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846e33c7 RS |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
8e2f6b79 | 3 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8e2f6b79 | 8 | */ |
846e33c7 | 9 | |
ea262260 BM |
10 | /* ==================================================================== |
11 | * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | |
12 | * | |
0f113f3e | 13 | * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by |
ea262260 BM |
14 | * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
15 | * | |
16 | * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source | |
17 | * license provided above. | |
18 | * | |
ea262260 BM |
19 | * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by |
20 | * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. | |
21 | * | |
22 | */ | |
ddac1974 NL |
23 | /* ==================================================================== |
24 | * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. | |
25 | * | |
26 | * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by | |
27 | * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source | |
28 | * license. | |
29 | * | |
30 | * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of | |
31 | * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites | |
32 | * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. | |
33 | * | |
34 | * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in | |
35 | * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received | |
36 | * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. | |
37 | * | |
38 | * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not | |
39 | * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third | |
40 | * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights | |
41 | * to make use of the Contribution. | |
42 | * | |
43 | * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN | |
44 | * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA | |
45 | * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY | |
46 | * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR | |
47 | * OTHERWISE. | |
48 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 49 | |
d02b48c6 | 50 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 51 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 52 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
68570797 | 53 | #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" |
ec577822 BM |
54 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
55 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
56 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
57 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
6434abbf | 58 | #include <openssl/hmac.h> |
ec577822 | 59 | #include <openssl/x509.h> |
3c27208f | 60 | #include <openssl/dh.h> |
d095b68d | 61 | #include <openssl/bn.h> |
dbad1690 | 62 | #include <openssl/md5.h> |
f9b3bff6 | 63 | |
e46f2334 | 64 | static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); |
38a3cbfb EK |
65 | static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, |
66 | PACKET *cipher_suites, | |
a230b26e EK |
67 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) |
68 | **skp, int sslv2format, | |
69 | int *al); | |
d45ba43d | 70 | |
61ae935a | 71 | /* |
0f1e51ea MC |
72 | * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed |
73 | * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from | |
74 | * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. | |
75 | * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
76 | * | |
94ed2c67 MC |
77 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
78 | * (transition not allowed) | |
0f1e51ea MC |
79 | */ |
80 | static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) | |
81 | { | |
82 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
83 | ||
94ed2c67 MC |
84 | /* |
85 | * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time | |
86 | * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3 | |
87 | */ | |
88 | ||
0f1e51ea MC |
89 | /* |
90 | * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have | |
91 | * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by | |
92 | * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() | |
93 | */ | |
94 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
95 | default: | |
96 | break; | |
97 | ||
92760c21 | 98 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: |
0f1e51ea MC |
99 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
100 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
101 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; | |
102 | return 1; | |
103 | } | |
104 | } else { | |
92760c21 MC |
105 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
106 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
107 | return 1; |
108 | } | |
109 | } | |
110 | break; | |
111 | ||
112 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
113 | if (s->session->peer == NULL) { | |
92760c21 MC |
114 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
115 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
116 | return 1; |
117 | } | |
118 | } else { | |
119 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { | |
120 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; | |
121 | return 1; | |
122 | } | |
123 | } | |
124 | break; | |
125 | ||
126 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
0f1e51ea MC |
127 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
128 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
129 | return 1; | |
130 | } | |
131 | break; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
132 | } |
133 | ||
134 | /* No valid transition found */ | |
135 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
136 | SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_READ_TRANSITION, | |
137 | SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
138 | return 0; | |
139 | } | |
140 | ||
141 | /* | |
142 | * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed | |
143 | * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the | |
144 | * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The | |
145 | * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
61ae935a | 146 | * |
94ed2c67 MC |
147 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
148 | * (transition not allowed) | |
61ae935a | 149 | */ |
8481f583 | 150 | int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) |
61ae935a | 151 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 152 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 153 | |
f5ca0b04 | 154 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
5abeaf35 MC |
155 | if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt)) |
156 | goto err; | |
157 | return 1; | |
158 | } | |
0f1e51ea | 159 | |
e8aa8b6c | 160 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
161 | default: |
162 | break; | |
163 | ||
61ae935a | 164 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE: |
0386aad1 | 165 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
61ae935a MC |
166 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
167 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { | |
168 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; | |
169 | return 1; | |
170 | } | |
171 | break; | |
172 | ||
173 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
174 | /* | |
175 | * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either | |
176 | * 1) We didn't request a Certificate | |
177 | * OR | |
178 | * 2) If we did request one then | |
179 | * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned | |
180 | * AND | |
181 | * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0 | |
182 | * list if we requested a certificate) | |
183 | */ | |
0f512756 MC |
184 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { |
185 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { | |
186 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
23dd09b5 MC |
187 | if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) |
188 | && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { | |
0f512756 MC |
189 | /* |
190 | * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just | |
23dd09b5 MC |
191 | * not going to accept it because we require a client |
192 | * cert. | |
0f512756 MC |
193 | */ |
194 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, | |
195 | SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
340a2828 | 196 | SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, |
0f512756 MC |
197 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); |
198 | return 0; | |
199 | } | |
200 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
201 | return 1; | |
202 | } | |
203 | } else { | |
204 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
205 | return 1; | |
206 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
207 | } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
208 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
209 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; | |
210 | return 1; | |
f100b031 | 211 | } |
61ae935a MC |
212 | } |
213 | break; | |
214 | ||
215 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
216 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { | |
217 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
218 | return 1; | |
219 | } | |
220 | break; | |
221 | ||
222 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
223 | /* | |
224 | * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have | |
225 | * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| | |
226 | * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is | |
227 | * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in | |
a71a4966 | 228 | * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be |
61ae935a MC |
229 | * set. |
230 | */ | |
a71a4966 | 231 | if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) { |
61ae935a MC |
232 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
233 | /* | |
234 | * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH | |
235 | * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is | |
236 | * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses | |
237 | * its key from the certificate for key exchange. | |
238 | */ | |
239 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
240 | return 1; | |
241 | } | |
242 | } else { | |
243 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { | |
244 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; | |
245 | return 1; | |
246 | } | |
247 | } | |
248 | break; | |
249 | ||
250 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
251 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
252 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
253 | return 1; | |
254 | } | |
255 | break; | |
256 | ||
257 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
258 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
aff8c126 | 259 | if (s->s3->npn_seen) { |
61ae935a MC |
260 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) { |
261 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO; | |
262 | return 1; | |
263 | } | |
264 | } else { | |
265 | #endif | |
266 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
267 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
268 | return 1; | |
269 | } | |
270 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
271 | } | |
272 | #endif | |
273 | break; | |
274 | ||
275 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
276 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
277 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
278 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
279 | return 1; | |
280 | } | |
281 | break; | |
282 | #endif | |
283 | ||
284 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
285 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
286 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
287 | return 1; | |
288 | } | |
289 | break; | |
61ae935a MC |
290 | } |
291 | ||
5abeaf35 | 292 | err: |
61ae935a | 293 | /* No valid transition found */ |
672f3337 | 294 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
340a2828 | 295 | SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
61ae935a MC |
296 | return 0; |
297 | } | |
298 | ||
299 | /* | |
300 | * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message? | |
301 | * | |
302 | * Valid return values are: | |
303 | * 1: Yes | |
304 | * 0: No | |
305 | */ | |
bb3e20cf | 306 | static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) |
61ae935a MC |
307 | { |
308 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
309 | ||
310 | /* | |
361a1191 | 311 | * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a |
61ae935a MC |
312 | * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For |
313 | * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if | |
314 | * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, | |
315 | * the server certificate contains the server's public key for | |
316 | * key exchange. | |
317 | */ | |
a230b26e | 318 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE) |
61ae935a MC |
319 | /* |
320 | * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if | |
321 | * provided | |
322 | */ | |
323 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK | |
324 | /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */ | |
325 | || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) | |
326 | && s->cert->psk_identity_hint) | |
327 | /* For other PSK always send SKE */ | |
328 | || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK))) | |
329 | #endif | |
330 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
331 | /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ | |
332 | || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) | |
333 | #endif | |
a230b26e | 334 | ) { |
61ae935a MC |
335 | return 1; |
336 | } | |
337 | ||
338 | return 0; | |
339 | } | |
340 | ||
341 | /* | |
342 | * Should we send a CertificateRequest message? | |
343 | * | |
344 | * Valid return values are: | |
345 | * 1: Yes | |
346 | * 0: No | |
347 | */ | |
bb3e20cf | 348 | static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s) |
61ae935a MC |
349 | { |
350 | if ( | |
351 | /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ | |
352 | s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER | |
353 | /* | |
354 | * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert | |
355 | * during re-negotiation: | |
356 | */ | |
a03a9dbe | 357 | && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 || |
61ae935a MC |
358 | !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) |
359 | /* | |
360 | * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see | |
361 | * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in | |
362 | * RFC 2246): | |
363 | */ | |
364 | && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) | |
a230b26e EK |
365 | /* |
366 | * ... except when the application insists on | |
367 | * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts | |
368 | * this for SSL 3) | |
369 | */ | |
61ae935a MC |
370 | || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) |
371 | /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ | |
372 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) | |
373 | /* | |
374 | * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests | |
375 | * are omitted | |
376 | */ | |
b7fa1f98 | 377 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) { |
61ae935a MC |
378 | return 1; |
379 | } | |
380 | ||
381 | return 0; | |
382 | } | |
383 | ||
384 | /* | |
0f1e51ea MC |
385 | * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to |
386 | * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the | |
387 | * client. | |
0f1e51ea MC |
388 | */ |
389 | static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s) | |
390 | { | |
391 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
392 | ||
94ed2c67 MC |
393 | /* |
394 | * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time | |
395 | * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3 | |
396 | */ | |
397 | ||
0f1e51ea MC |
398 | /* |
399 | * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated | |
400 | * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition() | |
401 | */ | |
402 | ||
403 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
404 | default: | |
405 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
406 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; | |
407 | ||
408 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: | |
409 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; | |
410 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
411 | ||
412 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: | |
e46f2334 MC |
413 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; |
414 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
415 | ||
416 | case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: | |
94ed2c67 | 417 | if (s->hit) |
92760c21 MC |
418 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; |
419 | else if (send_certificate_request(s)) | |
420 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; | |
94ed2c67 | 421 | else |
0f1e51ea | 422 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
94ed2c67 | 423 | |
0f1e51ea MC |
424 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
425 | ||
0f1e51ea | 426 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
92760c21 | 427 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
0f1e51ea MC |
428 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
429 | ||
92760c21 | 430 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
431 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY; |
432 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
433 | ||
434 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: | |
d805a57b | 435 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; |
0f1e51ea MC |
436 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
437 | ||
438 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
92760c21 | 439 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; |
94ed2c67 | 440 | |
92760c21 | 441 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: |
30f05b19 MC |
442 | /* |
443 | * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're | |
444 | * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket | |
445 | * immediately. | |
446 | * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour | |
447 | * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the | |
448 | * session ticket? | |
449 | */ | |
450 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; | |
451 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
452 | ||
453 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: | |
0f1e51ea MC |
454 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; |
455 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); | |
456 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
457 | } | |
458 | } | |
459 | ||
460 | /* | |
461 | * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move | |
462 | * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client. | |
61ae935a | 463 | */ |
8481f583 | 464 | WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 465 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 466 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 467 | |
0f1e51ea MC |
468 | /* |
469 | * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going | |
470 | * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later | |
471 | */ | |
472 | ||
f5ca0b04 | 473 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) |
0f1e51ea MC |
474 | return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s); |
475 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 476 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
477 | default: |
478 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
479 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; | |
480 | ||
0386aad1 MC |
481 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
482 | if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) { | |
483 | /* We must be trying to renegotiate */ | |
484 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ; | |
485 | st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE; | |
486 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
487 | } | |
c7f47786 MC |
488 | /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */ |
489 | if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { | |
490 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
491 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; | |
492 | } | |
0386aad1 MC |
