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1 | /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ | |
2 | ||
3 | #include <errno.h> | |
4 | #include <fcntl.h> | |
5 | #include <poll.h> | |
6 | #include <sys/eventfd.h> | |
7 | #include <sys/ioctl.h> | |
8 | #include <sys/mman.h> | |
9 | #include <sys/mount.h> | |
10 | #include <sys/personality.h> | |
11 | #include <sys/prctl.h> | |
12 | #include <sys/shm.h> | |
13 | #include <sys/types.h> | |
14 | #include <sys/un.h> | |
15 | #include <unistd.h> | |
16 | #include <utmpx.h> | |
17 | ||
18 | #if HAVE_PAM | |
19 | #include <security/pam_appl.h> | |
20 | #endif | |
21 | ||
22 | #if HAVE_SELINUX | |
23 | #include <selinux/selinux.h> | |
24 | #endif | |
25 | ||
26 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP | |
27 | #include <seccomp.h> | |
28 | #endif | |
29 | ||
30 | #if HAVE_APPARMOR | |
31 | #include <sys/apparmor.h> | |
32 | #endif | |
33 | ||
34 | #include "sd-messages.h" | |
35 | ||
36 | #include "acl-util.h" | |
37 | #include "af-list.h" | |
38 | #include "alloc-util.h" | |
39 | #if HAVE_APPARMOR | |
40 | #include "apparmor-util.h" | |
41 | #endif | |
42 | #include "argv-util.h" | |
43 | #include "async.h" | |
44 | #include "barrier.h" | |
45 | #include "bpf-lsm.h" | |
46 | #include "cap-list.h" | |
47 | #include "capability-util.h" | |
48 | #include "cgroup-setup.h" | |
49 | #include "chase.h" | |
50 | #include "chown-recursive.h" | |
51 | #include "constants.h" | |
52 | #include "cpu-set-util.h" | |
53 | #include "creds-util.h" | |
54 | #include "data-fd-util.h" | |
55 | #include "env-file.h" | |
56 | #include "env-util.h" | |
57 | #include "errno-list.h" | |
58 | #include "escape.h" | |
59 | #include "execute.h" | |
60 | #include "exit-status.h" | |
61 | #include "fd-util.h" | |
62 | #include "fileio.h" | |
63 | #include "format-util.h" | |
64 | #include "glob-util.h" | |
65 | #include "hexdecoct.h" | |
66 | #include "io-util.h" | |
67 | #include "ioprio-util.h" | |
68 | #include "label.h" | |
69 | #include "log.h" | |
70 | #include "macro.h" | |
71 | #include "manager.h" | |
72 | #include "manager-dump.h" | |
73 | #include "memory-util.h" | |
74 | #include "missing_fs.h" | |
75 | #include "missing_ioprio.h" | |
76 | #include "missing_prctl.h" | |
77 | #include "mkdir-label.h" | |
78 | #include "mount-util.h" | |
79 | #include "mountpoint-util.h" | |
80 | #include "namespace.h" | |
81 | #include "parse-util.h" | |
82 | #include "path-util.h" | |
83 | #include "proc-cmdline.h" | |
84 | #include "process-util.h" | |
85 | #include "psi-util.h" | |
86 | #include "random-util.h" | |
87 | #include "recurse-dir.h" | |
88 | #include "rlimit-util.h" | |
89 | #include "rm-rf.h" | |
90 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP | |
91 | #include "seccomp-util.h" | |
92 | #endif | |
93 | #include "securebits-util.h" | |
94 | #include "selinux-util.h" | |
95 | #include "signal-util.h" | |
96 | #include "smack-util.h" | |
97 | #include "socket-util.h" | |
98 | #include "sort-util.h" | |
99 | #include "special.h" | |
100 | #include "stat-util.h" | |
101 | #include "string-table.h" | |
102 | #include "string-util.h" | |
103 | #include "strv.h" | |
104 | #include "syslog-util.h" | |
105 | #include "terminal-util.h" | |
106 | #include "tmpfile-util.h" | |
107 | #include "umask-util.h" | |
108 | #include "unit-serialize.h" | |
109 | #include "user-util.h" | |
110 | #include "utmp-wtmp.h" | |
111 | ||
112 | #define IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC (5*USEC_PER_SEC) | |
113 | #define IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC (1*USEC_PER_SEC) | |
114 | ||
115 | #define SNDBUF_SIZE (8*1024*1024) | |
116 | ||
117 | static int shift_fds(int fds[], size_t n_fds) { | |
118 | if (n_fds <= 0) | |
119 | return 0; | |
120 | ||
121 | /* Modifies the fds array! (sorts it) */ | |
122 | ||
123 | assert(fds); | |
124 | ||
125 | for (int start = 0;;) { | |
126 | int restart_from = -1; | |
127 | ||
128 | for (int i = start; i < (int) n_fds; i++) { | |
129 | int nfd; | |
130 | ||
131 | /* Already at right index? */ | |
132 | if (fds[i] == i+3) | |
133 | continue; | |
134 | ||
135 | nfd = fcntl(fds[i], F_DUPFD, i + 3); | |
136 | if (nfd < 0) | |
137 | return -errno; | |
138 | ||
139 | safe_close(fds[i]); | |
140 | fds[i] = nfd; | |
141 | ||
142 | /* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then | |
143 | * let's remember that and try again from here */ | |
144 | if (nfd != i+3 && restart_from < 0) | |
145 | restart_from = i; | |
146 | } | |
147 | ||
148 | if (restart_from < 0) | |
149 | break; | |
150 | ||
151 | start = restart_from; | |
152 | } | |
153 | ||
154 | return 0; | |
155 | } | |
156 | ||
157 | static int flags_fds( | |
158 | const int fds[], | |
159 | size_t n_socket_fds, | |
160 | size_t n_fds, | |
161 | bool nonblock) { | |
162 | ||
163 | int r; | |
164 | ||
165 | if (n_fds <= 0) | |
166 | return 0; | |
167 | ||
168 | assert(fds); | |
169 | ||
170 | /* Drops/Sets O_NONBLOCK and FD_CLOEXEC from the file flags. | |
171 | * O_NONBLOCK only applies to socket activation though. */ | |
172 | ||
173 | for (size_t i = 0; i < n_fds; i++) { | |
174 | ||
175 | if (i < n_socket_fds) { | |
176 | r = fd_nonblock(fds[i], nonblock); | |
177 | if (r < 0) | |
178 | return r; | |
179 | } | |
180 | ||
181 | /* We unconditionally drop FD_CLOEXEC from the fds, | |
182 | * since after all we want to pass these fds to our | |
183 | * children */ | |
184 | ||
185 | r = fd_cloexec(fds[i], false); | |
186 | if (r < 0) | |
187 | return r; | |
188 | } | |
189 | ||
190 | return 0; | |
191 | } | |
192 | ||
193 | static const char *exec_context_tty_path(const ExecContext *context) { | |
194 | assert(context); | |
195 | ||
196 | if (context->stdio_as_fds) | |
197 | return NULL; | |
198 | ||
199 | if (context->tty_path) | |
200 | return context->tty_path; | |
201 | ||
202 | return "/dev/console"; | |
203 | } | |
204 | ||
205 | static int exec_context_tty_size(const ExecContext *context, unsigned *ret_rows, unsigned *ret_cols) { | |
206 | _cleanup_free_ char *rowskey = NULL, *rowsvalue = NULL, *colskey = NULL, *colsvalue = NULL; | |
207 | unsigned rows, cols; | |
208 | const char *tty; | |
209 | int r; | |
210 | ||
211 | assert(context); | |
212 | assert(ret_rows); | |
213 | assert(ret_cols); | |
214 | ||
215 | rows = context->tty_rows; | |
216 | cols = context->tty_cols; | |
217 | ||
218 | tty = exec_context_tty_path(context); | |
219 | if (!tty || (rows != UINT_MAX && cols != UINT_MAX)) { | |
220 | *ret_rows = rows; | |
221 | *ret_cols = cols; | |
222 | return 0; | |
223 | } | |
224 | ||
225 | tty = skip_dev_prefix(tty); | |
226 | if (!in_charset(tty, ALPHANUMERICAL)) { | |
227 | log_debug("%s contains non-alphanumeric characters, ignoring", tty); | |
228 | *ret_rows = rows; | |
229 | *ret_cols = cols; | |
230 | return 0; | |
231 | } | |
232 | ||
233 | rowskey = strjoin("systemd.tty.rows.", tty); | |
234 | if (!rowskey) | |
235 | return -ENOMEM; | |
236 | ||
237 | colskey = strjoin("systemd.tty.columns.", tty); | |
238 | if (!colskey) | |
239 | return -ENOMEM; | |
240 | ||
241 | r = proc_cmdline_get_key_many(/* flags = */ 0, | |
242 | rowskey, &rowsvalue, | |
243 | colskey, &colsvalue); | |
244 | if (r < 0) | |
245 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to read TTY size of %s from kernel cmdline, ignoring: %m", tty); | |
246 | ||
247 | if (rows == UINT_MAX && rowsvalue) { | |
248 | r = safe_atou(rowsvalue, &rows); | |
249 | if (r < 0) | |
250 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s=%s, ignoring: %m", rowskey, rowsvalue); | |
251 | } | |
252 | ||
253 | if (cols == UINT_MAX && colsvalue) { | |
254 | r = safe_atou(colsvalue, &cols); | |
255 | if (r < 0) | |
256 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s=%s, ignoring: %m", colskey, colsvalue); | |
257 | } | |
258 | ||
259 | *ret_rows = rows; | |
260 | *ret_cols = cols; | |
261 | ||
262 | return 0; | |
263 | } | |
264 | ||
265 | static void exec_context_tty_reset(const ExecContext *context, const ExecParameters *p) { | |
266 | const char *path; | |
267 | ||
268 | assert(context); | |
269 | ||
270 | path = exec_context_tty_path(context); | |
271 | ||
272 | if (context->tty_vhangup) { | |
273 | if (p && p->stdin_fd >= 0) | |
274 | (void) terminal_vhangup_fd(p->stdin_fd); | |
275 | else if (path) | |
276 | (void) terminal_vhangup(path); | |
277 | } | |
278 | ||
279 | if (context->tty_reset) { | |
280 | if (p && p->stdin_fd >= 0) | |
281 | (void) reset_terminal_fd(p->stdin_fd, true); | |
282 | else if (path) | |
283 | (void) reset_terminal(path); | |
284 | } | |
285 | ||
286 | if (p && p->stdin_fd >= 0) { | |
287 | unsigned rows = context->tty_rows, cols = context->tty_cols; | |
288 | ||
289 | (void) exec_context_tty_size(context, &rows, &cols); | |
290 | (void) terminal_set_size_fd(p->stdin_fd, path, rows, cols); | |
291 | } | |
292 | ||
293 | if (context->tty_vt_disallocate && path) | |
294 | (void) vt_disallocate(path); | |
295 | } | |
296 | ||
297 | static bool is_terminal_input(ExecInput i) { | |
298 | return IN_SET(i, | |
299 | EXEC_INPUT_TTY, | |
300 | EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE, | |
301 | EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL); | |
302 | } | |
303 | ||
304 | static bool is_terminal_output(ExecOutput o) { | |
305 | return IN_SET(o, | |
306 | EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY, | |
307 | EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE, | |
308 | EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE); | |
309 | } | |
310 | ||
311 | static bool is_kmsg_output(ExecOutput o) { | |
312 | return IN_SET(o, | |
313 | EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG, | |
314 | EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE); | |
315 | } | |
316 | ||
317 | static bool exec_context_needs_term(const ExecContext *c) { | |
318 | assert(c); | |
319 | ||
320 | /* Return true if the execution context suggests we should set $TERM to something useful. */ | |
321 | ||
322 | if (is_terminal_input(c->std_input)) | |
323 | return true; | |
324 | ||
325 | if (is_terminal_output(c->std_output)) | |
326 | return true; | |
327 | ||
328 | if (is_terminal_output(c->std_error)) | |
329 | return true; | |
330 | ||
331 | return !!c->tty_path; | |
332 | } | |
333 | ||
334 | static int open_null_as(int flags, int nfd) { | |
335 | int fd; | |
336 | ||
337 | assert(nfd >= 0); | |
338 | ||
339 | fd = open("/dev/null", flags|O_NOCTTY); | |
340 | if (fd < 0) | |
341 | return -errno; | |
342 | ||
343 | return move_fd(fd, nfd, false); | |
344 | } | |
345 | ||
346 | static int connect_journal_socket( | |
347 | int fd, | |
348 | const char *log_namespace, | |
349 | uid_t uid, | |
350 | gid_t gid) { | |
351 | ||
352 | uid_t olduid = UID_INVALID; | |
353 | gid_t oldgid = GID_INVALID; | |
354 | const char *j; | |
355 | int r; | |
356 | ||
357 | j = log_namespace ? | |
358 | strjoina("/run/systemd/journal.", log_namespace, "/stdout") : | |
359 | "/run/systemd/journal/stdout"; | |
360 | ||
361 | if (gid_is_valid(gid)) { | |
362 | oldgid = getgid(); | |
363 | ||
364 | if (setegid(gid) < 0) | |
365 | return -errno; | |
366 | } | |
367 | ||
368 | if (uid_is_valid(uid)) { | |
369 | olduid = getuid(); | |
370 | ||
371 | if (seteuid(uid) < 0) { | |
372 | r = -errno; | |
373 | goto restore_gid; | |
374 | } | |
375 | } | |
376 | ||
377 | r = connect_unix_path(fd, AT_FDCWD, j); | |
378 | ||
379 | /* If we fail to restore the uid or gid, things will likely fail later on. This should only happen if | |
380 | an LSM interferes. */ | |
381 | ||
382 | if (uid_is_valid(uid)) | |
383 | (void) seteuid(olduid); | |
384 | ||
385 | restore_gid: | |
386 | if (gid_is_valid(gid)) | |
387 | (void) setegid(oldgid); | |
388 | ||
389 | return r; | |
390 | } | |
391 | ||
392 | static int connect_logger_as( | |
393 | const Unit *unit, | |
394 | const ExecContext *context, | |
395 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
396 | ExecOutput output, | |
397 | const char *ident, | |
398 | int nfd, | |
399 | uid_t uid, | |
400 | gid_t gid) { | |
401 | ||
402 | _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; | |
403 | int r; | |
404 | ||
405 | assert(context); | |
406 | assert(params); | |
407 | assert(output < _EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX); | |
408 | assert(ident); | |
409 | assert(nfd >= 0); | |
410 | ||
411 | fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); | |
412 | if (fd < 0) | |
413 | return -errno; | |
414 | ||
415 | r = connect_journal_socket(fd, context->log_namespace, uid, gid); | |
416 | if (r < 0) | |
417 | return r; | |
418 | ||
419 | if (shutdown(fd, SHUT_RD) < 0) | |
420 | return -errno; | |
421 | ||
422 | (void) fd_inc_sndbuf(fd, SNDBUF_SIZE); | |
423 | ||
424 | if (dprintf(fd, | |
425 | "%s\n" | |
426 | "%s\n" | |
427 | "%i\n" | |
428 | "%i\n" | |
429 | "%i\n" | |
430 | "%i\n" | |
431 | "%i\n", | |
432 | context->syslog_identifier ?: ident, | |
433 | params->flags & EXEC_PASS_LOG_UNIT ? unit->id : "", | |
434 | context->syslog_priority, | |
435 | !!context->syslog_level_prefix, | |
436 | false, | |
437 | is_kmsg_output(output), | |
438 | is_terminal_output(output)) < 0) | |
439 | return -errno; | |
440 | ||
441 | return move_fd(TAKE_FD(fd), nfd, false); | |
442 | } | |
443 | ||
444 | static int open_terminal_as(const char *path, int flags, int nfd) { | |
445 | int fd; | |
446 | ||
447 | assert(path); | |
448 | assert(nfd >= 0); | |
449 | ||
450 | fd = open_terminal(path, flags | O_NOCTTY); | |
451 | if (fd < 0) | |
452 | return fd; | |
453 | ||
454 | return move_fd(fd, nfd, false); | |
455 | } | |
456 | ||
457 | static int acquire_path(const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode) { | |
458 | _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; | |
459 | int r; | |
460 | ||
461 | assert(path); | |
462 | ||
463 | if (IN_SET(flags & O_ACCMODE, O_WRONLY, O_RDWR)) | |
464 | flags |= O_CREAT; | |
465 | ||
466 | fd = open(path, flags|O_NOCTTY, mode); | |
467 | if (fd >= 0) | |
468 | return TAKE_FD(fd); | |
469 | ||
470 | if (errno != ENXIO) /* ENXIO is returned when we try to open() an AF_UNIX file system socket on Linux */ | |
471 | return -errno; | |
472 | ||
473 | /* So, it appears the specified path could be an AF_UNIX socket. Let's see if we can connect to it. */ | |
474 | ||
475 | fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); | |
476 | if (fd < 0) | |
477 | return -errno; | |
478 | ||
479 | r = connect_unix_path(fd, AT_FDCWD, path); | |
480 | if (IN_SET(r, -ENOTSOCK, -EINVAL)) | |
481 | /* Propagate initial error if we get ENOTSOCK or EINVAL, i.e. we have indication that this | |
482 | * wasn't an AF_UNIX socket after all */ | |
483 | return -ENXIO; | |
484 | if (r < 0) | |
485 | return r; | |
486 | ||
487 | if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) | |
488 | r = shutdown(fd, SHUT_WR); | |
489 | else if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY) | |
490 | r = shutdown(fd, SHUT_RD); | |
491 | else | |
492 | r = 0; | |
493 | if (r < 0) | |
494 | return -errno; | |
495 | ||
496 | return TAKE_FD(fd); | |
497 | } | |
498 | ||
499 | static int fixup_input( | |
500 | const ExecContext *context, | |
501 | int socket_fd, | |
502 | bool apply_tty_stdin) { | |
503 | ||
504 | ExecInput std_input; | |
505 | ||
506 | assert(context); | |
507 | ||
508 | std_input = context->std_input; | |
509 | ||
510 | if (is_terminal_input(std_input) && !apply_tty_stdin) | |
511 | return EXEC_INPUT_NULL; | |
512 | ||
513 | if (std_input == EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET && socket_fd < 0) | |
514 | return EXEC_INPUT_NULL; | |
515 | ||
516 | if (std_input == EXEC_INPUT_DATA && context->stdin_data_size == 0) | |
517 | return EXEC_INPUT_NULL; | |
518 | ||
519 | return std_input; | |
520 | } | |
521 | ||
522 | static int fixup_output(ExecOutput output, int socket_fd) { | |
523 | ||
524 | if (output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET && socket_fd < 0) | |
525 | return EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT; | |
526 | ||
527 | return output; | |
528 | } | |
529 | ||
530 | static int setup_input( | |
531 | const ExecContext *context, | |
532 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
533 | int socket_fd, | |
534 | const int named_iofds[static 3]) { | |
535 | ||
536 | ExecInput i; | |
537 | int r; | |
538 | ||
539 | assert(context); | |
540 | assert(params); | |
541 | assert(named_iofds); | |
542 | ||
543 | if (params->stdin_fd >= 0) { | |
544 | if (dup2(params->stdin_fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0) | |
545 | return -errno; | |
546 | ||
547 | /* Try to make this the controlling tty, if it is a tty, and reset it */ | |
548 | if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) { | |
549 | unsigned rows = context->tty_rows, cols = context->tty_cols; | |
550 | ||
551 | (void) exec_context_tty_size(context, &rows, &cols); | |
552 | (void) ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, TIOCSCTTY, context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE); | |
553 | (void) reset_terminal_fd(STDIN_FILENO, true); | |
554 | (void) terminal_set_size_fd(STDIN_FILENO, NULL, rows, cols); | |
555 | } | |
556 | ||
557 | return STDIN_FILENO; | |
558 | } | |
559 | ||
560 | i = fixup_input(context, socket_fd, params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN); | |
561 | ||
562 | switch (i) { | |
563 | ||
564 | case EXEC_INPUT_NULL: | |
565 | return open_null_as(O_RDONLY, STDIN_FILENO); | |
566 | ||
567 | case EXEC_INPUT_TTY: | |
568 | case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE: | |
569 | case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL: { | |
570 | unsigned rows, cols; | |
571 | int fd; | |
572 | ||
573 | fd = acquire_terminal(exec_context_tty_path(context), | |
574 | i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL ? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_TRY : | |
575 | i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE ? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_FORCE : | |
576 | ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT, | |
577 | USEC_INFINITY); | |
578 | if (fd < 0) | |
579 | return fd; | |
580 | ||
581 | r = exec_context_tty_size(context, &rows, &cols); | |
582 | if (r < 0) | |
583 | return r; | |
584 | ||
585 | r = terminal_set_size_fd(fd, exec_context_tty_path(context), rows, cols); | |
586 | if (r < 0) | |
587 | return r; | |
588 | ||
589 | return move_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO, false); | |
590 | } | |
591 | ||
592 | case EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET: | |
593 | assert(socket_fd >= 0); | |
594 | ||
595 | return RET_NERRNO(dup2(socket_fd, STDIN_FILENO)); | |
596 | ||
597 | case EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD: | |
598 | assert(named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO] >= 0); | |
599 | ||
600 | (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO], false); | |
601 | return RET_NERRNO(dup2(named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO], STDIN_FILENO)); | |
602 | ||
603 | case EXEC_INPUT_DATA: { | |
604 | int fd; | |
605 | ||
606 | fd = acquire_data_fd(context->stdin_data, context->stdin_data_size, 0); | |
607 | if (fd < 0) | |
608 | return fd; | |
609 | ||
610 | return move_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO, false); | |
611 | } | |
612 | ||
613 | case EXEC_INPUT_FILE: { | |
614 | bool rw; | |
615 | int fd; | |
616 | ||
617 | assert(context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO]); | |
618 | ||
619 | rw = (context->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE && streq_ptr(context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO], context->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO])) || | |
620 | (context->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE && streq_ptr(context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO], context->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO])); | |
621 | ||
622 | fd = acquire_path(context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO], rw ? O_RDWR : O_RDONLY, 0666 & ~context->umask); | |
623 | if (fd < 0) | |
624 | return fd; | |
625 | ||
626 | return move_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO, false); | |
627 | } | |
628 | ||
629 | default: | |
630 | assert_not_reached(); | |
631 | } | |
632 | } | |
633 | ||
634 | static bool can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout( | |
635 | const ExecContext *context, | |
636 | ExecOutput o, | |
637 | ExecOutput e) { | |
638 | ||
639 | assert(context); | |
640 | ||
641 | /* Returns true, if given the specified STDERR and STDOUT output we can directly dup() the stdout fd to the | |
642 | * stderr fd */ | |
643 | ||
644 | if (e == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT) | |
645 | return true; | |
646 | if (e != o) | |
647 | return false; | |
648 | ||
649 | if (e == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) | |
650 | return streq_ptr(context->stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO], context->stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO]); | |
651 | ||
652 | if (IN_SET(e, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE)) | |
653 | return streq_ptr(context->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO], context->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO]); | |
654 | ||
655 | return true; | |
656 | } | |
657 | ||
658 | static int setup_output( | |
659 | const Unit *unit, | |
660 | const ExecContext *context, | |
661 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
662 | int fileno, | |
663 | int socket_fd, | |
664 | const int named_iofds[static 3], | |
665 | const char *ident, | |
666 | uid_t uid, | |
667 | gid_t gid, | |
668 | dev_t *journal_stream_dev, | |
669 | ino_t *journal_stream_ino) { | |
670 | ||
671 | ExecOutput o; | |
672 | ExecInput i; | |
673 | int r; | |
674 | ||
675 | assert(unit); | |
676 | assert(context); | |
677 | assert(params); | |
678 | assert(ident); | |
679 | assert(journal_stream_dev); | |
680 | assert(journal_stream_ino); | |
681 | ||
682 | if (fileno == STDOUT_FILENO && params->stdout_fd >= 0) { | |
683 | ||
684 | if (dup2(params->stdout_fd, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0) | |
685 | return -errno; | |
686 | ||
687 | return STDOUT_FILENO; | |
688 | } | |
689 | ||
690 | if (fileno == STDERR_FILENO && params->stderr_fd >= 0) { | |
691 | if (dup2(params->stderr_fd, STDERR_FILENO) < 0) | |
692 | return -errno; | |
693 | ||
694 | return STDERR_FILENO; | |
695 | } | |
696 | ||
697 | i = fixup_input(context, socket_fd, params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN); | |
698 | o = fixup_output(context->std_output, socket_fd); | |
699 | ||
700 | if (fileno == STDERR_FILENO) { | |
701 | ExecOutput e; | |
702 | e = fixup_output(context->std_error, socket_fd); | |
703 | ||
704 | /* This expects the input and output are already set up */ | |
705 | ||
706 | /* Don't change the stderr file descriptor if we inherit all | |
707 | * the way and are not on a tty */ | |
708 | if (e == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT && | |
709 | o == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT && | |
710 | i == EXEC_INPUT_NULL && | |
711 | !is_terminal_input(context->std_input) && | |
712 | getppid() != 1) | |
713 | return fileno; | |
714 | ||
715 | /* Duplicate from stdout if possible */ | |
716 | if (can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout(context, o, e)) | |
717 | return RET_NERRNO(dup2(STDOUT_FILENO, fileno)); | |
718 | ||
719 | o = e; | |
720 | ||
721 | } else if (o == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT) { | |
722 | /* If input got downgraded, inherit the original value */ | |
723 | if (i == EXEC_INPUT_NULL && is_terminal_input(context->std_input)) | |
724 | return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context), O_WRONLY, fileno); | |
725 | ||
726 | /* If the input is connected to anything that's not a /dev/null or a data fd, inherit that... */ | |
727 | if (!IN_SET(i, EXEC_INPUT_NULL, EXEC_INPUT_DATA)) | |
728 | return RET_NERRNO(dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno)); | |
729 | ||
730 | /* If we are not started from PID 1 we just inherit STDOUT from our parent process. */ | |
731 | if (getppid() != 1) | |
732 | return fileno; | |
733 | ||
734 | /* We need to open /dev/null here anew, to get the right access mode. */ | |
735 | return open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno); | |
736 | } | |
737 | ||
738 | switch (o) { | |
739 | ||
740 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL: | |
741 | return open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno); | |
742 | ||
743 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY: | |
744 | if (is_terminal_input(i)) | |
745 | return RET_NERRNO(dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno)); | |
746 | ||
