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2b442ac8 LP |
1 | /*-*- Mode: C; c-basic-offset: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*-*/ |
2 | ||
3 | /*** | |
4 | This file is part of systemd. | |
5 | ||
6 | Copyright 2015 Lennart Poettering | |
7 | ||
8 | systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it | |
9 | under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by | |
10 | the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or | |
11 | (at your option) any later version. | |
12 | ||
13 | systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but | |
14 | WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of | |
15 | MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU | |
16 | Lesser General Public License for more details. | |
17 | ||
18 | You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License | |
19 | along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. | |
20 | ***/ | |
21 | ||
22 | #include <gcrypt.h> | |
23 | ||
24 | #include "alloc-util.h" | |
25 | #include "dns-domain.h" | |
72667f08 | 26 | #include "hexdecoct.h" |
2b442ac8 LP |
27 | #include "resolved-dns-dnssec.h" |
28 | #include "resolved-dns-packet.h" | |
24710c48 | 29 | #include "string-table.h" |
2b442ac8 LP |
30 | |
31 | /* Open question: | |
32 | * | |
33 | * How does the DNSSEC canonical form of a hostname with a label | |
34 | * containing a dot look like, the way DNS-SD does it? | |
35 | * | |
2cd87277 LP |
36 | * TODO: |
37 | * | |
3ecc3df8 | 38 | * - wildcard zones compatibility (NSEC/NSEC3 wildcard check is missing) |
bb1fa242 | 39 | * - multi-label zone compatibility |
3e92a719 | 40 | * - cname/dname compatibility |
160fbda9 | 41 | * - nxdomain on qname |
6f8a2c68 | 42 | * - per-interface DNSSEC setting |
0a9a2ac3 | 43 | * - when doing negative caching, use NSEC/NSEC3 RR instead of SOA for TTL |
2cd87277 | 44 | * |
2b442ac8 LP |
45 | * */ |
46 | ||
47 | #define VERIFY_RRS_MAX 256 | |
48 | #define MAX_KEY_SIZE (32*1024) | |
49 | ||
896c5672 LP |
50 | /* Permit a maximum clock skew of 1h 10min. This should be enough to deal with DST confusion */ |
51 | #define SKEW_MAX (1*USEC_PER_HOUR + 10*USEC_PER_MINUTE) | |
52 | ||
a8f158b9 LP |
53 | /* Maximum number of NSEC3 iterations we'll do. */ |
54 | #define NSEC3_ITERATIONS_MAX 2048 | |
55 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
56 | /* |
57 | * The DNSSEC Chain of trust: | |
58 | * | |
59 | * Normal RRs are protected via RRSIG RRs in combination with DNSKEY RRs, all in the same zone | |
60 | * DNSKEY RRs are either protected like normal RRs, or via a DS from a zone "higher" up the tree | |
61 | * DS RRs are protected like normal RRs | |
62 | * | |
63 | * Example chain: | |
64 | * Normal RR → RRSIG/DNSKEY+ → DS → RRSIG/DNSKEY+ → DS → ... → DS → RRSIG/DNSKEY+ → DS | |
65 | */ | |
66 | ||
0638401a LP |
67 | static void initialize_libgcrypt(void) { |
68 | const char *p; | |
69 | ||
70 | if (gcry_control(GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED_P)) | |
71 | return; | |
72 | ||
73 | p = gcry_check_version("1.4.5"); | |
74 | assert(p); | |
75 | ||
76 | gcry_control(GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM); | |
77 | gcry_control(GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0); | |
78 | } | |
79 | ||
0c857028 | 80 | uint16_t dnssec_keytag(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, bool mask_revoke) { |
2b442ac8 | 81 | const uint8_t *p; |
0c857028 | 82 | uint32_t sum, f; |
2b442ac8 LP |
83 | size_t i; |
84 | ||
85 | /* The algorithm from RFC 4034, Appendix B. */ | |
86 | ||
87 | assert(dnskey); | |
88 | assert(dnskey->key->type == DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY); | |
89 | ||
0c857028 LP |
90 | f = (uint32_t) dnskey->dnskey.flags; |
91 | ||
92 | if (mask_revoke) | |
93 | f &= ~DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE; | |
94 | ||
95 | sum = f + ((((uint32_t) dnskey->dnskey.protocol) << 8) + (uint32_t) dnskey->dnskey.algorithm); | |
2b442ac8 LP |
96 | |
97 | p = dnskey->dnskey.key; | |
98 | ||
99 | for (i = 0; i < dnskey->dnskey.key_size; i++) | |
100 | sum += (i & 1) == 0 ? (uint32_t) p[i] << 8 : (uint32_t) p[i]; | |
101 | ||
102 | sum += (sum >> 16) & UINT32_C(0xFFFF); | |
103 | ||
104 | return sum & UINT32_C(0xFFFF); | |
105 | } | |
106 | ||
107 | static int rr_compare(const void *a, const void *b) { | |
108 | DnsResourceRecord **x = (DnsResourceRecord**) a, **y = (DnsResourceRecord**) b; | |
109 | size_t m; | |
110 | int r; | |
111 | ||
112 | /* Let's order the RRs according to RFC 4034, Section 6.3 */ | |
113 | ||
114 | assert(x); | |
115 | assert(*x); | |
116 | assert((*x)->wire_format); | |
117 | assert(y); | |
118 | assert(*y); | |
119 | assert((*y)->wire_format); | |
120 | ||
85aeaccc | 121 | m = MIN(DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(*x), DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(*y)); |
2b442ac8 | 122 | |
85aeaccc | 123 | r = memcmp(DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA(*x), DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA(*y), m); |
2b442ac8 LP |
124 | if (r != 0) |
125 | return r; | |
126 | ||
85aeaccc | 127 | if (DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(*x) < DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(*y)) |
2b442ac8 | 128 | return -1; |
85aeaccc | 129 | else if (DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(*x) > DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(*y)) |
2b442ac8 LP |
130 | return 1; |
131 | ||
132 | return 0; | |
133 | } | |
134 | ||
ea3a892f | 135 | static int dnssec_rsa_verify_raw( |
2b442ac8 LP |
136 | const char *hash_algorithm, |
137 | const void *signature, size_t signature_size, | |
138 | const void *data, size_t data_size, | |
139 | const void *exponent, size_t exponent_size, | |
140 | const void *modulus, size_t modulus_size) { | |
141 | ||
142 | gcry_sexp_t public_key_sexp = NULL, data_sexp = NULL, signature_sexp = NULL; | |
143 | gcry_mpi_t n = NULL, e = NULL, s = NULL; | |
144 | gcry_error_t ge; | |
145 | int r; | |
146 | ||
147 | assert(hash_algorithm); | |
148 | ||
149 | ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&s, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, signature, signature_size, NULL); | |
150 | if (ge != 0) { | |
151 | r = -EIO; | |
152 | goto finish; | |
153 | } | |
154 | ||
155 | ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&e, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, exponent, exponent_size, NULL); | |
156 | if (ge != 0) { | |
157 | r = -EIO; | |
158 | goto finish; | |
159 | } | |
160 | ||
161 | ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&n, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, modulus, modulus_size, NULL); | |
162 | if (ge != 0) { | |
163 | r = -EIO; | |
164 | goto finish; | |
165 | } | |
166 | ||
167 | ge = gcry_sexp_build(&signature_sexp, | |
168 | NULL, | |
169 | "(sig-val (rsa (s %m)))", | |
170 | s); | |
171 | ||
172 | if (ge != 0) { | |
173 | r = -EIO; | |
174 | goto finish; | |
175 | } | |
176 | ||
177 | ge = gcry_sexp_build(&data_sexp, | |
178 | NULL, | |
179 | "(data (flags pkcs1) (hash %s %b))", | |
180 | hash_algorithm, | |
181 | (int) data_size, | |
182 | data); | |
183 | if (ge != 0) { | |
184 | r = -EIO; | |
185 | goto finish; | |
186 | } | |
187 | ||
188 | ge = gcry_sexp_build(&public_key_sexp, | |
189 | NULL, | |
190 | "(public-key (rsa (n %m) (e %m)))", | |
191 | n, | |
192 | e); | |
193 | if (ge != 0) { | |
194 | r = -EIO; | |
195 | goto finish; | |
196 | } | |
197 | ||
