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846e33c7 RS |
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
8e2f6b79 | 3 | * |
846e33c7 RS |
4 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use |
5 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
6 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
7 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
8e2f6b79 | 8 | */ |
846e33c7 | 9 | |
ea262260 BM |
10 | /* ==================================================================== |
11 | * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | |
12 | * | |
0f113f3e | 13 | * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by |
ea262260 BM |
14 | * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
15 | * | |
16 | * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source | |
17 | * license provided above. | |
18 | * | |
ea262260 BM |
19 | * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by |
20 | * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. | |
21 | * | |
22 | */ | |
ddac1974 NL |
23 | /* ==================================================================== |
24 | * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. | |
25 | * | |
26 | * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by | |
27 | * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source | |
28 | * license. | |
29 | * | |
30 | * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of | |
31 | * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites | |
32 | * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. | |
33 | * | |
34 | * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in | |
35 | * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received | |
36 | * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. | |
37 | * | |
38 | * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not | |
39 | * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third | |
40 | * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights | |
41 | * to make use of the Contribution. | |
42 | * | |
43 | * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN | |
44 | * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA | |
45 | * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY | |
46 | * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR | |
47 | * OTHERWISE. | |
48 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 49 | |
d02b48c6 | 50 | #include <stdio.h> |
8ba708e5 | 51 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" |
61ae935a | 52 | #include "statem_locl.h" |
68570797 | 53 | #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" |
ec577822 BM |
54 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
55 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
56 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
57 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
6434abbf | 58 | #include <openssl/hmac.h> |
ec577822 | 59 | #include <openssl/x509.h> |
3c27208f | 60 | #include <openssl/dh.h> |
d095b68d | 61 | #include <openssl/bn.h> |
dbad1690 | 62 | #include <openssl/md5.h> |
f9b3bff6 | 63 | |
e46f2334 | 64 | static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); |
38a3cbfb EK |
65 | static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, |
66 | PACKET *cipher_suites, | |
a230b26e EK |
67 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) |
68 | **skp, int sslv2format, | |
69 | int *al); | |
d45ba43d | 70 | |
61ae935a | 71 | /* |
0f1e51ea MC |
72 | * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed |
73 | * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from | |
74 | * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. | |
75 | * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
76 | * | |
94ed2c67 MC |
77 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
78 | * (transition not allowed) | |
0f1e51ea MC |
79 | */ |
80 | static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) | |
81 | { | |
82 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
83 | ||
94ed2c67 MC |
84 | /* |
85 | * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time | |
86 | * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3 | |
87 | */ | |
88 | ||
0f1e51ea MC |
89 | /* |
90 | * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have | |
91 | * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by | |
92 | * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() | |
93 | */ | |
94 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
95 | default: | |
96 | break; | |
97 | ||
92760c21 | 98 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: |
0f1e51ea MC |
99 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
100 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
101 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; | |
102 | return 1; | |
103 | } | |
104 | } else { | |
92760c21 MC |
105 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
106 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
107 | return 1; |
108 | } | |
109 | } | |
110 | break; | |
111 | ||
112 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
113 | if (s->session->peer == NULL) { | |
92760c21 MC |
114 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
115 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
116 | return 1; |
117 | } | |
118 | } else { | |
119 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { | |
120 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; | |
121 | return 1; | |
122 | } | |
123 | } | |
124 | break; | |
125 | ||
126 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
0f1e51ea MC |
127 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { |
128 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
129 | return 1; | |
130 | } | |
131 | break; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
132 | } |
133 | ||
134 | /* No valid transition found */ | |
135 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
136 | SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_READ_TRANSITION, | |
137 | SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
138 | return 0; | |
139 | } | |
140 | ||
141 | /* | |
142 | * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed | |
143 | * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the | |
144 | * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The | |
145 | * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
61ae935a | 146 | * |
94ed2c67 MC |
147 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error |
148 | * (transition not allowed) | |
61ae935a | 149 | */ |
8481f583 | 150 | int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) |
61ae935a | 151 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 152 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 153 | |
f5ca0b04 | 154 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
5abeaf35 MC |
155 | if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt)) |
156 | goto err; | |
157 | return 1; | |
158 | } | |
0f1e51ea | 159 | |
e8aa8b6c | 160 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
161 | default: |
162 | break; | |
163 | ||
61ae935a MC |
164 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE: |
165 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: | |
166 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { | |
167 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; | |
168 | return 1; | |
169 | } | |
170 | break; | |
171 | ||
172 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
173 | /* | |
174 | * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either | |
175 | * 1) We didn't request a Certificate | |
176 | * OR | |
177 | * 2) If we did request one then | |
178 | * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned | |
179 | * AND | |
180 | * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0 | |
181 | * list if we requested a certificate) | |
182 | */ | |
0f512756 MC |
183 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { |
184 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { | |
185 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
23dd09b5 MC |
186 | if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) |
187 | && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { | |
0f512756 MC |
188 | /* |
189 | * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just | |
23dd09b5 MC |
190 | * not going to accept it because we require a client |
191 | * cert. | |
0f512756 MC |
192 | */ |
193 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, | |
194 | SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
340a2828 | 195 | SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, |
0f512756 MC |
196 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); |
197 | return 0; | |
198 | } | |
199 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
200 | return 1; | |
201 | } | |
202 | } else { | |
203 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
204 | return 1; | |
205 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
206 | } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
207 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
208 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; | |
209 | return 1; | |
f100b031 | 210 | } |
61ae935a MC |
211 | } |
212 | break; | |
213 | ||
214 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
215 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { | |
216 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; | |
217 | return 1; | |
218 | } | |
219 | break; | |
220 | ||
221 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
222 | /* | |
223 | * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have | |
224 | * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| | |
225 | * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is | |
226 | * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in | |
a71a4966 | 227 | * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be |
61ae935a MC |
228 | * set. |
229 | */ | |
a71a4966 | 230 | if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) { |
61ae935a MC |
231 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { |
232 | /* | |
233 | * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH | |
234 | * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is | |
235 | * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses | |
236 | * its key from the certificate for key exchange. | |
237 | */ | |
238 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
239 | return 1; | |
240 | } | |
241 | } else { | |
242 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { | |
243 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; | |
244 | return 1; | |
245 | } | |
246 | } | |
247 | break; | |
248 | ||
249 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
250 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
251 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
252 | return 1; | |
253 | } | |
254 | break; | |
255 | ||
256 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
257 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
aff8c126 | 258 | if (s->s3->npn_seen) { |
61ae935a MC |
259 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) { |
260 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO; | |
261 | return 1; | |
262 | } | |
263 | } else { | |
264 | #endif | |
265 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
266 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
267 | return 1; | |
268 | } | |
269 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
270 | } | |
271 | #endif | |
272 | break; | |
273 | ||
274 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
275 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
276 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
277 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; | |
278 | return 1; | |
279 | } | |
280 | break; | |
281 | #endif | |
282 | ||
283 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
284 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
285 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; | |
286 | return 1; | |
287 | } | |
288 | break; | |
61ae935a MC |
289 | } |
290 | ||
5abeaf35 | 291 | err: |
61ae935a | 292 | /* No valid transition found */ |
672f3337 | 293 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
340a2828 | 294 | SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
61ae935a MC |
295 | return 0; |
296 | } | |
297 | ||
298 | /* | |
299 | * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message? | |
300 | * | |
301 | * Valid return values are: | |
302 | * 1: Yes | |
303 | * 0: No | |
304 | */ | |
bb3e20cf | 305 | static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) |
61ae935a MC |
306 | { |
307 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
308 | ||
309 | /* | |
361a1191 | 310 | * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a |
61ae935a MC |
311 | * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For |
312 | * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if | |
313 | * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, | |
314 | * the server certificate contains the server's public key for | |
315 | * key exchange. | |
316 | */ | |
a230b26e | 317 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE) |
61ae935a MC |
318 | /* |
319 | * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if | |
320 | * provided | |
321 | */ | |
322 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK | |
323 | /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */ | |
324 | || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) | |
325 | && s->cert->psk_identity_hint) | |
326 | /* For other PSK always send SKE */ | |
327 | || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK))) | |
328 | #endif | |
329 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
330 | /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ | |
331 | || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) | |
332 | #endif | |
a230b26e | 333 | ) { |
61ae935a MC |
334 | return 1; |
335 | } | |
336 | ||
337 | return 0; | |
338 | } | |
339 | ||
340 | /* | |
341 | * Should we send a CertificateRequest message? | |
342 | * | |
343 | * Valid return values are: | |
344 | * 1: Yes | |
345 | * 0: No | |
346 | */ | |
bb3e20cf | 347 | static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s) |
61ae935a MC |
348 | { |
349 | if ( | |
350 | /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ | |
351 | s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER | |
352 | /* | |
353 | * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert | |
354 | * during re-negotiation: | |
355 | */ | |
356 | && ((s->session->peer == NULL) || | |
357 | !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) | |
358 | /* | |
359 | * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see | |
360 | * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in | |
361 | * RFC 2246): | |
362 | */ | |
363 | && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) | |
a230b26e EK |
364 | /* |
365 | * ... except when the application insists on | |
366 | * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts | |
367 | * this for SSL 3) | |
368 | */ | |
61ae935a MC |
369 | || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) |
370 | /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ | |
371 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) | |
372 | /* | |
373 | * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests | |
374 | * are omitted | |
375 | */ | |
b7fa1f98 | 376 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) { |
61ae935a MC |
377 | return 1; |
378 | } | |
379 | ||
380 | return 0; | |
381 | } | |
382 | ||
383 | /* | |
0f1e51ea MC |
384 | * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to |
385 | * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the | |
386 | * client. | |
0f1e51ea MC |
387 | */ |
388 | static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s) | |
389 | { | |
390 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
391 | ||
94ed2c67 MC |
392 | /* |
393 | * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time | |
394 | * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3 | |
395 | */ | |
396 | ||
0f1e51ea MC |
397 | /* |
398 | * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated | |
399 | * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition() | |
400 | */ | |
401 | ||
402 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
403 | default: | |
404 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
405 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; | |
406 | ||
407 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: | |
408 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; | |
409 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
410 | ||
411 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: | |
e46f2334 MC |
412 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; |
413 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
414 | ||
415 | case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: | |
94ed2c67 | 416 | if (s->hit) |
92760c21 MC |
417 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; |
418 | else if (send_certificate_request(s)) | |
419 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; | |
94ed2c67 | 420 | else |
0f1e51ea | 421 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
94ed2c67 | 422 | |
0f1e51ea MC |
423 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
424 | ||
0f1e51ea | 425 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
92760c21 | 426 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
0f1e51ea MC |
427 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
428 | ||
92760c21 | 429 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
430 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY; |
431 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
432 | ||
433 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: | |
d805a57b | 434 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; |
0f1e51ea MC |
435 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
436 | ||
437 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
92760c21 | 438 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; |
94ed2c67 | 439 | |
92760c21 | 440 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: |
0f1e51ea MC |
441 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; |
442 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); | |
443 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
444 | } | |
445 | } | |
446 | ||
447 | /* | |
448 | * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move | |
449 | * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client. | |
61ae935a | 450 | */ |
8481f583 | 451 | WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 452 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 453 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 454 | |
0f1e51ea MC |
455 | /* |
456 | * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going | |
457 | * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later | |
458 | */ | |
459 | ||
f5ca0b04 | 460 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) |
0f1e51ea MC |
461 | return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s); |
462 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 463 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
464 | default: |
465 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
466 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; | |
467 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 468 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE: |
a230b26e | 469 | /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */ |
e8aa8b6c | 470 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; |
61ae935a | 471 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
472 | case TLS_ST_OK: |
473 | /* We must be trying to renegotiate */ | |
474 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ; | |
475 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 476 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
477 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