747 | /* We don't reset the terminal if this is just about output */ | |
748 | return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context), O_WRONLY, fileno); | |
749 | ||
750 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG: | |
751 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE: | |
752 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL: | |
753 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE: | |
754 | r = connect_logger_as(unit, context, params, o, ident, fileno, uid, gid); | |
755 | if (r < 0) { | |
756 | log_unit_warning_errno(unit, r, "Failed to connect %s to the journal socket, ignoring: %m", | |
757 | fileno == STDOUT_FILENO ? "stdout" : "stderr"); | |
758 | r = open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno); | |
759 | } else { | |
760 | struct stat st; | |
761 | ||
762 | /* If we connected this fd to the journal via a stream, patch the device/inode into the passed | |
763 | * parameters, but only then. This is useful so that we can set $JOURNAL_STREAM that permits | |
764 | * services to detect whether they are connected to the journal or not. | |
765 | * | |
766 | * If both stdout and stderr are connected to a stream then let's make sure to store the data | |
767 | * about STDERR as that's usually the best way to do logging. */ | |
768 | ||
769 | if (fstat(fileno, &st) >= 0 && | |
770 | (*journal_stream_ino == 0 || fileno == STDERR_FILENO)) { | |
771 | *journal_stream_dev = st.st_dev; | |
772 | *journal_stream_ino = st.st_ino; | |
773 | } | |
774 | } | |
775 | return r; | |
776 | ||
777 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET: | |
778 | assert(socket_fd >= 0); | |
779 | ||
780 | return RET_NERRNO(dup2(socket_fd, fileno)); | |
781 | ||
782 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD: | |
783 | assert(named_iofds[fileno] >= 0); | |
784 | ||
785 | (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds[fileno], false); | |
786 | return RET_NERRNO(dup2(named_iofds[fileno], fileno)); | |
787 | ||
788 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE: | |
789 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND: | |
790 | case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE: { | |
791 | bool rw; | |
792 | int fd, flags; | |
793 | ||
794 | assert(context->stdio_file[fileno]); | |
795 | ||
796 | rw = context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_FILE && | |
797 | streq_ptr(context->stdio_file[fileno], context->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO]); | |
798 | ||
799 | if (rw) | |
800 | return RET_NERRNO(dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno)); | |
801 | ||
802 | flags = O_WRONLY; | |
803 | if (o == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND) | |
804 | flags |= O_APPEND; | |
805 | else if (o == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE) | |
806 | flags |= O_TRUNC; | |
807 | ||
808 | fd = acquire_path(context->stdio_file[fileno], flags, 0666 & ~context->umask); | |
809 | if (fd < 0) | |
810 | return fd; | |
811 | ||
812 | return move_fd(fd, fileno, 0); | |
813 | } | |
814 | ||
815 | default: | |
816 | assert_not_reached(); | |
817 | } | |
818 | } | |
819 | ||
820 | static int chown_terminal(int fd, uid_t uid) { | |
821 | int r; | |
822 | ||
823 | assert(fd >= 0); | |
824 | ||
825 | /* Before we chown/chmod the TTY, let's ensure this is actually a tty */ | |
826 | if (isatty(fd) < 1) { | |
827 | if (IN_SET(errno, EINVAL, ENOTTY)) | |
828 | return 0; /* not a tty */ | |
829 | ||
830 | return -errno; | |
831 | } | |
832 | ||
833 | /* This might fail. What matters are the results. */ | |
834 | r = fchmod_and_chown(fd, TTY_MODE, uid, GID_INVALID); | |
835 | if (r < 0) | |
836 | return r; | |
837 | ||
838 | return 1; | |
839 | } | |
840 | ||
841 | static int setup_confirm_stdio( | |
842 | const ExecContext *context, | |
843 | const char *vc, | |
844 | int *ret_saved_stdin, | |
845 | int *ret_saved_stdout) { | |
846 | ||
847 | _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF, saved_stdin = -EBADF, saved_stdout = -EBADF; | |
848 | unsigned rows, cols; | |
849 | int r; | |
850 | ||
851 | assert(ret_saved_stdin); | |
852 | assert(ret_saved_stdout); | |
853 | ||
854 | saved_stdin = fcntl(STDIN_FILENO, F_DUPFD, 3); | |
855 | if (saved_stdin < 0) | |
856 | return -errno; | |
857 | ||
858 | saved_stdout = fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO, F_DUPFD, 3); | |
859 | if (saved_stdout < 0) | |
860 | return -errno; | |
861 | ||
862 | fd = acquire_terminal(vc, ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT, DEFAULT_CONFIRM_USEC); | |
863 | if (fd < 0) | |
864 | return fd; | |
865 | ||
866 | r = chown_terminal(fd, getuid()); | |
867 | if (r < 0) | |
868 | return r; | |
869 | ||
870 | r = reset_terminal_fd(fd, true); | |
871 | if (r < 0) | |
872 | return r; | |
873 | ||
874 | r = exec_context_tty_size(context, &rows, &cols); | |
875 | if (r < 0) | |
876 | return r; | |
877 | ||
878 | r = terminal_set_size_fd(fd, vc, rows, cols); | |
879 | if (r < 0) | |
880 | return r; | |
881 | ||
882 | r = rearrange_stdio(fd, fd, STDERR_FILENO); /* Invalidates 'fd' also on failure */ | |
883 | TAKE_FD(fd); | |
884 | if (r < 0) | |
885 | return r; | |
886 | ||
887 | *ret_saved_stdin = TAKE_FD(saved_stdin); | |
888 | *ret_saved_stdout = TAKE_FD(saved_stdout); | |
889 | return 0; | |
890 | } | |
891 | ||
892 | static void write_confirm_error_fd(int err, int fd, const Unit *u) { | |
893 | assert(err < 0); | |
894 | ||
895 | if (err == -ETIMEDOUT) | |
896 | dprintf(fd, "Confirmation question timed out for %s, assuming positive response.\n", u->id); | |
897 | else { | |
898 | errno = -err; | |
899 | dprintf(fd, "Couldn't ask confirmation for %s: %m, assuming positive response.\n", u->id); | |
900 | } | |
901 | } | |
902 | ||
903 | static void write_confirm_error(int err, const char *vc, const Unit *u) { | |
904 | _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; | |
905 | ||
906 | assert(vc); | |
907 | ||
908 | fd = open_terminal(vc, O_WRONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC); | |
909 | if (fd < 0) | |
910 | return; | |
911 | ||
912 | write_confirm_error_fd(err, fd, u); | |
913 | } | |
914 | ||
915 | static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin, int *saved_stdout) { | |
916 | int r = 0; | |
917 | ||
918 | assert(saved_stdin); | |
919 | assert(saved_stdout); | |
920 | ||
921 | release_terminal(); | |
922 | ||
923 | if (*saved_stdin >= 0) | |
924 | if (dup2(*saved_stdin, STDIN_FILENO) < 0) | |
925 | r = -errno; | |
926 | ||
927 | if (*saved_stdout >= 0) | |
928 | if (dup2(*saved_stdout, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0) | |
929 | r = -errno; | |
930 | ||
931 | *saved_stdin = safe_close(*saved_stdin); | |
932 | *saved_stdout = safe_close(*saved_stdout); | |
933 | ||
934 | return r; | |
935 | } | |
936 | ||
937 | enum { | |
938 | CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE = -1, | |
939 | CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS = 0, | |
940 | CONFIRM_EXECUTE = 1, | |
941 | }; | |
942 | ||
943 | static int ask_for_confirmation(const ExecContext *context, const char *vc, Unit *u, const char *cmdline) { | |
944 | int saved_stdout = -1, saved_stdin = -1, r; | |
945 | _cleanup_free_ char *e = NULL; | |
946 | char c; | |
947 | ||
948 | /* For any internal errors, assume a positive response. */ | |
949 | r = setup_confirm_stdio(context, vc, &saved_stdin, &saved_stdout); | |
950 | if (r < 0) { | |
951 | write_confirm_error(r, vc, u); | |
952 | return CONFIRM_EXECUTE; | |
953 | } | |
954 | ||
955 | /* confirm_spawn might have been disabled while we were sleeping. */ | |
956 | if (manager_is_confirm_spawn_disabled(u->manager)) { | |
957 | r = 1; | |
958 | goto restore_stdio; | |
959 | } | |
960 | ||
961 | e = ellipsize(cmdline, 60, 100); | |
962 | if (!e) { | |
963 | log_oom(); | |
964 | r = CONFIRM_EXECUTE; | |
965 | goto restore_stdio; | |
966 | } | |
967 | ||
968 | for (;;) { | |
969 | r = ask_char(&c, "yfshiDjcn", "Execute %s? [y, f, s – h for help] ", e); | |
970 | if (r < 0) { | |
971 | write_confirm_error_fd(r, STDOUT_FILENO, u); | |
972 | r = CONFIRM_EXECUTE; | |
973 | goto restore_stdio; | |
974 | } | |
975 | ||
976 | switch (c) { | |
977 | case 'c': | |
978 | printf("Resuming normal execution.\n"); | |
979 | manager_disable_confirm_spawn(); | |
980 | r = 1; | |
981 | break; | |
982 | case 'D': | |
983 | unit_dump(u, stdout, " "); | |
984 | continue; /* ask again */ | |
985 | case 'f': | |
986 | printf("Failing execution.\n"); | |
987 | r = CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE; | |
988 | break; | |
989 | case 'h': | |
990 | printf(" c - continue, proceed without asking anymore\n" | |
991 | " D - dump, show the state of the unit\n" | |
992 | " f - fail, don't execute the command and pretend it failed\n" | |
993 | " h - help\n" | |
994 | " i - info, show a short summary of the unit\n" | |
995 | " j - jobs, show jobs that are in progress\n" | |
996 | " s - skip, don't execute the command and pretend it succeeded\n" | |
997 | " y - yes, execute the command\n"); | |
998 | continue; /* ask again */ | |
999 | case 'i': | |
1000 | printf(" Description: %s\n" | |
1001 | " Unit: %s\n" | |
1002 | " Command: %s\n", | |
1003 | u->id, u->description, cmdline); | |
1004 | continue; /* ask again */ | |
1005 | case 'j': | |
1006 | manager_dump_jobs(u->manager, stdout, /* patterns= */ NULL, " "); | |
1007 | continue; /* ask again */ | |
1008 | case 'n': | |
1009 | /* 'n' was removed in favor of 'f'. */ | |
1010 | printf("Didn't understand 'n', did you mean 'f'?\n"); | |
1011 | continue; /* ask again */ | |
1012 | case 's': | |
1013 | printf("Skipping execution.\n"); | |
1014 | r = CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS; | |
1015 | break; | |
1016 | case 'y': | |
1017 | r = CONFIRM_EXECUTE; | |
1018 | break; | |
1019 | default: | |
1020 | assert_not_reached(); | |
1021 | } | |
1022 | break; | |
1023 | } | |
1024 | ||
1025 | restore_stdio: | |
1026 | restore_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin, &saved_stdout); | |
1027 | return r; | |
1028 | } | |
1029 | ||
1030 | static int get_fixed_user(const ExecContext *c, const char **user, | |
1031 | uid_t *uid, gid_t *gid, | |
1032 | const char **home, const char **shell) { | |
1033 | int r; | |
1034 | const char *name; | |
1035 | ||
1036 | assert(c); | |
1037 | ||
1038 | if (!c->user) | |
1039 | return 0; | |
1040 | ||
1041 | /* Note that we don't set $HOME or $SHELL if they are not particularly enlightening anyway | |
1042 | * (i.e. are "/" or "/bin/nologin"). */ | |
1043 | ||
1044 | name = c->user; | |
1045 | r = get_user_creds(&name, uid, gid, home, shell, USER_CREDS_CLEAN); | |
1046 | if (r < 0) | |
1047 | return r; | |
1048 | ||
1049 | *user = name; | |
1050 | return 0; | |
1051 | } | |
1052 | ||
1053 | static int get_fixed_group(const ExecContext *c, const char **group, gid_t *gid) { | |
1054 | int r; | |
1055 | const char *name; | |
1056 | ||
1057 | assert(c); | |
1058 | ||
1059 | if (!c->group) | |
1060 | return 0; | |
1061 | ||
1062 | name = c->group; | |
1063 | r = get_group_creds(&name, gid, 0); | |
1064 | if (r < 0) | |
1065 | return r; | |
1066 | ||
1067 | *group = name; | |
1068 | return 0; | |
1069 | } | |
1070 | ||
1071 | static int get_supplementary_groups(const ExecContext *c, const char *user, | |
1072 | const char *group, gid_t gid, | |
1073 | gid_t **supplementary_gids, int *ngids) { | |
1074 | int r, k = 0; | |
1075 | int ngroups_max; | |
1076 | bool keep_groups = false; | |
1077 | gid_t *groups = NULL; | |
1078 | _cleanup_free_ gid_t *l_gids = NULL; | |
1079 | ||
1080 | assert(c); | |
1081 | ||
1082 | /* | |
1083 | * If user is given, then lookup GID and supplementary groups list. | |
1084 | * We avoid NSS lookups for gid=0. Also we have to initialize groups | |
1085 | * here and as early as possible so we keep the list of supplementary | |
1086 | * groups of the caller. | |
1087 | */ | |
1088 | if (user && gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != 0) { | |
1089 | /* First step, initialize groups from /etc/groups */ | |
1090 | if (initgroups(user, gid) < 0) | |
1091 | return -errno; | |
1092 | ||
1093 | keep_groups = true; | |
1094 | } | |
1095 | ||
1096 | if (strv_isempty(c->supplementary_groups)) | |
1097 | return 0; | |
1098 | ||
1099 | /* | |
1100 | * If SupplementaryGroups= was passed then NGROUPS_MAX has to | |
1101 | * be positive, otherwise fail. | |
1102 | */ | |
1103 | errno = 0; | |
1104 | ngroups_max = (int) sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX); | |
1105 | if (ngroups_max <= 0) | |
1106 | return errno_or_else(EOPNOTSUPP); | |
1107 | ||
1108 | l_gids = new(gid_t, ngroups_max); | |
1109 | if (!l_gids) | |
1110 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1111 | ||
1112 | if (keep_groups) { | |
1113 | /* | |
1114 | * Lookup the list of groups that the user belongs to, we | |
1115 | * avoid NSS lookups here too for gid=0. | |
1116 | */ | |
1117 | k = ngroups_max; | |
1118 | if (getgrouplist(user, gid, l_gids, &k) < 0) | |
1119 | return -EINVAL; | |
1120 | } else | |
1121 | k = 0; | |
1122 | ||
1123 | STRV_FOREACH(i, c->supplementary_groups) { | |
1124 | const char *g; | |
1125 | ||
1126 | if (k >= ngroups_max) | |
1127 | return -E2BIG; | |
1128 | ||
1129 | g = *i; | |
1130 | r = get_group_creds(&g, l_gids+k, 0); | |
1131 | if (r < 0) | |
1132 | return r; | |
1133 | ||
1134 | k++; | |
1135 | } | |
1136 | ||
1137 | /* | |
1138 | * Sets ngids to zero to drop all supplementary groups, happens | |
1139 | * when we are under root and SupplementaryGroups= is empty. | |
1140 | */ | |
1141 | if (k == 0) { | |
1142 | *ngids = 0; | |
1143 | return 0; | |
1144 | } | |
1145 | ||
1146 | /* Otherwise get the final list of supplementary groups */ | |
1147 | groups = memdup(l_gids, sizeof(gid_t) * k); | |
1148 | if (!groups) | |
1149 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1150 | ||
1151 | *supplementary_gids = groups; | |
1152 | *ngids = k; | |
1153 | ||
1154 | groups = NULL; | |
1155 | ||
1156 | return 0; | |
1157 | } | |
1158 | ||
1159 | static int enforce_groups(gid_t gid, const gid_t *supplementary_gids, int ngids) { | |
1160 | int r; | |
1161 | ||
1162 | /* Handle SupplementaryGroups= if it is not empty */ | |
1163 | if (ngids > 0) { | |
1164 | r = maybe_setgroups(ngids, supplementary_gids); | |
1165 | if (r < 0) | |
1166 | return r; | |
1167 | } | |
1168 | ||
1169 | if (gid_is_valid(gid)) { | |
1170 | /* Then set our gids */ | |
1171 | if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) < 0) | |
1172 | return -errno; | |
1173 | } | |
1174 | ||
1175 | return 0; | |
1176 | } | |
1177 | ||
1178 | static int set_securebits(unsigned bits, unsigned mask) { | |
1179 | unsigned applied; | |
1180 | int current; | |
1181 | ||
1182 | current = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS); | |
1183 | if (current < 0) | |
1184 | return -errno; | |
1185 | ||
1186 | /* Clear all securebits defined in mask and set bits */ | |
1187 | applied = ((unsigned) current & ~mask) | bits; | |
1188 | if ((unsigned) current == applied) | |
1189 | return 0; | |
1190 | ||
1191 | if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, applied) < 0) | |
1192 | return -errno; | |
1193 | ||
1194 | return 1; | |
1195 | } | |
1196 | ||
1197 | static int enforce_user( | |
1198 | const ExecContext *context, | |
1199 | uid_t uid, | |
1200 | uint64_t capability_ambient_set) { | |
1201 | assert(context); | |
1202 | int r; | |
1203 | ||
1204 | if (!uid_is_valid(uid)) | |
1205 | return 0; | |
1206 | ||
1207 | /* Sets (but doesn't look up) the UIS and makes sure we keep the capabilities while doing so. For | |
1208 | * setting secure bits the capability CAP_SETPCAP is required, so we also need keep-caps in this | |
1209 | * case. */ | |
1210 | ||
1211 | if ((capability_ambient_set != 0 || context->secure_bits != 0) && uid != 0) { | |
1212 | ||
1213 | /* First step: If we need to keep capabilities but drop privileges we need to make sure we | |
1214 | * keep our caps, while we drop privileges. Add KEEP_CAPS to the securebits */ | |
1215 | r = set_securebits(1U << SECURE_KEEP_CAPS, 0); | |
1216 | if (r < 0) | |
1217 | return r; | |
1218 | } | |
1219 | ||
1220 | /* Second step: actually set the uids */ | |
1221 | if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0) | |
1222 | return -errno; | |
1223 | ||
1224 | /* At this point we should have all necessary capabilities but are otherwise a normal user. However, | |
1225 | * the caps might got corrupted due to the setresuid() so we need clean them up later. This is done | |
1226 | * outside of this call. */ | |
1227 | return 0; | |
1228 | } | |
1229 | ||
1230 | #if HAVE_PAM | |
1231 | ||
1232 | static int null_conv( | |
1233 | int num_msg, | |
1234 | const struct pam_message **msg, | |
1235 | struct pam_response **resp, | |
1236 | void *appdata_ptr) { | |
1237 | ||
1238 | /* We don't support conversations */ | |
1239 | ||
1240 | return PAM_CONV_ERR; | |
1241 | } | |
1242 | ||
1243 | #endif | |
1244 | ||
1245 | static int setup_pam( | |
1246 | const char *name, | |
1247 | const char *user, | |
1248 | uid_t uid, | |
1249 | gid_t gid, | |
1250 | const char *tty, | |
1251 | char ***env, /* updated on success */ | |
1252 | const int fds[], size_t n_fds) { | |
1253 | ||
1254 | #if HAVE_PAM | |
1255 | ||
1256 | static const struct pam_conv conv = { | |
1257 | .conv = null_conv, | |
1258 | .appdata_ptr = NULL | |
1259 | }; | |
1260 | ||
1261 | _cleanup_(barrier_destroy) Barrier barrier = BARRIER_NULL; | |
1262 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **e = NULL; | |
1263 | pam_handle_t *handle = NULL; | |
1264 | sigset_t old_ss; | |
1265 | int pam_code = PAM_SUCCESS, r; | |
1266 | bool close_session = false; | |
1267 | pid_t pam_pid = 0, parent_pid; | |
1268 | int flags = 0; | |
1269 | ||
1270 | assert(name); | |
1271 | assert(user); | |
1272 | assert(env); | |
1273 | ||
1274 | /* We set up PAM in the parent process, then fork. The child | |
1275 | * will then stay around until killed via PR_GET_PDEATHSIG or | |
1276 | * systemd via the cgroup logic. It will then remove the PAM | |
1277 | * session again. The parent process will exec() the actual | |
1278 | * daemon. We do things this way to ensure that the main PID | |
1279 | * of the daemon is the one we initially fork()ed. */ | |
1280 | ||
1281 | r = barrier_create(&barrier); | |
1282 | if (r < 0) | |
1283 | goto fail; | |
1284 | ||
1285 | if (log_get_max_level() < LOG_DEBUG) | |
1286 | flags |= PAM_SILENT; | |
1287 | ||
1288 | pam_code = pam_start(name, user, &conv, &handle); | |
1289 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) { | |
1290 | handle = NULL; | |
1291 | goto fail; | |
1292 | } | |
1293 | ||
1294 | if (!tty) { | |
1295 | _cleanup_free_ char *q = NULL; | |
1296 | ||
1297 | /* Hmm, so no TTY was explicitly passed, but an fd passed to us directly might be a TTY. Let's figure | |
1298 | * out if that's the case, and read the TTY off it. */ | |
1299 | ||
1300 | if (getttyname_malloc(STDIN_FILENO, &q) >= 0) | |
1301 | tty = strjoina("/dev/", q); | |
1302 | } | |
1303 | ||
1304 | if (tty) { | |
1305 | pam_code = pam_set_item(handle, PAM_TTY, tty); | |
1306 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) | |
1307 | goto fail; | |
1308 | } | |
1309 | ||
1310 | STRV_FOREACH(nv, *env) { | |
1311 | pam_code = pam_putenv(handle, *nv); | |
1312 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) | |
1313 | goto fail; | |
1314 | } | |
1315 | ||
1316 | pam_code = pam_acct_mgmt(handle, flags); | |
1317 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) | |
1318 | goto fail; | |
1319 | ||
1320 | pam_code = pam_setcred(handle, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED | flags); | |
1321 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) | |
1322 | log_debug("pam_setcred() failed, ignoring: %s", pam_strerror(handle, pam_code)); | |
1323 | ||
1324 | pam_code = pam_open_session(handle, flags); | |
1325 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) | |
1326 | goto fail; | |
1327 | ||
1328 | close_session = true; | |
1329 | ||
1330 | e = pam_getenvlist(handle); | |
1331 | if (!e) { | |
1332 | pam_code = PAM_BUF_ERR; | |
1333 | goto fail; | |
1334 | } | |
1335 | ||
1336 | /* Block SIGTERM, so that we know that it won't get lost in the child */ | |
1337 | ||
1338 | assert_se(sigprocmask_many(SIG_BLOCK, &old_ss, SIGTERM, -1) >= 0); | |
1339 | ||
1340 | parent_pid = getpid_cached(); | |
1341 | ||
1342 | r = safe_fork("(sd-pam)", 0, &pam_pid); | |
1343 | if (r < 0) | |
1344 | goto fail; | |
1345 | if (r == 0) { | |
1346 | int sig, ret = EXIT_PAM; | |
1347 | ||
1348 | /* The child's job is to reset the PAM session on termination */ | |
1349 | barrier_set_role(&barrier, BARRIER_CHILD); | |
1350 | ||
1351 | /* Make sure we don't keep open the passed fds in this child. We assume that otherwise only | |
1352 | * those fds are open here that have been opened by PAM. */ | |
1353 | (void) close_many(fds, n_fds); | |
1354 | ||
1355 | /* Drop privileges - we don't need any to pam_close_session and this will make | |
1356 | * PR_SET_PDEATHSIG work in most cases. If this fails, ignore the error - but expect sd-pam | |
1357 | * threads to fail to exit normally */ | |
1358 | ||
1359 | r = maybe_setgroups(0, NULL); | |
1360 | if (r < 0) | |
1361 | log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to setgroups() in sd-pam: %m"); | |
1362 | if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) < 0) | |
1363 | log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to setresgid() in sd-pam: %m"); | |
1364 | if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0) | |
1365 | log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %m"); | |
1366 | ||
1367 | (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE); | |
1368 | ||
1369 | /* Wait until our parent died. This will only work if the above setresuid() succeeds, | |
1370 | * otherwise the kernel will not allow unprivileged parents kill their privileged children | |
1371 | * this way. We rely on the control groups kill logic to do the rest for us. */ | |
1372 | if (prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGTERM) < 0) | |
1373 | goto child_finish; | |
1374 | ||
1375 | /* Tell the parent that our setup is done. This is especially important regarding dropping | |
1376 | * privileges. Otherwise, unit setup might race against our setresuid(2) call. | |
1377 | * | |
1378 | * If the parent aborted, we'll detect this below, hence ignore return failure here. */ | |
1379 | (void) barrier_place(&barrier); | |
1380 | ||
1381 | /* Check if our parent process might already have died? */ | |
1382 | if (getppid() == parent_pid) { | |
1383 | sigset_t ss; | |
1384 | ||
1385 | assert_se(sigemptyset(&ss) >= 0); | |
1386 | assert_se(sigaddset(&ss, SIGTERM) >= 0); | |
1387 | ||
1388 | for (;;) { | |
1389 | if (sigwait(&ss, &sig) < 0) { | |
1390 | if (errno == EINTR) | |
1391 | continue; | |
1392 | ||
1393 | goto child_finish; | |
1394 | } | |
1395 | ||
1396 | assert(sig == SIGTERM); | |
1397 | break; | |
1398 | } | |
1399 | } | |
1400 | ||
1401 | pam_code = pam_setcred(handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED | flags); | |
1402 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) | |
1403 | goto child_finish; | |
1404 | ||
1405 | /* If our parent died we'll end the session */ | |
1406 | if (getppid() != parent_pid) { | |
1407 | pam_code = pam_close_session(handle, flags); | |
1408 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) | |
1409 | goto child_finish; | |
1410 | } | |
1411 | ||
1412 | ret = 0; | |
1413 | ||
1414 | child_finish: | |
1415 | /* NB: pam_end() when called in child processes should set PAM_DATA_SILENT to let the module | |
1416 | * know about this. See pam_end(3) */ | |
1417 | (void) pam_end(handle, pam_code | flags | PAM_DATA_SILENT); | |
1418 | _exit(ret); | |
1419 | } | |
1420 | ||
1421 | barrier_set_role(&barrier, BARRIER_PARENT); | |
1422 | ||
1423 | /* If the child was forked off successfully it will do all the cleanups, so forget about the handle | |
1424 | * here. */ | |
1425 | handle = NULL; | |
1426 | ||
1427 | /* Unblock SIGTERM again in the parent */ | |
1428 | assert_se(sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &old_ss, NULL) >= 0); | |
1429 | ||
1430 | /* We close the log explicitly here, since the PAM modules might have opened it, but we don't want | |
1431 | * this fd around. */ | |
1432 | closelog(); | |
1433 | ||
1434 | /* Synchronously wait for the child to initialize. We don't care for errors as we cannot | |
1435 | * recover. However, warn loudly if it happens. */ | |
1436 | if (!barrier_place_and_sync(&barrier)) | |
1437 | log_error("PAM initialization failed"); | |
1438 | ||
1439 | return strv_free_and_replace(*env, e); | |
1440 | ||
1441 | fail: | |
1442 | if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) { | |
1443 | log_error("PAM failed: %s", pam_strerror(handle, pam_code)); | |
