]>
Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
53e1b683 | 1 | /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */ |
57183d11 | 2 | |
a8fbdf54 | 3 | #include <errno.h> |
3c27973b | 4 | #include <fcntl.h> |
469830d1 | 5 | #include <linux/seccomp.h> |
57183d11 | 6 | #include <seccomp.h> |
a8fbdf54 | 7 | #include <stddef.h> |
469830d1 | 8 | #include <sys/mman.h> |
d347d902 | 9 | #include <sys/prctl.h> |
469830d1 | 10 | #include <sys/shm.h> |
3c27973b | 11 | #include <sys/stat.h> |
57183d11 | 12 | |
469830d1 | 13 | #include "af-list.h" |
add00535 | 14 | #include "alloc-util.h" |
d8b4d14d | 15 | #include "errno-list.h" |
a8fbdf54 | 16 | #include "macro.h" |
add00535 | 17 | #include "nsflags.h" |
d8b4d14d | 18 | #include "nulstr-util.h" |
78e864e5 | 19 | #include "process-util.h" |
cf0fbc49 | 20 | #include "seccomp-util.h" |
b16bd535 | 21 | #include "set.h" |
07630cea | 22 | #include "string-util.h" |
b16bd535 | 23 | #include "strv.h" |
469830d1 LP |
24 | |
25 | const uint32_t seccomp_local_archs[] = { | |
26 | ||
6b000af4 | 27 | /* Note: always list the native arch we are compiled as last, so that users can deny-list seccomp(), but our own calls to it still succeed */ |
f2d9751c LP |
28 | |
29 | #if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) | |
469830d1 LP |
30 | SCMP_ARCH_X86, |
31 | SCMP_ARCH_X86_64, | |
f2d9751c LP |
32 | SCMP_ARCH_X32, /* native */ |
33 | #elif defined(__x86_64__) && !defined(__ILP32__) | |
34 | SCMP_ARCH_X86, | |
469830d1 | 35 | SCMP_ARCH_X32, |
f2d9751c LP |
36 | SCMP_ARCH_X86_64, /* native */ |
37 | #elif defined(__i386__) | |
38 | SCMP_ARCH_X86, | |
39 | #elif defined(__aarch64__) | |
469830d1 | 40 | SCMP_ARCH_ARM, |
f2d9751c LP |
41 | SCMP_ARCH_AARCH64, /* native */ |
42 | #elif defined(__arm__) | |
43 | SCMP_ARCH_ARM, | |
44 | #elif defined(__mips__) && __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN && _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI32 | |
45 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL, | |
46 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPS, /* native */ | |
47 | #elif defined(__mips__) && __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN && _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI32 | |
469830d1 | 48 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPS, |
f2d9751c LP |
49 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL, /* native */ |
50 | #elif defined(__mips__) && __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN && _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI64 | |
51 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL, | |
52 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPS, | |
53 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32, | |
469830d1 | 54 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64N32, |
f2d9751c LP |
55 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64, |
56 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64, /* native */ | |
57 | #elif defined(__mips__) && __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN && _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI64 | |
58 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPS, | |
469830d1 | 59 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL, |
f2d9751c LP |
60 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64N32, |
61 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32, | |
62 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64, | |
63 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64, /* native */ | |
64 | #elif defined(__mips__) && __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN && _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_NABI32 | |
65 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL, | |
66 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPS, | |
469830d1 | 67 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64, |
f2d9751c | 68 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64, |
469830d1 | 69 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32, |
f2d9751c LP |
70 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64N32, /* native */ |
71 | #elif defined(__mips__) && __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN && _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_NABI32 | |
72 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPS, | |
73 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL, | |
74 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64, | |
75 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64, | |
76 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64N32, | |
77 | SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32, /* native */ | |
78 | #elif defined(__powerpc64__) && __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN | |
469830d1 | 79 | SCMP_ARCH_PPC, |
469830d1 | 80 | SCMP_ARCH_PPC64LE, |
f2d9751c LP |
81 | SCMP_ARCH_PPC64, /* native */ |
82 | #elif defined(__powerpc64__) && __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN | |
83 | SCMP_ARCH_PPC, | |
84 | SCMP_ARCH_PPC64, | |
85 | SCMP_ARCH_PPC64LE, /* native */ | |
86 | #elif defined(__powerpc__) | |
87 | SCMP_ARCH_PPC, | |
f9252236 AJ |
88 | #elif defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 64 && defined(SCMP_ARCH_RISCV64) |
89 | SCMP_ARCH_RISCV64, | |
f2d9751c LP |
90 | #elif defined(__s390x__) |
91 | SCMP_ARCH_S390, | |
92 | SCMP_ARCH_S390X, /* native */ | |
93 | #elif defined(__s390__) | |
469830d1 | 94 | SCMP_ARCH_S390, |
469830d1 LP |
95 | #endif |
96 | (uint32_t) -1 | |
97 | }; | |
57183d11 LP |
98 | |
99 | const char* seccomp_arch_to_string(uint32_t c) { | |
aa34055f ZJS |
100 | /* Maintain order used in <seccomp.h>. |
101 | * | |
102 | * Names used here should be the same as those used for ConditionArchitecture=, | |
103 | * except for "subarchitectures" like x32. */ | |
57183d11 | 104 | |
aa34055f ZJS |
105 | switch(c) { |
106 | case SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE: | |
57183d11 | 107 | return "native"; |
aa34055f | 108 | case SCMP_ARCH_X86: |
57183d11 | 109 | return "x86"; |
aa34055f | 110 | case SCMP_ARCH_X86_64: |
57183d11 | 111 | return "x86-64"; |
aa34055f | 112 | case SCMP_ARCH_X32: |
57183d11 | 113 | return "x32"; |
aa34055f | 114 | case SCMP_ARCH_ARM: |
57183d11 | 115 | return "arm"; |
aa34055f ZJS |
116 | case SCMP_ARCH_AARCH64: |
117 | return "arm64"; | |
118 | case SCMP_ARCH_MIPS: | |
119 | return "mips"; | |
120 | case SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64: | |
121 | return "mips64"; | |
122 | case SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64N32: | |
123 | return "mips64-n32"; | |
124 | case SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL: | |
125 | return "mips-le"; | |
126 | case SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64: | |
127 | return "mips64-le"; | |
128 | case SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32: | |
129 | return "mips64-le-n32"; | |
130 | case SCMP_ARCH_PPC: | |
131 | return "ppc"; | |
132 | case SCMP_ARCH_PPC64: | |
133 | return "ppc64"; | |
134 | case SCMP_ARCH_PPC64LE: | |
135 | return "ppc64-le"; | |
f9252236 AJ |
136 | #ifdef SCMP_ARCH_RISCV64 |
137 | case SCMP_ARCH_RISCV64: | |
138 | return "riscv64"; | |
139 | #endif | |
aa34055f | 140 | case SCMP_ARCH_S390: |
6abfd303 | 141 | return "s390"; |
aa34055f | 142 | case SCMP_ARCH_S390X: |
6abfd303 | 143 | return "s390x"; |
aa34055f ZJS |
144 | default: |
145 | return NULL; | |
146 | } | |
57183d11 LP |
147 | } |
148 | ||
149 | int seccomp_arch_from_string(const char *n, uint32_t *ret) { | |
150 | if (!n) | |
151 | return -EINVAL; | |
152 | ||
153 | assert(ret); | |
154 | ||
155 | if (streq(n, "native")) | |
156 | *ret = SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE; | |
157 | else if (streq(n, "x86")) | |
158 | *ret = SCMP_ARCH_X86; | |
159 | else if (streq(n, "x86-64")) | |
160 | *ret = SCMP_ARCH_X86_64; | |
161 | else if (streq(n, "x32")) | |
162 | *ret = SCMP_ARCH_X32; | |
163 | else if (streq(n, "arm")) | |
164 | *ret = SCMP_ARCH_ARM; | |
aa34055f ZJS |
165 | else if (streq(n, "arm64")) |
166 | *ret = SCMP_ARCH_AARCH64; | |
167 | else if (streq(n, "mips")) | |
168 | *ret = SCMP_ARCH_MIPS; | |
169 | else if (streq(n, "mips64")) | |
170 | *ret = SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64; | |
171 | else if (streq(n, "mips64-n32")) | |
172 | *ret = SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64N32; | |
173 | else if (streq(n, "mips-le")) | |
174 | *ret = SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL; | |
175 | else if (streq(n, "mips64-le")) | |
176 | *ret = SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64; | |
177 | else if (streq(n, "mips64-le-n32")) | |
178 | *ret = SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32; | |
179 | else if (streq(n, "ppc")) | |
180 | *ret = SCMP_ARCH_PPC; | |
181 | else if (streq(n, "ppc64")) | |
182 | *ret = SCMP_ARCH_PPC64; | |
183 | else if (streq(n, "ppc64-le")) | |
184 | *ret = SCMP_ARCH_PPC64LE; | |
f9252236 AJ |
185 | #ifdef SCMP_ARCH_RISCV64 |
186 | else if (streq(n, "riscv64")) | |
187 | *ret = SCMP_ARCH_RISCV64; | |
188 | #endif | |
6abfd303 HB |
189 | else if (streq(n, "s390")) |
190 | *ret = SCMP_ARCH_S390; | |
191 | else if (streq(n, "s390x")) | |
192 | *ret = SCMP_ARCH_S390X; | |
57183d11 LP |
193 | else |
194 | return -EINVAL; | |
195 | ||
196 | return 0; | |
197 | } | |
e9642be2 | 198 | |
469830d1 | 199 | int seccomp_init_for_arch(scmp_filter_ctx *ret, uint32_t arch, uint32_t default_action) { |
b4eaa6cc | 200 | _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; |
8d7b0c8f LP |
201 | int r; |
202 | ||
469830d1 LP |
203 | /* Much like seccomp_init(), but initializes the filter for one specific architecture only, without affecting |
204 | * any others. Also, turns off the NNP fiddling. */ | |
8d7b0c8f LP |
205 | |
206 | seccomp = seccomp_init(default_action); | |
207 | if (!seccomp) | |
208 | return -ENOMEM; | |
209 | ||
469830d1 LP |
210 | if (arch != SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE && |
211 | arch != seccomp_arch_native()) { | |
212 | ||
1b52793d | 213 | r = seccomp_arch_remove(seccomp, seccomp_arch_native()); |