493 | /* Fall through */ |
494 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 495 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE: |
a230b26e | 496 | /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */ |
e8aa8b6c | 497 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; |
61ae935a | 498 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
499 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
500 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
501 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); | |
502 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 503 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
504 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
505 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified | |
a230b26e | 506 | && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) |
e8aa8b6c F |
507 | st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; |
508 | else | |
509 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; | |
510 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 511 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
512 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
513 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
61ae935a | 514 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
515 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
516 | if (s->hit) { | |
aff8c126 | 517 | if (s->ext.ticket_expected) |
e8aa8b6c F |
518 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; |
519 | else | |
520 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
521 | } else { | |
522 | /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ | |
523 | /* normal PSK or SRP */ | |
524 | if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & | |
a230b26e | 525 | (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { |
e8aa8b6c F |
526 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
527 | } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { | |
61ae935a | 528 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; |
e8aa8b6c | 529 | } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) { |
61ae935a | 530 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; |
e8aa8b6c F |
531 | } else { |
532 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; | |
61ae935a | 533 | } |
e8aa8b6c F |
534 | } |
535 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 536 | |
e8aa8b6c | 537 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
aff8c126 | 538 | if (s->ext.status_expected) { |
e8aa8b6c | 539 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS; |
61ae935a | 540 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
541 | } |
542 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 543 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
544 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: |
545 | if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { | |
546 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; | |
61ae935a | 547 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
548 | } |
549 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 550 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
551 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: |
552 | if (send_certificate_request(s)) { | |
553 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; | |
61ae935a | 554 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
555 | } |
556 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 557 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
558 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
559 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; | |
560 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 561 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
562 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: |
563 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
564 | ||
565 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
566 | if (s->hit) { | |
61ae935a | 567 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; |
fe3a3291 | 568 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); |
61ae935a | 569 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
aff8c126 | 570 | } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { |
e8aa8b6c F |
571 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; |
572 | } else { | |
573 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
574 | } | |
575 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
576 | ||
577 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: | |
578 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
579 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 580 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
581 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: |
582 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; | |
583 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
584 | ||
585 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
586 | if (s->hit) { | |
587 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
588 | } | |
589 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
590 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); | |
591 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a MC |
592 | } |
593 | } | |
594 | ||
595 | /* | |
596 | * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from | |
597 | * the server to the client. | |
598 | */ | |
8481f583 | 599 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 600 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 601 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 602 | |
e8aa8b6c | 603 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
604 | default: |
605 | /* No pre work to be done */ | |
606 | break; | |
607 | ||
61ae935a MC |
608 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
609 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
610 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
f5c7f5df | 611 | dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); |
61ae935a MC |
612 | break; |
613 | ||
614 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: | |
615 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
616 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
f5c7f5df | 617 | dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); |
61ae935a MC |
618 | /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */ |
619 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
620 | } | |
621 | break; | |
622 | ||
623 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: | |
624 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
625 | /* | |
626 | * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and | |
627 | * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now | |
628 | */ | |
629 | st->use_timer = 1; | |
630 | } | |
631 | break; | |
632 | ||
633 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
634 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
635 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) | |
636 | return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); | |
637 | #endif | |
638 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
639 | ||
640 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: | |
30f05b19 MC |
641 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
642 | /* | |
643 | * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going | |
644 | * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off | |
645 | * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active. | |
646 | */ | |
647 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0); | |
648 | } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
61ae935a MC |
649 | /* |
650 | * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight | |
651 | * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer | |
652 | */ | |
653 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
654 | } | |
655 | break; | |
656 | ||
657 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
658 | s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; | |
659 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { | |
fe3a3291 | 660 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
61ae935a MC |
661 | return WORK_ERROR; |
662 | } | |
663 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
664 | /* | |
665 | * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight | |
666 | * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have | |
667 | * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message, | |
668 | * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't. | |
669 | */ | |
670 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
671 | } | |
672 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
673 | ||
674 | case TLS_ST_OK: | |
30f05b19 | 675 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1); |
61ae935a MC |
676 | } |
677 | ||
678 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
679 | } | |
680 | ||
681 | /* | |
682 | * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the | |
683 | * server to the client. | |
684 | */ | |
8481f583 | 685 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 686 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 687 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a MC |
688 | |
689 | s->init_num = 0; | |
690 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 691 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
692 | default: |
693 | /* No post work to be done */ | |
694 | break; | |
695 | ||
61ae935a MC |
696 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
697 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
698 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
2c4a056f MC |
699 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
700 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
701 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
702 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
703 | break; |
704 | ||
705 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: | |
706 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
707 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
708 | /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */ | |
2c4a056f MC |
709 | if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
710 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
711 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
712 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
713 | /* |
714 | * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to | |
715 | * treat like it was the first packet | |
716 | */ | |
717 | s->first_packet = 1; | |
718 | break; | |
719 | ||
720 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: | |
721 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
722 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { | |
723 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
724 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
725 | ||
726 | /* | |
727 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no | |
728 | * SCTP used. | |
729 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
730 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
731 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
61ae935a MC |
732 | |
733 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, | |
a230b26e EK |
734 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, |
735 | sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, | |
736 | 0) <= 0) { | |
fe3a3291 | 737 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
61ae935a MC |
738 | return WORK_ERROR; |
739 | } | |
740 | ||
741 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, | |
742 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
743 | } | |
744 | #endif | |
92760c21 MC |
745 | /* |
746 | * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know | |
747 | * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted | |
748 | * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need | |
749 | * something clever in the record layer for this. | |
750 | */ | |
751 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
752 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) | |
753 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
754 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE) | |
755 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
756 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) | |
757 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
758 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
759 | break; |
760 | ||
761 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
762 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
763 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) { | |
764 | /* | |
765 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
766 | * no SCTP used. | |
767 | */ | |
768 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
769 | 0, NULL); | |
770 | } | |
771 | #endif | |
772 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
a230b26e EK |
773 | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) |
774 | { | |
fe3a3291 | 775 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
61ae935a MC |
776 | return WORK_ERROR; |
777 | } | |
778 | ||
779 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
780 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); | |
781 | break; | |
782 | ||
783 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
784 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
785 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
786 | break; | |
787 | ||
788 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
789 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
790 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
791 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
792 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { | |
793 | /* | |
794 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
795 | * no SCTP used. | |
796 | */ | |
797 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
798 | 0, NULL); | |
799 | } | |
800 | #endif | |
92760c21 MC |
801 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
802 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
ec15acb6 | 803 | s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, |
92760c21 MC |
804 | &s->session->master_key_length) |
805 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
806 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) | |
807 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
808 | } | |
61ae935a | 809 | break; |
30f05b19 MC |
810 | |
811 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: | |
812 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
813 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
814 | break; | |
61ae935a MC |
815 | } |
816 | ||
817 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
818 | } | |
819 | ||
820 | /* | |
6392fb8e MC |
821 | * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the |
822 | * server | |
61ae935a MC |
823 | * |
824 | * Valid return values are: | |
825 | * 1: Success | |
826 | * 0: Error | |
827 | */ | |
6392fb8e | 828 | int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
a15c953f | 829 | confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) |
61ae935a | 830 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 831 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 832 | |
4a01c59f MC |
833 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
834 | default: | |
835 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
836 | return 0; | |
837 | ||
838 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
5923ad4b | 839 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
6392fb8e | 840 | *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
4a01c59f | 841 | else |
6392fb8e MC |
842 | *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
843 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; | |
4a01c59f | 844 | break; |
f3b3d7f0 | 845 | |
4a01c59f | 846 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
6392fb8e MC |
847 | *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request; |
848 | *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 849 | break; |
61ae935a | 850 | |
4a01c59f MC |
851 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
852 | /* No construction function needed */ | |
6392fb8e MC |
853 | *confunc = NULL; |
854 | *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 855 | break; |
61ae935a | 856 | |
4a01c59f | 857 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
6392fb8e MC |
858 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello; |
859 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; | |
4a01c59f | 860 | break; |
61ae935a | 861 | |
4a01c59f | 862 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
6392fb8e MC |
863 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate; |
864 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; | |
4a01c59f | 865 | break; |
61ae935a | 866 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
867 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: |
868 | *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify; | |
869 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; | |
870 | break; | |
871 | ||
872 | ||
4a01c59f | 873 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: |
6392fb8e MC |
874 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange; |
875 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; | |
4a01c59f | 876 | break; |
61ae935a | 877 | |
4a01c59f | 878 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
6392fb8e MC |
879 | *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request; |
880 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 881 | break; |
61ae935a | 882 | |
4a01c59f | 883 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: |
6392fb8e MC |
884 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_done; |
885 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; | |
4a01c59f | 886 | break; |
61ae935a | 887 | |
4a01c59f | 888 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: |
6392fb8e MC |
889 | *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket; |
890 | *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; | |
4a01c59f | 891 | break; |
61ae935a | 892 | |
4a01c59f | 893 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: |
6392fb8e MC |
894 | *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status; |
895 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; | |
4a01c59f | 896 | break; |
61ae935a | 897 | |
4a01c59f | 898 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: |
6392fb8e MC |
899 | *confunc = tls_construct_finished; |
900 | *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; | |
4a01c59f | 901 | break; |
e46f2334 MC |
902 | |
903 | case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: | |
904 | *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions; | |
905 | *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; | |
906 | break; | |
4a01c59f | 907 | } |
61ae935a | 908 | |
5923ad4b | 909 | return 1; |
61ae935a MC |
910 | } |
911 | ||
8a18bc25 AG |
912 | /* |
913 | * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message, | |
914 | * calculated as follows: | |
915 | * | |
916 | * 2 + # client_version | |
917 | * 32 + # only valid length for random | |
918 | * 1 + # length of session_id | |
919 | * 32 + # maximum size for session_id | |
920 | * 2 + # length of cipher suites | |
921 | * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array | |
922 | * 1 + # length of compression_methods | |
923 | * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods | |
924 | * 2 + # length of extensions | |
925 | * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions | |
926 | */ | |
927 | #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396 | |
928 | ||
61ae935a MC |
929 | #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048 |
930 | #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514 | |
931 | ||
932 | /* | |
933 | * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are | |
934 | * reading. Excludes the message header. | |
935 | */ | |
eda75751 | 936 | size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 937 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 938 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 939 | |
e8aa8b6c | 940 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
941 | default: |
942 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
943 | return 0; | |
944 | ||
61ae935a | 945 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