1444 | r = -EPERM; /* PAM errors do not map to errno */ | |
1445 | } else | |
1446 | log_error_errno(r, "PAM failed: %m"); | |
1447 | ||
1448 | if (handle) { | |
1449 | if (close_session) | |
1450 | pam_code = pam_close_session(handle, flags); | |
1451 | ||
1452 | (void) pam_end(handle, pam_code | flags); | |
1453 | } | |
1454 | ||
1455 | closelog(); | |
1456 | return r; | |
1457 | #else | |
1458 | return 0; | |
1459 | #endif | |
1460 | } | |
1461 | ||
1462 | static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path) { | |
1463 | _cleanup_free_ char *buf = NULL; | |
1464 | const char *p; | |
1465 | ||
1466 | assert(path); | |
1467 | ||
1468 | /* This resulting string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length of "/sbin/init") to look pretty in | |
1469 | * /bin/ps */ | |
1470 | ||
1471 | if (path_extract_filename(path, &buf) < 0) { | |
1472 | rename_process("(...)"); | |
1473 | return; | |
1474 | } | |
1475 | ||
1476 | size_t l = strlen(buf); | |
1477 | if (l > 8) { | |
1478 | /* The end of the process name is usually more interesting, since the first bit might just be | |
1479 | * "systemd-" */ | |
1480 | p = buf + l - 8; | |
1481 | l = 8; | |
1482 | } else | |
1483 | p = buf; | |
1484 | ||
1485 | char process_name[11]; | |
1486 | process_name[0] = '('; | |
1487 | memcpy(process_name+1, p, l); | |
1488 | process_name[1+l] = ')'; | |
1489 | process_name[1+l+1] = 0; | |
1490 | ||
1491 | rename_process(process_name); | |
1492 | } | |
1493 | ||
1494 | static bool context_has_address_families(const ExecContext *c) { | |
1495 | assert(c); | |
1496 | ||
1497 | return c->address_families_allow_list || | |
1498 | !set_isempty(c->address_families); | |
1499 | } | |
1500 | ||
1501 | static bool context_has_syscall_filters(const ExecContext *c) { | |
1502 | assert(c); | |
1503 | ||
1504 | return c->syscall_allow_list || | |
1505 | !hashmap_isempty(c->syscall_filter); | |
1506 | } | |
1507 | ||
1508 | static bool context_has_syscall_logs(const ExecContext *c) { | |
1509 | assert(c); | |
1510 | ||
1511 | return c->syscall_log_allow_list || | |
1512 | !hashmap_isempty(c->syscall_log); | |
1513 | } | |
1514 | ||
1515 | static bool context_has_no_new_privileges(const ExecContext *c) { | |
1516 | assert(c); | |
1517 | ||
1518 | if (c->no_new_privileges) | |
1519 | return true; | |
1520 | ||
1521 | if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) > 0) /* if we are privileged, we don't need NNP */ | |
1522 | return false; | |
1523 | ||
1524 | /* We need NNP if we have any form of seccomp and are unprivileged */ | |
1525 | return c->lock_personality || | |
1526 | c->memory_deny_write_execute || | |
1527 | c->private_devices || | |
1528 | c->protect_clock || | |
1529 | c->protect_hostname || | |
1530 | c->protect_kernel_tunables || | |
1531 | c->protect_kernel_modules || | |
1532 | c->protect_kernel_logs || | |
1533 | context_has_address_families(c) || | |
1534 | exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c) || | |
1535 | c->restrict_realtime || | |
1536 | c->restrict_suid_sgid || | |
1537 | !set_isempty(c->syscall_archs) || | |
1538 | context_has_syscall_filters(c) || | |
1539 | context_has_syscall_logs(c); | |
1540 | } | |
1541 | ||
1542 | static bool exec_context_has_credentials(const ExecContext *context) { | |
1543 | ||
1544 | assert(context); | |
1545 | ||
1546 | return !hashmap_isempty(context->set_credentials) || | |
1547 | !hashmap_isempty(context->load_credentials); | |
1548 | } | |
1549 | ||
1550 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP | |
1551 | ||
1552 | static bool skip_seccomp_unavailable(const Unit* u, const char* msg) { | |
1553 | ||
1554 | if (is_seccomp_available()) | |
1555 | return false; | |
1556 | ||
1557 | log_unit_debug(u, "SECCOMP features not detected in the kernel, skipping %s", msg); | |
1558 | return true; | |
1559 | } | |
1560 | ||
1561 | static int apply_syscall_filter(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c, bool needs_ambient_hack) { | |
1562 | uint32_t negative_action, default_action, action; | |
1563 | int r; | |
1564 | ||
1565 | assert(u); | |
1566 | assert(c); | |
1567 | ||
1568 | if (!context_has_syscall_filters(c)) | |
1569 | return 0; | |
1570 | ||
1571 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "SystemCallFilter=")) | |
1572 | return 0; | |
1573 | ||
1574 | negative_action = c->syscall_errno == SECCOMP_ERROR_NUMBER_KILL ? scmp_act_kill_process() : SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c->syscall_errno); | |
1575 | ||
1576 | if (c->syscall_allow_list) { | |
1577 | default_action = negative_action; | |
1578 | action = SCMP_ACT_ALLOW; | |
1579 | } else { | |
1580 | default_action = SCMP_ACT_ALLOW; | |
1581 | action = negative_action; | |
1582 | } | |
1583 | ||
1584 | if (needs_ambient_hack) { | |
1585 | r = seccomp_filter_set_add(c->syscall_filter, c->syscall_allow_list, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SETUID); | |
1586 | if (r < 0) | |
1587 | return r; | |
1588 | } | |
1589 | ||
1590 | return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(default_action, c->syscall_filter, action, false); | |
1591 | } | |
1592 | ||
1593 | static int apply_syscall_log(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { | |
1594 | #ifdef SCMP_ACT_LOG | |
1595 | uint32_t default_action, action; | |
1596 | #endif | |
1597 | ||
1598 | assert(u); | |
1599 | assert(c); | |
1600 | ||
1601 | if (!context_has_syscall_logs(c)) | |
1602 | return 0; | |
1603 | ||
1604 | #ifdef SCMP_ACT_LOG | |
1605 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "SystemCallLog=")) | |
1606 | return 0; | |
1607 | ||
1608 | if (c->syscall_log_allow_list) { | |
1609 | /* Log nothing but the ones listed */ | |
1610 | default_action = SCMP_ACT_ALLOW; | |
1611 | action = SCMP_ACT_LOG; | |
1612 | } else { | |
1613 | /* Log everything but the ones listed */ | |
1614 | default_action = SCMP_ACT_LOG; | |
1615 | action = SCMP_ACT_ALLOW; | |
1616 | } | |
1617 | ||
1618 | return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(default_action, c->syscall_log, action, false); | |
1619 | #else | |
1620 | /* old libseccomp */ | |
1621 | log_unit_debug(u, "SECCOMP feature SCMP_ACT_LOG not available, skipping SystemCallLog="); | |
1622 | return 0; | |
1623 | #endif | |
1624 | } | |
1625 | ||
1626 | static int apply_syscall_archs(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { | |
1627 | assert(u); | |
1628 | assert(c); | |
1629 | ||
1630 | if (set_isempty(c->syscall_archs)) | |
1631 | return 0; | |
1632 | ||
1633 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "SystemCallArchitectures=")) | |
1634 | return 0; | |
1635 | ||
1636 | return seccomp_restrict_archs(c->syscall_archs); | |
1637 | } | |
1638 | ||
1639 | static int apply_address_families(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { | |
1640 | assert(u); | |
1641 | assert(c); | |
1642 | ||
1643 | if (!context_has_address_families(c)) | |
1644 | return 0; | |
1645 | ||
1646 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "RestrictAddressFamilies=")) | |
1647 | return 0; | |
1648 | ||
1649 | return seccomp_restrict_address_families(c->address_families, c->address_families_allow_list); | |
1650 | } | |
1651 | ||
1652 | static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { | |
1653 | int r; | |
1654 | ||
1655 | assert(u); | |
1656 | assert(c); | |
1657 | ||
1658 | if (!c->memory_deny_write_execute) | |
1659 | return 0; | |
1660 | ||
1661 | /* use prctl() if kernel supports it (6.3) */ | |
1662 | r = prctl(PR_SET_MDWE, PR_MDWE_REFUSE_EXEC_GAIN, 0, 0, 0); | |
1663 | if (r == 0) { | |
1664 | log_unit_debug(u, "Enabled MemoryDenyWriteExecute= with PR_SET_MDWE"); | |
1665 | return 0; | |
1666 | } | |
1667 | if (r < 0 && errno != EINVAL) | |
1668 | return log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Failed to enable MemoryDenyWriteExecute= with PR_SET_MDWE: %m"); | |
1669 | /* else use seccomp */ | |
1670 | log_unit_debug(u, "Kernel doesn't support PR_SET_MDWE: falling back to seccomp"); | |
1671 | ||
1672 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "MemoryDenyWriteExecute=")) | |
1673 | return 0; | |
1674 | ||
1675 | return seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute(); | |
1676 | } | |
1677 | ||
1678 | static int apply_restrict_realtime(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { | |
1679 | assert(u); | |
1680 | assert(c); | |
1681 | ||
1682 | if (!c->restrict_realtime) | |
1683 | return 0; | |
1684 | ||
1685 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "RestrictRealtime=")) | |
1686 | return 0; | |
1687 | ||
1688 | return seccomp_restrict_realtime(); | |
1689 | } | |
1690 | ||
1691 | static int apply_restrict_suid_sgid(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { | |
1692 | assert(u); | |
1693 | assert(c); | |
1694 | ||
1695 | if (!c->restrict_suid_sgid) | |
1696 | return 0; | |
1697 | ||
1698 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "RestrictSUIDSGID=")) | |
1699 | return 0; | |
1700 | ||
1701 | return seccomp_restrict_suid_sgid(); | |
1702 | } | |
1703 | ||
1704 | static int apply_protect_sysctl(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { | |
1705 | assert(u); | |
1706 | assert(c); | |
1707 | ||
1708 | /* Turn off the legacy sysctl() system call. Many distributions turn this off while building the kernel, but | |
1709 | * let's protect even those systems where this is left on in the kernel. */ | |
1710 | ||
1711 | if (!c->protect_kernel_tunables) | |
1712 | return 0; | |
1713 | ||
1714 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectKernelTunables=")) | |
1715 | return 0; | |
1716 | ||
1717 | return seccomp_protect_sysctl(); | |
1718 | } | |
1719 | ||
1720 | static int apply_protect_kernel_modules(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { | |
1721 | assert(u); | |
1722 | assert(c); | |
1723 | ||
1724 | /* Turn off module syscalls on ProtectKernelModules=yes */ | |
1725 | ||
1726 | if (!c->protect_kernel_modules) | |
1727 | return 0; | |
1728 | ||
1729 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectKernelModules=")) | |
1730 | return 0; | |
1731 | ||
1732 | return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), false); | |
1733 | } | |
1734 | ||
1735 | static int apply_protect_kernel_logs(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { | |
1736 | assert(u); | |
1737 | assert(c); | |
1738 | ||
1739 | if (!c->protect_kernel_logs) | |
1740 | return 0; | |
1741 | ||
1742 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectKernelLogs=")) | |
1743 | return 0; | |
1744 | ||
1745 | return seccomp_protect_syslog(); | |
1746 | } | |
1747 | ||
1748 | static int apply_protect_clock(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { | |
1749 | assert(u); | |
1750 | assert(c); | |
1751 | ||
1752 | if (!c->protect_clock) | |
1753 | return 0; | |
1754 | ||
1755 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectClock=")) | |
1756 | return 0; | |
1757 | ||
1758 | return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CLOCK, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), false); | |
1759 | } | |
1760 | ||
1761 | static int apply_private_devices(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { | |
1762 | assert(u); | |
1763 | assert(c); | |
1764 | ||
1765 | /* If PrivateDevices= is set, also turn off iopl and all @raw-io syscalls. */ | |
1766 | ||
1767 | if (!c->private_devices) | |
1768 | return 0; | |
1769 | ||
1770 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "PrivateDevices=")) | |
1771 | return 0; | |
1772 | ||
1773 | return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), false); | |
1774 | } | |
1775 | ||
1776 | static int apply_restrict_namespaces(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { | |
1777 | assert(u); | |
1778 | assert(c); | |
1779 | ||
1780 | if (!exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c)) | |
1781 | return 0; | |
1782 | ||
1783 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "RestrictNamespaces=")) | |
1784 | return 0; | |
1785 | ||
1786 | return seccomp_restrict_namespaces(c->restrict_namespaces); | |
1787 | } | |
1788 | ||
1789 | static int apply_lock_personality(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) { | |
1790 | unsigned long personality; | |
1791 | int r; | |
1792 | ||
1793 | assert(u); | |
1794 | assert(c); | |
1795 | ||
1796 | if (!c->lock_personality) | |
1797 | return 0; | |
1798 | ||
1799 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "LockPersonality=")) | |
1800 | return 0; | |
1801 | ||
1802 | personality = c->personality; | |
1803 | ||
1804 | /* If personality is not specified, use either PER_LINUX or PER_LINUX32 depending on what is currently set. */ | |
1805 | if (personality == PERSONALITY_INVALID) { | |
1806 | ||
1807 | r = opinionated_personality(&personality); | |
1808 | if (r < 0) | |
1809 | return r; | |
1810 | } | |
1811 | ||
1812 | return seccomp_lock_personality(personality); | |
1813 | } | |
1814 | ||
1815 | #endif | |
1816 | ||
1817 | #if HAVE_LIBBPF | |
1818 | static int apply_restrict_filesystems(Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) { | |
1819 | assert(u); | |
1820 | assert(c); | |
1821 | ||
1822 | if (!exec_context_restrict_filesystems_set(c)) | |
1823 | return 0; | |
1824 | ||
1825 | if (!u->manager->restrict_fs) { | |
1826 | /* LSM BPF is unsupported or lsm_bpf_setup failed */ | |
1827 | log_unit_debug(u, "LSM BPF not supported, skipping RestrictFileSystems="); | |
1828 | return 0; | |
1829 | } | |
1830 | ||
1831 | return lsm_bpf_unit_restrict_filesystems(u, c->restrict_filesystems, c->restrict_filesystems_allow_list); | |
1832 | } | |
1833 | #endif | |
1834 | ||
1835 | static int apply_protect_hostname(const Unit *u, const ExecContext *c, int *ret_exit_status) { | |
1836 | assert(u); | |
1837 | assert(c); | |
1838 | ||
1839 | if (!c->protect_hostname) | |
1840 | return 0; | |
1841 | ||
1842 | if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_UTS)) { | |
1843 | if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUTS) < 0) { | |
1844 | if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(errno) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(errno)) { | |
1845 | *ret_exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; | |
1846 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to set up UTS namespacing: %m"); | |
1847 | } | |
1848 | ||
1849 | log_unit_warning(u, "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but UTS namespace setup is prohibited (container manager?), ignoring namespace setup."); | |
1850 | } | |
1851 | } else | |
1852 | log_unit_warning(u, "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support UTS namespaces, ignoring namespace setup."); | |
1853 | ||
1854 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP | |
1855 | int r; | |
1856 | ||
1857 | if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectHostname=")) | |
1858 | return 0; | |
1859 | ||
1860 | r = seccomp_protect_hostname(); | |
1861 | if (r < 0) { | |
1862 | *ret_exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
1863 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, r, "Failed to apply hostname restrictions: %m"); | |
1864 | } | |
1865 | #endif | |
1866 | ||
1867 | return 0; | |
1868 | } | |
1869 | ||
1870 | static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe[static 4]) { | |
1871 | assert(idle_pipe); | |
1872 | ||
1873 | idle_pipe[1] = safe_close(idle_pipe[1]); | |
1874 | idle_pipe[2] = safe_close(idle_pipe[2]); | |
1875 | ||
1876 | if (idle_pipe[0] >= 0) { | |
1877 | int r; | |
1878 | ||
1879 | r = fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe[0], POLLHUP, IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC); | |
1880 | ||
1881 | if (idle_pipe[3] >= 0 && r == 0 /* timeout */) { | |
1882 | ssize_t n; | |
1883 | ||
1884 | /* Signal systemd that we are bored and want to continue. */ | |
1885 | n = write(idle_pipe[3], "x", 1); | |
1886 | if (n > 0) | |
1887 | /* Wait for systemd to react to the signal above. */ | |
1888 | (void) fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe[0], POLLHUP, IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC); | |
1889 | } | |
1890 | ||
1891 | idle_pipe[0] = safe_close(idle_pipe[0]); | |
1892 | ||
1893 | } | |
1894 | ||
1895 | idle_pipe[3] = safe_close(idle_pipe[3]); | |
1896 | } | |
1897 | ||
1898 | static const char *exec_directory_env_name_to_string(ExecDirectoryType t); | |
1899 | ||
1900 | static int build_environment( | |
1901 | const Unit *u, | |
1902 | const ExecContext *c, | |
1903 | const ExecParameters *p, | |
1904 | const CGroupContext *cgroup_context, | |
1905 | size_t n_fds, | |
1906 | char **fdnames, | |
1907 | const char *home, | |
1908 | const char *username, | |
1909 | const char *shell, | |
1910 | dev_t journal_stream_dev, | |
1911 | ino_t journal_stream_ino, | |
1912 | const char *memory_pressure_path, | |
1913 | char ***ret) { | |
1914 | ||
1915 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL; | |
1916 | size_t n_env = 0; | |
1917 | char *x; | |
1918 | int r; | |
1919 | ||
1920 | assert(u); | |
1921 | assert(c); | |
1922 | assert(p); | |
1923 | assert(ret); | |
1924 | ||
1925 | #define N_ENV_VARS 19 | |
1926 | our_env = new0(char*, N_ENV_VARS + _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX); | |
1927 | if (!our_env) | |
1928 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1929 | ||
1930 | if (n_fds > 0) { | |
1931 | _cleanup_free_ char *joined = NULL; | |
1932 | ||
1933 | if (asprintf(&x, "LISTEN_PID="PID_FMT, getpid_cached()) < 0) | |
1934 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1935 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1936 | ||
1937 | if (asprintf(&x, "LISTEN_FDS=%zu", n_fds) < 0) | |
1938 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1939 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1940 | ||
1941 | joined = strv_join(fdnames, ":"); | |
1942 | if (!joined) | |
1943 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1944 | ||
1945 | x = strjoin("LISTEN_FDNAMES=", joined); | |
1946 | if (!x) | |
1947 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1948 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1949 | } | |
1950 | ||
1951 | if ((p->flags & EXEC_SET_WATCHDOG) && p->watchdog_usec > 0) { | |
1952 | if (asprintf(&x, "WATCHDOG_PID="PID_FMT, getpid_cached()) < 0) | |
1953 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1954 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1955 | ||
1956 | if (asprintf(&x, "WATCHDOG_USEC="USEC_FMT, p->watchdog_usec) < 0) | |
1957 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1958 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1959 | } | |
1960 | ||
1961 | /* If this is D-Bus, tell the nss-systemd module, since it relies on being able to use blocking | |
1962 | * Varlink calls back to us for look up dynamic users in PID 1. Break the deadlock between D-Bus and | |
1963 | * PID 1 by disabling use of PID1' NSS interface for looking up dynamic users. */ | |
1964 | if (p->flags & EXEC_NSS_DYNAMIC_BYPASS) { | |
1965 | x = strdup("SYSTEMD_NSS_DYNAMIC_BYPASS=1"); | |
1966 | if (!x) | |
1967 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1968 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1969 | } | |
1970 | ||
1971 | if (home) { | |
1972 | x = strjoin("HOME=", home); | |
1973 | if (!x) | |
1974 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1975 | ||
1976 | path_simplify(x + 5); | |
1977 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1978 | } | |
1979 | ||
1980 | if (username) { | |
1981 | x = strjoin("LOGNAME=", username); | |
1982 | if (!x) | |
1983 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1984 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1985 | ||
1986 | x = strjoin("USER=", username); | |
1987 | if (!x) | |
1988 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1989 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1990 | } | |
1991 | ||
1992 | if (shell) { | |
1993 | x = strjoin("SHELL=", shell); | |
1994 | if (!x) | |
1995 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1996 | ||
1997 | path_simplify(x + 6); | |
1998 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
1999 | } | |
2000 | ||
2001 | if (!sd_id128_is_null(u->invocation_id)) { | |
2002 | if (asprintf(&x, "INVOCATION_ID=" SD_ID128_FORMAT_STR, SD_ID128_FORMAT_VAL(u->invocation_id)) < 0) | |
2003 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2004 | ||
2005 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
2006 | } | |
2007 | ||
2008 | if (exec_context_needs_term(c)) { | |
2009 | _cleanup_free_ char *cmdline = NULL; | |
2010 | const char *tty_path, *term = NULL; | |
2011 | ||
2012 | tty_path = exec_context_tty_path(c); | |
2013 | ||
2014 | /* If we are forked off PID 1 and we are supposed to operate on /dev/console, then let's try | |
2015 | * to inherit the $TERM set for PID 1. This is useful for containers so that the $TERM the | |
2016 | * container manager passes to PID 1 ends up all the way in the console login shown. */ | |
2017 | ||
2018 | if (path_equal_ptr(tty_path, "/dev/console") && getppid() == 1) | |
2019 | term = getenv("TERM"); | |
2020 | else if (tty_path && in_charset(skip_dev_prefix(tty_path), ALPHANUMERICAL)) { | |
2021 | _cleanup_free_ char *key = NULL; | |
2022 | ||
2023 | key = strjoin("systemd.tty.term.", skip_dev_prefix(tty_path)); | |
2024 | if (!key) | |
2025 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2026 | ||
2027 | r = proc_cmdline_get_key(key, 0, &cmdline); | |
2028 | if (r < 0) | |
2029 | log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to read %s from kernel cmdline, ignoring: %m", key); | |
2030 | else if (r > 0) | |
2031 | term = cmdline; | |
2032 | } | |
2033 | ||
2034 | if (!term) | |
2035 | term = default_term_for_tty(tty_path); | |
2036 | ||
2037 | x = strjoin("TERM=", term); | |
2038 | if (!x) | |
2039 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2040 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
2041 | } | |
2042 | ||
2043 | if (journal_stream_dev != 0 && journal_stream_ino != 0) { | |
2044 | if (asprintf(&x, "JOURNAL_STREAM=" DEV_FMT ":" INO_FMT, journal_stream_dev, journal_stream_ino) < 0) | |
2045 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2046 | ||
2047 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
2048 | } | |
2049 | ||
2050 | if (c->log_namespace) { | |
2051 | x = strjoin("LOG_NAMESPACE=", c->log_namespace); | |
2052 | if (!x) | |
2053 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2054 | ||
2055 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
2056 | } | |
2057 | ||
2058 | for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { | |
2059 | _cleanup_free_ char *joined = NULL; | |
2060 | const char *n; | |
2061 | ||
2062 | if (!p->prefix[t]) | |
2063 | continue; | |
2064 | ||
2065 | if (c->directories[t].n_items == 0) | |
2066 | continue; | |
2067 | ||
2068 | n = exec_directory_env_name_to_string(t); | |
2069 | if (!n) | |
2070 | continue; | |
2071 | ||
2072 | for (size_t i = 0; i < c->directories[t].n_items; i++) { | |
2073 | _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed = NULL; | |
2074 | ||
2075 | prefixed = path_join(p->prefix[t], c->directories[t].items[i].path); | |
2076 | if (!prefixed) | |
2077 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2078 | ||
2079 | if (!strextend_with_separator(&joined, ":", prefixed)) | |
2080 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2081 | } | |
2082 | ||
2083 | x = strjoin(n, "=", joined); | |
2084 | if (!x) | |
2085 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2086 | ||
2087 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
2088 | } | |
2089 | ||
2090 | if (exec_context_has_credentials(c) && p->prefix[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME]) { | |
2091 | x = strjoin("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY=", p->prefix[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME], "/credentials/", u->id); | |
2092 | if (!x) | |
2093 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2094 | ||
2095 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
2096 | } | |
2097 | ||
2098 | if (asprintf(&x, "SYSTEMD_EXEC_PID=" PID_FMT, getpid_cached()) < 0) | |
2099 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2100 | ||
2101 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
2102 | ||
2103 | if (memory_pressure_path) { | |
2104 | x = strjoin("MEMORY_PRESSURE_WATCH=", memory_pressure_path); | |
2105 | if (!x) | |
2106 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2107 | ||
2108 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
2109 | ||
2110 | if (cgroup_context && !path_equal(memory_pressure_path, "/dev/null")) { | |
2111 | _cleanup_free_ char *b = NULL, *e = NULL; | |
2112 | ||
2113 | if (asprintf(&b, "%s " USEC_FMT " " USEC_FMT, | |
2114 | MEMORY_PRESSURE_DEFAULT_TYPE, | |
2115 | cgroup_context->memory_pressure_threshold_usec == USEC_INFINITY ? MEMORY_PRESSURE_DEFAULT_THRESHOLD_USEC : | |
