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2b442ac8 LP |
1 | /*-*- Mode: C; c-basic-offset: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*-*/ |
2 | ||
3 | /*** | |
4 | This file is part of systemd. | |
5 | ||
6 | Copyright 2015 Lennart Poettering | |
7 | ||
8 | systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it | |
9 | under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by | |
10 | the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or | |
11 | (at your option) any later version. | |
12 | ||
13 | systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but | |
14 | WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of | |
15 | MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU | |
16 | Lesser General Public License for more details. | |
17 | ||
18 | You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License | |
19 | along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. | |
20 | ***/ | |
21 | ||
22 | #include <gcrypt.h> | |
23 | ||
24 | #include "alloc-util.h" | |
25 | #include "dns-domain.h" | |
72667f08 | 26 | #include "hexdecoct.h" |
2b442ac8 LP |
27 | #include "resolved-dns-dnssec.h" |
28 | #include "resolved-dns-packet.h" | |
24710c48 | 29 | #include "string-table.h" |
2b442ac8 LP |
30 | |
31 | /* Open question: | |
32 | * | |
33 | * How does the DNSSEC canonical form of a hostname with a label | |
34 | * containing a dot look like, the way DNS-SD does it? | |
35 | * | |
2cd87277 LP |
36 | * TODO: |
37 | * | |
3ecc3df8 | 38 | * - wildcard zones compatibility (NSEC/NSEC3 wildcard check is missing) |
bb1fa242 | 39 | * - multi-label zone compatibility |
3e92a719 | 40 | * - cname/dname compatibility |
160fbda9 | 41 | * - nxdomain on qname |
d1d1d4b8 LP |
42 | * - workable hack for the .corp, .home, .box case |
43 | * - bus calls to override DNSEC setting per interface | |
28bf03b5 LP |
44 | * - log all DNSSEC downgrades |
45 | * - enable by default | |
2cd87277 | 46 | * |
2b442ac8 LP |
47 | * */ |
48 | ||
49 | #define VERIFY_RRS_MAX 256 | |
50 | #define MAX_KEY_SIZE (32*1024) | |
51 | ||
896c5672 LP |
52 | /* Permit a maximum clock skew of 1h 10min. This should be enough to deal with DST confusion */ |
53 | #define SKEW_MAX (1*USEC_PER_HOUR + 10*USEC_PER_MINUTE) | |
54 | ||
a8f158b9 LP |
55 | /* Maximum number of NSEC3 iterations we'll do. */ |
56 | #define NSEC3_ITERATIONS_MAX 2048 | |
57 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
58 | /* |
59 | * The DNSSEC Chain of trust: | |
60 | * | |
61 | * Normal RRs are protected via RRSIG RRs in combination with DNSKEY RRs, all in the same zone | |
62 | * DNSKEY RRs are either protected like normal RRs, or via a DS from a zone "higher" up the tree | |
63 | * DS RRs are protected like normal RRs | |
64 | * | |
65 | * Example chain: | |
66 | * Normal RR → RRSIG/DNSKEY+ → DS → RRSIG/DNSKEY+ → DS → ... → DS → RRSIG/DNSKEY+ → DS | |
67 | */ | |
68 | ||
0638401a LP |
69 | static void initialize_libgcrypt(void) { |
70 | const char *p; | |
71 | ||
72 | if (gcry_control(GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED_P)) | |
73 | return; | |
74 | ||
75 | p = gcry_check_version("1.4.5"); | |
76 | assert(p); | |
77 | ||
78 | gcry_control(GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM); | |
79 | gcry_control(GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0); | |
80 | } | |
81 | ||
0c857028 | 82 | uint16_t dnssec_keytag(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, bool mask_revoke) { |
2b442ac8 | 83 | const uint8_t *p; |
0c857028 | 84 | uint32_t sum, f; |
2b442ac8 LP |
85 | size_t i; |
86 | ||
87 | /* The algorithm from RFC 4034, Appendix B. */ | |
88 | ||
89 | assert(dnskey); | |
90 | assert(dnskey->key->type == DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY); | |
91 | ||
0c857028 LP |
92 | f = (uint32_t) dnskey->dnskey.flags; |
93 | ||
94 | if (mask_revoke) | |
95 | f &= ~DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE; | |
96 | ||
97 | sum = f + ((((uint32_t) dnskey->dnskey.protocol) << 8) + (uint32_t) dnskey->dnskey.algorithm); | |
2b442ac8 LP |
98 | |
99 | p = dnskey->dnskey.key; | |
100 | ||
101 | for (i = 0; i < dnskey->dnskey.key_size; i++) | |
102 | sum += (i & 1) == 0 ? (uint32_t) p[i] << 8 : (uint32_t) p[i]; | |
103 | ||
104 | sum += (sum >> 16) & UINT32_C(0xFFFF); | |
105 | ||
106 | return sum & UINT32_C(0xFFFF); | |
107 | } | |
108 | ||
109 | static int rr_compare(const void *a, const void *b) { | |
110 | DnsResourceRecord **x = (DnsResourceRecord**) a, **y = (DnsResourceRecord**) b; | |
111 | size_t m; | |
112 | int r; | |
113 | ||
114 | /* Let's order the RRs according to RFC 4034, Section 6.3 */ | |
115 | ||
116 | assert(x); | |
117 | assert(*x); | |
118 | assert((*x)->wire_format); | |
119 | assert(y); | |
120 | assert(*y); | |
121 | assert((*y)->wire_format); | |
122 | ||
85aeaccc | 123 | m = MIN(DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(*x), DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(*y)); |
2b442ac8 | 124 | |
85aeaccc | 125 | r = memcmp(DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA(*x), DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA(*y), m); |
2b442ac8 LP |
126 | if (r != 0) |
127 | return r; | |
128 | ||
85aeaccc | 129 | if (DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(*x) < DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(*y)) |
2b442ac8 | 130 | return -1; |
85aeaccc | 131 | else if (DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(*x) > DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(*y)) |
2b442ac8 LP |
132 | return 1; |
133 | ||
134 | return 0; | |
135 | } | |
136 | ||
ea3a892f | 137 | static int dnssec_rsa_verify_raw( |
2b442ac8 LP |
138 | const char *hash_algorithm, |
139 | const void *signature, size_t signature_size, | |
140 | const void *data, size_t data_size, | |
141 | const void *exponent, size_t exponent_size, | |
142 | const void *modulus, size_t modulus_size) { | |
143 | ||
144 | gcry_sexp_t public_key_sexp = NULL, data_sexp = NULL, signature_sexp = NULL; | |
145 | gcry_mpi_t n = NULL, e = NULL, s = NULL; | |
146 | gcry_error_t ge; | |
147 | int r; | |
148 | ||
149 | assert(hash_algorithm); | |
150 | ||
151 | ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&s, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, signature, signature_size, NULL); | |
152 | if (ge != 0) { | |
153 | r = -EIO; | |
154 | goto finish; | |
155 | } | |
156 | ||
157 | ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&e, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, exponent, exponent_size, NULL); | |
158 | if (ge != 0) { | |
159 | r = -EIO; | |
160 | goto finish; | |
161 | } | |
162 | ||
163 | ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&n, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, modulus, modulus_size, NULL); | |
164 | if (ge != 0) { | |
165 | r = -EIO; | |
166 | goto finish; | |
167 | } | |
168 | ||
169 | ge = gcry_sexp_build(&signature_sexp, | |
170 | NULL, | |
171 | "(sig-val (rsa (s %m)))", | |
172 | s); | |
173 | ||
174 | if (ge != 0) { | |
175 | r = -EIO; | |
176 | goto finish; | |
177 | } | |
178 | ||
179 | ge = gcry_sexp_build(&data_sexp, | |
180 | NULL, | |
181 | "(data (flags pkcs1) (hash %s %b))", | |
182 | hash_algorithm, | |
183 | (int) data_size, | |
184 | data); | |
185 | if (ge != 0) { | |
186 | r = -EIO; | |
187 | goto finish; | |
188 | } | |
189 | ||
190 | ge = gcry_sexp_build(&public_key_sexp, | |
191 | NULL, | |
192 | "(public-key (rsa (n %m) (e %m)))", | |
193 | n, | |
194 | e); | |
195 | if (ge != 0) { | |
196 | r = -EIO; | |