8a18bc25 | 946 | return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; |
61ae935a MC |
947 | |
948 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
949 | return s->max_cert_list; | |
950 | ||
951 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
952 | return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; | |
953 | ||
954 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
955 | return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
956 | ||
957 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
958 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
959 | return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH; | |
960 | #endif | |
961 | ||
962 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
963 | return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; | |
964 | ||
965 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
966 | return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 967 | } |
61ae935a MC |
968 | } |
969 | ||
970 | /* | |
971 | * Process a message that the server has received from the client. | |
972 | */ | |
8481f583 | 973 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
61ae935a | 974 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 975 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 976 | |
e8aa8b6c | 977 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
978 | default: |
979 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
980 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
981 | ||
61ae935a MC |
982 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
983 | return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt); | |
984 | ||
985 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
986 | return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt); | |
987 | ||
988 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
989 | return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt); | |
990 | ||
991 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
992 | return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); | |
993 | ||
994 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
995 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
996 | return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt); | |
997 | #endif | |
998 | ||
999 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
1000 | return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); | |
1001 | ||
1002 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
1003 | return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 1004 | } |
61ae935a MC |
1005 | } |
1006 | ||
1007 | /* | |
1008 | * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message | |
1009 | * from the client | |
1010 | */ | |
8481f583 | 1011 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 1012 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 1013 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 1014 | |
e8aa8b6c | 1015 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
1016 | default: |
1017 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
1018 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
1019 | ||
61ae935a MC |
1020 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
1021 | return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst); | |
1022 | ||
1023 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
1024 | return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst); | |
1025 | ||
1026 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
1027 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
a230b26e EK |
1028 | if ( /* Is this SCTP? */ |
1029 | BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) | |
1030 | /* Are we renegotiating? */ | |
1031 | && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { | |
61ae935a MC |
1032 | s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; |
1033 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1034 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); | |
1035 | BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); | |
d99b0691 | 1036 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1); |
61ae935a MC |
1037 | return WORK_MORE_A; |
1038 | } else { | |
d99b0691 | 1039 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0); |
61ae935a MC |
1040 | } |
1041 | #endif | |
1042 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 1043 | } |
92760c21 | 1044 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a MC |
1045 | } |
1046 | ||
edc032b5 | 1047 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
71fa4513 | 1048 | static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) |
0f113f3e MC |
1049 | { |
1050 | int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; | |
1051 | ||
1052 | *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
1053 | ||
1054 | if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && | |
1055 | (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { | |
1056 | if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { | |
1057 | /* | |
1058 | * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp | |
1059 | * login name | |
1060 | */ | |
1061 | ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; | |
1062 | *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; | |
1063 | } else { | |
1064 | ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al); | |
1065 | } | |
1066 | } | |
1067 | return ret; | |
1068 | } | |
edc032b5 BL |
1069 | #endif |
1070 | ||
c536b6be | 1071 | int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie, |
cb150cbc | 1072 | size_t cookie_len) |
8ba708e5 | 1073 | { |
8ba708e5 | 1074 | /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */ |
c536b6be MC |
1075 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION) |
1076 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len)) | |
1077 | return 0; | |
8ba708e5 | 1078 | |
c536b6be | 1079 | return 1; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1080 | } |
1081 | ||
7cea05dc | 1082 | int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
8ba708e5 | 1083 | { |
cb150cbc | 1084 | unsigned int cookie_leni; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1085 | if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || |
1086 | s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, | |
cb150cbc MC |
1087 | &cookie_leni) == 0 || |
1088 | cookie_leni > 255) { | |
f0659bdb | 1089 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, |
8ba708e5 | 1090 | SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); |
8ba708e5 MC |
1091 | return 0; |
1092 | } | |
cb150cbc | 1093 | s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni; |
8ba708e5 | 1094 | |
4a01c59f MC |
1095 | if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie, |
1096 | s->d1->cookie_len)) { | |
c536b6be | 1097 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c536b6be MC |
1098 | return 0; |
1099 | } | |
8ba708e5 | 1100 | |
8ba708e5 MC |
1101 | return 1; |
1102 | } | |
1103 | ||
805a2e9e MC |
1104 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
1105 | /*- | |
1106 | * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X | |
1107 | * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|. | |
1108 | * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: | |
1109 | * SNI, | |
1110 | * elliptic_curves | |
1111 | * ec_point_formats | |
1112 | * | |
1113 | * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, | |
1114 | * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. | |
1115 | * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from | |
1116 | * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). | |
1117 | */ | |
1118 | static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) | |
1119 | { | |
805a2e9e MC |
1120 | static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { |
1121 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ | |
1122 | 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ | |
1123 | 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ | |
1124 | 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ | |
1125 | 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ | |
1126 | 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ | |
1127 | ||
1128 | 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ | |
1129 | 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ | |
1130 | 0x01, /* 1 point format */ | |
1131 | 0x00, /* uncompressed */ | |
1132 | /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ | |
1133 | 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ | |
1134 | 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ | |
1135 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ | |
1136 | 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ | |
1137 | 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ | |
1138 | 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ | |
1139 | 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ | |
1140 | 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ | |
1141 | }; | |
805a2e9e MC |
1142 | /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */ |
1143 | static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18; | |
1266eefd MC |
1144 | unsigned int type; |
1145 | PACKET sni, tmppkt; | |
1146 | size_t ext_len; | |
805a2e9e MC |
1147 | |
1148 | tmppkt = hello->extensions; | |
1149 | ||
1150 | if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2) | |
1151 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type) | |
1152 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) { | |
1153 | return; | |
6b473aca MC |
1154 | } |
1155 | ||
805a2e9e MC |
1156 | if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) |
1157 | return; | |
1158 | ||
1159 | ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? | |
1160 | sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength; | |
1161 | ||
1162 | s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock, | |
1163 | ext_len); | |
6b473aca | 1164 | } |
805a2e9e | 1165 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
6b473aca | 1166 | |
be3583fa | 1167 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a MC |
1168 | { |
1169 | int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
348240c6 | 1170 | unsigned int j; |
1ab3836b | 1171 | size_t loop; |
e27f234a | 1172 | unsigned long id; |
4a640fb6 | 1173 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; |
e27f234a MC |
1174 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
1175 | SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; | |
1176 | #endif | |
1177 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; | |
4fa52141 | 1178 | int protverr; |
e27f234a | 1179 | /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */ |
1ab3836b | 1180 | PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie; |
6e3ff632 | 1181 | static const unsigned char null_compression = 0; |
1ab3836b | 1182 | CLIENTHELLO_MSG clienthello; |
e27f234a | 1183 | |
c7f47786 MC |
1184 | /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */ |
1185 | if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { | |
1186 | s->renegotiate = 1; | |
1187 | s->new_session = 1; | |
1188 | } | |
1189 | ||
1190 | /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ | |
1191 | s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; | |
1192 | ||
1ab3836b | 1193 | /* |
b1b4b543 | 1194 | * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure. |
1ab3836b | 1195 | */ |
9529419d | 1196 | memset(&clienthello, 0, sizeof(clienthello)); |
1ab3836b | 1197 | clienthello.isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer); |
bbafa47b | 1198 | PACKET_null_init(&cookie); |
1ab3836b MC |
1199 | |
1200 | if (clienthello.isv2) { | |
9ceb2426 | 1201 | unsigned int mt; |
b1b4b543 | 1202 | |
32ec4153 MC |
1203 | /*- |
1204 | * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2 | |
1205 | * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS | |
1206 | * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes | |
1207 | * the rest right through. Its format is: | |
1208 | * Byte Content | |
1209 | * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer | |
1210 | * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here | |
1211 | * 3-4 version | |
1212 | * 5-6 cipher_spec_length | |
1213 | * 7-8 session_id_length | |
1214 | * 9-10 challenge_length | |
1215 | * ... ... | |
1216 | */ | |
1217 | ||
73999b62 | 1218 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt) |
a230b26e | 1219 | || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { |
32ec4153 MC |
1220 | /* |
1221 | * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record | |
1222 | * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record | |
1223 | * in the first place | |
1224 | */ | |
e27f234a | 1225 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d45ba43d | 1226 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1227 | } |
32ec4153 MC |
1228 | } |
1229 | ||
df7ce507 | 1230 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello.legacy_version)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1231 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1232 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
1233 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1234 | } |
1235 | ||
b3e2272c | 1236 | /* Parse the message and load client random. */ |
1ab3836b | 1237 | if (clienthello.isv2) { |
32ec4153 MC |
1238 | /* |
1239 | * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello | |
1240 | * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format. | |
e2994cf0 | 1241 | * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below. |
32ec4153 | 1242 | */ |
1ab3836b | 1243 | unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len; |
b3e2272c | 1244 | PACKET challenge; |
0f113f3e | 1245 | |
1ab3836b | 1246 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len) |
a230b26e EK |
1247 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len) |
1248 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) { | |
e27f234a MC |
1249 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1250 | SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
6c3cca57 AE |
1251 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1252 | goto f_err; | |
5e9f0eeb | 1253 | } |
0f113f3e | 1254 | |
293b5ca4 AG |
1255 | if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { |
1256 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1257 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1258 | goto f_err; | |
1259 | } | |
1260 | ||
1ab3836b MC |
1261 | if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites, |
1262 | ciphersuite_len) | |
035b1e69 | 1263 | || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.session_id, session_id_len) |
73999b62 | 1264 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len) |
b3e2272c | 1265 | /* No extensions. */ |
73999b62 | 1266 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
f0659bdb MC |
1267 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1268 | SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
9ceb2426 MC |
1269 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1270 | goto f_err; | |
1271 | } | |
035b1e69 | 1272 | clienthello.session_id_len = session_id_len; |
9ceb2426 | 1273 | |
fba7b84c MC |
1274 | /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
1275 | * here rather than sizeof(clienthello.random) because that is the limit | |
1276 | * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if | |
1277 | * sizeof(clienthello.random) does. | |
1278 | */ | |
1279 | challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1280 | ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len; | |
1281 | memset(clienthello.random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
b3e2272c | 1282 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge, |
fba7b84c | 1283 | clienthello.random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - |
cb21df32 DB |
1284 | challenge_len, challenge_len) |
1285 | /* Advertise only null compression. */ | |
1286 | || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) { | |
f0659bdb | 1287 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
b3e2272c | 1288 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
9ceb2426 MC |
1289 | goto f_err; |
1290 | } | |
b3e2272c | 1291 | |
1ab3836b | 1292 | PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions); |
0f113f3e | 1293 | } else { |
b3e2272c | 1294 | /* Regular ClientHello. */ |
1ab3836b | 1295 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) |
e2994cf0 MC |
1296 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id) |
1297 | || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello.session_id, | |
1298 | SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH, | |
1299 | &clienthello.session_id_len)) { | |
9ceb2426 | 1300 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
f0659bdb | 1301 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
9ceb2426 MC |
1302 | goto f_err; |
1303 | } | |
32ec4153 | 1304 | |
b3e2272c | 1305 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 1306 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) { |
32ec4153 | 1307 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
f0659bdb | 1308 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
32ec4153 MC |
1309 | goto f_err; |
1310 | } | |
1ab3836b MC |
1311 | if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello.dtls_cookie, |
1312 | DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH, | |
1313 | &clienthello.dtls_cookie_len)) { | |
1314 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1315 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1316 | goto f_err; | |
1317 | } | |
b3e2272c EK |
1318 | /* |
1319 | * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, | |
1320 | * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. | |
1321 | * So check cookie length... | |
1322 | */ | |
1323 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { | |
1ab3836b | 1324 | if (clienthello.dtls_cookie_len == 0) |
a230b26e | 1325 | return 1; |
b3e2272c | 1326 | } |
5e9f0eeb | 1327 | } |
0f113f3e | 1328 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1329 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites)) { |
1330 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1331 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1332 | goto f_err; | |
1333 | } | |
1334 | ||
4bfe1432 | 1335 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) { |
a230b26e EK |
1336 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1337 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1338 | goto f_err; | |
b3e2272c | 1339 | } |
1ab3836b | 1340 | |
b3e2272c | 1341 | /* Could be empty. */ |
1ab3836b MC |
1342 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { |
1343 | PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions); | |
1344 | } else { | |
1345 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.extensions)) { | |
1346 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1347 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1348 | goto f_err; | |
1349 | } | |
1350 | } | |
1351 | } | |
1352 | ||
4bfe1432 | 1353 | if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello.compressions, |
e2994cf0 MC |
1354 | MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE, |
1355 | &clienthello.compressions_len)) { | |
1ab3836b MC |
1356 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1357 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1358 | goto f_err; | |
1359 | } | |
1360 | ||
b1b4b543 | 1361 | /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */ |
1ab3836b | 1362 | extensions = clienthello.extensions; |
fadd9a1e | 1363 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
70af3d8e | 1364 | &clienthello.pre_proc_exts, &al)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1365 | /* SSLerr already been called */ |
1366 | goto f_err; | |
1367 | } | |
1368 | ||
1369 | /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */ | |
1370 | ||
1371 | /* Set up the client_random */ | |
1372 | memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
1373 | ||
1374 | /* Choose the version */ | |
1375 | ||
1376 | if (clienthello.isv2) { | |
df7ce507 MC |
1377 | if (clienthello.legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION |
1378 | || (clienthello.legacy_version & 0xff00) | |
b1b4b543 MC |
1379 | != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) { |
1380 | /* | |
1381 | * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't | |
1382 | * support it. | |
1383 | */ | |
1ab3836b MC |
1384 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); |
1385 | goto err; | |