198 | ge = gcry_pk_verify(signature_sexp, data_sexp, public_key_sexp); | |
d12bf2bd | 199 | if (gpg_err_code(ge) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE) |
2b442ac8 | 200 | r = 0; |
d12bf2bd LP |
201 | else if (ge != 0) { |
202 | log_debug("RSA signature check failed: %s", gpg_strerror(ge)); | |
2b442ac8 | 203 | r = -EIO; |
d12bf2bd | 204 | } else |
2b442ac8 LP |
205 | r = 1; |
206 | ||
207 | finish: | |
208 | if (e) | |
209 | gcry_mpi_release(e); | |
210 | if (n) | |
211 | gcry_mpi_release(n); | |
212 | if (s) | |
213 | gcry_mpi_release(s); | |
214 | ||
215 | if (public_key_sexp) | |
216 | gcry_sexp_release(public_key_sexp); | |
217 | if (signature_sexp) | |
218 | gcry_sexp_release(signature_sexp); | |
219 | if (data_sexp) | |
220 | gcry_sexp_release(data_sexp); | |
221 | ||
222 | return r; | |
223 | } | |
224 | ||
ea3a892f LP |
225 | static int dnssec_rsa_verify( |
226 | const char *hash_algorithm, | |
227 | const void *hash, size_t hash_size, | |
228 | DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, | |
229 | DnsResourceRecord *dnskey) { | |
230 | ||
231 | size_t exponent_size, modulus_size; | |
232 | void *exponent, *modulus; | |
233 | ||
234 | assert(hash_algorithm); | |
235 | assert(hash); | |
236 | assert(hash_size > 0); | |
237 | assert(rrsig); | |
238 | assert(dnskey); | |
239 | ||
240 | if (*(uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key == 0) { | |
241 | /* exponent is > 255 bytes long */ | |
242 | ||
243 | exponent = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 3; | |
244 | exponent_size = | |
ac04adbe TG |
245 | ((size_t) (((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[1]) << 8) | |
246 | ((size_t) ((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[2]); | |
ea3a892f LP |
247 | |
248 | if (exponent_size < 256) | |
249 | return -EINVAL; | |
250 | ||
251 | if (3 + exponent_size >= dnskey->dnskey.key_size) | |
252 | return -EINVAL; | |
253 | ||
254 | modulus = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 3 + exponent_size; | |
255 | modulus_size = dnskey->dnskey.key_size - 3 - exponent_size; | |
256 | ||
257 | } else { | |
258 | /* exponent is <= 255 bytes long */ | |
259 | ||
260 | exponent = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 1; | |
261 | exponent_size = (size_t) ((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[0]; | |
262 | ||
263 | if (exponent_size <= 0) | |
264 | return -EINVAL; | |
265 | ||
266 | if (1 + exponent_size >= dnskey->dnskey.key_size) | |
267 | return -EINVAL; | |
268 | ||
269 | modulus = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 1 + exponent_size; | |
270 | modulus_size = dnskey->dnskey.key_size - 1 - exponent_size; | |
271 | } | |
272 | ||
273 | return dnssec_rsa_verify_raw( | |
274 | hash_algorithm, | |
275 | rrsig->rrsig.signature, rrsig->rrsig.signature_size, | |
276 | hash, hash_size, | |
277 | exponent, exponent_size, | |
278 | modulus, modulus_size); | |
279 | } | |
280 | ||
e0240c64 LP |
281 | static int dnssec_ecdsa_verify_raw( |
282 | const char *hash_algorithm, | |
283 | const char *curve, | |
284 | const void *signature_r, size_t signature_r_size, | |
285 | const void *signature_s, size_t signature_s_size, | |
286 | const void *data, size_t data_size, | |
287 | const void *key, size_t key_size) { | |
288 | ||
289 | gcry_sexp_t public_key_sexp = NULL, data_sexp = NULL, signature_sexp = NULL; | |
290 | gcry_mpi_t q = NULL, r = NULL, s = NULL; | |
291 | gcry_error_t ge; | |
292 | int k; | |
293 | ||
294 | assert(hash_algorithm); | |
295 | ||
296 | ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&r, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, signature_r, signature_r_size, NULL); | |
297 | if (ge != 0) { | |
298 | k = -EIO; | |
299 | goto finish; | |
300 | } | |
301 | ||
302 | ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&s, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, signature_s, signature_s_size, NULL); | |
303 | if (ge != 0) { | |
304 | k = -EIO; | |
305 | goto finish; | |
306 | } | |
307 | ||
308 | ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&q, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, key, key_size, NULL); | |
309 | if (ge != 0) { | |
310 | k = -EIO; | |
311 | goto finish; | |
312 | } | |
313 | ||
314 | ge = gcry_sexp_build(&signature_sexp, | |
315 | NULL, | |
316 | "(sig-val (ecdsa (r %m) (s %m)))", | |
317 | r, | |
318 | s); | |
319 | if (ge != 0) { | |
320 | k = -EIO; | |
321 | goto finish; | |
322 | } | |
323 | ||
324 | ge = gcry_sexp_build(&data_sexp, | |
325 | NULL, | |
326 | "(data (flags rfc6979) (hash %s %b))", | |
327 | hash_algorithm, | |
328 | (int) data_size, | |
329 | data); | |
330 | if (ge != 0) { | |
331 | k = -EIO; | |
332 | goto finish; | |
333 | } | |
334 | ||
335 | ge = gcry_sexp_build(&public_key_sexp, | |
336 | NULL, | |
337 | "(public-key (ecc (curve %s) (q %m)))", | |
338 | curve, | |
339 | q); | |
340 | if (ge != 0) { | |
341 | k = -EIO; | |
342 | goto finish; | |
343 | } | |
344 | ||
345 | ge = gcry_pk_verify(signature_sexp, data_sexp, public_key_sexp); | |
346 | if (gpg_err_code(ge) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE) | |
347 | k = 0; | |
348 | else if (ge != 0) { | |
349 | log_debug("ECDSA signature check failed: %s", gpg_strerror(ge)); | |
350 | k = -EIO; | |
351 | } else | |
352 | k = 1; | |
353 | finish: | |
354 | if (r) | |
355 | gcry_mpi_release(r); | |
356 | if (s) | |
357 | gcry_mpi_release(s); | |
358 | if (q) | |
359 | gcry_mpi_release(q); | |
360 | ||
361 | if (public_key_sexp) | |
362 | gcry_sexp_release(public_key_sexp); | |
363 | if (signature_sexp) | |
364 | gcry_sexp_release(signature_sexp); | |
365 | if (data_sexp) | |
366 | gcry_sexp_release(data_sexp); | |
367 | ||
368 | return k; | |
369 | } | |
370 | ||
371 | static int dnssec_ecdsa_verify( | |
372 | const char *hash_algorithm, | |
373 | int algorithm, | |
374 | const void *hash, size_t hash_size, | |
375 | DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, | |
376 | DnsResourceRecord *dnskey) { | |
377 | ||
378 | const char *curve; | |
379 | size_t key_size; | |
380 | uint8_t *q; | |
381 | ||
382 | assert(hash); | |
383 | assert(hash_size); | |
384 | assert(rrsig); | |
385 | assert(dnskey); | |
386 | ||
387 | if (algorithm == DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP256SHA256) { | |
388 | key_size = 32; | |
389 | curve = "NIST P-256"; | |
390 | } else if (algorithm == DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP384SHA384) { | |
391 | key_size = 48; | |
392 | curve = "NIST P-384"; | |
393 | } else | |
394 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
395 | ||
396 | if (dnskey->dnskey.key_size != key_size * 2) | |
397 | return -EINVAL; | |
398 | ||
399 | if (rrsig->rrsig.signature_size != key_size * 2) | |
400 | return -EINVAL; | |
401 | ||
402 | q = alloca(key_size*2 + 1); | |
403 | q[0] = 0x04; /* Prepend 0x04 to indicate an uncompressed key */ | |
404 | memcpy(q+1, dnskey->dnskey.key, key_size*2); | |
405 | ||
406 | return dnssec_ecdsa_verify_raw( | |
407 | hash_algorithm, | |
408 | curve, | |
409 | rrsig->rrsig.signature, key_size, | |
410 | (uint8_t*) rrsig->rrsig.signature + key_size, key_size, | |
411 | hash, hash_size, | |
412 | q, key_size*2+1); | |
413 | } | |
414 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
415 | static void md_add_uint8(gcry_md_hd_t md, uint8_t v) { |
416 | gcry_md_write(md, &v, sizeof(v)); | |
417 | } | |
418 | ||
419 | static void md_add_uint16(gcry_md_hd_t md, uint16_t v) { | |
420 | v = htobe16(v); | |
421 | gcry_md_write(md, &v, sizeof(v)); | |