2116 | CLAMP(cgroup_context->memory_pressure_threshold_usec, 1U, MEMORY_PRESSURE_DEFAULT_WINDOW_USEC), | |
2117 | MEMORY_PRESSURE_DEFAULT_WINDOW_USEC) < 0) | |
2118 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2119 | ||
2120 | if (base64mem(b, strlen(b) + 1, &e) < 0) | |
2121 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2122 | ||
2123 | x = strjoin("MEMORY_PRESSURE_WRITE=", e); | |
2124 | if (!x) | |
2125 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2126 | ||
2127 | our_env[n_env++] = x; | |
2128 | } | |
2129 | } | |
2130 | ||
2131 | assert(n_env < N_ENV_VARS + _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX); | |
2132 | #undef N_ENV_VARS | |
2133 | ||
2134 | *ret = TAKE_PTR(our_env); | |
2135 | ||
2136 | return 0; | |
2137 | } | |
2138 | ||
2139 | static int build_pass_environment(const ExecContext *c, char ***ret) { | |
2140 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **pass_env = NULL; | |
2141 | size_t n_env = 0; | |
2142 | ||
2143 | STRV_FOREACH(i, c->pass_environment) { | |
2144 | _cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL; | |
2145 | char *v; | |
2146 | ||
2147 | v = getenv(*i); | |
2148 | if (!v) | |
2149 | continue; | |
2150 | x = strjoin(*i, "=", v); | |
2151 | if (!x) | |
2152 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2153 | ||
2154 | if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(pass_env, n_env + 2)) | |
2155 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2156 | ||
2157 | pass_env[n_env++] = TAKE_PTR(x); | |
2158 | pass_env[n_env] = NULL; | |
2159 | } | |
2160 | ||
2161 | *ret = TAKE_PTR(pass_env); | |
2162 | ||
2163 | return 0; | |
2164 | } | |
2165 | ||
2166 | bool exec_needs_network_namespace(const ExecContext *context) { | |
2167 | assert(context); | |
2168 | ||
2169 | return context->private_network || context->network_namespace_path; | |
2170 | } | |
2171 | ||
2172 | static bool exec_needs_ipc_namespace(const ExecContext *context) { | |
2173 | assert(context); | |
2174 | ||
2175 | return context->private_ipc || context->ipc_namespace_path; | |
2176 | } | |
2177 | ||
2178 | bool exec_needs_mount_namespace( | |
2179 | const ExecContext *context, | |
2180 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
2181 | const ExecRuntime *runtime) { | |
2182 | ||
2183 | assert(context); | |
2184 | ||
2185 | if (context->root_image) | |
2186 | return true; | |
2187 | ||
2188 | if (!strv_isempty(context->read_write_paths) || | |
2189 | !strv_isempty(context->read_only_paths) || | |
2190 | !strv_isempty(context->inaccessible_paths) || | |
2191 | !strv_isempty(context->exec_paths) || | |
2192 | !strv_isempty(context->no_exec_paths)) | |
2193 | return true; | |
2194 | ||
2195 | if (context->n_bind_mounts > 0) | |
2196 | return true; | |
2197 | ||
2198 | if (context->n_temporary_filesystems > 0) | |
2199 | return true; | |
2200 | ||
2201 | if (context->n_mount_images > 0) | |
2202 | return true; | |
2203 | ||
2204 | if (context->n_extension_images > 0) | |
2205 | return true; | |
2206 | ||
2207 | if (!strv_isempty(context->extension_directories)) | |
2208 | return true; | |
2209 | ||
2210 | if (!IN_SET(context->mount_propagation_flag, 0, MS_SHARED)) | |
2211 | return true; | |
2212 | ||
2213 | if (context->private_tmp && runtime && runtime->shared && (runtime->shared->tmp_dir || runtime->shared->var_tmp_dir)) | |
2214 | return true; | |
2215 | ||
2216 | if (context->private_devices || | |
2217 | context->private_mounts > 0 || | |
2218 | (context->private_mounts < 0 && exec_needs_network_namespace(context)) || | |
2219 | context->protect_system != PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO || | |
2220 | context->protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO || | |
2221 | context->protect_kernel_tunables || | |
2222 | context->protect_kernel_modules || | |
2223 | context->protect_kernel_logs || | |
2224 | context->protect_control_groups || | |
2225 | context->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT || | |
2226 | context->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL || | |
2227 | exec_needs_ipc_namespace(context)) | |
2228 | return true; | |
2229 | ||
2230 | if (context->root_directory) { | |
2231 | if (exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(context)) | |
2232 | return true; | |
2233 | ||
2234 | for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { | |
2235 | if (params && !params->prefix[t]) | |
2236 | continue; | |
2237 | ||
2238 | if (context->directories[t].n_items > 0) | |
2239 | return true; | |
2240 | } | |
2241 | } | |
2242 | ||
2243 | if (context->dynamic_user && | |
2244 | (context->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE].n_items > 0 || | |
2245 | context->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE].n_items > 0 || | |
2246 | context->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS].n_items > 0)) | |
2247 | return true; | |
2248 | ||
2249 | if (context->log_namespace) | |
2250 | return true; | |
2251 | ||
2252 | return false; | |
2253 | } | |
2254 | ||
2255 | static int setup_private_users(uid_t ouid, gid_t ogid, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { | |
2256 | _cleanup_free_ char *uid_map = NULL, *gid_map = NULL; | |
2257 | _cleanup_close_pair_ int errno_pipe[2] = PIPE_EBADF; | |
2258 | _cleanup_close_ int unshare_ready_fd = -EBADF; | |
2259 | _cleanup_(sigkill_waitp) pid_t pid = 0; | |
2260 | uint64_t c = 1; | |
2261 | ssize_t n; | |
2262 | int r; | |
2263 | ||
2264 | /* Set up a user namespace and map the original UID/GID (IDs from before any user or group changes, i.e. | |
2265 | * the IDs from the user or system manager(s)) to itself, the selected UID/GID to itself, and everything else to | |
2266 | * nobody. In order to be able to write this mapping we need CAP_SETUID in the original user namespace, which | |
2267 | * we however lack after opening the user namespace. To work around this we fork() a temporary child process, | |
2268 | * which waits for the parent to create the new user namespace while staying in the original namespace. The | |
2269 | * child then writes the UID mapping, under full privileges. The parent waits for the child to finish and | |
2270 | * continues execution normally. | |
2271 | * For unprivileged users (i.e. without capabilities), the root to root mapping is excluded. As such, it | |
2272 | * does not need CAP_SETUID to write the single line mapping to itself. */ | |
2273 | ||
2274 | /* Can only set up multiple mappings with CAP_SETUID. */ | |
2275 | if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SETUID) > 0 && uid != ouid && uid_is_valid(uid)) | |
2276 | r = asprintf(&uid_map, | |
2277 | UID_FMT " " UID_FMT " 1\n" /* Map $OUID → $OUID */ | |
2278 | UID_FMT " " UID_FMT " 1\n", /* Map $UID → $UID */ | |
2279 | ouid, ouid, uid, uid); | |
2280 | else | |
2281 | r = asprintf(&uid_map, | |
2282 | UID_FMT " " UID_FMT " 1\n", /* Map $OUID → $OUID */ | |
2283 | ouid, ouid); | |
2284 | ||
2285 | if (r < 0) | |
2286 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2287 | ||
2288 | /* Can only set up multiple mappings with CAP_SETGID. */ | |
2289 | if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SETGID) > 0 && gid != ogid && gid_is_valid(gid)) | |
2290 | r = asprintf(&gid_map, | |
2291 | GID_FMT " " GID_FMT " 1\n" /* Map $OGID → $OGID */ | |
2292 | GID_FMT " " GID_FMT " 1\n", /* Map $GID → $GID */ | |
2293 | ogid, ogid, gid, gid); | |
2294 | else | |
2295 | r = asprintf(&gid_map, | |
2296 | GID_FMT " " GID_FMT " 1\n", /* Map $OGID -> $OGID */ | |
2297 | ogid, ogid); | |
2298 | ||
2299 | if (r < 0) | |
2300 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2301 | ||
2302 | /* Create a communication channel so that the parent can tell the child when it finished creating the user | |
2303 | * namespace. */ | |
2304 | unshare_ready_fd = eventfd(0, EFD_CLOEXEC); | |
2305 | if (unshare_ready_fd < 0) | |
2306 | return -errno; | |
2307 | ||
2308 | /* Create a communication channel so that the child can tell the parent a proper error code in case it | |
2309 | * failed. */ | |
2310 | if (pipe2(errno_pipe, O_CLOEXEC) < 0) | |
2311 | return -errno; | |
2312 | ||
2313 | r = safe_fork("(sd-userns)", FORK_RESET_SIGNALS|FORK_DEATHSIG, &pid); | |
2314 | if (r < 0) | |
2315 | return r; | |
2316 | if (r == 0) { | |
2317 | _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; | |
2318 | const char *a; | |
2319 | pid_t ppid; | |
2320 | ||
2321 | /* Child process, running in the original user namespace. Let's update the parent's UID/GID map from | |
2322 | * here, after the parent opened its own user namespace. */ | |
2323 | ||
2324 | ppid = getppid(); | |
2325 | errno_pipe[0] = safe_close(errno_pipe[0]); | |
2326 | ||
2327 | /* Wait until the parent unshared the user namespace */ | |
2328 | if (read(unshare_ready_fd, &c, sizeof(c)) < 0) { | |
2329 | r = -errno; | |
2330 | goto child_fail; | |
2331 | } | |
2332 | ||
2333 | /* Disable the setgroups() system call in the child user namespace, for good. */ | |
2334 | a = procfs_file_alloca(ppid, "setgroups"); | |
2335 | fd = open(a, O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC); | |
2336 | if (fd < 0) { | |
2337 | if (errno != ENOENT) { | |
2338 | r = -errno; | |
2339 | goto child_fail; | |
2340 | } | |
2341 | ||
2342 | /* If the file is missing the kernel is too old, let's continue anyway. */ | |
2343 | } else { | |
2344 | if (write(fd, "deny\n", 5) < 0) { | |
2345 | r = -errno; | |
2346 | goto child_fail; | |
2347 | } | |
2348 | ||
2349 | fd = safe_close(fd); | |
2350 | } | |
2351 | ||
2352 | /* First write the GID map */ | |
2353 | a = procfs_file_alloca(ppid, "gid_map"); | |
2354 | fd = open(a, O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC); | |
2355 | if (fd < 0) { | |
2356 | r = -errno; | |
2357 | goto child_fail; | |
2358 | } | |
2359 | if (write(fd, gid_map, strlen(gid_map)) < 0) { | |
2360 | r = -errno; | |
2361 | goto child_fail; | |
2362 | } | |
2363 | fd = safe_close(fd); | |
2364 | ||
2365 | /* The write the UID map */ | |
2366 | a = procfs_file_alloca(ppid, "uid_map"); | |
2367 | fd = open(a, O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC); | |
2368 | if (fd < 0) { | |
2369 | r = -errno; | |
2370 | goto child_fail; | |
2371 | } | |
2372 | if (write(fd, uid_map, strlen(uid_map)) < 0) { | |
2373 | r = -errno; | |
2374 | goto child_fail; | |
2375 | } | |
2376 | ||
2377 | _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); | |
2378 | ||
2379 | child_fail: | |
2380 | (void) write(errno_pipe[1], &r, sizeof(r)); | |
2381 | _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); | |
2382 | } | |
2383 | ||
2384 | errno_pipe[1] = safe_close(errno_pipe[1]); | |
2385 | ||
2386 | if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) < 0) | |
2387 | return -errno; | |
2388 | ||
2389 | /* Let the child know that the namespace is ready now */ | |
2390 | if (write(unshare_ready_fd, &c, sizeof(c)) < 0) | |
2391 | return -errno; | |
2392 | ||
2393 | /* Try to read an error code from the child */ | |
2394 | n = read(errno_pipe[0], &r, sizeof(r)); | |
2395 | if (n < 0) | |
2396 | return -errno; | |
2397 | if (n == sizeof(r)) { /* an error code was sent to us */ | |
2398 | if (r < 0) | |
2399 | return r; | |
2400 | return -EIO; | |
2401 | } | |
2402 | if (n != 0) /* on success we should have read 0 bytes */ | |
2403 | return -EIO; | |
2404 | ||
2405 | r = wait_for_terminate_and_check("(sd-userns)", TAKE_PID(pid), 0); | |
2406 | if (r < 0) | |
2407 | return r; | |
2408 | if (r != EXIT_SUCCESS) /* If something strange happened with the child, let's consider this fatal, too */ | |
2409 | return -EIO; | |
2410 | ||
2411 | return 0; | |
2412 | } | |
2413 | ||
2414 | static bool exec_directory_is_private(const ExecContext *context, ExecDirectoryType type) { | |
2415 | assert(context); | |
2416 | ||
2417 | if (!context->dynamic_user) | |
2418 | return false; | |
2419 | ||
2420 | if (type == EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION) | |
2421 | return false; | |
2422 | ||
2423 | if (type == EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME && context->runtime_directory_preserve_mode == EXEC_PRESERVE_NO) | |
2424 | return false; | |
2425 | ||
2426 | return true; | |
2427 | } | |
2428 | ||
2429 | static int create_many_symlinks(const char *root, const char *source, char **symlinks) { | |
2430 | _cleanup_free_ char *src_abs = NULL; | |
2431 | int r; | |
2432 | ||
2433 | assert(source); | |
2434 | ||
2435 | src_abs = path_join(root, source); | |
2436 | if (!src_abs) | |
2437 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2438 | ||
2439 | STRV_FOREACH(dst, symlinks) { | |
2440 | _cleanup_free_ char *dst_abs = NULL; | |
2441 | ||
2442 | dst_abs = path_join(root, *dst); | |
2443 | if (!dst_abs) | |
2444 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2445 | ||
2446 | r = mkdir_parents_label(dst_abs, 0755); | |
2447 | if (r < 0) | |
2448 | return r; | |
2449 | ||
2450 | r = symlink_idempotent(src_abs, dst_abs, true); | |
2451 | if (r < 0) | |
2452 | return r; | |
2453 | } | |
2454 | ||
2455 | return 0; | |
2456 | } | |
2457 | ||
2458 | static int setup_exec_directory( | |
2459 | const ExecContext *context, | |
2460 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
2461 | uid_t uid, | |
2462 | gid_t gid, | |
2463 | ExecDirectoryType type, | |
2464 | bool needs_mount_namespace, | |
2465 | int *exit_status) { | |
2466 | ||
2467 | static const int exit_status_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = { | |
2468 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY, | |
2469 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE] = EXIT_STATE_DIRECTORY, | |
2470 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE] = EXIT_CACHE_DIRECTORY, | |
2471 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS] = EXIT_LOGS_DIRECTORY, | |
2472 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION] = EXIT_CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY, | |
2473 | }; | |
2474 | int r; | |
2475 | ||
2476 | assert(context); | |
2477 | assert(params); | |
2478 | assert(type >= 0 && type < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX); | |
2479 | assert(exit_status); | |
2480 | ||
2481 | if (!params->prefix[type]) | |
2482 | return 0; | |
2483 | ||
2484 | if (params->flags & EXEC_CHOWN_DIRECTORIES) { | |
2485 | if (!uid_is_valid(uid)) | |
2486 | uid = 0; | |
2487 | if (!gid_is_valid(gid)) | |
2488 | gid = 0; | |
2489 | } | |
2490 | ||
2491 | for (size_t i = 0; i < context->directories[type].n_items; i++) { | |
2492 | _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL, *pp = NULL; | |
2493 | ||
2494 | p = path_join(params->prefix[type], context->directories[type].items[i].path); | |
2495 | if (!p) { | |
2496 | r = -ENOMEM; | |
2497 | goto fail; | |
2498 | } | |
2499 | ||
2500 | r = mkdir_parents_label(p, 0755); | |
2501 | if (r < 0) | |
2502 | goto fail; | |
2503 | ||
2504 | if (exec_directory_is_private(context, type)) { | |
2505 | /* So, here's one extra complication when dealing with DynamicUser=1 units. In that | |
2506 | * case we want to avoid leaving a directory around fully accessible that is owned by | |
2507 | * a dynamic user whose UID is later on reused. To lock this down we use the same | |
2508 | * trick used by container managers to prohibit host users to get access to files of | |
2509 | * the same UID in containers: we place everything inside a directory that has an | |
2510 | * access mode of 0700 and is owned root:root, so that it acts as security boundary | |
2511 | * for unprivileged host code. We then use fs namespacing to make this directory | |
2512 | * permeable for the service itself. | |
2513 | * | |
2514 | * Specifically: for a service which wants a special directory "foo/" we first create | |
2515 | * a directory "private/" with access mode 0700 owned by root:root. Then we place | |
2516 | * "foo" inside of that directory (i.e. "private/foo/"), and make "foo" a symlink to | |
2517 | * "private/foo". This way, privileged host users can access "foo/" as usual, but | |
2518 | * unprivileged host users can't look into it. Inside of the namespace of the unit | |
2519 | * "private/" is replaced by a more liberally accessible tmpfs, into which the host's | |
2520 | * "private/foo/" is mounted under the same name, thus disabling the access boundary | |
2521 | * for the service and making sure it only gets access to the dirs it needs but no | |
2522 | * others. Tricky? Yes, absolutely, but it works! | |
2523 | * | |
2524 | * Note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION as that's assumed not | |
2525 | * to be owned by the service itself. | |
2526 | * | |
2527 | * Also, note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME as that's often used | |
2528 | * for sharing files or sockets with other services. */ | |
2529 | ||
2530 | pp = path_join(params->prefix[type], "private"); | |
2531 | if (!pp) { | |
2532 | r = -ENOMEM; | |
2533 | goto fail; | |
2534 | } | |
2535 | ||
2536 | /* First set up private root if it doesn't exist yet, with access mode 0700 and owned by root:root */ | |
2537 | r = mkdir_safe_label(pp, 0700, 0, 0, MKDIR_WARN_MODE); | |
2538 | if (r < 0) | |
2539 | goto fail; | |
2540 | ||
2541 | if (!path_extend(&pp, context->directories[type].items[i].path)) { | |
2542 | r = -ENOMEM; | |
2543 | goto fail; | |
2544 | } | |
2545 | ||
2546 | /* Create all directories between the configured directory and this private root, and mark them 0755 */ | |
2547 | r = mkdir_parents_label(pp, 0755); | |
2548 | if (r < 0) | |
2549 | goto fail; | |
2550 | ||
2551 | if (is_dir(p, false) > 0 && | |
2552 | (laccess(pp, F_OK) < 0 && errno == ENOENT)) { | |
2553 | ||
2554 | /* Hmm, the private directory doesn't exist yet, but the normal one exists? If so, move | |
2555 | * it over. Most likely the service has been upgraded from one that didn't use | |
2556 | * DynamicUser=1, to one that does. */ | |
2557 | ||
2558 | log_info("Found pre-existing public %s= directory %s, migrating to %s.\n" | |
2559 | "Apparently, service previously had DynamicUser= turned off, and has now turned it on.", | |
2560 | exec_directory_type_to_string(type), p, pp); | |
2561 | ||
2562 | if (rename(p, pp) < 0) { | |
2563 | r = -errno; | |
2564 | goto fail; | |
2565 | } | |
2566 | } else { | |
2567 | /* Otherwise, create the actual directory for the service */ | |
2568 | ||
2569 | r = mkdir_label(pp, context->directories[type].mode); | |
2570 | if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST) | |
2571 | goto fail; | |
2572 | } | |
2573 | ||
2574 | if (!context->directories[type].items[i].only_create) { | |
2575 | /* And link it up from the original place. | |
2576 | * Notes | |
2577 | * 1) If a mount namespace is going to be used, then this symlink remains on | |
2578 | * the host, and a new one for the child namespace will be created later. | |
2579 | * 2) It is not necessary to create this symlink when one of its parent | |
2580 | * directories is specified and already created. E.g. | |
2581 | * StateDirectory=foo foo/bar | |
2582 | * In that case, the inode points to pp and p for "foo/bar" are the same: | |
2583 | * pp = "/var/lib/private/foo/bar" | |
2584 | * p = "/var/lib/foo/bar" | |
2585 | * and, /var/lib/foo is a symlink to /var/lib/private/foo. So, not only | |
2586 | * we do not need to create the symlink, but we cannot create the symlink. | |
2587 | * See issue #24783. */ | |
2588 | r = symlink_idempotent(pp, p, true); | |
2589 | if (r < 0) | |
2590 | goto fail; | |
2591 | } | |
2592 | ||
2593 | } else { | |
2594 | _cleanup_free_ char *target = NULL; | |
2595 | ||
2596 | if (type != EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION && | |
2597 | readlink_and_make_absolute(p, &target) >= 0) { | |
2598 | _cleanup_free_ char *q = NULL, *q_resolved = NULL, *target_resolved = NULL; | |
2599 | ||
2600 | /* This already exists and is a symlink? Interesting. Maybe it's one created | |
2601 | * by DynamicUser=1 (see above)? | |
2602 | * | |
2603 | * We do this for all directory types except for ConfigurationDirectory=, | |
2604 | * since they all support the private/ symlink logic at least in some | |
2605 | * configurations, see above. */ | |
2606 | ||
2607 | r = chase(target, NULL, 0, &target_resolved, NULL); | |
2608 | if (r < 0) | |
2609 | goto fail; | |
2610 | ||
2611 | q = path_join(params->prefix[type], "private", context->directories[type].items[i].path); | |
2612 | if (!q) { | |
2613 | r = -ENOMEM; | |
2614 | goto fail; | |
2615 | } | |
2616 | ||
2617 | /* /var/lib or friends may be symlinks. So, let's chase them also. */ | |
2618 | r = chase(q, NULL, CHASE_NONEXISTENT, &q_resolved, NULL); | |
2619 | if (r < 0) | |
2620 | goto fail; | |
2621 | ||
2622 | if (path_equal(q_resolved, target_resolved)) { | |
2623 | ||
2624 | /* Hmm, apparently DynamicUser= was once turned on for this service, | |
2625 | * but is no longer. Let's move the directory back up. */ | |
2626 | ||
2627 | log_info("Found pre-existing private %s= directory %s, migrating to %s.\n" | |
2628 | "Apparently, service previously had DynamicUser= turned on, and has now turned it off.", | |
2629 | exec_directory_type_to_string(type), q, p); | |
2630 | ||
2631 | if (unlink(p) < 0) { | |
2632 | r = -errno; | |
2633 | goto fail; | |
2634 | } | |
2635 | ||
2636 | if (rename(q, p) < 0) { | |
2637 | r = -errno; | |
2638 | goto fail; | |
2639 | } | |
2640 | } | |
2641 | } | |
2642 | ||
2643 | r = mkdir_label(p, context->directories[type].mode); | |
2644 | if (r < 0) { | |
2645 | if (r != -EEXIST) | |
2646 | goto fail; | |
2647 | ||
2648 | if (type == EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION) { | |
2649 | struct stat st; | |
2650 | ||
2651 | /* Don't change the owner/access mode of the configuration directory, | |
2652 | * as in the common case it is not written to by a service, and shall | |
2653 | * not be writable. */ | |
2654 | ||
2655 | if (stat(p, &st) < 0) { | |
2656 | r = -errno; | |
2657 | goto fail; | |
2658 | } | |
2659 | ||
2660 | /* Still complain if the access mode doesn't match */ | |
2661 | if (((st.st_mode ^ context->directories[type].mode) & 07777) != 0) | |
2662 | log_warning("%s \'%s\' already exists but the mode is different. " | |
2663 | "(File system: %o %sMode: %o)", | |
2664 | exec_directory_type_to_string(type), context->directories[type].items[i].path, | |
2665 | st.st_mode & 07777, exec_directory_type_to_string(type), context->directories[type].mode & 07777); | |
2666 | ||
2667 | continue; | |
2668 | } | |
2669 | } | |
2670 | } | |
2671 | ||
2672 | /* Lock down the access mode (we use chmod_and_chown() to make this idempotent. We don't | |
2673 | * specify UID/GID here, so that path_chown_recursive() can optimize things depending on the | |
2674 | * current UID/GID ownership.) */ | |
2675 | r = chmod_and_chown(pp ?: p, context->directories[type].mode, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID); | |
2676 | if (r < 0) | |
2677 | goto fail; | |
2678 | ||
2679 | /* Then, change the ownership of the whole tree, if necessary. When dynamic users are used we | |
2680 | * drop the suid/sgid bits, since we really don't want SUID/SGID files for dynamic UID/GID | |
2681 | * assignments to exist. */ | |
2682 | r = path_chown_recursive(pp ?: p, uid, gid, context->dynamic_user ? 01777 : 07777); | |
2683 | if (r < 0) | |
2684 | goto fail; | |
2685 | } | |
2686 | ||
2687 | /* If we are not going to run in a namespace, set up the symlinks - otherwise | |
2688 | * they are set up later, to allow configuring empty var/run/etc. */ | |
2689 | if (!needs_mount_namespace) | |
2690 | for (size_t i = 0; i < context->directories[type].n_items; i++) { | |
2691 | r = create_many_symlinks(params->prefix[type], | |
2692 | context->directories[type].items[i].path, | |
2693 | context->directories[type].items[i].symlinks); | |
2694 | if (r < 0) | |
2695 | goto fail; | |
2696 | } | |
2697 | ||
2698 | return 0; | |
2699 | ||
2700 | fail: | |
2701 | *exit_status = exit_status_table[type]; | |
2702 | return r; | |
2703 | } | |
2704 | ||
2705 | static int write_credential( | |
2706 | int dfd, | |
2707 | const char *id, | |
2708 | const void *data, | |
2709 | size_t size, | |
2710 | uid_t uid, | |
2711 | bool ownership_ok) { | |
2712 | ||
2713 | _cleanup_(unlink_and_freep) char *tmp = NULL; | |
2714 | _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; | |
2715 | int r; | |
2716 | ||
2717 | r = tempfn_random_child("", "cred", &tmp); | |
2718 | if (r < 0) | |
2719 | return r; | |
2720 | ||
2721 | fd = openat(dfd, tmp, O_CREAT|O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW|O_NOCTTY, 0600); | |
2722 | if (fd < 0) { | |
2723 | tmp = mfree(tmp); | |
2724 | return -errno; | |
2725 | } | |
2726 | ||
2727 | r = loop_write(fd, data, size, /* do_poll = */ false); | |
2728 | if (r < 0) | |
2729 | return r; | |
2730 | ||
2731 | if (fchmod(fd, 0400) < 0) /* Take away "w" bit */ | |
2732 | return -errno; | |
2733 | ||
