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Fix seg fault in ASN1_generate_v3/ASN1_generate_nconf
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / s3_srvr.c
CommitLineData
cbb92dfa 1/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
58964a49 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
d02b48c6
RE		 3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
0f113f3e 8 *
d02b48c6
RE		 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
0f113f3e 15 *
d02b48c6
RE		 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
0f113f3e 22 *
d02b48c6
RE		 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
0f113f3e 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
d02b48c6
RE		 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
0f113f3e 40 *
d02b48c6
RE		 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
0f113f3e 52 *
d02b48c6
RE		 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
8e2f6b79 58/* ====================================================================
52b8dad8 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
8e2f6b79
BM		 60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
0f113f3e 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
8e2f6b79
BM		 67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
ea262260
BM		 111/* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
0f113f3e 114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
ea262260
BM		 115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
ea262260
BM		 120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
ddac1974
NL		 124/* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
d02b48c6 150
de469ef2 151
d02b48c6 152#include <stdio.h>
7b63c0fa
LJ		 153#include "ssl_locl.h"
154#include "kssl_lcl.h"
455b65df 155#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h"
ec577822
BM		 156#include <openssl/buffer.h>
157#include <openssl/rand.h>
158#include <openssl/objects.h>
159#include <openssl/evp.h>
6434abbf 160#include <openssl/hmac.h>
ec577822 161#include <openssl/x509.h>
3eeaab4b 162#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
0f113f3e 163# include <openssl/dh.h>
3eeaab4b 164#endif
d095b68d 165#include <openssl/bn.h>
5fdf0666 166#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
0f113f3e 167# include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
5fdf0666 168#endif
dbad1690 169#include <openssl/md5.h>
f9b3bff6 170
3881d810 171#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
4ebb342f 172static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
d02b48c6 173
4ebb342f 174static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
0f113f3e
MC		 175{
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return (SSLv3_server_method());
178 else
179 return (NULL);
180}
d02b48c6 181
3881d810 182IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
0f113f3e
MC		 183 ssl3_accept,
184 ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
3881d810 185#endif
edc032b5 186#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
71fa4513 187static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
0f113f3e
MC		 188{
189 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
190
191 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
192
193 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
194 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
195 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
196 /*
197 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
198 * login name
199 */
200 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
201 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
202 } else {
203 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
204 }
205 }
206 return ret;
207}
edc032b5
BL		 208#endif
209
6b691a5c 210int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 211{
212 BUF_MEM *buf;
213 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
214 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
215 int ret = -1;
216 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
217
218 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
219 ERR_clear_error();
220 clear_sys_error();
221
222 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
223 cb = s->info_callback;
224 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
225 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
226
227 /* init things to blank */
228 s->in_handshake++;
229 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
230 SSL_clear(s);
231
232 if (s->cert == NULL) {
233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
234 return (-1);
235 }
4817504d 236#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
0f113f3e
MC		 237 /*
238 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
239 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
240 * handshakes anyway.
241 */
242 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
243 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
244 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
245 }
4817504d
DSH		 246#endif
247
0f113f3e
MC		 248 for (;;) {
249 state = s->state;
250
251 switch (s->state) {
252 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
253 s->renegotiate = 1;
254 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
255
256 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
257 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
258 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
259 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
260
261 s->server = 1;
262 if (cb != NULL)
263 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
264
265 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
267 return -1;
268 }
269
270 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
272 return -1;
273 }
274
275 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
276
277 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
278 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
279 ret = -1;
280 goto end;
281 }
282 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
283 BUF_MEM_free(buf);
284 ret = -1;
285 goto end;
286 }
287 s->init_buf = buf;
288 }
289
290 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
291 ret = -1;
292 goto end;
293 }
294
295 s->init_num = 0;
296 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
297 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
298 /*
299 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
300 */
301 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
302
303 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
304 /*
305 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
306 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
307 */
308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
309 ret = -1;
310 goto end;
311 }
312
313 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
314 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
315 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
316 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
317 !(s->options &
318 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
319 /*
320 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
321 * support secure renegotiation.
322 */
323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
324 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
325 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
326 ret = -1;
327 goto end;
328 } else {
329 /*
330 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
331 * HelloRequest
332 */
333 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
334 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
335 }
336 break;
337
338 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
339 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
340
341 s->shutdown = 0;
342 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
343 if (ret <= 0)
344 goto end;
345 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
346 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
347 s->init_num = 0;
348
349 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
350 break;
351
352 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
353 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
354 break;
355
356 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
357 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
358 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
359
360 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
361 if (ret <= 0)
362 goto end;
edc032b5 363#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
0f113f3e
MC		 364 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
365 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
366 {
367 int al;
368 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
369 /*
370 * callback indicates firther work to be done
371 */
372 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
373 goto end;
374 }
375 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
376 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
377 /*
378 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
379 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
380 */
381 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
383 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
384 ret = -1;
385 goto end;
386 }
387 }
388#endif
389
390 s->renegotiate = 2;
391 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
392 s->init_num = 0;
393 break;
394
395 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
396 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
397 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
398 if (ret <= 0)
399 goto end;
d26c905c 400#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
0f113f3e
MC		 401 if (s->hit) {
402 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
403 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
404 else
405 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
406 }
d26c905c 407#else
0f113f3e
MC		 408 if (s->hit)
409 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
d26c905c 410#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 411 else
412 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
413 s->init_num = 0;
414 break;
415
416 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
417 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
418 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
419 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
420 if (!
421 (s->s3->tmp.
422 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 |
423 SSL_aSRP))
424&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
425 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
426 if (ret <= 0)
427 goto end;
67c8e7f4 428#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
0f113f3e
MC		 429 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
430 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
431 else
432 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
433 } else {
434 skip = 1;
435 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
436 }
67c8e7f4 437#else
0f113f3e
MC		 438 } else
439 skip = 1;
67c8e7f4 440
0f113f3e 441 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
67c8e7f4 442#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 443 s->init_num = 0;
444 break;
445
446 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
447 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
448 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
449
450 /*
451 * clear this, it may get reset by
452 * send_server_key_exchange
453 */
454 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
455
456 /*
457 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
458 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
459 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
460 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
461 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
462 * key exchange.
463 */
464 if (0
465 /*
466 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
467 * provided
468 */
ddac1974 469#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
0f113f3e 470 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
edc032b5
BL		 471#endif
472#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
0f113f3e
MC		 473 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
474 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
ddac1974 475#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 476 || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
477 || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
478 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
479 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
480 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
739a5eee 481 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
0f113f3e
MC		 482 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
483 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
484 )
485 )
486 )
487 ) {
488 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
489 if (ret <= 0)
490 goto end;
491 } else
492 skip = 1;
493
494 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
495 s->init_num = 0;
496 break;
497
498 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
499 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
500 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
501 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
502 /*
503 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
504 * during re-negotiation:
505 */
506 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
507 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
508 /*
509 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
510 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
511 * RFC 2246):
512 */
513 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
514 /*
515 * ... except when the application insists on
516 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
517 * this for SSL 3)
518 */
519 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
520 /*
521 * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites
522 */
523 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) ||
524 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
525 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
526 /*
527 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
528 * are omitted
529 */
530 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
531 /* no cert request */
532 skip = 1;
533 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
534 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
535 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
536 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
537 return -1;
538 } else {
539 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
540 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
541 if (ret <= 0)
542 goto end;
0f113f3e 543 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
0f113f3e
MC		 544 s->init_num = 0;
545 }
546 break;
547
548 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
549 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
550 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
551 if (ret <= 0)
552 goto end;
553 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
554 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
555 s->init_num = 0;
556 break;
557
558 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
559
560 /*
561 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
562 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
563 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
564 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
565 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
566 * unconditionally.