469830d1 | 214 | if (r < 0) |
b4eaa6cc | 215 | return r; |
469830d1 | 216 | |
1b52793d | 217 | r = seccomp_arch_add(seccomp, arch); |
469830d1 | 218 | if (r < 0) |
b4eaa6cc | 219 | return r; |
469830d1 LP |
220 | |
221 | assert(seccomp_arch_exist(seccomp, arch) >= 0); | |
222 | assert(seccomp_arch_exist(seccomp, SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE) == -EEXIST); | |
223 | assert(seccomp_arch_exist(seccomp, seccomp_arch_native()) == -EEXIST); | |
224 | } else { | |
225 | assert(seccomp_arch_exist(seccomp, SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE) >= 0); | |
226 | assert(seccomp_arch_exist(seccomp, seccomp_arch_native()) >= 0); | |
227 | } | |
228 | ||
229 | r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_ACT_BADARCH, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); | |
8d7b0c8f | 230 | if (r < 0) |
b4eaa6cc | 231 | return r; |
8d7b0c8f LP |
232 | |
233 | r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0); | |
234 | if (r < 0) | |
b4eaa6cc | 235 | return r; |
8d7b0c8f | 236 | |
b4eaa6cc | 237 | *ret = TAKE_PTR(seccomp); |
8d7b0c8f | 238 | return 0; |
8d7b0c8f LP |
239 | } |
240 | ||
d347d902 | 241 | static bool is_basic_seccomp_available(void) { |
4d5bd50a | 242 | return prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP, 0, 0, 0, 0) >= 0; |
d347d902 FS |
243 | } |
244 | ||
245 | static bool is_seccomp_filter_available(void) { | |
4d5bd50a LP |
246 | return prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, NULL, 0, 0) < 0 && |
247 | errno == EFAULT; | |
d347d902 FS |
248 | } |
249 | ||
83f12b27 | 250 | bool is_seccomp_available(void) { |
83f12b27 | 251 | static int cached_enabled = -1; |
4d5bd50a | 252 | |
83f12b27 | 253 | if (cached_enabled < 0) |
4d5bd50a LP |
254 | cached_enabled = |
255 | is_basic_seccomp_available() && | |
256 | is_seccomp_filter_available(); | |
257 | ||
83f12b27 FS |
258 | return cached_enabled; |
259 | } | |
260 | ||
8130926d | 261 | const SyscallFilterSet syscall_filter_sets[_SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX] = { |
40eb6a80 | 262 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT] = { |
40eb6a80 | 263 | .name = "@default", |
d5efc18b | 264 | .help = "System calls that are always permitted", |
40eb6a80 ZJS |
265 | .value = |
266 | "clock_getres\0" | |
6ca67710 | 267 | "clock_getres_time64\0" |
40eb6a80 | 268 | "clock_gettime\0" |
6ca67710 | 269 | "clock_gettime64\0" |
40eb6a80 | 270 | "clock_nanosleep\0" |
6ca67710 | 271 | "clock_nanosleep_time64\0" |
40eb6a80 ZJS |
272 | "execve\0" |
273 | "exit\0" | |
274 | "exit_group\0" | |
e41b0f42 | 275 | "futex\0" |
6ca67710 | 276 | "futex_time64\0" |
e41b0f42 LP |
277 | "get_robust_list\0" |
278 | "get_thread_area\0" | |
09d3020b DH |
279 | "getegid\0" |
280 | "getegid32\0" | |
281 | "geteuid\0" | |
282 | "geteuid32\0" | |
283 | "getgid\0" | |
284 | "getgid32\0" | |
285 | "getgroups\0" | |
286 | "getgroups32\0" | |
287 | "getpgid\0" | |
288 | "getpgrp\0" | |
289 | "getpid\0" | |
290 | "getppid\0" | |
291 | "getresgid\0" | |
292 | "getresgid32\0" | |
293 | "getresuid\0" | |
294 | "getresuid32\0" | |
40eb6a80 | 295 | "getrlimit\0" /* make sure processes can query stack size and such */ |
09d3020b DH |
296 | "getsid\0" |
297 | "gettid\0" | |
40eb6a80 | 298 | "gettimeofday\0" |
09d3020b DH |
299 | "getuid\0" |
300 | "getuid32\0" | |
e41b0f42 | 301 | "membarrier\0" |
40eb6a80 ZJS |
302 | "nanosleep\0" |
303 | "pause\0" | |
4c3a9176 | 304 | "prlimit64\0" |
e41b0f42 | 305 | "restart_syscall\0" |
6fee3be0 | 306 | "rseq\0" |
40eb6a80 | 307 | "rt_sigreturn\0" |
8f44de08 | 308 | "sched_yield\0" |
e41b0f42 LP |
309 | "set_robust_list\0" |
310 | "set_thread_area\0" | |
311 | "set_tid_address\0" | |
ce5faeac | 312 | "set_tls\0" |
40eb6a80 ZJS |
313 | "sigreturn\0" |
314 | "time\0" | |
4c3a9176 | 315 | "ugetrlimit\0" |
40eb6a80 | 316 | }, |
44898c53 LP |
317 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_AIO] = { |
318 | .name = "@aio", | |
319 | .help = "Asynchronous IO", | |
320 | .value = | |
321 | "io_cancel\0" | |
322 | "io_destroy\0" | |
323 | "io_getevents\0" | |
a05cfe23 | 324 | "io_pgetevents\0" |
6ca67710 | 325 | "io_pgetevents_time64\0" |
44898c53 LP |
326 | "io_setup\0" |
327 | "io_submit\0" | |
9e486265 LP |
328 | "io_uring_enter\0" |
329 | "io_uring_register\0" | |
330 | "io_uring_setup\0" | |
44898c53 | 331 | }, |
133ddbbe | 332 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_BASIC_IO] = { |
133ddbbe | 333 | .name = "@basic-io", |
d5efc18b | 334 | .help = "Basic IO", |
133ddbbe | 335 | .value = |
648a0ed0 | 336 | "_llseek\0" |
133ddbbe | 337 | "close\0" |
648a0ed0 | 338 | "dup\0" |
133ddbbe LP |
339 | "dup2\0" |
340 | "dup3\0" | |
133ddbbe LP |
341 | "lseek\0" |
342 | "pread64\0" | |
343 | "preadv\0" | |
44898c53 | 344 | "preadv2\0" |
133ddbbe LP |
345 | "pwrite64\0" |
346 | "pwritev\0" | |
44898c53 | 347 | "pwritev2\0" |
133ddbbe LP |
348 | "read\0" |
349 | "readv\0" | |
350 | "write\0" | |
351 | "writev\0" | |
352 | }, | |
44898c53 LP |
353 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CHOWN] = { |
354 | .name = "@chown", | |
355 | .help = "Change ownership of files and directories", | |
356 | .value = | |
357 | "chown\0" | |
358 | "chown32\0" | |
359 | "fchown\0" | |
360 | "fchown32\0" | |
361 | "fchownat\0" | |
362 | "lchown\0" | |
363 | "lchown32\0" | |
364 | }, | |
8130926d | 365 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CLOCK] = { |
8130926d | 366 | .name = "@clock", |
d5efc18b | 367 | .help = "Change the system time", |
201c1cc2 TM |
368 | .value = |
369 | "adjtimex\0" | |
1f9ac68b | 370 | "clock_adjtime\0" |
6ca67710 | 371 | "clock_adjtime64\0" |
1f9ac68b | 372 | "clock_settime\0" |
6ca67710 | 373 | "clock_settime64\0" |
201c1cc2 | 374 | "settimeofday\0" |
1f9ac68b | 375 | "stime\0" |
8130926d LP |
376 | }, |
377 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CPU_EMULATION] = { | |
8130926d | 378 | .name = "@cpu-emulation", |
d5efc18b | 379 | .help = "System calls for CPU emulation functionality", |
1f9ac68b LP |
380 | .value = |
381 | "modify_ldt\0" | |
382 | "subpage_prot\0" | |
383 | "switch_endian\0" | |
384 | "vm86\0" | |
385 | "vm86old\0" | |
8130926d LP |
386 | }, |
387 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEBUG] = { | |
8130926d | 388 | .name = "@debug", |
d5efc18b | 389 | .help = "Debugging, performance monitoring and tracing functionality", |
1f9ac68b LP |
390 | .value = |
391 | "lookup_dcookie\0" | |
392 | "perf_event_open\0" | |
8270e3d8 | 393 | "pidfd_getfd\0" |
1f9ac68b LP |
394 | "ptrace\0" |
395 | "rtas\0" | |
6da432fd | 396 | #if defined __s390__ || defined __s390x__ |
1f9ac68b | 397 | "s390_runtime_instr\0" |
8130926d | 398 | #endif |
1f9ac68b | 399 | "sys_debug_setcontext\0" |
8130926d | 400 | }, |
1a1b13c9 LP |
401 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_FILE_SYSTEM] = { |
402 | .name = "@file-system", | |
403 | .help = "File system operations", | |
404 | .value = | |
405 | "access\0" | |
406 | "chdir\0" | |
407 | "chmod\0" | |
408 | "close\0" | |
409 | "creat\0" | |
410 | "faccessat\0" | |
bcf08acb | 411 | "faccessat2\0" |
1a1b13c9 LP |
412 | "fallocate\0" |
413 | "fchdir\0" | |
414 | "fchmod\0" | |
415 | "fchmodat\0" | |
1a1b13c9 | 416 | "fcntl\0" |
ceaa6aa7 | 417 | "fcntl64\0" |
1a1b13c9 LP |
418 | "fgetxattr\0" |
419 | "flistxattr\0" | |
ceaa6aa7 | 420 | "fremovexattr\0" |
1a1b13c9 | 421 | "fsetxattr\0" |
1a1b13c9 | 422 | "fstat\0" |
ceaa6aa7 | 423 | "fstat64\0" |
1a1b13c9 | 424 | "fstatat64\0" |
1a1b13c9 | 425 | "fstatfs\0" |
ceaa6aa7 | 426 | "fstatfs64\0" |
1a1b13c9 | 427 | "ftruncate\0" |
ceaa6aa7 | 428 | "ftruncate64\0" |
1a1b13c9 LP |
429 | "futimesat\0" |
430 | "getcwd\0" | |
1a1b13c9 | 431 | "getdents\0" |
ceaa6aa7 | 432 | "getdents64\0" |
1a1b13c9 LP |
433 | "getxattr\0" |
434 | "inotify_add_watch\0" | |
ceaa6aa7 | 435 | "inotify_init\0" |
1a1b13c9 LP |
436 | "inotify_init1\0" |
437 | "inotify_rm_watch\0" | |
438 | "lgetxattr\0" | |
439 | "link\0" | |
440 | "linkat\0" | |
441 | "listxattr\0" | |
442 | "llistxattr\0" | |
443 | "lremovexattr\0" | |
444 | "lsetxattr\0" | |
1a1b13c9 | 445 | "lstat\0" |
ceaa6aa7 | 446 | "lstat64\0" |
1a1b13c9 LP |
447 | "mkdir\0" |
448 | "mkdirat\0" | |
449 | "mknod\0" | |
450 | "mknodat\0" | |
1a1b13c9 | 451 | "mmap\0" |
ceaa6aa7 | 452 | "mmap2\0" |
7961116e | 453 | "munmap\0" |
1a1b13c9 | 454 | "newfstatat\0" |
ceaa6aa7 LP |
455 | "oldfstat\0" |
456 | "oldlstat\0" | |
457 | "oldstat\0" | |
1a1b13c9 LP |
458 | "open\0" |
459 | "openat\0" | |
8270e3d8 | 460 | "openat2\0" |
1a1b13c9 LP |
461 | "readlink\0" |
462 | "readlinkat\0" | |
463 | "removexattr\0" | |
464 | "rename\0" | |
1a1b13c9 | 465 | "renameat\0" |
ceaa6aa7 | 466 | "renameat2\0" |
1a1b13c9 LP |
467 | "rmdir\0" |
468 | "setxattr\0" | |
1a1b13c9 | 469 | "stat\0" |
ceaa6aa7 | 470 | "stat64\0" |
1a1b13c9 | 471 | "statfs\0" |
ceaa6aa7 | 472 | "statfs64\0" |
a4135a74 | 473 | "statx\0" |
1a1b13c9 LP |
474 | "symlink\0" |
475 | "symlinkat\0" | |
1a1b13c9 | 476 | "truncate\0" |
ceaa6aa7 | 477 | "truncate64\0" |
1a1b13c9 LP |
478 | "unlink\0" |
479 | "unlinkat\0" | |
ceaa6aa7 | 480 | "utime\0" |
1a1b13c9 | 481 | "utimensat\0" |
6ca67710 | 482 | "utimensat_time64\0" |
1a1b13c9 LP |
483 | "utimes\0" |
484 | }, | |
8130926d | 485 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_IO_EVENT] = { |
8130926d | 486 | .name = "@io-event", |
d5efc18b | 487 | .help = "Event loop system calls", |
201c1cc2 TM |
488 | .value = |
489 | "_newselect\0" | |
201c1cc2 | 490 | "epoll_create\0" |
215728ff | 491 | "epoll_create1\0" |
201c1cc2 TM |
492 | "epoll_ctl\0" |
493 | "epoll_ctl_old\0" | |
494 | "epoll_pwait\0" | |
495 | "epoll_wait\0" | |
496 | "epoll_wait_old\0" | |
201c1cc2 | 497 | "eventfd\0" |
215728ff | 498 | "eventfd2\0" |
201c1cc2 TM |
499 | "poll\0" |
500 | "ppoll\0" | |
6ca67710 | 501 | "ppoll_time64\0" |
201c1cc2 | 502 | "pselect6\0" |
6ca67710 | 503 | "pselect6_time64\0" |
201c1cc2 | 504 | "select\0" |
8130926d LP |
505 | }, |
506 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_IPC] = { | |
8130926d | 507 | .name = "@ipc", |
d5efc18b ZJS |
508 | .help = "SysV IPC, POSIX Message Queues or other IPC", |
509 | .value = | |
510 | "ipc\0" | |
cd5bfd7e | 511 | "memfd_create\0" |