2734 | if (uid_is_valid(uid) && uid != getuid()) { | |
2735 | r = fd_add_uid_acl_permission(fd, uid, ACL_READ); | |
2736 | if (r < 0) { | |
2737 | if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r)) | |
2738 | return r; | |
2739 | ||
2740 | if (!ownership_ok) /* Ideally we use ACLs, since we can neatly express what we want | |
2741 | * to express: that the user gets read access and nothing | |
2742 | * else. But if the backing fs can't support that (e.g. ramfs) | |
2743 | * then we can use file ownership instead. But that's only safe if | |
2744 | * we can then re-mount the whole thing read-only, so that the | |
2745 | * user can no longer chmod() the file to gain write access. */ | |
2746 | return r; | |
2747 | ||
2748 | if (fchown(fd, uid, GID_INVALID) < 0) | |
2749 | return -errno; | |
2750 | } | |
2751 | } | |
2752 | ||
2753 | if (renameat(dfd, tmp, dfd, id) < 0) | |
2754 | return -errno; | |
2755 | ||
2756 | tmp = mfree(tmp); | |
2757 | return 0; | |
2758 | } | |
2759 | ||
2760 | static char **credential_search_path( | |
2761 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
2762 | bool encrypted) { | |
2763 | ||
2764 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; | |
2765 | ||
2766 | assert(params); | |
2767 | ||
2768 | /* Assemble a search path to find credentials in. We'll look in /etc/credstore/ (and similar | |
2769 | * directories in /usr/lib/ + /run/) for all types of credentials. If we are looking for encrypted | |
2770 | * credentials, also look in /etc/credstore.encrypted/ (and similar dirs). */ | |
2771 | ||
2772 | if (encrypted) { | |
2773 | if (strv_extend(&l, params->received_encrypted_credentials_directory) < 0) | |
2774 | return NULL; | |
2775 | ||
2776 | if (strv_extend_strv(&l, CONF_PATHS_STRV("credstore.encrypted"), /* filter_duplicates= */ true) < 0) | |
2777 | return NULL; | |
2778 | } | |
2779 | ||
2780 | if (params->received_credentials_directory) | |
2781 | if (strv_extend(&l, params->received_credentials_directory) < 0) | |
2782 | return NULL; | |
2783 | ||
2784 | if (strv_extend_strv(&l, CONF_PATHS_STRV("credstore"), /* filter_duplicates= */ true) < 0) | |
2785 | return NULL; | |
2786 | ||
2787 | if (DEBUG_LOGGING) { | |
2788 | _cleanup_free_ char *t = strv_join(l, ":"); | |
2789 | ||
2790 | log_debug("Credential search path is: %s", t); | |
2791 | } | |
2792 | ||
2793 | return TAKE_PTR(l); | |
2794 | } | |
2795 | ||
2796 | static int load_credential( | |
2797 | const ExecContext *context, | |
2798 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
2799 | const char *id, | |
2800 | const char *path, | |
2801 | bool encrypted, | |
2802 | const char *unit, | |
2803 | int read_dfd, | |
2804 | int write_dfd, | |
2805 | uid_t uid, | |
2806 | bool ownership_ok, | |
2807 | uint64_t *left) { | |
2808 | ||
2809 | ReadFullFileFlags flags = READ_FULL_FILE_SECURE|READ_FULL_FILE_FAIL_WHEN_LARGER; | |
2810 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **search_path = NULL; | |
2811 | _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *data = NULL; | |
2812 | _cleanup_free_ char *bindname = NULL; | |
2813 | const char *source = NULL; | |
2814 | bool missing_ok = true; | |
2815 | size_t size, add, maxsz; | |
2816 | int r; | |
2817 | ||
2818 | assert(context); | |
2819 | assert(params); | |
2820 | assert(id); | |
2821 | assert(path); | |
2822 | assert(unit); | |
2823 | assert(read_dfd >= 0 || read_dfd == AT_FDCWD); | |
2824 | assert(write_dfd >= 0); | |
2825 | assert(left); | |
2826 | ||
2827 | if (read_dfd >= 0) { | |
2828 | /* If a directory fd is specified, then read the file directly from that dir. In this case we | |
2829 | * won't do AF_UNIX stuff (we simply don't want to recursively iterate down a tree of AF_UNIX | |
2830 | * IPC sockets). It's OK if a file vanishes here in the time we enumerate it and intend to | |
2831 | * open it. */ | |
2832 | ||
2833 | if (!filename_is_valid(path)) /* safety check */ | |
2834 | return -EINVAL; | |
2835 | ||
2836 | missing_ok = true; | |
2837 | source = path; | |
2838 | ||
2839 | } else if (path_is_absolute(path)) { | |
2840 | /* If this is an absolute path, read the data directly from it, and support AF_UNIX | |
2841 | * sockets */ | |
2842 | ||
2843 | if (!path_is_valid(path)) /* safety check */ | |
2844 | return -EINVAL; | |
2845 | ||
2846 | flags |= READ_FULL_FILE_CONNECT_SOCKET; | |
2847 | ||
2848 | /* Pass some minimal info about the unit and the credential name we are looking to acquire | |
2849 | * via the source socket address in case we read off an AF_UNIX socket. */ | |
2850 | if (asprintf(&bindname, "@%" PRIx64"/unit/%s/%s", random_u64(), unit, id) < 0) | |
2851 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2852 | ||
2853 | missing_ok = false; | |
2854 | source = path; | |
2855 | ||
2856 | } else if (credential_name_valid(path)) { | |
2857 | /* If this is a relative path, take it as credential name relative to the credentials | |
2858 | * directory we received ourselves. We don't support the AF_UNIX stuff in this mode, since we | |
2859 | * are operating on a credential store, i.e. this is guaranteed to be regular files. */ | |
2860 | ||
2861 | search_path = credential_search_path(params, encrypted); | |
2862 | if (!search_path) | |
2863 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2864 | ||
2865 | missing_ok = true; | |
2866 | } else | |
2867 | source = NULL; | |
2868 | ||
2869 | if (encrypted) | |
2870 | flags |= READ_FULL_FILE_UNBASE64; | |
2871 | ||
2872 | maxsz = encrypted ? CREDENTIAL_ENCRYPTED_SIZE_MAX : CREDENTIAL_SIZE_MAX; | |
2873 | ||
2874 | if (search_path) { | |
2875 | STRV_FOREACH(d, search_path) { | |
2876 | _cleanup_free_ char *j = NULL; | |
2877 | ||
2878 | j = path_join(*d, path); | |
2879 | if (!j) | |
2880 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2881 | ||
2882 | r = read_full_file_full( | |
2883 | AT_FDCWD, j, /* path is absolute, hence pass AT_FDCWD as nop dir fd here */ | |
2884 | UINT64_MAX, | |
2885 | maxsz, | |
2886 | flags, | |
2887 | NULL, | |
2888 | &data, &size); | |
2889 | if (r != -ENOENT) | |
2890 | break; | |
2891 | } | |
2892 | } else if (source) | |
2893 | r = read_full_file_full( | |
2894 | read_dfd, source, | |
2895 | UINT64_MAX, | |
2896 | maxsz, | |
2897 | flags, | |
2898 | bindname, | |
2899 | &data, &size); | |
2900 | else | |
2901 | r = -ENOENT; | |
2902 | ||
2903 | if (r == -ENOENT && (missing_ok || hashmap_contains(context->set_credentials, id))) { | |
2904 | /* Make a missing inherited credential non-fatal, let's just continue. After all apps | |
2905 | * will get clear errors if we don't pass such a missing credential on as they | |
2906 | * themselves will get ENOENT when trying to read them, which should not be much | |
2907 | * worse than when we handle the error here and make it fatal. | |
2908 | * | |
2909 | * Also, if the source file doesn't exist, but a fallback is set via SetCredentials= | |
2910 | * we are fine, too. */ | |
2911 | log_debug_errno(r, "Couldn't read inherited credential '%s', skipping: %m", path); | |
2912 | return 0; | |
2913 | } | |
2914 | if (r < 0) | |
2915 | return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to read credential '%s': %m", path); | |
2916 | ||
2917 | if (encrypted) { | |
2918 | _cleanup_free_ void *plaintext = NULL; | |
2919 | size_t plaintext_size = 0; | |
2920 | ||
2921 | r = decrypt_credential_and_warn(id, now(CLOCK_REALTIME), NULL, NULL, data, size, &plaintext, &plaintext_size); | |
2922 | if (r < 0) | |
2923 | return r; | |
2924 | ||
2925 | free_and_replace(data, plaintext); | |
2926 | size = plaintext_size; | |
2927 | } | |
2928 | ||
2929 | add = strlen(id) + size; | |
2930 | if (add > *left) | |
2931 | return -E2BIG; | |
2932 | ||
2933 | r = write_credential(write_dfd, id, data, size, uid, ownership_ok); | |
2934 | if (r < 0) | |
2935 | return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to write credential '%s': %m", id); | |
2936 | ||
2937 | *left -= add; | |
2938 | return 0; | |
2939 | } | |
2940 | ||
2941 | struct load_cred_args { | |
2942 | const ExecContext *context; | |
2943 | const ExecParameters *params; | |
2944 | bool encrypted; | |
2945 | const char *unit; | |
2946 | int dfd; | |
2947 | uid_t uid; | |
2948 | bool ownership_ok; | |
2949 | uint64_t *left; | |
2950 | }; | |
2951 | ||
2952 | static int load_cred_recurse_dir_cb( | |
2953 | RecurseDirEvent event, | |
2954 | const char *path, | |
2955 | int dir_fd, | |
2956 | int inode_fd, | |
2957 | const struct dirent *de, | |
2958 | const struct statx *sx, | |
2959 | void *userdata) { | |
2960 | ||
2961 | struct load_cred_args *args = ASSERT_PTR(userdata); | |
2962 | _cleanup_free_ char *sub_id = NULL; | |
2963 | int r; | |
2964 | ||
2965 | if (event != RECURSE_DIR_ENTRY) | |
2966 | return RECURSE_DIR_CONTINUE; | |
2967 | ||
2968 | if (!IN_SET(de->d_type, DT_REG, DT_SOCK)) | |
2969 | return RECURSE_DIR_CONTINUE; | |
2970 | ||
2971 | sub_id = strreplace(path, "/", "_"); | |
2972 | if (!sub_id) | |
2973 | return -ENOMEM; | |
2974 | ||
2975 | if (!credential_name_valid(sub_id)) | |
2976 | return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Credential would get ID %s, which is not valid, refusing", sub_id); | |
2977 | ||
2978 | if (faccessat(args->dfd, sub_id, F_OK, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) >= 0) { | |
2979 | log_debug("Skipping credential with duplicated ID %s at %s", sub_id, path); | |
2980 | return RECURSE_DIR_CONTINUE; | |
2981 | } | |
2982 | if (errno != ENOENT) | |
2983 | return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to test if credential %s exists: %m", sub_id); | |
2984 | ||
2985 | r = load_credential( | |
2986 | args->context, | |
2987 | args->params, | |
2988 | sub_id, | |
2989 | de->d_name, | |
2990 | args->encrypted, | |
2991 | args->unit, | |
2992 | dir_fd, | |
2993 | args->dfd, | |
2994 | args->uid, | |
2995 | args->ownership_ok, | |
2996 | args->left); | |
2997 | if (r < 0) | |
2998 | return r; | |
2999 | ||
3000 | return RECURSE_DIR_CONTINUE; | |
3001 | } | |
3002 | ||
3003 | static int acquire_credentials( | |
3004 | const ExecContext *context, | |
3005 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
3006 | const char *unit, | |
3007 | const char *p, | |
3008 | uid_t uid, | |
3009 | bool ownership_ok) { | |
3010 | ||
3011 | uint64_t left = CREDENTIALS_TOTAL_SIZE_MAX; | |
3012 | _cleanup_close_ int dfd = -EBADF; | |
3013 | ExecLoadCredential *lc; | |
3014 | ExecSetCredential *sc; | |
3015 | int r; | |
3016 | ||
3017 | assert(context); | |
3018 | assert(p); | |
3019 | ||
3020 | dfd = open(p, O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC); | |
3021 | if (dfd < 0) | |
3022 | return -errno; | |
3023 | ||
3024 | /* First, load credentials off disk (or acquire via AF_UNIX socket) */ | |
3025 | HASHMAP_FOREACH(lc, context->load_credentials) { | |
3026 | _cleanup_close_ int sub_fd = -EBADF; | |
3027 | ||
3028 | /* If this is an absolute path, then try to open it as a directory. If that works, then we'll | |
3029 | * recurse into it. If it is an absolute path but it isn't a directory, then we'll open it as | |
3030 | * a regular file. Finally, if it's a relative path we will use it as a credential name to | |
3031 | * propagate a credential passed to us from further up. */ | |
3032 | ||
3033 | if (path_is_absolute(lc->path)) { | |
3034 | sub_fd = open(lc->path, O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC|O_RDONLY); | |
3035 | if (sub_fd < 0 && !IN_SET(errno, | |
3036 | ENOTDIR, /* Not a directory */ | |
3037 | ENOENT)) /* Doesn't exist? */ | |
3038 | return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to open '%s': %m", lc->path); | |
3039 | } | |
3040 | ||
3041 | if (sub_fd < 0) | |
3042 | /* Regular file (incl. a credential passed in from higher up) */ | |
3043 | r = load_credential( | |
3044 | context, | |
3045 | params, | |
3046 | lc->id, | |
3047 | lc->path, | |
3048 | lc->encrypted, | |
3049 | unit, | |
3050 | AT_FDCWD, | |
3051 | dfd, | |
3052 | uid, | |
3053 | ownership_ok, | |
3054 | &left); | |
3055 | else | |
3056 | /* Directory */ | |
3057 | r = recurse_dir( | |
3058 | sub_fd, | |
3059 | /* path= */ lc->id, /* recurse_dir() will suffix the subdir paths from here to the top-level id */ | |
3060 | /* statx_mask= */ 0, | |
3061 | /* n_depth_max= */ UINT_MAX, | |
3062 | RECURSE_DIR_SORT|RECURSE_DIR_IGNORE_DOT|RECURSE_DIR_ENSURE_TYPE, | |
3063 | load_cred_recurse_dir_cb, | |
3064 | &(struct load_cred_args) { | |
3065 | .context = context, | |
3066 | .params = params, | |
3067 | .encrypted = lc->encrypted, | |
3068 | .unit = unit, | |
3069 | .dfd = dfd, | |
3070 | .uid = uid, | |
3071 | .ownership_ok = ownership_ok, | |
3072 | .left = &left, | |
3073 | }); | |
3074 | if (r < 0) | |
3075 | return r; | |
3076 | } | |
3077 | ||
3078 | /* Second, we add in literally specified credentials. If the credentials already exist, we'll not add | |
3079 | * them, so that they can act as a "default" if the same credential is specified multiple times. */ | |
3080 | HASHMAP_FOREACH(sc, context->set_credentials) { | |
3081 | _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *plaintext = NULL; | |
3082 | const char *data; | |
3083 | size_t size, add; | |
3084 | ||
3085 | /* Note that we check ahead of time here instead of relying on O_EXCL|O_CREAT later to return | |
3086 | * EEXIST if the credential already exists. That's because the TPM2-based decryption is kinda | |
3087 | * slow and involved, hence it's nice to be able to skip that if the credential already | |
3088 | * exists anyway. */ | |
3089 | if (faccessat(dfd, sc->id, F_OK, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) >= 0) | |
3090 | continue; | |
3091 | if (errno != ENOENT) | |
3092 | return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to test if credential %s exists: %m", sc->id); | |
3093 | ||
3094 | if (sc->encrypted) { | |
3095 | r = decrypt_credential_and_warn(sc->id, now(CLOCK_REALTIME), NULL, NULL, sc->data, sc->size, &plaintext, &size); | |
3096 | if (r < 0) | |
3097 | return r; | |
3098 | ||
3099 | data = plaintext; | |
3100 | } else { | |
3101 | data = sc->data; | |
3102 | size = sc->size; | |
3103 | } | |
3104 | ||
3105 | add = strlen(sc->id) + size; | |
3106 | if (add > left) | |
3107 | return -E2BIG; | |
3108 | ||
3109 | r = write_credential(dfd, sc->id, data, size, uid, ownership_ok); | |
3110 | if (r < 0) | |
3111 | return r; | |
3112 | ||
3113 | left -= add; | |
3114 | } | |
3115 | ||
3116 | if (fchmod(dfd, 0500) < 0) /* Now take away the "w" bit */ | |
3117 | return -errno; | |
3118 | ||
3119 | /* After we created all keys with the right perms, also make sure the credential store as a whole is | |
3120 | * accessible */ | |
3121 | ||
3122 | if (uid_is_valid(uid) && uid != getuid()) { | |
3123 | r = fd_add_uid_acl_permission(dfd, uid, ACL_READ | ACL_EXECUTE); | |
3124 | if (r < 0) { | |
3125 | if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r)) | |
3126 | return r; | |
3127 | ||
3128 | if (!ownership_ok) | |
3129 | return r; | |
3130 | ||
3131 | if (fchown(dfd, uid, GID_INVALID) < 0) | |
3132 | return -errno; | |
3133 | } | |
3134 | } | |
3135 | ||
3136 | return 0; | |
3137 | } | |
3138 | ||
3139 | static int setup_credentials_internal( | |
3140 | const ExecContext *context, | |
3141 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
3142 | const char *unit, | |
3143 | const char *final, /* This is where the credential store shall eventually end up at */ | |
3144 | const char *workspace, /* This is where we can prepare it before moving it to the final place */ | |
3145 | bool reuse_workspace, /* Whether to reuse any existing workspace mount if it already is a mount */ | |
3146 | bool must_mount, /* Whether to require that we mount something, it's not OK to use the plain directory fall back */ | |
3147 | uid_t uid) { | |
3148 | ||
3149 | int r, workspace_mounted; /* negative if we don't know yet whether we have/can mount something; true | |
3150 | * if we mounted something; false if we definitely can't mount anything */ | |
3151 | bool final_mounted; | |
3152 | const char *where; | |
3153 | ||
3154 | assert(context); | |
3155 | assert(final); | |
3156 | assert(workspace); | |
3157 | ||
3158 | if (reuse_workspace) { | |
3159 | r = path_is_mount_point(workspace, NULL, 0); | |
3160 | if (r < 0) | |
3161 | return r; | |
3162 | if (r > 0) | |
3163 | workspace_mounted = true; /* If this is already a mount, and we are supposed to reuse it, let's keep this in mind */ | |
3164 | else | |
3165 | workspace_mounted = -1; /* We need to figure out if we can mount something to the workspace */ | |
3166 | } else | |
3167 | workspace_mounted = -1; /* ditto */ | |
3168 | ||
3169 | r = path_is_mount_point(final, NULL, 0); | |
3170 | if (r < 0) | |
3171 | return r; | |
3172 | if (r > 0) { | |
3173 | /* If the final place already has something mounted, we use that. If the workspace also has | |
3174 | * something mounted we assume it's actually the same mount (but with MS_RDONLY | |
3175 | * different). */ | |
3176 | final_mounted = true; | |
3177 | ||
3178 | if (workspace_mounted < 0) { | |
3179 | /* If the final place is mounted, but the workspace isn't, then let's bind mount | |
3180 | * the final version to the workspace, and make it writable, so that we can make | |
3181 | * changes */ | |
3182 | ||
3183 | r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, final, workspace, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL); | |
3184 | if (r < 0) | |
3185 | return r; | |
3186 | ||
3187 | r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, NULL, workspace, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REMOUNT|MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, NULL); | |
3188 | if (r < 0) | |
3189 | return r; | |
3190 | ||
3191 | workspace_mounted = true; | |
3192 | } | |
3193 | } else | |
3194 | final_mounted = false; | |
3195 | ||
3196 | if (workspace_mounted < 0) { | |
3197 | /* Nothing is mounted on the workspace yet, let's try to mount something now */ | |
3198 | for (int try = 0;; try++) { | |
3199 | ||
3200 | if (try == 0) { | |
3201 | /* Try "ramfs" first, since it's not swap backed */ | |
3202 | r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "ramfs", workspace, "ramfs", MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, "mode=0700"); | |
3203 | if (r >= 0) { | |
3204 | workspace_mounted = true; | |
3205 | break; | |
3206 | } | |
3207 | ||
3208 | } else if (try == 1) { | |
3209 | _cleanup_free_ char *opts = NULL; | |
3210 | ||
3211 | if (asprintf(&opts, "mode=0700,nr_inodes=1024,size=%zu", (size_t) CREDENTIALS_TOTAL_SIZE_MAX) < 0) | |
3212 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3213 | ||
3214 | /* Fall back to "tmpfs" otherwise */ | |
3215 | r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "tmpfs", workspace, "tmpfs", MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, opts); | |
3216 | if (r >= 0) { | |
3217 | workspace_mounted = true; | |
3218 | break; | |
3219 | } | |
3220 | ||
3221 | } else { | |
3222 | /* If that didn't work, try to make a bind mount from the final to the workspace, so that we can make it writable there. */ | |
3223 | r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, final, workspace, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL); | |
3224 | if (r < 0) { | |
3225 | if (!ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r)) /* Propagate anything that isn't a permission problem */ | |
3226 | return r; | |
3227 | ||
3228 | if (must_mount) /* If we it's not OK to use the plain directory | |
3229 | * fallback, propagate all errors too */ | |
3230 | return r; | |
3231 | ||
3232 | /* If we lack privileges to bind mount stuff, then let's gracefully | |
3233 | * proceed for compat with container envs, and just use the final dir | |
3234 | * as is. */ | |
3235 | ||
3236 | workspace_mounted = false; | |
3237 | break; | |
3238 | } | |
3239 | ||
3240 | /* Make the new bind mount writable (i.e. drop MS_RDONLY) */ | |
3241 | r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, NULL, workspace, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REMOUNT|MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, NULL); | |
3242 | if (r < 0) | |
3243 | return r; | |
3244 | ||
3245 | workspace_mounted = true; | |
3246 | break; | |
3247 | } | |
3248 | } | |
3249 | } | |
3250 | ||
3251 | assert(!must_mount || workspace_mounted > 0); | |
3252 | where = workspace_mounted ? workspace : final; | |
3253 | ||
3254 | (void) label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, where, final, 0); | |
3255 | ||
3256 | r = acquire_credentials(context, params, unit, where, uid, workspace_mounted); | |
3257 | if (r < 0) | |
3258 | return r; | |
3259 | ||
3260 | if (workspace_mounted) { | |
3261 | /* Make workspace read-only now, so that any bind mount we make from it defaults to read-only too */ | |
3262 | r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, NULL, workspace, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REMOUNT|MS_RDONLY|MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NOSUID, NULL); | |
3263 | if (r < 0) | |
3264 | return r; | |
3265 | ||
3266 | /* And mount it to the final place, read-only */ | |
3267 | if (final_mounted) | |
3268 | r = umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, workspace, MNT_DETACH|UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW); | |
3269 | else | |
3270 | r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, workspace, final, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL); | |
3271 | if (r < 0) | |
3272 | return r; | |
3273 | } else { | |
3274 | _cleanup_free_ char *parent = NULL; | |
3275 | ||
3276 | /* If we do not have our own mount put used the plain directory fallback, then we need to | |
3277 | * open access to the top-level credential directory and the per-service directory now */ | |
3278 | ||
3279 | r = path_extract_directory(final, &parent); | |
3280 | if (r < 0) | |
3281 | return r; | |
3282 | if (chmod(parent, 0755) < 0) | |
3283 | return -errno; | |
3284 | } | |
3285 | ||
3286 | return 0; | |
3287 | } | |
3288 | ||
3289 | static int setup_credentials( | |
3290 | const ExecContext *context, | |
3291 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
3292 | const char *unit, | |
3293 | uid_t uid) { | |
3294 | ||
3295 | _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL, *q = NULL; | |
3296 | int r; | |
3297 | ||
3298 | assert(context); | |
3299 | assert(params); | |
3300 | ||
3301 | if (!exec_context_has_credentials(context)) | |
3302 | return 0; | |
3303 | ||
3304 | if (!params->prefix[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME]) | |
3305 | return -EINVAL; | |
3306 | ||
3307 | /* This where we'll place stuff when we are done; this main credentials directory is world-readable, | |
3308 | * and the subdir we mount over with a read-only file system readable by the service's user */ | |
3309 | q = path_join(params->prefix[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME], "credentials"); | |
3310 | if (!q) | |
3311 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3312 | ||
3313 | r = mkdir_label(q, 0755); /* top-level dir: world readable/searchable */ | |
3314 | if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST) | |
3315 | return r; | |
3316 | ||
3317 | p = path_join(q, unit); | |
3318 | if (!p) | |
3319 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3320 | ||
3321 | r = mkdir_label(p, 0700); /* per-unit dir: private to user */ | |
3322 | if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST) | |
3323 | return r; | |
3324 | ||
3325 | r = safe_fork("(sd-mkdcreds)", FORK_DEATHSIG|FORK_WAIT|FORK_NEW_MOUNTNS, NULL); | |
3326 | if (r < 0) { | |
3327 | _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL, *u = NULL; | |
3328 | ||
3329 | /* If this is not a privilege or support issue then propagate the error */ | |
3330 | if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r)) | |
3331 | return r; | |
3332 | ||
3333 | /* Temporary workspace, that remains inaccessible all the time. We prepare stuff there before moving | |
3334 | * it into place, so that users can't access half-initialized credential stores. */ | |
3335 | t = path_join(params->prefix[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME], "systemd/temporary-credentials"); | |
3336 | if (!t) | |
3337 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3338 | ||
3339 | /* We can't set up a mount namespace. In that case operate on a fixed, inaccessible per-unit | |
3340 | * directory outside of /run/credentials/ first, and then move it over to /run/credentials/ | |
3341 | * after it is fully set up */ | |
3342 | u = path_join(t, unit); | |
3343 | if (!u) | |
3344 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3345 | ||
3346 | FOREACH_STRING(i, t, u) { | |
3347 | r = mkdir_label(i, 0700); | |
3348 | if (r < 0 && r != -EEXIST) | |
3349 | return r; | |
3350 | } | |
3351 | ||
3352 | r = setup_credentials_internal( | |
3353 | context, | |
3354 | params, | |