567 */
568
569 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
570 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
571 ret = -1;
572 goto end;
573 }
574 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
575
576 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
577 break;
578
579 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
580 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
581 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
582 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
583 if (ret <= 0)
584 goto end;
585 }
586 s->init_num = 0;
587 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
588 break;
589
590 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
591 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
592 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
593 if (ret <= 0)
594 goto end;
595 if (ret == 2) {
596 /*
597 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
598 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
599 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
600 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
601 */
bf48836c 602#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
0f113f3e 603 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
ee2ffc27 604#else
0f113f3e
MC		 605 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
606 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
607 else
608 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
ee2ffc27 609#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 610 s->init_num = 0;
611 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
612 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
613 s->init_num = 0;
614 if (!s->session->peer)
615 break;
0f113f3e
MC		 616 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
618 return -1;
619 }
0cfb0e75
DSH		 620 /*
621 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
622 * extms we've done this already.
623 */
624 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
625 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
626 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
627 return -1;
628 }
0f113f3e
MC		 629 } else {
630 int offset = 0;
631 int dgst_num;
632
633 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
634 s->init_num = 0;
635
636 /*
637 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
638 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
639 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
640 * step
641 */
642 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
643 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
644 return -1;
645 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
646 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
647 int dgst_size;
648
649 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
650 EVP_MD_CTX_type
651 (s->
652 s3->handshake_dgst
653 [dgst_num]),
654 &(s->s3->
655 tmp.cert_verify_md
656 [offset]));
657 dgst_size =
658 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
659 if (dgst_size < 0) {
660 ret = -1;
661 goto end;
662 }
663 offset += dgst_size;
664 }
665 }
666 break;
667
668 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
669 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
670 /*
671 * This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
672 * extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
673 * to set this here because we don't know if we're
674 * expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
675 */
676 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
677 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
678 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
679 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
680 if (ret <= 0)
681 goto end;
d02b48c6 682
bf48836c 683#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
0f113f3e 684 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
ee2ffc27 685#else
0f113f3e
MC		 686 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
687 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
688 else
689 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
ee2ffc27 690#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 691 s->init_num = 0;
692 break;
d02b48c6 693
bf48836c 694#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
0f113f3e
MC		 695 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
696 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
697 /*
698 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes with NPN.
699 * In a full handshake with NPN, we end up here through
700 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
701 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
702 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
703 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
704 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
705 * the client's Finished message is read.
706 */
707 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
708 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
709
710 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
711 if (ret <= 0)
712 goto end;
713 s->init_num = 0;
714 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
715 break;
ee2ffc27
BL		 716#endif
717
0f113f3e
MC		 718 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
719 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
720 /*
721 * Enable CCS for resumed handshakes without NPN.
722 * In a full handshake, we end up here through
723 * SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, where SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK was
724 * already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
725 * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
726 * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
727 * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
728 * the client's Finished message is read.
729 */
730 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
731 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
732 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
733 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
734 if (ret <= 0)
735 goto end;
736 if (s->hit)
737 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
c519e89f 738#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
0f113f3e
MC		 739 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
740 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
6434abbf 741#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 742 else
743 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
744 s->init_num = 0;
745 break;
d02b48c6 746
6434abbf 747#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
0f113f3e
MC		 748 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
749 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
750 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
751 if (ret <= 0)
752 goto end;
753 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
754 s->init_num = 0;
755 break;
756
757 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
759 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
760 if (ret <= 0)
761 goto end;
762 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
763 s->init_num = 0;
764 break;
67c8e7f4 765
6434abbf
DSH		 766#endif
767
0f113f3e
MC		 768 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
769 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
770
771 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
772 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
773 ret = -1;
774 goto end;
775 }
776
777 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
778 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,
779 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
780
781 if (ret <= 0)
782 goto end;
783 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
784 s->init_num = 0;
785
786 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
787 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
788 {
789 ret = -1;
790 goto end;
791 }
792
793 break;
794
795 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
796 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
797 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
798 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
799 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
800 s->method->
801 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
802 s->method->
803 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
804 if (ret <= 0)
805 goto end;
806 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
807 if (s->hit) {
bf48836c 808#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
0f113f3e 809 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
ee2ffc27 810#else
0f113f3e
MC		 811 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
812 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
813 } else
814 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
ee2ffc27 815#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 816 } else
817 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
818 s->init_num = 0;
819 break;
820
821 case SSL_ST_OK:
822 /* clean a few things up */
823 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
824
825 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
826 s->init_buf = NULL;
827
828 /* remove buffering on output */
829 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
830
831 s->init_num = 0;
832
833 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
834 * HelloRequest */
835 s->renegotiate = 0;
836 s->new_session = 0;
837
838 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
839
840 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
841 /* s->server=1; */
842 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
843
844 if (cb != NULL)
845 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
846 }
847
848 ret = 1;
849 goto end;
850 /* break; */
851
852 default:
853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
854 ret = -1;
855 goto end;
856 /* break; */
857 }
858
859 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
860 if (s->debug) {
861 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
862 goto end;
863 }
864
865 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
866 new_state = s->state;
867 s->state = state;
868 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
869 s->state = new_state;
870 }
871 }
872 skip = 0;
873 }
874 end:
875 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
876
877 s->in_handshake--;
878 if (cb != NULL)
879 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
880 return (ret);
881}
d02b48c6 882
36d16f8e 883int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
0f113f3e 884{
d02b48c6 885
0f113f3e
MC		 886 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
887 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
888 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
889 }
d02b48c6 890
0f113f3e
MC		 891 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
892 return ssl_do_write(s);
893}
d02b48c6 894
36d16f8e 895int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 896{
897 int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
898 unsigned int cookie_len;
899 long n;
900 unsigned long id;
901 unsigned char *p, *d;
902 SSL_CIPHER *c;
09b6c2ef 903#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
0f113f3e
MC		 904 unsigned char *q;
905 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
09b6c2ef 906#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 907 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
908
909 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
910 goto retry_cert;
911
912 /*
913 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
914 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
915 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
916 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
917 */
918 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
919 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
920 }
921 s->first_packet = 1;
922 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
923 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
924 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
925 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
926 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
927
928 if (!ok)
929 return ((int)n);
930 s->first_packet = 0;
931 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
932
933 /*
934 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
935 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
936 */
937 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
938 p += 2;
939
940 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
941 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
942 : (s->client_version < s->version)) {
943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
944 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
945 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
946 /*
947 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
948 * number
949 */
950 s->version = s->client_version;
951 }
952 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
953 goto f_err;
954 }
955
956 /*
957 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
958 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
959 * cookie length...