197 | goto finish; | |
198 | } | |
199 | ||
200 | ge = gcry_pk_verify(signature_sexp, data_sexp, public_key_sexp); | |
d12bf2bd | 201 | if (gpg_err_code(ge) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE) |
2b442ac8 | 202 | r = 0; |
d12bf2bd LP |
203 | else if (ge != 0) { |
204 | log_debug("RSA signature check failed: %s", gpg_strerror(ge)); | |
2b442ac8 | 205 | r = -EIO; |
d12bf2bd | 206 | } else |
2b442ac8 LP |
207 | r = 1; |
208 | ||
209 | finish: | |
210 | if (e) | |
211 | gcry_mpi_release(e); | |
212 | if (n) | |
213 | gcry_mpi_release(n); | |
214 | if (s) | |
215 | gcry_mpi_release(s); | |
216 | ||
217 | if (public_key_sexp) | |
218 | gcry_sexp_release(public_key_sexp); | |
219 | if (signature_sexp) | |
220 | gcry_sexp_release(signature_sexp); | |
221 | if (data_sexp) | |
222 | gcry_sexp_release(data_sexp); | |
223 | ||
224 | return r; | |
225 | } | |
226 | ||
ea3a892f LP |
227 | static int dnssec_rsa_verify( |
228 | const char *hash_algorithm, | |
229 | const void *hash, size_t hash_size, | |
230 | DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, | |
231 | DnsResourceRecord *dnskey) { | |
232 | ||
233 | size_t exponent_size, modulus_size; | |
234 | void *exponent, *modulus; | |
235 | ||
236 | assert(hash_algorithm); | |
237 | assert(hash); | |
238 | assert(hash_size > 0); | |
239 | assert(rrsig); | |
240 | assert(dnskey); | |
241 | ||
242 | if (*(uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key == 0) { | |
243 | /* exponent is > 255 bytes long */ | |
244 | ||
245 | exponent = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 3; | |
246 | exponent_size = | |
ac04adbe TG |
247 | ((size_t) (((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[1]) << 8) | |
248 | ((size_t) ((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[2]); | |
ea3a892f LP |
249 | |
250 | if (exponent_size < 256) | |
251 | return -EINVAL; | |
252 | ||
253 | if (3 + exponent_size >= dnskey->dnskey.key_size) | |
254 | return -EINVAL; | |
255 | ||
256 | modulus = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 3 + exponent_size; | |
257 | modulus_size = dnskey->dnskey.key_size - 3 - exponent_size; | |
258 | ||
259 | } else { | |
260 | /* exponent is <= 255 bytes long */ | |
261 | ||
262 | exponent = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 1; | |
263 | exponent_size = (size_t) ((uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key)[0]; | |
264 | ||
265 | if (exponent_size <= 0) | |
266 | return -EINVAL; | |
267 | ||
268 | if (1 + exponent_size >= dnskey->dnskey.key_size) | |
269 | return -EINVAL; | |
270 | ||
271 | modulus = (uint8_t*) dnskey->dnskey.key + 1 + exponent_size; | |
272 | modulus_size = dnskey->dnskey.key_size - 1 - exponent_size; | |
273 | } | |
274 | ||
275 | return dnssec_rsa_verify_raw( | |
276 | hash_algorithm, | |
277 | rrsig->rrsig.signature, rrsig->rrsig.signature_size, | |
278 | hash, hash_size, | |
279 | exponent, exponent_size, | |
280 | modulus, modulus_size); | |
281 | } | |
282 | ||
e0240c64 LP |
283 | static int dnssec_ecdsa_verify_raw( |
284 | const char *hash_algorithm, | |
285 | const char *curve, | |
286 | const void *signature_r, size_t signature_r_size, | |
287 | const void *signature_s, size_t signature_s_size, | |
288 | const void *data, size_t data_size, | |
289 | const void *key, size_t key_size) { | |
290 | ||
291 | gcry_sexp_t public_key_sexp = NULL, data_sexp = NULL, signature_sexp = NULL; | |
292 | gcry_mpi_t q = NULL, r = NULL, s = NULL; | |
293 | gcry_error_t ge; | |
294 | int k; | |
295 | ||
296 | assert(hash_algorithm); | |
297 | ||
298 | ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&r, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, signature_r, signature_r_size, NULL); | |
299 | if (ge != 0) { | |
300 | k = -EIO; | |
301 | goto finish; | |
302 | } | |
303 | ||
304 | ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&s, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, signature_s, signature_s_size, NULL); | |
305 | if (ge != 0) { | |
306 | k = -EIO; | |
307 | goto finish; | |
308 | } | |
309 | ||
310 | ge = gcry_mpi_scan(&q, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, key, key_size, NULL); | |
311 | if (ge != 0) { | |
312 | k = -EIO; | |
313 | goto finish; | |
314 | } | |
315 | ||
316 | ge = gcry_sexp_build(&signature_sexp, | |
317 | NULL, | |
318 | "(sig-val (ecdsa (r %m) (s %m)))", | |
319 | r, | |
320 | s); | |
321 | if (ge != 0) { | |
322 | k = -EIO; | |
323 | goto finish; | |
324 | } | |
325 | ||
326 | ge = gcry_sexp_build(&data_sexp, | |
327 | NULL, | |
328 | "(data (flags rfc6979) (hash %s %b))", | |
329 | hash_algorithm, | |
330 | (int) data_size, | |
331 | data); | |
332 | if (ge != 0) { | |
333 | k = -EIO; | |
334 | goto finish; | |
335 | } | |
336 | ||
337 | ge = gcry_sexp_build(&public_key_sexp, | |
338 | NULL, | |
339 | "(public-key (ecc (curve %s) (q %m)))", | |
340 | curve, | |
341 | q); | |
342 | if (ge != 0) { | |
343 | k = -EIO; | |
344 | goto finish; | |
345 | } | |
346 | ||
347 | ge = gcry_pk_verify(signature_sexp, data_sexp, public_key_sexp); | |
348 | if (gpg_err_code(ge) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE) | |
349 | k = 0; | |
350 | else if (ge != 0) { | |
351 | log_debug("ECDSA signature check failed: %s", gpg_strerror(ge)); | |
352 | k = -EIO; | |
353 | } else | |
354 | k = 1; | |
355 | finish: | |
356 | if (r) | |
357 | gcry_mpi_release(r); | |
358 | if (s) | |
359 | gcry_mpi_release(s); | |
360 | if (q) | |
361 | gcry_mpi_release(q); | |
362 | ||
363 | if (public_key_sexp) | |
364 | gcry_sexp_release(public_key_sexp); | |
365 | if (signature_sexp) | |
366 | gcry_sexp_release(signature_sexp); | |
367 | if (data_sexp) | |
368 | gcry_sexp_release(data_sexp); | |
369 | ||
370 | return k; | |
371 | } | |
372 | ||
373 | static int dnssec_ecdsa_verify( | |
374 | const char *hash_algorithm, | |
375 | int algorithm, | |
376 | const void *hash, size_t hash_size, | |
377 | DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, | |
378 | DnsResourceRecord *dnskey) { | |
379 | ||
380 | const char *curve; | |
381 | size_t key_size; | |
382 | uint8_t *q; | |
383 | ||
384 | assert(hash); | |
385 | assert(hash_size); | |
386 | assert(rrsig); | |
387 | assert(dnskey); | |
388 | ||
389 | if (algorithm == DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP256SHA256) { | |
390 | key_size = 32; | |
391 | curve = "NIST P-256"; | |
392 | } else if (algorithm == DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP384SHA384) { | |
393 | key_size = 48; | |
394 | curve = "NIST P-384"; | |
395 | } else | |
396 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
397 | ||
398 | if (dnskey->dnskey.key_size != key_size * 2) | |
399 | return -EINVAL; | |
400 | ||
401 | if (rrsig->rrsig.signature_size != key_size * 2) | |
402 | return -EINVAL; | |
403 | ||
404 | q = alloca(key_size*2 + 1); | |
405 | q[0] = 0x04; /* Prepend 0x04 to indicate an uncompressed key */ | |
406 | memcpy(q+1, dnskey->dnskey.key, key_size*2); | |
407 | ||
408 | return dnssec_ecdsa_verify_raw( | |
409 | hash_algorithm, | |
410 | curve, | |
411 | rrsig->rrsig.signature, key_size, | |
412 | (uint8_t*) rrsig->rrsig.signature + key_size, key_size, | |
413 | hash, hash_size, | |
414 | q, key_size*2+1); | |
415 | } | |
416 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
417 | static void md_add_uint8(gcry_md_hd_t md, uint8_t v) { |
418 | gcry_md_write(md, &v, sizeof(v)); | |
419 | } | |
420 | ||
421 | static void md_add_uint16(gcry_md_hd_t md, uint16_t v) { | |
422 | v = htobe16(v); | |