3355 | unit, | |
3356 | p, /* final mount point */ | |
3357 | u, /* temporary workspace to overmount */ | |
3358 | true, /* reuse the workspace if it is already a mount */ | |
3359 | false, /* it's OK to fall back to a plain directory if we can't mount anything */ | |
3360 | uid); | |
3361 | ||
3362 | (void) rmdir(u); /* remove the workspace again if we can. */ | |
3363 | ||
3364 | if (r < 0) | |
3365 | return r; | |
3366 | ||
3367 | } else if (r == 0) { | |
3368 | ||
3369 | /* We managed to set up a mount namespace, and are now in a child. That's great. In this case | |
3370 | * we can use the same directory for all cases, after turning off propagation. Question | |
3371 | * though is: where do we turn off propagation exactly, and where do we place the workspace | |
3372 | * directory? We need some place that is guaranteed to be a mount point in the host, and | |
3373 | * which is guaranteed to have a subdir we can mount over. /run/ is not suitable for this, | |
3374 | * since we ultimately want to move the resulting file system there, i.e. we need propagation | |
3375 | * for /run/ eventually. We could use our own /run/systemd/bind mount on itself, but that | |
3376 | * would be visible in the host mount table all the time, which we want to avoid. Hence, what | |
3377 | * we do here instead we use /dev/ and /dev/shm/ for our purposes. We know for sure that | |
3378 | * /dev/ is a mount point and we now for sure that /dev/shm/ exists. Hence we can turn off | |
3379 | * propagation on the former, and then overmount the latter. | |
3380 | * | |
3381 | * Yes it's nasty playing games with /dev/ and /dev/shm/ like this, since it does not exist | |
3382 | * for this purpose, but there are few other candidates that work equally well for us, and | |
3383 | * given that the we do this in a privately namespaced short-lived single-threaded process | |
3384 | * that no one else sees this should be OK to do. */ | |
3385 | ||
3386 | r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, NULL, "/dev", NULL, MS_SLAVE|MS_REC, NULL); /* Turn off propagation from our namespace to host */ | |
3387 | if (r < 0) | |
3388 | goto child_fail; | |
3389 | ||
3390 | r = setup_credentials_internal( | |
3391 | context, | |
3392 | params, | |
3393 | unit, | |
3394 | p, /* final mount point */ | |
3395 | "/dev/shm", /* temporary workspace to overmount */ | |
3396 | false, /* do not reuse /dev/shm if it is already a mount, under no circumstances */ | |
3397 | true, /* insist that something is mounted, do not allow fallback to plain directory */ | |
3398 | uid); | |
3399 | if (r < 0) | |
3400 | goto child_fail; | |
3401 | ||
3402 | _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); | |
3403 | ||
3404 | child_fail: | |
3405 | _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); | |
3406 | } | |
3407 | ||
3408 | return 0; | |
3409 | } | |
3410 | ||
3411 | #if ENABLE_SMACK | |
3412 | static int setup_smack( | |
3413 | const Manager *manager, | |
3414 | const ExecContext *context, | |
3415 | int executable_fd) { | |
3416 | int r; | |
3417 | ||
3418 | assert(context); | |
3419 | assert(executable_fd >= 0); | |
3420 | ||
3421 | if (context->smack_process_label) { | |
3422 | r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context->smack_process_label); | |
3423 | if (r < 0) | |
3424 | return r; | |
3425 | } else if (manager->default_smack_process_label) { | |
3426 | _cleanup_free_ char *exec_label = NULL; | |
3427 | ||
3428 | r = mac_smack_read_fd(executable_fd, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC, &exec_label); | |
3429 | if (r < 0 && !ERRNO_IS_XATTR_ABSENT(r)) | |
3430 | return r; | |
3431 | ||
3432 | r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label ?: manager->default_smack_process_label); | |
3433 | if (r < 0) | |
3434 | return r; | |
3435 | } | |
3436 | ||
3437 | return 0; | |
3438 | } | |
3439 | #endif | |
3440 | ||
3441 | static int compile_bind_mounts( | |
3442 | const ExecContext *context, | |
3443 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
3444 | BindMount **ret_bind_mounts, | |
3445 | size_t *ret_n_bind_mounts, | |
3446 | char ***ret_empty_directories) { | |
3447 | ||
3448 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **empty_directories = NULL; | |
3449 | BindMount *bind_mounts = NULL; | |
3450 | size_t n, h = 0; | |
3451 | int r; | |
3452 | ||
3453 | assert(context); | |
3454 | assert(params); | |
3455 | assert(ret_bind_mounts); | |
3456 | assert(ret_n_bind_mounts); | |
3457 | assert(ret_empty_directories); | |
3458 | ||
3459 | CLEANUP_ARRAY(bind_mounts, h, bind_mount_free_many); | |
3460 | ||
3461 | n = context->n_bind_mounts; | |
3462 | for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { | |
3463 | if (!params->prefix[t]) | |
3464 | continue; | |
3465 | ||
3466 | for (size_t i = 0; i < context->directories[t].n_items; i++) | |
3467 | n += !context->directories[t].items[i].only_create; | |
3468 | } | |
3469 | ||
3470 | if (n <= 0) { | |
3471 | *ret_bind_mounts = NULL; | |
3472 | *ret_n_bind_mounts = 0; | |
3473 | *ret_empty_directories = NULL; | |
3474 | return 0; | |
3475 | } | |
3476 | ||
3477 | bind_mounts = new(BindMount, n); | |
3478 | if (!bind_mounts) | |
3479 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3480 | ||
3481 | for (size_t i = 0; i < context->n_bind_mounts; i++) { | |
3482 | BindMount *item = context->bind_mounts + i; | |
3483 | _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL; | |
3484 | ||
3485 | s = strdup(item->source); | |
3486 | if (!s) | |
3487 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3488 | ||
3489 | d = strdup(item->destination); | |
3490 | if (!d) | |
3491 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3492 | ||
3493 | bind_mounts[h++] = (BindMount) { | |
3494 | .source = TAKE_PTR(s), | |
3495 | .destination = TAKE_PTR(d), | |
3496 | .read_only = item->read_only, | |
3497 | .recursive = item->recursive, | |
3498 | .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent, | |
3499 | }; | |
3500 | } | |
3501 | ||
3502 | for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { | |
3503 | if (!params->prefix[t]) | |
3504 | continue; | |
3505 | ||
3506 | if (context->directories[t].n_items == 0) | |
3507 | continue; | |
3508 | ||
3509 | if (exec_directory_is_private(context, t) && | |
3510 | !exec_context_with_rootfs(context)) { | |
3511 | char *private_root; | |
3512 | ||
3513 | /* So this is for a dynamic user, and we need to make sure the process can access its own | |
3514 | * directory. For that we overmount the usually inaccessible "private" subdirectory with a | |
3515 | * tmpfs that makes it accessible and is empty except for the submounts we do this for. */ | |
3516 | ||
3517 | private_root = path_join(params->prefix[t], "private"); | |
3518 | if (!private_root) | |
3519 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3520 | ||
3521 | r = strv_consume(&empty_directories, private_root); | |
3522 | if (r < 0) | |
3523 | return r; | |
3524 | } | |
3525 | ||
3526 | for (size_t i = 0; i < context->directories[t].n_items; i++) { | |
3527 | _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL; | |
3528 | ||
3529 | /* When one of the parent directories is in the list, we cannot create the symlink | |
3530 | * for the child directory. See also the comments in setup_exec_directory(). */ | |
3531 | if (context->directories[t].items[i].only_create) | |
3532 | continue; | |
3533 | ||
3534 | if (exec_directory_is_private(context, t)) | |
3535 | s = path_join(params->prefix[t], "private", context->directories[t].items[i].path); | |
3536 | else | |
3537 | s = path_join(params->prefix[t], context->directories[t].items[i].path); | |
3538 | if (!s) | |
3539 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3540 | ||
3541 | if (exec_directory_is_private(context, t) && | |
3542 | exec_context_with_rootfs(context)) | |
3543 | /* When RootDirectory= or RootImage= are set, then the symbolic link to the private | |
3544 | * directory is not created on the root directory. So, let's bind-mount the directory | |
3545 | * on the 'non-private' place. */ | |
3546 | d = path_join(params->prefix[t], context->directories[t].items[i].path); | |
3547 | else | |
3548 | d = strdup(s); | |
3549 | if (!d) | |
3550 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3551 | ||
3552 | bind_mounts[h++] = (BindMount) { | |
3553 | .source = TAKE_PTR(s), | |
3554 | .destination = TAKE_PTR(d), | |
3555 | .read_only = false, | |
3556 | .nosuid = context->dynamic_user, /* don't allow suid/sgid when DynamicUser= is on */ | |
3557 | .recursive = true, | |
3558 | .ignore_enoent = false, | |
3559 | }; | |
3560 | } | |
3561 | } | |
3562 | ||
3563 | assert(h == n); | |
3564 | ||
3565 | *ret_bind_mounts = TAKE_PTR(bind_mounts); | |
3566 | *ret_n_bind_mounts = n; | |
3567 | *ret_empty_directories = TAKE_PTR(empty_directories); | |
3568 | ||
3569 | return (int) n; | |
3570 | } | |
3571 | ||
3572 | /* ret_symlinks will contain a list of pairs src:dest that describes | |
3573 | * the symlinks to create later on. For example, the symlinks needed | |
3574 | * to safely give private directories to DynamicUser=1 users. */ | |
3575 | static int compile_symlinks( | |
3576 | const ExecContext *context, | |
3577 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
3578 | char ***ret_symlinks) { | |
3579 | ||
3580 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **symlinks = NULL; | |
3581 | int r; | |
3582 | ||
3583 | assert(context); | |
3584 | assert(params); | |
3585 | assert(ret_symlinks); | |
3586 | ||
3587 | for (ExecDirectoryType dt = 0; dt < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; dt++) { | |
3588 | for (size_t i = 0; i < context->directories[dt].n_items; i++) { | |
3589 | _cleanup_free_ char *private_path = NULL, *path = NULL; | |
3590 | ||
3591 | STRV_FOREACH(symlink, context->directories[dt].items[i].symlinks) { | |
3592 | _cleanup_free_ char *src_abs = NULL, *dst_abs = NULL; | |
3593 | ||
3594 | src_abs = path_join(params->prefix[dt], context->directories[dt].items[i].path); | |
3595 | dst_abs = path_join(params->prefix[dt], *symlink); | |
3596 | if (!src_abs || !dst_abs) | |
3597 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3598 | ||
3599 | r = strv_consume_pair(&symlinks, TAKE_PTR(src_abs), TAKE_PTR(dst_abs)); | |
3600 | if (r < 0) | |
3601 | return r; | |
3602 | } | |
3603 | ||
3604 | if (!exec_directory_is_private(context, dt) || | |
3605 | exec_context_with_rootfs(context) || | |
3606 | context->directories[dt].items[i].only_create) | |
3607 | continue; | |
3608 | ||
3609 | private_path = path_join(params->prefix[dt], "private", context->directories[dt].items[i].path); | |
3610 | if (!private_path) | |
3611 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3612 | ||
3613 | path = path_join(params->prefix[dt], context->directories[dt].items[i].path); | |
3614 | if (!path) | |
3615 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3616 | ||
3617 | r = strv_consume_pair(&symlinks, TAKE_PTR(private_path), TAKE_PTR(path)); | |
3618 | if (r < 0) | |
3619 | return r; | |
3620 | } | |
3621 | } | |
3622 | ||
3623 | *ret_symlinks = TAKE_PTR(symlinks); | |
3624 | ||
3625 | return 0; | |
3626 | } | |
3627 | ||
3628 | static bool insist_on_sandboxing( | |
3629 | const ExecContext *context, | |
3630 | const char *root_dir, | |
3631 | const char *root_image, | |
3632 | const BindMount *bind_mounts, | |
3633 | size_t n_bind_mounts) { | |
3634 | ||
3635 | assert(context); | |
3636 | assert(n_bind_mounts == 0 || bind_mounts); | |
3637 | ||
3638 | /* Checks whether we need to insist on fs namespacing. i.e. whether we have settings configured that | |
3639 | * would alter the view on the file system beyond making things read-only or invisible, i.e. would | |
3640 | * rearrange stuff in a way we cannot ignore gracefully. */ | |
3641 | ||
3642 | if (context->n_temporary_filesystems > 0) | |
3643 | return true; | |
3644 | ||
3645 | if (root_dir || root_image) | |
3646 | return true; | |
3647 | ||
3648 | if (context->n_mount_images > 0) | |
3649 | return true; | |
3650 | ||
3651 | if (context->dynamic_user) | |
3652 | return true; | |
3653 | ||
3654 | if (context->n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(context->extension_directories)) | |
3655 | return true; | |
3656 | ||
3657 | /* If there are any bind mounts set that don't map back onto themselves, fs namespacing becomes | |
3658 | * essential. */ | |
3659 | for (size_t i = 0; i < n_bind_mounts; i++) | |
3660 | if (!path_equal(bind_mounts[i].source, bind_mounts[i].destination)) | |
3661 | return true; | |
3662 | ||
3663 | if (context->log_namespace) | |
3664 | return true; | |
3665 | ||
3666 | return false; | |
3667 | } | |
3668 | ||
3669 | static int apply_mount_namespace( | |
3670 | const Unit *u, | |
3671 | ExecCommandFlags command_flags, | |
3672 | const ExecContext *context, | |
3673 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
3674 | const ExecRuntime *runtime, | |
3675 | const char *memory_pressure_path, | |
3676 | char **error_path) { | |
3677 | ||
3678 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **empty_directories = NULL, **symlinks = NULL, | |
3679 | **read_write_paths_cleanup = NULL; | |
3680 | const char *tmp_dir = NULL, *var_tmp_dir = NULL; | |
3681 | const char *root_dir = NULL, *root_image = NULL; | |
3682 | _cleanup_free_ char *creds_path = NULL, *incoming_dir = NULL, *propagate_dir = NULL, | |
3683 | *extension_dir = NULL; | |
3684 | char **read_write_paths; | |
3685 | NamespaceInfo ns_info; | |
3686 | bool needs_sandboxing; | |
3687 | BindMount *bind_mounts = NULL; | |
3688 | size_t n_bind_mounts = 0; | |
3689 | int r; | |
3690 | ||
3691 | assert(context); | |
3692 | ||
3693 | CLEANUP_ARRAY(bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts, bind_mount_free_many); | |
3694 | ||
3695 | if (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT) { | |
3696 | root_image = context->root_image; | |
3697 | ||
3698 | if (!root_image) | |
3699 | root_dir = context->root_directory; | |
3700 | } | |
3701 | ||
3702 | r = compile_bind_mounts(context, params, &bind_mounts, &n_bind_mounts, &empty_directories); | |
3703 | if (r < 0) | |
3704 | return r; | |
3705 | ||
3706 | /* Symlinks for exec dirs are set up after other mounts, before they are made read-only. */ | |
3707 | r = compile_symlinks(context, params, &symlinks); | |
3708 | if (r < 0) | |
3709 | return r; | |
3710 | ||
3711 | /* We need to make the pressure path writable even if /sys/fs/cgroups is made read-only, as the | |
3712 | * service will need to write to it in order to start the notifications. */ | |
3713 | if (context->protect_control_groups && memory_pressure_path && !streq(memory_pressure_path, "/dev/null")) { | |
3714 | read_write_paths_cleanup = strv_copy(context->read_write_paths); | |
3715 | if (!read_write_paths_cleanup) | |
3716 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3717 | ||
3718 | r = strv_extend(&read_write_paths_cleanup, memory_pressure_path); | |
3719 | if (r < 0) | |
3720 | return r; | |
3721 | ||
3722 | read_write_paths = read_write_paths_cleanup; | |
3723 | } else | |
3724 | read_write_paths = context->read_write_paths; | |
3725 | ||
3726 | needs_sandboxing = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && !(command_flags & EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED); | |
3727 | if (needs_sandboxing) { | |
3728 | /* The runtime struct only contains the parent of the private /tmp, | |
3729 | * which is non-accessible to world users. Inside of it there's a /tmp | |
3730 | * that is sticky, and that's the one we want to use here. | |
3731 | * This does not apply when we are using /run/systemd/empty as fallback. */ | |
3732 | ||
3733 | if (context->private_tmp && runtime && runtime->shared) { | |
3734 | if (streq_ptr(runtime->shared->tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY)) | |
3735 | tmp_dir = runtime->shared->tmp_dir; | |
3736 | else if (runtime->shared->tmp_dir) | |
3737 | tmp_dir = strjoina(runtime->shared->tmp_dir, "/tmp"); | |
3738 | ||
3739 | if (streq_ptr(runtime->shared->var_tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY)) | |
3740 | var_tmp_dir = runtime->shared->var_tmp_dir; | |
3741 | else if (runtime->shared->var_tmp_dir) | |
3742 | var_tmp_dir = strjoina(runtime->shared->var_tmp_dir, "/tmp"); | |
3743 | } | |
3744 | ||
3745 | ns_info = (NamespaceInfo) { | |
3746 | .ignore_protect_paths = false, | |
3747 | .private_dev = context->private_devices, | |
3748 | .protect_control_groups = context->protect_control_groups, | |
3749 | .protect_kernel_tunables = context->protect_kernel_tunables, | |
3750 | .protect_kernel_modules = context->protect_kernel_modules, | |
3751 | .protect_kernel_logs = context->protect_kernel_logs, | |
3752 | .protect_hostname = context->protect_hostname, | |
3753 | .mount_apivfs = exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(context), | |
3754 | .protect_home = context->protect_home, | |
3755 | .protect_system = context->protect_system, | |
3756 | .protect_proc = context->protect_proc, | |
3757 | .proc_subset = context->proc_subset, | |
3758 | .private_network = exec_needs_network_namespace(context), | |
3759 | .private_ipc = exec_needs_ipc_namespace(context), | |
3760 | /* If NNP is on, we can turn on MS_NOSUID, since it won't have any effect anymore. */ | |
3761 | .mount_nosuid = context->no_new_privileges && !mac_selinux_use(), | |
3762 | }; | |
3763 | } else if (!context->dynamic_user && root_dir) | |
3764 | /* | |
3765 | * If DynamicUser=no and RootDirectory= is set then lets pass a relaxed | |
3766 | * sandbox info, otherwise enforce it, don't ignore protected paths and | |
3767 | * fail if we are enable to apply the sandbox inside the mount namespace. | |
3768 | */ | |
3769 | ns_info = (NamespaceInfo) { | |
3770 | .ignore_protect_paths = true, | |
3771 | }; | |
3772 | else | |
3773 | ns_info = (NamespaceInfo) {}; | |
3774 | ||
3775 | if (context->mount_propagation_flag == MS_SHARED) | |
3776 | log_unit_debug(u, "shared mount propagation hidden by other fs namespacing unit settings: ignoring"); | |
3777 | ||
3778 | if (exec_context_has_credentials(context) && | |
3779 | params->prefix[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] && | |
3780 | FLAGS_SET(params->flags, EXEC_WRITE_CREDENTIALS)) { | |
3781 | creds_path = path_join(params->prefix[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME], "credentials", u->id); | |
3782 | if (!creds_path) | |
3783 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3784 | } | |
3785 | ||
3786 | if (MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(u->manager)) { | |
3787 | propagate_dir = path_join("/run/systemd/propagate/", u->id); | |
3788 | if (!propagate_dir) | |
3789 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3790 | ||
3791 | incoming_dir = strdup("/run/systemd/incoming"); | |
3792 | if (!incoming_dir) | |
3793 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3794 | ||
3795 | extension_dir = strdup("/run/systemd/unit-extensions"); | |
3796 | if (!extension_dir) | |
3797 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3798 | } else | |
3799 | if (asprintf(&extension_dir, "/run/user/" UID_FMT "/systemd/unit-extensions", geteuid()) < 0) | |
3800 | return -ENOMEM; | |
3801 | ||
3802 | r = setup_namespace( | |
3803 | root_dir, | |
3804 | root_image, | |
3805 | context->root_image_options, | |
3806 | context->root_image_policy ?: &image_policy_service, | |
3807 | &ns_info, | |
3808 | read_write_paths, | |
3809 | needs_sandboxing ? context->read_only_paths : NULL, | |
3810 | needs_sandboxing ? context->inaccessible_paths : NULL, | |
3811 | needs_sandboxing ? context->exec_paths : NULL, | |
3812 | needs_sandboxing ? context->no_exec_paths : NULL, | |
3813 | empty_directories, | |
3814 | symlinks, | |
3815 | bind_mounts, | |
3816 | n_bind_mounts, | |
3817 | context->temporary_filesystems, | |
3818 | context->n_temporary_filesystems, | |
3819 | context->mount_images, | |
3820 | context->n_mount_images, | |
3821 | context->mount_image_policy ?: &image_policy_service, | |
3822 | tmp_dir, | |
3823 | var_tmp_dir, | |
3824 | creds_path, | |
3825 | context->log_namespace, | |
3826 | context->mount_propagation_flag, | |
3827 | context->root_hash, context->root_hash_size, context->root_hash_path, | |
3828 | context->root_hash_sig, context->root_hash_sig_size, context->root_hash_sig_path, | |
3829 | context->root_verity, | |
3830 | context->extension_images, | |
3831 | context->n_extension_images, | |
3832 | context->extension_image_policy ?: &image_policy_sysext, | |
3833 | context->extension_directories, | |
3834 | propagate_dir, | |
3835 | incoming_dir, | |
3836 | extension_dir, | |
3837 | root_dir || root_image ? params->notify_socket : NULL, | |
3838 | error_path); | |
3839 | ||
3840 | /* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is probably due to a missing capability. setup_namespace() reports | |
3841 | * that with a special, recognizable error ENOANO. In this case, silently proceed, but only if exclusively | |
3842 | * sandboxing options were used, i.e. nothing such as RootDirectory= or BindMount= that would result in a | |
3843 | * completely different execution environment. */ | |
3844 | if (r == -ENOANO) { | |
3845 | if (insist_on_sandboxing( | |
3846 | context, | |
3847 | root_dir, root_image, | |
3848 | bind_mounts, | |
3849 | n_bind_mounts)) | |
3850 | return log_unit_debug_errno(u, | |
3851 | SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), | |
3852 | "Failed to set up namespace, and refusing to continue since " | |
3853 | "the selected namespacing options alter mount environment non-trivially.\n" | |
3854 | "Bind mounts: %zu, temporary filesystems: %zu, root directory: %s, root image: %s, dynamic user: %s", | |
3855 | n_bind_mounts, | |
3856 | context->n_temporary_filesystems, | |
3857 | yes_no(root_dir), | |
3858 | yes_no(root_image), | |
3859 | yes_no(context->dynamic_user)); | |
3860 | ||
3861 | log_unit_debug(u, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution and ignoring."); | |
3862 | return 0; | |
3863 | } | |
3864 | ||
3865 | return r; | |
3866 | } | |
3867 | ||
3868 | static int apply_working_directory( | |
3869 | const ExecContext *context, | |
3870 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
3871 | const char *home, | |
3872 | int *exit_status) { | |
3873 | ||
3874 | const char *d, *wd; | |
3875 | ||
3876 | assert(context); | |
3877 | assert(exit_status); | |
3878 | ||
3879 | if (context->working_directory_home) { | |
3880 | ||
3881 | if (!home) { | |
3882 | *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR; | |
3883 | return -ENXIO; | |
3884 | } | |
3885 | ||
3886 | wd = home; | |
3887 | ||
3888 | } else | |
3889 | wd = empty_to_root(context->working_directory); | |
3890 | ||
3891 | if (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT) | |
3892 | d = wd; | |
3893 | else | |
3894 | d = prefix_roota(context->root_directory, wd); | |
3895 | ||
3896 | if (chdir(d) < 0 && !context->working_directory_missing_ok) { | |
3897 | *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR; | |
3898 | return -errno; | |
3899 | } | |
3900 | ||
3901 | return 0; | |
3902 | } | |
3903 | ||
3904 | static int apply_root_directory( | |
3905 | const ExecContext *context, | |
3906 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
3907 | const bool needs_mount_ns, | |
3908 | int *exit_status) { | |
3909 | ||
3910 | assert(context); | |
3911 | assert(exit_status); | |
3912 | ||
3913 | if (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT) | |
3914 | if (!needs_mount_ns && context->root_directory) | |
3915 | if (chroot(context->root_directory) < 0) { | |
3916 | *exit_status = EXIT_CHROOT; | |
3917 | return -errno; | |
3918 | } | |
3919 | ||
3920 | return 0; | |
3921 | } | |
3922 | ||
3923 | static int setup_keyring( | |
3924 | const Unit *u, | |
3925 | const ExecContext *context, | |
3926 | const ExecParameters *p, | |
3927 | uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { | |
3928 | ||
3929 | key_serial_t keyring; | |
3930 | int r = 0; | |
3931 | uid_t saved_uid; | |
3932 | gid_t saved_gid; | |
3933 | ||
3934 | assert(u); | |
3935 | assert(context); | |
3936 | assert(p); | |
3937 | ||
3938 | /* Let's set up a new per-service "session" kernel keyring for each system service. This has the benefit that | |
3939 | * each service runs with its own keyring shared among all processes of the service, but with no hook-up beyond | |
3940 | * that scope, and in particular no link to the per-UID keyring. If we don't do this the keyring will be | |
3941 | * automatically created on-demand and then linked to the per-UID keyring, by the kernel. The kernel's built-in | |
3942 | * on-demand behaviour is very appropriate for login users, but probably not so much for system services, where | |
3943 | * UIDs are not necessarily specific to a service but reused (at least in the case of UID 0). */ | |
3944 | ||