960 */
961 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
962 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
963
964 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
965 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
966
967 if (cookie_length == 0)
968 return 1;
969 }
970
971 /* load the client random */
972 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
973 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
974
975 /* get the session-id */
976 j = *(p++);
977
978 s->hit = 0;
979 /*
980 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
981 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
982 * ignore resumption requests with flag
983 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
984 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
985 * for security won't even compile against older library versions).
986 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
987 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
988 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
989 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
990 */
991 if ((s->new_session
992 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
993 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
994 goto err;
995 } else {
996 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
997 /*
998 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
999 * version.
1000 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1001 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1002 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1003 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1004 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1005 */
1006 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
1007 * session */
1008 s->hit = 1;
1009 } else if (i == -1)
1010 goto err;
1011 else { /* i == 0 */
1012
1013 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1014 goto err;
1015 }
1016 }
1017
1018 p += j;
1019
1020 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1021 /* cookie stuff */
1022 cookie_len = *(p++);
1023
1024 /*
1025 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1026 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1027 * does not cause an overflow.
1028 */
1029 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
1030 /* too much data */
1031 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1033 goto f_err;
1034 }
1035
1036 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1037 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
1038 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1039
1040 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1041 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1042 cookie_len) == 0) {
1043 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1045 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1046 goto f_err;
1047 }
1048 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1049 }
1050 /* default verification */
1051 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1052 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1053 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1055 goto f_err;
1056 }
1057 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1058 ret = -2;
1059 }
1060
1061 p += cookie_len;
1062 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1063 /* Select version to use */
1064 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1065 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
1066 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1067 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1068 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1070 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1071 s->version = s->client_version;
1072 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1073 goto f_err;
1074 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1075 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
1076 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1077 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1078 } else {
1079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1080 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1081 s->version = s->client_version;
1082 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1083 goto f_err;
1084 }
1085 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1086 }
1087 }
1088
1089 n2s(p, i);
1090 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) {
1091 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1092 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1094 goto f_err;
1095 }
1096 if ((p + i) >= (d + n)) {
1097 /* not enough data */
1098 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1100 goto f_err;
1101 }
1102 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers))
1103 == NULL)) {
1104 goto err;
1105 }
1106 p += i;
1107
1108 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1109 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) {
1110 j = 0;
1111 id = s->session->cipher->id;
d02b48c6 1112
413c4f45 1113#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
0f113f3e
MC		 1114 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1115 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
413c4f45 1116#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 1117 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1118 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
413c4f45 1119#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
0f113f3e
MC		 1120 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1121 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
413c4f45 1122#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 1123 if (c->id == id) {
1124 j = 1;
1125 break;
1126 }
1127 }
1128 /*
1129 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
1130 * CVE-2010-4180.
1131 */
88f2a4cf 1132#if 0
0f113f3e
MC		 1133 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1134 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
1135 /*
1136 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1137 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1138 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1139 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1140 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1141 */
1142 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1143 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
1144 s->session->cipher = c;
1145 j = 1;
1146 }
1147 }
88f2a4cf 1148#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 1149 if (j == 0) {
1150 /*
1151 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1152 * to reuse it
1153 */
1154 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1156 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1157 goto f_err;
1158 }
1159 }
1160
1161 /* compression */
1162 i = *(p++);
1163 if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
1164 /* not enough data */
1165 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1167 goto f_err;
1168 }
a4c4a7d5 1169#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
0f113f3e 1170 q = p;
a4c4a7d5 1171#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 1172 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
1173 if (p[j] == 0)
1174 break;
1175 }
1176
1177 p += i;
1178 if (j >= i) {
1179 /* no compress */
1180 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1182 goto f_err;
1183 }
58ece833 1184#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
0f113f3e
MC		 1185 /* TLS extensions */
1186 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1187 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1189 goto err;
1190 }
1191 }
1192
1193 /*
1194 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1195 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1196 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1197 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1198 */
1199 {
1200 unsigned char *pos;
1201 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1202 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1203 goto f_err;
1204 }
1205 }
1206
1207 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1208 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1209
1210 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1211 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1212 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1213 &pref_cipher,
1214 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1215 s->hit = 1;
1216 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1217 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1218
1219 ciphers = NULL;
1220
1221 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1222 pref_cipher =
1223 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1224 s->
1225 session->ciphers,
1226 SSL_get_ciphers
1227 (s));
1228 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1229 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1231 goto f_err;
1232 }
1233
1234 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1235
1236 if (s->cipher_list)
1237 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1238
1239 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1240 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1241
1242 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1243 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1244 }
1245 }
58ece833
BM		 1246#endif
1247
0f113f3e
MC		 1248 /*
1249 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1250 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1251 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1252 */
1253 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
09b6c2ef 1254#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
0f113f3e
MC		 1255 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1256 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1257 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1258 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1259 /* Can't disable compression */
1260 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1262 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1263 goto f_err;
1264 }
1265 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1266 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1267 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1268 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1269 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1270 break;
1271 }
1272 }
1273 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1275 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1276 goto f_err;
1277 }
1278 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1279 for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
1280 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1281 break;
1282 }
1283 if (m >= i) {
1284 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1286 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1287 goto f_err;
1288 }
1289 } else if (s->hit)
1290 comp = NULL;
1291 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
df6741c9 1292 /* See if we have a match */
0f113f3e
MC		 1293 int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
1294
1295 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1296 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1297 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1298 v = comp->id;
1299 for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
1300 if (v == q[o]) {
1301 done = 1;
1302 break;
1303 }
1304 }
1305 if (done)
1306 break;
1307 }
1308 if (done)
1309 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1310 else
1311 comp = NULL;
1312 }
e6f418bc 1313#else
0f113f3e
MC		 1314 /*
1315 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1316 * using compression.
1317 */
1318 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1320 goto f_err;
1321 }
09b6c2ef 1322#endif
413c4f45 1323
0f113f3e
MC		 1324 /*
1325 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1326 */
d02b48c6 1327
0f113f3e 1328 if (!s->hit) {
09b6c2ef 1329#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
0f113f3e 1330 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
09b6c2ef 1331#else
0f113f3e 1332 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
09b6c2ef 1333#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 1334 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1335 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1336 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1337 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1338 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1340 goto f_err;
1341 }
1342 ciphers = NULL;
1343 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1345 goto err;
1346 }
1347 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1348 retry_cert:
1349 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1350 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1351 if (rv == 0) {
1352 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1354 goto f_err;
1355 }
1356 if (rv < 0) {
1357 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1358 return -1;
1359 }
1360 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1361 }
1362 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1363
1364 if (c == NULL) {
1365 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1367 goto f_err;
1368 }
1369 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1370 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1371 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1372 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1373 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
1374 != 0));
1375 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1376 /* do not send a session ticket */
1377 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1378 } else {
1379 /* Session-id reuse */
7a4dadc3 1380 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
0f113f3e
MC		 1381 }
1382
1383 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1384 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1385 goto f_err;
1386 }
1387
50e735f9
MC		 1388 /*-
1389 * we now have the following setup.
