[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / record / methods / ssl3_meth.c

/*
 * Copyright 2022-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 *
 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
 */

#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include "internal/ssl3_cbc.h"
#include "../../ssl_local.h"
#include "../record_local.h"
#include "recmethod_local.h"

static int ssl3_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
                                 unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
                                 unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
                                 unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
                                 const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
                                 size_t taglen,
                                 int mactype,
                                 const EVP_MD *md,
                                 COMP_METHOD *comp)
{
    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
    int enc = (rl->direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE) ? 1 : 0;

    if (md == NULL) {
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
        return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
    }

    if ((rl->enc_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
        return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
    }
    ciph_ctx = rl->enc_ctx;

    rl->md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
    if (rl->md_ctx == NULL) {
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
        return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
    }

    if ((md != NULL && EVP_DigestInit_ex(rl->md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0)) {
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
        return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
    }

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
    if (comp != NULL) {
        rl->compctx = COMP_CTX_new(comp);
        if (rl->compctx == NULL) {
            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
            return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
        }
    }
#endif

    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, iv, enc)) {
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
        return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
    }

    /*
     * The cipher we actually ended up using in the EVP_CIPHER_CTX may be
     * different to that in ciph if we have an ENGINE in use
     */
    if (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ciph_ctx)) != NULL
            && !ossl_set_tls_provider_parameters(rl, ciph_ctx, ciph, md)) {
        /* ERR_raise already called */
        return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
    }

    if (mackeylen > sizeof(rl->mac_secret)) {
        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
        return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
    }
    memcpy(rl->mac_secret, mackey, mackeylen);

    return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS;
}

/*
 * ssl3_cipher encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| records in |inrecs|. Calls RLAYERfatal
 * on internal error, but not otherwise. It is the responsibility of the caller
 * to report a bad_record_mac
 *
 * Returns:
 *    0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error
 *    1: Success or Mac-then-encrypt decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
 */
static int ssl3_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, TLS_RL_RECORD *inrecs,
                       size_t n_recs, int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *mac,
                       size_t macsize)
{
    TLS_RL_RECORD *rec;
    EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
    size_t l, i;
    size_t bs;
    const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
    int provided;

    rec = inrecs;
    /*
     * We shouldn't ever be called with more than one record in the SSLv3 case
     */
    if (n_recs != 1)
        return 0;

    ds = rl->enc_ctx;
    if (ds == NULL || (enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds)) == NULL)
        return 0;

    provided = (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(enc) != NULL);

    l = rec->length;
    bs = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_block_size(ds);

    /* COMPRESS */

    if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) {
        /*
         * We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
         * padding on the provider side.
         */
        i = bs - (l % bs);

        /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */
        l += i;
        /*
         * the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten with the
         * padding length.
         */
        memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i);
        rec->length += i;
        rec->input[l - 1] = (unsigned char)(i - 1);
    }

    if (!sending) {
        if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) {
            /* Publicly invalid */
            return 0;
        }
        /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
    }

    if (provided) {
        int outlen;

        if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ds, rec->data, &outlen, rec->input,
                              (unsigned int)l))
            return 0;
        rec->length = outlen;

        if (!sending && mac != NULL) {
            /* Now get a pointer to the MAC */
            OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;

            /* Get the MAC */
            mac->alloced = 0;

            *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC,
                                                  (void **)&mac->mac,
                                                  macsize);
            *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();

            if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ds, params)) {
                /* Shouldn't normally happen */
                RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                return 0;
            }
        }
    } else {
        if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, (unsigned int)l) < 1) {
            /* Shouldn't happen */
            RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
            return 0;
        }

        if (!sending)
            return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&rec->length,
                                        rec->orig_len,
                                        rec->data,
                                        (mac != NULL) ? &mac->mac : NULL,
                                        (mac != NULL) ? &mac->alloced : NULL,
                                        bs,
                                        macsize,
                                        rl->libctx);
    }

    return 1;
}

static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48] = {
    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
    0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
};

static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = {
    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
    0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
};

static int ssl3_mac(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, TLS_RL_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
                    int sending)
{
    unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq = rl->sequence;
    const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
    unsigned char *p, rec_char;
    size_t md_size;
    size_t npad;
    int t;

    mac_sec = &(rl->mac_secret[0]);
    hash = rl->md_ctx;

    t = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(hash);
    if (t <= 0)
        return 0;
    md_size = t;
    npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size;

    if (!sending
        && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(rl->enc_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
        && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) {
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
        return 0;
#else
        /*
         * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
         * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
         * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
         */

