042 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(ds, flags, validated_ds) { |
1043 | ||
1044 | if ((flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED) == 0) | |
1045 | continue; | |
547973de LP |
1046 | |
1047 | if (ds->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DS) | |
1048 | continue; | |
1049 | ||
d1c4ee32 LP |
1050 | if (ds->key->class != dnskey->key->class) |
1051 | continue; | |
1052 | ||
1053 | r = dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(dnskey->key), DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(ds->key)); | |
1054 | if (r < 0) | |
1055 | return r; | |
1056 | if (r == 0) | |
1057 | continue; | |
1058 | ||
0c857028 LP |
1059 | r = dnssec_verify_dnskey(dnskey, ds, false); |
1060 | if (r == -EKEYREJECTED) | |
1061 | return 0; /* The DNSKEY is revoked or otherwise invalid, we won't bless it */ | |
547973de LP |
1062 | if (r < 0) |
1063 | return r; | |
1064 | if (r > 0) | |
1065 | return 1; | |
1066 | } | |
1067 | ||
1068 | return 0; | |
1069 | } | |
1070 | ||
d15ad742 LP |
1071 | static int nsec3_hash_to_gcrypt_md(uint8_t algorithm) { |
1072 | ||
1073 | /* Translates a DNSSEC NSEC3 hash algorithm into a gcrypt digest identifier */ | |
1074 | ||
1075 | switch (algorithm) { | |
1076 | ||
1077 | case NSEC3_ALGORITHM_SHA1: | |
1078 | return GCRY_MD_SHA1; | |
1079 | ||
1080 | default: | |
1081 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
1082 | } | |
1083 | } | |
1084 | ||
1d3db294 | 1085 | int dnssec_nsec3_hash(DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *name, void *ret) { |
72667f08 LP |
1086 | uint8_t wire_format[DNS_WIRE_FOMAT_HOSTNAME_MAX]; |
1087 | gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL; | |
1088 | size_t hash_size; | |
1089 | int algorithm; | |
1090 | void *result; | |
1091 | unsigned k; | |
1092 | int r; | |
1093 | ||
1094 | assert(nsec3); | |
1095 | assert(name); | |
1096 | assert(ret); | |
1097 | ||
1098 | if (nsec3->key->type != DNS_TYPE_NSEC3) | |
1099 | return -EINVAL; | |
1100 | ||
1d3db294 LP |
1101 | if (nsec3->nsec3.iterations > NSEC3_ITERATIONS_MAX) { |
1102 | log_debug("Ignoring NSEC3 RR %s with excessive number of iterations.", dns_resource_record_to_string(nsec3)); | |
a8f158b9 | 1103 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
1d3db294 | 1104 | } |
a8f158b9 | 1105 | |
d15ad742 | 1106 | algorithm = nsec3_hash_to_gcrypt_md(nsec3->nsec3.algorithm); |
72667f08 LP |
1107 | if (algorithm < 0) |
1108 | return algorithm; | |
1109 | ||
1110 | initialize_libgcrypt(); | |
1111 | ||
1112 | hash_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(algorithm); | |
1113 | assert(hash_size > 0); | |
1114 | ||
1115 | if (nsec3->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size != hash_size) | |
1116 | return -EINVAL; | |
1117 | ||
1118 | r = dns_name_to_wire_format(name, wire_format, sizeof(wire_format), true); | |
1119 | if (r < 0) | |
1120 | return r; | |
1121 | ||
1122 | gcry_md_open(&md, algorithm, 0); | |
1123 | if (!md) | |
1124 | return -EIO; | |
1125 | ||
1126 | gcry_md_write(md, wire_format, r); | |
1127 | gcry_md_write(md, nsec3->nsec3.salt, nsec3->nsec3.salt_size); | |
1128 | ||
1129 | result = gcry_md_read(md, 0); | |
1130 | if (!result) { | |
1131 | r = -EIO; | |
1132 | goto finish; | |
1133 | } | |
1134 | ||
1135 | for (k = 0; k < nsec3->nsec3.iterations; k++) { | |
1136 | uint8_t tmp[hash_size]; | |
1137 | memcpy(tmp, result, hash_size); | |
1138 | ||
1139 | gcry_md_reset(md); | |
1140 | gcry_md_write(md, tmp, hash_size); | |
1141 | gcry_md_write(md, nsec3->nsec3.salt, nsec3->nsec3.salt_size); | |
1142 | ||
1143 | result = gcry_md_read(md, 0); | |
1144 | if (!result) { | |
1145 | r = -EIO; | |
1146 | goto finish; | |