423 | gcry_md_write(md, &v, sizeof(v)); | |
424 | } | |
425 | ||
426 | static void md_add_uint32(gcry_md_hd_t md, uint32_t v) { | |
427 | v = htobe32(v); | |
428 | gcry_md_write(md, &v, sizeof(v)); | |
429 | } | |
430 | ||
2a326321 LP |
431 | static int dnssec_rrsig_expired(DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, usec_t realtime) { |
432 | usec_t expiration, inception, skew; | |
433 | ||
434 | assert(rrsig); | |
435 | assert(rrsig->key->type == DNS_TYPE_RRSIG); | |
436 | ||
437 | if (realtime == USEC_INFINITY) | |
438 | realtime = now(CLOCK_REALTIME); | |
439 | ||
440 | expiration = rrsig->rrsig.expiration * USEC_PER_SEC; | |
441 | inception = rrsig->rrsig.inception * USEC_PER_SEC; | |
442 | ||
443 | if (inception > expiration) | |
2a44bec4 | 444 | return -EKEYREJECTED; |
2a326321 | 445 | |
896c5672 LP |
446 | /* Permit a certain amount of clock skew of 10% of the valid |
447 | * time range. This takes inspiration from unbound's | |
448 | * resolver. */ | |
2a326321 | 449 | skew = (expiration - inception) / 10; |
896c5672 LP |
450 | if (skew > SKEW_MAX) |
451 | skew = SKEW_MAX; | |
2a326321 LP |
452 | |
453 | if (inception < skew) | |
454 | inception = 0; | |
455 | else | |
456 | inception -= skew; | |
457 | ||
458 | if (expiration + skew < expiration) | |
459 | expiration = USEC_INFINITY; | |
460 | else | |
461 | expiration += skew; | |
462 | ||
463 | return realtime < inception || realtime > expiration; | |
464 | } | |
465 | ||
ca994e85 | 466 | static int algorithm_to_gcrypt_md(uint8_t algorithm) { |
fbf1a66d | 467 | |
6af47493 LP |
468 | /* Translates a DNSSEC signature algorithm into a gcrypt |
469 | * digest identifier. | |
470 | * | |
471 | * Note that we implement all algorithms listed as "Must | |
472 | * implement" and "Recommended to Implement" in RFC6944. We | |
473 | * don't implement any algorithms that are listed as | |
474 | * "Optional" or "Must Not Implement". Specifically, we do not | |
475 | * implement RSAMD5, DSASHA1, DH, DSA-NSEC3-SHA1, and | |
476 | * GOST-ECC. */ | |
fbf1a66d LP |
477 | |
478 | switch (algorithm) { | |
479 | ||
480 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1: | |
481 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1_NSEC3_SHA1: | |
482 | return GCRY_MD_SHA1; | |
483 | ||
484 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256: | |
e0240c64 | 485 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP256SHA256: |
fbf1a66d LP |
486 | return GCRY_MD_SHA256; |
487 | ||
e0240c64 LP |
488 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP384SHA384: |
489 | return GCRY_MD_SHA384; | |
490 | ||
fbf1a66d LP |
491 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA512: |
492 | return GCRY_MD_SHA512; | |
493 | ||
494 | default: | |
495 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
496 | } | |
497 | } | |
498 | ||
2a326321 LP |
499 | int dnssec_verify_rrset( |
500 | DnsAnswer *a, | |
0c857028 | 501 | const DnsResourceKey *key, |
2a326321 LP |
502 | DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, |
503 | DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, | |
547973de LP |
504 | usec_t realtime, |
505 | DnssecResult *result) { | |
2a326321 | 506 | |
2b442ac8 | 507 | uint8_t wire_format_name[DNS_WIRE_FOMAT_HOSTNAME_MAX]; |
ea3a892f LP |
508 | size_t hash_size; |
509 | void *hash; | |
2b442ac8 LP |
510 | DnsResourceRecord **list, *rr; |
511 | gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL; | |
ca994e85 | 512 | int r, md_algorithm; |
2b442ac8 | 513 | size_t k, n = 0; |
2b442ac8 LP |
514 | |
515 | assert(key); | |
516 | assert(rrsig); | |
517 | assert(dnskey); | |
547973de | 518 | assert(result); |
2a326321 LP |
519 | assert(rrsig->key->type == DNS_TYPE_RRSIG); |
520 | assert(dnskey->key->type == DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY); | |
2b442ac8 LP |
521 | |
522 | /* Verifies the the RRSet matching the specified "key" in "a", | |
523 | * using the signature "rrsig" and the key "dnskey". It's | |
524 | * assumed the RRSIG and DNSKEY match. */ | |
525 | ||
ca994e85 LP |
526 | md_algorithm = algorithm_to_gcrypt_md(rrsig->rrsig.algorithm); |
527 | if (md_algorithm == -EOPNOTSUPP) { | |
203f1b35 LP |
528 | *result = DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM; |
529 | return 0; | |
530 | } | |
ca994e85 LP |
531 | if (md_algorithm < 0) |
532 | return md_algorithm; | |
2b442ac8 | 533 | |
2a326321 LP |
534 | r = dnssec_rrsig_expired(rrsig, realtime); |
535 | if (r < 0) | |
536 | return r; | |
547973de LP |
537 | if (r > 0) { |
538 | *result = DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED; | |
539 | return 0; | |
540 | } | |
2a326321 | 541 | |
2b442ac8 LP |
542 | /* Collect all relevant RRs in a single array, so that we can look at the RRset */ |
543 | list = newa(DnsResourceRecord *, a->n_rrs); | |
544 | ||
545 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, a) { | |
546 | r = dns_resource_key_equal(key, rr->key); | |
547 | if (r < 0) | |
548 | return r; | |
549 | if (r == 0) | |
550 | continue; | |
551 | ||
552 | /* We need the wire format for ordering, and digest calculation */ | |
553 | r = dns_resource_record_to_wire_format(rr, true); | |
554 | if (r < 0) | |
555 | return r; | |
556 | ||
557 | list[n++] = rr; | |
935a999f TG |
558 | |
559 | if (n > VERIFY_RRS_MAX) | |
560 | return -E2BIG; | |
2b442ac8 LP |
561 | } |
562 | ||
563 | if (n <= 0) | |
564 | return -ENODATA; | |
565 | ||
566 | /* Bring the RRs into canonical order */ | |
6c5e8fbf | 567 | qsort_safe(list, n, sizeof(DnsResourceRecord*), rr_compare); |
2b442ac8 LP |
568 | |
569 | /* OK, the RRs are now in canonical order. Let's calculate the digest */ | |
fbf1a66d | 570 | initialize_libgcrypt(); |
2b442ac8 | 571 | |
ca994e85 | 572 | hash_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(md_algorithm); |
fbf1a66d | 573 | assert(hash_size > 0); |
2b442ac8 | 574 | |
ca994e85 | 575 | gcry_md_open(&md, md_algorithm, 0); |
2b442ac8 LP |
576 | if (!md) |
577 | return -EIO; | |
578 | ||
579 | md_add_uint16(md, rrsig->rrsig.type_covered); | |
580 | md_add_uint8(md, rrsig->rrsig.algorithm); | |
581 | md_add_uint8(md, rrsig->rrsig.labels); | |
582 | md_add_uint32(md, rrsig->rrsig.original_ttl); | |
583 | md_add_uint32(md, rrsig->rrsig.expiration); | |
584 | md_add_uint32(md, rrsig->rrsig.inception); | |
585 | md_add_uint16(md, rrsig->rrsig.key_tag); | |
586 | ||
587 | r = dns_name_to_wire_format(rrsig->rrsig.signer, wire_format_name, sizeof(wire_format_name), true); | |
588 | if (r < 0) | |
589 | goto finish; | |
590 | gcry_md_write(md, wire_format_name, r); | |
591 | ||
592 | for (k = 0; k < n; k++) { | |
e7ff0e0b | 593 | const char *suffix; |
2b442ac8 LP |
594 | size_t l; |
595 | rr = list[k]; | |
596 | ||
e7ff0e0b LP |
597 | r = dns_name_suffix(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), rrsig->rrsig.labels, &suffix); |
598 | if (r < 0) | |
599 | goto finish; | |
600 | if (r > 0) /* This is a wildcard! */ | |
601 | gcry_md_write(md, (uint8_t[]) { 1, '*'}, 2); | |
602 | ||
603 | r = dns_name_to_wire_format(suffix, wire_format_name, sizeof(wire_format_name), true); | |
2b442ac8 LP |
604 | if (r < 0) |
605 | goto finish; | |
606 | gcry_md_write(md, wire_format_name, r); | |
607 | ||
608 | md_add_uint16(md, rr->key->type); | |
609 | md_add_uint16(md, rr->key->class); | |
610 | md_add_uint32(md, rrsig->rrsig.original_ttl); | |
611 | ||
85aeaccc | 612 | l = DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA_SIZE(rr); |
2b442ac8 LP |
613 | assert(l <= 0xFFFF); |
614 | ||
615 | md_add_uint16(md, (uint16_t) l); | |