422 | } | |
423 | ||
424 | static void md_add_uint32(gcry_md_hd_t md, uint32_t v) { | |
425 | v = htobe32(v); | |
426 | gcry_md_write(md, &v, sizeof(v)); | |
427 | } | |
428 | ||
2a326321 LP |
429 | static int dnssec_rrsig_expired(DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, usec_t realtime) { |
430 | usec_t expiration, inception, skew; | |
431 | ||
432 | assert(rrsig); | |
433 | assert(rrsig->key->type == DNS_TYPE_RRSIG); | |
434 | ||
435 | if (realtime == USEC_INFINITY) | |
436 | realtime = now(CLOCK_REALTIME); | |
437 | ||
438 | expiration = rrsig->rrsig.expiration * USEC_PER_SEC; | |
439 | inception = rrsig->rrsig.inception * USEC_PER_SEC; | |
440 | ||
441 | if (inception > expiration) | |
2a44bec4 | 442 | return -EKEYREJECTED; |
2a326321 | 443 | |
896c5672 LP |
444 | /* Permit a certain amount of clock skew of 10% of the valid |
445 | * time range. This takes inspiration from unbound's | |
446 | * resolver. */ | |
2a326321 | 447 | skew = (expiration - inception) / 10; |
896c5672 LP |
448 | if (skew > SKEW_MAX) |
449 | skew = SKEW_MAX; | |
2a326321 LP |
450 | |
451 | if (inception < skew) | |
452 | inception = 0; | |
453 | else | |
454 | inception -= skew; | |
455 | ||
456 | if (expiration + skew < expiration) | |
457 | expiration = USEC_INFINITY; | |
458 | else | |
459 | expiration += skew; | |
460 | ||
461 | return realtime < inception || realtime > expiration; | |
462 | } | |
463 | ||
ca994e85 | 464 | static int algorithm_to_gcrypt_md(uint8_t algorithm) { |
fbf1a66d | 465 | |
6af47493 LP |
466 | /* Translates a DNSSEC signature algorithm into a gcrypt |
467 | * digest identifier. | |
468 | * | |
469 | * Note that we implement all algorithms listed as "Must | |
470 | * implement" and "Recommended to Implement" in RFC6944. We | |
471 | * don't implement any algorithms that are listed as | |
472 | * "Optional" or "Must Not Implement". Specifically, we do not | |
473 | * implement RSAMD5, DSASHA1, DH, DSA-NSEC3-SHA1, and | |
474 | * GOST-ECC. */ | |
fbf1a66d LP |
475 | |
476 | switch (algorithm) { | |
477 | ||
478 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1: | |
479 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1_NSEC3_SHA1: | |
480 | return GCRY_MD_SHA1; | |
481 | ||
482 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256: | |
e0240c64 | 483 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP256SHA256: |
fbf1a66d LP |
484 | return GCRY_MD_SHA256; |
485 | ||
e0240c64 LP |
486 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP384SHA384: |
487 | return GCRY_MD_SHA384; | |
488 | ||
fbf1a66d LP |
489 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA512: |
490 | return GCRY_MD_SHA512; | |
491 | ||
492 | default: | |
493 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
494 | } | |
495 | } | |
496 | ||
2a326321 LP |
497 | int dnssec_verify_rrset( |
498 | DnsAnswer *a, | |
0c857028 | 499 | const DnsResourceKey *key, |
2a326321 LP |
500 | DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, |
501 | DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, | |
547973de LP |
502 | usec_t realtime, |
503 | DnssecResult *result) { | |
2a326321 | 504 | |
2b442ac8 | 505 | uint8_t wire_format_name[DNS_WIRE_FOMAT_HOSTNAME_MAX]; |
ea3a892f LP |
506 | size_t hash_size; |
507 | void *hash; | |
2b442ac8 LP |
508 | DnsResourceRecord **list, *rr; |
509 | gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL; | |
ca994e85 | 510 | int r, md_algorithm; |
2b442ac8 | 511 | size_t k, n = 0; |
2b442ac8 LP |
512 | |
513 | assert(key); | |
514 | assert(rrsig); | |
515 | assert(dnskey); | |
547973de | 516 | assert(result); |
2a326321 LP |
517 | assert(rrsig->key->type == DNS_TYPE_RRSIG); |
518 | assert(dnskey->key->type == DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY); | |
2b442ac8 LP |
519 | |
520 | /* Verifies the the RRSet matching the specified "key" in "a", | |
521 | * using the signature "rrsig" and the key "dnskey". It's | |
522 | * assumed the RRSIG and DNSKEY match. */ | |
523 | ||
ca994e85 LP |
524 | md_algorithm = algorithm_to_gcrypt_md(rrsig->rrsig.algorithm); |
525 | if (md_algorithm == -EOPNOTSUPP) { | |
203f1b35 LP |
526 | *result = DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM; |
527 | return 0; | |
528 | } | |
ca994e85 LP |
529 | if (md_algorithm < 0) |
530 | return md_algorithm; | |
2b442ac8 | 531 | |
2a326321 LP |
532 | r = dnssec_rrsig_expired(rrsig, realtime); |
533 | if (r < 0) | |
534 | return r; | |
547973de LP |
535 | if (r > 0) { |
536 | *result = DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED; | |
537 | return 0; | |
538 | } | |
2a326321 | 539 | |
2b442ac8 LP |
540 | /* Collect all relevant RRs in a single array, so that we can look at the RRset */ |
541 | list = newa(DnsResourceRecord *, a->n_rrs); | |
542 | ||
543 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, a) { | |
544 | r = dns_resource_key_equal(key, rr->key); | |
545 | if (r < 0) | |
546 | return r; | |
547 | if (r == 0) | |
548 | continue; | |
549 | ||
550 | /* We need the wire format for ordering, and digest calculation */ | |
551 | r = dns_resource_record_to_wire_format(rr, true); | |
552 | if (r < 0) | |
553 | return r; | |
554 | ||
555 | list[n++] = rr; | |
935a999f TG |
556 | |
557 | if (n > VERIFY_RRS_MAX) | |
558 | return -E2BIG; | |
2b442ac8 LP |
559 | } |
560 | ||
561 | if (n <= 0) | |
562 | return -ENODATA; | |
563 | ||
564 | /* Bring the RRs into canonical order */ | |
6c5e8fbf | 565 | qsort_safe(list, n, sizeof(DnsResourceRecord*), rr_compare); |
2b442ac8 LP |
566 | |
567 | /* OK, the RRs are now in canonical order. Let's calculate the digest */ | |
fbf1a66d | 568 | initialize_libgcrypt(); |
2b442ac8 | 569 | |
ca994e85 | 570 | hash_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(md_algorithm); |
fbf1a66d | 571 | assert(hash_size > 0); |
2b442ac8 | 572 | |
ca994e85 | 573 | gcry_md_open(&md, md_algorithm, 0); |
2b442ac8 LP |
574 | if (!md) |
575 | return -EIO; | |
576 | ||
577 | md_add_uint16(md, rrsig->rrsig.type_covered); | |
578 | md_add_uint8(md, rrsig->rrsig.algorithm); | |
579 | md_add_uint8(md, rrsig->rrsig.labels); | |
580 | md_add_uint32(md, rrsig->rrsig.original_ttl); | |
581 | md_add_uint32(md, rrsig->rrsig.expiration); | |
582 | md_add_uint32(md, rrsig->rrsig.inception); | |
583 | md_add_uint16(md, rrsig->rrsig.key_tag); | |
584 | ||
585 | r = dns_name_to_wire_format(rrsig->rrsig.signer, wire_format_name, sizeof(wire_format_name), true); | |
586 | if (r < 0) | |
587 | goto finish; | |
588 | gcry_md_write(md, wire_format_name, r); | |
589 | ||
590 | for (k = 0; k < n; k++) { | |
e7ff0e0b | 591 | const char *suffix; |
2b442ac8 LP |
592 | size_t l; |
593 | rr = list[k]; | |
594 | ||
e7ff0e0b LP |
595 | r = dns_name_suffix(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), rrsig->rrsig.labels, &suffix); |
596 | if (r < 0) | |
597 | goto finish; | |
598 | if (r > 0) /* This is a wildcard! */ | |
599 | gcry_md_write(md, (uint8_t[]) { 1, '*'}, 2); | |
600 | ||
601 | r = dns_name_to_wire_format(suffix, wire_format_name, sizeof(wire_format_name), true); | |
2b442ac8 LP |
602 | if (r < 0) |
603 | goto finish; | |
604 | gcry_md_write(md, wire_format_name, r); | |
605 | ||
606 | md_add_uint16(md, rr->key->type); | |
607 | md_add_uint16(md, rr->key->class); | |
608 | md_add_uint32(md, rrsig->rrsig.original_ttl); | |
609 | ||
85aeaccc | 610 | l = DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(rr); |
2b442ac8 LP |
611 | assert(l <= 0xFFFF); |
612 | ||
613 | md_add_uint16(md, (uint16_t) l); | |