1386 | } | |
b1b4b543 | 1387 | /* SSLv3/TLS */ |
df7ce507 | 1388 | s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version; |
1ab3836b MC |
1389 | } |
1390 | /* | |
1391 | * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check | |
1392 | * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later. | |
1393 | */ | |
1394 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1395 | protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello); | |
1396 | } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION && | |
df7ce507 | 1397 | DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello.legacy_version, s->version)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1398 | protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; |
1399 | } else { | |
1400 | protverr = 0; | |
1401 | } | |
1402 | ||
1403 | if (protverr) { | |
1404 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); | |
1405 | if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) { | |
b1b4b543 | 1406 | /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ |
df7ce507 | 1407 | s->version = s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version; |
1ab3836b MC |
1408 | } |
1409 | al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
1410 | goto f_err; | |
b3e2272c EK |
1411 | } |
1412 | ||
1ed65871 DB |
1413 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
1414 | /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */ | |
1415 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { | |
1416 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { | |
1ab3836b MC |
1417 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello.dtls_cookie, |
1418 | clienthello.dtls_cookie_len) == 0) { | |
1ed65871 DB |
1419 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
1420 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1421 | SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); | |
1422 | goto f_err; | |
1423 | /* else cookie verification succeeded */ | |
1424 | } | |
a230b26e | 1425 | /* default verification */ |
1ab3836b MC |
1426 | } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello.dtls_cookie_len |
1427 | || memcmp(clienthello.dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie, | |
1428 | s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { | |
1ed65871 DB |
1429 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
1430 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); | |
1431 | goto f_err; | |
1432 | } | |
1433 | s->d1->cookie_verified = 1; | |
1434 | } | |
1435 | if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { | |
1ab3836b | 1436 | protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello); |
1ed65871 DB |
1437 | if (protverr != 0) { |
1438 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); | |
1439 | s->version = s->client_version; | |
1440 | al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
1441 | goto f_err; | |
1442 | } | |
1443 | } | |
1444 | } | |
1445 | ||
b3e2272c EK |
1446 | s->hit = 0; |
1447 | ||
1ab3836b | 1448 | /* We need to do this before getting the session */ |
70af3d8e | 1449 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret, |
4b299b8e | 1450 | EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
f97d4c37 | 1451 | clienthello.pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1452 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); |
1453 | goto f_err; | |
1454 | } | |
1455 | ||
b3e2272c EK |
1456 | /* |
1457 | * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello. | |
1458 | * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty. | |
1459 | * | |
1460 | * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in | |
1461 | * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally | |
1462 | * ignore resumption requests with flag | |
1463 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather | |
1464 | * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on | |
1465 | * this for security won't even compile against older library versions). | |
1466 | * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to | |
1467 | * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains | |
1468 | * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the | |
1469 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be | |
1470 | * ignored. | |
1471 | */ | |
1ab3836b | 1472 | if (clienthello.isv2 || |
b3e2272c EK |
1473 | (s->new_session && |
1474 | (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { | |
1475 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) | |
1476 | goto err; | |
1477 | } else { | |
1a9f457c | 1478 | i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &clienthello, &al); |
128ae276 | 1479 | if (i == 1) { |
b3e2272c EK |
1480 | /* previous session */ |
1481 | s->hit = 1; | |
1482 | } else if (i == -1) { | |
1a9f457c | 1483 | goto f_err; |
32ec4153 | 1484 | } else { |
b3e2272c EK |
1485 | /* i == 0 */ |
1486 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) | |
32ec4153 | 1487 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1488 | } |
b3e2272c | 1489 | } |
0f113f3e | 1490 | |
b1b4b543 | 1491 | if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello.ciphersuites, &ciphers, |
1ab3836b | 1492 | clienthello.isv2, &al) == NULL) { |
b3e2272c EK |
1493 | goto f_err; |
1494 | } | |
5e9f0eeb | 1495 | |
b3e2272c EK |
1496 | /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ |
1497 | if (s->hit) { | |
1498 | j = 0; | |
1499 | id = s->session->cipher->id; | |
d02b48c6 | 1500 | |
413c4f45 | 1501 | #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG |
a230b26e | 1502 | fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); |
413c4f45 | 1503 | #endif |
b3e2272c EK |
1504 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { |
1505 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
413c4f45 | 1506 | #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG |
b3e2272c EK |
1507 | fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", |
1508 | i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); | |
88f2a4cf | 1509 | #endif |
b3e2272c EK |
1510 | if (c->id == id) { |
1511 | j = 1; | |
1512 | break; | |
32ec4153 | 1513 | } |
0f113f3e | 1514 | } |
b3e2272c | 1515 | if (j == 0) { |
ec30e856 | 1516 | /* |
b3e2272c EK |
1517 | * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked |
1518 | * to reuse it | |
ec30e856 | 1519 | */ |
b3e2272c | 1520 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
f0659bdb | 1521 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
b3e2272c | 1522 | SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); |
32ec4153 MC |
1523 | goto f_err; |
1524 | } | |
b3e2272c | 1525 | } |
9ceb2426 | 1526 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1527 | for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello.compressions_len; loop++) { |
1528 | if (clienthello.compressions[loop] == 0) | |
b3e2272c | 1529 | break; |
0f113f3e | 1530 | } |
32ec4153 | 1531 | |
1ab3836b | 1532 | if (loop >= clienthello.compressions_len) { |
b3e2272c EK |
1533 | /* no compress */ |
1534 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
f0659bdb | 1535 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); |
b3e2272c EK |
1536 | goto f_err; |
1537 | } | |
f100b031 | 1538 | |
805a2e9e MC |
1539 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
1540 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) | |
1541 | ssl_check_for_safari(s, &clienthello); | |
1542 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | |
1543 | ||
0f113f3e | 1544 | /* TLS extensions */ |
24b8e4b2 | 1545 | if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
f97d4c37 | 1546 | clienthello.pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) { |
1ab3836b | 1547 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); |
24b8e4b2 | 1548 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1549 | } |
1550 | ||
1551 | /* | |
1552 | * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake | |
1553 | * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before | |
1554 | * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket | |
1555 | * processing to use it in key derivation. | |
1556 | */ | |
1557 | { | |
1558 | unsigned char *pos; | |
1559 | pos = s->s3->server_random; | |
1560 | if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { | |
1561 | goto f_err; | |
1562 | } | |
1563 | } | |
1564 | ||
aff8c126 | 1565 | if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->ext.session_secret_cb) { |
4a640fb6 | 1566 | const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; |
8c1a5343 MC |
1567 | /* |
1568 | * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for | |
1569 | * backwards compat reasons | |
1570 | */ | |
1571 | int master_key_length; | |
0f113f3e | 1572 | |
8c1a5343 | 1573 | master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); |
aff8c126 | 1574 | if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, |
8c1a5343 | 1575 | &master_key_length, ciphers, |
0f113f3e | 1576 | &pref_cipher, |
aff8c126 | 1577 | s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) |
8c1a5343 MC |
1578 | && master_key_length > 0) { |
1579 | s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1580 | s->hit = 1; |
1581 | s->session->ciphers = ciphers; | |
1582 | s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; | |
1583 | ||
1584 | ciphers = NULL; | |
1585 | ||
1586 | /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ | |
3f4bf115 DSH |
1587 | if (pref_cipher == NULL) |
1588 | pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, | |
1589 | SSL_get_ciphers(s)); | |
0f113f3e MC |
1590 | if (pref_cipher == NULL) { |
1591 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
e27f234a | 1592 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); |
0f113f3e MC |
1593 | goto f_err; |
1594 | } | |
1595 | ||
1596 | s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; | |
25aaa98a | 1597 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); |
0f113f3e | 1598 | s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); |
25aaa98a | 1599 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); |
0f113f3e MC |
1600 | s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); |
1601 | } | |
1602 | } | |
58ece833 | 1603 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1604 | /* |
1605 | * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other | |
b2ce0337 | 1606 | * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression |
0f113f3e MC |
1607 | * algorithms from the client, starting at q. |
1608 | */ | |
1609 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; | |
09b6c2ef | 1610 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
0f113f3e MC |
1611 | /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ |
1612 | if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { | |
1613 | int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; | |
9ceb2426 | 1614 | unsigned int k; |
0f113f3e MC |
1615 | /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ |
1616 | /* Can't disable compression */ | |
1617 | if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { | |
e27f234a | 1618 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
0f113f3e MC |
1619 | SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); |
1620 | goto f_err; | |
1621 | } | |
1622 | /* Look for resumed compression method */ | |
1623 | for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { | |
1624 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); | |
1625 | if (comp_id == comp->id) { | |
1626 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; | |
1627 | break; | |
1628 | } | |
1629 | } | |
1630 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { | |
e27f234a | 1631 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
0f113f3e MC |
1632 | SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); |
1633 | goto f_err; | |
1634 | } | |
1635 | /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ | |
1ab3836b MC |
1636 | for (k = 0; k < clienthello.compressions_len; k++) { |
1637 | if (clienthello.compressions[k] == comp_id) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1638 | break; |
1639 | } | |
1ab3836b | 1640 | if (k >= clienthello.compressions_len) { |
0f113f3e | 1641 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
e27f234a | 1642 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
8fdc99cb | 1643 | SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); |
0f113f3e MC |
1644 | goto f_err; |
1645 | } | |
1646 | } else if (s->hit) | |
1647 | comp = NULL; | |
1648 | else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { | |
df6741c9 | 1649 | /* See if we have a match */ |
9ceb2426 MC |
1650 | int m, nn, v, done = 0; |
1651 | unsigned int o; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1652 | |
1653 | nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); | |
1654 | for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { | |
1655 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); | |
1656 | v = comp->id; | |
1ab3836b MC |
1657 | for (o = 0; o < clienthello.compressions_len; o++) { |
1658 | if (v == clienthello.compressions[o]) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
1659 | done = 1; |
1660 | break; | |
1661 | } | |
1662 | } | |
1663 | if (done) | |
1664 | break; | |
1665 | } | |
1666 | if (done) | |
1667 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; | |
1668 | else | |
1669 | comp = NULL; | |
1670 | } | |
e6f418bc | 1671 | #else |
0f113f3e MC |
1672 | /* |
1673 | * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session | |
1674 | * using compression. | |
1675 | */ | |
1676 | if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { | |
e27f234a | 1677 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); |
0f113f3e MC |
1678 | goto f_err; |
1679 | } | |
09b6c2ef | 1680 | #endif |
413c4f45 | 1681 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1682 | /* |
1683 | * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher | |
1684 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 1685 | |
0f113f3e | 1686 | if (!s->hit) { |
09b6c2ef | 1687 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
0f113f3e | 1688 | s->session->compress_meth = 0; |
09b6c2ef | 1689 | #else |
0f113f3e | 1690 | s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; |
09b6c2ef | 1691 | #endif |
25aaa98a | 1692 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); |
0f113f3e MC |
1693 | s->session->ciphers = ciphers; |
1694 | if (ciphers == NULL) { | |
3ae91cfb | 1695 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 1696 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0f113f3e MC |
1697 | goto f_err; |
1698 | } | |
1699 | ciphers = NULL; | |
1700 | if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { | |
e27f234a | 1701 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); |
0f113f3e MC |
1702 | goto err; |
1703 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
1704 | } |
1705 | ||
1706 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); | |
9529419d | 1707 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts); |
e27f234a MC |
1708 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
1709 | f_err: | |
1710 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
1711 | err: | |
fe3a3291 | 1712 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a MC |
1713 | |
1714 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); | |
9529419d | 1715 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts); |
e27f234a | 1716 | |
58c9e32a | 1717 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
e27f234a MC |
1718 | } |
1719 | ||
24b8e4b2 MC |
1720 | /* |
1721 | * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1. | |
1266eefd | 1722 | * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert. |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1723 | */ |
1724 | static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s, int *al) | |
1725 | { | |
aff8c126 | 1726 | s->ext.status_expected = 0; |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1727 | |
1728 | /* | |
1729 | * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be | |
1730 | * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed, | |
1731 | * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may | |
1732 | * influence which certificate is sent | |
1733 | */ | |
aff8c126 RS |
1734 | if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL |
1735 | && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { | |
24b8e4b2 | 1736 | int ret; |
1266eefd MC |
1737 | CERT_PKEY *certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); |
1738 | ||
24b8e4b2 MC |
1739 | /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ |
1740 | if (certpkey != NULL) { | |
1741 | /* | |
1742 | * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate | |
1743 | * et al can pick it up. | |
1744 | */ | |
1745 | s->cert->key = certpkey; | |
aff8c126 | 1746 | ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg); |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1747 | switch (ret) { |
1748 | /* We don't want to send a status request response */ | |
1749 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: | |
aff8c126 | 1750 | s->ext.status_expected = 0; |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1751 | break; |
1752 | /* status request response should be sent */ | |
1753 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: | |
aff8c126 RS |
1754 | if (s->ext.ocsp.resp) |
1755 | s->ext.status_expected = 1; | |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1756 | break; |
1757 | /* something bad happened */ | |
1758 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
1759 | default: | |
1760 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1761 | return 0; | |
1762 | } | |
1763 | } | |
1764 | } | |
1765 | ||
1766 | return 1; | |
1767 | } | |
1768 | ||
be3583fa | 1769 | WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
e27f234a | 1770 | { |
d13dd4be | 1771 | int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
4a640fb6 | 1772 | const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; |
e27f234a MC |
1773 | |
1774 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { | |
1775 | if (!s->hit) { | |
1776 | /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ | |
1777 | if (s->cert->cert_cb) { | |
1778 | int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); | |
1779 | if (rv == 0) { | |
1780 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
a230b26e EK |
1781 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1782 | SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); | |
e27f234a MC |
1783 | goto f_err; |
1784 | } | |
1785 | if (rv < 0) { | |
1786 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
1787 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
1788 | } | |
1789 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
0f113f3e | 1790 | } |
a230b26e EK |
1791 | cipher = |
1792 | ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); | |
e27f234a MC |
1793 | |
1794 | if (cipher == NULL) { | |
a230b26e EK |
1795 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1796 | SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); | |
e27f234a | 1797 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e | 1798 | } |
e27f234a MC |
1799 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; |
1800 | /* check whether we should disable session resumption */ | |
1801 | if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL) | |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1802 | s->session->not_resumable = |
1803 | s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, ((cipher->algorithm_mkey | |
1804 | & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) | |
1805 | != 0)); | |
e27f234a MC |
1806 | if (s->session->not_resumable) |
1807 | /* do not send a session ticket */ | |
aff8c126 | 1808 | s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; |
e27f234a MC |
1809 | } else { |
1810 | /* Session-id reuse */ | |
1811 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; | |
0f113f3e | 1812 | } |
0f113f3e | 1813 | |
28f4580c | 1814 | if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { |
d13dd4be MC |
1815 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
1816 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
e27f234a | 1817 | goto f_err; |
d13dd4be | 1818 | } |
0f113f3e | 1819 | } |
0f113f3e | 1820 | |
e27f234a MC |
1821 | /*- |
1822 | * we now have the following setup. | |
1823 | * client_random | |
60250017 | 1824 | * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers |
1825 | * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers | |
e27f234a MC |