201c1cc2 TM |
512 | "mq_getsetattr\0" |
513 | "mq_notify\0" | |
514 | "mq_open\0" | |
515 | "mq_timedreceive\0" | |
6ca67710 | 516 | "mq_timedreceive_time64\0" |
201c1cc2 | 517 | "mq_timedsend\0" |
6ca67710 | 518 | "mq_timedsend_time64\0" |
201c1cc2 TM |
519 | "mq_unlink\0" |
520 | "msgctl\0" | |
521 | "msgget\0" | |
522 | "msgrcv\0" | |
523 | "msgsnd\0" | |
cd5bfd7e | 524 | "pipe\0" |
215728ff | 525 | "pipe2\0" |
201c1cc2 TM |
526 | "process_vm_readv\0" |
527 | "process_vm_writev\0" | |
528 | "semctl\0" | |
529 | "semget\0" | |
530 | "semop\0" | |
531 | "semtimedop\0" | |
6ca67710 | 532 | "semtimedop_time64\0" |
201c1cc2 TM |
533 | "shmat\0" |
534 | "shmctl\0" | |
535 | "shmdt\0" | |
536 | "shmget\0" | |
8130926d LP |
537 | }, |
538 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_KEYRING] = { | |
8130926d | 539 | .name = "@keyring", |
d5efc18b | 540 | .help = "Kernel keyring access", |
1f9ac68b LP |
541 | .value = |
542 | "add_key\0" | |
543 | "keyctl\0" | |
544 | "request_key\0" | |
8130926d | 545 | }, |
cd0ddf6f LP |
546 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MEMLOCK] = { |
547 | .name = "@memlock", | |
548 | .help = "Memory locking control", | |
549 | .value = | |
550 | "mlock\0" | |
551 | "mlock2\0" | |
552 | "mlockall\0" | |
553 | "munlock\0" | |
554 | "munlockall\0" | |
555 | }, | |
8130926d | 556 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE] = { |
8130926d | 557 | .name = "@module", |
d5efc18b | 558 | .help = "Loading and unloading of kernel modules", |
201c1cc2 | 559 | .value = |
201c1cc2 TM |
560 | "delete_module\0" |
561 | "finit_module\0" | |
562 | "init_module\0" | |
8130926d LP |
563 | }, |
564 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MOUNT] = { | |
8130926d | 565 | .name = "@mount", |
d5efc18b | 566 | .help = "Mounting and unmounting of file systems", |
201c1cc2 TM |
567 | .value = |
568 | "chroot\0" | |
9e486265 LP |
569 | "fsconfig\0" |
570 | "fsmount\0" | |
571 | "fsopen\0" | |
572 | "fspick\0" | |
201c1cc2 | 573 | "mount\0" |
9e486265 LP |
574 | "move_mount\0" |
575 | "open_tree\0" | |
201c1cc2 | 576 | "pivot_root\0" |
201c1cc2 | 577 | "umount\0" |
215728ff | 578 | "umount2\0" |
8130926d LP |
579 | }, |
580 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_NETWORK_IO] = { | |
8130926d | 581 | .name = "@network-io", |
d5efc18b | 582 | .help = "Network or Unix socket IO, should not be needed if not network facing", |
201c1cc2 | 583 | .value = |
201c1cc2 | 584 | "accept\0" |
215728ff | 585 | "accept4\0" |
201c1cc2 TM |
586 | "bind\0" |
587 | "connect\0" | |
588 | "getpeername\0" | |
589 | "getsockname\0" | |
590 | "getsockopt\0" | |
591 | "listen\0" | |
592 | "recv\0" | |
593 | "recvfrom\0" | |
594 | "recvmmsg\0" | |
6ca67710 | 595 | "recvmmsg_time64\0" |
201c1cc2 TM |
596 | "recvmsg\0" |
597 | "send\0" | |
598 | "sendmmsg\0" | |
599 | "sendmsg\0" | |
600 | "sendto\0" | |
601 | "setsockopt\0" | |
602 | "shutdown\0" | |
603 | "socket\0" | |
604 | "socketcall\0" | |
605 | "socketpair\0" | |
8130926d LP |
606 | }, |
607 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_OBSOLETE] = { | |
d5efc18b | 608 | /* some unknown even to libseccomp */ |
8130926d | 609 | .name = "@obsolete", |
d5efc18b | 610 | .help = "Unusual, obsolete or unimplemented system calls", |
201c1cc2 TM |
611 | .value = |
612 | "_sysctl\0" | |
613 | "afs_syscall\0" | |
802fa07a | 614 | "bdflush\0" |
201c1cc2 | 615 | "break\0" |
1f9ac68b | 616 | "create_module\0" |
201c1cc2 TM |
617 | "ftime\0" |
618 | "get_kernel_syms\0" | |
201c1cc2 TM |
619 | "getpmsg\0" |
620 | "gtty\0" | |
7e0c3b8f | 621 | "idle\0" |
201c1cc2 | 622 | "lock\0" |
201c1cc2 | 623 | "mpx\0" |
201c1cc2 TM |
624 | "prof\0" |
625 | "profil\0" | |
201c1cc2 TM |
626 | "putpmsg\0" |
627 | "query_module\0" | |
201c1cc2 TM |
628 | "security\0" |
629 | "sgetmask\0" | |
630 | "ssetmask\0" | |
631 | "stty\0" | |
1f9ac68b | 632 | "sysfs\0" |
201c1cc2 TM |
633 | "tuxcall\0" |
634 | "ulimit\0" | |
635 | "uselib\0" | |
1f9ac68b | 636 | "ustat\0" |
201c1cc2 | 637 | "vserver\0" |
8130926d | 638 | }, |
9493b168 ZJS |
639 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_PKEY] = { |
640 | .name = "@pkey", | |
641 | .help = "System calls used for memory protection keys", | |
642 | .value = | |
643 | "pkey_alloc\0" | |
644 | "pkey_free\0" | |
645 | "pkey_mprotect\0" | |
646 | }, | |
8130926d | 647 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_PRIVILEGED] = { |
8130926d | 648 | .name = "@privileged", |
d5efc18b | 649 | .help = "All system calls which need super-user capabilities", |
201c1cc2 | 650 | .value = |
44898c53 | 651 | "@chown\0" |
201c1cc2 TM |
652 | "@clock\0" |
653 | "@module\0" | |
654 | "@raw-io\0" | |
af0f047b LP |
655 | "@reboot\0" |
656 | "@swap\0" | |
215728ff | 657 | "_sysctl\0" |
201c1cc2 | 658 | "acct\0" |
201c1cc2 | 659 | "bpf\0" |
1f9ac68b | 660 | "capset\0" |
201c1cc2 | 661 | "chroot\0" |
a05cfe23 | 662 | "fanotify_init\0" |
9e486265 | 663 | "fanotify_mark\0" |
201c1cc2 | 664 | "nfsservctl\0" |
a05cfe23 | 665 | "open_by_handle_at\0" |
201c1cc2 TM |
666 | "pivot_root\0" |
667 | "quotactl\0" | |
201c1cc2 | 668 | "setdomainname\0" |
201c1cc2 | 669 | "setfsuid\0" |
215728ff | 670 | "setfsuid32\0" |
201c1cc2 | 671 | "setgroups\0" |
215728ff | 672 | "setgroups32\0" |
201c1cc2 | 673 | "sethostname\0" |
201c1cc2 | 674 | "setresuid\0" |
215728ff | 675 | "setresuid32\0" |
201c1cc2 | 676 | "setreuid\0" |
215728ff | 677 | "setreuid32\0" |
e05ee49b | 678 | "setuid\0" /* We list the explicit system calls here, as @setuid also includes setgid() which is not necessarily privileged */ |
215728ff | 679 | "setuid32\0" |
201c1cc2 | 680 | "vhangup\0" |
8130926d LP |
681 | }, |
682 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_PROCESS] = { | |
8130926d | 683 | .name = "@process", |
d5efc18b | 684 | .help = "Process control, execution, namespaceing operations", |
201c1cc2 TM |
685 | .value = |
686 | "arch_prctl\0" | |
09d3020b | 687 | "capget\0" /* Able to query arbitrary processes */ |
201c1cc2 | 688 | "clone\0" |
9e486265 | 689 | "clone3\0" |
201c1cc2 TM |
690 | "execveat\0" |
691 | "fork\0" | |
b887d2eb | 692 | "getrusage\0" |
201c1cc2 | 693 | "kill\0" |
9e486265 | 694 | "pidfd_open\0" |
46fcf95d | 695 | "pidfd_send_signal\0" |
201c1cc2 | 696 | "prctl\0" |
b887d2eb LP |
697 | "rt_sigqueueinfo\0" |
698 | "rt_tgsigqueueinfo\0" | |
201c1cc2 | 699 | "setns\0" |
a9518dc3 | 700 | "swapcontext\0" /* Some archs e.g. powerpc32 are using it to do userspace context switches */ |
201c1cc2 | 701 | "tgkill\0" |
b887d2eb | 702 | "times\0" |
201c1cc2 TM |
703 | "tkill\0" |
704 | "unshare\0" | |
705 | "vfork\0" | |
b887d2eb LP |
706 | "wait4\0" |
707 | "waitid\0" | |
708 | "waitpid\0" | |
8130926d LP |
709 | }, |
710 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO] = { | |
8130926d | 711 | .name = "@raw-io", |
d5efc18b | 712 | .help = "Raw I/O port access", |
201c1cc2 TM |
713 | .value = |
714 | "ioperm\0" | |
715 | "iopl\0" | |
1f9ac68b | 716 | "pciconfig_iobase\0" |
201c1cc2 TM |
717 | "pciconfig_read\0" |
718 | "pciconfig_write\0" | |
6da432fd | 719 | #if defined __s390__ || defined __s390x__ |
201c1cc2 TM |
720 | "s390_pci_mmio_read\0" |
721 | "s390_pci_mmio_write\0" | |
8130926d LP |
722 | #endif |
723 | }, | |
bd2ab3f4 LP |
724 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_REBOOT] = { |
725 | .name = "@reboot", | |
726 | .help = "Reboot and reboot preparation/kexec", | |
727 | .value = | |
bd2ab3f4 | 728 | "kexec_file_load\0" |
e59608fa | 729 | "kexec_load\0" |
bd2ab3f4 LP |
730 | "reboot\0" |
731 | }, | |
133ddbbe | 732 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RESOURCES] = { |
133ddbbe | 733 | .name = "@resources", |
58a8f68b | 734 | .help = "Alter resource settings", |
133ddbbe | 735 | .value = |
0963c053 LP |
736 | "ioprio_set\0" |
737 | "mbind\0" | |
738 | "migrate_pages\0" | |
739 | "move_pages\0" | |
740 | "nice\0" | |
0963c053 LP |
741 | "sched_setaffinity\0" |
742 | "sched_setattr\0" | |
133ddbbe LP |
743 | "sched_setparam\0" |
744 | "sched_setscheduler\0" | |
0963c053 | 745 | "set_mempolicy\0" |
133ddbbe LP |
746 | "setpriority\0" |
747 | "setrlimit\0" | |
133ddbbe | 748 | }, |
6eaaeee9 LP |
749 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SETUID] = { |
750 | .name = "@setuid", | |
751 | .help = "Operations for changing user/group credentials", | |
752 | .value = | |
6eaaeee9 | 753 | "setgid\0" |
215728ff | 754 | "setgid32\0" |
6eaaeee9 | 755 | "setgroups\0" |
215728ff | 756 | "setgroups32\0" |
6eaaeee9 | 757 | "setregid\0" |
215728ff | 758 | "setregid32\0" |
6eaaeee9 | 759 | "setresgid\0" |
215728ff | 760 | "setresgid32\0" |
6eaaeee9 | 761 | "setresuid\0" |
215728ff | 762 | "setresuid32\0" |
6eaaeee9 | 763 | "setreuid\0" |
215728ff | 764 | "setreuid32\0" |
6eaaeee9 | 765 | "setuid\0" |
215728ff | 766 | "setuid32\0" |
6eaaeee9 | 767 | }, |
cd0ddf6f LP |
768 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SIGNAL] = { |
769 | .name = "@signal", | |
770 | .help = "Process signal handling", | |
771 | .value = | |
772 | "rt_sigaction\0" | |
773 | "rt_sigpending\0" | |
774 | "rt_sigprocmask\0" | |
775 | "rt_sigsuspend\0" | |
776 | "rt_sigtimedwait\0" | |
6ca67710 | 777 | "rt_sigtimedwait_time64\0" |
cd0ddf6f LP |
778 | "sigaction\0" |
779 | "sigaltstack\0" | |
780 | "signal\0" | |
781 | "signalfd\0" | |
782 | "signalfd4\0" | |
783 | "sigpending\0" | |
784 | "sigprocmask\0" | |
785 | "sigsuspend\0" | |
786 | }, | |
bd2ab3f4 LP |
787 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SWAP] = { |
788 | .name = "@swap", | |
789 | .help = "Enable/disable swap devices", | |
790 | .value = | |
791 | "swapoff\0" | |
792 | "swapon\0" | |
793 | }, | |
44898c53 LP |
794 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SYNC] = { |
795 | .name = "@sync", | |
796 | .help = "Synchronize files and memory to storage", | |
797 | .value = | |
798 | "fdatasync\0" | |
799 | "fsync\0" | |
800 | "msync\0" | |
801 | "sync\0" | |
802 | "sync_file_range\0" | |
a8fb09f5 | 803 | "sync_file_range2\0" |
44898c53 LP |
804 | "syncfs\0" |
805 | }, | |
70526841 LP |
806 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SYSTEM_SERVICE] = { |
807 | .name = "@system-service", | |
808 | .help = "General system service operations", | |