85aeaccc | 614 | gcry_md_write(md, DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA(rr), l); |
2b442ac8 LP |
615 | } |
616 | ||
617 | hash = gcry_md_read(md, 0); | |
618 | if (!hash) { | |
619 | r = -EIO; | |
620 | goto finish; | |
621 | } | |
622 | ||
e0240c64 LP |
623 | switch (rrsig->rrsig.algorithm) { |
624 | ||
625 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1: | |
626 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1_NSEC3_SHA1: | |
627 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256: | |
628 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA512: | |
629 | r = dnssec_rsa_verify( | |
ca994e85 | 630 | gcry_md_algo_name(md_algorithm), |
e0240c64 LP |
631 | hash, hash_size, |
632 | rrsig, | |
633 | dnskey); | |
634 | break; | |
635 | ||
636 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP256SHA256: | |
637 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP384SHA384: | |
638 | r = dnssec_ecdsa_verify( | |
ca994e85 | 639 | gcry_md_algo_name(md_algorithm), |
e0240c64 LP |
640 | rrsig->rrsig.algorithm, |
641 | hash, hash_size, | |
642 | rrsig, | |
643 | dnskey); | |
644 | break; | |
645 | } | |
646 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
647 | if (r < 0) |
648 | goto finish; | |
649 | ||
547973de LP |
650 | *result = r ? DNSSEC_VALIDATED : DNSSEC_INVALID; |
651 | r = 0; | |
2b442ac8 LP |
652 | |
653 | finish: | |
654 | gcry_md_close(md); | |
655 | return r; | |
656 | } | |
657 | ||
0c857028 | 658 | int dnssec_rrsig_match_dnskey(DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, bool revoked_ok) { |
2b442ac8 LP |
659 | |
660 | assert(rrsig); | |
661 | assert(dnskey); | |
662 | ||
663 | /* Checks if the specified DNSKEY RR matches the key used for | |
664 | * the signature in the specified RRSIG RR */ | |
665 | ||
666 | if (rrsig->key->type != DNS_TYPE_RRSIG) | |
667 | return -EINVAL; | |
668 | ||
669 | if (dnskey->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) | |
670 | return 0; | |
671 | if (dnskey->key->class != rrsig->key->class) | |
672 | return 0; | |
673 | if ((dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_ZONE_KEY) == 0) | |
674 | return 0; | |
0c857028 | 675 | if (!revoked_ok && (dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE)) |
28b8191e | 676 | return 0; |
2b442ac8 LP |
677 | if (dnskey->dnskey.protocol != 3) |
678 | return 0; | |
679 | if (dnskey->dnskey.algorithm != rrsig->rrsig.algorithm) | |
680 | return 0; | |
681 | ||
0c857028 | 682 | if (dnssec_keytag(dnskey, false) != rrsig->rrsig.key_tag) |
2b442ac8 LP |
683 | return 0; |
684 | ||
15accc27 | 685 | return dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(dnskey->key), rrsig->rrsig.signer); |
2b442ac8 LP |
686 | } |
687 | ||
105e1512 | 688 | int dnssec_key_match_rrsig(const DnsResourceKey *key, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig) { |
e7ff0e0b LP |
689 | int r; |
690 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
691 | assert(key); |
692 | assert(rrsig); | |
693 | ||
694 | /* Checks if the specified RRSIG RR protects the RRSet of the specified RR key. */ | |
695 | ||
696 | if (rrsig->key->type != DNS_TYPE_RRSIG) | |
697 | return 0; | |
698 | if (rrsig->key->class != key->class) | |
699 | return 0; | |
700 | if (rrsig->rrsig.type_covered != key->type) | |
701 | return 0; | |
702 | ||
e7ff0e0b LP |
703 | /* Make sure signer is a parent of the RRset */ |
704 | r = dns_name_endswith(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rrsig->key), rrsig->rrsig.signer); | |
705 | if (r <= 0) | |
706 | return r; | |
707 | ||
708 | /* Make sure the owner name has at least as many labels as the "label" fields indicates. */ | |
709 | r = dns_name_count_labels(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rrsig->key)); | |
710 | if (r < 0) | |
711 | return r; | |
712 | if (r < rrsig->rrsig.labels) | |
713 | return 0; | |
714 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
715 | return dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rrsig->key), DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key)); |
716 | } | |
717 | ||
ee3d6aff LP |
718 | static int dnssec_fix_rrset_ttl(DnsAnswer *a, const DnsResourceKey *key, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, usec_t realtime) { |
719 | DnsResourceRecord *rr; | |
720 | int r; | |
721 | ||
722 | assert(key); | |
723 | assert(rrsig); | |
724 | ||
725 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, a) { | |
726 | r = dns_resource_key_equal(key, rr->key); | |
727 | if (r < 0) | |
728 | return r; | |
729 | if (r == 0) | |
730 | continue; | |
731 | ||
732 | /* Pick the TTL as the minimum of the RR's TTL, the | |
733 | * RR's original TTL according to the RRSIG and the | |
734 | * RRSIG's own TTL, see RFC 4035, Section 5.3.3 */ | |
735 | rr->ttl = MIN3(rr->ttl, rrsig->rrsig.original_ttl, rrsig->ttl); | |
736 | rr->expiry = rrsig->rrsig.expiration * USEC_PER_SEC; | |
737 | } | |
738 | ||
739 | return 0; | |
740 | } | |
741 | ||
2a326321 LP |
742 | int dnssec_verify_rrset_search( |
743 | DnsAnswer *a, | |
0c857028 | 744 | const DnsResourceKey *key, |
2a326321 | 745 | DnsAnswer *validated_dnskeys, |
547973de LP |
746 | usec_t realtime, |
747 | DnssecResult *result) { | |
2a326321 | 748 | |
203f1b35 | 749 | bool found_rrsig = false, found_invalid = false, found_expired_rrsig = false, found_unsupported_algorithm = false; |
2b442ac8 LP |
750 | DnsResourceRecord *rrsig; |
751 | int r; | |
752 | ||
753 | assert(key); | |
547973de | 754 | assert(result); |
2b442ac8 | 755 | |
105e1512 | 756 | /* Verifies all RRs from "a" that match the key "key" against DNSKEYs in "validated_dnskeys" */ |
2b442ac8 LP |
757 | |
758 | if (!a || a->n_rrs <= 0) | |
759 | return -ENODATA; | |
760 | ||
761 | /* Iterate through each RRSIG RR. */ | |
762 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rrsig, a) { | |
763 | DnsResourceRecord *dnskey; | |
105e1512 | 764 | DnsAnswerFlags flags; |
2b442ac8 | 765 | |
203f1b35 | 766 | /* Is this an RRSIG RR that applies to RRs matching our key? */ |
2b442ac8 LP |
767 | r = dnssec_key_match_rrsig(key, rrsig); |
768 | if (r < 0) | |
769 | return r; | |
770 | if (r == 0) | |
771 | continue; | |
772 | ||
773 | found_rrsig = true; | |
774 | ||
547973de | 775 | /* Look for a matching key */ |
105e1512 | 776 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(dnskey, flags, validated_dnskeys) { |
547973de | 777 | DnssecResult one_result; |
2b442ac8 | 778 | |
105e1512 LP |
779 | if ((flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED) == 0) |
780 | continue; | |
781 | ||
203f1b35 | 782 | /* Is this a DNSKEY RR that matches they key of our RRSIG? */ |
0c857028 | 783 | r = dnssec_rrsig_match_dnskey(rrsig, dnskey, false); |
2b442ac8 LP |
784 | if (r < 0) |
785 | return r; | |
786 | if (r == 0) | |
787 | continue; | |
788 | ||
2a326321 LP |
789 | /* Take the time here, if it isn't set yet, so |
790 | * that we do all validations with the same | |
791 | * time. */ | |
792 | if (realtime == USEC_INFINITY) | |
793 | realtime = now(CLOCK_REALTIME); | |
794 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
795 | /* Yay, we found a matching RRSIG with a matching |
796 | * DNSKEY, awesome. Now let's verify all entries of | |
797 | * the RRSet against the RRSIG and DNSKEY | |
798 | * combination. */ | |
799 | ||
547973de | 800 | r = dnssec_verify_rrset(a, key, rrsig, dnskey, realtime, &one_result); |
203f1b35 | 801 | if (r < 0) |
2b442ac8 | 802 | return r; |
203f1b35 LP |
803 | |
804 | switch (one_result) { | |
805 | ||
806 | case DNSSEC_VALIDATED: | |
807 | /* Yay, the RR has been validated, | |