85aeaccc | 616 | gcry_md_write(md, DNS_RESOURCE_RECORD_RDATA(rr), l); |
2b442ac8 LP |
617 | } |
618 | ||
619 | hash = gcry_md_read(md, 0); | |
620 | if (!hash) { | |
621 | r = -EIO; | |
622 | goto finish; | |
623 | } | |
624 | ||
e0240c64 LP |
625 | switch (rrsig->rrsig.algorithm) { |
626 | ||
627 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1: | |
628 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA1_NSEC3_SHA1: | |
629 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256: | |
630 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA512: | |
631 | r = dnssec_rsa_verify( | |
ca994e85 | 632 | gcry_md_algo_name(md_algorithm), |
e0240c64 LP |
633 | hash, hash_size, |
634 | rrsig, | |
635 | dnskey); | |
636 | break; | |
637 | ||
638 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP256SHA256: | |
639 | case DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_ECDSAP384SHA384: | |
640 | r = dnssec_ecdsa_verify( | |
ca994e85 | 641 | gcry_md_algo_name(md_algorithm), |
e0240c64 LP |
642 | rrsig->rrsig.algorithm, |
643 | hash, hash_size, | |
644 | rrsig, | |
645 | dnskey); | |
646 | break; | |
647 | } | |
648 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
649 | if (r < 0) |
650 | goto finish; | |
651 | ||
547973de LP |
652 | *result = r ? DNSSEC_VALIDATED : DNSSEC_INVALID; |
653 | r = 0; | |
2b442ac8 LP |
654 | |
655 | finish: | |
656 | gcry_md_close(md); | |
657 | return r; | |
658 | } | |
659 | ||
0c857028 | 660 | int dnssec_rrsig_match_dnskey(DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, bool revoked_ok) { |
2b442ac8 LP |
661 | |
662 | assert(rrsig); | |
663 | assert(dnskey); | |
664 | ||
665 | /* Checks if the specified DNSKEY RR matches the key used for | |
666 | * the signature in the specified RRSIG RR */ | |
667 | ||
668 | if (rrsig->key->type != DNS_TYPE_RRSIG) | |
669 | return -EINVAL; | |
670 | ||
671 | if (dnskey->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) | |
672 | return 0; | |
673 | if (dnskey->key->class != rrsig->key->class) | |
674 | return 0; | |
675 | if ((dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_ZONE_KEY) == 0) | |
676 | return 0; | |
0c857028 | 677 | if (!revoked_ok && (dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE)) |
28b8191e | 678 | return 0; |
2b442ac8 LP |
679 | if (dnskey->dnskey.protocol != 3) |
680 | return 0; | |
681 | if (dnskey->dnskey.algorithm != rrsig->rrsig.algorithm) | |
682 | return 0; | |
683 | ||
0c857028 | 684 | if (dnssec_keytag(dnskey, false) != rrsig->rrsig.key_tag) |
2b442ac8 LP |
685 | return 0; |
686 | ||
15accc27 | 687 | return dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(dnskey->key), rrsig->rrsig.signer); |
2b442ac8 LP |
688 | } |
689 | ||
105e1512 | 690 | int dnssec_key_match_rrsig(const DnsResourceKey *key, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig) { |
e7ff0e0b LP |
691 | int r; |
692 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
693 | assert(key); |
694 | assert(rrsig); | |
695 | ||
696 | /* Checks if the specified RRSIG RR protects the RRSet of the specified RR key. */ | |
697 | ||
698 | if (rrsig->key->type != DNS_TYPE_RRSIG) | |
699 | return 0; | |
700 | if (rrsig->key->class != key->class) | |
701 | return 0; | |
702 | if (rrsig->rrsig.type_covered != key->type) | |
703 | return 0; | |
704 | ||
e7ff0e0b LP |
705 | /* Make sure signer is a parent of the RRset */ |
706 | r = dns_name_endswith(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rrsig->key), rrsig->rrsig.signer); | |
707 | if (r <= 0) | |
708 | return r; | |
709 | ||
710 | /* Make sure the owner name has at least as many labels as the "label" fields indicates. */ | |
711 | r = dns_name_count_labels(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rrsig->key)); | |
712 | if (r < 0) | |
713 | return r; | |
714 | if (r < rrsig->rrsig.labels) | |
715 | return 0; | |
716 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
717 | return dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rrsig->key), DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key)); |
718 | } | |
719 | ||
ee3d6aff LP |
720 | static int dnssec_fix_rrset_ttl(DnsAnswer *a, const DnsResourceKey *key, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig, usec_t realtime) { |
721 | DnsResourceRecord *rr; | |
722 | int r; | |
723 | ||
724 | assert(key); | |
725 | assert(rrsig); | |
726 | ||
727 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, a) { | |
728 | r = dns_resource_key_equal(key, rr->key); | |
729 | if (r < 0) | |
730 | return r; | |
731 | if (r == 0) | |
732 | continue; | |
733 | ||
734 | /* Pick the TTL as the minimum of the RR's TTL, the | |
735 | * RR's original TTL according to the RRSIG and the | |
736 | * RRSIG's own TTL, see RFC 4035, Section 5.3.3 */ | |
737 | rr->ttl = MIN3(rr->ttl, rrsig->rrsig.original_ttl, rrsig->ttl); | |
738 | rr->expiry = rrsig->rrsig.expiration * USEC_PER_SEC; | |
739 | } | |
740 | ||
741 | return 0; | |
742 | } | |
743 | ||
2a326321 LP |
744 | int dnssec_verify_rrset_search( |
745 | DnsAnswer *a, | |
0c857028 | 746 | const DnsResourceKey *key, |
2a326321 | 747 | DnsAnswer *validated_dnskeys, |
547973de LP |
748 | usec_t realtime, |
749 | DnssecResult *result) { | |
2a326321 | 750 | |
203f1b35 | 751 | bool found_rrsig = false, found_invalid = false, found_expired_rrsig = false, found_unsupported_algorithm = false; |
2b442ac8 LP |
752 | DnsResourceRecord *rrsig; |
753 | int r; | |
754 | ||
755 | assert(key); | |
547973de | 756 | assert(result); |
2b442ac8 | 757 | |
105e1512 | 758 | /* Verifies all RRs from "a" that match the key "key" against DNSKEYs in "validated_dnskeys" */ |
2b442ac8 LP |
759 | |
760 | if (!a || a->n_rrs <= 0) | |
761 | return -ENODATA; | |
762 | ||
763 | /* Iterate through each RRSIG RR. */ | |
764 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rrsig, a) { | |
765 | DnsResourceRecord *dnskey; | |
105e1512 | 766 | DnsAnswerFlags flags; |
2b442ac8 | 767 | |
203f1b35 | 768 | /* Is this an RRSIG RR that applies to RRs matching our key? */ |
2b442ac8 LP |
769 | r = dnssec_key_match_rrsig(key, rrsig); |
770 | if (r < 0) | |
771 | return r; | |
772 | if (r == 0) | |
773 | continue; | |
774 | ||
775 | found_rrsig = true; | |
776 | ||
547973de | 777 | /* Look for a matching key */ |
105e1512 | 778 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(dnskey, flags, validated_dnskeys) { |
547973de | 779 | DnssecResult one_result; |
2b442ac8 | 780 | |
105e1512 LP |
781 | if ((flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED) == 0) |
782 | continue; | |
783 | ||
203f1b35 | 784 | /* Is this a DNSKEY RR that matches they key of our RRSIG? */ |
0c857028 | 785 | r = dnssec_rrsig_match_dnskey(rrsig, dnskey, false); |
2b442ac8 LP |
786 | if (r < 0) |
787 | return r; | |
788 | if (r == 0) | |
789 | continue; | |
790 | ||
2a326321 LP |
791 | /* Take the time here, if it isn't set yet, so |
792 | * that we do all validations with the same | |
793 | * time. */ | |
794 | if (realtime == USEC_INFINITY) | |
795 | realtime = now(CLOCK_REALTIME); | |
796 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
797 | /* Yay, we found a matching RRSIG with a matching |
798 | * DNSKEY, awesome. Now let's verify all entries of | |
799 | * the RRSet against the RRSIG and DNSKEY | |
800 | * combination. */ | |
801 | ||
547973de | 802 | r = dnssec_verify_rrset(a, key, rrsig, dnskey, realtime, &one_result); |
203f1b35 | 803 | if (r < 0) |
2b442ac8 | 804 | return r; |
203f1b35 LP |
805 | |
806 | switch (one_result) { | |
807 | ||
808 | case DNSSEC_VALIDATED: | |