809 | .value = | |
810 | "@aio\0" | |
811 | "@basic-io\0" | |
812 | "@chown\0" | |
813 | "@default\0" | |
814 | "@file-system\0" | |
815 | "@io-event\0" | |
816 | "@ipc\0" | |
817 | "@keyring\0" | |
818 | "@memlock\0" | |
819 | "@network-io\0" | |
820 | "@process\0" | |
821 | "@resources\0" | |
822 | "@setuid\0" | |
823 | "@signal\0" | |
824 | "@sync\0" | |
825 | "@timer\0" | |
826 | "brk\0" | |
827 | "capget\0" | |
828 | "capset\0" | |
829 | "copy_file_range\0" | |
830 | "fadvise64\0" | |
831 | "fadvise64_64\0" | |
832 | "flock\0" | |
833 | "get_mempolicy\0" | |
834 | "getcpu\0" | |
835 | "getpriority\0" | |
836 | "getrandom\0" | |
837 | "ioctl\0" | |
838 | "ioprio_get\0" | |
839 | "kcmp\0" | |
840 | "madvise\0" | |
70526841 LP |
841 | "mprotect\0" |
842 | "mremap\0" | |
843 | "name_to_handle_at\0" | |
844 | "oldolduname\0" | |
845 | "olduname\0" | |
846 | "personality\0" | |
847 | "readahead\0" | |
848 | "readdir\0" | |
849 | "remap_file_pages\0" | |
850 | "sched_get_priority_max\0" | |
851 | "sched_get_priority_min\0" | |
852 | "sched_getaffinity\0" | |
853 | "sched_getattr\0" | |
854 | "sched_getparam\0" | |
855 | "sched_getscheduler\0" | |
856 | "sched_rr_get_interval\0" | |
6ca67710 | 857 | "sched_rr_get_interval_time64\0" |
70526841 LP |
858 | "sched_yield\0" |
859 | "sendfile\0" | |
860 | "sendfile64\0" | |
861 | "setfsgid\0" | |
862 | "setfsgid32\0" | |
863 | "setfsuid\0" | |
864 | "setfsuid32\0" | |
865 | "setpgid\0" | |
866 | "setsid\0" | |
867 | "splice\0" | |
868 | "sysinfo\0" | |
869 | "tee\0" | |
870 | "umask\0" | |
871 | "uname\0" | |
872 | "userfaultfd\0" | |
873 | "vmsplice\0" | |
874 | }, | |
cd0ddf6f LP |
875 | [SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_TIMER] = { |
876 | .name = "@timer", | |
877 | .help = "Schedule operations by time", | |
878 | .value = | |
879 | "alarm\0" | |
880 | "getitimer\0" | |
881 | "setitimer\0" | |
882 | "timer_create\0" | |
883 | "timer_delete\0" | |
884 | "timer_getoverrun\0" | |
885 | "timer_gettime\0" | |
6ca67710 | 886 | "timer_gettime64\0" |
cd0ddf6f | 887 | "timer_settime\0" |
6ca67710 | 888 | "timer_settime64\0" |
cd0ddf6f LP |
889 | "timerfd_create\0" |
890 | "timerfd_gettime\0" | |
6ca67710 | 891 | "timerfd_gettime64\0" |
cd0ddf6f | 892 | "timerfd_settime\0" |
6ca67710 | 893 | "timerfd_settime64\0" |
cd0ddf6f LP |
894 | "times\0" |
895 | }, | |
201c1cc2 | 896 | }; |
8130926d LP |
897 | |
898 | const SyscallFilterSet *syscall_filter_set_find(const char *name) { | |
899 | unsigned i; | |
900 | ||
901 | if (isempty(name) || name[0] != '@') | |
902 | return NULL; | |
903 | ||
904 | for (i = 0; i < _SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX; i++) | |
905 | if (streq(syscall_filter_sets[i].name, name)) | |
906 | return syscall_filter_sets + i; | |
907 | ||
908 | return NULL; | |
909 | } | |
910 | ||
b54f36c6 | 911 | static int seccomp_add_syscall_filter_set(scmp_filter_ctx seccomp, const SyscallFilterSet *set, uint32_t action, char **exclude, bool log_missing); |
69b1b241 | 912 | |
b54f36c6 | 913 | int seccomp_add_syscall_filter_item(scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp, const char *name, uint32_t action, char **exclude, bool log_missing) { |
69b1b241 LP |
914 | assert(seccomp); |
915 | assert(name); | |
916 | ||
960e4569 LP |
917 | if (strv_contains(exclude, name)) |
918 | return 0; | |
919 | ||
69b1b241 LP |
920 | if (name[0] == '@') { |
921 | const SyscallFilterSet *other; | |
922 | ||
923 | other = syscall_filter_set_find(name); | |
baaa35ad ZJS |
924 | if (!other) |
925 | return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), | |
926 | "Filter set %s is not known!", | |
927 | name); | |
69b1b241 | 928 | |
b54f36c6 ZJS |
929 | return seccomp_add_syscall_filter_set(seccomp, other, action, exclude, log_missing); |
930 | ||
69b1b241 | 931 | } else { |
b54f36c6 | 932 | int id, r; |
69b1b241 LP |
933 | |
934 | id = seccomp_syscall_resolve_name(name); | |
cff7bff8 | 935 | if (id == __NR_SCMP_ERROR) { |
b54f36c6 ZJS |
936 | if (log_missing) |
937 | log_debug("System call %s is not known, ignoring.", name); | |
ff217dc3 | 938 | return 0; |
cff7bff8 | 939 | } |
69b1b241 LP |
940 | |
941 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(seccomp, action, id, 0); | |
b54f36c6 | 942 | if (r < 0) { |
69b1b241 | 943 | /* If the system call is not known on this architecture, then that's fine, let's ignore it */ |
7e86bd73 ZJS |
944 | bool ignore = r == -EDOM; |
945 | ||
946 | if (!ignore || log_missing) | |
947 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add rule for system call %s() / %d%s: %m", | |
948 | name, id, ignore ? ", ignoring" : ""); | |
949 | if (!ignore) | |
950 | return r; | |
b54f36c6 | 951 | } |
69b1b241 | 952 | |
b54f36c6 ZJS |
953 | return 0; |
954 | } | |
69b1b241 LP |
955 | } |
956 | ||
469830d1 LP |
957 | static int seccomp_add_syscall_filter_set( |
958 | scmp_filter_ctx seccomp, | |
469830d1 | 959 | const SyscallFilterSet *set, |
960e4569 | 960 | uint32_t action, |
b54f36c6 ZJS |
961 | char **exclude, |
962 | bool log_missing) { | |
469830d1 | 963 | |
8130926d LP |
964 | const char *sys; |
965 | int r; | |
966 | ||
967 | assert(seccomp); | |
968 | assert(set); | |
969 | ||
970 | NULSTR_FOREACH(sys, set->value) { | |
b54f36c6 | 971 | r = seccomp_add_syscall_filter_item(seccomp, sys, action, exclude, log_missing); |
69b1b241 LP |
972 | if (r < 0) |
973 | return r; | |
469830d1 LP |
974 | } |
975 | ||
976 | return 0; | |
977 | } | |
978 | ||
b54f36c6 | 979 | int seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(uint32_t default_action, const SyscallFilterSet *set, uint32_t action, bool log_missing) { |
469830d1 LP |
980 | uint32_t arch; |
981 | int r; | |
982 | ||
983 | assert(set); | |
984 | ||
985 | /* The one-stop solution: allocate a seccomp object, add the specified filter to it, and apply it. Once for | |
a90db619 | 986 | * each local arch. */ |
469830d1 LP |
987 | |
988 | SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) { | |
989 | _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; | |
990 | ||
991 | log_debug("Operating on architecture: %s", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
992 | ||
993 | r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, default_action); | |
8130926d LP |
994 | if (r < 0) |
995 | return r; | |
469830d1 | 996 | |
b54f36c6 | 997 | r = seccomp_add_syscall_filter_set(seccomp, set, action, NULL, log_missing); |
7e86bd73 ZJS |
998 | if (r < 0) |
999 | return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter set: %m"); | |
469830d1 LP |
1000 | |
1001 | r = seccomp_load(seccomp); | |
7bc5e0b1 | 1002 | if (ERRNO_IS_SECCOMP_FATAL(r)) |
469830d1 LP |
1003 | return r; |
1004 | if (r < 0) | |
1005 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to install filter set for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
8130926d LP |
1006 | } |
1007 | ||
1008 | return 0; | |
1009 | } | |
a3be2849 | 1010 | |
b54f36c6 | 1011 | int seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(uint32_t default_action, Hashmap* set, uint32_t action, bool log_missing) { |
469830d1 | 1012 | uint32_t arch; |
a3be2849 LP |
1013 | int r; |
1014 | ||
469830d1 LP |
1015 | /* Similar to seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(), but takes a raw Set* of syscalls, instead of a |
1016 | * SyscallFilterSet* table. */ | |
a3be2849 | 1017 | |
8cfa775f | 1018 | if (hashmap_isempty(set) && default_action == SCMP_ACT_ALLOW) |
469830d1 | 1019 | return 0; |
a3be2849 | 1020 | |
469830d1 LP |
1021 | SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) { |
1022 | _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; | |
1023 | Iterator i; | |
b54f36c6 | 1024 | void *syscall_id, *val; |
a3be2849 | 1025 | |
469830d1 | 1026 | log_debug("Operating on architecture: %s", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); |
a3be2849 | 1027 | |
469830d1 LP |
1028 | r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, default_action); |
1029 | if (r < 0) | |
1030 | return r; | |
a3be2849 | 1031 | |
b54f36c6 | 1032 | HASHMAP_FOREACH_KEY(val, syscall_id, set, i) { |
8cfa775f | 1033 | uint32_t a = action; |
b54f36c6 ZJS |
1034 | int id = PTR_TO_INT(syscall_id) - 1; |
1035 | int error = PTR_TO_INT(val); | |
8cfa775f | 1036 | |
b54f36c6 ZJS |
1037 | if (action != SCMP_ACT_ALLOW && error >= 0) |
1038 | a = SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(error); | |
8cfa775f | 1039 | |
b54f36c6 | 1040 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(seccomp, a, id, 0); |
469830d1 LP |
1041 | if (r < 0) { |
1042 | /* If the system call is not known on this architecture, then that's fine, let's ignore it */ | |
1043 | _cleanup_free_ char *n = NULL; | |
7e86bd73 | 1044 | bool ignore; |
469830d1 | 1045 | |
b54f36c6 | 1046 | n = seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE, id); |
7e86bd73 ZJS |
1047 | ignore = r == -EDOM; |
1048 | if (!ignore || log_missing) | |
1049 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add rule for system call %s() / %d%s: %m", | |
1050 | strna(n), id, ignore ? ", ignoring" : ""); | |
1051 | if (!ignore) | |
1052 | return r; | |
469830d1 LP |
1053 | } |
1054 | } | |
1055 | ||
1056 | r = seccomp_load(seccomp); | |
7bc5e0b1 | 1057 | if (ERRNO_IS_SECCOMP_FATAL(r)) |
469830d1 LP |
1058 | return r; |
1059 | if (r < 0) | |
1060 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to install filter set for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1061 | } | |
1062 | ||
1063 | return 0; | |
add00535 LP |
1064 | } |
1065 | ||
58f6ab44 | 1066 | int seccomp_parse_syscall_filter( |
898748d8 YW |
1067 | const char *name, |
1068 | int errno_num, | |
1069 | Hashmap *filter, | |
13d92c63 | 1070 | SeccompParseFlags flags, |
898748d8 YW |
1071 | const char *unit, |
1072 | const char *filename, | |
1073 | unsigned line) { | |
1074 | ||
1075 | int r; | |
1076 | ||
1077 | assert(name); | |
1078 | assert(filter); | |
1079 | ||
1080 | if (name[0] == '@') { | |
1081 | const SyscallFilterSet *set; | |
1082 | const char *i; | |
1083 | ||
1084 | set = syscall_filter_set_find(name); | |
1085 | if (!set) { | |
13d92c63 | 1086 | if (!(flags & SECCOMP_PARSE_PERMISSIVE)) |