        /*-
         * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
         *   16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
         *
         * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
         * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
         * total size.
         */
        unsigned char header[75];
        size_t j = 0;
        memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size);
        j += md_size;
        memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
        j += npad;
        memcpy(header + j, seq, 8);
        j += 8;
        header[j++] = rec->type;
        header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
        header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);

        /* Final param == is SSLv3 */
        if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(hash),
                                   md, &md_size,
                                   header, rec->input,
                                   rec->length, rec->orig_len,
                                   mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0)
            return 0;
#endif
    } else {
        unsigned int md_size_u;
        /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
        EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();

        if (md_ctx == NULL)
            return 0;

        rec_char = rec->type;
        p = md;
        s2n(rec->length, p);
        if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0
            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0
            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0
            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0
            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
            || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
            || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
            || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0
            || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) {
            EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
            return 0;
        }

        EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
    }

    if (!tls_increment_sequence_ctr(rl))
        return 0;

    return 1;
}

struct record_functions_st ssl_3_0_funcs = {
    ssl3_set_crypto_state,
    ssl3_cipher,
    ssl3_mac,
    tls_default_set_protocol_version,
    tls_default_read_n,
    tls_get_more_records,
    tls_default_validate_record_header,
    tls_default_post_process_record,
    tls_get_max_records_default,
    tls_write_records_default,
    /* These 2 functions are defined in tls1_meth.c */
    tls1_allocate_write_buffers,
    tls1_initialise_write_packets,
    NULL,
    tls_prepare_record_header_default,
    NULL,
    tls_prepare_for_encryption_default,
    tls_post_encryption_processing_default,
    NULL
};
Commit	Line	Data
50023e9b	1	/*
da1c088f	2	* Copyright 2022-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
50023e9b MC	3	*
	4	* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
	5	* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
	6	* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
	7	* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
	8	*/
	9
	10	#include <openssl/evp.h>
	11	#include <openssl/core_names.h>
25624c90	12	#include "internal/ssl3_cbc.h"
50023e9b MC	13	#include "../../ssl_local.h"
	14	#include "../record_local.h"
	15	#include "recmethod_local.h"
	16
50023e9b MC	17	static int ssl3_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
	18	unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
	19	unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
	20	unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
	21	const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
	22	size_t taglen,
50023e9b MC	23	int mactype,
50023e9b MC	24	const EVP_MD *md,
1e76110b	25	COMP_METHOD *comp)
50023e9b MC	26	{
50023e9b MC	27	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
a8572674	28	int enc = (rl->direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE) ? 1 : 0;
50023e9b MC	29
50023e9b MC	30	if (md == NULL) {
7c293999 MC	31	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
7c293999 MC	32	return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
50023e9b MC	33	}
50023e9b MC	34
6366bdd9	35	if ((rl->enc_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
7c293999 MC	36	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
7c293999 MC	37	return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
50023e9b	38	}
6366bdd9	39	ciph_ctx = rl->enc_ctx;
50023e9b	40
6366bdd9 MC	41	rl->md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
6366bdd9 MC	42	if (rl->md_ctx == NULL) {
7c293999 MC	43	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
7c293999 MC	44	return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
50023e9b	45	}
a8572674 MC	46
	47	if ((md != NULL && EVP_DigestInit_ex(rl->md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0)) {
	48	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