1147 | } | |
1148 | } | |
1149 | ||
1150 | memcpy(ret, result, hash_size); | |
1151 | r = (int) hash_size; | |
1152 | ||
1153 | finish: | |
1154 | gcry_md_close(md); | |
1155 | return r; | |
1156 | } | |
1157 | ||
db5b0e92 LP |
1158 | static int nsec3_is_good(DnsResourceRecord *rr, DnsAnswerFlags flags, DnsResourceRecord *nsec3) { |
1159 | const char *a, *b; | |
1160 | int r; | |
1161 | ||
1162 | assert(rr); | |
1163 | ||
db5b0e92 LP |
1164 | if (rr->key->type != DNS_TYPE_NSEC3) |
1165 | return 0; | |
1166 | ||
1167 | /* RFC 5155, Section 8.2 says we MUST ignore NSEC3 RRs with flags != 0 or 1 */ | |
1168 | if (!IN_SET(rr->nsec3.flags, 0, 1)) | |
1169 | return 0; | |
1170 | ||
d15ad742 LP |
1171 | /* Ignore NSEC3 RRs whose algorithm we don't know */ |
1172 | if (nsec3_hash_to_gcrypt_md(rr->nsec3.algorithm) < 0) | |
1173 | return 0; | |
a8f158b9 LP |
1174 | /* Ignore NSEC3 RRs with an excessive number of required iterations */ |
1175 | if (rr->nsec3.iterations > NSEC3_ITERATIONS_MAX) | |
1176 | return 0; | |
d15ad742 | 1177 | |
db5b0e92 LP |
1178 | if (!nsec3) |
1179 | return 1; | |
1180 | ||
1181 | /* If a second NSEC3 RR is specified, also check if they are from the same zone. */ | |
1182 | ||
1183 | if (nsec3 == rr) /* Shortcut */ | |
1184 | return 1; | |
1185 | ||
1186 | if (rr->key->class != nsec3->key->class) | |
1187 | return 0; | |
1188 | if (rr->nsec3.algorithm != nsec3->nsec3.algorithm) | |
1189 | return 0; | |
1190 | if (rr->nsec3.iterations != nsec3->nsec3.iterations) | |
1191 | return 0; | |
1192 | if (rr->nsec3.salt_size != nsec3->nsec3.salt_size) | |
1193 | return 0; | |
1194 | if (memcmp(rr->nsec3.salt, nsec3->nsec3.salt, rr->nsec3.salt_size) != 0) | |
1195 | return 0; | |
1196 | ||
1197 | a = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key); | |
1198 | r = dns_name_parent(&a); /* strip off hash */ | |
1199 | if (r < 0) | |
1200 | return r; | |
1201 | if (r == 0) | |
1202 | return 0; | |
1203 | ||
1204 | b = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(nsec3->key); | |
1205 | r = dns_name_parent(&b); /* strip off hash */ | |
1206 | if (r < 0) | |
1207 | return r; | |
1208 | if (r == 0) | |
1209 | return 0; | |
1210 | ||
1211 | return dns_name_equal(a, b); | |
1212 | } | |
1213 | ||
1d3db294 | 1214 | static int nsec3_hashed_domain(DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *domain, const char *zone, char **ret) { |
6f76ec5a | 1215 | _cleanup_free_ char *l = NULL, *hashed_domain = NULL; |
105e1512 | 1216 | uint8_t hashed[DNSSEC_HASH_SIZE_MAX]; |
6f76ec5a TG |
1217 | int hashed_size; |
1218 | ||
1219 | assert(nsec3); | |
1220 | assert(domain); | |
1221 | assert(zone); | |
1222 | assert(ret); | |
1223 | ||
1224 | hashed_size = dnssec_nsec3_hash(nsec3, domain, hashed); | |
1225 | if (hashed_size < 0) | |
1226 | return hashed_size; | |
1227 | ||
1228 | l = base32hexmem(hashed, hashed_size, false); | |
1229 | if (!l) | |
1230 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1231 | ||
1232 | hashed_domain = strjoin(l, ".", zone, NULL); | |
1233 | if (!hashed_domain) | |
1234 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1235 | ||
1236 | *ret = hashed_domain; | |
1237 | hashed_domain = NULL; | |
1238 | ||
1239 | return hashed_size; | |
1240 | } | |
1241 | ||
35ad41d3 TG |
1242 | /* See RFC 5155, Section 8 |
1243 | * First try to find a NSEC3 record that matches our query precisely, if that fails, find the closest | |
1244 | * enclosure. Secondly, find a proof that there is no closer enclosure and either a proof that there | |
1245 | * is no wildcard domain as a direct descendant of the closest enclosure, or find an NSEC3 record that | |
1246 | * matches the wildcard domain. | |
1247 | * | |