898748d8 | 1087 | return -EINVAL; |
13d92c63 LP |
1088 | |
1089 | log_syntax(unit, flags & SECCOMP_PARSE_LOG ? LOG_WARNING : LOG_DEBUG, filename, line, 0, | |
1090 | "Unknown system call group, ignoring: %s", name); | |
1091 | return 0; | |
898748d8 YW |
1092 | } |
1093 | ||
1094 | NULSTR_FOREACH(i, set->value) { | |
13d92c63 LP |
1095 | /* Call ourselves again, for the group to parse. Note that we downgrade logging here (i.e. take |
1096 | * away the SECCOMP_PARSE_LOG flag) since any issues in the group table are our own problem, | |
1097 | * not a problem in user configuration data and we shouldn't pretend otherwise by complaining | |
1098 | * about them. */ | |
58f6ab44 | 1099 | r = seccomp_parse_syscall_filter(i, errno_num, filter, flags &~ SECCOMP_PARSE_LOG, unit, filename, line); |
898748d8 YW |
1100 | if (r < 0) |
1101 | return r; | |
1102 | } | |
1103 | } else { | |
1104 | int id; | |
1105 | ||
1106 | id = seccomp_syscall_resolve_name(name); | |
1107 | if (id == __NR_SCMP_ERROR) { | |
13d92c63 | 1108 | if (!(flags & SECCOMP_PARSE_PERMISSIVE)) |
898748d8 | 1109 | return -EINVAL; |
13d92c63 LP |
1110 | |
1111 | log_syntax(unit, flags & SECCOMP_PARSE_LOG ? LOG_WARNING : LOG_DEBUG, filename, line, 0, | |
1112 | "Failed to parse system call, ignoring: %s", name); | |
1113 | return 0; | |
898748d8 YW |
1114 | } |
1115 | ||
1116 | /* If we previously wanted to forbid a syscall and now | |
1117 | * we want to allow it, then remove it from the list. */ | |
6b000af4 | 1118 | if (!(flags & SECCOMP_PARSE_INVERT) == !!(flags & SECCOMP_PARSE_ALLOW_LIST)) { |
898748d8 YW |
1119 | r = hashmap_put(filter, INT_TO_PTR(id + 1), INT_TO_PTR(errno_num)); |
1120 | if (r < 0) | |
851ee70a LW |
1121 | switch (r) { |
1122 | case -ENOMEM: | |
1123 | return flags & SECCOMP_PARSE_LOG ? log_oom() : -ENOMEM; | |
1124 | case -EEXIST: | |
9d7fe7c6 LW |
1125 | assert_se(hashmap_update(filter, INT_TO_PTR(id + 1), INT_TO_PTR(errno_num)) == 0); |
1126 | break; | |
851ee70a LW |
1127 | default: |
1128 | return r; | |
1129 | } | |
898748d8 YW |
1130 | } else |
1131 | (void) hashmap_remove(filter, INT_TO_PTR(id + 1)); | |
1132 | } | |
1133 | ||
1134 | return 0; | |
1135 | } | |
1136 | ||
add00535 | 1137 | int seccomp_restrict_namespaces(unsigned long retain) { |
469830d1 | 1138 | uint32_t arch; |
add00535 LP |
1139 | int r; |
1140 | ||
f1d34068 | 1141 | if (DEBUG_LOGGING) { |
add00535 LP |
1142 | _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL; |
1143 | ||
86c2a9f1 | 1144 | (void) namespace_flags_to_string(retain, &s); |
add00535 LP |
1145 | log_debug("Restricting namespace to: %s.", strna(s)); |
1146 | } | |
1147 | ||
1148 | /* NOOP? */ | |
1149 | if ((retain & NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL) == NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL) | |
1150 | return 0; | |
1151 | ||
469830d1 LP |
1152 | SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) { |
1153 | _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; | |
1154 | unsigned i; | |
add00535 | 1155 | |
469830d1 LP |
1156 | log_debug("Operating on architecture: %s", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); |
1157 | ||
1158 | r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); | |
1159 | if (r < 0) | |
1160 | return r; | |
1161 | ||
1162 | if ((retain & NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL) == 0) | |
1163 | /* If every single kind of namespace shall be prohibited, then let's block the whole setns() syscall | |
1164 | * altogether. */ | |
1165 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
1166 | seccomp, | |
1167 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), | |
1168 | SCMP_SYS(setns), | |
1169 | 0); | |
1170 | else | |
1171 | /* Otherwise, block only the invocations with the appropriate flags in the loop below, but also the | |
1172 | * special invocation with a zero flags argument, right here. */ | |
1173 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
1174 | seccomp, | |
1175 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), | |
1176 | SCMP_SYS(setns), | |
1177 | 1, | |
1178 | SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_EQ, 0)); | |
1179 | if (r < 0) { | |
1180 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add setns() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1181 | continue; | |
1182 | } | |
1183 | ||
1184 | for (i = 0; namespace_flag_map[i].name; i++) { | |
1185 | unsigned long f; | |
1186 | ||
1187 | f = namespace_flag_map[i].flag; | |
1188 | if ((retain & f) == f) { | |
1189 | log_debug("Permitting %s.", namespace_flag_map[i].name); | |
1190 | continue; | |
1191 | } | |
1192 | ||
1193 | log_debug("Blocking %s.", namespace_flag_map[i].name); | |
1194 | ||
1195 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
1196 | seccomp, | |
1197 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), | |
1198 | SCMP_SYS(unshare), | |
1199 | 1, | |
1200 | SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, f, f)); | |
1201 | if (r < 0) { | |
1202 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add unshare() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1203 | break; | |
1204 | } | |
1205 | ||
511ceb1f ZJS |
1206 | /* On s390/s390x the first two parameters to clone are switched */ |
1207 | if (!IN_SET(arch, SCMP_ARCH_S390, SCMP_ARCH_S390X)) | |
ae9d60ce LP |
1208 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( |
1209 | seccomp, | |
1210 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), | |
1211 | SCMP_SYS(clone), | |
1212 | 1, | |
1213 | SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, f, f)); | |
1214 | else | |
1215 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
1216 | seccomp, | |
1217 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), | |
1218 | SCMP_SYS(clone), | |
1219 | 1, | |
1220 | SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, f, f)); | |
469830d1 LP |
1221 | if (r < 0) { |
1222 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add clone() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1223 | break; | |
1224 | } | |
1225 | ||
1226 | if ((retain & NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL) != 0) { | |
1227 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
1228 | seccomp, | |
1229 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), | |
1230 | SCMP_SYS(setns), | |
1231 | 1, | |
1232 | SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, f, f)); | |
1233 | if (r < 0) { | |
1234 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add setns() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1235 | break; | |
1236 | } | |
1237 | } | |
1238 | } | |
1239 | if (r < 0) | |
1240 | continue; | |
1241 | ||
1242 | r = seccomp_load(seccomp); | |
7bc5e0b1 | 1243 | if (ERRNO_IS_SECCOMP_FATAL(r)) |
469830d1 LP |
1244 | return r; |
1245 | if (r < 0) | |
1246 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to install namespace restriction rules for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1247 | } | |
1248 | ||
1249 | return 0; | |
1250 | } | |
1251 | ||
1252 | int seccomp_protect_sysctl(void) { | |
1253 | uint32_t arch; | |
1254 | int r; | |
1255 | ||
1256 | SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) { | |
1257 | _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; | |
1258 | ||
1259 | log_debug("Operating on architecture: %s", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1260 | ||
f9252236 AJ |
1261 | if (IN_SET(arch, |
1262 | SCMP_ARCH_AARCH64, | |
1263 | #ifdef SCMP_ARCH_RISCV64 | |
1264 | SCMP_ARCH_RISCV64, | |
1265 | #endif | |
1266 | SCMP_ARCH_X32 | |
1267 | )) | |
2e64e8f4 ZJS |
1268 | /* No _sysctl syscall */ |
1269 | continue; | |
1270 | ||
469830d1 LP |
1271 | r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); |
1272 | if (r < 0) | |
1273 | return r; | |
1274 | ||
1275 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
add00535 LP |
1276 | seccomp, |
1277 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), | |
469830d1 | 1278 | SCMP_SYS(_sysctl), |
add00535 | 1279 | 0); |
469830d1 LP |
1280 | if (r < 0) { |
1281 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add _sysctl() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1282 | continue; | |
1283 | } | |
1284 | ||
1285 | r = seccomp_load(seccomp); | |
7bc5e0b1 | 1286 | if (ERRNO_IS_SECCOMP_FATAL(r)) |
469830d1 LP |
1287 | return r; |
1288 | if (r < 0) | |
1289 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to install sysctl protection rules for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1290 | } | |
1291 | ||
1292 | return 0; | |
1293 | } | |
1294 | ||
620dbdd2 KK |
1295 | int seccomp_protect_syslog(void) { |
1296 | uint32_t arch; | |
1297 | int r; | |
1298 | ||
1299 | SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) { | |
1300 | _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; | |
1301 | ||
1302 | r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); | |
1303 | if (r < 0) | |
1304 | return r; | |
1305 | ||
1306 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
1307 | seccomp, | |
1308 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), | |
1309 | SCMP_SYS(syslog), | |
1310 | 0); | |
1311 | ||
1312 | if (r < 0) { | |
1313 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add syslog() rule for architecture %s, skipping %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1314 | continue; | |
1315 | } | |
1316 | ||
1317 | r = seccomp_load(seccomp); | |
1318 | if (ERRNO_IS_SECCOMP_FATAL(r)) | |
1319 | return r; | |
1320 | if (r < 0) | |
1321 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to install syslog protection rules for architecture %s, skipping %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1322 | } | |
1323 | ||
1324 | return 0; | |
1325 | } | |
1326 | ||
6b000af4 | 1327 | int seccomp_restrict_address_families(Set *address_families, bool allow_list) { |
469830d1 LP |
1328 | uint32_t arch; |
1329 | int r; | |
1330 | ||
1331 | SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) { | |
1332 | _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; | |
9606bc4b | 1333 | bool supported; |
469830d1 LP |
1334 | Iterator i; |
1335 | ||
1336 | log_debug("Operating on architecture: %s", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1337 | ||