1390 * client_random
1391 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1392 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1393 * compression - basically ignored right now
1394 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1395 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1396 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1397 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1398 */
0f113f3e
MC		 1399
1400 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1401 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1402 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1404 goto err;
1405 }
1406 }
1407
1408 if (ret < 0)
1409 ret = -ret;
1410 if (0) {
1411 f_err:
1412 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1413 }
1414 err:
1415 if (ciphers != NULL)
1416 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1417 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1418}
d02b48c6 1419
36d16f8e 1420int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 1421{
1422 unsigned char *buf;
1423 unsigned char *p, *d;
1424 int i, sl;
1425 int al = 0;
1426 unsigned long l;
1427
1428 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1429 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
12bf56c0 1430#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
0f113f3e
MC		 1431 p = s->s3->server_random;
1432 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1433 return -1;
12bf56c0 1434#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 1435 /* Do the message type and length last */
1436 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1437
1438 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1439 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1440
1441 /* Random stuff */
1442 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1443 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1444
50e735f9
MC		 1445 /*-
1446 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1447 * back in the server hello:
1448 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1449 * we send back the old session ID.
1450 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1451 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1452 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1453 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1454 * session ID.
1455 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1456 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1457 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1458 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1459 * to send back.
1460 */
0f113f3e
MC		 1461 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1462 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1463 && !s->hit))
1464 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1465
1466 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1467 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1469 return -1;
1470 }
1471 *(p++) = sl;
1472 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1473 p += sl;
1474
1475 /* put the cipher */
1476 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1477 p += i;
1478
1479 /* put the compression method */
09b6c2ef 1480#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
0f113f3e 1481 *(p++) = 0;
09b6c2ef 1482#else
0f113f3e
MC		 1483 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1484 *(p++) = 0;
1485 else
1486 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
09b6c2ef 1487#endif
ed3883d2 1488#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
0f113f3e
MC		 1489 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1491 return -1;
1492 }
1493 if ((p =
1494 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1495 &al)) == NULL) {
1496 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1498 return -1;
1499 }
ed3883d2 1500#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 1501 /* do the header */
1502 l = (p - d);
1503 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1504 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1505 }
d02b48c6 1506
0f113f3e
MC		 1507 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1508 return ssl_do_write(s);
1509}
d02b48c6 1510
36d16f8e 1511int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
0f113f3e 1512{
d02b48c6 1513
0f113f3e
MC		 1514 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1515 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1516 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1517 }
d02b48c6 1518
0f113f3e
MC		 1519 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1520 return ssl_do_write(s);
1521}
d02b48c6 1522
36d16f8e 1523int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
0f113f3e 1524{
bc36ee62 1525#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
0f113f3e
MC		 1526 unsigned char *q;
1527 int j, num;
1528 RSA *rsa;
1529 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1530 unsigned int u;
d02b48c6 1531#endif
bc36ee62 1532#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
0f113f3e 1533 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
ea262260
BM		 1534#endif
1535#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
0f113f3e
MC		 1536 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1537 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1538 int encodedlen = 0;
1539 int curve_id = 0;
1540 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
d02b48c6 1541#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 1542 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1543 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1544 unsigned char *p, *d;
1545 int al, i;
1546 unsigned long type;
1547 int n;
1548 CERT *cert;
1549 BIGNUM *r[4];
1550 int nr[4], kn;
1551 BUF_MEM *buf;
1552 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1553
1554 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1555 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1556 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1557 cert = s->cert;
1558
1559 buf = s->init_buf;
1560
1561 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1562 n = 0;
bc36ee62 1563#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
0f113f3e
MC		 1564 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1565 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1566 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1567 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1568 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1569 tmp.new_cipher),
1570 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1571 tmp.new_cipher));
1572 if (rsa == NULL) {
1573 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1575 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1576 goto f_err;
1577 }
1578 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1579 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1580 }
1581 if (rsa == NULL) {
1582 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1584 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1585 goto f_err;
1586 }
1587 r[0] = rsa->n;
1588 r[1] = rsa->e;
1589 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1590 } else
d02b48c6 1591#endif
bc36ee62 1592#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
0f113f3e
MC		 1593 if (type & SSL_kDHE) {
1594 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1595 dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1596 if (dhp == NULL) {
1597 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1599 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1600 goto f_err;
1601 }
1602 } else
1603 dhp = cert->dh_tmp;
1604 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1605 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1606 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1607 tmp.new_cipher),
1608 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1609 tmp.new_cipher));
1610 if (dhp == NULL) {
1611 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1613 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1614 goto f_err;
1615 }
1616 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1617 DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp)) {
1618 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1620 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1621 goto f_err;
1622 }
1623 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1625 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1626 goto err;
1627 }
1628
1629 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1630 dh = dhp;
1631 else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1633 goto err;
1634 }
1635
1636 s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
1637 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1638 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1639 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1640 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1642 goto err;
1643 }
1644 } else {
1645 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1646 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1647 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1649 goto err;
1650 }
1651 }
1652 r[0] = dh->p;
1653 r[1] = dh->g;
1654 r[2] = dh->pub_key;
1655 } else
d02b48c6 1656#endif
ea262260 1657#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
0f113f3e
MC		 1658 if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
1659 const EC_GROUP *group;
1660
1661 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1662 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
1663 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1664 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1665 if (nid != NID_undef)
1666 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1667 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
1668 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1669 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1670 tmp.new_cipher),
1671 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1672 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1673 }
1674 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1675 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1677 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1678 goto f_err;
1679 }
1680
1681 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1683 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1684 goto err;
1685 }
1686
1687 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1688 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1690 goto err;
1691 }
1692 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1693 ecdh = ecdhp;
1694 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1696 goto err;
1697 }
1698
1699 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1700 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1701 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1702 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1703 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1705 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1706 goto err;
1707 }
1708 }
1709
1710 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1711 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1712 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1714 goto err;
1715 }
1716
1717 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1718 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1720 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1721 goto err;
1722 }
1723
1724 /*
1725 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1726 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1727 * non-zero.
1728 */
1729 if ((curve_id =
1730 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1731 == 0) {
1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1733 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1734 goto err;
1735 }
1736
1737 /*
1738 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1739 * allocate memory accordingly.
1740 */
1741 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1742 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1743 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1744 NULL, 0, NULL);
1745
1746 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1747 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1748 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1749 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1751 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1752 goto err;
1753 }
1754
1755 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1756 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1757 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1758 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1759
1760 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1762 goto err;
1763 }
1764
1765 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1766 bn_ctx = NULL;
1767
1768 /*
1769 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1770 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1771 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1772 * structure.