809 | /* Yay, the RR has been validated, | |
ee3d6aff LP |
810 | * return immediately, but fix up the expiry */ |
811 | r = dnssec_fix_rrset_ttl(a, key, rrsig, realtime); | |
812 | if (r < 0) | |
813 | return r; | |
814 | ||
547973de LP |
815 | *result = DNSSEC_VALIDATED; |
816 | return 0; | |
2b442ac8 | 817 | |
203f1b35 LP |
818 | case DNSSEC_INVALID: |
819 | /* If the signature is invalid, let's try another | |
820 | key and/or signature. After all they | |
821 | key_tags and stuff are not unique, and | |
822 | might be shared by multiple keys. */ | |
823 | found_invalid = true; | |
824 | continue; | |
825 | ||
826 | case DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM: | |
827 | /* If the key algorithm is | |
828 | unsupported, try another | |
829 | RRSIG/DNSKEY pair, but remember we | |
830 | encountered this, so that we can | |
831 | return a proper error when we | |
832 | encounter nothing better. */ | |
833 | found_unsupported_algorithm = true; | |
834 | continue; | |
835 | ||
836 | case DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED: | |
837 | /* If the signature is expired, try | |
838 | another one, but remember it, so | |
839 | that we can return this */ | |
840 | found_expired_rrsig = true; | |
841 | continue; | |
842 | ||
843 | default: | |
844 | assert_not_reached("Unexpected DNSSEC validation result"); | |
845 | } | |
2b442ac8 LP |
846 | } |
847 | } | |
848 | ||
203f1b35 LP |
849 | if (found_expired_rrsig) |
850 | *result = DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED; | |
851 | else if (found_unsupported_algorithm) | |
852 | *result = DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM; | |
853 | else if (found_invalid) | |
547973de LP |
854 | *result = DNSSEC_INVALID; |
855 | else if (found_rrsig) | |
856 | *result = DNSSEC_MISSING_KEY; | |
857 | else | |
858 | *result = DNSSEC_NO_SIGNATURE; | |
2b442ac8 | 859 | |
547973de | 860 | return 0; |
2b442ac8 LP |
861 | } |
862 | ||
105e1512 LP |
863 | int dnssec_has_rrsig(DnsAnswer *a, const DnsResourceKey *key) { |
864 | DnsResourceRecord *rr; | |
865 | int r; | |
866 | ||
867 | /* Checks whether there's at least one RRSIG in 'a' that proctects RRs of the specified key */ | |
868 | ||
869 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, a) { | |
870 | r = dnssec_key_match_rrsig(key, rr); | |
871 | if (r < 0) | |
872 | return r; | |
873 | if (r > 0) | |
874 | return 1; | |
875 | } | |
876 | ||
877 | return 0; | |
878 | } | |
879 | ||
2b442ac8 | 880 | int dnssec_canonicalize(const char *n, char *buffer, size_t buffer_max) { |
2b442ac8 LP |
881 | size_t c = 0; |
882 | int r; | |
883 | ||
884 | /* Converts the specified hostname into DNSSEC canonicalized | |
885 | * form. */ | |
886 | ||
887 | if (buffer_max < 2) | |
888 | return -ENOBUFS; | |
889 | ||
890 | for (;;) { | |
891 | size_t i; | |
892 | ||
893 | r = dns_label_unescape(&n, buffer, buffer_max); | |
894 | if (r < 0) | |
895 | return r; | |
896 | if (r == 0) | |
897 | break; | |
898 | if (r > 0) { | |
899 | int k; | |
900 | ||
901 | /* DNSSEC validation is always done on the ASCII version of the label */ | |
902 | k = dns_label_apply_idna(buffer, r, buffer, buffer_max); | |
903 | if (k < 0) | |
904 | return k; | |
905 | if (k > 0) | |
906 | r = k; | |
907 | } | |
908 | ||
909 | if (buffer_max < (size_t) r + 2) | |
910 | return -ENOBUFS; | |
911 | ||
912 | /* The DNSSEC canonical form is not clear on what to | |
913 | * do with dots appearing in labels, the way DNS-SD | |
914 | * does it. Refuse it for now. */ | |
915 | ||
916 | if (memchr(buffer, '.', r)) | |
917 | return -EINVAL; | |
918 | ||
919 | for (i = 0; i < (size_t) r; i ++) { | |
920 | if (buffer[i] >= 'A' && buffer[i] <= 'Z') | |
921 | buffer[i] = buffer[i] - 'A' + 'a'; | |
922 | } | |
923 | ||
924 | buffer[r] = '.'; | |
925 | ||
926 | buffer += r + 1; | |
927 | c += r + 1; | |
928 | ||
929 | buffer_max -= r + 1; | |
930 | } | |
931 | ||
932 | if (c <= 0) { | |
933 | /* Not even a single label: this is the root domain name */ | |
934 | ||
935 | assert(buffer_max > 2); | |
936 | buffer[0] = '.'; | |
937 | buffer[1] = 0; | |
938 | ||
939 | return 1; | |
940 | } | |
941 | ||
942 | return (int) c; | |
943 | } | |
944 | ||
ca994e85 | 945 | static int digest_to_gcrypt_md(uint8_t algorithm) { |
a1972a91 | 946 | |
fbf1a66d | 947 | /* Translates a DNSSEC digest algorithm into a gcrypt digest identifier */ |
a1972a91 LP |
948 | |
949 | switch (algorithm) { | |
950 | ||
951 | case DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA1: | |
952 | return GCRY_MD_SHA1; | |
953 | ||
954 | case DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA256: | |
955 | return GCRY_MD_SHA256; | |
956 | ||
af22c65b LP |
957 | case DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA384: |
958 | return GCRY_MD_SHA384; | |
959 | ||
a1972a91 LP |
960 | default: |
961 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
962 | } | |
963 | } | |
964 | ||
0c857028 | 965 | int dnssec_verify_dnskey(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, DnsResourceRecord *ds, bool mask_revoke) { |
2b442ac8 | 966 | char owner_name[DNSSEC_CANONICAL_HOSTNAME_MAX]; |
a1972a91 LP |
967 | gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL; |
968 | size_t hash_size; | |
ca994e85 | 969 | int md_algorithm, r; |
2b442ac8 | 970 | void *result; |
2b442ac8 LP |
971 | |
972 | assert(dnskey); | |
973 | assert(ds); | |
974 | ||
975 | /* Implements DNSKEY verification by a DS, according to RFC 4035, section 5.2 */ | |
976 | ||
977 | if (dnskey->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) | |
978 | return -EINVAL; | |
979 | if (ds->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DS) | |
980 | return -EINVAL; | |
981 | if ((dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_ZONE_KEY) == 0) | |
982 | return -EKEYREJECTED; | |
0c857028 LP |
983 | if (!mask_revoke && (dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE)) |
984 | return -EKEYREJECTED; | |
2b442ac8 LP |
985 | if (dnskey->dnskey.protocol != 3) |
986 | return -EKEYREJECTED; | |
987 | ||
2b442ac8 LP |
988 | if (dnskey->dnskey.algorithm != ds->ds.algorithm) |
989 | return 0; | |
0c857028 | 990 | if (dnssec_keytag(dnskey, mask_revoke) != ds->ds.key_tag) |
2b442ac8 LP |
991 | return 0; |
992 | ||
0638401a LP |
993 | initialize_libgcrypt(); |
994 | ||
ca994e85 LP |
995 | md_algorithm = digest_to_gcrypt_md(ds->ds.digest_type); |
996 | if (md_algorithm < 0) | |
997 | return md_algorithm; | |
2b442ac8 | 998 | |
ca994e85 | 999 | hash_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(md_algorithm); |
a1972a91 | 1000 | assert(hash_size > 0); |
2b442ac8 | 1001 | |
a1972a91 LP |
1002 | if (ds->ds.digest_size != hash_size) |
1003 | return 0; | |
2b442ac8 | 1004 | |
a1972a91 LP |
1005 | r = dnssec_canonicalize(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(dnskey->key), owner_name, sizeof(owner_name)); |
1006 | if (r < 0) | |
1007 | return r; | |
2b442ac8 | 1008 | |
ca994e85 | 1009 | gcry_md_open(&md, md_algorithm, 0); |
2b442ac8 LP |
1010 | if (!md) |
1011 | return -EIO; | |
1012 | ||
2b442ac8 | 1013 | gcry_md_write(md, owner_name, r); |
0c857028 LP |
1014 | if (mask_revoke) |
1015 | md_add_uint16(md, dnskey->dnskey.flags & ~DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE); | |
1016 | else | |
1017 | md_add_uint16(md, dnskey->dnskey.flags); | |
2b442ac8 LP |
1018 | md_add_uint8(md, dnskey->dnskey.protocol); |
1019 | md_add_uint8(md, dnskey->dnskey.algorithm); | |
1020 | gcry_md_write(md, dnskey->dnskey.key, dnskey->dnskey.key_size); | |
1021 | ||
1022 | result = gcry_md_read(md, 0); | |