	49	return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
	50	}
	51
50023e9b MC	52	#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
50023e9b MC	53	if (comp != NULL) {
1e76110b	54	rl->compctx = COMP_CTX_new(comp);
9251c3c4	55	if (rl->compctx == NULL) {
7c293999 MC	56	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
7c293999 MC	57	return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
50023e9b MC	58	}
	59	}
	60	#endif
	61
a8572674	62	if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, iv, enc)) {
7c293999 MC	63	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
7c293999 MC	64	return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
50023e9b MC	65	}
50023e9b MC	66
afcc12c4 MC	67	/*
	68	* The cipher we actually ended up using in the EVP_CIPHER_CTX may be
	69	* different to that in ciph if we have an ENGINE in use
	70	*/
	71	if (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ciph_ctx)) != NULL
7f2f0ac7	72	&& !ossl_set_tls_provider_parameters(rl, ciph_ctx, ciph, md)) {
1704961c	73	/* ERR_raise already called */
7c293999	74	return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
50023e9b MC	75	}
	76
	77	if (mackeylen > sizeof(rl->mac_secret)) {
7c293999 MC	78	ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
7c293999 MC	79	return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
50023e9b MC	80	}
	81	memcpy(rl->mac_secret, mackey, mackeylen);
	82
7c293999	83	return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS;
50023e9b MC	84	}
	85
	86	/*
	87	* ssl3_cipher encrypts/decrypts \|n_recs\| records in \|inrecs\|. Calls RLAYERfatal
	88	* on internal error, but not otherwise. It is the responsibility of the caller
	89	* to report a bad_record_mac
	90	*
	91	* Returns:
	92	* 0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error
	93	* 1: Success or Mac-then-encrypt decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
	94	*/
22094d11 MC	95	static int ssl3_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER rl, TLS_RL_RECORD inrecs,
	96	size_t n_recs, int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *mac,
	97	size_t macsize)
50023e9b	98	{
22094d11	99	TLS_RL_RECORD *rec;
50023e9b MC	100	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
	101	size_t l, i;
	102	size_t bs;
	103	const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
	104	int provided;
	105
	106	rec = inrecs;
	107	/*
	108	* We shouldn't ever be called with more than one record in the SSLv3 case
	109	*/
	110	if (n_recs != 1)
	111	return 0;
6366bdd9 MC	112
6366bdd9 MC	113	ds = rl->enc_ctx;
35bcac13 TM	114	if (ds == NULL \|\| (enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds)) == NULL)
35bcac13 TM	115	return 0;
50023e9b MC	116
	117	provided = (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(enc) != NULL);
	118
	119	l = rec->length;
	120	bs = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_block_size(ds);
	121
	122	/* COMPRESS */
	123
	124	if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) {
	125	/*
1704961c MC	126	* We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
	127	* padding on the provider side.
	128	*/
50023e9b MC	129	i = bs - (l % bs);
	130
	131	/* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */
	132	l += i;
	133	/*
1704961c MC	134	* the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten with the
	135	* padding length.
	136	*/
50023e9b MC	137	memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i);
	138	rec->length += i;
	139	rec->input[l - 1] = (unsigned char)(i - 1);
	140	}
	141
	142	if (!sending) {
	143	if (l == 0 \|\| l % bs != 0) {
	144	/* Publicly invalid */
	145	return 0;
	146	}
	147	/* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
	148	}
	149
	150	if (provided) {
	151	int outlen;
	152
	153	if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ds, rec->data, &outlen, rec->input,
1704961c	154	(unsigned int)l))
50023e9b MC	155	return 0;
	156	rec->length = outlen;
	157
	158	if (!sending && mac != NULL) {
	159	/* Now get a pointer to the MAC */
	160	OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
	161
	162	/* Get the MAC */
	163	mac->alloced = 0;
	164
	165	*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC,
1704961c MC	166	(void **)&mac->mac,
1704961c MC	167	macsize);
50023e9b MC	168	*p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
	169
	170	if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ds, params)) {
	171	/* Shouldn't normally happen */
	172	RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
	173	return 0;
	174	}
	175	}
	176	} else {
	177	if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, (unsigned int)l) < 1) {
	178	/* Shouldn't happen */
	179	RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
	180	return 0;
	181	}
	182
	183	if (!sending)
	184	return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&rec->length,
	185	rec->orig_len,
	186	rec->data,
	187	(mac != NULL) ? &mac->mac : NULL,
	188	(mac != NULL) ? &mac->alloced : NULL,
	189	bs,
	190	macsize,
	191	rl->libctx);
	192	}
	193
	194	return 1;
	195	}
	196
	197	static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48] = {
	198	0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