478 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
479 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); | |
480 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 481 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
482 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
483 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified | |
a230b26e | 484 | && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) |
e8aa8b6c F |
485 | st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; |
486 | else | |
487 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; | |
488 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 489 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
490 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
491 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
61ae935a | 492 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
493 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
494 | if (s->hit) { | |
aff8c126 | 495 | if (s->ext.ticket_expected) |
e8aa8b6c F |
496 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; |
497 | else | |
498 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
499 | } else { | |
500 | /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ | |
501 | /* normal PSK or SRP */ | |
502 | if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & | |
a230b26e | 503 | (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { |
e8aa8b6c F |
504 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; |
505 | } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { | |
61ae935a | 506 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; |
e8aa8b6c | 507 | } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) { |
61ae935a | 508 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; |
e8aa8b6c F |
509 | } else { |
510 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; | |
61ae935a | 511 | } |
e8aa8b6c F |
512 | } |
513 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 514 | |
e8aa8b6c | 515 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
aff8c126 | 516 | if (s->ext.status_expected) { |
e8aa8b6c | 517 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS; |
61ae935a | 518 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
519 | } |
520 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 521 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
522 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: |
523 | if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { | |
524 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; | |
61ae935a | 525 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
526 | } |
527 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 528 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
529 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: |
530 | if (send_certificate_request(s)) { | |
531 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; | |
61ae935a | 532 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
e8aa8b6c F |
533 | } |
534 | /* Fall through */ | |
61ae935a | 535 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
536 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
537 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; | |
538 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 539 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
540 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: |
541 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
542 | ||
543 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
544 | if (s->hit) { | |
61ae935a | 545 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; |
fe3a3291 | 546 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); |
61ae935a | 547 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; |
aff8c126 | 548 | } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { |
e8aa8b6c F |
549 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; |
550 | } else { | |
551 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
552 | } | |
553 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
554 | ||
555 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: | |
556 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; | |
557 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 558 | |
e8aa8b6c F |
559 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: |
560 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; | |
561 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
562 | ||
563 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
564 | if (s->hit) { | |
565 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
566 | } | |
567 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
568 | ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); | |
569 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a MC |
570 | } |
571 | } | |
572 | ||
573 | /* | |
574 | * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from | |
575 | * the server to the client. | |
576 | */ | |
8481f583 | 577 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 578 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 579 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 580 | |
e8aa8b6c | 581 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
582 | default: |
583 | /* No pre work to be done */ | |
584 | break; | |
585 | ||
61ae935a MC |
586 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
587 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
588 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
f5c7f5df | 589 | dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); |
61ae935a MC |
590 | break; |
591 | ||
592 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: | |
593 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
594 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
f5c7f5df | 595 | dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); |
61ae935a MC |
596 | /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */ |
597 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
598 | } | |
599 | break; | |
600 | ||
601 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: | |
602 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
603 | /* | |
604 | * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and | |
605 | * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now | |
606 | */ | |
607 | st->use_timer = 1; | |
608 | } | |
609 | break; | |
610 | ||
611 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
612 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
613 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) | |
614 | return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); | |
615 | #endif | |
616 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
617 | ||
618 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: | |
619 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
620 | /* | |
621 | * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight | |
622 | * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer | |
623 | */ | |
624 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
625 | } | |
626 | break; | |
627 | ||
628 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
629 | s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; | |
630 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { | |
fe3a3291 | 631 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
61ae935a MC |
632 | return WORK_ERROR; |
633 | } | |
634 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
635 | /* | |
636 | * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight | |
637 | * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have | |
638 | * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message, | |
639 | * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't. | |
640 | */ | |
641 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
642 | } | |
643 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
644 | ||
645 | case TLS_ST_OK: | |
646 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst); | |
61ae935a MC |
647 | } |
648 | ||
649 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
650 | } | |
651 | ||
652 | /* | |
653 | * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the | |
654 | * server to the client. | |
655 | */ | |
8481f583 | 656 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 657 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 658 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a MC |
659 | |
660 | s->init_num = 0; | |
661 | ||
e8aa8b6c | 662 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
663 | default: |
664 | /* No post work to be done */ | |
665 | break; | |
666 | ||
61ae935a MC |
667 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
668 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
669 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
2c4a056f MC |
670 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
671 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
672 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
673 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
674 | break; |
675 | ||
676 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: | |
677 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
678 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
679 | /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */ | |
2c4a056f MC |
680 | if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { |
681 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
682 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
683 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
684 | /* |
685 | * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to | |
686 | * treat like it was the first packet | |
687 | */ | |
688 | s->first_packet = 1; | |
689 | break; | |
690 | ||
691 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: | |
692 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
693 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { | |
694 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
695 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
696 | ||
697 | /* | |
698 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no | |
699 | * SCTP used. | |
700 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
701 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
702 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
61ae935a MC |
703 | |
704 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, | |
a230b26e EK |
705 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, |
706 | sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, | |
707 | 0) <= 0) { | |
fe3a3291 | 708 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
61ae935a MC |
709 | return WORK_ERROR; |
710 | } | |
711 | ||
712 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, | |
713 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
714 | } | |
715 | #endif | |
92760c21 MC |
716 | /* |
717 | * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know | |
718 | * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted | |
719 | * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need | |
720 | * something clever in the record layer for this. | |
721 | */ | |
722 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
723 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) | |
724 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
725 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE) | |
726 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
727 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) | |
728 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
729 | } | |
61ae935a MC |
730 | break; |
731 | ||
732 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
733 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
734 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) { | |
735 | /* | |
736 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
737 | * no SCTP used. | |
738 | */ | |
739 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
740 | 0, NULL); | |
741 | } | |
742 | #endif | |
743 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
a230b26e EK |
744 | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) |
745 | { | |
fe3a3291 | 746 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
61ae935a MC |
747 | return WORK_ERROR; |
748 | } | |
749 | ||
750 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
751 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); | |
752 | break; | |
753 | ||
754 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: | |
755 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
756 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
757 | break; | |
758 | ||
759 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: | |
760 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
761 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
762 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
763 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { | |
764 | /* | |
765 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
766 | * no SCTP used. | |
767 | */ | |
768 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
769 | 0, NULL); | |
770 | } | |
771 | #endif | |
92760c21 MC |
772 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { |
773 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, | |
774 | s->session->master_key, s->handshake_secret, 0, | |
775 | &s->session->master_key_length) | |
776 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
777 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) | |
778 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
779 | } | |
61ae935a | 780 | break; |
61ae935a MC |
781 | } |
782 | ||
783 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
784 | } | |
785 | ||
786 | /* | |
6392fb8e MC |
787 | * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the |
788 | * server | |
61ae935a MC |
789 | * |
790 | * Valid return values are: | |
791 | * 1: Success | |
792 | * 0: Error | |
793 | */ | |
6392fb8e | 794 | int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, |
a15c953f | 795 | confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) |
61ae935a | 796 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 797 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 798 | |
4a01c59f MC |
799 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
800 | default: | |
801 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
802 | return 0; | |
803 | ||
804 | case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: | |
5923ad4b | 805 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
6392fb8e | 806 | *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
4a01c59f | 807 | else |
6392fb8e MC |
808 | *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; |
809 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; | |
4a01c59f | 810 | break; |
f3b3d7f0 | 811 | |
4a01c59f | 812 | case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: |
6392fb8e MC |
813 | *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request; |
814 | *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 815 | break; |
61ae935a | 816 | |
4a01c59f MC |
817 | case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: |
818 | /* No construction function needed */ | |
6392fb8e MC |
819 | *confunc = NULL; |
820 | *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 821 | break; |
61ae935a | 822 | |
4a01c59f | 823 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: |
6392fb8e MC |
824 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello; |
825 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; | |
4a01c59f | 826 | break; |
61ae935a | 827 | |
4a01c59f | 828 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: |
6392fb8e MC |
829 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate; |
830 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; | |
4a01c59f | 831 | break; |
61ae935a | 832 | |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
833 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY: |
834 | *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify; | |
835 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; | |
836 | break; | |
837 | ||
838 | ||
4a01c59f | 839 | case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: |
6392fb8e MC |
840 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange; |
841 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; | |
4a01c59f | 842 | break; |
61ae935a | 843 | |
4a01c59f | 844 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: |
6392fb8e MC |
845 | *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request; |
846 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; | |
4a01c59f | 847 | break; |
61ae935a | 848 | |
4a01c59f | 849 | case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: |
6392fb8e MC |
850 | *confunc = tls_construct_server_done; |
851 | *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; | |
4a01c59f | 852 | break; |
61ae935a | 853 | |
4a01c59f | 854 | case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: |
6392fb8e MC |
855 | *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket; |
856 | *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; | |
4a01c59f | 857 | break; |
61ae935a | 858 | |
4a01c59f | 859 | case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: |
6392fb8e MC |
860 | *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status; |
861 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; | |
4a01c59f | 862 | break; |
61ae935a | 863 | |
4a01c59f | 864 | case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: |
6392fb8e MC |
865 | *confunc = tls_construct_finished; |
866 | *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; | |
4a01c59f | 867 | break; |
e46f2334 MC |
868 | |
869 | case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: | |
870 | *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions; | |
871 | *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; | |
872 | break; | |
4a01c59f | 873 | } |
61ae935a | 874 | |
5923ad4b | 875 | return 1; |
61ae935a MC |
876 | } |
877 | ||
8a18bc25 AG |
878 | /* |
879 | * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message, | |
880 | * calculated as follows: | |
881 | * | |
882 | * 2 + # client_version | |
883 | * 32 + # only valid length for random | |
884 | * 1 + # length of session_id | |
885 | * 32 + # maximum size for session_id | |
886 | * 2 + # length of cipher suites | |
887 | * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array | |
888 | * 1 + # length of compression_methods | |
889 | * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods | |
890 | * 2 + # length of extensions | |
891 | * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions | |
892 | */ | |
893 | #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396 | |
894 | ||
61ae935a MC |
895 | #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048 |
896 | #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514 | |
897 | ||
898 | /* | |
899 | * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are | |
900 | * reading. Excludes the message header. | |
901 | */ | |
eda75751 | 902 | size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s) |
61ae935a | 903 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 904 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 905 | |
e8aa8b6c | 906 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
907 | default: |
908 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
909 | return 0; | |
910 | ||
61ae935a | 911 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
8a18bc25 | 912 | return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; |
61ae935a MC |
913 | |
914 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
915 | return s->max_cert_list; | |
916 | ||
917 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
918 | return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; | |
919 | ||
920 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
921 | return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
922 | ||
923 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