1773 */
1774 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1775
1776 /*
1777 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1778 * can set these to NULLs
1779 */
1780 r[0] = NULL;
1781 r[1] = NULL;
1782 r[2] = NULL;
1783 r[3] = NULL;
1784 } else
1785#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
ddac1974 1786#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
0f113f3e
MC		 1787 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1788 /*
1789 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1790 */
1791 n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1792 } else
1793#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
edc032b5 1794#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
0f113f3e
MC		 1795 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1796 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1797 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1798 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1799 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1800 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1801 goto err;
1802 }
1803 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1804 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1805 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1806 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1807 } else
edc032b5 1808#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 1809 {
1810 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1812 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1813 goto f_err;
1814 }
1815 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1816 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
edc032b5 1817#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
0f113f3e
MC		 1818 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1819 n += 1 + nr[i];
1820 else
edc032b5 1821#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 1822 n += 2 + nr[i];
1823 }
1824
1825 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1826 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
1827 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1828 == NULL) {
1829 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1830 goto f_err;
1831 }
1832 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1833 } else {
1834 pkey = NULL;
1835 kn = 0;
1836 }
1837
1838 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1839 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1840 goto err;
1841 }
1842 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1843
1844 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
edc032b5 1845#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
0f113f3e
MC		 1846 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1847 *p = nr[i];
1848 p++;
1849 } else
edc032b5 1850#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 1851 s2n(nr[i], p);
1852 BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
1853 p += nr[i];
1854 }
d02b48c6 1855
ea262260 1856#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
0f113f3e
MC		 1857 if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
1858 /*
1859 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1860 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1861 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1862 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1863 */
1864 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1865 p += 1;
1866 *p = 0;
1867 p += 1;
1868 *p = curve_id;
1869 p += 1;
1870 *p = encodedlen;
1871 p += 1;
1872 memcpy((unsigned char *)p,
1873 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1874 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1875 encodedPoint = NULL;
1876 p += encodedlen;
1877 }
ea262260
BM		 1878#endif
1879
ddac1974 1880#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
0f113f3e
MC		 1881 if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
1882 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1883 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1884 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
1885 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1886 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1887 }
ddac1974
NL		 1888#endif
1889
0f113f3e
MC		 1890 /* not anonymous */
1891 if (pkey != NULL) {
1892 /*
1893 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1894 * points to the space at the end.
1895 */
bc36ee62 1896#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
0f113f3e
MC		 1897 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1898 q = md_buf;
1899 j = 0;
1900 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1901 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1902 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1903 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1904 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1905 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1906 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1907 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1908 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1909 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1910 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
1911 q += i;
1912 j += i;
1913 }
1914 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1915 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
1916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
1917 goto err;
1918 }
1919 s2n(u, p);
1920 n += u + 2;
1921 } else
d02b48c6 1922#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 1923 if (md) {
1924 /* send signature algorithm */
1925 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1926 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1927 /* Should never happen */
1928 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1930 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1931 goto f_err;
1932 }
1933 p += 2;
1934 }
a2f9200f 1935#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
0f113f3e 1936 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
a2f9200f 1937#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 1938 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1939 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1940 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1941 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1942 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1943 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1944 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
1945 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
1946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
1947 goto err;
1948 }
1949 s2n(i, p);
1950 n += i + 2;
1951 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1952 n += 2;
1953 } else {
1954 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1955 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1957 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1958 goto f_err;
1959 }
1960 }
1961
1962 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
1963 }
1964
1965 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1966 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1967 return ssl_do_write(s);
1968 f_err:
1969 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1970 err:
ea262260 1971#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
0f113f3e
MC		 1972 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
1973 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1974 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
ea262260 1975#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 1976 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1977 return (-1);
1978}
d02b48c6 1979
36d16f8e 1980int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 1981{
1982 unsigned char *p, *d;
1983 int i, j, nl, off, n;
1984 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
1985 X509_NAME *name;
1986 BUF_MEM *buf;
1987
1988 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
1989 buf = s->init_buf;
1990
1991 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1992
1993 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1994 p++;
1995 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
1996 d[0] = n;
1997 p += n;
1998 n++;
1999
2000 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2001 const unsigned char *psigs;
2002 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2003 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2004 /* Skip over length for now */
2005 p += 2;
2006 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2007 /* Now fill in length */
2008 s2n(nl, etmp);
2009 p += nl;
2010 n += nl + 2;
2011 }
2012
2013 off = n;
2014 p += 2;
2015 n += 2;
2016
2017 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2018 nl = 0;
2019 if (sk != NULL) {
2020 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2021 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2022 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2023 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2024 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2026 ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2027 goto err;
2028 }
2029 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
3c33c6f6
MC		 2030 s2n(j, p);
2031 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2032 n += 2 + j;
2033 nl += 2 + j;
0f113f3e
MC		 2034 }
2035 }
2036 /* else no CA names */
2037 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2038 s2n(nl, p);
2039
2040 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
d02b48c6 2041
0f113f3e
MC		 2042 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2043 }
d02b48c6 2044
0f113f3e
MC		 2045 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2046 return ssl_do_write(s);
2047 err:
2048 return (-1);
2049}
d02b48c6 2050
36d16f8e 2051int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 2052{
2053 int i, al, ok;
2054 long n;
2055 unsigned long alg_k;
2056 unsigned char *p;
bc36ee62 2057#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
0f113f3e
MC		 2058 RSA *rsa = NULL;
2059 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
79df9d62 2060#endif
bc36ee62 2061#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
0f113f3e
MC		 2062 BIGNUM *pub = NULL;
2063 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
58964a49 2064#endif
bc36ee62 2065#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
0f113f3e
MC		 2066 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
2067#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
d02b48c6 2068
ea262260 2069#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
0f113f3e
MC		 2070 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2071 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2072 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2073 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
ea262260
BM		 2074#endif
2075
0f113f3e
MC		 2076 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2077 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2078 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2079 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
d02b48c6 2080
0f113f3e
MC		 2081 if (!ok)
2082 return ((int)n);
2083 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
d02b48c6 2084
0f113f3e 2085 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
d02b48c6 2086
bc36ee62 2087#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
0f113f3e
MC		 2088 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2089 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2090 int decrypt_len;
2091 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2092 size_t j;
2093
2094 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2095 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2096 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2097 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2098 /*
2099 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2100 */
2101 if (rsa == NULL) {
2102 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2104 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2105 goto f_err;
2106
2107 }
2108 } else {
2109 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2110 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2111 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2112 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2113 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2114 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2115 goto f_err;
2116 }
2117 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2118 }
2119
2120 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2121 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2122 n2s(p, i);
2123 if (n != i + 2) {
2124 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
2125 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2127 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2128 goto f_err;
2129 } else
2130 p -= 2;
2131 } else
2132 n = i;
2133 }
2134
2135 /*
2136 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2137 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2138 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2139 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2140 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2141 */
2142 if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2143 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2145 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2146 goto f_err;
2147 }
2148
2149 /*
2150 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2151 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2152 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2153 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2154 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2155 */
2156
2157 /*
2158 * should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure.
2159 */
2160 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2161 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2162 goto err;
2163 decrypt_len =
2164 RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2165 ERR_clear_error();
2166
2167 /*
2168 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2169 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2170 */
2171 decrypt_good =
2172 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2173
2174 /*
2175 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2176 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2177 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2178 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2179 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2180 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2181 */
2182 version_good =
2183 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2184 version_good &=
2185 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2186
2187 /*
2188 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2189 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2190 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2191 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2192 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2193 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2194 * clients.