1023 | if (!result) { | |
1024 | r = -EIO; | |
1025 | goto finish; | |
1026 | } | |
1027 | ||
1028 | r = memcmp(result, ds->ds.digest, ds->ds.digest_size) != 0; | |
1029 | ||
1030 | finish: | |
1031 | gcry_md_close(md); | |
1032 | return r; | |
1033 | } | |
24710c48 | 1034 | |
547973de LP |
1035 | int dnssec_verify_dnskey_search(DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, DnsAnswer *validated_ds) { |
1036 | DnsResourceRecord *ds; | |
105e1512 | 1037 | DnsAnswerFlags flags; |
547973de LP |
1038 | int r; |
1039 | ||
1040 | assert(dnskey); | |
1041 | ||
1042 | if (dnskey->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) | |
1043 | return 0; | |
1044 | ||
105e1512 LP |
1045 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(ds, flags, validated_ds) { |
1046 | ||
1047 | if ((flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED) == 0) | |
1048 | continue; | |
547973de LP |
1049 | |
1050 | if (ds->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DS) | |
1051 | continue; | |
1052 | ||
d1c4ee32 LP |
1053 | if (ds->key->class != dnskey->key->class) |
1054 | continue; | |
1055 | ||
1056 | r = dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(dnskey->key), DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(ds->key)); | |
1057 | if (r < 0) | |
1058 | return r; | |
1059 | if (r == 0) | |
1060 | continue; | |
1061 | ||
0c857028 LP |
1062 | r = dnssec_verify_dnskey(dnskey, ds, false); |
1063 | if (r == -EKEYREJECTED) | |
1064 | return 0; /* The DNSKEY is revoked or otherwise invalid, we won't bless it */ | |
547973de LP |
1065 | if (r < 0) |
1066 | return r; | |
1067 | if (r > 0) | |
1068 | return 1; | |
1069 | } | |
1070 | ||
1071 | return 0; | |
1072 | } | |
1073 | ||
d15ad742 LP |
1074 | static int nsec3_hash_to_gcrypt_md(uint8_t algorithm) { |
1075 | ||
1076 | /* Translates a DNSSEC NSEC3 hash algorithm into a gcrypt digest identifier */ | |
1077 | ||
1078 | switch (algorithm) { | |
1079 | ||
1080 | case NSEC3_ALGORITHM_SHA1: | |
1081 | return GCRY_MD_SHA1; | |
1082 | ||
1083 | default: | |
1084 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
1085 | } | |
1086 | } | |
1087 | ||
1d3db294 | 1088 | int dnssec_nsec3_hash(DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *name, void *ret) { |
72667f08 LP |
1089 | uint8_t wire_format[DNS_WIRE_FOMAT_HOSTNAME_MAX]; |
1090 | gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL; | |
1091 | size_t hash_size; | |
1092 | int algorithm; | |
1093 | void *result; | |
1094 | unsigned k; | |
1095 | int r; | |
1096 | ||
1097 | assert(nsec3); | |
1098 | assert(name); | |
1099 | assert(ret); | |
1100 | ||
1101 | if (nsec3->key->type != DNS_TYPE_NSEC3) | |
1102 | return -EINVAL; | |
1103 | ||
1d3db294 LP |
1104 | if (nsec3->nsec3.iterations > NSEC3_ITERATIONS_MAX) { |
1105 | log_debug("Ignoring NSEC3 RR %s with excessive number of iterations.", dns_resource_record_to_string(nsec3)); | |
a8f158b9 | 1106 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
1d3db294 | 1107 | } |
a8f158b9 | 1108 | |
d15ad742 | 1109 | algorithm = nsec3_hash_to_gcrypt_md(nsec3->nsec3.algorithm); |
72667f08 LP |
1110 | if (algorithm < 0) |
1111 | return algorithm; | |
1112 | ||
1113 | initialize_libgcrypt(); | |
1114 | ||
1115 | hash_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(algorithm); | |
1116 | assert(hash_size > 0); | |
1117 | ||
1118 | if (nsec3->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size != hash_size) | |
1119 | return -EINVAL; | |
1120 | ||
1121 | r = dns_name_to_wire_format(name, wire_format, sizeof(wire_format), true); | |
1122 | if (r < 0) | |
1123 | return r; | |
1124 | ||
1125 | gcry_md_open(&md, algorithm, 0); | |
1126 | if (!md) | |
1127 | return -EIO; | |
1128 | ||
1129 | gcry_md_write(md, wire_format, r); | |
1130 | gcry_md_write(md, nsec3->nsec3.salt, nsec3->nsec3.salt_size); | |
1131 | ||
1132 | result = gcry_md_read(md, 0); | |
1133 | if (!result) { | |
1134 | r = -EIO; | |
1135 | goto finish; | |
1136 | } | |
1137 | ||
1138 | for (k = 0; k < nsec3->nsec3.iterations; k++) { | |
1139 | uint8_t tmp[hash_size]; | |
1140 | memcpy(tmp, result, hash_size); | |
1141 | ||
1142 | gcry_md_reset(md); | |
1143 | gcry_md_write(md, tmp, hash_size); | |
1144 | gcry_md_write(md, nsec3->nsec3.salt, nsec3->nsec3.salt_size); | |
1145 | ||
1146 | result = gcry_md_read(md, 0); | |
1147 | if (!result) { | |
1148 | r = -EIO; | |
1149 | goto finish; | |
1150 | } | |
1151 | } | |
1152 | ||
1153 | memcpy(ret, result, hash_size); | |
1154 | r = (int) hash_size; | |
1155 | ||
1156 | finish: | |
1157 | gcry_md_close(md); | |
1158 | return r; | |
1159 | } | |
1160 | ||
db5b0e92 LP |
1161 | static int nsec3_is_good(DnsResourceRecord *rr, DnsAnswerFlags flags, DnsResourceRecord *nsec3) { |
1162 | const char *a, *b; | |
1163 | int r; | |
1164 | ||
1165 | assert(rr); | |
1166 | ||
db5b0e92 LP |
1167 | if (rr->key->type != DNS_TYPE_NSEC3) |
1168 | return 0; | |
1169 | ||
1170 | /* RFC 5155, Section 8.2 says we MUST ignore NSEC3 RRs with flags != 0 or 1 */ | |
1171 | if (!IN_SET(rr->nsec3.flags, 0, 1)) | |
1172 | return 0; | |
1173 | ||
d15ad742 LP |
1174 | /* Ignore NSEC3 RRs whose algorithm we don't know */ |
1175 | if (nsec3_hash_to_gcrypt_md(rr->nsec3.algorithm) < 0) | |
1176 | return 0; | |
a8f158b9 LP |
1177 | /* Ignore NSEC3 RRs with an excessive number of required iterations */ |
1178 | if (rr->nsec3.iterations > NSEC3_ITERATIONS_MAX) | |
1179 | return 0; | |
d15ad742 | 1180 | |
db5b0e92 LP |
1181 | if (!nsec3) |
1182 | return 1; | |
1183 | ||
1184 | /* If a second NSEC3 RR is specified, also check if they are from the same zone. */ | |
1185 | ||
1186 | if (nsec3 == rr) /* Shortcut */ | |
1187 | return 1; | |
1188 | ||
1189 | if (rr->key->class != nsec3->key->class) | |
1190 | return 0; | |
1191 | if (rr->nsec3.algorithm != nsec3->nsec3.algorithm) | |
1192 | return 0; | |
1193 | if (rr->nsec3.iterations != nsec3->nsec3.iterations) | |
1194 | return 0; | |
1195 | if (rr->nsec3.salt_size != nsec3->nsec3.salt_size) | |
1196 | return 0; | |
1197 | if (memcmp(rr->nsec3.salt, nsec3->nsec3.salt, rr->nsec3.salt_size) != 0) | |
1198 | return 0; | |
1199 | ||
1200 | a = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key); | |
1201 | r = dns_name_parent(&a); /* strip off hash */ | |
1202 | if (r < 0) | |
1203 | return r; | |
1204 | if (r == 0) | |
1205 | return 0; | |
1206 | ||
1207 | b = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(nsec3->key); | |
1208 | r = dns_name_parent(&b); /* strip off hash */ | |
1209 | if (r < 0) | |
1210 | return r; | |
1211 | if (r == 0) | |
1212 | return 0; | |
1213 | ||
1214 | return dns_name_equal(a, b); | |
1215 | } | |
1216 | ||
1d3db294 | 1217 | static int nsec3_hashed_domain(DnsResourceRecord *nsec3, const char *domain, const char *zone, char **ret) { |
6f76ec5a | 1218 | _cleanup_free_ char *l = NULL, *hashed_domain = NULL; |
105e1512 | 1219 | uint8_t hashed[DNSSEC_HASH_SIZE_MAX]; |
6f76ec5a TG |
1220 | int hashed_size; |
1221 | ||
1222 | assert(nsec3); | |
1223 | assert(domain); | |
1224 | assert(zone); | |
1225 | assert(ret); | |
1226 | ||
1227 | hashed_size = dnssec_nsec3_hash(nsec3, domain, hashed); | |
1228 | if (hashed_size < 0) | |
1229 | return hashed_size; | |
1230 | ||
1231 | l = base32hexmem(hashed, hashed_size, false); | |
1232 | if (!l) | |
1233 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1234 | ||
1235 | hashed_domain = strjoin(l, ".", zone, NULL); | |
1236 | if (!hashed_domain) | |
1237 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1238 | ||