924 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
925 | return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH; | |
926 | #endif | |
927 | ||
928 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
929 | return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; | |
930 | ||
931 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
932 | return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; | |
61ae935a | 933 | } |
61ae935a MC |
934 | } |
935 | ||
936 | /* | |
937 | * Process a message that the server has received from the client. | |
938 | */ | |
8481f583 | 939 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
61ae935a | 940 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 941 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 942 | |
e8aa8b6c | 943 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
944 | default: |
945 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
946 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
947 | ||
61ae935a MC |
948 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
949 | return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt); | |
950 | ||
951 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: | |
952 | return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt); | |
953 | ||
954 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
955 | return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt); | |
956 | ||
957 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
958 | return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); | |
959 | ||
960 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
961 | case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: | |
962 | return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt); | |
963 | #endif | |
964 | ||
965 | case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: | |
966 | return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); | |
967 | ||
968 | case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: | |
969 | return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); | |
61ae935a | 970 | } |
61ae935a MC |
971 | } |
972 | ||
973 | /* | |
974 | * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message | |
975 | * from the client | |
976 | */ | |
8481f583 | 977 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
61ae935a | 978 | { |
d6f1a6e9 | 979 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; |
61ae935a | 980 | |
e8aa8b6c | 981 | switch (st->hand_state) { |
f3b3d7f0 RS |
982 | default: |
983 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
984 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
985 | ||
61ae935a MC |
986 | case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: |
987 | return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst); | |
988 | ||
989 | case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: | |
990 | return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst); | |
991 | ||
992 | case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: | |
993 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
a230b26e EK |
994 | if ( /* Is this SCTP? */ |
995 | BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) | |
996 | /* Are we renegotiating? */ | |
997 | && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { | |
61ae935a MC |
998 | s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; |
999 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
1000 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); | |
1001 | BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); | |
d99b0691 | 1002 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1); |
61ae935a MC |
1003 | return WORK_MORE_A; |
1004 | } else { | |
d99b0691 | 1005 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0); |
61ae935a MC |
1006 | } |
1007 | #endif | |
1008 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
61ae935a | 1009 | } |
92760c21 | 1010 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
61ae935a MC |
1011 | } |
1012 | ||
edc032b5 | 1013 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
71fa4513 | 1014 | static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) |
0f113f3e MC |
1015 | { |
1016 | int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; | |
1017 | ||
1018 | *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
1019 | ||
1020 | if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && | |
1021 | (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { | |
1022 | if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { | |
1023 | /* | |
1024 | * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp | |
1025 | * login name | |
1026 | */ | |
1027 | ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; | |
1028 | *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; | |
1029 | } else { | |
1030 | ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al); | |
1031 | } | |
1032 | } | |
1033 | return ret; | |
1034 | } | |
edc032b5 BL |
1035 | #endif |
1036 | ||
c536b6be | 1037 | int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie, |
cb150cbc | 1038 | size_t cookie_len) |
8ba708e5 | 1039 | { |
8ba708e5 | 1040 | /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */ |
c536b6be MC |
1041 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION) |
1042 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len)) | |
1043 | return 0; | |
8ba708e5 | 1044 | |
c536b6be | 1045 | return 1; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1046 | } |
1047 | ||
7cea05dc | 1048 | int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
8ba708e5 | 1049 | { |
cb150cbc | 1050 | unsigned int cookie_leni; |
8ba708e5 MC |
1051 | if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || |
1052 | s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, | |
cb150cbc MC |
1053 | &cookie_leni) == 0 || |
1054 | cookie_leni > 255) { | |
f0659bdb | 1055 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, |
8ba708e5 | 1056 | SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); |
8ba708e5 MC |
1057 | return 0; |
1058 | } | |
cb150cbc | 1059 | s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni; |
8ba708e5 | 1060 | |
4a01c59f MC |
1061 | if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie, |
1062 | s->d1->cookie_len)) { | |
c536b6be | 1063 | SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c536b6be MC |
1064 | return 0; |
1065 | } | |
8ba708e5 | 1066 | |
8ba708e5 MC |
1067 | return 1; |
1068 | } | |
1069 | ||
805a2e9e MC |
1070 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
1071 | /*- | |
1072 | * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X | |
1073 | * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|. | |
1074 | * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: | |
1075 | * SNI, | |
1076 | * elliptic_curves | |
1077 | * ec_point_formats | |
1078 | * | |
1079 | * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, | |
1080 | * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. | |
1081 | * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from | |
1082 | * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). | |
1083 | */ | |
1084 | static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) | |
1085 | { | |
805a2e9e MC |
1086 | static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { |
1087 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ | |
1088 | 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ | |
1089 | 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ | |
1090 | 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ | |
1091 | 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ | |
1092 | 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ | |
1093 | ||
1094 | 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ | |
1095 | 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ | |
1096 | 0x01, /* 1 point format */ | |
1097 | 0x00, /* uncompressed */ | |
1098 | /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ | |
1099 | 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ | |
1100 | 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ | |
1101 | 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ | |
1102 | 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ | |
1103 | 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ | |
1104 | 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ | |
1105 | 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ | |
1106 | 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ | |
1107 | }; | |
805a2e9e MC |
1108 | /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */ |
1109 | static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18; | |
1266eefd MC |
1110 | unsigned int type; |
1111 | PACKET sni, tmppkt; | |
1112 | size_t ext_len; | |
805a2e9e MC |
1113 | |
1114 | tmppkt = hello->extensions; | |
1115 | ||
1116 | if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2) | |
1117 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type) | |
1118 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) { | |
1119 | return; | |
6b473aca MC |
1120 | } |
1121 | ||
805a2e9e MC |
1122 | if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) |
1123 | return; | |
1124 | ||
1125 | ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? | |
1126 | sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength; | |
1127 | ||
1128 | s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock, | |
1129 | ext_len); | |
6b473aca | 1130 | } |
805a2e9e | 1131 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
6b473aca | 1132 | |
be3583fa | 1133 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a MC |
1134 | { |
1135 | int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
348240c6 | 1136 | unsigned int j; |
1ab3836b | 1137 | size_t loop; |
e27f234a | 1138 | unsigned long id; |
4a640fb6 | 1139 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; |
e27f234a MC |
1140 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
1141 | SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; | |
1142 | #endif | |
1143 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; | |
4fa52141 | 1144 | int protverr; |
e27f234a | 1145 | /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */ |
1ab3836b | 1146 | PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie; |
6e3ff632 | 1147 | static const unsigned char null_compression = 0; |
1ab3836b | 1148 | CLIENTHELLO_MSG clienthello; |
e27f234a | 1149 | |
1ab3836b | 1150 | /* |
b1b4b543 | 1151 | * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure. |
1ab3836b | 1152 | */ |
9529419d | 1153 | memset(&clienthello, 0, sizeof(clienthello)); |
1ab3836b | 1154 | clienthello.isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer); |
bbafa47b | 1155 | PACKET_null_init(&cookie); |
1ab3836b MC |
1156 | |
1157 | if (clienthello.isv2) { | |
9ceb2426 | 1158 | unsigned int mt; |
b1b4b543 | 1159 | |
32ec4153 MC |
1160 | /*- |
1161 | * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2 | |
1162 | * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS | |
1163 | * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes | |
1164 | * the rest right through. Its format is: | |
1165 | * Byte Content | |
1166 | * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer | |
1167 | * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here | |
1168 | * 3-4 version | |
1169 | * 5-6 cipher_spec_length | |
1170 | * 7-8 session_id_length | |
1171 | * 9-10 challenge_length | |
1172 | * ... ... | |
1173 | */ | |
1174 | ||
73999b62 | 1175 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt) |
a230b26e | 1176 | || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { |
32ec4153 MC |
1177 | /* |
1178 | * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record | |
1179 | * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record | |
1180 | * in the first place | |
1181 | */ | |
e27f234a | 1182 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
d45ba43d | 1183 | goto err; |
32ec4153 | 1184 | } |
32ec4153 MC |
1185 | } |
1186 | ||
df7ce507 | 1187 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello.legacy_version)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1188 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1189 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
1190 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1191 | } |
1192 | ||
b3e2272c | 1193 | /* Parse the message and load client random. */ |
1ab3836b | 1194 | if (clienthello.isv2) { |
32ec4153 MC |
1195 | /* |
1196 | * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello | |
1197 | * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format. | |
e2994cf0 | 1198 | * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below. |
32ec4153 | 1199 | */ |
1ab3836b | 1200 | unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len; |
b3e2272c | 1201 | PACKET challenge; |
0f113f3e | 1202 | |
1ab3836b | 1203 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len) |
a230b26e EK |
1204 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len) |
1205 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) { | |
e27f234a MC |
1206 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1207 | SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
6c3cca57 AE |
1208 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1209 | goto f_err; | |
5e9f0eeb | 1210 | } |
0f113f3e | 1211 | |
293b5ca4 AG |
1212 | if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { |
1213 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1214 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1215 | goto f_err; | |
1216 | } | |
1217 | ||
1ab3836b MC |
1218 | if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites, |
1219 | ciphersuite_len) | |
035b1e69 | 1220 | || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.session_id, session_id_len) |
73999b62 | 1221 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len) |
b3e2272c | 1222 | /* No extensions. */ |
73999b62 | 1223 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { |
f0659bdb MC |
1224 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1225 | SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
9ceb2426 MC |
1226 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1227 | goto f_err; | |
1228 | } | |
035b1e69 | 1229 | clienthello.session_id_len = session_id_len; |
9ceb2426 | 1230 | |
fba7b84c MC |
1231 | /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE |
1232 | * here rather than sizeof(clienthello.random) because that is the limit | |
1233 | * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if | |
1234 | * sizeof(clienthello.random) does. | |
1235 | */ | |
1236 | challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE | |
1237 | ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len; | |
1238 | memset(clienthello.random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
b3e2272c | 1239 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge, |
fba7b84c | 1240 | clienthello.random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - |
cb21df32 DB |
1241 | challenge_len, challenge_len) |
1242 | /* Advertise only null compression. */ | |
1243 | || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) { | |
f0659bdb | 1244 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
b3e2272c | 1245 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
9ceb2426 MC |
1246 | goto f_err; |
1247 | } | |
b3e2272c | 1248 | |
1ab3836b | 1249 | PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions); |
0f113f3e | 1250 | } else { |
b3e2272c | 1251 | /* Regular ClientHello. */ |
1ab3836b | 1252 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) |
e2994cf0 MC |
1253 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id) |
1254 | || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello.session_id, | |
1255 | SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH, | |
1256 | &clienthello.session_id_len)) { | |
9ceb2426 | 1257 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
f0659bdb | 1258 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
9ceb2426 MC |
1259 | goto f_err; |
1260 | } | |
32ec4153 | 1261 | |
b3e2272c | 1262 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
73999b62 | 1263 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) { |
32ec4153 | 1264 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
f0659bdb | 1265 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
32ec4153 MC |
1266 | goto f_err; |
1267 | } | |
1ab3836b MC |
1268 | if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello.dtls_cookie, |
1269 | DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH, | |
1270 | &clienthello.dtls_cookie_len)) { | |
1271 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1272 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1273 | goto f_err; | |
1274 | } | |
b3e2272c EK |
1275 | /* |
1276 | * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, | |
1277 | * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. | |
1278 | * So check cookie length... | |
1279 | */ | |
1280 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { | |
1ab3836b | 1281 | if (clienthello.dtls_cookie_len == 0) |
a230b26e | 1282 | return 1; |
b3e2272c | 1283 | } |
5e9f0eeb | 1284 | } |
0f113f3e | 1285 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1286 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites)) { |
1287 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1288 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1289 | goto f_err; | |
1290 | } | |
1291 | ||
4bfe1432 | 1292 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) { |
a230b26e EK |
1293 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1294 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1295 | goto f_err; | |
b3e2272c | 1296 | } |
1ab3836b | 1297 | |
b3e2272c | 1298 | /* Could be empty. */ |
1ab3836b MC |
1299 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { |
1300 | PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions); | |
1301 | } else { | |
1302 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.extensions)) { | |
1303 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
1304 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1305 | goto f_err; | |
1306 | } | |
1307 | } | |
1308 | } | |
1309 | ||
4bfe1432 | 1310 | if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello.compressions, |
e2994cf0 MC |
1311 | MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE, |
1312 | &clienthello.compressions_len)) { | |
1ab3836b MC |
1313 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
1314 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1315 | goto f_err; | |
1316 | } | |
1317 | ||
b1b4b543 | 1318 | /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */ |
1ab3836b | 1319 | extensions = clienthello.extensions; |
fadd9a1e | 1320 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
70af3d8e | 1321 | &clienthello.pre_proc_exts, &al)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1322 | /* SSLerr already been called */ |
1323 | goto f_err; | |
1324 | } | |
1325 | ||
1326 | /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */ | |
1327 | ||
1328 | /* Set up the client_random */ | |
1329 | memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
1330 | ||
1331 | /* Choose the version */ | |
1332 | ||
1333 | if (clienthello.isv2) { | |
df7ce507 MC |
1334 | if (clienthello.legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION |
1335 | || (clienthello.legacy_version & 0xff00) | |
b1b4b543 MC |
1336 | != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) { |
1337 | /* | |
1338 | * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't | |
1339 | * support it. | |
1340 | */ | |
1ab3836b MC |
1341 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); |
1342 | goto err; | |
1343 | } | |
b1b4b543 | 1344 | /* SSLv3/TLS */ |
df7ce507 | 1345 | s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version; |
1ab3836b MC |
1346 | } |
1347 | /* | |
1348 | * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check | |
1349 | * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later. | |
1350 | */ | |
1351 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1352 | protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello); | |