1826 | * compression - basically ignored right now |
1827 | * ssl version is set - sslv3 | |
1828 | * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. | |
1829 | * s->hit - session reuse flag | |
1830 | * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use. | |
1831 | */ | |
0f113f3e | 1832 | |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1833 | /* |
1834 | * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the | |
1835 | * certificate callbacks etc above. | |
1836 | */ | |
1837 | if (!tls_handle_status_request(s, &al)) { | |
1838 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1839 | SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); | |
1840 | goto f_err; | |
e27f234a | 1841 | } |
0f113f3e | 1842 | |
e27f234a MC |
1843 | wst = WORK_MORE_B; |
1844 | } | |
1845 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
1846 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { | |
1847 | int ret; | |
1848 | if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) { | |
1849 | /* | |
1850 | * callback indicates further work to be done | |
1851 | */ | |
1852 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
1853 | return WORK_MORE_B; | |
1854 | } | |
1855 | if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) { | |
1856 | /* | |
1857 | * This is not really an error but the only means to for | |
1858 | * a client to detect whether srp is supported. | |
1859 | */ | |
1860 | if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) | |
1861 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
a230b26e | 1862 | SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); |
7bb37cb5 E |
1863 | else |
1864 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1865 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); | |
e27f234a | 1866 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1867 | } |
1868 | } | |
e27f234a | 1869 | #endif |
0f113f3e | 1870 | |
e27f234a | 1871 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
0f113f3e | 1872 | f_err: |
e27f234a | 1873 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
fe3a3291 | 1874 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a MC |
1875 | return WORK_ERROR; |
1876 | } | |
1877 | ||
7cea05dc | 1878 | int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 1879 | { |
ec60ccc1 MC |
1880 | int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
1881 | size_t sl, len; | |
f2342b7a | 1882 | int version; |
0f113f3e | 1883 | |
b97667ce | 1884 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */ |
f2342b7a MC |
1885 | version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version; |
1886 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version) | |
8157d44b MC |
1887 | /* |
1888 | * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in | |
1889 | * tls_process_client_hello() | |
1890 | */ | |
7cea05dc | 1891 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { |
8157d44b MC |
1892 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
1893 | goto err; | |
1894 | } | |
0f113f3e | 1895 | |
e27f234a MC |
1896 | /*- |
1897 | * There are several cases for the session ID to send | |
1898 | * back in the server hello: | |
1899 | * - For session reuse from the session cache, | |
1900 | * we send back the old session ID. | |
1901 | * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) | |
1902 | * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" | |
1903 | * (which doesn't actually identify the session). | |
1904 | * - If it is a new session, we send back the new | |
1905 | * session ID. | |
1906 | * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, | |
1907 | * we send back a 0-length session ID. | |
1908 | * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, | |
1909 | * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed | |
1910 | * to send back. | |
1911 | */ | |
1912 | if (s->session->not_resumable || | |
1913 | (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) | |
1914 | && !s->hit)) | |
1915 | s->session->session_id_length = 0; | |
1916 | ||
1917 | sl = s->session->session_id_length; | |
ec60ccc1 | 1918 | if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { |
e27f234a | 1919 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
8157d44b | 1920 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 1921 | } |
0f113f3e | 1922 | |
8157d44b | 1923 | /* set up the compression method */ |
09b6c2ef | 1924 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
8157d44b | 1925 | compm = 0; |
09b6c2ef | 1926 | #else |
e27f234a | 1927 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) |
8157d44b | 1928 | compm = 0; |
e27f234a | 1929 | else |
8157d44b | 1930 | compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; |
09b6c2ef | 1931 | #endif |
e481f9b9 | 1932 | |
71728dd8 MC |
1933 | if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
1934 | && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl)) | |
7cea05dc | 1935 | || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len) |
71728dd8 MC |
1936 | || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
1937 | && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) | |
7da160b0 | 1938 | || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, |
3434f40b | 1939 | SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
1266eefd | 1940 | ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO |
30aeba43 MC |
1941 | : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO, |
1942 | NULL, 0, &al)) { | |
e27f234a | 1943 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
8157d44b | 1944 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1945 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1946 | |
e27f234a | 1947 | return 1; |
8157d44b | 1948 | err: |
7da160b0 | 1949 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
8157d44b | 1950 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 1951 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1952 | |
7cea05dc | 1953 | int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 1954 | { |
e27f234a | 1955 | if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
5923ad4b MC |
1956 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
1957 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1958 | return 0; | |
1959 | } | |
e27f234a | 1960 | } |
e27f234a MC |
1961 | return 1; |
1962 | } | |
1963 | ||
7cea05dc | 1964 | int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 1965 | { |
bc36ee62 | 1966 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
e2b420fd | 1967 | EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL; |
ea262260 | 1968 | #endif |
10bf4fc2 | 1969 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
0f113f3e | 1970 | unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; |
348240c6 | 1971 | size_t encodedlen = 0; |
0f113f3e | 1972 | int curve_id = 0; |
d02b48c6 | 1973 | #endif |
0f113f3e MC |
1974 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; |
1975 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
c13d2a5b | 1976 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i; |
0f113f3e | 1977 | unsigned long type; |
2ac6115d | 1978 | const BIGNUM *r[4]; |
bfb0641f | 1979 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
fe3066ee | 1980 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
c13d2a5b MC |
1981 | size_t paramlen, paramoffset; |
1982 | ||
5923ad4b | 1983 | if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) { |
e4e1aa90 | 1984 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c13d2a5b MC |
1985 | goto f_err; |
1986 | } | |
0f113f3e | 1987 | |
6e59a892 RL |
1988 | if (md_ctx == NULL) { |
1989 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
6e59a892 RL |
1990 | goto f_err; |
1991 | } | |
0f113f3e | 1992 | |
e27f234a | 1993 | type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
e27f234a | 1994 | |
e27f234a | 1995 | r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; |
85269210 | 1996 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
e27f234a MC |
1997 | /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */ |
1998 | if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { | |
1999 | } else | |
85269210 | 2000 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ |
bc36ee62 | 2001 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
e27f234a | 2002 | if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
94d61512 BL |
2003 | CERT *cert = s->cert; |
2004 | ||
e2b420fd DSH |
2005 | EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL; |
2006 | DH *dh; | |
2007 | ||
e27f234a | 2008 | if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) { |
e2b420fd DSH |
2009 | DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s); |
2010 | pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
2011 | if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) { | |
2012 | DH_free(dhp); | |
e27f234a | 2013 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
0f113f3e | 2014 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 2015 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e | 2016 | } |
e2b420fd DSH |
2017 | EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp); |
2018 | pkdhp = pkdh; | |
2019 | } else { | |
2020 | pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp; | |
2021 | } | |
2022 | if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { | |
2023 | DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024); | |
2024 | pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp); | |
2025 | if (pkdh == NULL) { | |
e2b420fd DSH |
2026 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2027 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2028 | goto f_err; | |
2029 | } | |
2030 | pkdhp = pkdh; | |
2031 | } | |
2032 | if (pkdhp == NULL) { | |
e27f234a MC |
2033 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
2034 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2035 | SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); | |
2036 | goto f_err; | |
2037 | } | |
2038 | if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, | |
e2b420fd | 2039 | EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) { |
e27f234a MC |
2040 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
2041 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2042 | SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
2043 | goto f_err; | |
2044 | } | |
e2b420fd | 2045 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { |
e27f234a MC |
2046 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2047 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2048 | goto err; | |
2049 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2050 | |
0a699a07 | 2051 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp); |
e27f234a | 2052 | |
e2b420fd DSH |
2053 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { |
2054 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
ffaef3f1 | 2055 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 2056 | } |
e2b420fd DSH |
2057 | |
2058 | dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey); | |
2059 | ||
2060 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); | |
2061 | pkdh = NULL; | |
2062 | ||
0aeddcfa MC |
2063 | DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]); |
2064 | DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL); | |
e27f234a | 2065 | } else |
d02b48c6 | 2066 | #endif |
10bf4fc2 | 2067 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
e27f234a | 2068 | if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
57be4444 | 2069 | int nid; |
e27f234a | 2070 | |
880d9d86 | 2071 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { |
e27f234a MC |
2072 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2073 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2074 | goto err; | |
2075 | } | |
2076 | ||
57be4444 | 2077 | /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ |
de4d764e | 2078 | nid = tls1_shared_group(s, -2); |
57be4444 DSH |
2079 | curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid); |
2080 | if (curve_id == 0) { | |
e27f234a MC |
2081 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2082 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); | |
2083 | goto err; | |
2084 | } | |
0a699a07 | 2085 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id); |
880d9d86 DSH |
2086 | /* Generate a new key for this curve */ |
2087 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { | |
880d9d86 | 2088 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
57be4444 DSH |
2089 | goto f_err; |
2090 | } | |
2091 | ||
880d9d86 | 2092 | /* Encode the public key. */ |
ec24630a DSH |
2093 | encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey, |
2094 | &encodedPoint); | |
e27f234a | 2095 | if (encodedlen == 0) { |
cae41364 | 2096 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
e27f234a MC |
2097 | goto err; |
2098 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2099 | |
e27f234a MC |
2100 | /* |
2101 | * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we | |
2102 | * can set these to NULLs | |
2103 | */ | |
2104 | r[0] = NULL; | |
2105 | r[1] = NULL; | |
2106 | r[2] = NULL; | |
2107 | r[3] = NULL; | |
2108 | } else | |
10bf4fc2 | 2109 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
edc032b5 | 2110 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
e27f234a MC |
2111 | if (type & SSL_kSRP) { |
2112 | if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || | |
2113 | (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || | |
2114 | (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { | |
2115 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2116 | SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); | |
2117 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 2118 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2119 | r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; |
2120 | r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; | |
2121 | r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; | |
2122 | r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; | |
2123 | } else | |
2124 | #endif | |
2125 | { | |
2126 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
2127 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2128 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); | |
2129 | goto f_err; | |
2130 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2131 | |
a230b26e | 2132 | if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) |
e27f234a MC |
2133 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) { |
2134 | if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) | |
2135 | == NULL) { | |
2136 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2137 | goto f_err; | |
0f113f3e | 2138 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2139 | } else { |
2140 | pkey = NULL; | |
e27f234a | 2141 | } |
0f113f3e | 2142 | |
85269210 | 2143 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
e27f234a | 2144 | if (type & SSL_PSK) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2145 | size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL) |
2146 | ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); | |
2147 | ||
2148 | /* | |
2149 | * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already | |
2150 | * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case | |
2151 | */ | |
2152 | if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN | |
7cea05dc | 2153 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, |
c13d2a5b MC |
2154 | len)) { |
2155 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2156 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2157 | goto f_err; | |
85269210 | 2158 | } |
e27f234a | 2159 | } |
85269210 DSH |
2160 | #endif |
2161 | ||
e27f234a | 2162 | for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2163 | unsigned char *binval; |
2164 | int res; | |
2165 | ||
edc032b5 | 2166 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
e27f234a | 2167 | if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { |
7cea05dc | 2168 | res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt); |
e27f234a | 2169 | } else |
78a01b3f | 2170 | #endif |
7cea05dc | 2171 | res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt); |
c13d2a5b MC |
2172 | |
2173 | if (!res) { | |
2174 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2175 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2176 | goto f_err; | |
2177 | } | |
2178 | ||
78a01b3f | 2179 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
a230b26e | 2180 | /*- |
78a01b3f | 2181 | * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS |
2182 | * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length | |
2183 | * as the prime | |
2184 | */ | |
2185 | if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) { | |
c13d2a5b | 2186 | size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]); |
ff819477 | 2187 | |
c13d2a5b | 2188 | if (len > 0) { |
7cea05dc | 2189 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2190 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2191 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2192 | goto f_err; | |
2193 | } | |
2194 | memset(binval, 0, len); | |
78a01b3f | 2195 | } |
c13d2a5b | 2196 | } |
edc032b5 | 2197 | #endif |
7cea05dc MC |
2198 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval) |
2199 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2200 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2201 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2202 | goto f_err; | |
2203 | } | |
2204 | ||
2205 | BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval); | |
e27f234a | 2206 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2207 | |
10bf4fc2 | 2208 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
e27f234a MC |
2209 | if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
2210 | /* | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2211 | * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the |
2212 | * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] | |
2213 | * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded | |
2214 | * point itself | |
e27f234a | 2215 | */ |
7cea05dc MC |
2216 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) |
2217 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) | |
2218 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id) | |
2219 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) { | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2220 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2221 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2222 | goto f_err; | |
2223 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2224 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
2225 | encodedPoint = NULL; | |
e27f234a | 2226 | } |
ea262260 BM |
2227 | #endif |
2228 | ||
e27f234a MC |
2229 | /* not anonymous */ |
2230 | if (pkey != NULL) { | |
2231 | /* | |
2232 | * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p | |
2233 | * points to the space at the end. | |
2234 | */ | |
e27f234a | 2235 | if (md) { |
c13d2a5b | 2236 | unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2; |
fe3066ee MC |
2237 | size_t siglen; |
2238 | int ispss = 0; | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2239 | |
2240 | /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */ | |
7cea05dc | 2241 | if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2242 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2243 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2244 | goto f_err; | |
2245 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2246 | /* send signature algorithm */ |
2247 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { | |
fe3066ee | 2248 | if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(s, pkt, pkey, md, &ispss)) { |
e27f234a | 2249 | /* Should never happen */ |
e27f234a MC |
2250 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2251 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2252 | goto f_err; | |
0f113f3e | 2253 | } |
e27f234a | 2254 | } |
a2f9200f | 2255 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG |
e27f234a | 2256 | fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); |
a2f9200f | 2257 | #endif |
c13d2a5b MC |
2258 | /* |
2259 | * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig | |
2260 | * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it | |
2261 | * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET | |
2262 | * afterwards. | |
2263 | */ | |
0cc092f8 MC |
2264 | siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
2265 | if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1) | |