1239 | *ret = hashed_domain; | |
1240 | hashed_domain = NULL; | |
1241 | ||
1242 | return hashed_size; | |
1243 | } | |
1244 | ||
35ad41d3 TG |
1245 | /* See RFC 5155, Section 8 |
1246 | * First try to find a NSEC3 record that matches our query precisely, if that fails, find the closest | |
1247 | * enclosure. Secondly, find a proof that there is no closer enclosure and either a proof that there | |
1248 | * is no wildcard domain as a direct descendant of the closest enclosure, or find an NSEC3 record that | |
1249 | * matches the wildcard domain. | |
1250 | * | |
1251 | * Based on this we can prove either the existence of the record in @key, or NXDOMAIN or NODATA, or | |
1252 | * that there is no proof either way. The latter is the case if a the proof of non-existence of a given | |
1253 | * name uses an NSEC3 record with the opt-out bit set. Lastly, if we are given insufficient NSEC3 records | |
1254 | * to conclude anything we indicate this by returning NO_RR. */ | |
d3760be0 | 1255 | static int dnssec_test_nsec3(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecResult *result, bool *authenticated, uint32_t *ttl) { |
35ad41d3 | 1256 | _cleanup_free_ char *next_closer_domain = NULL, *wildcard = NULL, *wildcard_domain = NULL; |
d1511b33 | 1257 | const char *zone, *p, *pp = NULL; |
35ad41d3 | 1258 | DnsResourceRecord *rr, *enclosure_rr, *suffix_rr, *wildcard_rr = NULL; |
105e1512 LP |
1259 | DnsAnswerFlags flags; |
1260 | int hashed_size, r; | |
35ad41d3 | 1261 | bool a, no_closer = false, no_wildcard = false, optout = false; |
72667f08 LP |
1262 | |
1263 | assert(key); | |
1264 | assert(result); | |
1265 | ||
d1511b33 TG |
1266 | /* First step, find the zone name and the NSEC3 parameters of the zone. |
1267 | * it is sufficient to look for the longest common suffix we find with | |
1268 | * any NSEC3 RR in the response. Any NSEC3 record will do as all NSEC3 | |
1269 | * records from a given zone in a response must use the same | |
1270 | * parameters. */ | |
1271 | zone = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key); | |
13b78323 | 1272 | for (;;) { |
db5b0e92 | 1273 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(suffix_rr, flags, answer) { |
db5b0e92 LP |
1274 | r = nsec3_is_good(suffix_rr, flags, NULL); |
1275 | if (r < 0) | |
1276 | return r; | |
1277 | if (r == 0) | |
13b78323 LP |
1278 | continue; |
1279 | ||
d1511b33 | 1280 | r = dns_name_equal_skip(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(suffix_rr->key), 1, zone); |
13b78323 LP |
1281 | if (r < 0) |
1282 | return r; | |
1283 | if (r > 0) | |
d1511b33 | 1284 | goto found_zone; |
13b78323 LP |
1285 | } |
1286 | ||
1287 | /* Strip one label from the front */ | |
d1511b33 | 1288 | r = dns_name_parent(&zone); |
13b78323 LP |
1289 | if (r < 0) |
1290 | return r; | |
1291 | if (r == 0) | |
1292 | break; | |
1293 | } | |
1294 | ||
1295 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; | |
1296 | return 0; | |
1297 | ||
d1511b33 | 1298 | found_zone: |
13b78323 | 1299 | /* Second step, find the closest encloser NSEC3 RR in 'answer' that matches 'key' */ |
105e1512 LP |
1300 | p = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key); |
1301 | for (;;) { | |
6f76ec5a | 1302 | _cleanup_free_ char *hashed_domain = NULL; |
72667f08 | 1303 | |
6f76ec5a | 1304 | hashed_size = nsec3_hashed_domain(suffix_rr, p, zone, &hashed_domain); |
db5b0e92 LP |
1305 | if (hashed_size == -EOPNOTSUPP) { |
1306 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM; | |
1307 | return 0; | |
1308 | } | |
1309 | if (hashed_size < 0) | |
1310 | return hashed_size; | |
72667f08 | 1311 | |
d1511b33 | 1312 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(enclosure_rr, flags, answer) { |
db5b0e92 | 1313 | |
d1511b33 | 1314 | r = nsec3_is_good(enclosure_rr, flags, suffix_rr); |
72667f08 LP |
1315 | if (r < 0) |
1316 | return r; | |
105e1512 LP |
1317 | if (r == 0) |
1318 | continue; | |
1319 | ||
d1511b33 | 1320 | if (enclosure_rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size != (size_t) hashed_size) |
db5b0e92 | 1321 | continue; |
105e1512 | 1322 | |
d1511b33 | 1323 | r = dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(enclosure_rr->key), hashed_domain); |
72667f08 LP |
1324 | if (r < 0) |
1325 | return r; | |
ed29bfdc LP |
1326 | if (r > 0) { |
1327 | a = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; | |
13b78323 | 1328 | goto found_closest_encloser; |
ed29bfdc | 1329 | } |
105e1512 LP |
1330 | } |
1331 | ||
1332 | /* We didn't find the closest encloser with this name, | |
1333 | * but let's remember this domain name, it might be | |
1334 | * the next closer name */ | |
1335 | ||
1336 | pp = p; | |
1337 | ||
1338 | /* Strip one label from the front */ | |
1339 | r = dns_name_parent(&p); | |
1340 | if (r < 0) | |
1341 | return r; | |
1342 | if (r == 0) | |
72667f08 | 1343 | break; |
105e1512 | 1344 | } |
72667f08 | 1345 | |
105e1512 LP |
1346 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; |
1347 | return 0; | |
72667f08 | 1348 | |
13b78323 | 1349 | found_closest_encloser: |
105e1512 | 1350 | /* We found a closest encloser in 'p'; next closer is 'pp' */ |
72667f08 | 1351 | |
105e1512 | 1352 | /* Ensure this is not a DNAME domain, see RFC5155, section 8.3. */ |
d1511b33 | 1353 | if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_DNAME)) |
105e1512 | 1354 | return -EBADMSG; |
72667f08 | 1355 | |
105e1512 LP |
1356 | /* Ensure that this data is from the delegated domain |
1357 | * (i.e. originates from the "lower" DNS server), and isn't | |
1358 | * just glue records (i.e. doesn't originate from the "upper" | |
1359 | * DNS server). */ | |
d1511b33 TG |
1360 | if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_NS) && |
1361 | !bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_SOA)) | |
105e1512 | 1362 | return -EBADMSG; |
72667f08 | 1363 | |
105e1512 LP |
1364 | if (!pp) { |
1365 | /* No next closer NSEC3 RR. That means there's a direct NSEC3 RR for our key. */ | |
146035b3 TG |
1366 | if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, key->type)) |
1367 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND; | |
1368 | else if (bitmap_isset(enclosure_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_CNAME)) | |
1369 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME; | |
1370 | else | |
1371 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; | |
1372 | ||
d3760be0 LP |
1373 | if (authenticated) |
1374 | *authenticated = a; | |
1375 | if (ttl) | |
1376 | *ttl = enclosure_rr->ttl; | |
146035b3 | 1377 | |
105e1512 LP |
1378 | return 0; |
1379 | } | |
72667f08 | 1380 | |
35ad41d3 TG |
1381 | /* Prove that there is no next closer and whether or not there is a wildcard domain. */ |
1382 | ||
1383 | wildcard = strappend("*.", p); | |
1384 | if (!wildcard) | |
1385 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1386 | ||
1387 | r = nsec3_hashed_domain(enclosure_rr, wildcard, zone, &wildcard_domain); | |
105e1512 LP |
1388 | if (r < 0) |
1389 | return r; | |
1390 | if (r != hashed_size) | |
1391 | return -EBADMSG; | |
72667f08 | 1392 | |
6f76ec5a | 1393 | r = nsec3_hashed_domain(enclosure_rr, pp, zone, &next_closer_domain); |
105e1512 LP |
1394 | if (r < 0) |
1395 | return r; | |
1396 | if (r != hashed_size) | |
1397 | return -EBADMSG; | |
72667f08 | 1398 | |
105e1512 LP |
1399 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(rr, flags, answer) { |
1400 | _cleanup_free_ char *label = NULL, *next_hashed_domain = NULL; | |
105e1512 | 1401 | |
db5b0e92 | 1402 | r = nsec3_is_good(rr, flags, suffix_rr); |