ee3d6aff LP |
808 | * return immediately, but fix up the expiry */ |
809 | r = dnssec_fix_rrset_ttl(a, key, rrsig, realtime); | |
810 | if (r < 0) | |
811 | return r; | |
812 | ||
547973de LP |
813 | *result = DNSSEC_VALIDATED; |
814 | return 0; | |
2b442ac8 | 815 | |
203f1b35 LP |
816 | case DNSSEC_INVALID: |
817 | /* If the signature is invalid, let's try another | |
818 | key and/or signature. After all they | |
819 | key_tags and stuff are not unique, and | |
820 | might be shared by multiple keys. */ | |
821 | found_invalid = true; | |
822 | continue; | |
823 | ||
824 | case DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM: | |
825 | /* If the key algorithm is | |
826 | unsupported, try another | |
827 | RRSIG/DNSKEY pair, but remember we | |
828 | encountered this, so that we can | |
829 | return a proper error when we | |
830 | encounter nothing better. */ | |
831 | found_unsupported_algorithm = true; | |
832 | continue; | |
833 | ||
834 | case DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED: | |
835 | /* If the signature is expired, try | |
836 | another one, but remember it, so | |
837 | that we can return this */ | |
838 | found_expired_rrsig = true; | |
839 | continue; | |
840 | ||
841 | default: | |
842 | assert_not_reached("Unexpected DNSSEC validation result"); | |
843 | } | |
2b442ac8 LP |
844 | } |
845 | } | |
846 | ||
203f1b35 LP |
847 | if (found_expired_rrsig) |
848 | *result = DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED; | |
849 | else if (found_unsupported_algorithm) | |
850 | *result = DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM; | |
851 | else if (found_invalid) | |
547973de LP |
852 | *result = DNSSEC_INVALID; |
853 | else if (found_rrsig) | |
854 | *result = DNSSEC_MISSING_KEY; | |
855 | else | |
856 | *result = DNSSEC_NO_SIGNATURE; | |
2b442ac8 | 857 | |
547973de | 858 | return 0; |
2b442ac8 LP |
859 | } |
860 | ||
105e1512 LP |
861 | int dnssec_has_rrsig(DnsAnswer *a, const DnsResourceKey *key) { |
862 | DnsResourceRecord *rr; | |
863 | int r; | |
864 | ||
865 | /* Checks whether there's at least one RRSIG in 'a' that proctects RRs of the specified key */ | |
866 | ||
867 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, a) { | |
868 | r = dnssec_key_match_rrsig(key, rr); | |
869 | if (r < 0) | |
870 | return r; | |
871 | if (r > 0) | |
872 | return 1; | |
873 | } | |
874 | ||
875 | return 0; | |
876 | } | |
877 | ||
2b442ac8 | 878 | int dnssec_canonicalize(const char *n, char *buffer, size_t buffer_max) { |
2b442ac8 LP |
879 | size_t c = 0; |
880 | int r; | |
881 | ||
882 | /* Converts the specified hostname into DNSSEC canonicalized | |
883 | * form. */ | |
884 | ||
885 | if (buffer_max < 2) | |
886 | return -ENOBUFS; | |
887 | ||
888 | for (;;) { | |
889 | size_t i; | |
890 | ||
891 | r = dns_label_unescape(&n, buffer, buffer_max); | |
892 | if (r < 0) | |
893 | return r; | |
894 | if (r == 0) | |
895 | break; | |
896 | if (r > 0) { | |
897 | int k; | |
898 | ||
899 | /* DNSSEC validation is always done on the ASCII version of the label */ | |
900 | k = dns_label_apply_idna(buffer, r, buffer, buffer_max); | |
901 | if (k < 0) | |
902 | return k; | |
903 | if (k > 0) | |
904 | r = k; | |
905 | } | |
906 | ||
907 | if (buffer_max < (size_t) r + 2) | |
908 | return -ENOBUFS; | |
909 | ||
910 | /* The DNSSEC canonical form is not clear on what to | |
911 | * do with dots appearing in labels, the way DNS-SD | |
912 | * does it. Refuse it for now. */ | |
913 | ||
914 | if (memchr(buffer, '.', r)) | |
915 | return -EINVAL; | |
916 | ||
917 | for (i = 0; i < (size_t) r; i ++) { | |
918 | if (buffer[i] >= 'A' && buffer[i] <= 'Z') | |
919 | buffer[i] = buffer[i] - 'A' + 'a'; | |
920 | } | |
921 | ||
922 | buffer[r] = '.'; | |
923 | ||
924 | buffer += r + 1; | |
925 | c += r + 1; | |
926 | ||
927 | buffer_max -= r + 1; | |
928 | } | |
929 | ||
930 | if (c <= 0) { | |
931 | /* Not even a single label: this is the root domain name */ | |
932 | ||
933 | assert(buffer_max > 2); | |
934 | buffer[0] = '.'; | |
935 | buffer[1] = 0; | |
936 | ||
937 | return 1; | |
938 | } | |
939 | ||
940 | return (int) c; | |
941 | } | |
942 | ||
ca994e85 | 943 | static int digest_to_gcrypt_md(uint8_t algorithm) { |
a1972a91 | 944 | |
fbf1a66d | 945 | /* Translates a DNSSEC digest algorithm into a gcrypt digest identifier */ |
a1972a91 LP |
946 | |
947 | switch (algorithm) { | |
948 | ||
949 | case DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA1: | |
950 | return GCRY_MD_SHA1; | |
951 | ||
952 | case DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA256: | |
953 | return GCRY_MD_SHA256; | |
954 | ||
af22c65b LP |
955 | case DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA384: |
956 | return GCRY_MD_SHA384; | |
957 | ||
a1972a91 LP |
958 | default: |
959 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
960 | } | |
961 | } | |
962 | ||
0c857028 | 963 | int dnssec_verify_dnskey(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, DnsResourceRecord *ds, bool mask_revoke) { |
2b442ac8 | 964 | char owner_name[DNSSEC_CANONICAL_HOSTNAME_MAX]; |
a1972a91 LP |
965 | gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL; |
966 | size_t hash_size; | |
ca994e85 | 967 | int md_algorithm, r; |
2b442ac8 | 968 | void *result; |
2b442ac8 LP |
969 | |
970 | assert(dnskey); | |
971 | assert(ds); | |
972 | ||
973 | /* Implements DNSKEY verification by a DS, according to RFC 4035, section 5.2 */ | |
974 | ||
975 | if (dnskey->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) | |
976 | return -EINVAL; | |
977 | if (ds->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DS) | |
978 | return -EINVAL; | |
979 | if ((dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_ZONE_KEY) == 0) | |
980 | return -EKEYREJECTED; | |
0c857028 LP |
981 | if (!mask_revoke && (dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE)) |
982 | return -EKEYREJECTED; | |
2b442ac8 LP |
983 | if (dnskey->dnskey.protocol != 3) |
984 | return -EKEYREJECTED; | |
985 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
986 | if (dnskey->dnskey.algorithm != ds->ds.algorithm) |
987 | return 0; | |
0c857028 | 988 | if (dnssec_keytag(dnskey, mask_revoke) != ds->ds.key_tag) |
2b442ac8 LP |
989 | return 0; |
990 | ||
0638401a LP |
991 | initialize_libgcrypt(); |
992 | ||
ca994e85 LP |
993 | md_algorithm = digest_to_gcrypt_md(ds->ds.digest_type); |
994 | if (md_algorithm < 0) | |
995 | return md_algorithm; | |
2b442ac8 | 996 | |
ca994e85 | 997 | hash_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(md_algorithm); |
a1972a91 | 998 | assert(hash_size > 0); |
2b442ac8 | 999 | |
a1972a91 LP |
1000 | if (ds->ds.digest_size != hash_size) |
1001 | return 0; | |
2b442ac8 | 1002 | |
a1972a91 LP |
1003 | r = dnssec_canonicalize(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(dnskey->key), owner_name, sizeof(owner_name)); |
1004 | if (r < 0) | |
1005 | return r; | |
2b442ac8 | 1006 | |
ca994e85 | 1007 | gcry_md_open(&md, md_algorithm, 0); |
2b442ac8 LP |
1008 | if (!md) |
1009 | return -EIO; | |
1010 | ||
2b442ac8 | 1011 | gcry_md_write(md, owner_name, r); |
0c857028 LP |
1012 | if (mask_revoke) |
1013 | md_add_uint16(md, dnskey->dnskey.flags & ~DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE); | |
1014 | else | |
1015 | md_add_uint16(md, dnskey->dnskey.flags); | |
2b442ac8 LP |
1016 | md_add_uint8(md, dnskey->dnskey.protocol); |
1017 | md_add_uint8(md, dnskey->dnskey.algorithm); | |
1018 | gcry_md_write(md, dnskey->dnskey.key, dnskey->dnskey.key_size); | |
1019 | ||