1353 | } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION && | |
df7ce507 | 1354 | DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello.legacy_version, s->version)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1355 | protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; |
1356 | } else { | |
1357 | protverr = 0; | |
1358 | } | |
1359 | ||
1360 | if (protverr) { | |
1361 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); | |
1362 | if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) { | |
b1b4b543 | 1363 | /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ |
df7ce507 | 1364 | s->version = s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version; |
1ab3836b MC |
1365 | } |
1366 | al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
1367 | goto f_err; | |
b3e2272c EK |
1368 | } |
1369 | ||
1ed65871 DB |
1370 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
1371 | /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */ | |
1372 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { | |
1373 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { | |
1ab3836b MC |
1374 | if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello.dtls_cookie, |
1375 | clienthello.dtls_cookie_len) == 0) { | |
1ed65871 DB |
1376 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
1377 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1378 | SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); | |
1379 | goto f_err; | |
1380 | /* else cookie verification succeeded */ | |
1381 | } | |
a230b26e | 1382 | /* default verification */ |
1ab3836b MC |
1383 | } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello.dtls_cookie_len |
1384 | || memcmp(clienthello.dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie, | |
1385 | s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { | |
1ed65871 DB |
1386 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
1387 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); | |
1388 | goto f_err; | |
1389 | } | |
1390 | s->d1->cookie_verified = 1; | |
1391 | } | |
1392 | if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { | |
1ab3836b | 1393 | protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello); |
1ed65871 DB |
1394 | if (protverr != 0) { |
1395 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); | |
1396 | s->version = s->client_version; | |
1397 | al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
1398 | goto f_err; | |
1399 | } | |
1400 | } | |
1401 | } | |
1402 | ||
b3e2272c EK |
1403 | s->hit = 0; |
1404 | ||
1ab3836b | 1405 | /* We need to do this before getting the session */ |
70af3d8e | 1406 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret, |
4b299b8e | 1407 | EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
f97d4c37 | 1408 | clienthello.pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) { |
1ab3836b MC |
1409 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); |
1410 | goto f_err; | |
1411 | } | |
1412 | ||
b3e2272c EK |
1413 | /* |
1414 | * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello. | |
1415 | * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty. | |
1416 | * | |
1417 | * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in | |
1418 | * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally | |
1419 | * ignore resumption requests with flag | |
1420 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather | |
1421 | * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on | |
1422 | * this for security won't even compile against older library versions). | |
1423 | * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to | |
1424 | * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains | |
1425 | * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the | |
1426 | * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be | |
1427 | * ignored. | |
1428 | */ | |
1ab3836b | 1429 | if (clienthello.isv2 || |
b3e2272c EK |
1430 | (s->new_session && |
1431 | (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { | |
1432 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) | |
1433 | goto err; | |
1434 | } else { | |
1ab3836b | 1435 | i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &clienthello); |
0f113f3e | 1436 | /* |
b3e2272c EK |
1437 | * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated |
1438 | * version. | |
1439 | * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption | |
1440 | * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but | |
1441 | * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable. | |
1442 | * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and | |
1443 | * will abort the handshake with an error. | |
0f113f3e | 1444 | */ |
b3e2272c EK |
1445 | if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { |
1446 | /* previous session */ | |
1447 | s->hit = 1; | |
1448 | } else if (i == -1) { | |
1449 | goto err; | |
32ec4153 | 1450 | } else { |
b3e2272c EK |
1451 | /* i == 0 */ |
1452 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) | |
32ec4153 | 1453 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1454 | } |
b3e2272c | 1455 | } |
0f113f3e | 1456 | |
b1b4b543 | 1457 | if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello.ciphersuites, &ciphers, |
1ab3836b | 1458 | clienthello.isv2, &al) == NULL) { |
b3e2272c EK |
1459 | goto f_err; |
1460 | } | |
5e9f0eeb | 1461 | |
b3e2272c EK |
1462 | /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ |
1463 | if (s->hit) { | |
1464 | j = 0; | |
1465 | id = s->session->cipher->id; | |
d02b48c6 | 1466 | |
413c4f45 | 1467 | #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG |
a230b26e | 1468 | fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); |
413c4f45 | 1469 | #endif |
b3e2272c EK |
1470 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { |
1471 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
413c4f45 | 1472 | #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG |
b3e2272c EK |
1473 | fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", |
1474 | i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); | |
88f2a4cf | 1475 | #endif |
b3e2272c EK |
1476 | if (c->id == id) { |
1477 | j = 1; | |
1478 | break; | |
32ec4153 | 1479 | } |
0f113f3e | 1480 | } |
b3e2272c | 1481 | if (j == 0) { |
ec30e856 | 1482 | /* |
b3e2272c EK |
1483 | * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked |
1484 | * to reuse it | |
ec30e856 | 1485 | */ |
b3e2272c | 1486 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
f0659bdb | 1487 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
b3e2272c | 1488 | SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); |
32ec4153 MC |
1489 | goto f_err; |
1490 | } | |
b3e2272c | 1491 | } |
9ceb2426 | 1492 | |
1ab3836b MC |
1493 | for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello.compressions_len; loop++) { |
1494 | if (clienthello.compressions[loop] == 0) | |
b3e2272c | 1495 | break; |
0f113f3e | 1496 | } |
32ec4153 | 1497 | |
1ab3836b | 1498 | if (loop >= clienthello.compressions_len) { |
b3e2272c EK |
1499 | /* no compress */ |
1500 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
f0659bdb | 1501 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); |
b3e2272c EK |
1502 | goto f_err; |
1503 | } | |
f100b031 | 1504 | |
805a2e9e MC |
1505 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
1506 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) | |
1507 | ssl_check_for_safari(s, &clienthello); | |
1508 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | |
1509 | ||
0f113f3e | 1510 | /* TLS extensions */ |
24b8e4b2 | 1511 | if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, |
f97d4c37 | 1512 | clienthello.pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) { |
1ab3836b | 1513 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); |
24b8e4b2 | 1514 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1515 | } |
1516 | ||
b1834ad7 | 1517 | /* Check we've got a key_share for TLSv1.3 */ |
657a43f6 | 1518 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL && !s->hit) { |
b1834ad7 | 1519 | /* No suitable share */ |
94ed2c67 | 1520 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Send a HelloRetryRequest */ |
b1834ad7 MC |
1521 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
1522 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE); | |
1523 | goto f_err; | |
1524 | } | |
1525 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
1526 | /* |
1527 | * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake | |
1528 | * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before | |
1529 | * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket | |
1530 | * processing to use it in key derivation. | |
1531 | */ | |
1532 | { | |
1533 | unsigned char *pos; | |
1534 | pos = s->s3->server_random; | |
1535 | if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { | |
1536 | goto f_err; | |
1537 | } | |
1538 | } | |
1539 | ||
aff8c126 | 1540 | if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->ext.session_secret_cb) { |
4a640fb6 | 1541 | const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; |
8c1a5343 MC |
1542 | /* |
1543 | * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for | |
1544 | * backwards compat reasons | |
1545 | */ | |
1546 | int master_key_length; | |
0f113f3e | 1547 | |
8c1a5343 | 1548 | master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); |
aff8c126 | 1549 | if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, |
8c1a5343 | 1550 | &master_key_length, ciphers, |
0f113f3e | 1551 | &pref_cipher, |
aff8c126 | 1552 | s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) |
8c1a5343 MC |
1553 | && master_key_length > 0) { |
1554 | s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1555 | s->hit = 1; |
1556 | s->session->ciphers = ciphers; | |
1557 | s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; | |
1558 | ||
1559 | ciphers = NULL; | |
1560 | ||
1561 | /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ | |
1562 | pref_cipher = | |
1563 | pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, | |
1564 | s-> | |
1565 | session->ciphers, | |
1566 | SSL_get_ciphers | |
1567 | (s)); | |
1568 | if (pref_cipher == NULL) { | |
1569 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
e27f234a | 1570 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); |
0f113f3e MC |
1571 | goto f_err; |
1572 | } | |
1573 | ||
1574 | s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; | |
25aaa98a | 1575 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); |
0f113f3e | 1576 | s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); |
25aaa98a | 1577 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); |
0f113f3e MC |
1578 | s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); |
1579 | } | |
1580 | } | |
58ece833 | 1581 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1582 | /* |
1583 | * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other | |
b2ce0337 | 1584 | * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression |
0f113f3e MC |
1585 | * algorithms from the client, starting at q. |
1586 | */ | |
1587 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; | |
09b6c2ef | 1588 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
0f113f3e MC |
1589 | /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ |
1590 | if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { | |
1591 | int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; | |
9ceb2426 | 1592 | unsigned int k; |
0f113f3e MC |
1593 | /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ |
1594 | /* Can't disable compression */ | |
1595 | if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { | |
e27f234a | 1596 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
0f113f3e MC |
1597 | SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); |
1598 | goto f_err; | |
1599 | } | |
1600 | /* Look for resumed compression method */ | |
1601 | for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { | |
1602 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); | |
1603 | if (comp_id == comp->id) { | |
1604 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; | |
1605 | break; | |
1606 | } | |
1607 | } | |
1608 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { | |
e27f234a | 1609 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
0f113f3e MC |
1610 | SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); |
1611 | goto f_err; | |
1612 | } | |
1613 | /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ | |
1ab3836b MC |
1614 | for (k = 0; k < clienthello.compressions_len; k++) { |
1615 | if (clienthello.compressions[k] == comp_id) | |
0f113f3e MC |
1616 | break; |
1617 | } | |
1ab3836b | 1618 | if (k >= clienthello.compressions_len) { |
0f113f3e | 1619 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
e27f234a | 1620 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
8fdc99cb | 1621 | SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); |
0f113f3e MC |
1622 | goto f_err; |
1623 | } | |
1624 | } else if (s->hit) | |
1625 | comp = NULL; | |
1626 | else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { | |
df6741c9 | 1627 | /* See if we have a match */ |
9ceb2426 MC |
1628 | int m, nn, v, done = 0; |
1629 | unsigned int o; | |
0f113f3e MC |
1630 | |
1631 | nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); | |
1632 | for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { | |
1633 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); | |
1634 | v = comp->id; | |
1ab3836b MC |
1635 | for (o = 0; o < clienthello.compressions_len; o++) { |
1636 | if (v == clienthello.compressions[o]) { | |
0f113f3e MC |
1637 | done = 1; |
1638 | break; | |
1639 | } | |
1640 | } | |
1641 | if (done) | |
1642 | break; | |
1643 | } | |
1644 | if (done) | |
1645 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; | |
1646 | else | |
1647 | comp = NULL; | |
1648 | } | |
e6f418bc | 1649 | #else |
0f113f3e MC |
1650 | /* |
1651 | * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session | |
1652 | * using compression. | |
1653 | */ | |
1654 | if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { | |
e27f234a | 1655 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); |
0f113f3e MC |
1656 | goto f_err; |
1657 | } | |
09b6c2ef | 1658 | #endif |
413c4f45 | 1659 | |
0f113f3e MC |
1660 | /* |
1661 | * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher | |
1662 | */ | |
d02b48c6 | 1663 | |
0f113f3e | 1664 | if (!s->hit) { |
09b6c2ef | 1665 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
0f113f3e | 1666 | s->session->compress_meth = 0; |
09b6c2ef | 1667 | #else |
0f113f3e | 1668 | s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; |
09b6c2ef | 1669 | #endif |
25aaa98a | 1670 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); |
0f113f3e MC |
1671 | s->session->ciphers = ciphers; |
1672 | if (ciphers == NULL) { | |
3ae91cfb | 1673 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 1674 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0f113f3e MC |
1675 | goto f_err; |
1676 | } | |
1677 | ciphers = NULL; | |
1678 | if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { | |
e27f234a | 1679 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); |
0f113f3e MC |
1680 | goto err; |
1681 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
1682 | } |
1683 | ||
1684 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); | |
9529419d | 1685 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts); |
e27f234a MC |
1686 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
1687 | f_err: | |
1688 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
1689 | err: | |
fe3a3291 | 1690 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a MC |
1691 | |
1692 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); | |
9529419d | 1693 | OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts); |
e27f234a | 1694 | |
58c9e32a | 1695 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
e27f234a MC |
1696 | } |
1697 | ||
24b8e4b2 MC |
1698 | /* |
1699 | * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1. | |
1266eefd | 1700 | * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert. |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1701 | */ |
1702 | static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s, int *al) | |
1703 | { | |
aff8c126 | 1704 | s->ext.status_expected = 0; |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1705 | |
1706 | /* | |
1707 | * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be | |
1708 | * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed, | |
1709 | * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may | |
1710 | * influence which certificate is sent | |
1711 | */ | |
aff8c126 RS |
1712 | if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL |
1713 | && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { | |
24b8e4b2 | 1714 | int ret; |
1266eefd MC |
1715 | CERT_PKEY *certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); |
1716 | ||
24b8e4b2 MC |
1717 | /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ |
1718 | if (certpkey != NULL) { | |
1719 | /* | |
1720 | * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate | |
1721 | * et al can pick it up. | |
1722 | */ | |
1723 | s->cert->key = certpkey; | |
aff8c126 | 1724 | ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg); |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1725 | switch (ret) { |
1726 | /* We don't want to send a status request response */ | |
1727 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: | |
aff8c126 | 1728 | s->ext.status_expected = 0; |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1729 | break; |
1730 | /* status request response should be sent */ | |
1731 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: | |
aff8c126 RS |
1732 | if (s->ext.ocsp.resp) |
1733 | s->ext.status_expected = 1; | |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1734 | break; |
1735 | /* something bad happened */ | |
1736 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
1737 | default: | |
1738 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
1739 | return 0; | |
1740 | } | |
1741 | } | |
1742 | } | |
1743 | ||
1744 | return 1; | |
1745 | } | |
1746 | ||
be3583fa | 1747 | WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
e27f234a | 1748 | { |
d13dd4be | 1749 | int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
4a640fb6 | 1750 | const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; |
e27f234a MC |
1751 | |
1752 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { | |
1753 | if (!s->hit) { | |
1754 | /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ | |
1755 | if (s->cert->cert_cb) { | |
1756 | int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); | |
1757 | if (rv == 0) { | |
1758 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
a230b26e EK |
1759 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1760 | SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); | |
e27f234a MC |
1761 | goto f_err; |
1762 | } | |
1763 | if (rv < 0) { | |
1764 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
1765 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
1766 | } | |
1767 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
0f113f3e | 1768 | } |
a230b26e EK |
1769 | cipher = |
1770 | ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); | |
e27f234a MC |
1771 | |
1772 | if (cipher == NULL) { | |
a230b26e EK |
1773 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, |
1774 | SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); | |
e27f234a | 1775 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e | 1776 | } |
e27f234a MC |
1777 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; |
1778 | /* check whether we should disable session resumption */ | |
1779 | if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL) | |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1780 | s->session->not_resumable = |
1781 | s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, ((cipher->algorithm_mkey | |