fe3066ee MC |
2266 | || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
2267 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2268 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2269 | goto f_err; | |
2270 | } | |
2271 | if (ispss) { | |
2272 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, | |
2273 | RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 | |
968ae5b3 | 2274 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { |
fe3066ee MC |
2275 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2276 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
2277 | goto f_err; | |
2278 | } | |
2279 | } | |
2280 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), | |
2281 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 | |
2282 | || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), | |
2283 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 | |
2284 | || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, | |
2285 | s->init_buf->data + paramoffset, | |
2286 | paramlen) <= 0 | |
2287 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen) <= 0 | |
7cea05dc | 2288 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2) |
c13d2a5b MC |
2289 | || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) { |
2290 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2291 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5f3d93e4 | 2292 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e | 2293 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2294 | } else { |
2295 | /* Is this error check actually needed? */ | |
77d514c5 | 2296 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
e27f234a MC |
2297 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2298 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); | |
77d514c5 MC |
2299 | goto f_err; |
2300 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
2301 | } |
2302 | ||
bfb0641f | 2303 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
e27f234a | 2304 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
2305 | f_err: |
2306 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
2307 | err: | |
e2b420fd DSH |
2308 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
2309 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); | |
2310 | #endif | |
556efe79 | 2311 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
b548a1f1 | 2312 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
ea262260 | 2313 | #endif |
bfb0641f | 2314 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
e27f234a | 2315 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2316 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2317 | |
7cea05dc | 2318 | int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2319 | { |
348240c6 | 2320 | int i; |
0f113f3e | 2321 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; |
0f113f3e | 2322 | |
e27f234a | 2323 | /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ |
7cea05dc MC |
2324 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) |
2325 | || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) | |
2326 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2327 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2328 | goto err; | |
2329 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2330 | |
e27f234a | 2331 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
98c792d1 | 2332 | const uint16_t *psigs; |
a9669ddc | 2333 | size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs); |
703bcee0 | 2334 | |
7cea05dc MC |
2335 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
2336 | || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl) | |
2337 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2338 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, |
2339 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2340 | goto err; | |
2341 | } | |
e27f234a | 2342 | } |
0f113f3e | 2343 | |
28ff8ef3 | 2344 | /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ |
7cea05dc | 2345 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2346 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2347 | goto err; | |
2348 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2349 | |
2350 | sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); | |
e27f234a MC |
2351 | if (sk != NULL) { |
2352 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { | |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2353 | unsigned char *namebytes; |
2354 | X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); | |
2355 | int namelen; | |
2356 | ||
2357 | if (name == NULL | |
2358 | || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 | |
7cea05dc | 2359 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2360 | &namebytes) |
2361 | || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { | |
2362 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2363 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e27f234a | 2364 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
2365 | } |
2366 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2367 | } |
2368 | /* else no CA names */ | |
d02b48c6 | 2369 | |
5923ad4b | 2370 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
e27f234a MC |
2371 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2372 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 2373 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2374 | |
e27f234a MC |
2375 | s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; |
2376 | ||
2377 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 2378 | err: |
28ff8ef3 | 2379 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 2380 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2381 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2382 | |
0907d710 | 2383 | static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
e27f234a | 2384 | { |
85269210 | 2385 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
0907d710 MC |
2386 | unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; |
2387 | size_t psklen; | |
2388 | PACKET psk_identity; | |
efcdbcbe | 2389 | |
0907d710 MC |
2390 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) { |
2391 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2392 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
0907d710 MC |
2393 | return 0; |
2394 | } | |
2395 | if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { | |
2396 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2397 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
0907d710 MC |
2398 | return 0; |
2399 | } | |
2400 | if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { | |
2401 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
a230b26e | 2402 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); |
0907d710 MC |
2403 | return 0; |
2404 | } | |
85269210 | 2405 | |
0907d710 MC |
2406 | if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) { |
2407 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2408 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2409 | return 0; |
2410 | } | |
85269210 | 2411 | |
0907d710 | 2412 | psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity, |
a230b26e | 2413 | psk, sizeof(psk)); |
85269210 | 2414 | |
0907d710 MC |
2415 | if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { |
2416 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2417 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2418 | return 0; |
2419 | } else if (psklen == 0) { | |
2420 | /* | |
2421 | * PSK related to the given identity not found | |
2422 | */ | |
2423 | *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; | |
c76a4aea | 2424 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
0907d710 MC |
2425 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); |
2426 | return 0; | |
2427 | } | |
85269210 | 2428 | |
0907d710 MC |
2429 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); |
2430 | s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); | |
2431 | OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); | |
85269210 | 2432 | |
0907d710 MC |
2433 | if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) { |
2434 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2435 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
0907d710 | 2436 | return 0; |
85269210 | 2437 | } |
0907d710 MC |
2438 | |
2439 | s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; | |
2440 | ||
2441 | return 1; | |
2442 | #else | |
2443 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2444 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2445 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 | 2446 | return 0; |
85269210 | 2447 | #endif |
0907d710 MC |
2448 | } |
2449 | ||
0907d710 MC |
2450 | static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
2451 | { | |
bc36ee62 | 2452 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
0907d710 MC |
2453 | unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; |
2454 | int decrypt_len; | |
2455 | unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; | |
2456 | size_t j, padding_len; | |
2457 | PACKET enc_premaster; | |
2458 | RSA *rsa = NULL; | |
2459 | unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL; | |
2460 | int ret = 0; | |
2461 | ||
2462 | rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey); | |
2463 | if (rsa == NULL) { | |
2464 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
c76a4aea | 2465 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); |
0907d710 MC |
2466 | return 0; |
2467 | } | |
2468 | ||
2469 | /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */ | |
2470 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { | |
2471 | enc_premaster = *pkt; | |
2472 | } else { | |
2473 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster) | |
2474 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
2475 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2476 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
0907d710 | 2477 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2478 | } |
0907d710 | 2479 | } |
0f113f3e | 2480 | |
0907d710 MC |
2481 | /* |
2482 | * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to | |
2483 | * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret | |
2484 | * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because | |
2485 | * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway. | |
2486 | */ | |
2487 | if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { | |
2488 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2489 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); |
0907d710 MC |
2490 | return 0; |
2491 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2492 | |
0907d710 MC |
2493 | rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa)); |
2494 | if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) { | |
2495 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2496 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
0907d710 MC |
2497 | return 0; |
2498 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2499 | |
0907d710 MC |
2500 | /* |
2501 | * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of | |
2502 | * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, | |
2503 | * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and | |
2504 | * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt | |
2505 | * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 | |
2506 | */ | |
20ca916d | 2507 | |
a230b26e | 2508 | if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) |
0907d710 | 2509 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2510 | |
0907d710 MC |
2511 | /* |
2512 | * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of | |
2513 | * the timing-sensitive code below. | |
2514 | */ | |
348240c6 MC |
2515 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ |
2516 | decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster), | |
2517 | PACKET_data(&enc_premaster), | |
2518 | rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); | |
0907d710 MC |
2519 | if (decrypt_len < 0) |
2520 | goto err; | |
20ca916d | 2521 | |
0907d710 | 2522 | /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */ |
5b8fa431 | 2523 | |
0907d710 MC |
2524 | /* |
2525 | * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys | |
2526 | * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures | |
2527 | * PS is at least 8 bytes. | |
2528 | */ | |
2529 | if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { | |
2530 | *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2531 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
0907d710 MC |
2532 | goto err; |
2533 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2534 | |
0907d710 MC |
2535 | padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; |
2536 | decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) & | |
a230b26e | 2537 | constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2); |
0907d710 MC |
2538 | for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) { |
2539 | decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]); | |
2540 | } | |
2541 | decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]); | |
5b8fa431 | 2542 | |
0907d710 MC |
2543 | /* |
2544 | * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then | |
2545 | * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The | |
2546 | * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack | |
2547 | * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number | |
2548 | * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in | |
2549 | * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. | |
2550 | */ | |
2551 | version_good = | |
2552 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], | |
2553 | (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); | |
2554 | version_good &= | |
2555 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], | |
2556 | (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); | |
0f113f3e | 2557 | |
0907d710 MC |
2558 | /* |
2559 | * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the | |
2560 | * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the | |
2561 | * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). | |
2562 | * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol | |
2563 | * version instead if the server does not support the requested | |
2564 | * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such | |
2565 | * clients. | |
2566 | */ | |
2567 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { | |
2568 | unsigned char workaround_good; | |
2569 | workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], | |
2570 | (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); | |
2571 | workaround_good &= | |
5b8fa431 | 2572 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], |
0907d710 MC |
2573 | (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); |
2574 | version_good |= workaround_good; | |
2575 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2576 | |
0907d710 MC |
2577 | /* |
2578 | * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to | |
2579 | * remain non-zero (0xff). | |
2580 | */ | |
2581 | decrypt_good &= version_good; | |
0f113f3e | 2582 | |
0907d710 MC |
2583 | /* |
2584 | * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using | |
2585 | * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not | |
2586 | * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees | |
2587 | * it is still sufficiently large to read from. | |
2588 | */ | |
2589 | for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { | |
2590 | rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] = | |
2591 | constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, | |
2592 | rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j], | |
2593 | rand_premaster_secret[j]); | |
2594 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2595 | |
0907d710 MC |
2596 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len, |
2597 | sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) { | |
2598 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2599 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2600 | goto err; |
2601 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2602 | |
0907d710 MC |
2603 | ret = 1; |
2604 | err: | |
2605 | OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt); | |
2606 | return ret; | |
2607 | #else | |
2608 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2609 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2610 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2611 | return 0; |
2612 | #endif | |
2613 | } | |
2614 | ||
642360f9 MC |
2615 | static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
2616 | { | |
2617 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH | |
2618 | EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; | |
2619 | DH *cdh; | |
2620 | unsigned int i; | |
2621 | BIGNUM *pub_key; | |
2622 | const unsigned char *data; | |
2623 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; | |
2624 | int ret = 0; | |
2625 | ||
31a7d80d | 2626 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) { |
642360f9 | 2627 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
c76a4aea | 2628 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, |
642360f9 MC |
2629 | SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); |
2630 | goto err; | |
2631 | } | |
642360f9 MC |
2632 | skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; |
2633 | if (skey == NULL) { | |
2634 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
c76a4aea | 2635 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); |
642360f9 MC |
2636 | goto err; |
2637 | } | |
2638 | ||
2639 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { | |
2640 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
c76a4aea | 2641 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); |
642360f9 MC |
2642 | goto err; |
2643 | } | |
2644 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { | |
2645 | /* We already checked we have enough data */ | |
2646 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2647 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2648 | goto err; |
2649 | } | |
2650 | ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
2651 | if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) { | |
c76a4aea | 2652 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); |
642360f9 MC |
2653 | goto err; |
2654 | } | |
2655 | cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); | |
2656 | pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL); | |
2657 | ||
2658 | if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) { | |
c76a4aea | 2659 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2660 | if (pub_key != NULL) |
2661 | BN_free(pub_key); | |
2662 | goto err; | |
2663 | } | |
2664 | ||
0f1e51ea | 2665 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { |
642360f9 | 2666 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2667 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2668 | goto err; |
2669 | } | |
2670 | ||
2671 | ret = 1; | |
2672 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); | |
2673 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; | |
2674 | err: | |
2675 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); | |
2676 | return ret; | |
2677 | #else | |
2678 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2679 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2680 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2681 | return 0; |
2682 | #endif | |
2683 | } | |
2684 | ||
19ed1ec1 MC |
2685 | static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
2686 | { | |
2687 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
2688 | EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; | |
2689 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; | |
2690 | int ret = 0; | |
2691 | ||
2692 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { | |
2693 | /* We don't support ECDH client auth */ | |
2694 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
c76a4aea | 2695 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2696 | goto err; |
2697 | } else { | |
2698 | unsigned int i; | |
2699 | const unsigned char *data; | |
2700 | ||
2701 | /* | |
2702 | * Get client's public key from encoded point in the | |
2703 | * ClientKeyExchange message. | |
2704 | */ | |
2705 | ||
2706 | /* Get encoded point length */ | |
fb933982 DSH |
2707 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i) |
2708 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
19ed1ec1 | 2709 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2710 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2711 | goto err; |