1020 | result = gcry_md_read(md, 0); | |
1021 | if (!result) { | |
1022 | r = -EIO; | |
1023 | goto finish; | |
1024 | } | |
1025 | ||
1026 | r = memcmp(result, ds->ds.digest, ds->ds.digest_size) != 0; | |
1027 | ||
1028 | finish: | |
1029 | gcry_md_close(md); | |
1030 | return r; | |
1031 | } | |
24710c48 | 1032 | |
547973de LP |
1033 | int dnssec_verify_dnskey_search(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, DnsAnswer *validated_ds) { |
1034 | DnsResourceRecord *ds; | |
105e1512 | 1035 | DnsAnswerFlags flags; |
547973de LP |
1036 | int r; |
1037 | ||
1038 | assert(dnskey); | |
1039 | ||
1040 | if (dnskey->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) | |
1041 | return 0; | |
1042 | ||
105e1512 LP |
1043 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(ds, flags, validated_ds) { |
1044 | ||
1045 | if ((flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED) == 0) | |
1046 | continue; | |
547973de LP |
1047 | |
1048 | if (ds->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DS) | |
1049 | continue; | |
1050 | ||
d1c4ee32 LP |
1051 | if (ds->key->class != dnskey->key->class) |
1052 | continue; | |
1053 | ||
1054 | r = dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(dnskey->key), DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(ds->key)); | |
1055 | if (r < 0) | |
1056 | return r; | |
1057 | if (r == 0) | |
1058 | continue; | |
1059 | ||
0c857028 LP |
1060 | r = dnssec_verify_dnskey(dnskey, ds, false); |
1061 | if (r == -EKEYREJECTED) | |
1062 | return 0; /* The DNSKEY is revoked or otherwise invalid, we won't bless it */ | |
547973de LP |
1063 | if (r < 0) |
1064 | return r; | |
1065 | if (r > 0) | |
1066 | return 1; | |
1067 | } | |
1068 | ||
1069 | return 0; | |
1070 | } | |
1071 | ||
d15ad742 LP |
1072 | static int nsec3_hash_to_gcrypt_md(uint8_t algorithm) { |
1073 | ||
1074 | /* Translates a DNSSEC NSEC3 hash algorithm into a gcrypt digest identifier */ | |
1075 | ||
1076 | switch (algorithm) { | |
1077 | ||
1078 | case NSEC3_ALGORITHM_SHA1: | |
1079 | return GCRY_MD_SHA1; | |
1080 | ||
1081 | default: | |
1082 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
1083 | } | |
1084 | } | |
1085 | ||
1d3db294 | 1086 | int dnssec_nsec3_hash(DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *name, void *ret) { |
72667f08 LP |
1087 | uint8_t wire_format[DNS_WIRE_FOMAT_HOSTNAME_MAX]; |
1088 | gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL; | |
1089 | size_t hash_size; | |
1090 | int algorithm; | |
1091 | void *result; | |
1092 | unsigned k; | |
1093 | int r; | |
1094 | ||
1095 | assert(nsec3); | |
1096 | assert(name); | |
1097 | assert(ret); | |
1098 | ||
1099 | if (nsec3->key->type != DNS_TYPE_NSEC3) | |
1100 | return -EINVAL; | |
1101 | ||
1d3db294 LP |
1102 | if (nsec3->nsec3.iterations > NSEC3_ITERATIONS_MAX) { |
1103 | log_debug("Ignoring NSEC3 RR %s with excessive number of iterations.", dns_resource_record_to_string(nsec3)); | |
a8f158b9 | 1104 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
1d3db294 | 1105 | } |
a8f158b9 | 1106 | |
d15ad742 | 1107 | algorithm = nsec3_hash_to_gcrypt_md(nsec3->nsec3.algorithm); |
72667f08 LP |
1108 | if (algorithm < 0) |
1109 | return algorithm; | |
1110 | ||
1111 | initialize_libgcrypt(); | |
1112 | ||
1113 | hash_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(algorithm); | |
1114 | assert(hash_size > 0); | |
1115 | ||
1116 | if (nsec3->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size != hash_size) | |
1117 | return -EINVAL; | |
1118 | ||
1119 | r = dns_name_to_wire_format(name, wire_format, sizeof(wire_format), true); | |
1120 | if (r < 0) | |
1121 | return r; | |
1122 | ||
1123 | gcry_md_open(&md, algorithm, 0); | |
1124 | if (!md) | |
1125 | return -EIO; | |
1126 | ||
1127 | gcry_md_write(md, wire_format, r); | |
1128 | gcry_md_write(md, nsec3->nsec3.salt, nsec3->nsec3.salt_size); | |
1129 | ||
1130 | result = gcry_md_read(md, 0); | |
1131 | if (!result) { | |
1132 | r = -EIO; | |
1133 | goto finish; | |
1134 | } | |
1135 | ||
1136 | for (k = 0; k < nsec3->nsec3.iterations; k++) { | |
1137 | uint8_t tmp[hash_size]; | |
1138 | memcpy(tmp, result, hash_size); | |
1139 | ||
1140 | gcry_md_reset(md); | |
1141 | gcry_md_write(md, tmp, hash_size); | |
1142 | gcry_md_write(md, nsec3->nsec3.salt, nsec3->nsec3.salt_size); | |
1143 | ||
1144 | result = gcry_md_read(md, 0); | |
1145 | if (!result) { | |
1146 | r = -EIO; | |
1147 | goto finish; | |
1148 | } | |
1149 | } | |
1150 | ||
1151 | memcpy(ret, result, hash_size); | |
1152 | r = (int) hash_size; | |
1153 | ||
1154 | finish: | |
1155 | gcry_md_close(md); | |
1156 | return r; | |
1157 | } | |
1158 | ||
db5b0e92 LP |
1159 | static int nsec3_is_good(DnsResourceRecord *rr, DnsAnswerFlags flags, DnsResourceRecord *nsec3) { |
1160 | const char *a, *b; | |
1161 | int r; | |
1162 | ||
1163 | assert(rr); | |
1164 | ||
db5b0e92 LP |
1165 | if (rr->key->type != DNS_TYPE_NSEC3) |
1166 | return 0; | |
1167 | ||
1168 | /* RFC 5155, Section 8.2 says we MUST ignore NSEC3 RRs with flags != 0 or 1 */ | |
1169 | if (!IN_SET(rr->nsec3.flags, 0, 1)) | |
1170 | return 0; | |
1171 | ||
d15ad742 LP |
1172 | /* Ignore NSEC3 RRs whose algorithm we don't know */ |
1173 | if (nsec3_hash_to_gcrypt_md(rr->nsec3.algorithm) < 0) | |
1174 | return 0; | |
a8f158b9 LP |
1175 | /* Ignore NSEC3 RRs with an excessive number of required iterations */ |
1176 | if (rr->nsec3.iterations > NSEC3_ITERATIONS_MAX) | |
1177 | return 0; | |
d15ad742 | 1178 | |
db5b0e92 LP |
1179 | if (!nsec3) |
1180 | return 1; | |
1181 | ||
1182 | /* If a second NSEC3 RR is specified, also check if they are from the same zone. */ | |
1183 | ||
1184 | if (nsec3 == rr) /* Shortcut */ | |
1185 | return 1; | |
1186 | ||
1187 | if (rr->key->class != nsec3->key->class) | |
1188 | return 0; | |
1189 | if (rr->nsec3.algorithm != nsec3->nsec3.algorithm) | |
1190 | return 0; | |
1191 | if (rr->nsec3.iterations != nsec3->nsec3.iterations) | |
1192 | return 0; | |
1193 | if (rr->nsec3.salt_size != nsec3->nsec3.salt_size) | |
1194 | return 0; | |
1195 | if (memcmp(rr->nsec3.salt, nsec3->nsec3.salt, rr->nsec3.salt_size) != 0) | |
1196 | return 0; | |
1197 | ||
1198 | a = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key); | |
1199 | r = dns_name_parent(&a); /* strip off hash */ | |
1200 | if (r < 0) | |
1201 | return r; | |
1202 | if (r == 0) | |
1203 | return 0; | |
1204 | ||
1205 | b = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(nsec3->key); | |
1206 | r = dns_name_parent(&b); /* strip off hash */ | |
1207 | if (r < 0) | |
1208 | return r; | |
1209 | if (r == 0) | |
1210 | return 0; | |
1211 | ||
1212 | return dns_name_equal(a, b); | |
1213 | } | |
1214 | ||
1d3db294 | 1215 | static int nsec3_hashed_domain(DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *domain, const char *zone, char **ret) { |
6f76ec5a | 1216 | _cleanup_free_ char *l = NULL, *hashed_domain = NULL; |
105e1512 | 1217 | uint8_t hashed[DNSSEC_HASH_SIZE_MAX]; |
6f76ec5a TG |
1218 | int hashed_size; |
1219 | ||
1220 | assert(nsec3); | |
1221 | assert(domain); | |
1222 | assert(zone); | |
1223 | assert(ret); | |
1224 | ||
1225 | hashed_size = dnssec_nsec3_hash(nsec3, domain, hashed); | |
1226 | if (hashed_size < 0) | |
1227 | return hashed_size; | |
1228 | ||
1229 | l = base32hexmem(hashed, hashed_size, false); | |
1230 | if (!l) | |
1231 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1232 | ||
1233 | hashed_domain = strjoin(l, ".", zone, NULL); | |
1234 | if (!hashed_domain) | |
1235 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1236 | ||