1782 | & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) | |
1783 | != 0)); | |
e27f234a MC |
1784 | if (s->session->not_resumable) |
1785 | /* do not send a session ticket */ | |
aff8c126 | 1786 | s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; |
e27f234a MC |
1787 | } else { |
1788 | /* Session-id reuse */ | |
1789 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; | |
0f113f3e | 1790 | } |
0f113f3e | 1791 | |
28f4580c | 1792 | if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { |
d13dd4be MC |
1793 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
1794 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
e27f234a | 1795 | goto f_err; |
d13dd4be | 1796 | } |
0f113f3e | 1797 | } |
0f113f3e | 1798 | |
e27f234a MC |
1799 | /*- |
1800 | * we now have the following setup. | |
1801 | * client_random | |
60250017 | 1802 | * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers |
1803 | * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers | |
e27f234a MC |
1804 | * compression - basically ignored right now |
1805 | * ssl version is set - sslv3 | |
1806 | * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. | |
1807 | * s->hit - session reuse flag | |
1808 | * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use. | |
1809 | */ | |
0f113f3e | 1810 | |
24b8e4b2 MC |
1811 | /* |
1812 | * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the | |
1813 | * certificate callbacks etc above. | |
1814 | */ | |
1815 | if (!tls_handle_status_request(s, &al)) { | |
1816 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1817 | SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); | |
1818 | goto f_err; | |
e27f234a | 1819 | } |
0f113f3e | 1820 | |
e27f234a MC |
1821 | wst = WORK_MORE_B; |
1822 | } | |
1823 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
1824 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { | |
1825 | int ret; | |
1826 | if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) { | |
1827 | /* | |
1828 | * callback indicates further work to be done | |
1829 | */ | |
1830 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
1831 | return WORK_MORE_B; | |
1832 | } | |
1833 | if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) { | |
1834 | /* | |
1835 | * This is not really an error but the only means to for | |
1836 | * a client to detect whether srp is supported. | |
1837 | */ | |
1838 | if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) | |
1839 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
a230b26e | 1840 | SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); |
7bb37cb5 E |
1841 | else |
1842 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1843 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); | |
e27f234a | 1844 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e MC |
1845 | } |
1846 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
1847 | #endif |
1848 | s->renegotiate = 2; | |
0f113f3e | 1849 | |
e27f234a | 1850 | return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; |
0f113f3e | 1851 | f_err: |
e27f234a | 1852 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
fe3a3291 | 1853 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a MC |
1854 | return WORK_ERROR; |
1855 | } | |
1856 | ||
7cea05dc | 1857 | int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 1858 | { |
ec60ccc1 MC |
1859 | int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
1860 | size_t sl, len; | |
f2342b7a | 1861 | int version; |
0f113f3e | 1862 | |
b97667ce | 1863 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */ |
f2342b7a MC |
1864 | version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version; |
1865 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version) | |
8157d44b MC |
1866 | /* |
1867 | * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in | |
1868 | * tls_process_client_hello() | |
1869 | */ | |
7cea05dc | 1870 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { |
8157d44b MC |
1871 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
1872 | goto err; | |
1873 | } | |
0f113f3e | 1874 | |
e27f234a MC |
1875 | /*- |
1876 | * There are several cases for the session ID to send | |
1877 | * back in the server hello: | |
1878 | * - For session reuse from the session cache, | |
1879 | * we send back the old session ID. | |
1880 | * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) | |
1881 | * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" | |
1882 | * (which doesn't actually identify the session). | |
1883 | * - If it is a new session, we send back the new | |
1884 | * session ID. | |
1885 | * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, | |
1886 | * we send back a 0-length session ID. | |
1887 | * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, | |
1888 | * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed | |
1889 | * to send back. | |
1890 | */ | |
1891 | if (s->session->not_resumable || | |
1892 | (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) | |
1893 | && !s->hit)) | |
1894 | s->session->session_id_length = 0; | |
1895 | ||
1896 | sl = s->session->session_id_length; | |
ec60ccc1 | 1897 | if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { |
e27f234a | 1898 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
8157d44b | 1899 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 1900 | } |
0f113f3e | 1901 | |
8157d44b | 1902 | /* set up the compression method */ |
09b6c2ef | 1903 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
8157d44b | 1904 | compm = 0; |
09b6c2ef | 1905 | #else |
e27f234a | 1906 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) |
8157d44b | 1907 | compm = 0; |
e27f234a | 1908 | else |
8157d44b | 1909 | compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; |
09b6c2ef | 1910 | #endif |
e481f9b9 | 1911 | |
71728dd8 MC |
1912 | if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
1913 | && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl)) | |
7cea05dc | 1914 | || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len) |
71728dd8 MC |
1915 | || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
1916 | && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) | |
7da160b0 | 1917 | || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, |
3434f40b | 1918 | SSL_IS_TLS13(s) |
1266eefd | 1919 | ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO |
30aeba43 MC |
1920 | : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO, |
1921 | NULL, 0, &al)) { | |
e27f234a | 1922 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
8157d44b | 1923 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 1924 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1925 | |
e27f234a | 1926 | return 1; |
8157d44b | 1927 | err: |
7da160b0 | 1928 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
8157d44b | 1929 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 1930 | } |
d02b48c6 | 1931 | |
7cea05dc | 1932 | int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 1933 | { |
e27f234a | 1934 | if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
5923ad4b MC |
1935 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
1936 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1937 | return 0; | |
1938 | } | |
e27f234a | 1939 | } |
e27f234a MC |
1940 | return 1; |
1941 | } | |
1942 | ||
7cea05dc | 1943 | int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 1944 | { |
bc36ee62 | 1945 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
e2b420fd | 1946 | EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL; |
ea262260 | 1947 | #endif |
10bf4fc2 | 1948 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
0f113f3e | 1949 | unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; |
348240c6 | 1950 | size_t encodedlen = 0; |
0f113f3e | 1951 | int curve_id = 0; |
d02b48c6 | 1952 | #endif |
0f113f3e MC |
1953 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; |
1954 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
c13d2a5b | 1955 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i; |
0f113f3e | 1956 | unsigned long type; |
2ac6115d | 1957 | const BIGNUM *r[4]; |
bfb0641f | 1958 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
fe3066ee | 1959 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
c13d2a5b MC |
1960 | size_t paramlen, paramoffset; |
1961 | ||
5923ad4b | 1962 | if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) { |
e4e1aa90 | 1963 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c13d2a5b MC |
1964 | goto f_err; |
1965 | } | |
0f113f3e | 1966 | |
6e59a892 RL |
1967 | if (md_ctx == NULL) { |
1968 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
6e59a892 RL |
1969 | goto f_err; |
1970 | } | |
0f113f3e | 1971 | |
e27f234a | 1972 | type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
e27f234a | 1973 | |
e27f234a | 1974 | r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; |
85269210 | 1975 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
e27f234a MC |
1976 | /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */ |
1977 | if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { | |
1978 | } else | |
85269210 | 1979 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ |
bc36ee62 | 1980 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
e27f234a | 1981 | if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
94d61512 BL |
1982 | CERT *cert = s->cert; |
1983 | ||
e2b420fd DSH |
1984 | EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL; |
1985 | DH *dh; | |
1986 | ||
e27f234a | 1987 | if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) { |
e2b420fd DSH |
1988 | DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s); |
1989 | pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
1990 | if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) { | |
1991 | DH_free(dhp); | |
e27f234a | 1992 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
0f113f3e | 1993 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 1994 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e | 1995 | } |
e2b420fd DSH |
1996 | EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp); |
1997 | pkdhp = pkdh; | |
1998 | } else { | |
1999 | pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp; | |
2000 | } | |
2001 | if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { | |
2002 | DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024); | |
2003 | pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp); | |
2004 | if (pkdh == NULL) { | |
e2b420fd DSH |
2005 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2006 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2007 | goto f_err; | |
2008 | } | |
2009 | pkdhp = pkdh; | |
2010 | } | |
2011 | if (pkdhp == NULL) { | |
e27f234a MC |
2012 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
2013 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2014 | SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); | |
2015 | goto f_err; | |
2016 | } | |
2017 | if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, | |
e2b420fd | 2018 | EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) { |
e27f234a MC |
2019 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
2020 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2021 | SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
2022 | goto f_err; | |
2023 | } | |
e2b420fd | 2024 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { |
e27f234a MC |
2025 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2026 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2027 | goto err; | |
2028 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2029 | |
0a699a07 | 2030 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp); |
e27f234a | 2031 | |
e2b420fd DSH |
2032 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { |
2033 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
ffaef3f1 | 2034 | goto err; |
e27f234a | 2035 | } |
e2b420fd DSH |
2036 | |
2037 | dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey); | |
2038 | ||
2039 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); | |
2040 | pkdh = NULL; | |
2041 | ||
0aeddcfa MC |
2042 | DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]); |
2043 | DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL); | |
e27f234a | 2044 | } else |
d02b48c6 | 2045 | #endif |
10bf4fc2 | 2046 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
e27f234a | 2047 | if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
57be4444 | 2048 | int nid; |
e27f234a | 2049 | |
880d9d86 | 2050 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { |
e27f234a MC |
2051 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2052 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2053 | goto err; | |
2054 | } | |
2055 | ||
57be4444 | 2056 | /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ |
de4d764e | 2057 | nid = tls1_shared_group(s, -2); |
57be4444 DSH |
2058 | curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid); |
2059 | if (curve_id == 0) { | |
e27f234a MC |
2060 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2061 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); | |
2062 | goto err; | |
2063 | } | |
0a699a07 | 2064 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id); |
880d9d86 DSH |
2065 | /* Generate a new key for this curve */ |
2066 | if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { | |
880d9d86 | 2067 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
57be4444 DSH |
2068 | goto f_err; |
2069 | } | |
2070 | ||
880d9d86 | 2071 | /* Encode the public key. */ |
ec24630a DSH |
2072 | encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey, |
2073 | &encodedPoint); | |
e27f234a | 2074 | if (encodedlen == 0) { |
cae41364 | 2075 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
e27f234a MC |
2076 | goto err; |
2077 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2078 | |
e27f234a MC |
2079 | /* |
2080 | * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we | |
2081 | * can set these to NULLs | |
2082 | */ | |
2083 | r[0] = NULL; | |
2084 | r[1] = NULL; | |
2085 | r[2] = NULL; | |
2086 | r[3] = NULL; | |
2087 | } else | |
10bf4fc2 | 2088 | #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
edc032b5 | 2089 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
e27f234a MC |
2090 | if (type & SSL_kSRP) { |
2091 | if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || | |
2092 | (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || | |
2093 | (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { | |
2094 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2095 | SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); | |
2096 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 2097 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2098 | r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; |
2099 | r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; | |
2100 | r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; | |
2101 | r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; | |
2102 | } else | |
2103 | #endif | |
2104 | { | |
2105 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
2106 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2107 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); | |
2108 | goto f_err; | |
2109 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2110 | |
a230b26e | 2111 | if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) |
e27f234a MC |
2112 | && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) { |
2113 | if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) | |
2114 | == NULL) { | |
2115 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
2116 | goto f_err; | |
0f113f3e | 2117 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2118 | } else { |
2119 | pkey = NULL; | |
e27f234a | 2120 | } |
0f113f3e | 2121 | |
85269210 | 2122 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
e27f234a | 2123 | if (type & SSL_PSK) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2124 | size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL) |
2125 | ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); | |
2126 | ||
2127 | /* | |
2128 | * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already | |
2129 | * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case | |
2130 | */ | |
2131 | if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN | |
7cea05dc | 2132 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, |
c13d2a5b MC |
2133 | len)) { |
2134 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2135 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2136 | goto f_err; | |
85269210 | 2137 | } |
e27f234a | 2138 | } |
85269210 DSH |
2139 | #endif |
2140 | ||
e27f234a | 2141 | for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2142 | unsigned char *binval; |
2143 | int res; | |
2144 | ||
edc032b5 | 2145 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
e27f234a | 2146 | if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { |
7cea05dc | 2147 | res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt); |
e27f234a | 2148 | } else |
78a01b3f | 2149 | #endif |
7cea05dc | 2150 | res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt); |
c13d2a5b MC |
2151 | |
2152 | if (!res) { | |
2153 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2154 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2155 | goto f_err; | |
2156 | } | |
2157 | ||
78a01b3f | 2158 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
a230b26e | 2159 | /*- |
78a01b3f | 2160 | * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS |
2161 | * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length | |
2162 | * as the prime | |
2163 | */ | |
2164 | if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) { | |
c13d2a5b | 2165 | size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]); |
ff819477 | 2166 | |
c13d2a5b | 2167 | if (len > 0) { |
7cea05dc | 2168 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2169 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2170 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2171 | goto f_err; | |
2172 | } | |
2173 | memset(binval, 0, len); | |
78a01b3f | 2174 | } |
c13d2a5b | 2175 | } |
edc032b5 | 2176 | #endif |
7cea05dc MC |
2177 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval) |
2178 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2179 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2180 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2181 | goto f_err; | |
2182 | } | |
2183 | ||
2184 | BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval); | |
e27f234a | 2185 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2186 | |
10bf4fc2 | 2187 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
e27f234a MC |
2188 | if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
2189 | /* | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2190 | * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the |
2191 | * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] | |
2192 | * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded | |
2193 | * point itself | |
e27f234a | 2194 | */ |
7cea05dc MC |
2195 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) |
2196 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) | |
2197 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id) | |
2198 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) { | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2199 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2200 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2201 | goto f_err; | |
2202 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2203 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
2204 | encodedPoint = NULL; | |
e27f234a | 2205 | } |
ea262260 BM |
2206 | #endif |
2207 | ||
e27f234a MC |
2208 | /* not anonymous */ |
2209 | if (pkey != NULL) { | |
2210 | /* | |
2211 | * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p | |
2212 | * points to the space at the end. | |
2213 | */ | |
e27f234a | 2214 | if (md) { |
c13d2a5b | 2215 | unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2; |
fe3066ee MC |
2216 | size_t siglen; |
2217 | int ispss = 0; | |