2195 */
2196 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2197 unsigned char workaround_good;
2198 workaround_good =
2199 constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2200 workaround_good &=
2201 constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2202 version_good |= workaround_good;
2203 }
2204
2205 /*
2206 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2207 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2208 */
2209 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2210
2211 /*
2212 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2213 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2214 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2215 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2216 */
2217 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2218 p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
2219 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2220 }
2221
2222 s->session->master_key_length =
2223 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2224 s->
2225 session->master_key,
2226 p,
2227 sizeof
2228 (rand_premaster_secret));
2229 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
2230 } else
4c5fac4a 2231#endif
bc36ee62 2232#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
0f113f3e
MC		 2233 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2234 int idx = -1;
2235 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2236 if (n)
2237 n2s(p, i);
2238 else
2239 i = 0;
2240 if (n && n != i + 2) {
2241 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2243 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2244 goto err;
2245 } else {
2246 p -= 2;
2247 i = (int)n;
2248 }
2249 }
2250 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2251 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2252 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2253 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2254 if (idx >= 0) {
2255 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2256 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2257 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
2258 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2260 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2261 goto f_err;
2262 }
2263 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2264 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2265 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2267 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2268 goto f_err;
2269 } else
2270 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2271
2272 if (n == 0L) {
2273 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2274 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2275 if (clkey) {
2276 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2277 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2278 }
2279 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2280 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2282 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2283 goto f_err;
2284 }
2285 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2286 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2287 } else
2288 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
2289 if (pub == NULL) {
2290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2291 goto err;
2292 }
2293
2294 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
2295
2296 if (i <= 0) {
2297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2298 BN_clear_free(pub);
2299 goto err;
2300 }
2301
2302 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2303 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2304 if (dh_clnt)
2305 DH_free(dh_clnt);
2306 else
2307 BN_clear_free(pub);
2308 pub = NULL;
2309 s->session->master_key_length =
2310 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2311 s->
2312 session->master_key,
2313 p, i);
2314 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2315 if (dh_clnt)
2316 return 2;
2317 } else
d02b48c6 2318#endif
bc36ee62 2319#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
0f113f3e
MC		 2320 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2321 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2322 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2323 krb5_data authenticator;
2324 krb5_data enc_pms;
2325 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2326 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2327 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2328 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2329 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2330 int padl, outl;
2331 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2332 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2333
2334 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2335
2336 if (!kssl_ctx)
2337 kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2338
2339 n2s(p, i);
2340 enc_ticket.length = i;
2341
2342 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) {
2343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2344 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2345 goto err;
2346 }
2347
2348 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2349 p += enc_ticket.length;
2350
2351 n2s(p, i);
2352 authenticator.length = i;
2353
2354 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) {
2355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2356 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2357 goto err;
2358 }
2359
2360 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2361 p += authenticator.length;
2362
2363 n2s(p, i);
2364 enc_pms.length = i;
2365 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2366 p += enc_pms.length;
2367
2368 /*
2369 * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption
2370 */
2371 if (enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) {
2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2373 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2374 goto err;
2375 }
2376
2377 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2378 enc_pms.length + 6)) {
2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2380 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2381 goto err;
2382 }
2383
2384 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2385 &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2386# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2387 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2388 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2389 if (kssl_err.text)
2390 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2391# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2393 goto err;
2394 }
2395
2396 /*
2397 * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will
2398 * return authtime == 0.
2399 */
2400 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2401 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) {
2402# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2403 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2404 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2405 if (kssl_err.text)
2406 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2407# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2409 goto err;
2410 }
2411
2412 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) {
2413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2414 goto err;
2415 }
2416# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2417 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2418# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2419
2420 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2421 if (enc == NULL)
2422 goto err;
2423
2424 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2425
2426 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) {
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2428 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2429 goto err;
2430 }
2431 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl,
2432 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2433 {
2434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2435 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2436 goto err;
2437 }
2438 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2440 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2441 goto err;
2442 }
2443 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) {
2444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2445 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2446 goto err;
2447 }
2448 outl += padl;
2449 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2451 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2452 goto err;
2453 }
2454 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8))
2455 && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
2456 /*
2457 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2458 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely,
2459 * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH
2460 * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random
2461 * bytes instead of the protocol version. If
2462 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2463 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos
2464 * cipher)
2465 */
2466 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) {
2467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2468 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2469 goto err;
2470 }
2471 }
2472
2473 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2474
2475 s->session->master_key_length =
2476 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2477 s->
2478 session->master_key,
2479 pms, outl);
2480
2481 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) {
2482 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2483 if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) {
2484 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2485 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ,
2486 len);
2487 }
2488 }
2489
50e735f9
MC		 2490 /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2491 * but it caused problems for apache.
2492 * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2493 * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2494 */
0f113f3e
MC		 2495 } else
2496#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
ea262260
BM		 2497
2498#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
0f113f3e
MC		 2499 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2500 int ret = 1;
2501 int field_size = 0;
2502 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2503 const EC_GROUP *group;
2504 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2505
2506 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2507 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2509 goto err;
2510 }
2511
2512 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2513 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2514 /* use the certificate */
2515 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2516 } else {
2517 /*
2518 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2519 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2520 */
2521 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2522 }
2523
2524 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2525 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2526
2527 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2528 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2530 goto err;
2531 }
2532
2533 /* Let's get client's public key */
2534 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2536 goto err;
2537 }
2538
2539 if (n == 0L) {
2540 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2541
2542 if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
2543 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2545 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2546 goto f_err;
2547 }
2548 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2549 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2550 /*
2551 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2552 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2553 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2554 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2555 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2556 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2557 */
2558 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2560 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2561 goto f_err;
2562 }
2563
2564 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2565 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2566 pkey.ec)) == 0) {
2567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2568 goto err;
2569 }
2570 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2571 } else {
2572 /*
2573 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2574 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2575 */
2576 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2578 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2579 goto err;
2580 }
2581
2582 /* Get encoded point length */
2583 i = *p;
2584 p += 1;
2585 if (n != 1 + i) {
2586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2587 goto err;
2588 }
2589 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2591 goto err;
2592 }
2593 /*
2594 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
2595 * to the start
2596 */
2597 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2598 }
2599
2600 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2601 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2602 if (field_size <= 0) {
2603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2604 goto err;
2605 }
2606 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
2607 NULL);
2608 if (i <= 0) {
2609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2610 goto err;
2611 }
2612
2613 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2614 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2615 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2616 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2617 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2618 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2619
2620 /* Compute the master secret */
2621 s->session->master_key_length =
2622 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2623 s->
2624 session->master_key,
2625 p, i);
2626
2627 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2628 return (ret);
2629 } else
ddac1974
NL		 2630#endif
2631#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
0f113f3e
MC		 2632 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2633 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2634 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
2635 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2636 int psk_err = 1;
2637 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2638
2639 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2640
2641 n2s(p, i);
2642 if (n != i + 2) {
2643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2644 goto psk_err;
2645 }
2646 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2648 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2649 goto psk_err;
2650 }
2651 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2653 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2654 goto psk_err;
2655 }
2656
2657 /*
2658 * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
2659 */
2660 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2661 memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
2662 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2663 psk_or_pre_ms,
2664 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2665 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
2666
2667 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2668 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2669 goto psk_err;
2670 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2671 /*
2672 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2673 */
2674 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2675 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2676 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2677 goto psk_err;
2678 }
2679
2680 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2681 pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2682 t = psk_or_pre_ms;
2683 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2684 s2n(psk_len, t);
2685 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2686 t += psk_len;
2687 s2n(psk_len, t);
2688
2689 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2690 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2691 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2692 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2693 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2694 goto psk_err;
2695 }
2696
2697 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2698 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2699 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2700 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2701 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2703 goto psk_err;
2704 }
2705
2706 s->session->master_key_length =
2707 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2708 s->
2709 session->master_key,
2710 psk_or_pre_ms,
2711 pre_ms_len);
2712 psk_err = 0;
2713 psk_err:
2714 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2715 if (psk_err != 0)
2716 goto f_err;
2717 } else
ea262260 2718#endif
edc032b5 2719#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
0f113f3e
MC		 2720 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2721 int param_len;
2722
2723 n2s(p, i);
2724 param_len = i + 2;
2725 if (param_len > n) {
2726 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2728 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2729 goto f_err;
2730 }
2731 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
2732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2733 goto err;
2734 }
2735 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2736 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2737 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2739 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2740 goto f_err;
2741 }
2742 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2743 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2744 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2745 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2747 goto err;
2748 }
2749
2750 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
2751 SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
2752 s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
2753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2754 goto err;
2755 }
2756
2757 p += i;
2758 } else
2759#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2760 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2761 int ret = 0;
2762 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2763 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2764 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2765 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2766 unsigned long alg_a;
2767 int Ttag, Tclass;
2768 long Tlen;
2769
2770 /* Get our certificate private key */
2771 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2772 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2773 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2774 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2775 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2776
2777 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2778 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2779 /*
2780 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2781 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2782 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2783 * client certificate for authorization only.