2712 | } | |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2713 | ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); |
2714 | if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) { | |
c76a4aea | 2715 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2716 | goto err; |
2717 | } | |
ec24630a | 2718 | if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) { |
fb933982 | 2719 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
c76a4aea | 2720 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2721 | goto err; |
2722 | } | |
2723 | } | |
2724 | ||
0f1e51ea | 2725 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { |
19ed1ec1 | 2726 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2727 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2728 | goto err; |
2729 | } | |
2730 | ||
2731 | ret = 1; | |
2732 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); | |
2733 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; | |
2734 | err: | |
2735 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); | |
2736 | ||
2737 | return ret; | |
2738 | #else | |
2739 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2740 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2741 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2742 | return 0; |
2743 | #endif | |
2744 | } | |
2745 | ||
c437eef6 MC |
2746 | static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
2747 | { | |
2748 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
2749 | unsigned int i; | |
2750 | const unsigned char *data; | |
2751 | ||
2752 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) | |
a230b26e | 2753 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { |
c437eef6 | 2754 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2755 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); |
c437eef6 MC |
2756 | return 0; |
2757 | } | |
2758 | if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) { | |
c76a4aea | 2759 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
c437eef6 MC |
2760 | return 0; |
2761 | } | |
a230b26e | 2762 | if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { |
c437eef6 | 2763 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
c76a4aea | 2764 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); |
c437eef6 MC |
2765 | return 0; |
2766 | } | |
2767 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); | |
2768 | s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); | |
2769 | if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { | |
c76a4aea | 2770 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
c437eef6 MC |
2771 | return 0; |
2772 | } | |
2773 | ||
2774 | if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) { | |
c76a4aea | 2775 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2776 | return 0; |
2777 | } | |
2778 | ||
2779 | return 1; | |
2780 | #else | |
2781 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2782 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2783 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2784 | return 0; |
2785 | #endif | |
2786 | } | |
2787 | ||
2788 | static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) | |
2789 | { | |
2790 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
2791 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; | |
2792 | EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; | |
2793 | unsigned char premaster_secret[32]; | |
2794 | const unsigned char *start; | |
2795 | size_t outlen = 32, inlen; | |
2796 | unsigned long alg_a; | |
2797 | int Ttag, Tclass; | |
2798 | long Tlen; | |
348240c6 | 2799 | size_t sess_key_len; |
c437eef6 MC |
2800 | const unsigned char *data; |
2801 | int ret = 0; | |
2802 | ||
2803 | /* Get our certificate private key */ | |
2804 | alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
2805 | if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) { | |
2806 | /* | |
2807 | * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too | |
2808 | */ | |
2809 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey; | |
2810 | if (pk == NULL) { | |
2811 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey; | |
2812 | } | |
2813 | if (pk == NULL) { | |
2814 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; | |
2815 | } | |
2816 | } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) { | |
2817 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; | |
2818 | } | |
2819 | ||
2820 | pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); | |
2821 | if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { | |
2822 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2823 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
c437eef6 MC |
2824 | return 0; |
2825 | } | |
2826 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { | |
2827 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2828 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2829 | return 0; |
2830 | } | |
2831 | /* | |
2832 | * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe | |
2833 | * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from | |
2834 | * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a | |
2835 | * client certificate for authorization only. | |
2836 | */ | |
2837 | client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); | |
2838 | if (client_pub_pkey) { | |
2839 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) | |
2840 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
2841 | } | |
2842 | /* Decrypt session key */ | |
2843 | sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); | |
2844 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) { | |
2845 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2846 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2847 | goto err; |
2848 | } | |
348240c6 | 2849 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ |
a230b26e | 2850 | if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag, |
348240c6 | 2851 | &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
a230b26e | 2852 | || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { |
c437eef6 | 2853 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2854 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
c437eef6 MC |
2855 | goto err; |
2856 | } | |
2857 | start = data; | |
2858 | inlen = Tlen; | |
2859 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt | |
2860 | (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { | |
2861 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2862 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
c437eef6 MC |
2863 | goto err; |
2864 | } | |
2865 | /* Generate master secret */ | |
2866 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, | |
2867 | sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) { | |
2868 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2869 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2870 | goto err; |
2871 | } | |
2872 | /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ | |
2873 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl | |
2874 | (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) | |
2875 | s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1; | |
2876 | ||
2877 | ret = 1; | |
2878 | err: | |
2879 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); | |
2880 | return ret; | |
2881 | #else | |
2882 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2883 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2884 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2885 | return 0; |
2886 | #endif | |
2887 | } | |
2888 | ||
0907d710 MC |
2889 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
2890 | { | |
2891 | int al = -1; | |
2892 | unsigned long alg_k; | |
2893 | ||
2894 | alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
2895 | ||
2896 | /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */ | |
2897 | if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al)) | |
2898 | goto err; | |
2899 | ||
2900 | if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { | |
2901 | /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */ | |
2902 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
2903 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
a230b26e EK |
2904 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2905 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
9059eb71 | 2906 | goto err; |
0907d710 MC |
2907 | } |
2908 | /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */ | |
2909 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) { | |
69f68237 | 2910 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 2911 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
9059eb71 | 2912 | goto err; |
69f68237 | 2913 | } |
0907d710 MC |
2914 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { |
2915 | if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al)) | |
2916 | goto err; | |
642360f9 MC |
2917 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
2918 | if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al)) | |
0f113f3e | 2919 | goto err; |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2920 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
2921 | if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al)) | |
2922 | goto err; | |
c437eef6 MC |
2923 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { |
2924 | if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al)) | |
0f113f3e | 2925 | goto err; |
c437eef6 MC |
2926 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { |
2927 | if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al)) | |
0f113f3e | 2928 | goto err; |
c437eef6 | 2929 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 2930 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
a230b26e EK |
2931 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2932 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); | |
9059eb71 | 2933 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
2934 | } |
2935 | ||
e27f234a | 2936 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
0f113f3e | 2937 | err: |
0907d710 MC |
2938 | if (al != -1) |
2939 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
85269210 DSH |
2940 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
2941 | OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); | |
2942 | s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; | |
58964a49 | 2943 | #endif |
fe3a3291 | 2944 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a | 2945 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 2946 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2947 | |
be3583fa | 2948 | WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
94836de2 | 2949 | { |
94836de2 | 2950 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
c130dd8e MC |
2951 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { |
2952 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
2953 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
2954 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
2955 | /* | |
2956 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP | |
2957 | * used. | |
2958 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
2959 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
2960 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
c130dd8e MC |
2961 | |
2962 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, | |
a230b26e EK |
2963 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, |
2964 | sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, | |
2965 | 0) <= 0) { | |
fe3a3291 | 2966 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
0fe2a0af | 2967 | return WORK_ERROR; |
c130dd8e | 2968 | } |
94836de2 | 2969 | |
c130dd8e MC |
2970 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, |
2971 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
94836de2 | 2972 | } |
c130dd8e MC |
2973 | wst = WORK_MORE_B; |
2974 | } | |
94836de2 | 2975 | |
c130dd8e | 2976 | if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B) |
a230b26e EK |
2977 | /* Is this SCTP? */ |
2978 | && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) | |
2979 | /* Are we renegotiating? */ | |
2980 | && s->renegotiate | |
2981 | /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */ | |
2982 | && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify) | |
2983 | && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { | |
c130dd8e MC |
2984 | s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; |
2985 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
2986 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); | |
2987 | BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); | |
d99b0691 | 2988 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1); |
c130dd8e MC |
2989 | return WORK_MORE_B; |
2990 | } else { | |
fe3a3291 | 2991 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0); |
94836de2 MC |
2992 | } |
2993 | #endif | |
2994 | ||
149c2ef5 | 2995 | if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) { |
a230b26e EK |
2996 | /* |
2997 | * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need | |
2998 | * the handshake_buffer | |
149c2ef5 MC |
2999 | */ |
3000 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { | |
3001 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
3002 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
3003 | } | |
94836de2 | 3004 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
28f4580c | 3005 | } else { |
94836de2 MC |
3006 | if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { |
3007 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
3008 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
fe3a3291 | 3009 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
94836de2 MC |
3010 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3011 | } | |
3012 | /* | |
3013 | * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support | |
3014 | * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op | |
3015 | */ | |
3016 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { | |
fe3a3291 | 3017 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
94836de2 MC |
3018 | return WORK_ERROR; |
3019 | } | |
94836de2 MC |
3020 | } |
3021 | ||
3022 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
3023 | } | |
3024 | ||
be3583fa | 3025 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3026 | { |
20dbe585 | 3027 | int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
e27f234a MC |
3028 | X509 *x = NULL; |
3029 | unsigned long l, llen; | |
b6981744 | 3030 | const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; |
e27f234a | 3031 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; |
e96e0f8e | 3032 | PACKET spkt, context; |
d805a57b | 3033 | size_t chainidx; |
0f113f3e MC |
3034 | |
3035 | if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { | |
e27f234a MC |
3036 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
3037 | goto f_err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3038 | } |
3039 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
3040 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */ |
3041 | if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)) | |
3042 | || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen) | |
3043 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen) | |
3044 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
0f113f3e | 3045 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3046 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
0f113f3e MC |
3047 | goto f_err; |
3048 | } | |
0bc09ecd | 3049 | |
d805a57b | 3050 | for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) { |
0bc09ecd | 3051 | if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l) |
a230b26e | 3052 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) { |
0f113f3e | 3053 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3054 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3055 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
3056 | goto f_err; | |
3057 | } | |
3058 | ||
0bc09ecd MC |
3059 | certstart = certbytes; |
3060 | x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l); | |
0f113f3e | 3061 | if (x == NULL) { |
e27f234a MC |
3062 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
3063 | goto f_err; | |
0f113f3e | 3064 | } |
0bc09ecd | 3065 | if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) { |
0f113f3e | 3066 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3067 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3068 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
3069 | goto f_err; | |
3070 | } | |
e96e0f8e MC |
3071 | |
3072 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
3073 | RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; | |
3074 | PACKET extensions; | |
3075 | ||
3076 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) { | |
3077 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
3078 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
3079 | goto f_err; | |
3080 | } | |
3081 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, | |
3082 | &rawexts, &al) | |
3083 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, | |
5ee289ea MC |
3084 | rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) { |
3085 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); | |
e96e0f8e | 3086 | goto f_err; |
5ee289ea MC |
3087 | } |
3088 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); | |
e96e0f8e MC |
3089 | } |
3090 | ||
0f113f3e | 3091 | if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { |
e27f234a MC |
3092 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
3093 | goto f_err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3094 | } |
3095 | x = NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3096 | } |
3097 | ||
3098 | if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { | |
3099 | /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ | |
3100 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
3101 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
e27f234a | 3102 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3103 | SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); |
3104 | goto f_err; | |
3105 | } | |
3106 | /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ | |
3107 | else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && | |
3108 | (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { | |
e27f234a | 3109 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3110 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); |
3111 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
3112 | goto f_err; | |
3113 | } | |
3114 | /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ | |
124037fd | 3115 | if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
0f113f3e MC |
3116 | goto f_err; |
3117 | } | |
3118 | } else { | |
3119 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; | |
3120 | i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); | |
3121 | if (i <= 0) { | |
3122 | al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); | |
e27f234a | 3123 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3124 | SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); |
3125 | goto f_err; | |
3126 | } | |
3127 | if (i > 1) { | |
e27f234a | 3128 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i); |
0f113f3e MC |
3129 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
3130 | goto f_err; | |
3131 | } | |
8382fd3a | 3132 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0)); |
0f113f3e MC |
3133 | if (pkey == NULL) { |
3134 | al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
e27f234a | 3135 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3136 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); |
3137 | goto f_err; | |
3138 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
3139 | } |
3140 | ||
222561fe | 3141 | X509_free(s->session->peer); |
0f113f3e MC |
3142 | s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); |
3143 | s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; | |
3144 | ||
c34b0f99 DSH |
3145 | sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free); |
3146 | s->session->peer_chain = sk; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
3147 | |
3148 | /* | |
3149 | * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE | |
3150 | * message | |
3151 | */ | |
94ed2c67 | 3152 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { |
0f1e51ea MC |
3153 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
3154 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3155 | goto f_err; | |