1237 | *ret = hashed_domain; | |
1238 | hashed_domain = NULL; | |
1239 | ||
1240 | return hashed_size; | |
1241 | } | |
1242 | ||
35ad41d3 TG |
1243 | /* See RFC 5155, Section 8 |
1244 | * First try to find a NSEC3 record that matches our query precisely, if that fails, find the closest | |
1245 | * enclosure. Secondly, find a proof that there is no closer enclosure and either a proof that there | |
1246 | * is no wildcard domain as a direct descendant of the closest enclosure, or find an NSEC3 record that | |
1247 | * matches the wildcard domain. | |
1248 | * | |
1249 | * Based on this we can prove either the existence of the record in @key, or NXDOMAIN or NODATA, or | |
1250 | * that there is no proof either way. The latter is the case if a the proof of non-existence of a given | |
1251 | * name uses an NSEC3 record with the opt-out bit set. Lastly, if we are given insufficient NSEC3 records | |
1252 | * to conclude anything we indicate this by returning NO_RR. */ | |
ed29bfdc | 1253 | static int dnssec_test_nsec3(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecResult *result, bool *authenticated) { |
35ad41d3 | 1254 | _cleanup_free_ char *next_closer_domain = NULL, *wildcard = NULL, *wildcard_domain = NULL; |
d1511b33 | 1255 | const char *zone, *p, *pp = NULL; |
35ad41d3 | 1256 | DnsResourceRecord *rr, *enclosure_rr, *suffix_rr, *wildcard_rr = NULL; |
105e1512 LP |
1257 | DnsAnswerFlags flags; |
1258 | int hashed_size, r; | |
35ad41d3 | 1259 | bool a, no_closer = false, no_wildcard = false, optout = false; |
72667f08 LP |
1260 | |
1261 | assert(key); | |
1262 | assert(result); | |
ed29bfdc | 1263 | assert(authenticated); |
72667f08 | 1264 | |
d1511b33 TG |
1265 | /* First step, find the zone name and the NSEC3 parameters of the zone. |
1266 | * it is sufficient to look for the longest common suffix we find with | |
1267 | * any NSEC3 RR in the response. Any NSEC3 record will do as all NSEC3 | |
1268 | * records from a given zone in a response must use the same | |
1269 | * parameters. */ | |
1270 | zone = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key); | |
13b78323 | 1271 | for (;;) { |
db5b0e92 | 1272 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(suffix_rr, flags, answer) { |
db5b0e92 LP |
1273 | r = nsec3_is_good(suffix_rr, flags, NULL); |
1274 | if (r < 0) | |
1275 | return r; | |
1276 | if (r == 0) | |
13b78323 LP |
1277 | continue; |
1278 | ||
d1511b33 | 1279 | r = dns_name_equal_skip(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(suffix_rr->key), 1, zone); |
13b78323 LP |
1280 | if (r < 0) |
1281 | return r; | |
1282 | if (r > 0) | |
d1511b33 | 1283 | goto found_zone; |
13b78323 LP |
1284 | } |
1285 | ||
1286 | /* Strip one label from the front */ | |
d1511b33 | 1287 | r = dns_name_parent(&zone); |
13b78323 LP |
1288 | if (r < 0) |
1289 | return r; | |
1290 | if (r == 0) | |
1291 | break; | |
1292 | } | |
1293 | ||
1294 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; | |
1295 | return 0; | |
1296 | ||
d1511b33 | 1297 | found_zone: |
13b78323 | 1298 | /* Second step, find the closest encloser NSEC3 RR in 'answer' that matches 'key' */ |
105e1512 LP |
1299 | p = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key); |
1300 | for (;;) { | |
6f76ec5a | 1301 | _cleanup_free_ char *hashed_domain = NULL; |
72667f08 | 1302 | |
6f76ec5a | 1303 | hashed_size = nsec3_hashed_domain(suffix_rr, p, zone, &hashed_domain); |
db5b0e92 LP |
1304 | if (hashed_size == -EOPNOTSUPP) { |
1305 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM; | |
1306 | return 0; | |
1307 | } | |
1308 | if (hashed_size < 0) | |
1309 | return hashed_size; | |
72667f08 | 1310 | |
d1511b33 | 1311 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(enclosure_rr, flags, answer) { |
db5b0e92 | 1312 | |
d1511b33 | 1313 | r = nsec3_is_good(enclosure_rr, flags, suffix_rr); |
72667f08 LP |
1314 | if (r < 0) |
1315 | return r; | |
105e1512 LP |
1316 | if (r == 0) |
1317 | continue; | |
1318 | ||
d1511b33 | 1319 | if (enclosure_rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size != (size_t) hashed_size) |
db5b0e92 | 1320 | continue; |
105e1512 | 1321 | |
d1511b33 | 1322 | r = dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(enclosure_rr->key), hashed_domain); |
72667f08 LP |
1323 | if (r < 0) |
1324 | return r; | |
ed29bfdc LP |
1325 | if (r > 0) { |
1326 | a = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; | |
13b78323 | 1327 | goto found_closest_encloser; |
ed29bfdc | 1328 | } |
105e1512 LP |
1329 | } |
1330 | ||
1331 | /* We didn't find the closest encloser with this name, | |
1332 | * but let's remember this domain name, it might be | |
1333 | * the next closer name */ | |
1334 | ||
1335 | pp = p; | |
1336 | ||
1337 | /* Strip one label from the front */ | |
1338 | r = dns_name_parent(&p); | |
1339 | if (r < 0) | |
1340 | return r; | |
1341 | if (r == 0) | |
72667f08 | 1342 | break; |
105e1512 | 1343 | } |
72667f08 | 1344 | |
105e1512 LP |
1345 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; |
1346 | return 0; | |
72667f08 | 1347 | |
13b78323 | 1348 | found_closest_encloser: |
105e1512 | 1349 | /* We found a closest encloser in 'p'; next closer is 'pp' */ |
72667f08 | 1350 | |
105e1512 | 1351 | /* Ensure this is not a DNAME domain, see RFC5155, section 8.3. */ |
d1511b33 | 1352 | if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_DNAME)) |
105e1512 | 1353 | return -EBADMSG; |
72667f08 | 1354 | |
105e1512 LP |
1355 | /* Ensure that this data is from the delegated domain |
1356 | * (i.e. originates from the "lower" DNS server), and isn't | |
1357 | * just glue records (i.e. doesn't originate from the "upper" | |
1358 | * DNS server). */ | |
d1511b33 TG |
1359 | if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_NS) && |
1360 | !bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_SOA)) | |
105e1512 | 1361 | return -EBADMSG; |
72667f08 | 1362 | |
105e1512 LP |
1363 | if (!pp) { |
1364 | /* No next closer NSEC3 RR. That means there's a direct NSEC3 RR for our key. */ | |
146035b3 TG |
1365 | if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, key->type)) |
1366 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND; | |
1367 | else if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_CNAME)) | |
1368 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME; | |
1369 | else | |
1370 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; | |
1371 | ||
ed29bfdc | 1372 | *authenticated = a; |
146035b3 | 1373 | |
105e1512 LP |
1374 | return 0; |
1375 | } | |
72667f08 | 1376 | |
35ad41d3 TG |
1377 | /* Prove that there is no next closer and whether or not there is a wildcard domain. */ |
1378 | ||
1379 | wildcard = strappend("*.", p); | |
1380 | if (!wildcard) | |
1381 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1382 | ||
1383 | r = nsec3_hashed_domain(enclosure_rr, wildcard, zone, &wildcard_domain); | |
105e1512 LP |
1384 | if (r < 0) |
1385 | return r; | |
1386 | if (r != hashed_size) | |
1387 | return -EBADMSG; | |
72667f08 | 1388 | |
6f76ec5a | 1389 | r = nsec3_hashed_domain(enclosure_rr, pp, zone, &next_closer_domain); |
105e1512 LP |
1390 | if (r < 0) |
1391 | return r; | |
1392 | if (r != hashed_size) | |
1393 | return -EBADMSG; | |
72667f08 | 1394 | |
105e1512 LP |
1395 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(rr, flags, answer) { |
1396 | _cleanup_free_ char *label = NULL, *next_hashed_domain = NULL; | |
105e1512 | 1397 | |
db5b0e92 | 1398 | r = nsec3_is_good(rr, flags, suffix_rr); |
105e1512 LP |
1399 | if (r < 0) |
1400 | return r; | |