c13d2a5b MC |
2218 | |
2219 | /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */ | |
7cea05dc | 2220 | if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) { |
c13d2a5b MC |
2221 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2222 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2223 | goto f_err; | |
2224 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2225 | /* send signature algorithm */ |
2226 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { | |
fe3066ee | 2227 | if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(s, pkt, pkey, md, &ispss)) { |
e27f234a | 2228 | /* Should never happen */ |
e27f234a MC |
2229 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2230 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2231 | goto f_err; | |
0f113f3e | 2232 | } |
e27f234a | 2233 | } |
a2f9200f | 2234 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG |
e27f234a | 2235 | fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); |
a2f9200f | 2236 | #endif |
c13d2a5b MC |
2237 | /* |
2238 | * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig | |
2239 | * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it | |
2240 | * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET | |
2241 | * afterwards. | |
2242 | */ | |
0cc092f8 MC |
2243 | siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
2244 | if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1) | |
fe3066ee MC |
2245 | || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { |
2246 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2247 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2248 | goto f_err; | |
2249 | } | |
2250 | if (ispss) { | |
2251 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, | |
2252 | RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 | |
2253 | /* -1 here means set saltlen to the digest len */ | |
2254 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1) <= 0) { | |
2255 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2256 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
2257 | goto f_err; | |
2258 | } | |
2259 | } | |
2260 | if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), | |
2261 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 | |
2262 | || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), | |
2263 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 | |
2264 | || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, | |
2265 | s->init_buf->data + paramoffset, | |
2266 | paramlen) <= 0 | |
2267 | || EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen) <= 0 | |
7cea05dc | 2268 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2) |
c13d2a5b MC |
2269 | || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) { |
2270 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2271 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5f3d93e4 | 2272 | goto f_err; |
0f113f3e | 2273 | } |
e27f234a MC |
2274 | } else { |
2275 | /* Is this error check actually needed? */ | |
77d514c5 | 2276 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
e27f234a MC |
2277 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2278 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); | |
77d514c5 MC |
2279 | goto f_err; |
2280 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
2281 | } |
2282 | ||
bfb0641f | 2283 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
e27f234a | 2284 | return 1; |
0f113f3e MC |
2285 | f_err: |
2286 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
2287 | err: | |
e2b420fd DSH |
2288 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
2289 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); | |
2290 | #endif | |
556efe79 | 2291 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
b548a1f1 | 2292 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
ea262260 | 2293 | #endif |
bfb0641f | 2294 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); |
e27f234a | 2295 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2296 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2297 | |
7cea05dc | 2298 | int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
0f113f3e | 2299 | { |
348240c6 | 2300 | int i; |
0f113f3e | 2301 | STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; |
0f113f3e | 2302 | |
e27f234a | 2303 | /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ |
7cea05dc MC |
2304 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) |
2305 | || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) | |
2306 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2307 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2308 | goto err; | |
2309 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2310 | |
e27f234a | 2311 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
703bcee0 | 2312 | const unsigned int *psigs; |
348240c6 | 2313 | size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs); |
703bcee0 | 2314 | |
7cea05dc MC |
2315 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
2316 | || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl) | |
2317 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2318 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, |
2319 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2320 | goto err; | |
2321 | } | |
e27f234a | 2322 | } |
0f113f3e | 2323 | |
28ff8ef3 | 2324 | /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ |
7cea05dc | 2325 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2326 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2327 | goto err; | |
2328 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2329 | |
2330 | sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); | |
e27f234a MC |
2331 | if (sk != NULL) { |
2332 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { | |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2333 | unsigned char *namebytes; |
2334 | X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); | |
2335 | int namelen; | |
2336 | ||
2337 | if (name == NULL | |
2338 | || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 | |
7cea05dc | 2339 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, |
28ff8ef3 MC |
2340 | &namebytes) |
2341 | || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { | |
2342 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2343 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e27f234a | 2344 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
2345 | } |
2346 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
2347 | } |
2348 | /* else no CA names */ | |
d02b48c6 | 2349 | |
5923ad4b | 2350 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
e27f234a MC |
2351 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
2352 | goto err; | |
0f113f3e | 2353 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2354 | |
e27f234a MC |
2355 | s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; |
2356 | ||
2357 | return 1; | |
0f113f3e | 2358 | err: |
28ff8ef3 | 2359 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 2360 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2361 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2362 | |
0907d710 | 2363 | static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
e27f234a | 2364 | { |
85269210 | 2365 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
0907d710 MC |
2366 | unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; |
2367 | size_t psklen; | |
2368 | PACKET psk_identity; | |
efcdbcbe | 2369 | |
0907d710 MC |
2370 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) { |
2371 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2372 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
0907d710 MC |
2373 | return 0; |
2374 | } | |
2375 | if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { | |
2376 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2377 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
0907d710 MC |
2378 | return 0; |
2379 | } | |
2380 | if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { | |
2381 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
a230b26e | 2382 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); |
0907d710 MC |
2383 | return 0; |
2384 | } | |
85269210 | 2385 | |
0907d710 MC |
2386 | if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) { |
2387 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2388 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2389 | return 0; |
2390 | } | |
85269210 | 2391 | |
0907d710 | 2392 | psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity, |
a230b26e | 2393 | psk, sizeof(psk)); |
85269210 | 2394 | |
0907d710 MC |
2395 | if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { |
2396 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2397 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2398 | return 0; |
2399 | } else if (psklen == 0) { | |
2400 | /* | |
2401 | * PSK related to the given identity not found | |
2402 | */ | |
2403 | *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; | |
c76a4aea | 2404 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, |
0907d710 MC |
2405 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); |
2406 | return 0; | |
2407 | } | |
85269210 | 2408 | |
0907d710 MC |
2409 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); |
2410 | s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); | |
2411 | OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); | |
85269210 | 2412 | |
0907d710 MC |
2413 | if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) { |
2414 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2415 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
0907d710 | 2416 | return 0; |
85269210 | 2417 | } |
0907d710 MC |
2418 | |
2419 | s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; | |
2420 | ||
2421 | return 1; | |
2422 | #else | |
2423 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2424 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2425 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 | 2426 | return 0; |
85269210 | 2427 | #endif |
0907d710 MC |
2428 | } |
2429 | ||
0907d710 MC |
2430 | static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
2431 | { | |
bc36ee62 | 2432 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
0907d710 MC |
2433 | unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; |
2434 | int decrypt_len; | |
2435 | unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; | |
2436 | size_t j, padding_len; | |
2437 | PACKET enc_premaster; | |
2438 | RSA *rsa = NULL; | |
2439 | unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL; | |
2440 | int ret = 0; | |
2441 | ||
2442 | rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey); | |
2443 | if (rsa == NULL) { | |
2444 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
c76a4aea | 2445 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); |
0907d710 MC |
2446 | return 0; |
2447 | } | |
2448 | ||
2449 | /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */ | |
2450 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { | |
2451 | enc_premaster = *pkt; | |
2452 | } else { | |
2453 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster) | |
2454 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
2455 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2456 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
0907d710 | 2457 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 2458 | } |
0907d710 | 2459 | } |
0f113f3e | 2460 | |
0907d710 MC |
2461 | /* |
2462 | * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to | |
2463 | * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret | |
2464 | * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because | |
2465 | * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway. | |
2466 | */ | |
2467 | if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { | |
2468 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2469 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); |
0907d710 MC |
2470 | return 0; |
2471 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2472 | |
0907d710 MC |
2473 | rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa)); |
2474 | if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) { | |
2475 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2476 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
0907d710 MC |
2477 | return 0; |
2478 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2479 | |
0907d710 MC |
2480 | /* |
2481 | * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of | |
2482 | * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, | |
2483 | * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and | |
2484 | * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt | |
2485 | * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 | |
2486 | */ | |
20ca916d | 2487 | |
a230b26e | 2488 | if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) |
0907d710 | 2489 | goto err; |
0f113f3e | 2490 | |
0907d710 MC |
2491 | /* |
2492 | * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of | |
2493 | * the timing-sensitive code below. | |
2494 | */ | |
348240c6 MC |
2495 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ |
2496 | decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster), | |
2497 | PACKET_data(&enc_premaster), | |
2498 | rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); | |
0907d710 MC |
2499 | if (decrypt_len < 0) |
2500 | goto err; | |
20ca916d | 2501 | |
0907d710 | 2502 | /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */ |
5b8fa431 | 2503 | |
0907d710 MC |
2504 | /* |
2505 | * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys | |
2506 | * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures | |
2507 | * PS is at least 8 bytes. | |
2508 | */ | |
2509 | if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { | |
2510 | *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2511 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
0907d710 MC |
2512 | goto err; |
2513 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2514 | |
0907d710 MC |
2515 | padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; |
2516 | decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) & | |
a230b26e | 2517 | constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2); |
0907d710 MC |
2518 | for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) { |
2519 | decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]); | |
2520 | } | |
2521 | decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]); | |
5b8fa431 | 2522 | |
0907d710 MC |
2523 | /* |
2524 | * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then | |
2525 | * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The | |
2526 | * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack | |
2527 | * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number | |
2528 | * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in | |
2529 | * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. | |
2530 | */ | |
2531 | version_good = | |
2532 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], | |
2533 | (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); | |
2534 | version_good &= | |
2535 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], | |
2536 | (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); | |
0f113f3e | 2537 | |
0907d710 MC |
2538 | /* |
2539 | * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the | |
2540 | * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the | |
2541 | * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). | |
2542 | * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol | |
2543 | * version instead if the server does not support the requested | |
2544 | * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such | |
2545 | * clients. | |
2546 | */ | |
2547 | if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { | |
2548 | unsigned char workaround_good; | |
2549 | workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], | |
2550 | (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); | |
2551 | workaround_good &= | |
5b8fa431 | 2552 | constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], |
0907d710 MC |
2553 | (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); |
2554 | version_good |= workaround_good; | |
2555 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2556 | |
0907d710 MC |
2557 | /* |
2558 | * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to | |
2559 | * remain non-zero (0xff). | |
2560 | */ | |
2561 | decrypt_good &= version_good; | |
0f113f3e | 2562 | |
0907d710 MC |
2563 | /* |
2564 | * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using | |
2565 | * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not | |
2566 | * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees | |
2567 | * it is still sufficiently large to read from. | |
2568 | */ | |
2569 | for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { | |
2570 | rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] = | |
2571 | constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, | |
2572 | rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j], | |
2573 | rand_premaster_secret[j]); | |
2574 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2575 | |
0907d710 MC |
2576 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len, |
2577 | sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) { | |
2578 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2579 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2580 | goto err; |
2581 | } | |
0f113f3e | 2582 | |
0907d710 MC |
2583 | ret = 1; |
2584 | err: | |
2585 | OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt); | |
2586 | return ret; | |
2587 | #else | |
2588 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2589 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2590 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
0907d710 MC |
2591 | return 0; |
2592 | #endif | |
2593 | } | |
2594 | ||
642360f9 MC |
2595 | static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
2596 | { | |
2597 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH | |
2598 | EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; | |
2599 | DH *cdh; | |
2600 | unsigned int i; | |
2601 | BIGNUM *pub_key; | |
2602 | const unsigned char *data; | |
2603 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; | |
2604 | int ret = 0; | |
2605 | ||
31a7d80d | 2606 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) { |
642360f9 | 2607 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
c76a4aea | 2608 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, |
642360f9 MC |
2609 | SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); |
2610 | goto err; | |
2611 | } | |
642360f9 MC |
2612 | skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; |
2613 | if (skey == NULL) { | |
2614 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
c76a4aea | 2615 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); |
642360f9 MC |
2616 | goto err; |
2617 | } | |
2618 | ||
2619 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { | |
2620 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
c76a4aea | 2621 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); |
642360f9 MC |
2622 | goto err; |
2623 | } | |
2624 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { | |
2625 | /* We already checked we have enough data */ | |
2626 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2627 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2628 | goto err; |
2629 | } | |
2630 | ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
2631 | if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) { | |
c76a4aea | 2632 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); |
642360f9 MC |
2633 | goto err; |
2634 | } | |
2635 | cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); | |
2636 | pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL); | |
2637 | ||
2638 | if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) { | |
c76a4aea | 2639 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2640 | if (pub_key != NULL) |
2641 | BN_free(pub_key); | |
2642 | goto err; | |