3156 | } | |
3157 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
3158 | /* |
3159 | * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own | |
d4d78943 | 3160 | * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c |
0f113f3e | 3161 | */ |
0f113f3e | 3162 | sk = NULL; |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
3163 | |
3164 | /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ | |
3165 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
3166 | && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
3167 | sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash), | |
3168 | &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) { | |
3169 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
3170 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3171 | goto f_err; | |
3172 | } | |
3173 | ||
e27f234a | 3174 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
66696478 RS |
3175 | goto done; |
3176 | ||
0f113f3e | 3177 | f_err: |
66696478 | 3178 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
fe3a3291 | 3179 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
66696478 | 3180 | done: |
222561fe RS |
3181 | X509_free(x); |
3182 | sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); | |
e27f234a | 3183 | return ret; |
0f113f3e | 3184 | } |
d02b48c6 | 3185 | |
7cea05dc | 3186 | int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a MC |
3187 | { |
3188 | CERT_PKEY *cpk; | |
e96e0f8e | 3189 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
e27f234a MC |
3190 | |
3191 | cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); | |
3192 | if (cpk == NULL) { | |
3193 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e27f234a MC |
3194 | return 0; |
3195 | } | |
3196 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
3197 | /* |
3198 | * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context | |
3199 | * for the server Certificate message | |
3200 | */ | |
3201 | if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) | |
3202 | || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &al)) { | |
e27f234a | 3203 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e96e0f8e | 3204 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
e27f234a MC |
3205 | return 0; |
3206 | } | |
3207 | ||
3208 | return 1; | |
3209 | } | |
3210 | ||
7cea05dc | 3211 | int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a MC |
3212 | { |
3213 | unsigned char *senc = NULL; | |
83ae4661 | 3214 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
bf7c6817 | 3215 | HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL; |
a00d75e1 | 3216 | unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2; |
e27f234a | 3217 | const unsigned char *const_p; |
a00d75e1 | 3218 | int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal; |
e27f234a MC |
3219 | SSL_SESSION *sess; |
3220 | unsigned int hlen; | |
222da979 | 3221 | SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx; |
e27f234a | 3222 | unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; |
d139723b | 3223 | unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH]; |
30f05b19 | 3224 | int iv_len, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
a00d75e1 | 3225 | size_t macoffset, macendoffset; |
30f05b19 MC |
3226 | union { |
3227 | unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)]; | |
3228 | uint32_t age_add; | |
3229 | } age_add_u; | |
e27f234a | 3230 | |
fc24f0bf MC |
3231 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
3232 | if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0) | |
3233 | goto err; | |
3234 | s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add; | |
3235 | } | |
3236 | ||
e27f234a MC |
3237 | /* get session encoding length */ |
3238 | slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); | |
3239 | /* | |
3240 | * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too | |
3241 | * long | |
3242 | */ | |
3243 | if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { | |
fe3a3291 | 3244 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a MC |
3245 | return 0; |
3246 | } | |
3247 | senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); | |
a71edf3b | 3248 | if (senc == NULL) { |
fe3a3291 | 3249 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a MC |
3250 | return 0; |
3251 | } | |
0f113f3e | 3252 | |
846ec07d | 3253 | ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); |
bf7c6817 | 3254 | hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); |
83ae4661 MC |
3255 | if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) { |
3256 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
3257 | goto err; | |
3258 | } | |
0f113f3e | 3259 | |
e27f234a MC |
3260 | p = senc; |
3261 | if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) | |
3262 | goto err; | |
687eaf27 | 3263 | |
e27f234a MC |
3264 | /* |
3265 | * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up | |
3266 | */ | |
3267 | const_p = senc; | |
3268 | sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); | |
3269 | if (sess == NULL) | |
3270 | goto err; | |
3271 | sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ | |
0f113f3e | 3272 | |
e27f234a MC |
3273 | slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); |
3274 | if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */ | |
3275 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
3276 | goto err; | |
3277 | } | |
3278 | p = senc; | |
3279 | if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { | |
3280 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
3281 | goto err; | |
3282 | } | |
3283 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
0f113f3e | 3284 | |
e27f234a MC |
3285 | /* |
3286 | * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does | |
3287 | * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. | |
3288 | */ | |
aff8c126 | 3289 | if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) { |
5c753de6 | 3290 | /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */ |
aff8c126 | 3291 | int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, |
5c753de6 TS |
3292 | hctx, 1); |
3293 | ||
3294 | if (ret == 0) { | |
a00d75e1 MC |
3295 | |
3296 | /* Put timeout and length */ | |
7cea05dc | 3297 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0) |
4a01c59f | 3298 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { |
a00d75e1 MC |
3299 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, |
3300 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5c753de6 | 3301 | goto err; |
a00d75e1 | 3302 | } |
5c753de6 TS |
3303 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
3304 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); | |
3305 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); | |
3306 | return 1; | |
3307 | } | |
3308 | if (ret < 0) | |
e27f234a | 3309 | goto err; |
d139723b | 3310 | iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); |
e27f234a | 3311 | } else { |
d139723b KR |
3312 | const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc(); |
3313 | ||
3314 | iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); | |
3315 | if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0) | |
687eaf27 | 3316 | goto err; |
d139723b | 3317 | if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, |
aff8c126 | 3318 | tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv)) |
687eaf27 | 3319 | goto err; |
aff8c126 RS |
3320 | if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key, |
3321 | sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key), | |
e27f234a | 3322 | EVP_sha256(), NULL)) |
4f9fab6b | 3323 | goto err; |
aff8c126 RS |
3324 | memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name, |
3325 | sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)); | |
0f113f3e MC |
3326 | } |
3327 | ||
e27f234a MC |
3328 | /* |
3329 | * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified | |
3330 | * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for | |
3331 | * new sessions will live as long as their sessions. | |
3332 | */ | |
7cea05dc | 3333 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout) |
30f05b19 MC |
3334 | || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
3335 | && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add)) | |
a00d75e1 | 3336 | /* Now the actual ticket data */ |
7cea05dc MC |
3337 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
3338 | || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset) | |
a00d75e1 | 3339 | /* Output key name */ |
7cea05dc | 3340 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name)) |
a00d75e1 | 3341 | /* output IV */ |
7cea05dc MC |
3342 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len) |
3343 | || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH, | |
a00d75e1 MC |
3344 | &encdata1) |
3345 | /* Encrypt session data */ | |
3346 | || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen) | |
7cea05dc | 3347 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3348 | || encdata1 != encdata2 |
3349 | || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal) | |
7cea05dc | 3350 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3351 | || encdata1 + len != encdata2 |
3352 | || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH | |
7cea05dc | 3353 | || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3354 | || !HMAC_Update(hctx, |
3355 | (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset, | |
3356 | macendoffset - macoffset) | |
7cea05dc | 3357 | || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3358 | || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen) |
3359 | || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE | |
7cea05dc | 3360 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2) |
a00d75e1 | 3361 | || macdata1 != macdata2 |
30f05b19 MC |
3362 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt) |
3363 | || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
3364 | && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, | |
3365 | EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
3366 | NULL, 0, &al))) { | |
a00d75e1 | 3367 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 3368 | goto err; |
a00d75e1 | 3369 | } |
bcaad809 DSH |
3370 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
3371 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); | |
e27f234a MC |
3372 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
3373 | ||
3374 | return 1; | |
687eaf27 | 3375 | err: |
b548a1f1 | 3376 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
846ec07d | 3377 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
bf7c6817 | 3378 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); |
a00d75e1 | 3379 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 3380 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 3381 | } |
67c8e7f4 | 3382 | |
f63e4288 MC |
3383 | /* |
3384 | * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to | |
3385 | * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. | |
3386 | */ | |
3387 | int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
e27f234a | 3388 | { |
8cbfcc70 RS |
3389 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type) |
3390 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, | |
3391 | s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) { | |
f63e4288 MC |
3392 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
3393 | return 0; | |
3394 | } | |
3395 | ||
3396 | return 1; | |
3397 | } | |
3398 | ||
3399 | int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
3400 | { | |
3401 | if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { | |
cc59ad10 | 3402 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
cc59ad10 MC |
3403 | return 0; |
3404 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
3405 | |
3406 | return 1; | |
3407 | } | |
3408 | ||
e481f9b9 | 3409 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
e27f234a MC |
3410 | /* |
3411 | * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. | |
3412 | * It sets the next_proto member in s if found | |
3413 | */ | |
be3583fa | 3414 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3415 | { |
73999b62 | 3416 | PACKET next_proto, padding; |
e27f234a MC |
3417 | size_t next_proto_len; |
3418 | ||
50e735f9 MC |
3419 | /*- |
3420 | * The payload looks like: | |
3421 | * uint8 proto_len; | |
3422 | * uint8 proto[proto_len]; | |
3423 | * uint8 padding_len; | |
3424 | * uint8 padding[padding_len]; | |
3425 | */ | |
73999b62 MC |
3426 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto) |
3427 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding) | |
3428 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { | |
e27f234a | 3429 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
c3fc7eea | 3430 | goto err; |
cf9b0b6f | 3431 | } |
0f113f3e | 3432 | |
aff8c126 RS |
3433 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) { |
3434 | s->ext.npn_len = 0; | |
c3fc7eea MC |
3435 | goto err; |
3436 | } | |
3437 | ||
aff8c126 | 3438 | s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len; |
0f113f3e | 3439 | |
e27f234a | 3440 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
a230b26e | 3441 | err: |
fe3a3291 | 3442 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a | 3443 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 3444 | } |
6434abbf | 3445 | #endif |
d45ba43d | 3446 | |
e46f2334 MC |
3447 | static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
3448 | { | |
3434f40b MC |
3449 | int al; |
3450 | ||
e96e0f8e | 3451 | if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, |
30aeba43 | 3452 | NULL, 0, &al)) { |
3434f40b | 3453 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
e46f2334 | 3454 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
3434f40b | 3455 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
e46f2334 MC |
3456 | return 0; |
3457 | } | |
3458 | ||
3459 | return 1; | |
3460 | } | |
3461 | ||
d45ba43d MC |
3462 | #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3 |
3463 | ||
38a3cbfb EK |
3464 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, |
3465 | PACKET *cipher_suites, | |
d45ba43d | 3466 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp, |
a230b26e | 3467 | int sslv2format, int *al) |
d45ba43d MC |
3468 | { |
3469 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
3470 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; | |
38a3cbfb EK |
3471 | int n; |
3472 | /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */ | |
3473 | unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN]; | |
d45ba43d | 3474 | |
38a3cbfb EK |
3475 | s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; |
3476 | ||
3477 | n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN; | |
3478 | ||
3479 | if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) { | |
3480 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); | |
3481 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
3482 | return NULL; | |
d45ba43d | 3483 | } |
38a3cbfb EK |
3484 | |
3485 | if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) { | |
d45ba43d MC |
3486 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, |
3487 | SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); | |
38a3cbfb EK |
3488 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
3489 | return NULL; | |
d45ba43d | 3490 | } |
38a3cbfb | 3491 | |
07afdf3c MC |
3492 | sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); |
3493 | if (sk == NULL) { | |
3494 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
3495 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
3496 | return NULL; | |
d45ba43d MC |
3497 | } |
3498 | ||
07afdf3c MC |
3499 | if (sslv2format) { |
3500 | size_t numciphers = PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) / n; | |
3501 | PACKET sslv2ciphers = *cipher_suites; | |
3502 | unsigned int leadbyte; | |
3503 | unsigned char *raw; | |
3504 | ||
3505 | /* | |
3506 | * We store the raw ciphers list in SSLv3+ format so we need to do some | |
3507 | * preprocessing to convert the list first. If there are any SSLv2 only | |
3508 | * ciphersuites with a non-zero leading byte then we are going to | |
3509 | * slightly over allocate because we won't store those. But that isn't a | |
3510 | * problem. | |
3511 | */ | |
f1429b85 BK |
3512 | raw = OPENSSL_malloc(numciphers * TLS_CIPHER_LEN); |
3513 | s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = raw; | |
07afdf3c MC |
3514 | if (raw == NULL) { |
3515 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
3516 | goto err; | |
3517 | } | |
3518 | for (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0; | |
3519 | PACKET_remaining(&sslv2ciphers) > 0; | |
3520 | raw += TLS_CIPHER_LEN) { | |
3521 | if (!PACKET_get_1(&sslv2ciphers, &leadbyte) | |
3522 | || (leadbyte == 0 | |
3523 | && !PACKET_copy_bytes(&sslv2ciphers, raw, | |
3524 | TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) | |
3525 | || (leadbyte != 0 | |
3526 | && !PACKET_forward(&sslv2ciphers, TLS_CIPHER_LEN))) { | |
3527 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
63414e64 | 3528 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw); |
07afdf3c MC |
3529 | s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL; |
3530 | s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0; | |
3531 | goto err; | |
3532 | } | |
3533 | if (leadbyte == 0) | |
3534 | s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen += TLS_CIPHER_LEN; | |
3535 | } | |
3536 | } else if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw, | |
3537 | &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) { | |
38a3cbfb | 3538 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
d45ba43d MC |
3539 | goto err; |
3540 | } | |
d45ba43d | 3541 | |
38a3cbfb EK |
3542 | while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) { |
3543 | /* | |
20218b58 EK |
3544 | * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the |
3545 | * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero | |
3546 | * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them. | |
38a3cbfb EK |
3547 | */ |
3548 | if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0') | |
a230b26e | 3549 | continue; |
38a3cbfb | 3550 | |
d45ba43d | 3551 | /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */ |
38a3cbfb EK |
3552 | if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && |
3553 | (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) { | |
d45ba43d MC |
3554 | /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */ |
3555 | if (s->renegotiate) { | |
3556 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, | |
3557 | SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); | |
38a3cbfb | 3558 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
d45ba43d MC |
3559 | goto err; |
3560 | } | |
3561 | s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; | |
d45ba43d MC |
3562 | continue; |
3563 | } | |
3564 | ||
3565 | /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */ | |
38a3cbfb EK |
3566 | if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && |
3567 | (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) { | |
d45ba43d MC |
3568 | /* |
3569 | * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher | |
3570 | * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected | |
3571 | * downgrade. | |
3572 | */ | |
4fa52141 | 3573 | if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) { |
d45ba43d MC |
3574 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, |
3575 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); | |
38a3cbfb | 3576 | *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK; |
d45ba43d MC |
3577 | goto err; |
3578 | } | |
d45ba43d MC |
3579 | continue; |
3580 | } | |
3581 | ||
38a3cbfb EK |
3582 | /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */ |
3583 | c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher); | |
d45ba43d MC |
3584 | if (c != NULL) { |
3585 | if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) { | |
3586 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
38a3cbfb | 3587 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
d45ba43d MC |
3588 | goto err; |
3589 | } | |
3590 | } | |
3591 | } | |
38a3cbfb EK |
3592 | if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) { |
3593 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
3594 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3595 | goto err; | |
3596 | } | |
d45ba43d | 3597 | |
07afdf3c MC |
3598 | *skp = sk; |
3599 | return sk; | |
d45ba43d | 3600 | err: |
07afdf3c | 3601 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); |
38a3cbfb | 3602 | return NULL; |
d45ba43d | 3603 | } |