9606bc4b LP |
1338 | switch (arch) { |
1339 | ||
1340 | case SCMP_ARCH_X86_64: | |
1341 | case SCMP_ARCH_X32: | |
1342 | case SCMP_ARCH_ARM: | |
1343 | case SCMP_ARCH_AARCH64: | |
0d9fca76 | 1344 | case SCMP_ARCH_PPC: |
da1921a5 ZJS |
1345 | case SCMP_ARCH_PPC64: |
1346 | case SCMP_ARCH_PPC64LE: | |
f5aeac14 JC |
1347 | case SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32: |
1348 | case SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64N32: | |
1349 | case SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL64: | |
1350 | case SCMP_ARCH_MIPS64: | |
f9252236 AJ |
1351 | #ifdef SCMP_ARCH_RISCV64 |
1352 | case SCMP_ARCH_RISCV64: | |
1353 | #endif | |
9606bc4b LP |
1354 | /* These we know we support (i.e. are the ones that do not use socketcall()) */ |
1355 | supported = true; | |
1356 | break; | |
1357 | ||
9606bc4b LP |
1358 | case SCMP_ARCH_S390: |
1359 | case SCMP_ARCH_S390X: | |
da1921a5 | 1360 | case SCMP_ARCH_X86: |
f5aeac14 JC |
1361 | case SCMP_ARCH_MIPSEL: |
1362 | case SCMP_ARCH_MIPS: | |
9606bc4b LP |
1363 | default: |
1364 | /* These we either know we don't support (i.e. are the ones that do use socketcall()), or we | |
1365 | * don't know */ | |
1366 | supported = false; | |
1367 | break; | |
1368 | } | |
1369 | ||
1370 | if (!supported) | |
1371 | continue; | |
1372 | ||
469830d1 LP |
1373 | r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); |
1374 | if (r < 0) | |
1375 | return r; | |
1376 | ||
6b000af4 | 1377 | if (allow_list) { |
469830d1 LP |
1378 | int af, first = 0, last = 0; |
1379 | void *afp; | |
1380 | ||
6b000af4 LP |
1381 | /* If this is an allow list, we first block the address families that are out of |
1382 | * range and then everything that is not in the set. First, we find the lowest and | |
1383 | * highest address family in the set. */ | |
469830d1 LP |
1384 | |
1385 | SET_FOREACH(afp, address_families, i) { | |
1386 | af = PTR_TO_INT(afp); | |
1387 | ||
1388 | if (af <= 0 || af >= af_max()) | |
1389 | continue; | |
1390 | ||
1391 | if (first == 0 || af < first) | |
1392 | first = af; | |
1393 | ||
1394 | if (last == 0 || af > last) | |
1395 | last = af; | |
1396 | } | |
1397 | ||
1398 | assert((first == 0) == (last == 0)); | |
1399 | ||
1400 | if (first == 0) { | |
1401 | ||
1402 | /* No entries in the valid range, block everything */ | |
1403 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
1404 | seccomp, | |
1405 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EAFNOSUPPORT), | |
1406 | SCMP_SYS(socket), | |
1407 | 0); | |
1408 | if (r < 0) { | |
1409 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add socket() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1410 | continue; | |
1411 | } | |
1412 | ||
1413 | } else { | |
1414 | ||
1415 | /* Block everything below the first entry */ | |
1416 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
1417 | seccomp, | |
1418 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EAFNOSUPPORT), | |
1419 | SCMP_SYS(socket), | |
1420 | 1, | |
1421 | SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_LT, first)); | |
1422 | if (r < 0) { | |
1423 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add socket() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1424 | continue; | |
1425 | } | |
1426 | ||
1427 | /* Block everything above the last entry */ | |
1428 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
1429 | seccomp, | |
1430 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EAFNOSUPPORT), | |
1431 | SCMP_SYS(socket), | |
1432 | 1, | |
1433 | SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_GT, last)); | |
1434 | if (r < 0) { | |
1435 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add socket() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1436 | continue; | |
1437 | } | |
1438 | ||
1439 | /* Block everything between the first and last entry */ | |
1440 | for (af = 1; af < af_max(); af++) { | |
1441 | ||
1442 | if (set_contains(address_families, INT_TO_PTR(af))) | |
1443 | continue; | |
1444 | ||
1445 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
1446 | seccomp, | |
1447 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EAFNOSUPPORT), | |
1448 | SCMP_SYS(socket), | |
1449 | 1, | |
1450 | SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ, af)); | |
1451 | if (r < 0) | |
1452 | break; | |
1453 | } | |
469830d1 LP |
1454 | if (r < 0) { |
1455 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add socket() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1456 | continue; | |
1457 | } | |
1458 | } | |
1459 | ||
1460 | } else { | |
1461 | void *af; | |
1462 | ||
6b000af4 LP |
1463 | /* If this is a deny list, then generate one rule for each address family that are |
1464 | * then combined in OR checks. */ | |
469830d1 LP |
1465 | |
1466 | SET_FOREACH(af, address_families, i) { | |
1467 | ||
1468 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
1469 | seccomp, | |
1470 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EAFNOSUPPORT), | |
1471 | SCMP_SYS(socket), | |
1472 | 1, | |
1473 | SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ, PTR_TO_INT(af))); | |
1474 | if (r < 0) | |
1475 | break; | |
1476 | } | |
469830d1 LP |
1477 | if (r < 0) { |
1478 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add socket() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1479 | continue; | |
1480 | } | |
1481 | } | |
1482 | ||
1483 | r = seccomp_load(seccomp); | |
7bc5e0b1 | 1484 | if (ERRNO_IS_SECCOMP_FATAL(r)) |
469830d1 LP |
1485 | return r; |
1486 | if (r < 0) | |
1487 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to install socket family rules for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1488 | } | |
1489 | ||
1490 | return 0; | |
1491 | } | |
1492 | ||
1493 | int seccomp_restrict_realtime(void) { | |
1494 | static const int permitted_policies[] = { | |
1495 | SCHED_OTHER, | |
1496 | SCHED_BATCH, | |
1497 | SCHED_IDLE, | |
1498 | }; | |
1499 | ||
1500 | int r, max_policy = 0; | |
1501 | uint32_t arch; | |
1502 | unsigned i; | |
1503 | ||
1504 | /* Determine the highest policy constant we want to allow */ | |
1505 | for (i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(permitted_policies); i++) | |
1506 | if (permitted_policies[i] > max_policy) | |
1507 | max_policy = permitted_policies[i]; | |
1508 | ||
1509 | SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) { | |
1510 | _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; | |
1511 | int p; | |
1512 | ||
1513 | log_debug("Operating on architecture: %s", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1514 | ||
1515 | r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); | |
1516 | if (r < 0) | |
1517 | return r; | |
1518 | ||
1519 | /* Go through all policies with lower values than that, and block them -- unless they appear in the | |
6b000af4 | 1520 | * allow list. */ |
469830d1 LP |
1521 | for (p = 0; p < max_policy; p++) { |
1522 | bool good = false; | |
1523 | ||
6b000af4 | 1524 | /* Check if this is in the allow list. */ |
469830d1 LP |
1525 | for (i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(permitted_policies); i++) |
1526 | if (permitted_policies[i] == p) { | |
1527 | good = true; | |
1528 | break; | |
1529 | } | |
1530 | ||
1531 | if (good) | |
1532 | continue; | |
1533 | ||
1534 | /* Deny this policy */ | |
1535 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
1536 | seccomp, | |
1537 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), | |
1538 | SCMP_SYS(sched_setscheduler), | |
1539 | 1, | |
1540 | SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_EQ, p)); | |
1541 | if (r < 0) { | |
1542 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add scheduler rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1543 | continue; | |
1544 | } | |
1545 | } | |
1546 | ||
6b000af4 LP |
1547 | /* Deny-list all other policies, i.e. the ones with higher values. Note that all comparisons |
1548 | * are unsigned here, hence no need no check for < 0 values. */ | |
469830d1 | 1549 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( |
add00535 LP |
1550 | seccomp, |
1551 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), | |
469830d1 | 1552 | SCMP_SYS(sched_setscheduler), |
add00535 | 1553 | 1, |
469830d1 LP |
1554 | SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_GT, max_policy)); |
1555 | if (r < 0) { | |
1556 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add scheduler rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1557 | continue; | |
1558 | } | |
add00535 | 1559 | |
469830d1 | 1560 | r = seccomp_load(seccomp); |
7bc5e0b1 | 1561 | if (ERRNO_IS_SECCOMP_FATAL(r)) |
469830d1 LP |
1562 | return r; |
1563 | if (r < 0) | |
1564 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to install realtime protection rules for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1565 | } | |
1566 | ||
1567 | return 0; | |
1568 | } | |
1569 | ||
6dc66688 ZJS |
1570 | static int add_seccomp_syscall_filter(scmp_filter_ctx seccomp, |
1571 | uint32_t arch, | |
1572 | int nr, | |
14cb109d | 1573 | unsigned arg_cnt, |
6dc66688 ZJS |
1574 | const struct scmp_arg_cmp arg) { |
1575 | int r; | |
1576 | ||
1577 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), nr, arg_cnt, arg); | |
1578 | if (r < 0) { | |
1579 | _cleanup_free_ char *n = NULL; | |
1580 | ||
1581 | n = seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(arch, nr); | |
1582 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add %s() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", | |
1583 | strna(n), | |
1584 | seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1585 | } | |
1586 | ||
1587 | return r; | |
1588 | } | |
1589 | ||
2a8d6e63 | 1590 | /* For known architectures, check that syscalls are indeed defined or not. */ |
f9252236 | 1591 | #if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__arm__) || defined(__aarch64__) || (defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 64) |
2a8d6e63 ZJS |
1592 | assert_cc(SCMP_SYS(shmget) > 0); |
1593 | assert_cc(SCMP_SYS(shmat) > 0); | |
1594 | assert_cc(SCMP_SYS(shmdt) > 0); | |
2a8d6e63 | 1595 | #endif |
6dc66688 | 1596 | |