2643 | } | |
2644 | ||
0f1e51ea | 2645 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { |
642360f9 | 2646 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2647 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2648 | goto err; |
2649 | } | |
2650 | ||
2651 | ret = 1; | |
2652 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); | |
2653 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; | |
2654 | err: | |
2655 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); | |
2656 | return ret; | |
2657 | #else | |
2658 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2659 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2660 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
642360f9 MC |
2661 | return 0; |
2662 | #endif | |
2663 | } | |
2664 | ||
19ed1ec1 MC |
2665 | static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
2666 | { | |
2667 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
2668 | EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; | |
2669 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; | |
2670 | int ret = 0; | |
2671 | ||
2672 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { | |
2673 | /* We don't support ECDH client auth */ | |
2674 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
c76a4aea | 2675 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2676 | goto err; |
2677 | } else { | |
2678 | unsigned int i; | |
2679 | const unsigned char *data; | |
2680 | ||
2681 | /* | |
2682 | * Get client's public key from encoded point in the | |
2683 | * ClientKeyExchange message. | |
2684 | */ | |
2685 | ||
2686 | /* Get encoded point length */ | |
fb933982 DSH |
2687 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i) |
2688 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
19ed1ec1 | 2689 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2690 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2691 | goto err; |
2692 | } | |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2693 | ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); |
2694 | if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) { | |
c76a4aea | 2695 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2696 | goto err; |
2697 | } | |
ec24630a | 2698 | if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) { |
fb933982 | 2699 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
c76a4aea | 2700 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2701 | goto err; |
2702 | } | |
2703 | } | |
2704 | ||
0f1e51ea | 2705 | if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { |
19ed1ec1 | 2706 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2707 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2708 | goto err; |
2709 | } | |
2710 | ||
2711 | ret = 1; | |
2712 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); | |
2713 | s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; | |
2714 | err: | |
2715 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); | |
2716 | ||
2717 | return ret; | |
2718 | #else | |
2719 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2720 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2721 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2722 | return 0; |
2723 | #endif | |
2724 | } | |
2725 | ||
c437eef6 MC |
2726 | static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) |
2727 | { | |
2728 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
2729 | unsigned int i; | |
2730 | const unsigned char *data; | |
2731 | ||
2732 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) | |
a230b26e | 2733 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { |
c437eef6 | 2734 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2735 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); |
c437eef6 MC |
2736 | return 0; |
2737 | } | |
2738 | if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) { | |
c76a4aea | 2739 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
c437eef6 MC |
2740 | return 0; |
2741 | } | |
a230b26e | 2742 | if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { |
c437eef6 | 2743 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
c76a4aea | 2744 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); |
c437eef6 MC |
2745 | return 0; |
2746 | } | |
2747 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); | |
2748 | s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); | |
2749 | if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { | |
c76a4aea | 2750 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
c437eef6 MC |
2751 | return 0; |
2752 | } | |
2753 | ||
2754 | if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) { | |
c76a4aea | 2755 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2756 | return 0; |
2757 | } | |
2758 | ||
2759 | return 1; | |
2760 | #else | |
2761 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2762 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2763 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2764 | return 0; |
2765 | #endif | |
2766 | } | |
2767 | ||
2768 | static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) | |
2769 | { | |
2770 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
2771 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; | |
2772 | EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; | |
2773 | unsigned char premaster_secret[32]; | |
2774 | const unsigned char *start; | |
2775 | size_t outlen = 32, inlen; | |
2776 | unsigned long alg_a; | |
2777 | int Ttag, Tclass; | |
2778 | long Tlen; | |
348240c6 | 2779 | size_t sess_key_len; |
c437eef6 MC |
2780 | const unsigned char *data; |
2781 | int ret = 0; | |
2782 | ||
2783 | /* Get our certificate private key */ | |
2784 | alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
2785 | if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) { | |
2786 | /* | |
2787 | * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too | |
2788 | */ | |
2789 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey; | |
2790 | if (pk == NULL) { | |
2791 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey; | |
2792 | } | |
2793 | if (pk == NULL) { | |
2794 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; | |
2795 | } | |
2796 | } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) { | |
2797 | pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; | |
2798 | } | |
2799 | ||
2800 | pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); | |
2801 | if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { | |
2802 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2803 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
c437eef6 MC |
2804 | return 0; |
2805 | } | |
2806 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { | |
2807 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2808 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2809 | return 0; |
2810 | } | |
2811 | /* | |
2812 | * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe | |
2813 | * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from | |
2814 | * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a | |
2815 | * client certificate for authorization only. | |
2816 | */ | |
2817 | client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); | |
2818 | if (client_pub_pkey) { | |
2819 | if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) | |
2820 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
2821 | } | |
2822 | /* Decrypt session key */ | |
2823 | sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); | |
2824 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) { | |
2825 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2826 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2827 | goto err; |
2828 | } | |
348240c6 | 2829 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ |
a230b26e | 2830 | if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag, |
348240c6 | 2831 | &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
a230b26e | 2832 | || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { |
c437eef6 | 2833 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
c76a4aea | 2834 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
c437eef6 MC |
2835 | goto err; |
2836 | } | |
2837 | start = data; | |
2838 | inlen = Tlen; | |
2839 | if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt | |
2840 | (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { | |
2841 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2842 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
c437eef6 MC |
2843 | goto err; |
2844 | } | |
2845 | /* Generate master secret */ | |
2846 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, | |
2847 | sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) { | |
2848 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2849 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2850 | goto err; |
2851 | } | |
2852 | /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ | |
2853 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl | |
2854 | (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) | |
2855 | s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1; | |
2856 | ||
2857 | ret = 1; | |
2858 | err: | |
2859 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); | |
2860 | return ret; | |
2861 | #else | |
2862 | /* Should never happen */ | |
2863 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
c76a4aea | 2864 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
c437eef6 MC |
2865 | return 0; |
2866 | #endif | |
2867 | } | |
2868 | ||
0907d710 MC |
2869 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
2870 | { | |
2871 | int al = -1; | |
2872 | unsigned long alg_k; | |
2873 | ||
2874 | alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
2875 | ||
2876 | /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */ | |
2877 | if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al)) | |
2878 | goto err; | |
2879 | ||
2880 | if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { | |
2881 | /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */ | |
2882 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
2883 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
a230b26e EK |
2884 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2885 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
9059eb71 | 2886 | goto err; |
0907d710 MC |
2887 | } |
2888 | /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */ | |
2889 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) { | |
69f68237 | 2890 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 2891 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
9059eb71 | 2892 | goto err; |
69f68237 | 2893 | } |
0907d710 MC |
2894 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { |
2895 | if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al)) | |
2896 | goto err; | |
642360f9 MC |
2897 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { |
2898 | if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al)) | |
0f113f3e | 2899 | goto err; |
19ed1ec1 MC |
2900 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { |
2901 | if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al)) | |
2902 | goto err; | |
c437eef6 MC |
2903 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { |
2904 | if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al)) | |
0f113f3e | 2905 | goto err; |
c437eef6 MC |
2906 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { |
2907 | if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al)) | |
0f113f3e | 2908 | goto err; |
c437eef6 | 2909 | } else { |
0f113f3e | 2910 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
a230b26e EK |
2911 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
2912 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); | |
9059eb71 | 2913 | goto err; |
0f113f3e MC |
2914 | } |
2915 | ||
e27f234a | 2916 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; |
0f113f3e | 2917 | err: |
0907d710 MC |
2918 | if (al != -1) |
2919 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
85269210 DSH |
2920 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
2921 | OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); | |
2922 | s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; | |
58964a49 | 2923 | #endif |
fe3a3291 | 2924 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a | 2925 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 2926 | } |
d02b48c6 | 2927 | |
be3583fa | 2928 | WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) |
94836de2 | 2929 | { |
94836de2 | 2930 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
c130dd8e MC |
2931 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { |
2932 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
2933 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
2934 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
2935 | /* | |
2936 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP | |
2937 | * used. | |
2938 | */ | |
141eb8c6 MC |
2939 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, |
2940 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
c130dd8e MC |
2941 | |
2942 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, | |
a230b26e EK |
2943 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, |
2944 | sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, | |
2945 | 0) <= 0) { | |
fe3a3291 | 2946 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
c130dd8e MC |
2947 | return WORK_ERROR;; |
2948 | } | |
94836de2 | 2949 | |
c130dd8e MC |
2950 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, |
2951 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
94836de2 | 2952 | } |
c130dd8e MC |
2953 | wst = WORK_MORE_B; |
2954 | } | |
94836de2 | 2955 | |
c130dd8e | 2956 | if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B) |
a230b26e EK |
2957 | /* Is this SCTP? */ |
2958 | && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) | |
2959 | /* Are we renegotiating? */ | |
2960 | && s->renegotiate | |
2961 | /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */ | |
2962 | && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify) | |
2963 | && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { | |
c130dd8e MC |
2964 | s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; |
2965 | s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
2966 | BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); | |
2967 | BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); | |
d99b0691 | 2968 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1); |
c130dd8e MC |
2969 | return WORK_MORE_B; |
2970 | } else { | |
fe3a3291 | 2971 | ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0); |
94836de2 MC |
2972 | } |
2973 | #endif | |
2974 | ||
149c2ef5 | 2975 | if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) { |
a230b26e EK |
2976 | /* |
2977 | * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need | |
2978 | * the handshake_buffer | |
149c2ef5 MC |
2979 | */ |
2980 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { | |
2981 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); | |
2982 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
2983 | } | |
94836de2 | 2984 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; |
28f4580c | 2985 | } else { |
94836de2 MC |
2986 | if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { |
2987 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2988 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
fe3a3291 | 2989 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
94836de2 MC |
2990 | return WORK_ERROR; |
2991 | } | |
2992 | /* | |
2993 | * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support | |
2994 | * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op | |
2995 | */ | |
2996 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { | |
fe3a3291 | 2997 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
94836de2 MC |
2998 | return WORK_ERROR; |
2999 | } | |
94836de2 MC |
3000 | } |
3001 | ||
3002 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
3003 | } | |
3004 | ||
be3583fa | 3005 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3006 | { |
20dbe585 | 3007 | int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
e27f234a MC |
3008 | X509 *x = NULL; |
3009 | unsigned long l, llen; | |
b6981744 | 3010 | const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; |
e27f234a | 3011 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; |
e96e0f8e | 3012 | PACKET spkt, context; |
d805a57b | 3013 | size_t chainidx; |
0f113f3e MC |
3014 | |
3015 | if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { | |
e27f234a MC |
3016 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
3017 | goto f_err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3018 | } |
3019 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
3020 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */ |
3021 | if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)) | |
3022 | || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen) | |
3023 | || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen) | |
3024 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
0f113f3e | 3025 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3026 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
0f113f3e MC |
3027 | goto f_err; |
3028 | } | |
0bc09ecd | 3029 | |
d805a57b | 3030 | for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) { |
0bc09ecd | 3031 | if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l) |
a230b26e | 3032 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) { |
0f113f3e | 3033 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3034 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3035 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
3036 | goto f_err; | |
3037 | } | |
3038 | ||
0bc09ecd MC |
3039 | certstart = certbytes; |
3040 | x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l); | |
0f113f3e | 3041 | if (x == NULL) { |
e27f234a MC |
3042 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
3043 | goto f_err; | |
0f113f3e | 3044 | } |
0bc09ecd | 3045 | if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) { |
0f113f3e | 3046 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
e27f234a | 3047 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3048 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
3049 | goto f_err; | |
3050 | } | |
e96e0f8e MC |
3051 | |
3052 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
3053 | RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; | |
3054 | PACKET extensions; | |
3055 | ||
3056 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) { | |
3057 | al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
3058 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
3059 | goto f_err; | |
3060 | } | |
3061 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, | |
3062 | &rawexts, &al) | |
3063 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, | |
d805a57b | 3064 | rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) |
e96e0f8e MC |
3065 | goto f_err; |
3066 | } | |
3067 | ||
0f113f3e | 3068 | if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { |
e27f234a MC |
3069 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
3070 | goto f_err; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3071 | } |
3072 | x = NULL; | |
0f113f3e MC |
3073 | } |
3074 | ||
3075 | if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { | |
3076 | /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ | |
3077 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
3078 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
e27f234a | 3079 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3080 | SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); |
3081 | goto f_err; | |
3082 | } | |
3083 | /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ | |
3084 | else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && | |
3085 | (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { | |
e27f234a | 3086 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3087 | SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); |