105e1512 LP |
1403 | if (r < 0) |
1404 | return r; | |
1405 | if (r == 0) | |
1406 | continue; | |
1407 | ||
1408 | label = base32hexmem(rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name, rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size, false); | |
1409 | if (!label) | |
1410 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1411 | ||
b2c2a1b9 | 1412 | next_hashed_domain = strjoin(label, ".", zone, NULL); |
105e1512 LP |
1413 | if (!next_hashed_domain) |
1414 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1415 | ||
1416 | r = dns_name_between(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), next_closer_domain, next_hashed_domain); | |
1417 | if (r < 0) | |
1418 | return r; | |
1419 | if (r > 0) { | |
1420 | if (rr->nsec3.flags & 1) | |
35ad41d3 | 1421 | optout = true; |
105e1512 | 1422 | |
35ad41d3 TG |
1423 | a = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED); |
1424 | ||
1425 | no_closer = true; | |
1426 | } | |
1427 | ||
1428 | r = dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), wildcard_domain); | |
1429 | if (r < 0) | |
1430 | return r; | |
1431 | if (r > 0) { | |
1432 | a = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED); | |
1433 | ||
1434 | wildcard_rr = rr; | |
1435 | } | |
1436 | ||
1437 | r = dns_name_between(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), wildcard_domain, next_hashed_domain); | |
1438 | if (r < 0) | |
1439 | return r; | |
1440 | if (r > 0) { | |
1441 | if (rr->nsec3.flags & 1) | |
1442 | /* This only makes sense if we have a wildcard delegation, which is | |
1443 | * very unlikely, see RFC 4592, Section 4.2, but we cannot rely on | |
1444 | * this not happening, so hence cannot simply conclude NXDOMAIN as | |
1445 | * we would wish */ | |
1446 | optout = true; | |
1447 | ||
1448 | a = a && (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED); | |
1449 | ||
1450 | no_wildcard = true; | |
105e1512 LP |
1451 | } |
1452 | } | |
1453 | ||
35ad41d3 TG |
1454 | if (wildcard_rr && no_wildcard) |
1455 | return -EBADMSG; | |
1456 | ||
1457 | if (!no_closer) { | |
1458 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; | |
35ad41d3 TG |
1459 | return 0; |
1460 | } | |
1461 | ||
1462 | if (wildcard_rr) { | |
1463 | /* A wildcard exists that matches our query. */ | |
1464 | if (optout) | |
1465 | /* This is not specified in any RFC to the best of my knowledge, but | |
1466 | * if the next closer enclosure is covered by an opt-out NSEC3 RR | |
1467 | * it means that we cannot prove that the source of synthesis is | |
1468 | * correct, as there may be a closer match. */ | |
1469 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_OPTOUT; | |
1470 | else if (bitmap_isset(wildcard_rr->nsec3.types, key->type)) | |
1471 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND; | |
1472 | else if (bitmap_isset(wildcard_rr->nsec3.types, DNS_TYPE_CNAME)) | |
1473 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME; | |
1474 | else | |
1475 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; | |
1476 | } else { | |
1477 | if (optout) | |
1478 | /* The RFC only specifies that we have to care for optout for NODATA for | |
1479 | * DS records. However, children of an insecure opt-out delegation should | |
1480 | * also be considered opt-out, rather than verified NXDOMAIN. | |
1481 | * Note that we do not require a proof of wildcard non-existence if the | |
1482 | * next closer domain is covered by an opt-out, as that would not provide | |
1483 | * any additional information. */ | |
1484 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_OPTOUT; | |
1485 | else if (no_wildcard) | |
1486 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NXDOMAIN; | |
1487 | else { | |
1488 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; | |
1489 | ||
1490 | return 0; | |
1491 | } | |
1492 | } | |
1493 | ||
d3760be0 LP |
1494 | if (authenticated) |
1495 | *authenticated = a; | |
1496 | ||
1497 | if (ttl) | |
1498 | *ttl = enclosure_rr->ttl; | |
35ad41d3 | 1499 | |
105e1512 LP |
1500 | return 0; |
1501 | } | |
1502 | ||
d3760be0 | 1503 | int dnssec_test_nsec(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecResult *result, bool *authenticated, uint32_t *ttl) { |
105e1512 LP |
1504 | DnsResourceRecord *rr; |
1505 | bool have_nsec3 = false; | |
1506 | DnsAnswerFlags flags; | |
1507 | int r; | |
1508 | ||
1509 | assert(key); | |
1510 | assert(result); | |
1511 | ||
1512 | /* Look for any NSEC/NSEC3 RRs that say something about the specified key. */ | |
1513 | ||
1514 | DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(rr, flags, answer) { | |
1515 | ||
1516 | if (rr->key->class != key->class) | |
1517 | continue; | |
1518 | ||
105e1512 LP |
1519 | switch (rr->key->type) { |
1520 | ||
1521 | case DNS_TYPE_NSEC: | |
1522 | ||
1523 | r = dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key)); | |
1524 | if (r < 0) | |
1525 | return r; | |
1526 | if (r > 0) { | |
146035b3 TG |
1527 | if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, key->type)) |
1528 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND; | |
1529 | else if (bitmap_isset(rr->nsec.types, DNS_TYPE_CNAME)) | |
1530 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME; | |
1531 | else | |
1532 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA; | |
d3760be0 LP |
1533 | |
1534 | if (authenticated) | |
1535 | *authenticated = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; | |
1536 | if (ttl) | |
1537 | *ttl = rr->ttl; | |
1538 | ||
72667f08 LP |
1539 | return 0; |
1540 | } | |
1541 | ||
105e1512 LP |
1542 | r = dns_name_between(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key), rr->nsec.next_domain_name); |
1543 | if (r < 0) | |
1544 | return r; | |
1545 | if (r > 0) { | |
1546 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NXDOMAIN; | |
d3760be0 LP |
1547 | |
1548 | if (authenticated) | |
1549 | *authenticated = flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED; | |
1550 | if (ttl) | |
1551 | *ttl = rr->ttl; | |
1552 | ||
105e1512 LP |
1553 | return 0; |
1554 | } | |
72667f08 | 1555 | break; |
72667f08 | 1556 | |
105e1512 LP |
1557 | case DNS_TYPE_NSEC3: |
1558 | have_nsec3 = true; | |
72667f08 LP |
1559 | break; |
1560 | } | |
1561 | } | |
1562 | ||
105e1512 LP |
1563 | /* OK, this was not sufficient. Let's see if NSEC3 can help. */ |
1564 | if (have_nsec3) | |
d3760be0 | 1565 | return dnssec_test_nsec3(answer, key, result, authenticated, ttl); |
105e1512 | 1566 | |
72667f08 LP |
1567 | /* No approproate NSEC RR found, report this. */ |
1568 | *result = DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR; | |
1569 | return 0; | |
1570 | } | |
1571 | ||
547973de LP |
1572 | static const char* const dnssec_result_table[_DNSSEC_RESULT_MAX] = { |
1573 | [DNSSEC_VALIDATED] = "validated", | |
1574 | [DNSSEC_INVALID] = "invalid", | |
203f1b35 LP |
1575 | [DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED] = "signature-expired", |
1576 | [DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM] = "unsupported-algorithm", | |
547973de LP |
1577 | [DNSSEC_NO_SIGNATURE] = "no-signature", |
1578 | [DNSSEC_MISSING_KEY] = "missing-key", | |
203f1b35 | 1579 | [DNSSEC_UNSIGNED] = "unsigned", |
547973de | 1580 | [DNSSEC_FAILED_AUXILIARY] = "failed-auxiliary", |
72667f08 | 1581 | [DNSSEC_NSEC_MISMATCH] = "nsec-mismatch", |
b652d4a2 | 1582 | [DNSSEC_INCOMPATIBLE_SERVER] = "incompatible-server", |
547973de LP |
1583 | }; |
1584 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(dnssec_result, DnssecResult); |