469830d1 LP |
1597 | int seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute(void) { |
1598 | uint32_t arch; | |
b069c2a3 | 1599 | unsigned loaded = 0; |
469830d1 LP |
1600 | |
1601 | SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) { | |
1602 | _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; | |
b069c2a3 | 1603 | int filter_syscall = 0, block_syscall = 0, shmat_syscall = 0, r; |
add00535 | 1604 | |
469830d1 LP |
1605 | log_debug("Operating on architecture: %s", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); |
1606 | ||
8a50cf69 LP |
1607 | switch (arch) { |
1608 | ||
bed4668d CE |
1609 | /* Note that on some architectures shmat() isn't available, and the call is multiplexed through ipc(). |
1610 | * We ignore that here, which means there's still a way to get writable/executable | |
1611 | * memory, if an IPC key is mapped like this. That's a pity, but no total loss. */ | |
1612 | ||
8a50cf69 | 1613 | case SCMP_ARCH_X86: |
57311925 | 1614 | case SCMP_ARCH_S390: |
8a50cf69 LP |
1615 | filter_syscall = SCMP_SYS(mmap2); |
1616 | block_syscall = SCMP_SYS(mmap); | |
bed4668d | 1617 | /* shmat multiplexed, see above */ |
2a8d6e63 ZJS |
1618 | break; |
1619 | ||
63d00dfb | 1620 | case SCMP_ARCH_PPC: |
2a8d6e63 ZJS |
1621 | case SCMP_ARCH_PPC64: |
1622 | case SCMP_ARCH_PPC64LE: | |
bed4668d | 1623 | case SCMP_ARCH_S390X: |
2a8d6e63 | 1624 | filter_syscall = SCMP_SYS(mmap); |
bed4668d | 1625 | /* shmat multiplexed, see above */ |
8a50cf69 LP |
1626 | break; |
1627 | ||
4278d1f5 ZJS |
1628 | case SCMP_ARCH_ARM: |
1629 | filter_syscall = SCMP_SYS(mmap2); /* arm has only mmap2 */ | |
1630 | shmat_syscall = SCMP_SYS(shmat); | |
1631 | break; | |
1632 | ||
8a50cf69 LP |
1633 | case SCMP_ARCH_X86_64: |
1634 | case SCMP_ARCH_X32: | |
79873bc8 | 1635 | case SCMP_ARCH_AARCH64: |
f9252236 AJ |
1636 | #ifdef SCMP_ARCH_RISCV64 |
1637 | case SCMP_ARCH_RISCV64: | |
1638 | #endif | |
1639 | filter_syscall = SCMP_SYS(mmap); /* amd64, x32, arm64 and riscv64 have only mmap */ | |
8a50cf69 LP |
1640 | shmat_syscall = SCMP_SYS(shmat); |
1641 | break; | |
1642 | ||
1643 | /* Please add more definitions here, if you port systemd to other architectures! */ | |
1644 | ||
f9252236 | 1645 | #if !defined(__i386__) && !defined(__x86_64__) && !defined(__powerpc__) && !defined(__powerpc64__) && !defined(__arm__) && !defined(__aarch64__) && !defined(__s390__) && !defined(__s390x__) && !(defined(__riscv) && __riscv_xlen == 64) |
8a50cf69 LP |
1646 | #warning "Consider adding the right mmap() syscall definitions here!" |
1647 | #endif | |
1648 | } | |
1649 | ||
1650 | /* Can't filter mmap() on this arch, then skip it */ | |
1651 | if (filter_syscall == 0) | |
1652 | continue; | |
1653 | ||
469830d1 LP |
1654 | r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); |
1655 | if (r < 0) | |
1656 | return r; | |
1657 | ||
6dc66688 ZJS |
1658 | r = add_seccomp_syscall_filter(seccomp, arch, filter_syscall, |
1659 | 1, | |
1660 | SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, PROT_EXEC|PROT_WRITE, PROT_EXEC|PROT_WRITE)); | |
1661 | if (r < 0) | |
1662 | continue; | |
8a50cf69 LP |
1663 | |
1664 | if (block_syscall != 0) { | |
6dc66688 ZJS |
1665 | r = add_seccomp_syscall_filter(seccomp, arch, block_syscall, 0, (const struct scmp_arg_cmp){} ); |
1666 | if (r < 0) | |
8a50cf69 | 1667 | continue; |
add00535 | 1668 | } |
a3be2849 | 1669 | |
6dc66688 ZJS |
1670 | r = add_seccomp_syscall_filter(seccomp, arch, SCMP_SYS(mprotect), |
1671 | 1, | |
b835eeb4 ZJS |
1672 | SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, PROT_EXEC, PROT_EXEC)); |
1673 | if (r < 0) | |
1674 | continue; | |
1675 | ||
91691f1d | 1676 | #ifdef __NR_pkey_mprotect |
b835eeb4 ZJS |
1677 | r = add_seccomp_syscall_filter(seccomp, arch, SCMP_SYS(pkey_mprotect), |
1678 | 1, | |
6dc66688 ZJS |
1679 | SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, PROT_EXEC, PROT_EXEC)); |
1680 | if (r < 0) | |
469830d1 | 1681 | continue; |
91691f1d | 1682 | #endif |
add00535 | 1683 | |
67fb5f33 | 1684 | if (shmat_syscall > 0) { |
5ef3ed97 | 1685 | r = add_seccomp_syscall_filter(seccomp, arch, shmat_syscall, |
6dc66688 ZJS |
1686 | 1, |
1687 | SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, SHM_EXEC, SHM_EXEC)); | |
1688 | if (r < 0) | |
8a50cf69 | 1689 | continue; |
469830d1 LP |
1690 | } |
1691 | ||
1692 | r = seccomp_load(seccomp); | |
7bc5e0b1 | 1693 | if (ERRNO_IS_SECCOMP_FATAL(r)) |
469830d1 | 1694 | return r; |
add00535 | 1695 | if (r < 0) |
b069c2a3 ZJS |
1696 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to install MemoryDenyWriteExecute= rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", |
1697 | seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
903659e7 | 1698 | loaded++; |
469830d1 | 1699 | } |
add00535 | 1700 | |
903659e7 | 1701 | if (loaded == 0) |
b069c2a3 | 1702 | log_debug("Failed to install any seccomp rules for MemoryDenyWriteExecute=."); |
903659e7 CE |
1703 | |
1704 | return loaded; | |
469830d1 LP |
1705 | } |
1706 | ||
1707 | int seccomp_restrict_archs(Set *archs) { | |
1708 | _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; | |
1709 | Iterator i; | |
1710 | void *id; | |
1711 | int r; | |
1712 | ||
1713 | /* This installs a filter with no rules, but that restricts the system call architectures to the specified | |
2428aaf8 AJ |
1714 | * list. |
1715 | * | |
1716 | * There are some qualifications. However the most important use is to stop processes from bypassing | |
1717 | * system call restrictions, in case they used a broader (multiplexing) syscall which is only available | |
1718 | * in a non-native architecture. There are no holes in this use case, at least so far. */ | |
469830d1 | 1719 | |
2428aaf8 AJ |
1720 | /* Note libseccomp includes our "native" (current) architecture in the filter by default. |
1721 | * We do not remove it. For example, our callers expect to be able to call execve() afterwards | |
1722 | * to run a program with the restrictions applied. */ | |
469830d1 LP |
1723 | seccomp = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); |
1724 | if (!seccomp) | |
1725 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1726 | ||
1727 | SET_FOREACH(id, archs, i) { | |
1728 | r = seccomp_arch_add(seccomp, PTR_TO_UINT32(id) - 1); | |
2428aaf8 AJ |
1729 | if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST) |
1730 | return r; | |
1731 | } | |
1732 | ||
1733 | /* The vdso for x32 assumes that x86-64 syscalls are available. Let's allow them, since x32 | |
1734 | * x32 syscalls should basically match x86-64 for everything except the pointer type. | |
1735 | * The important thing is that you can block the old 32-bit x86 syscalls. | |
1736 | * https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=850047 */ | |
1737 | ||
1738 | if (seccomp_arch_native() == SCMP_ARCH_X32 || | |
1739 | set_contains(archs, UINT32_TO_PTR(SCMP_ARCH_X32 + 1))) { | |
1740 | ||
1741 | r = seccomp_arch_add(seccomp, SCMP_ARCH_X86_64); | |
1742 | if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST) | |
469830d1 | 1743 | return r; |
add00535 LP |
1744 | } |
1745 | ||
469830d1 LP |
1746 | r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0); |
1747 | if (r < 0) | |
1748 | return r; | |
add00535 | 1749 | |
1c6af69b | 1750 | r = seccomp_load(seccomp); |
7bc5e0b1 | 1751 | if (ERRNO_IS_SECCOMP_FATAL(r)) |
1c6af69b LP |
1752 | return r; |
1753 | if (r < 0) | |
1754 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to restrict system call architectures, skipping: %m"); | |
1755 | ||
1756 | return 0; | |
a3be2849 | 1757 | } |
b16bd535 | 1758 | |
de7fef4b ZJS |
1759 | int parse_syscall_archs(char **l, Set **ret_archs) { |
1760 | _cleanup_set_free_ Set *archs = NULL; | |
b16bd535 YW |
1761 | char **s; |
1762 | int r; | |
1763 | ||
1764 | assert(l); | |
de7fef4b | 1765 | assert(ret_archs); |
b16bd535 YW |
1766 | |
1767 | STRV_FOREACH(s, l) { | |
1768 | uint32_t a; | |
1769 | ||
1770 | r = seccomp_arch_from_string(*s, &a); | |
1771 | if (r < 0) | |
1772 | return -EINVAL; | |
1773 | ||
de7fef4b | 1774 | r = set_ensure_put(&archs, NULL, UINT32_TO_PTR(a + 1)); |
b16bd535 YW |
1775 | if (r < 0) |
1776 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1777 | } | |
1778 | ||
de7fef4b | 1779 | *ret_archs = TAKE_PTR(archs); |
b16bd535 YW |
1780 | return 0; |
1781 | } | |
165a31c0 | 1782 | |
8cfa775f | 1783 | int seccomp_filter_set_add(Hashmap *filter, bool add, const SyscallFilterSet *set) { |
165a31c0 LP |
1784 | const char *i; |
1785 | int r; | |
1786 | ||
1787 | assert(set); | |
1788 | ||
1789 | NULSTR_FOREACH(i, set->value) { | |
1790 | ||
1791 | if (i[0] == '@') { | |
1792 | const SyscallFilterSet *more; | |
1793 | ||
1794 | more = syscall_filter_set_find(i); | |
1795 | if (!more) | |
1796 | return -ENXIO; | |
1797 | ||
165a31c0 LP |
1798 | r = seccomp_filter_set_add(filter, add, more); |
1799 | if (r < 0) | |
1800 | return r; | |
1801 | } else { | |
1802 | int id; | |
1803 | ||
1804 | id = seccomp_syscall_resolve_name(i); | |
ff217dc3 LP |
1805 | if (id == __NR_SCMP_ERROR) { |
1806 | log_debug("Couldn't resolve system call, ignoring: %s", i); | |
1807 | continue; | |
1808 | } | |
165a31c0 LP |
1809 | |
1810 | if (add) { | |
8cfa775f | 1811 | r = hashmap_put(filter, INT_TO_PTR(id + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)); |
165a31c0 LP |
1812 | if (r < 0) |
1813 | return r; | |
1814 | } else | |
8cfa775f | 1815 | (void) hashmap_remove(filter, INT_TO_PTR(id + 1)); |
165a31c0 LP |
1816 | } |
1817 | } | |
1818 | ||
1819 | return 0; | |
1820 | } | |
78e864e5 TM |
1821 | |
1822 | int seccomp_lock_personality(unsigned long personality) { | |
72eafe71 | 1823 | uint32_t arch; |
78e864e5 TM |
1824 | int r; |
1825 | ||
72eafe71 LP |
1826 | if (personality >= PERSONALITY_INVALID) |
1827 | return -EINVAL; | |
78e864e5 | 1828 | |
72eafe71 LP |
1829 | SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) { |
1830 | _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; | |
78e864e5 | 1831 | |
72eafe71 LP |
1832 | r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); |
1833 | if (r < 0) | |
1834 | return r; | |
1835 | ||
1836 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
1837 | seccomp, | |