3945 | if (context->keyring_mode == EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT) | |
3946 | return 0; | |
3947 | ||
3948 | /* Acquiring a reference to the user keyring is nasty. We briefly change identity in order to get things set up | |
3949 | * properly by the kernel. If we don't do that then we can't create it atomically, and that sucks for parallel | |
3950 | * execution. This mimics what pam_keyinit does, too. Setting up session keyring, to be owned by the right user | |
3951 | * & group is just as nasty as acquiring a reference to the user keyring. */ | |
3952 | ||
3953 | saved_uid = getuid(); | |
3954 | saved_gid = getgid(); | |
3955 | ||
3956 | if (gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != saved_gid) { | |
3957 | if (setregid(gid, -1) < 0) | |
3958 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change GID for user keyring: %m"); | |
3959 | } | |
3960 | ||
3961 | if (uid_is_valid(uid) && uid != saved_uid) { | |
3962 | if (setreuid(uid, -1) < 0) { | |
3963 | r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change UID for user keyring: %m"); | |
3964 | goto out; | |
3965 | } | |
3966 | } | |
3967 | ||
3968 | keyring = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, 0, 0, 0); | |
3969 | if (keyring == -1) { | |
3970 | if (errno == ENOSYS) | |
3971 | log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Kernel keyring not supported, ignoring."); | |
3972 | else if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(errno)) | |
3973 | log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Kernel keyring access prohibited, ignoring."); | |
3974 | else if (errno == EDQUOT) | |
3975 | log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Out of kernel keyrings to allocate, ignoring."); | |
3976 | else | |
3977 | r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Setting up kernel keyring failed: %m"); | |
3978 | ||
3979 | goto out; | |
3980 | } | |
3981 | ||
3982 | /* When requested link the user keyring into the session keyring. */ | |
3983 | if (context->keyring_mode == EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED) { | |
3984 | ||
3985 | if (keyctl(KEYCTL_LINK, | |
3986 | KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING, | |
3987 | KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, 0) < 0) { | |
3988 | r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to link user keyring into session keyring: %m"); | |
3989 | goto out; | |
3990 | } | |
3991 | } | |
3992 | ||
3993 | /* Restore uid/gid back */ | |
3994 | if (uid_is_valid(uid) && uid != saved_uid) { | |
3995 | if (setreuid(saved_uid, -1) < 0) { | |
3996 | r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change UID back for user keyring: %m"); | |
3997 | goto out; | |
3998 | } | |
3999 | } | |
4000 | ||
4001 | if (gid_is_valid(gid) && gid != saved_gid) { | |
4002 | if (setregid(saved_gid, -1) < 0) | |
4003 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to change GID back for user keyring: %m"); | |
4004 | } | |
4005 | ||
4006 | /* Populate they keyring with the invocation ID by default, as original saved_uid. */ | |
4007 | if (!sd_id128_is_null(u->invocation_id)) { | |
4008 | key_serial_t key; | |
4009 | ||
4010 | key = add_key("user", "invocation_id", &u->invocation_id, sizeof(u->invocation_id), KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING); | |
4011 | if (key == -1) | |
4012 | log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Failed to add invocation ID to keyring, ignoring: %m"); | |
4013 | else { | |
4014 | if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, key, | |
4015 | KEY_POS_VIEW|KEY_POS_READ|KEY_POS_SEARCH| | |
4016 | KEY_USR_VIEW|KEY_USR_READ|KEY_USR_SEARCH, 0, 0) < 0) | |
4017 | r = log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to restrict invocation ID permission: %m"); | |
4018 | } | |
4019 | } | |
4020 | ||
4021 | out: | |
4022 | /* Revert back uid & gid for the last time, and exit */ | |
4023 | /* no extra logging, as only the first already reported error matters */ | |
4024 | if (getuid() != saved_uid) | |
4025 | (void) setreuid(saved_uid, -1); | |
4026 | ||
4027 | if (getgid() != saved_gid) | |
4028 | (void) setregid(saved_gid, -1); | |
4029 | ||
4030 | return r; | |
4031 | } | |
4032 | ||
4033 | static void append_socket_pair(int *array, size_t *n, const int pair[static 2]) { | |
4034 | assert(array); | |
4035 | assert(n); | |
4036 | assert(pair); | |
4037 | ||
4038 | if (pair[0] >= 0) | |
4039 | array[(*n)++] = pair[0]; | |
4040 | if (pair[1] >= 0) | |
4041 | array[(*n)++] = pair[1]; | |
4042 | } | |
4043 | ||
4044 | static int close_remaining_fds( | |
4045 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
4046 | const ExecRuntime *runtime, | |
4047 | int user_lookup_fd, | |
4048 | int socket_fd, | |
4049 | const int *fds, size_t n_fds) { | |
4050 | ||
4051 | size_t n_dont_close = 0; | |
4052 | int dont_close[n_fds + 12]; | |
4053 | ||
4054 | assert(params); | |
4055 | ||
4056 | if (params->stdin_fd >= 0) | |
4057 | dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stdin_fd; | |
4058 | if (params->stdout_fd >= 0) | |
4059 | dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stdout_fd; | |
4060 | if (params->stderr_fd >= 0) | |
4061 | dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stderr_fd; | |
4062 | ||
4063 | if (socket_fd >= 0) | |
4064 | dont_close[n_dont_close++] = socket_fd; | |
4065 | if (n_fds > 0) { | |
4066 | memcpy(dont_close + n_dont_close, fds, sizeof(int) * n_fds); | |
4067 | n_dont_close += n_fds; | |
4068 | } | |
4069 | ||
4070 | if (runtime && runtime->shared) { | |
4071 | append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket); | |
4072 | append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket); | |
4073 | } | |
4074 | ||
4075 | if (runtime && runtime->dynamic_creds) { | |
4076 | if (runtime->dynamic_creds->user) | |
4077 | append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->dynamic_creds->user->storage_socket); | |
4078 | if (runtime->dynamic_creds->group) | |
4079 | append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, runtime->dynamic_creds->group->storage_socket); | |
4080 | } | |
4081 | ||
4082 | if (user_lookup_fd >= 0) | |
4083 | dont_close[n_dont_close++] = user_lookup_fd; | |
4084 | ||
4085 | return close_all_fds(dont_close, n_dont_close); | |
4086 | } | |
4087 | ||
4088 | static int send_user_lookup( | |
4089 | Unit *unit, | |
4090 | int user_lookup_fd, | |
4091 | uid_t uid, | |
4092 | gid_t gid) { | |
4093 | ||
4094 | assert(unit); | |
4095 | ||
4096 | /* Send the resolved UID/GID to PID 1 after we learnt it. We send a single datagram, containing the UID/GID | |
4097 | * data as well as the unit name. Note that we suppress sending this if no user/group to resolve was | |
4098 | * specified. */ | |
4099 | ||
4100 | if (user_lookup_fd < 0) | |
4101 | return 0; | |
4102 | ||
4103 | if (!uid_is_valid(uid) && !gid_is_valid(gid)) | |
4104 | return 0; | |
4105 | ||
4106 | if (writev(user_lookup_fd, | |
4107 | (struct iovec[]) { | |
4108 | IOVEC_MAKE(&uid, sizeof(uid)), | |
4109 | IOVEC_MAKE(&gid, sizeof(gid)), | |
4110 | IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(unit->id) }, 3) < 0) | |
4111 | return -errno; | |
4112 | ||
4113 | return 0; | |
4114 | } | |
4115 | ||
4116 | static int acquire_home(const ExecContext *c, uid_t uid, const char** home, char **buf) { | |
4117 | int r; | |
4118 | ||
4119 | assert(c); | |
4120 | assert(home); | |
4121 | assert(buf); | |
4122 | ||
4123 | /* If WorkingDirectory=~ is set, try to acquire a usable home directory. */ | |
4124 | ||
4125 | if (*home) | |
4126 | return 0; | |
4127 | ||
4128 | if (!c->working_directory_home) | |
4129 | return 0; | |
4130 | ||
4131 | r = get_home_dir(buf); | |
4132 | if (r < 0) | |
4133 | return r; | |
4134 | ||
4135 | *home = *buf; | |
4136 | return 1; | |
4137 | } | |
4138 | ||
4139 | static int compile_suggested_paths(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, char ***ret) { | |
4140 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char ** list = NULL; | |
4141 | int r; | |
4142 | ||
4143 | assert(c); | |
4144 | assert(p); | |
4145 | assert(ret); | |
4146 | ||
4147 | assert(c->dynamic_user); | |
4148 | ||
4149 | /* Compile a list of paths that it might make sense to read the owning UID from to use as initial candidate for | |
4150 | * dynamic UID allocation, in order to save us from doing costly recursive chown()s of the special | |
4151 | * directories. */ | |
4152 | ||
4153 | for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { | |
4154 | if (t == EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION) | |
4155 | continue; | |
4156 | ||
4157 | if (!p->prefix[t]) | |
4158 | continue; | |
4159 | ||
4160 | for (size_t i = 0; i < c->directories[t].n_items; i++) { | |
4161 | char *e; | |
4162 | ||
4163 | if (exec_directory_is_private(c, t)) | |
4164 | e = path_join(p->prefix[t], "private", c->directories[t].items[i].path); | |
4165 | else | |
4166 | e = path_join(p->prefix[t], c->directories[t].items[i].path); | |
4167 | if (!e) | |
4168 | return -ENOMEM; | |
4169 | ||
4170 | r = strv_consume(&list, e); | |
4171 | if (r < 0) | |
4172 | return r; | |
4173 | } | |
4174 | } | |
4175 | ||
4176 | *ret = TAKE_PTR(list); | |
4177 | ||
4178 | return 0; | |
4179 | } | |
4180 | ||
4181 | static int exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(const ExecParameters *params, char **ret) { | |
4182 | bool using_subcgroup; | |
4183 | char *p; | |
4184 | ||
4185 | assert(params); | |
4186 | assert(ret); | |
4187 | ||
4188 | if (!params->cgroup_path) | |
4189 | return -EINVAL; | |
4190 | ||
4191 | /* If we are called for a unit where cgroup delegation is on, and the payload created its own populated | |
4192 | * subcgroup (which we expect it to do, after all it asked for delegation), then we cannot place the control | |
4193 | * processes started after the main unit's process in the unit's main cgroup because it is now an inner one, | |
4194 | * and inner cgroups may not contain processes. Hence, if delegation is on, and this is a control process, | |
4195 | * let's use ".control" as subcgroup instead. Note that we do so only for ExecStartPost=, ExecReload=, | |
4196 | * ExecStop=, ExecStopPost=, i.e. for the commands where the main process is already forked. For ExecStartPre= | |
4197 | * this is not necessary, the cgroup is still empty. We distinguish these cases with the EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP | |
4198 | * flag, which is only passed for the former statements, not for the latter. */ | |
4199 | ||
4200 | using_subcgroup = FLAGS_SET(params->flags, EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP|EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE|EXEC_IS_CONTROL); | |
4201 | if (using_subcgroup) | |
4202 | p = path_join(params->cgroup_path, ".control"); | |
4203 | else | |
4204 | p = strdup(params->cgroup_path); | |
4205 | if (!p) | |
4206 | return -ENOMEM; | |
4207 | ||
4208 | *ret = p; | |
4209 | return using_subcgroup; | |
4210 | } | |
4211 | ||
4212 | static int exec_context_cpu_affinity_from_numa(const ExecContext *c, CPUSet *ret) { | |
4213 | _cleanup_(cpu_set_reset) CPUSet s = {}; | |
4214 | int r; | |
4215 | ||
4216 | assert(c); | |
4217 | assert(ret); | |
4218 | ||
4219 | if (!c->numa_policy.nodes.set) { | |
4220 | log_debug("Can't derive CPU affinity mask from NUMA mask because NUMA mask is not set, ignoring"); | |
4221 | return 0; | |
4222 | } | |
4223 | ||
4224 | r = numa_to_cpu_set(&c->numa_policy, &s); | |
4225 | if (r < 0) | |
4226 | return r; | |
4227 | ||
4228 | cpu_set_reset(ret); | |
4229 | ||
4230 | return cpu_set_add_all(ret, &s); | |
4231 | } | |
4232 | ||
4233 | bool exec_context_get_cpu_affinity_from_numa(const ExecContext *c) { | |
4234 | assert(c); | |
4235 | ||
4236 | return c->cpu_affinity_from_numa; | |
4237 | } | |
4238 | ||
4239 | static int add_shifted_fd(int *fds, size_t fds_size, size_t *n_fds, int fd, int *ret_fd) { | |
4240 | int r; | |
4241 | ||
4242 | assert(fds); | |
4243 | assert(n_fds); | |
4244 | assert(*n_fds < fds_size); | |
4245 | assert(ret_fd); | |
4246 | ||
4247 | if (fd < 0) { | |
4248 | *ret_fd = -EBADF; | |
4249 | return 0; | |
4250 | } | |
4251 | ||
4252 | if (fd < 3 + (int) *n_fds) { | |
4253 | /* Let's move the fd up, so that it's outside of the fd range we will use to store | |
4254 | * the fds we pass to the process (or which are closed only during execve). */ | |
4255 | ||
4256 | r = fcntl(fd, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC, 3 + (int) *n_fds); | |
4257 | if (r < 0) | |
4258 | return -errno; | |
4259 | ||
4260 | close_and_replace(fd, r); | |
4261 | } | |
4262 | ||
4263 | *ret_fd = fds[*n_fds] = fd; | |
4264 | (*n_fds) ++; | |
4265 | return 1; | |
4266 | } | |
4267 | ||
4268 | static int connect_unix_harder(Unit *u, const OpenFile *of, int ofd) { | |
4269 | union sockaddr_union addr = { | |
4270 | .un.sun_family = AF_UNIX, | |
4271 | }; | |
4272 | socklen_t sa_len; | |
4273 | static const int socket_types[] = { SOCK_DGRAM, SOCK_STREAM, SOCK_SEQPACKET }; | |
4274 | int r; | |
4275 | ||
4276 | assert(u); | |
4277 | assert(of); | |
4278 | assert(ofd >= 0); | |
4279 | ||
4280 | r = sockaddr_un_set_path(&addr.un, FORMAT_PROC_FD_PATH(ofd)); | |
4281 | if (r < 0) | |
4282 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, r, "Failed to set sockaddr for %s: %m", of->path); | |
4283 | ||
4284 | sa_len = r; | |
4285 | ||
4286 | for (size_t i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(socket_types); i++) { | |
4287 | _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; | |
4288 | ||
4289 | fd = socket(AF_UNIX, socket_types[i] | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0); | |
4290 | if (fd < 0) | |
4291 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to create socket for %s: %m", of->path); | |
4292 | ||
4293 | r = RET_NERRNO(connect(fd, &addr.sa, sa_len)); | |
4294 | if (r == -EPROTOTYPE) | |
4295 | continue; | |
4296 | if (r < 0) | |
4297 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, r, "Failed to connect socket for %s: %m", of->path); | |
4298 | ||
4299 | return TAKE_FD(fd); | |
4300 | } | |
4301 | ||
4302 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPROTOTYPE), "Failed to connect socket for \"%s\".", of->path); | |
4303 | } | |
4304 | ||
4305 | static int get_open_file_fd(Unit *u, const OpenFile *of) { | |
4306 | struct stat st; | |
4307 | _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF, ofd = -EBADF; | |
4308 | ||
4309 | assert(u); | |
4310 | assert(of); | |
4311 | ||
4312 | ofd = open(of->path, O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC); | |
4313 | if (ofd < 0) | |
4314 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Could not open \"%s\": %m", of->path); | |
4315 | ||
4316 | if (fstat(ofd, &st) < 0) | |
4317 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to stat %s: %m", of->path); | |
4318 | ||
4319 | if (S_ISSOCK(st.st_mode)) { | |
4320 | fd = connect_unix_harder(u, of, ofd); | |
4321 | if (fd < 0) | |
4322 | return fd; | |
4323 | ||
4324 | if (FLAGS_SET(of->flags, OPENFILE_READ_ONLY) && shutdown(fd, SHUT_WR) < 0) | |
4325 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, errno, "Failed to shutdown send for socket %s: %m", | |
4326 | of->path); | |
4327 | ||
4328 | log_unit_debug(u, "socket %s opened (fd=%d)", of->path, fd); | |
4329 | } else { | |
4330 | int flags = FLAGS_SET(of->flags, OPENFILE_READ_ONLY) ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR; | |
4331 | if (FLAGS_SET(of->flags, OPENFILE_APPEND)) | |
4332 | flags |= O_APPEND; | |
4333 | else if (FLAGS_SET(of->flags, OPENFILE_TRUNCATE)) | |
4334 | flags |= O_TRUNC; | |
4335 | ||
4336 | fd = fd_reopen(ofd, flags | O_CLOEXEC); | |
4337 | if (fd < 0) | |
4338 | return log_unit_error_errno(u, fd, "Failed to open file %s: %m", of->path); | |
4339 | ||
4340 | log_unit_debug(u, "file %s opened (fd=%d)", of->path, fd); | |
4341 | } | |
4342 | ||
4343 | return TAKE_FD(fd); | |
4344 | } | |
4345 | ||
4346 | static int collect_open_file_fds( | |
4347 | Unit *u, | |
4348 | OpenFile* open_files, | |
4349 | int **fds, | |
4350 | char ***fdnames, | |
4351 | size_t *n_fds) { | |
4352 | int r; | |
4353 | ||
4354 | assert(u); | |
4355 | assert(fds); | |
4356 | assert(fdnames); | |
4357 | assert(n_fds); | |
4358 | ||
4359 | LIST_FOREACH(open_files, of, open_files) { | |
4360 | _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; | |
4361 | ||
4362 | fd = get_open_file_fd(u, of); | |
4363 | if (fd < 0) { | |
4364 | if (FLAGS_SET(of->flags, OPENFILE_GRACEFUL)) { | |
4365 | log_unit_debug_errno(u, fd, "Failed to get OpenFile= file descriptor for %s, ignoring: %m", of->path); | |
4366 | continue; | |
4367 | } | |
4368 | ||
4369 | return fd; | |
4370 | } | |
4371 | ||
4372 | if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(*fds, *n_fds + 1)) | |
4373 | return -ENOMEM; | |
4374 | ||
4375 | r = strv_extend(fdnames, of->fdname); | |
4376 | if (r < 0) | |
4377 | return r; | |
4378 | ||
4379 | (*fds)[*n_fds] = TAKE_FD(fd); | |
4380 | ||
4381 | (*n_fds)++; | |
4382 | } | |
4383 | ||
4384 | return 0; | |
4385 | } | |
4386 | ||
4387 | static void log_command_line(Unit *unit, const char *msg, const char *executable, char **argv) { | |
4388 | assert(unit); | |
4389 | assert(msg); | |
4390 | assert(executable); | |
4391 | ||
4392 | if (!DEBUG_LOGGING) | |
4393 | return; | |
4394 | ||
4395 | _cleanup_free_ char *cmdline = quote_command_line(argv, SHELL_ESCAPE_EMPTY); | |
4396 | ||
4397 | log_unit_struct(unit, LOG_DEBUG, | |
4398 | "EXECUTABLE=%s", executable, | |
4399 | LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "%s: %s", msg, strnull(cmdline)), | |
4400 | LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit)); | |
4401 | } | |
4402 | ||
4403 | static int exec_child( | |
4404 | Unit *unit, | |
4405 | const ExecCommand *command, | |
4406 | const ExecContext *context, | |
4407 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
4408 | ExecRuntime *runtime, | |
4409 | const CGroupContext *cgroup_context, | |
4410 | int socket_fd, | |
4411 | const int named_iofds[static 3], | |
4412 | int *params_fds, | |
4413 | size_t n_socket_fds, | |
4414 | size_t n_storage_fds, | |
4415 | char **files_env, | |
4416 | int user_lookup_fd, | |
4417 | int *exit_status) { | |
4418 | ||
4419 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL, **pass_env = NULL, **joined_exec_search_path = NULL, **accum_env = NULL, **replaced_argv = NULL; | |
4420 | int r, ngids = 0, exec_fd; | |
4421 | _cleanup_free_ gid_t *supplementary_gids = NULL; | |
4422 | const char *username = NULL, *groupname = NULL; | |
4423 | _cleanup_free_ char *home_buffer = NULL, *memory_pressure_path = NULL; | |
4424 | const char *home = NULL, *shell = NULL; | |
4425 | char **final_argv = NULL; | |
4426 | dev_t journal_stream_dev = 0; | |
4427 | ino_t journal_stream_ino = 0; | |
4428 | bool userns_set_up = false; | |
4429 | bool needs_sandboxing, /* Do we need to set up full sandboxing? (i.e. all namespacing, all MAC stuff, caps, yadda yadda */ | |
4430 | needs_setuid, /* Do we need to do the actual setresuid()/setresgid() calls? */ | |
4431 | needs_mount_namespace, /* Do we need to set up a mount namespace for this kernel? */ | |
4432 | needs_ambient_hack; /* Do we need to apply the ambient capabilities hack? */ | |
4433 | #if HAVE_SELINUX | |
4434 | _cleanup_free_ char *mac_selinux_context_net = NULL; | |
4435 | bool use_selinux = false; | |
4436 | #endif | |
4437 | #if ENABLE_SMACK | |
4438 | bool use_smack = false; | |
4439 | #endif | |
4440 | #if HAVE_APPARMOR | |
4441 | bool use_apparmor = false; | |
4442 | #endif | |
4443 | uid_t saved_uid = getuid(); | |
4444 | gid_t saved_gid = getgid(); | |
4445 | uid_t uid = UID_INVALID; | |
4446 | gid_t gid = GID_INVALID; | |
4447 | size_t n_fds = n_socket_fds + n_storage_fds, /* fds to pass to the child */ | |
4448 | n_keep_fds; /* total number of fds not to close */ | |
4449 | int secure_bits; | |
4450 | _cleanup_free_ gid_t *gids_after_pam = NULL; | |
4451 | int ngids_after_pam = 0; | |
4452 | _cleanup_free_ int *fds = NULL; | |
4453 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **fdnames = NULL; | |
4454 | ||
4455 | assert(unit); | |
4456 | assert(command); | |
4457 | assert(context); | |
4458 | assert(params); | |
4459 | assert(exit_status); | |
4460 | ||
4461 | /* Explicitly test for CVE-2021-4034 inspired invocations */ | |
4462 | assert(command->path); | |
4463 | assert(!strv_isempty(command->argv)); | |
4464 | ||
4465 | rename_process_from_path(command->path); | |
4466 | ||
4467 | /* We reset exactly these signals, since they are the only ones we set to SIG_IGN in the main | |
4468 | * daemon. All others we leave untouched because we set them to SIG_DFL or a valid handler initially, | |
4469 | * both of which will be demoted to SIG_DFL. */ | |
4470 | (void) default_signals(SIGNALS_CRASH_HANDLER, | |
4471 | SIGNALS_IGNORE); | |
4472 | ||
4473 | if (context->ignore_sigpipe) | |
4474 | (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE); | |
4475 | ||
4476 | r = reset_signal_mask(); | |
4477 | if (r < 0) { | |
4478 | *exit_status = EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK; | |
4479 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set process signal mask: %m"); | |
4480 | } | |
4481 | ||
4482 | if (params->idle_pipe) | |
4483 | do_idle_pipe_dance(params->idle_pipe); | |
4484 | ||
4485 | /* Close fds we don't need very early to make sure we don't block init reexecution because it cannot bind its | |
4486 | * sockets. Among the fds we close are the logging fds, and we want to keep them closed, so that we don't have | |
4487 | * any fds open we don't really want open during the transition. In order to make logging work, we switch the | |
4488 | * log subsystem into open_when_needed mode, so that it reopens the logs on every single log call. */ | |
4489 | ||
4490 | log_forget_fds(); | |
4491 | log_set_open_when_needed(true); | |
4492 | log_settle_target(); | |
4493 | ||
4494 | /* In case anything used libc syslog(), close this here, too */ | |
4495 | closelog(); | |
4496 | ||
4497 | fds = newdup(int, params_fds, n_fds); | |
4498 | if (!fds) { | |
4499 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
4500 | return log_oom(); | |
4501 | } | |
4502 | ||
4503 | fdnames = strv_copy((char**) params->fd_names); | |
4504 | if (!fdnames) { | |
4505 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
4506 | return log_oom(); | |
4507 | } | |
4508 | ||
4509 | r = collect_open_file_fds(unit, params->open_files, &fds, &fdnames, &n_fds); | |
4510 | if (r < 0) { | |
4511 | *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; | |
4512 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to get OpenFile= file descriptors: %m"); | |
4513 | } | |
4514 | ||
4515 | int keep_fds[n_fds + 3]; | |
4516 | memcpy_safe(keep_fds, fds, n_fds * sizeof(int)); | |
4517 | n_keep_fds = n_fds; | |
4518 | ||
4519 | r = add_shifted_fd(keep_fds, ELEMENTSOF(keep_fds), &n_keep_fds, params->exec_fd, &exec_fd); | |
4520 | if (r < 0) { | |
4521 | *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; | |
4522 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m"); | |
4523 | } | |
4524 | ||
4525 | #if HAVE_LIBBPF | |
4526 | if (unit->manager->restrict_fs) { | |
4527 | int bpf_map_fd = lsm_bpf_map_restrict_fs_fd(unit); | |
4528 | if (bpf_map_fd < 0) { | |
4529 | *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; | |
4530 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, bpf_map_fd, "Failed to get restrict filesystems BPF map fd: %m"); | |
4531 | } | |
4532 | ||
4533 | r = add_shifted_fd(keep_fds, ELEMENTSOF(keep_fds), &n_keep_fds, bpf_map_fd, &bpf_map_fd); | |
4534 | if (r < 0) { | |
4535 | *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; | |
4536 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m"); | |
4537 | } | |
4538 | } | |
4539 | #endif | |
4540 | ||
4541 | r = close_remaining_fds(params, runtime, user_lookup_fd, socket_fd, keep_fds, n_keep_fds); | |
4542 | if (r < 0) { | |
4543 | *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; | |
4544 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to close unwanted file descriptors: %m"); | |
4545 | } | |
4546 | ||
4547 | if (!context->same_pgrp && | |
4548 | setsid() < 0) { | |
4549 | *exit_status = EXIT_SETSID; | |
4550 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to create new process session: %m"); | |
4551 | } | |
4552 | ||
4553 | exec_context_tty_reset(context, params); | |
4554 | ||
4555 | if (unit_shall_confirm_spawn(unit)) { | |
4556 | _cleanup_free_ char *cmdline = NULL; | |
4557 | ||
4558 | cmdline = quote_command_line(command->argv, SHELL_ESCAPE_EMPTY); | |
4559 | if (!cmdline) { | |
4560 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
4561 | return log_oom(); | |
4562 | } | |
4563 | ||
4564 | r = ask_for_confirmation(context, params->confirm_spawn, unit, cmdline); | |
4565 | if (r != CONFIRM_EXECUTE) { | |