1248 | * Based on this we can prove either the existence of the record in @key, or NXDOMAIN or NODATA, or | |
1249 | * that there is no proof either way. The latter is the case if a the proof of non-existence of a given | |
1250 | * name uses an NSEC3 record with the opt-out bit set. Lastly, if we are given insufficient NSEC3 records | |
1251 | * to conclude anything we indicate this by returning NO_RR. */ | |
d3760be0 | 1252 | static int dnssec_test_nsec3(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecResult *result, bool *authenticated, uint32_t *ttl) { |
35ad41d3 | 1253 | _cleanup_free_ char *next_closer_domain = NULL, *wildcard = NULL, *wildcard_domain = NULL; |
d1511b33 | 1254 | const char *zone, *p, *pp = NULL; |
35ad41d3 | 1255 | DnsResourceRecord *rr, *enclosure_rr, *suffix_rr, *wildcard_rr = NULL; |
105e1512 LP |
1256 | DnsAnswerFlags flags; |
1257 | int hashed_size, r; | |
35ad41d3 | 1258 | bool a, no_closer = false, no_wildcard = false, optout = false; |
72667f08 LP |
1259 | |
1260 | assert(key); | |
1261 | assert(result); | |
1262 | ||
d1511b33 TG |
1263 | /* First step, find the zone name and the NSEC3 parameters of the zone. |
1264 | * it is sufficient to look for the longest common suffix we find with | |
1265 | * any NSEC3 RR in the response. Any NSEC3 record will do as all NSEC3 | |
1266 | * records from a given zone in a response must use the same | |
1267 | * parameters. */ | |
1268 | zone = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key); | |
13b78323 | 1269 | for (;;) { |
db5b0e92 | 1270 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(suffix_rr, flags, answer) { |
db5b0e92 LP |
1271 | r = nsec3_is_good(suffix_rr, flags, NULL); |
1272 | if (r < 0) | |
1273 | return r; | |
1274 | if (r == 0) | |
13b78323 LP |
1275 | continue; |
1276 | ||
d1511b33 | 1277 | r = dns_name_equal_skip(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(suffix_rr->key), 1, zone); |
13b78323 LP |
1278 | if (r < 0) |
1279 | return r; | |
1280 | if (r > 0) | |
d1511b33 | 1281 | goto found_zone; |
13b78323 LP |
1282 | } |
1283 | ||
1284 | /* Strip one label from the front */ | |
d1511b33 | 1285 | r = dns_name_parent(&zone); |
13b78323 LP |
1286 | if (r < 0) |
1287 | return r; | |
1288 | if (r == 0) | |
1289 | break; | |
1290 | } | |
1291 | ||
1292 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; | |
1293 | return 0; | |
1294 | ||
d1511b33 | 1295 | found_zone: |
13b78323 | 1296 | /* Second step, find the closest encloser NSEC3 RR in 'answer' that matches 'key' */ |
105e1512 LP |
1297 | p = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key); |
1298 | for (;;) { | |
6f76ec5a | 1299 | _cleanup_free_ char *hashed_domain = NULL; |
72667f08 | 1300 | |
6f76ec5a | 1301 | hashed_size = nsec3_hashed_domain(suffix_rr, p, zone, &hashed_domain); |
db5b0e92 LP |
1302 | if (hashed_size == -EOPNOTSUPP) { |
1303 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM; | |
1304 | return 0; | |
1305 | } | |
1306 | if (hashed_size < 0) | |
1307 | return hashed_size; | |
72667f08 | 1308 | |
d1511b33 | 1309 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(enclosure_rr, flags, answer) { |
db5b0e92 | 1310 | |
d1511b33 | 1311 | r = nsec3_is_good(enclosure_rr, flags, suffix_rr); |
72667f08 LP |
1312 | if (r < 0) |
1313 | return r; | |
105e1512 LP |
1314 | if (r == 0) |
1315 | continue; | |
1316 | ||
d1511b33 | 1317 | if (enclosure_rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size != (size_t) hashed_size) |
db5b0e92 | 1318 | continue; |
105e1512 | 1319 | |
d1511b33 | 1320 | r = dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(enclosure_rr->key), hashed_domain); |
72667f08 LP |
1321 | if (r < 0) |
1322 | return r; | |
ed29bfdc LP |
1323 | if (r > 0) { |