1838 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), | |
1839 | SCMP_SYS(personality), | |
1840 | 1, | |
1841 | SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_NE, personality)); | |
448ac526 LP |
1842 | if (r < 0) { |
1843 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add scheduler rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1844 | continue; | |
1845 | } | |
72eafe71 LP |
1846 | |
1847 | r = seccomp_load(seccomp); | |
7bc5e0b1 | 1848 | if (ERRNO_IS_SECCOMP_FATAL(r)) |
72eafe71 LP |
1849 | return r; |
1850 | if (r < 0) | |
1851 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to enable personality lock for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1852 | } | |
1853 | ||
1854 | return 0; | |
78e864e5 | 1855 | } |
aecd5ac6 TM |
1856 | |
1857 | int seccomp_protect_hostname(void) { | |
1858 | uint32_t arch; | |
1859 | int r; | |
1860 | ||
1861 | SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) { | |
1862 | _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; | |
1863 | ||
1864 | r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); | |
1865 | if (r < 0) | |
1866 | return r; | |
1867 | ||
1868 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
1869 | seccomp, | |
1870 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), | |
1871 | SCMP_SYS(sethostname), | |
1872 | 0); | |
9e6e543c LP |
1873 | if (r < 0) { |
1874 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add sethostname() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
aecd5ac6 | 1875 | continue; |
9e6e543c | 1876 | } |
aecd5ac6 TM |
1877 | |
1878 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
1879 | seccomp, | |
1880 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), | |
1881 | SCMP_SYS(setdomainname), | |
1882 | 0); | |
9e6e543c LP |
1883 | if (r < 0) { |
1884 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add setdomainname() rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
aecd5ac6 | 1885 | continue; |
9e6e543c | 1886 | } |
aecd5ac6 TM |
1887 | |
1888 | r = seccomp_load(seccomp); | |
7bc5e0b1 | 1889 | if (ERRNO_IS_SECCOMP_FATAL(r)) |
aecd5ac6 TM |
1890 | return r; |
1891 | if (r < 0) | |
1892 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to apply hostname restrictions for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
1893 | } | |
1894 | ||
1895 | return 0; | |
1896 | } | |
3c27973b | 1897 | |
da4dc9a6 ZJS |
1898 | static int seccomp_restrict_sxid(scmp_filter_ctx seccomp, mode_t m) { |
1899 | /* Checks the mode_t parameter of the following system calls: | |
1900 | * | |
1901 | * → chmod() + fchmod() + fchmodat() | |
1902 | * → open() + creat() + openat() | |
1903 | * → mkdir() + mkdirat() | |
1904 | * → mknod() + mknodat() | |
1905 | * | |
1906 | * Returns error if *everything* failed, and 0 otherwise. | |
1907 | */ | |
1908 | int r = 0; | |
1909 | bool any = false; | |
1910 | ||
1911 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
1912 | seccomp, | |
1913 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), | |
1914 | SCMP_SYS(chmod), | |
1915 | 1, | |
1916 | SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m)); | |
1917 | if (r < 0) | |
1918 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for chmod: %m"); | |
1919 | else | |
1920 | any = true; | |
1921 | ||
1922 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
1923 | seccomp, | |
1924 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), | |
1925 | SCMP_SYS(fchmod), | |
1926 | 1, | |
1927 | SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m)); | |
1928 | if (r < 0) | |
1929 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for fchmod: %m"); | |
1930 | else | |
1931 | any = true; | |
1932 | ||
1933 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
1934 | seccomp, | |
1935 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), | |
1936 | SCMP_SYS(fchmodat), | |
1937 | 1, | |
1938 | SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m)); | |
1939 | if (r < 0) | |
1940 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for fchmodat: %m"); | |
1941 | else | |
1942 | any = true; | |
1943 | ||
1944 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
1945 | seccomp, | |
1946 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), | |
1947 | SCMP_SYS(mkdir), | |
1948 | 1, | |
1949 | SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m)); | |
1950 | if (r < 0) | |
1951 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for mkdir: %m"); | |
1952 | else | |
1953 | any = true; | |
1954 | ||
1955 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
1956 | seccomp, | |
1957 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), | |
1958 | SCMP_SYS(mkdirat), | |
1959 | 1, | |
1960 | SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m)); | |
1961 | if (r < 0) | |
1962 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for mkdirat: %m"); | |
1963 | else | |
1964 | any = true; | |
1965 | ||
1966 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
1967 | seccomp, | |
1968 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), | |
1969 | SCMP_SYS(mknod), | |
1970 | 1, | |
1971 | SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m)); | |
1972 | if (r < 0) | |
1973 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for mknod: %m"); | |
1974 | else | |
1975 | any = true; | |
1976 | ||
1977 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
1978 | seccomp, | |
1979 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), | |
1980 | SCMP_SYS(mknodat), | |
1981 | 1, | |
1982 | SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m)); | |
1983 | if (r < 0) | |
1984 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for mknodat: %m"); | |
1985 | else | |
1986 | any = true; | |
1987 | ||
1988 | #if SCMP_SYS(open) > 0 | |
1989 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
1990 | seccomp, | |
1991 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), | |
1992 | SCMP_SYS(open), | |
1993 | 2, | |
1994 | SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_CREAT, O_CREAT), | |
1995 | SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m)); | |
1996 | if (r < 0) | |
1997 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for open: %m"); | |
1998 | else | |
1999 | any = true; | |
2000 | #endif | |
2001 | ||
2002 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
2003 | seccomp, | |
2004 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), | |
2005 | SCMP_SYS(openat), | |
2006 | 2, | |
2007 | SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_CREAT, O_CREAT), | |
2008 | SCMP_A3(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m)); | |
2009 | if (r < 0) | |
2010 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for openat: %m"); | |
2011 | else | |
2012 | any = true; | |
2013 | ||
ecc04067 LP |
2014 | #if defined(__SNR_openat2) |
2015 | /* The new openat2() system call can't be filtered sensibly, since it moves the flags parameter into | |
2016 | * an indirect structure. Let's block it entirely for now. That should be a reasonably OK thing to do | |
2017 | * for now, since openat2() is very new and code generally needs fallback logic anyway to be | |
2018 | * compatible with kernels that are not absolutely recent. */ | |
2019 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( | |
2020 | seccomp, | |
2021 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), | |
2022 | SCMP_SYS(openat2), | |
2023 | 0); | |
2024 | if (r < 0) | |
2025 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for openat2: %m"); | |
2026 | else | |
2027 | any = true; | |
2028 | #endif | |
2029 | ||
da4dc9a6 ZJS |
2030 | r = seccomp_rule_add_exact( |
2031 | seccomp, | |
2032 | SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), | |
2033 | SCMP_SYS(creat), | |
2034 | 1, | |
2035 | SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m)); | |
2036 | if (r < 0) | |
2037 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for creat: %m"); | |
2038 | else | |
2039 | any = true; | |
2040 | ||
2041 | return any ? 0 : r; | |
2042 | } | |
2043 | ||
3c27973b LP |
2044 | int seccomp_restrict_suid_sgid(void) { |
2045 | uint32_t arch; | |
da4dc9a6 | 2046 | int r, k; |
3c27973b LP |
2047 | |
2048 | SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) { | |
2049 | _cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL; | |
2050 | ||
2051 | r = seccomp_init_for_arch(&seccomp, arch, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW); | |
2052 | if (r < 0) | |
2053 | return r; | |
2054 | ||
da4dc9a6 ZJS |
2055 | r = seccomp_restrict_sxid(seccomp, S_ISUID); |
2056 | if (r < 0) | |
2057 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add suid rule for architecture %s, ignoring: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
3c27973b | 2058 | |
da4dc9a6 ZJS |
2059 | k = seccomp_restrict_sxid(seccomp, S_ISGID); |
2060 | if (k < 0) | |
2061 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add sgid rule for architecture %s, ignoring: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
3c27973b | 2062 | |
da4dc9a6 | 2063 | if (r < 0 && k < 0) |
3c27973b | 2064 | continue; |
3c27973b LP |
2065 | |
2066 | r = seccomp_load(seccomp); | |
7bc5e0b1 | 2067 | if (ERRNO_IS_SECCOMP_FATAL(r)) |
3c27973b LP |
2068 | return r; |
2069 | if (r < 0) | |
2070 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to apply suid/sgid restrictions for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch)); | |
2071 | } | |
2072 | ||
2073 | return 0; | |
2074 | } | |
915fb324 LP |
2075 | |
2076 | uint32_t scmp_act_kill_process(void) { | |
2077 | ||
2078 | /* Returns SCMP_ACT_KILL_PROCESS if it's supported, and SCMP_ACT_KILL_THREAD otherwise. We never | |
2079 | * actually want to use SCMP_ACT_KILL_THREAD as its semantics are nuts (killing arbitrary threads of | |
2080 | * a program is just a bad idea), but on old kernels/old libseccomp it is all we have, and at least | |
2081 | * for single-threaded apps does the right thing. */ | |
2082 | ||
2083 | #ifdef SCMP_ACT_KILL_PROCESS | |
2084 | if (seccomp_api_get() >= 3) | |
2085 | return SCMP_ACT_KILL_PROCESS; | |
2086 | #endif | |
2087 | ||
2088 | return SCMP_ACT_KILL; /* same as SCMP_ACT_KILL_THREAD */ | |
2089 | } |