1401 | if (r == 0) | |
1402 | continue; | |
1403 | ||
1404 | label = base32hexmem(rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name, rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size, false); | |
1405 | if (!label) | |
1406 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1407 | ||
b2c2a1b9 | 1408 | next_hashed_domain = strjoin(label, ".", zone, NULL); |
105e1512 LP |
1409 | if (!next_hashed_domain) |
1410 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1411 | ||
1412 | r = dns_name_between(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), next_closer_domain, next_hashed_domain); | |
1413 | if (r < 0) | |
1414 | return r; | |
1415 | if (r > 0) { | |
1416 | if (rr->nsec3.flags & 1) | |
35ad41d3 | 1417 | optout = true; |
105e1512 | 1418 | |
35ad41d3 TG |
1419 | a = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED); |
1420 | ||
1421 | no_closer = true; | |
1422 | } | |
1423 | ||
1424 | r = dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), wildcard_domain); | |
1425 | if (r < 0) | |
1426 | return r; | |
1427 | if (r > 0) { | |
1428 | a = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED); | |
1429 | ||
1430 | wildcard_rr = rr; | |
1431 | } | |
1432 | ||
1433 | r = dns_name_between(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), wildcard_domain, next_hashed_domain); | |
1434 | if (r < 0) | |
1435 | return r; | |
1436 | if (r > 0) { | |
1437 | if (rr->nsec3.flags & 1) | |
1438 | /* This only makes sense if we have a wildcard delegation, which is | |
1439 | * very unlikely, see RFC 4592, Section 4.2, but we cannot rely on | |
1440 | * this not happening, so hence cannot simply conclude NXDOMAIN as | |
1441 | * we would wish */ | |
1442 | optout = true; | |
1443 | ||
1444 | a = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED); | |
1445 | ||
1446 | no_wildcard = true; | |
105e1512 LP |
1447 | } |
1448 | } | |
1449 | ||
35ad41d3 TG |
1450 | if (wildcard_rr && no_wildcard) |
1451 | return -EBADMSG; | |
1452 | ||
1453 | if (!no_closer) { | |
1454 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; | |
1455 | ||
1456 | return 0; | |
1457 | } | |
1458 | ||
1459 | if (wildcard_rr) { | |
1460 | /* A wildcard exists that matches our query. */ | |
1461 | if (optout) | |
1462 | /* This is not specified in any RFC to the best of my knowledge, but | |
1463 | * if the next closer enclosure is covered by an opt-out NSEC3 RR | |
1464 | * it means that we cannot prove that the source of synthesis is | |
1465 | * correct, as there may be a closer match. */ | |
1466 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_OPTOUT; | |
1467 | else if (bitmap_isset(wildcard_rr->nsec3.types, key->type)) | |
1468 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND; | |
1469 | else if (bitmap_isset(wildcard_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_CNAME)) | |
1470 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME; | |
1471 | else | |
1472 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; | |
1473 | } else { | |
1474 | if (optout) | |
1475 | /* The RFC only specifies that we have to care for optout for NODATA for | |
1476 | * DS records. However, children of an insecure opt-out delegation should | |
1477 | * also be considered opt-out, rather than verified NXDOMAIN. | |
1478 | * Note that we do not require a proof of wildcard non-existence if the | |
1479 | * next closer domain is covered by an opt-out, as that would not provide | |
1480 | * any additional information. */ | |
1481 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_OPTOUT; | |
1482 | else if (no_wildcard) | |
1483 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NXDOMAIN; | |
1484 | else { | |
1485 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; | |
1486 | ||
1487 | return 0; | |
1488 | } | |
1489 | } | |
1490 | ||
1491 | *authenticated = a; | |
1492 | ||
105e1512 LP |
1493 | return 0; |
1494 | } | |
1495 | ||
ed29bfdc | 1496 | int dnssec_test_nsec(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecResult *result, bool *authenticated) { |
105e1512 LP |
1497 | DnsResourceRecord *rr; |
1498 | bool have_nsec3 = false; | |
1499 | DnsAnswerFlags flags; | |
1500 | int r; | |
1501 | ||
1502 | assert(key); | |
1503 | assert(result); | |
ed29bfdc | 1504 | assert(authenticated); |
105e1512 LP |
1505 | |
1506 | /* Look for any NSEC/NSEC3 RRs that say something about the specified key. */ | |
1507 | ||
1508 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(rr, flags, answer) { | |
1509 | ||
1510 | if (rr->key->class != key->class) | |
1511 | continue; | |
1512 | ||
105e1512 LP |
1513 | switch (rr->key->type) { |
1514 | ||
1515 | case DNS_TYPE_NSEC: | |
1516 | ||
1517 | r = dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key)); | |
1518 | if (r < 0) | |
1519 | return r; | |
1520 | if (r > 0) { | |
146035b3 TG |
1521 | if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, key->type)) |
1522 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND; | |
1523 | else if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_CNAME)) | |
1524 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME; | |
1525 | else | |
1526 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; | |
ed29bfdc | 1527 | *authenticated = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; |
72667f08 LP |
1528 | return 0; |
1529 | } | |
1530 | ||
105e1512 LP |
1531 | r = dns_name_between(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key), rr->nsec.next_domain_name); |
1532 | if (r < 0) | |
1533 | return r; | |
1534 | if (r > 0) { | |
1535 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NXDOMAIN; | |
ed29bfdc | 1536 | *authenticated = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; |
105e1512 LP |
1537 | return 0; |
1538 | } | |
72667f08 | 1539 | break; |
72667f08 | 1540 | |
105e1512 LP |
1541 | case DNS_TYPE_NSEC3: |
1542 | have_nsec3 = true; | |
72667f08 LP |
1543 | break; |
1544 | } | |
1545 | } | |
1546 | ||
105e1512 LP |
1547 | /* OK, this was not sufficient. Let's see if NSEC3 can help. */ |
1548 | if (have_nsec3) | |
ed29bfdc | 1549 | return dnssec_test_nsec3(answer, key, result, authenticated); |
105e1512 | 1550 | |
72667f08 LP |
1551 | /* No approproate NSEC RR found, report this. */ |
1552 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; | |
1553 | return 0; | |
1554 | } | |
1555 | ||
24710c48 LP |
1556 | static const char* const dnssec_mode_table[_DNSSEC_MODE_MAX] = { |
1557 | [DNSSEC_NO] = "no", | |
b652d4a2 | 1558 | [DNSSEC_DOWNGRADE_OK] = "downgrade-ok", |
24710c48 LP |
1559 | [DNSSEC_YES] = "yes", |
1560 | }; | |
1561 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(dnssec_mode, DnssecMode); | |
547973de LP |
1562 | |
1563 | static const char* const dnssec_result_table[_DNSSEC_RESULT_MAX] = { | |
1564 | [DNSSEC_VALIDATED] = "validated", | |
1565 | [DNSSEC_INVALID] = "invalid", | |
203f1b35 LP |
1566 | [DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED] = "signature-expired", |
1567 | [DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM] = "unsupported-algorithm", | |
547973de LP |
1568 | [DNSSEC_NO_SIGNATURE] = "no-signature", |
1569 | [DNSSEC_MISSING_KEY] = "missing-key", | |
203f1b35 | 1570 | [DNSSEC_UNSIGNED] = "unsigned", |
547973de | 1571 | [DNSSEC_FAILED_AUXILIARY] = "failed-auxiliary", |
72667f08 | 1572 | [DNSSEC_NSEC_MISMATCH] = "nsec-mismatch", |
b652d4a2 | 1573 | [DNSSEC_INCOMPATIBLE_SERVER] = "incompatible-server", |
547973de LP |
1574 | }; |
1575 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(dnssec_result, DnssecResult); |