1324 | a = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; | |
13b78323 | 1325 | goto found_closest_encloser; |
ed29bfdc | 1326 | } |
105e1512 LP |
1327 | } |
1328 | ||
1329 | /* We didn't find the closest encloser with this name, | |
1330 | * but let's remember this domain name, it might be | |
1331 | * the next closer name */ | |
1332 | ||
1333 | pp = p; | |
1334 | ||
1335 | /* Strip one label from the front */ | |
1336 | r = dns_name_parent(&p); | |
1337 | if (r < 0) | |
1338 | return r; | |
1339 | if (r == 0) | |
72667f08 | 1340 | break; |
105e1512 | 1341 | } |
72667f08 | 1342 | |
105e1512 LP |
1343 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; |
1344 | return 0; | |
72667f08 | 1345 | |
13b78323 | 1346 | found_closest_encloser: |
105e1512 | 1347 | /* We found a closest encloser in 'p'; next closer is 'pp' */ |
72667f08 | 1348 | |
105e1512 | 1349 | /* Ensure this is not a DNAME domain, see RFC5155, section 8.3. */ |
d1511b33 | 1350 | if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_DNAME)) |
105e1512 | 1351 | return -EBADMSG; |
72667f08 | 1352 | |
105e1512 LP |
1353 | /* Ensure that this data is from the delegated domain |
1354 | * (i.e. originates from the "lower" DNS server), and isn't | |
1355 | * just glue records (i.e. doesn't originate from the "upper" | |
1356 | * DNS server). */ | |
d1511b33 TG |
1357 | if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_NS) && |
1358 | !bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_SOA)) | |
105e1512 | 1359 | return -EBADMSG; |
72667f08 | 1360 | |
105e1512 LP |
1361 | if (!pp) { |
1362 | /* No next closer NSEC3 RR. That means there's a direct NSEC3 RR for our key. */ | |
146035b3 TG |
1363 | if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, key->type)) |
1364 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND; | |
1365 | else if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_CNAME)) | |
1366 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME; | |
1367 | else | |
1368 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; | |
1369 | ||
d3760be0 LP |
1370 | if (authenticated) |
1371 | *authenticated = a; | |
1372 | if (ttl) | |
1373 | *ttl = enclosure_rr->ttl; | |
146035b3 | 1374 | |
105e1512 LP |
1375 | return 0; |
1376 | } | |
72667f08 | 1377 | |
35ad41d3 TG |
1378 | /* Prove that there is no next closer and whether or not there is a wildcard domain. */ |
1379 | ||
1380 | wildcard = strappend("*.", p); | |
1381 | if (!wildcard) | |
1382 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1383 | ||
1384 | r = nsec3_hashed_domain(enclosure_rr, wildcard, zone, &wildcard_domain); | |
105e1512 LP |
1385 | if (r < 0) |
1386 | return r; | |
1387 | if (r != hashed_size) | |
1388 | return -EBADMSG; | |
72667f08 | 1389 | |
6f76ec5a | 1390 | r = nsec3_hashed_domain(enclosure_rr, pp, zone, &next_closer_domain); |
105e1512 LP |
1391 | if (r < 0) |
1392 | return r; | |
1393 | if (r != hashed_size) | |
1394 | return -EBADMSG; | |
72667f08 | 1395 | |
105e1512 LP |
1396 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(rr, flags, answer) { |
1397 | _cleanup_free_ char *label = NULL, *next_hashed_domain = NULL; | |
105e1512 | 1398 | |
db5b0e92 | 1399 | r = nsec3_is_good(rr, flags, suffix_rr); |
105e1512 LP |
1400 | if (r < 0) |
1401 | return r; | |
1402 | if (r == 0) | |
1403 | continue; | |
1404 | ||
1405 | label = base32hexmem(rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name, rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size, false); | |
1406 | if (!label) | |
1407 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1408 | ||
b2c2a1b9 | 1409 | next_hashed_domain = strjoin(label, ".", zone, NULL); |
105e1512 LP |