2784 */
2785 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2786 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2787 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2788 ERR_clear_error();
2789 }
2790 /* Decrypt session key */
2791 if (ASN1_get_object
2792 ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2793 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2794 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2796 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2797 goto gerr;
2798 }
2799 start = p;
2800 inlen = Tlen;
2801 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2802 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2804 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2805 goto gerr;
2806 }
2807 /* Generate master secret */
2808 s->session->master_key_length =
2809 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2810 s->
2811 session->master_key,
2812 premaster_secret, 32);
2813 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2814 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2815 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2816 ret = 2;
2817 else
2818 ret = 1;
2819 gerr:
2820 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2821 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2822 if (ret)
2823 return ret;
2824 else
2825 goto err;
2826 } else {
2827 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2828 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2829 goto f_err;
2830 }
2831
2832 return (1);
2833 f_err:
2834 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
edc032b5 2835#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
0f113f3e 2836 err:
ea262260 2837#endif
d020e701 2838#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
0f113f3e
MC		 2839 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2840 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2841 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2842 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2843 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
58964a49 2844#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 2845 return (-1);
2846}
d02b48c6 2847
36d16f8e 2848int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 2849{
2850 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2851 unsigned char *p;
2852 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2853 long n;
2854 int type = 0, i, j;
2855 X509 *peer;
2856 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2857 EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
2858 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2859
2860 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2861 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2862 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2863 -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2864
2865 if (!ok)
2866 return ((int)n);
2867
2868 if (s->session->peer != NULL) {
2869 peer = s->session->peer;
2870 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2871 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2872 } else {
2873 peer = NULL;
2874 pkey = NULL;
2875 }
2876
2877 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
2878 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2879 if (peer != NULL) {
2880 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2882 goto f_err;
2883 }
2884 ret = 1;
2885 goto end;
2886 }
2887
2888 if (peer == NULL) {
2889 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2890 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2891 goto f_err;
2892 }
2893
2894 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2896 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2897 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2898 goto f_err;
2899 }
2900
2901 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
2902 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2903 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2904 goto f_err;
2905 }
2906
2907 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2908 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2909 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2910 /*
2911 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2912 * length field
2913 */
2914 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2915 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
2916 i = 64;
2917 } else {
2918 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2919 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
2920 if (rv == -1) {
2921 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2922 goto f_err;
2923 } else if (rv == 0) {
2924 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2925 goto f_err;
2926 }
f37f20ff 2927#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
0f113f3e 2928 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
f37f20ff 2929#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 2930 p += 2;
2931 n -= 2;
2932 }
2933 n2s(p, i);
2934 n -= 2;
2935 if (i > n) {
2936 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2937 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2938 goto f_err;
2939 }
2940 }
2941 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2942 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
2943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2944 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2945 goto f_err;
2946 }
2947
2948 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2949 long hdatalen = 0;
2950 void *hdata;
2951 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2952 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2953 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2954 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2955 goto f_err;
2956 }
f37f20ff 2957#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
0f113f3e
MC		 2958 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
2959 EVP_MD_name(md));
f37f20ff 2960#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 2961 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
2962 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2964 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2965 goto f_err;
2966 }
2967
2968 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
2969 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2971 goto f_err;
2972 }
2973 } else
2974#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2975 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
2976 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2977 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2978 pkey->pkey.rsa);
2979 if (i < 0) {
2980 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2982 goto f_err;
2983 }
2984 if (i == 0) {
2985 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2986 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2987 goto f_err;
2988 }
2989 } else
d02b48c6 2990#endif
bc36ee62 2991#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
0f113f3e
MC		 2992 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
2993 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2994 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2995 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
2996 if (j <= 0) {
2997 /* bad signature */
2998 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3000 goto f_err;
3001 }
3002 } else
ea262260
BM		 3003#endif
3004#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
0f113f3e
MC		 3005 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3006 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3007 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3008 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
3009 if (j <= 0) {
3010 /* bad signature */
3011 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3013 goto f_err;
3014 }
3015 } else
d02b48c6 3016#endif
0f113f3e
MC		 3017 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3018 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3019 unsigned char signature[64];
3020 int idx;
3021 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3022 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3023 if (i != 64) {
3024 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
3025 }
3026 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
3027 signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
3028 }
3029 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3030 32);
3031 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3032 if (j <= 0) {
3033 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3035 goto f_err;
3036 }
3037 } else {
3038 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3039 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3040 goto f_err;
3041 }
3042
3043 ret = 1;
3044 if (0) {
3045 f_err:
3046 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3047 }
3048 end:
3049 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3050 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3051 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3052 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3053 }
3054 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3055 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3056 return (ret);
3057}
d02b48c6 3058
36d16f8e 3059int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 3060{
3061 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
3062 X509 *x = NULL;
3063 unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
3064 const unsigned char *p, *q;
3065 unsigned char *d;
3066 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3067
3068 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3069 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
3070 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
3071 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3072
3073 if (!ok)
3074 return ((int)n);
3075
3076 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3077 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3078 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3080 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3081 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3082 goto f_err;
3083 }
3084 /*
3085 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3086 */
3087 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3089 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3090 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3091 goto f_err;
3092 }
3093 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3094 return (1);
3095 }
3096
3097 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3098 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3100 goto f_err;
3101 }
3102 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3103
3104 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3105 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3106 goto err;
3107 }
3108
3109 n2l3(p, llen);
3110 if (llen + 3 != n) {
3111 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3112 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3113 goto f_err;
3114 }
3115 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
3116 n2l3(p, l);
3117 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
3118 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3120 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3121 goto f_err;
3122 }
3123
3124 q = p;
3125 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
3126 if (x == NULL) {
3127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3128 goto err;
3129 }
3130 if (p != (q + l)) {
3131 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3133 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3134 goto f_err;
3135 }
3136 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3138 goto err;
3139 }
3140 x = NULL;
3141 nc += l + 3;
3142 }
3143
3144 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3145 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3146 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3147 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3149 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3150 goto f_err;
3151 }
3152 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3153 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3154 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3155 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3156 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3157 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3158 goto f_err;
3159 }
3160 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3161 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
3162 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3163 goto f_err;
3164 }
3165 } else {
3166 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
3167 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3168 if (i <= 0) {
3169 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3171 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3172 goto f_err;
3173 }
3174 if (i > 1) {
3175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3176 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3177 goto f_err;
3178 }
3179 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3180 if (pkey == NULL) {
3181 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3183 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3184 goto f_err;
3185 }
3186 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3187 }
3188
3189 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3190 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3191 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3192 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3193
3194 /*
3195 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
3196 * arrive here.