3088 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
3089 | goto f_err; | |
3090 | } | |
3091 | /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ | |
124037fd | 3092 | if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { |
0f113f3e MC |
3093 | goto f_err; |
3094 | } | |
3095 | } else { | |
3096 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; | |
3097 | i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); | |
3098 | if (i <= 0) { | |
3099 | al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); | |
e27f234a | 3100 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3101 | SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); |
3102 | goto f_err; | |
3103 | } | |
3104 | if (i > 1) { | |
e27f234a | 3105 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i); |
0f113f3e MC |
3106 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
3107 | goto f_err; | |
3108 | } | |
8382fd3a | 3109 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0)); |
0f113f3e MC |
3110 | if (pkey == NULL) { |
3111 | al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
e27f234a | 3112 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, |
0f113f3e MC |
3113 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); |
3114 | goto f_err; | |
3115 | } | |
0f113f3e MC |
3116 | } |
3117 | ||
222561fe | 3118 | X509_free(s->session->peer); |
0f113f3e MC |
3119 | s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); |
3120 | s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; | |
3121 | ||
c34b0f99 DSH |
3122 | sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free); |
3123 | s->session->peer_chain = sk; | |
0f1e51ea MC |
3124 | |
3125 | /* | |
3126 | * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE | |
3127 | * message | |
3128 | */ | |
94ed2c67 | 3129 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { |
0f1e51ea MC |
3130 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
3131 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3132 | goto f_err; | |
3133 | } | |
3134 | ||
0f113f3e MC |
3135 | /* |
3136 | * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own | |
d4d78943 | 3137 | * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c |
0f113f3e | 3138 | */ |
0f113f3e | 3139 | sk = NULL; |
2c5dfdc3 MC |
3140 | |
3141 | /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ | |
3142 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
3143 | && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
3144 | sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash), | |
3145 | &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) { | |
3146 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
3147 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3148 | goto f_err; | |
3149 | } | |
3150 | ||
e27f234a | 3151 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
66696478 RS |
3152 | goto done; |
3153 | ||
0f113f3e | 3154 | f_err: |
66696478 | 3155 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
fe3a3291 | 3156 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
66696478 | 3157 | done: |
222561fe RS |
3158 | X509_free(x); |
3159 | sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); | |
e27f234a | 3160 | return ret; |
0f113f3e | 3161 | } |
d02b48c6 | 3162 | |
7cea05dc | 3163 | int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a MC |
3164 | { |
3165 | CERT_PKEY *cpk; | |
e96e0f8e | 3166 | int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
e27f234a MC |
3167 | |
3168 | cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); | |
3169 | if (cpk == NULL) { | |
3170 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
e27f234a MC |
3171 | return 0; |
3172 | } | |
3173 | ||
e96e0f8e MC |
3174 | /* |
3175 | * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context | |
3176 | * for the server Certificate message | |
3177 | */ | |
3178 | if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) | |
3179 | || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &al)) { | |
e27f234a | 3180 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e96e0f8e | 3181 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
e27f234a MC |
3182 | return 0; |
3183 | } | |
3184 | ||
3185 | return 1; | |
3186 | } | |
3187 | ||
7cea05dc | 3188 | int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a MC |
3189 | { |
3190 | unsigned char *senc = NULL; | |
83ae4661 | 3191 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
bf7c6817 | 3192 | HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL; |
a00d75e1 | 3193 | unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2; |
e27f234a | 3194 | const unsigned char *const_p; |
a00d75e1 | 3195 | int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal; |
e27f234a MC |
3196 | SSL_SESSION *sess; |
3197 | unsigned int hlen; | |
3198 | SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; | |
3199 | unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; | |
d139723b KR |
3200 | unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH]; |
3201 | int iv_len; | |
a00d75e1 | 3202 | size_t macoffset, macendoffset; |
e27f234a MC |
3203 | |
3204 | /* get session encoding length */ | |
3205 | slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); | |
3206 | /* | |
3207 | * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too | |
3208 | * long | |
3209 | */ | |
3210 | if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { | |
fe3a3291 | 3211 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a MC |
3212 | return 0; |
3213 | } | |
3214 | senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); | |
a71edf3b | 3215 | if (senc == NULL) { |
fe3a3291 | 3216 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a MC |
3217 | return 0; |
3218 | } | |
0f113f3e | 3219 | |
846ec07d | 3220 | ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); |
bf7c6817 | 3221 | hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); |
83ae4661 MC |
3222 | if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) { |
3223 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
3224 | goto err; | |
3225 | } | |
0f113f3e | 3226 | |
e27f234a MC |
3227 | p = senc; |
3228 | if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) | |
3229 | goto err; | |
687eaf27 | 3230 | |
e27f234a MC |
3231 | /* |
3232 | * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up | |
3233 | */ | |
3234 | const_p = senc; | |
3235 | sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); | |
3236 | if (sess == NULL) | |
3237 | goto err; | |
3238 | sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ | |
0f113f3e | 3239 | |
e27f234a MC |
3240 | slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); |
3241 | if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */ | |
3242 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
3243 | goto err; | |
3244 | } | |
3245 | p = senc; | |
3246 | if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { | |
3247 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
3248 | goto err; | |
3249 | } | |
3250 | SSL_SESSION_free(sess); | |
0f113f3e | 3251 | |
e27f234a MC |
3252 | /* |
3253 | * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does | |
3254 | * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. | |
3255 | */ | |
aff8c126 | 3256 | if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) { |
5c753de6 | 3257 | /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */ |
aff8c126 | 3258 | int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, |
5c753de6 TS |
3259 | hctx, 1); |
3260 | ||
3261 | if (ret == 0) { | |
a00d75e1 MC |
3262 | |
3263 | /* Put timeout and length */ | |
7cea05dc | 3264 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0) |
4a01c59f | 3265 | || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { |
a00d75e1 MC |
3266 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, |
3267 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
5c753de6 | 3268 | goto err; |
a00d75e1 | 3269 | } |
5c753de6 TS |
3270 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
3271 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); | |
3272 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); | |
3273 | return 1; | |
3274 | } | |
3275 | if (ret < 0) | |
e27f234a | 3276 | goto err; |
d139723b | 3277 | iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); |
e27f234a | 3278 | } else { |
d139723b KR |
3279 | const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc(); |
3280 | ||
3281 | iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); | |
3282 | if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0) | |
687eaf27 | 3283 | goto err; |
d139723b | 3284 | if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, |
aff8c126 | 3285 | tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv)) |
687eaf27 | 3286 | goto err; |
aff8c126 RS |
3287 | if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key, |
3288 | sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key), | |
e27f234a | 3289 | EVP_sha256(), NULL)) |
4f9fab6b | 3290 | goto err; |
aff8c126 RS |
3291 | memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name, |
3292 | sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)); | |
0f113f3e MC |
3293 | } |
3294 | ||
e27f234a MC |
3295 | /* |
3296 | * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified | |
3297 | * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for | |
3298 | * new sessions will live as long as their sessions. | |
3299 | */ | |
7cea05dc | 3300 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout) |
a00d75e1 | 3301 | /* Now the actual ticket data */ |
7cea05dc MC |
3302 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) |
3303 | || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset) | |
a00d75e1 | 3304 | /* Output key name */ |
7cea05dc | 3305 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name)) |
a00d75e1 | 3306 | /* output IV */ |
7cea05dc MC |
3307 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len) |
3308 | || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH, | |
a00d75e1 MC |
3309 | &encdata1) |
3310 | /* Encrypt session data */ | |
3311 | || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen) | |
7cea05dc | 3312 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3313 | || encdata1 != encdata2 |
3314 | || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal) | |
7cea05dc | 3315 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3316 | || encdata1 + len != encdata2 |
3317 | || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH | |
7cea05dc | 3318 | || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3319 | || !HMAC_Update(hctx, |
3320 | (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset, | |
3321 | macendoffset - macoffset) | |
7cea05dc | 3322 | || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1) |
a00d75e1 MC |
3323 | || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen) |
3324 | || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE | |
7cea05dc | 3325 | || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2) |
a00d75e1 | 3326 | || macdata1 != macdata2 |
5923ad4b | 3327 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { |
a00d75e1 | 3328 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 3329 | goto err; |
a00d75e1 | 3330 | } |
bcaad809 DSH |
3331 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
3332 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); | |
e27f234a MC |
3333 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
3334 | ||
3335 | return 1; | |
687eaf27 | 3336 | err: |
b548a1f1 | 3337 | OPENSSL_free(senc); |
846ec07d | 3338 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); |
bf7c6817 | 3339 | HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); |
a00d75e1 | 3340 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
e27f234a | 3341 | return 0; |
0f113f3e | 3342 | } |
67c8e7f4 | 3343 | |
f63e4288 MC |
3344 | /* |
3345 | * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to | |
3346 | * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. | |
3347 | */ | |
3348 | int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
e27f234a | 3349 | { |
8cbfcc70 RS |
3350 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type) |
3351 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, | |
3352 | s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) { | |
f63e4288 MC |
3353 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
3354 | return 0; | |
3355 | } | |
3356 | ||
3357 | return 1; | |
3358 | } | |
3359 | ||
3360 | int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
3361 | { | |
3362 | if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { | |
cc59ad10 | 3363 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
cc59ad10 MC |
3364 | return 0; |
3365 | } | |
e27f234a MC |
3366 | |
3367 | return 1; | |
3368 | } | |
3369 | ||
e481f9b9 | 3370 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
e27f234a MC |
3371 | /* |
3372 | * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. | |
3373 | * It sets the next_proto member in s if found | |
3374 | */ | |
be3583fa | 3375 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) |
e27f234a | 3376 | { |
73999b62 | 3377 | PACKET next_proto, padding; |
e27f234a MC |
3378 | size_t next_proto_len; |
3379 | ||
50e735f9 MC |
3380 | /*- |
3381 | * The payload looks like: | |
3382 | * uint8 proto_len; | |
3383 | * uint8 proto[proto_len]; | |
3384 | * uint8 padding_len; | |
3385 | * uint8 padding[padding_len]; | |
3386 | */ | |
73999b62 MC |
3387 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto) |
3388 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding) | |
3389 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { | |
e27f234a | 3390 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
c3fc7eea | 3391 | goto err; |
cf9b0b6f | 3392 | } |
0f113f3e | 3393 | |
aff8c126 RS |
3394 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) { |
3395 | s->ext.npn_len = 0; | |
c3fc7eea MC |
3396 | goto err; |
3397 | } | |
3398 | ||
aff8c126 | 3399 | s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len; |
0f113f3e | 3400 | |
e27f234a | 3401 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; |
a230b26e | 3402 | err: |
fe3a3291 | 3403 | ossl_statem_set_error(s); |
e27f234a | 3404 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; |
0f113f3e | 3405 | } |
6434abbf | 3406 | #endif |
d45ba43d | 3407 | |
e46f2334 MC |
3408 | static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) |
3409 | { | |
3434f40b MC |
3410 | int al; |
3411 | ||
e96e0f8e | 3412 | if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, |
30aeba43 | 3413 | NULL, 0, &al)) { |
3434f40b | 3414 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
e46f2334 | 3415 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
3434f40b | 3416 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
e46f2334 MC |
3417 | return 0; |
3418 | } | |
3419 | ||
3420 | return 1; | |
3421 | } | |
3422 | ||
d45ba43d MC |
3423 | #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3 |
3424 | ||
38a3cbfb EK |
3425 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, |
3426 | PACKET *cipher_suites, | |
d45ba43d | 3427 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp, |
a230b26e | 3428 | int sslv2format, int *al) |
d45ba43d MC |
3429 | { |
3430 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
3431 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; | |
38a3cbfb EK |
3432 | int n; |
3433 | /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */ | |
3434 | unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN]; | |
d45ba43d | 3435 | |
38a3cbfb EK |
3436 | s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; |
3437 | ||
3438 | n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN; | |
3439 | ||
3440 | if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) { | |
3441 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); | |
3442 | *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
3443 | return NULL; | |
d45ba43d | 3444 | } |
38a3cbfb EK |
3445 | |
3446 | if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) { | |
d45ba43d MC |
3447 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, |
3448 | SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); | |
38a3cbfb EK |
3449 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
3450 | return NULL; | |
d45ba43d | 3451 | } |
38a3cbfb | 3452 | |
d45ba43d MC |
3453 | if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) { |
3454 | sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */ | |
e8aa8b6c | 3455 | if (sk == NULL) { |
d45ba43d | 3456 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
38a3cbfb | 3457 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
d45ba43d MC |
3458 | return NULL; |
3459 | } | |
3460 | } else { | |
3461 | sk = *skp; | |
3462 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk); | |
3463 | } | |
3464 | ||
38a3cbfb EK |
3465 | if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw, |
3466 | &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) { | |
3467 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
d45ba43d MC |
3468 | goto err; |
3469 | } | |
d45ba43d | 3470 | |
38a3cbfb EK |
3471 | while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) { |
3472 | /* | |
20218b58 EK |
3473 | * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the |
3474 | * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero | |
3475 | * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them. | |
38a3cbfb EK |
3476 | */ |
3477 | if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0') | |
a230b26e | 3478 | continue; |
38a3cbfb | 3479 | |
d45ba43d | 3480 | /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */ |
38a3cbfb EK |
3481 | if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && |
3482 | (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) { | |
d45ba43d MC |
3483 | /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */ |
3484 | if (s->renegotiate) { | |
3485 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, | |
3486 | SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); | |
38a3cbfb | 3487 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
d45ba43d MC |
3488 | goto err; |
3489 | } | |
3490 | s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; | |
d45ba43d MC |
3491 | continue; |
3492 | } | |
3493 | ||
3494 | /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */ | |
38a3cbfb EK |
3495 | if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && |
3496 | (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) { | |
d45ba43d MC |
3497 | /* |
3498 | * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher | |
3499 | * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected | |
3500 | * downgrade. | |
3501 | */ | |
4fa52141 | 3502 | if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) { |
d45ba43d MC |
3503 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, |
3504 | SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); | |
38a3cbfb | 3505 | *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK; |
d45ba43d MC |
3506 | goto err; |
3507 | } | |
d45ba43d MC |
3508 | continue; |
3509 | } | |
3510 | ||
38a3cbfb EK |
3511 | /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */ |
3512 | c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher); | |
d45ba43d MC |
3513 | if (c != NULL) { |
3514 | if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) { | |
3515 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
38a3cbfb | 3516 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
d45ba43d MC |
3517 | goto err; |
3518 | } | |
3519 | } | |
3520 | } | |
38a3cbfb EK |
3521 | if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) { |
3522 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
3523 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3524 | goto err; | |
3525 | } | |
d45ba43d MC |
3526 | |
3527 | if (skp != NULL) | |
3528 | *skp = sk; | |
3529 | return (sk); | |
3530 | err: | |
3531 | if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) | |
3532 | sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); | |
38a3cbfb | 3533 | return NULL; |
d45ba43d | 3534 | } |