1410 | if (!next_hashed_domain) |
1411 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1412 | ||
1413 | r = dns_name_between(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), next_closer_domain, next_hashed_domain); | |
1414 | if (r < 0) | |
1415 | return r; | |
1416 | if (r > 0) { | |
1417 | if (rr->nsec3.flags & 1) | |
35ad41d3 | 1418 | optout = true; |
105e1512 | 1419 | |
35ad41d3 TG |
1420 | a = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED); |
1421 | ||
1422 | no_closer = true; | |
1423 | } | |
1424 | ||
1425 | r = dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), wildcard_domain); | |
1426 | if (r < 0) | |
1427 | return r; | |
1428 | if (r > 0) { | |
1429 | a = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED); | |
1430 | ||
1431 | wildcard_rr = rr; | |
1432 | } | |
1433 | ||
1434 | r = dns_name_between(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), wildcard_domain, next_hashed_domain); | |
1435 | if (r < 0) | |
1436 | return r; | |
1437 | if (r > 0) { | |
1438 | if (rr->nsec3.flags & 1) | |
1439 | /* This only makes sense if we have a wildcard delegation, which is | |
1440 | * very unlikely, see RFC 4592, Section 4.2, but we cannot rely on | |
1441 | * this not happening, so hence cannot simply conclude NXDOMAIN as | |
1442 | * we would wish */ | |
1443 | optout = true; | |
1444 | ||
1445 | a = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED); | |
1446 | ||
1447 | no_wildcard = true; | |
105e1512 LP |
1448 | } |
1449 | } | |
1450 | ||
35ad41d3 TG |
1451 | if (wildcard_rr && no_wildcard) |
1452 | return -EBADMSG; | |
1453 | ||
1454 | if (!no_closer) { | |
1455 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; | |
35ad41d3 TG |
1456 | return 0; |
1457 | } | |
1458 | ||
1459 | if (wildcard_rr) { | |
1460 | /* A wildcard exists that matches our query. */ | |
1461 | if (optout) | |
1462 | /* This is not specified in any RFC to the best of my knowledge, but | |
1463 | * if the next closer enclosure is covered by an opt-out NSEC3 RR | |
1464 | * it means that we cannot prove that the source of synthesis is | |
1465 | * correct, as there may be a closer match. */ | |
1466 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_OPTOUT; | |
1467 | else if (bitmap_isset(wildcard_rr->nsec3.types, key->type)) | |
1468 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND; | |
1469 | else if (bitmap_isset(wildcard_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_CNAME)) | |
1470 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME; | |
1471 | else | |
1472 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; | |
1473 | } else { | |
1474 | if (optout) | |
1475 | /* The RFC only specifies that we have to care for optout for NODATA for | |
1476 | * DS records. However, children of an insecure opt-out delegation should | |
1477 | * also be considered opt-out, rather than verified NXDOMAIN. | |
1478 | * Note that we do not require a proof of wildcard non-existence if the | |
1479 | * next closer domain is covered by an opt-out, as that would not provide | |
1480 | * any additional information. */ | |
1481 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_OPTOUT; | |
1482 | else if (no_wildcard) | |
1483 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NXDOMAIN; | |
1484 | else { | |
1485 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; | |
1486 | ||
1487 | return 0; | |
1488 | } | |
1489 | } | |
1490 | ||
d3760be0 LP |
1491 | if (authenticated) |
1492 | *authenticated = a; | |
1493 | ||
1494 | if (ttl) | |
1495 | *ttl = enclosure_rr->ttl; | |
35ad41d3 | 1496 | |
105e1512 LP |
1497 | return 0; |
1498 | } | |
1499 | ||
d3760be0 | 1500 | int dnssec_test_nsec(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecResult *result, bool *authenticated, uint32_t *ttl) { |