	199	0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
	200	0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
	201	0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
	202	0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
	203	0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
	204	};
	205
	206	static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = {
	207	0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
	208	0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
	209	0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
	210	0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
	211	0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
	212	0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
	213	};
	214
22094d11	215	static int ssl3_mac(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER rl, TLS_RL_RECORD rec, unsigned char *md,
8124ab56	216	int sending)
50023e9b	217	{
0755722c	218	unsigned char mac_sec, seq = rl->sequence;
50023e9b MC	219	const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
	220	unsigned char *p, rec_char;
	221	size_t md_size;
	222	size_t npad;
	223	int t;
	224
6366bdd9 MC	225	mac_sec = &(rl->mac_secret[0]);
6366bdd9 MC	226	hash = rl->md_ctx;
50023e9b MC	227
50023e9b MC	228	t = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(hash);
624efd2b	229	if (t <= 0)
50023e9b MC	230	return 0;
	231	md_size = t;
	232	npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size;
	233
	234	if (!sending
6366bdd9	235	&& EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(rl->enc_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
50023e9b MC	236	&& ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) {
	237	#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
	238	return 0;
	239	#else
	240	/*
	241	* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
	242	* timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
	243	* are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
	244	*/
	245
	246	/*-
	247	* npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
	248	* 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
	249	*
	250	* With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
	251	* goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
	252	* total size.
	253	*/
	254	unsigned char header[75];
	255	size_t j = 0;
	256	memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size);
	257	j += md_size;
	258	memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
	259	j += npad;
	260	memcpy(header + j, seq, 8);
	261	j += 8;
	262	header[j++] = rec->type;
	263	header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
	264	header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
	265
	266	/* Final param == is SSLv3 */
	267	if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(hash),
	268	md, &md_size,
	269	header, rec->input,
	270	rec->length, rec->orig_len,
	271	mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0)
	272	return 0;
	273	#endif
	274	} else {
	275	unsigned int md_size_u;
	276	/* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
	277	EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
	278
	279	if (md_ctx == NULL)
	280	return 0;
	281
	282	rec_char = rec->type;
	283	p = md;
	284	s2n(rec->length, p);
	285	if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
	286	\|\| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
	287	\|\| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0
	288	\|\| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0
	289	\|\| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0
	290	\|\| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0
	291	\|\| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
	292	\|\| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
	293	\|\| EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
	294	\|\| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
	295	\|\| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
	296	\|\| EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0
	297	\|\| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) {
	298	EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
	299	return 0;
300	}
301
302	EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
303	}
304
bed07b18 MC	305	if (!tls_increment_sequence_ctr(rl))
	306	return 0;
	307
50023e9b MC	308	return 1;
	309	}
	310
	311	struct record_functions_st ssl_3_0_funcs = {
	312	ssl3_set_crypto_state,
	313	ssl3_cipher,
1853d20a MC	314	ssl3_mac,
1853d20a MC	315	tls_default_set_protocol_version,
bafe524b MC	316	tls_default_read_n,
bafe524b MC	317	tls_get_more_records,
1853d20a	318	tls_default_validate_record_header,
bafe524b MC	319	tls_default_post_process_record,
bafe524b MC	320	tls_get_max_records_default,
91fe8ff0 MC	321	tls_write_records_default,
	322	/* These 2 functions are defined in tls1_meth.c */
	323	tls1_allocate_write_buffers,
7ca61d63	324	tls1_initialise_write_packets,
aca70ca8	325	NULL,
2582de25	326	tls_prepare_record_header_default,
757ef3ba	327	NULL,
2a354d54	328	tls_prepare_for_encryption_default,
ace38195 MC	329	tls_post_encryption_processing_default,
ace38195 MC	330	NULL
50023e9b	331	};