3197 */
3198 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3199 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3200 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
3201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3202 goto err;
3203 }
3204 }
3205 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3206 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3207 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
3208 /*
3209 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3210 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3211 */
3212
3213 sk = NULL;
3214
3215 ret = 1;
3216 if (0) {
3217 f_err:
3218 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3219 }
3220 err:
3221 if (x != NULL)
3222 X509_free(x);
3223 if (sk != NULL)
3224 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3225 return (ret);
3226}
d02b48c6 3227
6b691a5c 3228int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 3229{
3230 CERT_PKEY *cpk;
3231
3232 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3233 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3234 if (cpk == NULL) {
3235 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3236 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3237 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) {
3238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
3239 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3240 return (0);
3241 }
3242 }
3243
3244 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
3245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3246 return (0);
3247 }
3248 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3249 }
3250
3251 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3252 return ssl_do_write(s);
3253}
c519e89f 3254
ddd3a617 3255#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
c519e89f 3256/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
6434abbf 3257int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
0f113f3e 3258{
687eaf27
MC		 3259 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3260 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3261 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3262
0f113f3e 3263 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
687eaf27 3264 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
0f113f3e
MC		 3265 const unsigned char *const_p;
3266 int len, slen_full, slen;
3267 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3268 unsigned int hlen;
0f113f3e
MC		 3269 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3270 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3271 unsigned char key_name[16];
3272
3273 /* get session encoding length */
3274 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3275 /*
3276 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3277 * long
3278 */
687eaf27 3279 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00)
0f113f3e
MC		 3280 return -1;
3281 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3282 if (!senc)
3283 return -1;
687eaf27
MC		 3284
3285 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3286 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3287
0f113f3e 3288 p = senc;
687eaf27
MC		 3289 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3290 goto err;
0f113f3e
MC		 3291
3292 /*
3293 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3294 */
3295 const_p = senc;
3296 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
687eaf27
MC		 3297 if (sess == NULL)
3298 goto err;
0f113f3e
MC		 3299 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3300
3301 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
687eaf27
MC		 3302 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3303 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3304 goto err;
0f113f3e
MC		 3305 }
3306 p = senc;
687eaf27
MC		 3307 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3308 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3309 goto err;
3310 }
0f113f3e
MC		 3311 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3312
50e735f9
MC		 3313 /*-
3314 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3315 * follows handshake_header_length +
3316 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3317 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3318 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3319 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3320 */
0f113f3e
MC		 3321 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3322 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3323 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
687eaf27
MC		 3324 goto err;
3325
0f113f3e 3326 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
0f113f3e
MC		 3327 /*
3328 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3329 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3330 */
3331 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3332 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
687eaf27
MC		 3333 &hctx, 1) < 0)
3334 goto err;
0f113f3e 3335 } else {
687eaf27
MC		 3336 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3337 goto err;
3338 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3339 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3340 goto err;
3341 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3342 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3343 goto err;
0f113f3e
MC		 3344 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3345 }
3346
3347 /*
3348 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3349 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3350 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3351 */
3352 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3353
3354 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3355 p += 2;
3356 /* Output key name */
3357 macstart = p;
3358 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3359 p += 16;
3360 /* output IV */
3361 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3362 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3363 /* Encrypt session data */
687eaf27
MC		 3364 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3365 goto err;
0f113f3e 3366 p += len;
687eaf27
MC		 3367 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3368 goto err;
0f113f3e 3369 p += len;
0f113f3e 3370
687eaf27
MC		 3371 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3372 goto err;
3373 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3374 goto err;
3375
3376 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
0f113f3e
MC		 3377 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3378
3379 p += hlen;
3380 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3381 /* Total length */
3382 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3383 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3384 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3385 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3386 s2n(len - 6, p);
3387 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3388 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3389 }
3390
3391 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3392 return ssl_do_write(s);
687eaf27
MC		 3393 err:
3394 if (senc)
3395 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3396 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3397 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3398 return -1;
0f113f3e 3399}
67c8e7f4
DSH		 3400
3401int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 3402{
3403 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3404 unsigned char *p;
50e735f9
MC		 3405 /*-
3406 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3407 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3408 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3409 * + (ocsp response)
3410 */
0f113f3e
MC		 3411 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3412 return -1;
3413
3414 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3415
3416 /* do the header */
3417 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3418 /* message length */
3419 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3420 /* status type */
3421 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3422 /* length of OCSP response */
3423 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3424 /* actual response */
3425 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3426 /* number of bytes to write */
3427 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3428 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3429 s->init_off = 0;
3430 }
3431
3432 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3433 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3434}
ee2ffc27 3435
71fa4513 3436# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
0f113f3e
MC		 3437/*
3438 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3439 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3440 */
ee2ffc27 3441int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
0f113f3e
MC		 3442{
3443 int ok;
3444 int proto_len, padding_len;
3445 long n;
3446 const unsigned char *p;
3447
3448 /*
3449 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3450 * extension in their ClientHello
3451 */
3452 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3454 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3455 return -1;
3456 }
3457
3458 /* See the payload format below */
3459 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3460 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3461 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3462 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3463
3464 if (!ok)
3465 return ((int)n);
3466
3467 /*
3468 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3469 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3470 * ssl3_get_finished).
3471 */
3472 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3474 return -1;
3475 }
3476
3477 if (n < 2)
3478 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3479
3480 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3481
50e735f9
MC		 3482 /*-
3483 * The payload looks like:
3484 * uint8 proto_len;
3485 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3486 * uint8 padding_len;
3487 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3488 */
0f113f3e
MC		 3489 proto_len = p[0];
3490 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3491 return 0;
3492 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3493 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3494 return 0;
3495
3496 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3497 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
3498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3499 return 0;
3500 }
3501 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3502 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3503
3504 return 1;
3505}
ee2ffc27 3506# endif
a9e1c50b 3507
6434abbf 3508#endif
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