105e1512 LP |
1501 | DnsResourceRecord *rr; |
1502 | bool have_nsec3 = false; | |
1503 | DnsAnswerFlags flags; | |
1504 | int r; | |
1505 | ||
1506 | assert(key); | |
1507 | assert(result); | |
1508 | ||
1509 | /* Look for any NSEC/NSEC3 RRs that say something about the specified key. */ | |
1510 | ||
1511 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(rr, flags, answer) { | |
1512 | ||
1513 | if (rr->key->class != key->class) | |
1514 | continue; | |
1515 | ||
105e1512 LP |
1516 | switch (rr->key->type) { |
1517 | ||
1518 | case DNS_TYPE_NSEC: | |
1519 | ||
1520 | r = dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key)); | |
1521 | if (r < 0) | |
1522 | return r; | |
1523 | if (r > 0) { | |
146035b3 TG |
1524 | if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, key->type)) |
1525 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND; | |
1526 | else if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_CNAME)) | |
1527 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME; | |
1528 | else | |
1529 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; | |
d3760be0 LP |
1530 | |
1531 | if (authenticated) | |
1532 | *authenticated = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; | |
1533 | if (ttl) | |
1534 | *ttl = rr->ttl; | |
1535 | ||
72667f08 LP |
1536 | return 0; |
1537 | } | |
1538 | ||
105e1512 LP |
1539 | r = dns_name_between(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key), rr->nsec.next_domain_name); |
1540 | if (r < 0) | |
1541 | return r; | |
1542 | if (r > 0) { | |
1543 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NXDOMAIN; | |
d3760be0 LP |
1544 | |
1545 | if (authenticated) | |
1546 | *authenticated = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; | |
1547 | if (ttl) | |
1548 | *ttl = rr->ttl; | |
1549 | ||
105e1512 LP |
1550 | return 0; |
1551 | } | |
72667f08 | 1552 | break; |
72667f08 | 1553 | |
105e1512 LP |
1554 | case DNS_TYPE_NSEC3: |
1555 | have_nsec3 = true; | |
72667f08 LP |
1556 | break; |
1557 | } | |
1558 | } | |
1559 | ||
105e1512 LP |
1560 | /* OK, this was not sufficient. Let's see if NSEC3 can help. */ |
1561 | if (have_nsec3) | |
d3760be0 | 1562 | return dnssec_test_nsec3(answer, key, result, authenticated, ttl); |
105e1512 | 1563 | |
72667f08 LP |
1564 | /* No approproate NSEC RR found, report this. */ |
1565 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; | |
1566 | return 0; | |
1567 | } | |
1568 | ||
24710c48 LP |
1569 | static const char* const dnssec_mode_table[_DNSSEC_MODE_MAX] = { |
1570 | [DNSSEC_NO] = "no", | |
b652d4a2 | 1571 | [DNSSEC_DOWNGRADE_OK] = "downgrade-ok", |
24710c48 LP |
1572 | [DNSSEC_YES] = "yes", |
1573 | }; | |
1574 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(dnssec_mode, DnssecMode); | |
547973de LP |
1575 | |
1576 | static const char* const dnssec_result_table[_DNSSEC_RESULT_MAX] = { | |
1577 | [DNSSEC_VALIDATED] = "validated", | |
1578 | [DNSSEC_INVALID] = "invalid", | |
203f1b35 LP |
1579 | [DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED] = "signature-expired", |
1580 | [DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM] = "unsupported-algorithm", | |
547973de LP |
1581 | [DNSSEC_NO_SIGNATURE] = "no-signature", |
1582 | [DNSSEC_MISSING_KEY] = "missing-key", | |
203f1b35 | 1583 | [DNSSEC_UNSIGNED] = "unsigned", |
547973de | 1584 | [DNSSEC_FAILED_AUXILIARY] = "failed-auxiliary", |
72667f08 | 1585 | [DNSSEC_NSEC_MISMATCH] = "nsec-mismatch", |
b652d4a2 | 1586 | [DNSSEC_INCOMPATIBLE_SERVER] = "incompatible-server", |
547973de LP |
1587 | }; |
1588 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(dnssec_result, DnssecResult); |