4566 | if (r == CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS) { | |
4567 | *exit_status = EXIT_SUCCESS; | |
4568 | return 0; | |
4569 | } | |
4570 | *exit_status = EXIT_CONFIRM; | |
4571 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ECANCELED), | |
4572 | "Execution cancelled by the user"); | |
4573 | } | |
4574 | } | |
4575 | ||
4576 | /* We are about to invoke NSS and PAM modules. Let's tell them what we are doing here, maybe they care. This is | |
4577 | * used by nss-resolve to disable itself when we are about to start systemd-resolved, to avoid deadlocks. Note | |
4578 | * that these env vars do not survive the execve(), which means they really only apply to the PAM and NSS | |
4579 | * invocations themselves. Also note that while we'll only invoke NSS modules involved in user management they | |
4580 | * might internally call into other NSS modules that are involved in hostname resolution, we never know. */ | |
4581 | if (setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_UNIT", unit->id, true) != 0 || | |
4582 | setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_SCOPE", runtime_scope_to_string(unit->manager->runtime_scope), true) != 0) { | |
4583 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
4584 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to update environment: %m"); | |
4585 | } | |
4586 | ||
4587 | if (context->dynamic_user && runtime && runtime->dynamic_creds) { | |
4588 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **suggested_paths = NULL; | |
4589 | ||
4590 | /* On top of that, make sure we bypass our own NSS module nss-systemd comprehensively for any NSS | |
4591 | * checks, if DynamicUser=1 is used, as we shouldn't create a feedback loop with ourselves here. */ | |
4592 | if (putenv((char*) "SYSTEMD_NSS_DYNAMIC_BYPASS=1") != 0) { | |
4593 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; | |
4594 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to update environment: %m"); | |
4595 | } | |
4596 | ||
4597 | r = compile_suggested_paths(context, params, &suggested_paths); | |
4598 | if (r < 0) { | |
4599 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
4600 | return log_oom(); | |
4601 | } | |
4602 | ||
4603 | r = dynamic_creds_realize(runtime->dynamic_creds, suggested_paths, &uid, &gid); | |
4604 | if (r < 0) { | |
4605 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; | |
4606 | if (r == -EILSEQ) | |
4607 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), | |
4608 | "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: User or group with specified name already exists."); | |
4609 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: %m"); | |
4610 | } | |
4611 | ||
4612 | if (!uid_is_valid(uid)) { | |
4613 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; | |
4614 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESRCH), "UID validation failed for \""UID_FMT"\"", uid); | |
4615 | } | |
4616 | ||
4617 | if (!gid_is_valid(gid)) { | |
4618 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; | |
4619 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESRCH), "GID validation failed for \""GID_FMT"\"", gid); | |
4620 | } | |
4621 | ||
4622 | if (runtime->dynamic_creds->user) | |
4623 | username = runtime->dynamic_creds->user->name; | |
4624 | ||
4625 | } else { | |
4626 | r = get_fixed_user(context, &username, &uid, &gid, &home, &shell); | |
4627 | if (r < 0) { | |
4628 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; | |
4629 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine user credentials: %m"); | |
4630 | } | |
4631 | ||
4632 | r = get_fixed_group(context, &groupname, &gid); | |
4633 | if (r < 0) { | |
4634 | *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP; | |
4635 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine group credentials: %m"); | |
4636 | } | |
4637 | } | |
4638 | ||
4639 | /* Initialize user supplementary groups and get SupplementaryGroups= ones */ | |
4640 | r = get_supplementary_groups(context, username, groupname, gid, | |
4641 | &supplementary_gids, &ngids); | |
4642 | if (r < 0) { | |
4643 | *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP; | |
4644 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine supplementary groups: %m"); | |
4645 | } | |
4646 | ||
4647 | r = send_user_lookup(unit, user_lookup_fd, uid, gid); | |
4648 | if (r < 0) { | |
4649 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; | |
4650 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to send user credentials to PID1: %m"); | |
4651 | } | |
4652 | ||
4653 | user_lookup_fd = safe_close(user_lookup_fd); | |
4654 | ||
4655 | r = acquire_home(context, uid, &home, &home_buffer); | |
4656 | if (r < 0) { | |
4657 | *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR; | |
4658 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine $HOME for user: %m"); | |
4659 | } | |
4660 | ||
4661 | /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we must drop O_NONBLOCK */ | |
4662 | if (socket_fd >= 0) | |
4663 | (void) fd_nonblock(socket_fd, false); | |
4664 | ||
4665 | /* Journald will try to look-up our cgroup in order to populate _SYSTEMD_CGROUP and _SYSTEMD_UNIT fields. | |
4666 | * Hence we need to migrate to the target cgroup from init.scope before connecting to journald */ | |
4667 | if (params->cgroup_path) { | |
4668 | _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL; | |
4669 | ||
4670 | r = exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params, &p); | |
4671 | if (r < 0) { | |
4672 | *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; | |
4673 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to acquire cgroup path: %m"); | |
4674 | } | |
4675 | ||
4676 | r = cg_attach_everywhere(params->cgroup_supported, p, 0, NULL, NULL); | |
4677 | if (r == -EUCLEAN) { | |
4678 | *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; | |
4679 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to attach process to cgroup %s " | |
4680 | "because the cgroup or one of its parents or " | |
4681 | "siblings is in the threaded mode: %m", p); | |
4682 | } | |
4683 | if (r < 0) { | |
4684 | *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; | |
4685 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to attach to cgroup %s: %m", p); | |
4686 | } | |
4687 | } | |
4688 | ||
4689 | if (context->network_namespace_path && runtime && runtime->shared && runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { | |
4690 | r = open_shareable_ns_path(runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket, context->network_namespace_path, CLONE_NEWNET); | |
4691 | if (r < 0) { | |
4692 | *exit_status = EXIT_NETWORK; | |
4693 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to open network namespace path %s: %m", context->network_namespace_path); | |
4694 | } | |
4695 | } | |
4696 | ||
4697 | if (context->ipc_namespace_path && runtime && runtime->shared && runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { | |
4698 | r = open_shareable_ns_path(runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket, context->ipc_namespace_path, CLONE_NEWIPC); | |
4699 | if (r < 0) { | |
4700 | *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; | |
4701 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to open IPC namespace path %s: %m", context->ipc_namespace_path); | |
4702 | } | |
4703 | } | |
4704 | ||
4705 | r = setup_input(context, params, socket_fd, named_iofds); | |
4706 | if (r < 0) { | |
4707 | *exit_status = EXIT_STDIN; | |
4708 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up standard input: %m"); | |
4709 | } | |
4710 | ||
4711 | r = setup_output(unit, context, params, STDOUT_FILENO, socket_fd, named_iofds, basename(command->path), uid, gid, &journal_stream_dev, &journal_stream_ino); | |
4712 | if (r < 0) { | |
4713 | *exit_status = EXIT_STDOUT; | |
4714 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up standard output: %m"); | |
4715 | } | |
4716 | ||
4717 | r = setup_output(unit, context, params, STDERR_FILENO, socket_fd, named_iofds, basename(command->path), uid, gid, &journal_stream_dev, &journal_stream_ino); | |
4718 | if (r < 0) { | |
4719 | *exit_status = EXIT_STDERR; | |
4720 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up standard error output: %m"); | |
4721 | } | |
4722 | ||
4723 | if (context->oom_score_adjust_set) { | |
4724 | /* When we can't make this change due to EPERM, then let's silently skip over it. User namespaces | |
4725 | * prohibit write access to this file, and we shouldn't trip up over that. */ | |
4726 | r = set_oom_score_adjust(context->oom_score_adjust); | |
4727 | if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r)) | |
4728 | log_unit_debug_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust OOM setting, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m"); | |
4729 | else if (r < 0) { | |
4730 | *exit_status = EXIT_OOM_ADJUST; | |
4731 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust OOM setting: %m"); | |
4732 | } | |
4733 | } | |
4734 | ||
4735 | if (context->coredump_filter_set) { | |
4736 | r = set_coredump_filter(context->coredump_filter); | |
4737 | if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r)) | |
4738 | log_unit_debug_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust coredump_filter, ignoring: %m"); | |
4739 | else if (r < 0) | |
4740 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust coredump_filter: %m"); | |
4741 | } | |
4742 | ||
4743 | if (context->nice_set) { | |
4744 | r = setpriority_closest(context->nice); | |
4745 | if (r < 0) | |
4746 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up process scheduling priority (nice level): %m"); | |
4747 | } | |
4748 | ||
4749 | if (context->cpu_sched_set) { | |
4750 | struct sched_param param = { | |
4751 | .sched_priority = context->cpu_sched_priority, | |
4752 | }; | |
4753 | ||
4754 | r = sched_setscheduler(0, | |
4755 | context->cpu_sched_policy | | |
4756 | (context->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork ? | |
4757 | SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK : 0), | |
4758 | ¶m); | |
4759 | if (r < 0) { | |
4760 | *exit_status = EXIT_SETSCHEDULER; | |
4761 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set up CPU scheduling: %m"); | |
4762 | } | |
4763 | } | |
4764 | ||
4765 | if (context->cpu_affinity_from_numa || context->cpu_set.set) { | |
4766 | _cleanup_(cpu_set_reset) CPUSet converted_cpu_set = {}; | |
4767 | const CPUSet *cpu_set; | |
4768 | ||
4769 | if (context->cpu_affinity_from_numa) { | |
4770 | r = exec_context_cpu_affinity_from_numa(context, &converted_cpu_set); | |
4771 | if (r < 0) { | |
4772 | *exit_status = EXIT_CPUAFFINITY; | |
4773 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to derive CPU affinity mask from NUMA mask: %m"); | |
4774 | } | |
4775 | ||
4776 | cpu_set = &converted_cpu_set; | |
4777 | } else | |
4778 | cpu_set = &context->cpu_set; | |
4779 | ||
4780 | if (sched_setaffinity(0, cpu_set->allocated, cpu_set->set) < 0) { | |
4781 | *exit_status = EXIT_CPUAFFINITY; | |
4782 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set up CPU affinity: %m"); | |
4783 | } | |
4784 | } | |
4785 | ||
4786 | if (mpol_is_valid(numa_policy_get_type(&context->numa_policy))) { | |
4787 | r = apply_numa_policy(&context->numa_policy); | |
4788 | if (r < 0) { | |
4789 | if (ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r)) | |
4790 | log_unit_debug_errno(unit, r, "NUMA support not available, ignoring."); | |
4791 | else { | |
4792 | *exit_status = EXIT_NUMA_POLICY; | |
4793 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set NUMA memory policy: %m"); | |
4794 | } | |
4795 | } | |
4796 | } | |
4797 | ||
4798 | if (context->ioprio_set) | |
4799 | if (ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0, context->ioprio) < 0) { | |
4800 | *exit_status = EXIT_IOPRIO; | |
4801 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set up IO scheduling priority: %m"); | |
4802 | } | |
4803 | ||
4804 | if (context->timer_slack_nsec != NSEC_INFINITY) | |
4805 | if (prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, context->timer_slack_nsec) < 0) { | |
4806 | *exit_status = EXIT_TIMERSLACK; | |
4807 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set up timer slack: %m"); | |
4808 | } | |
4809 | ||
4810 | if (context->personality != PERSONALITY_INVALID) { | |
4811 | r = safe_personality(context->personality); | |
4812 | if (r < 0) { | |
4813 | *exit_status = EXIT_PERSONALITY; | |
4814 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up execution domain (personality): %m"); | |
4815 | } | |
4816 | } | |
4817 | ||
4818 | if (context->utmp_id) { | |
4819 | const char *line = context->tty_path ? | |
4820 | (path_startswith(context->tty_path, "/dev/") ?: context->tty_path) : | |
4821 | NULL; | |
4822 | utmp_put_init_process(context->utmp_id, getpid_cached(), getsid(0), | |
4823 | line, | |
4824 | context->utmp_mode == EXEC_UTMP_INIT ? INIT_PROCESS : | |
4825 | context->utmp_mode == EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN ? LOGIN_PROCESS : | |
4826 | USER_PROCESS, | |
4827 | username); | |
4828 | } | |
4829 | ||
4830 | if (uid_is_valid(uid)) { | |
4831 | r = chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO, uid); | |
4832 | if (r < 0) { | |
4833 | *exit_status = EXIT_STDIN; | |
4834 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to change ownership of terminal: %m"); | |
4835 | } | |
4836 | } | |
4837 | ||
4838 | if (params->cgroup_path) { | |
4839 | /* If delegation is enabled we'll pass ownership of the cgroup to the user of the new process. On cgroup v1 | |
4840 | * this is only about systemd's own hierarchy, i.e. not the controller hierarchies, simply because that's not | |
4841 | * safe. On cgroup v2 there's only one hierarchy anyway, and delegation is safe there, hence in that case only | |
4842 | * touch a single hierarchy too. */ | |
4843 | ||
4844 | if (params->flags & EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE) { | |
4845 | r = cg_set_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, params->cgroup_path, uid, gid); | |
4846 | if (r < 0) { | |
4847 | *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP; | |
4848 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust control group access: %m"); | |
4849 | } | |
4850 | } | |
4851 | ||
4852 | if (cgroup_context && cg_unified() > 0 && is_pressure_supported() > 0) { | |
4853 | if (cgroup_context_want_memory_pressure(cgroup_context)) { | |
4854 | r = cg_get_path("memory", params->cgroup_path, "memory.pressure", &memory_pressure_path); | |
4855 | if (r < 0) { | |
4856 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
4857 | return log_oom(); | |
4858 | } | |
4859 | ||
4860 | r = chmod_and_chown(memory_pressure_path, 0644, uid, gid); | |
4861 | if (r < 0) { | |
4862 | log_unit_full_errno(unit, r == -ENOENT || ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r) ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_WARNING, r, | |
4863 | "Failed to adjust ownership of '%s', ignoring: %m", memory_pressure_path); | |
4864 | memory_pressure_path = mfree(memory_pressure_path); | |
4865 | } | |
4866 | } else if (cgroup_context->memory_pressure_watch == CGROUP_PRESSURE_WATCH_OFF) { | |
4867 | memory_pressure_path = strdup("/dev/null"); /* /dev/null is explicit indicator for turning of memory pressure watch */ | |
4868 | if (!memory_pressure_path) { | |
4869 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
4870 | return log_oom(); | |
4871 | } | |
4872 | } | |
4873 | } | |
4874 | } | |
4875 | ||
4876 | needs_mount_namespace = exec_needs_mount_namespace(context, params, runtime); | |
4877 | ||
4878 | for (ExecDirectoryType dt = 0; dt < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; dt++) { | |
4879 | r = setup_exec_directory(context, params, uid, gid, dt, needs_mount_namespace, exit_status); | |
4880 | if (r < 0) | |
4881 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up special execution directory in %s: %m", params->prefix[dt]); | |
4882 | } | |
4883 | ||
4884 | if (FLAGS_SET(params->flags, EXEC_WRITE_CREDENTIALS)) { | |
4885 | r = setup_credentials(context, params, unit->id, uid); | |
4886 | if (r < 0) { | |
4887 | *exit_status = EXIT_CREDENTIALS; | |
4888 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up credentials: %m"); | |
4889 | } | |
4890 | } | |
4891 | ||
4892 | r = build_environment( | |
4893 | unit, | |
4894 | context, | |
4895 | params, | |
4896 | cgroup_context, | |
4897 | n_fds, | |
4898 | fdnames, | |
4899 | home, | |
4900 | username, | |
4901 | shell, | |
4902 | journal_stream_dev, | |
4903 | journal_stream_ino, | |
4904 | memory_pressure_path, | |
4905 | &our_env); | |
4906 | if (r < 0) { | |
4907 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
4908 | return log_oom(); | |
4909 | } | |
4910 | ||
4911 | r = build_pass_environment(context, &pass_env); | |
4912 | if (r < 0) { | |
4913 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
4914 | return log_oom(); | |
4915 | } | |
4916 | ||
4917 | /* The $PATH variable is set to the default path in params->environment. However, this is overridden | |
4918 | * if user-specified fields have $PATH set. The intention is to also override $PATH if the unit does | |
4919 | * not specify PATH but the unit has ExecSearchPath. */ | |
4920 | if (!strv_isempty(context->exec_search_path)) { | |
4921 | _cleanup_free_ char *joined = NULL; | |
4922 | ||
4923 | joined = strv_join(context->exec_search_path, ":"); | |
4924 | if (!joined) { | |
4925 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
4926 | return log_oom(); | |
4927 | } | |
4928 | ||
4929 | r = strv_env_assign(&joined_exec_search_path, "PATH", joined); | |
4930 | if (r < 0) { | |
4931 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
4932 | return log_oom(); | |
4933 | } | |
4934 | } | |
4935 | ||
4936 | accum_env = strv_env_merge(params->environment, | |
4937 | our_env, | |
4938 | joined_exec_search_path, | |
4939 | pass_env, | |
4940 | context->environment, | |
4941 | files_env); | |
4942 | if (!accum_env) { | |
4943 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
4944 | return log_oom(); | |
4945 | } | |
4946 | accum_env = strv_env_clean(accum_env); | |
4947 | ||
4948 | (void) umask(context->umask); | |
4949 | ||
4950 | r = setup_keyring(unit, context, params, uid, gid); | |
4951 | if (r < 0) { | |
4952 | *exit_status = EXIT_KEYRING; | |
4953 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up kernel keyring: %m"); | |
4954 | } | |
4955 | ||
4956 | /* We need sandboxing if the caller asked us to apply it and the command isn't explicitly excepted | |
4957 | * from it. */ | |
4958 | needs_sandboxing = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && !(command->flags & EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED); | |
4959 | ||
4960 | /* We need the ambient capability hack, if the caller asked us to apply it and the command is marked | |
4961 | * for it, and the kernel doesn't actually support ambient caps. */ | |
4962 | needs_ambient_hack = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && (command->flags & EXEC_COMMAND_AMBIENT_MAGIC) && !ambient_capabilities_supported(); | |
4963 | ||
4964 | /* We need setresuid() if the caller asked us to apply sandboxing and the command isn't explicitly | |
4965 | * excepted from either whole sandboxing or just setresuid() itself, and the ambient hack is not | |
4966 | * desired. */ | |
4967 | if (needs_ambient_hack) | |
4968 | needs_setuid = false; | |
4969 | else | |
4970 | needs_setuid = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && !(command->flags & (EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED|EXEC_COMMAND_NO_SETUID)); | |
4971 | ||
4972 | uint64_t capability_ambient_set = context->capability_ambient_set; | |
4973 | ||
4974 | if (needs_sandboxing) { | |
4975 | /* MAC enablement checks need to be done before a new mount ns is created, as they rely on | |
4976 | * /sys being present. The actual MAC context application will happen later, as late as | |
4977 | * possible, to avoid impacting our own code paths. */ | |
4978 | ||
4979 | #if HAVE_SELINUX | |
4980 | use_selinux = mac_selinux_use(); | |
4981 | #endif | |
4982 | #if ENABLE_SMACK | |
4983 | use_smack = mac_smack_use(); | |
4984 | #endif | |
4985 | #if HAVE_APPARMOR | |
4986 | use_apparmor = mac_apparmor_use(); | |
4987 | #endif | |
4988 | } | |
4989 | ||
4990 | if (needs_sandboxing) { | |
4991 | int which_failed; | |
4992 | ||
4993 | /* Let's set the resource limits before we call into PAM, so that pam_limits wins over what | |
4994 | * is set here. (See below.) */ | |
4995 | ||
4996 | r = setrlimit_closest_all((const struct rlimit* const *) context->rlimit, &which_failed); | |
4997 | if (r < 0) { | |
4998 | *exit_status = EXIT_LIMITS; | |
4999 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust resource limit RLIMIT_%s: %m", rlimit_to_string(which_failed)); | |
5000 | } | |
5001 | } | |
5002 | ||
5003 | if (needs_setuid && context->pam_name && username) { | |
5004 | /* Let's call into PAM after we set up our own idea of resource limits to that pam_limits | |
5005 | * wins here. (See above.) */ | |
5006 | ||
5007 | /* All fds passed in the fds array will be closed in the pam child process. */ | |
5008 | r = setup_pam(context->pam_name, username, uid, gid, context->tty_path, &accum_env, fds, n_fds); | |
5009 | if (r < 0) { | |
5010 | *exit_status = EXIT_PAM; | |
5011 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up PAM session: %m"); | |
5012 | } | |
5013 | ||
5014 | if (ambient_capabilities_supported()) { | |
5015 | uint64_t ambient_after_pam; | |
5016 | ||
5017 | /* PAM modules might have set some ambient caps. Query them here and merge them into | |
5018 | * the caps we want to set in the end, so that we don't end up unsetting them. */ | |
5019 | r = capability_get_ambient(&ambient_after_pam); | |
5020 | if (r < 0) { | |
5021 | *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; | |
5022 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to query ambient caps: %m"); | |
5023 | } | |
5024 | ||
5025 | capability_ambient_set |= ambient_after_pam; | |
5026 | } | |
5027 | ||
5028 | ngids_after_pam = getgroups_alloc(&gids_after_pam); | |
5029 | if (ngids_after_pam < 0) { | |
5030 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
5031 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, ngids_after_pam, "Failed to obtain groups after setting up PAM: %m"); | |
5032 | } | |
5033 | } | |
5034 | ||
5035 | if (needs_sandboxing && context->private_users && have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) <= 0) { | |
5036 | /* If we're unprivileged, set up the user namespace first to enable use of the other namespaces. | |
5037 | * Users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can set up user namespaces last because they will be able to | |
5038 | * set up the all of the other namespaces (i.e. network, mount, UTS) without a user namespace. */ | |
5039 | ||
5040 | userns_set_up = true; | |
5041 | r = setup_private_users(saved_uid, saved_gid, uid, gid); | |
5042 | if (r < 0) { | |
5043 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; | |
5044 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up user namespacing for unprivileged user: %m"); | |
5045 | } | |
5046 | } | |
5047 | ||
5048 | if (exec_needs_network_namespace(context) && runtime && runtime->shared && runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { | |
5049 | ||
5050 | if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_NET)) { | |
5051 | r = setup_shareable_ns(runtime->shared->netns_storage_socket, CLONE_NEWNET); | |
5052 | if (r < 0) { | |
5053 | if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r)) | |
5054 | log_unit_warning_errno(unit, r, | |
5055 | "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but network namespace setup failed, ignoring: %m"); | |
5056 | else { | |
5057 | *exit_status = EXIT_NETWORK; | |
5058 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up network namespacing: %m"); | |
5059 | } | |
5060 | } | |
5061 | } else if (context->network_namespace_path) { | |
5062 | *exit_status = EXIT_NETWORK; | |
5063 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), | |
5064 | "NetworkNamespacePath= is not supported, refusing."); | |
5065 | } else | |
5066 | log_unit_warning(unit, "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support network namespaces, ignoring."); | |
5067 | } | |
5068 | ||
5069 | if (exec_needs_ipc_namespace(context) && runtime && runtime->shared && runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { | |
5070 | ||
5071 | if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_IPC)) { | |
5072 | r = setup_shareable_ns(runtime->shared->ipcns_storage_socket, CLONE_NEWIPC); | |
5073 | if (r == -EPERM) | |
5074 | log_unit_warning_errno(unit, r, | |
5075 | "PrivateIPC=yes is configured, but IPC namespace setup failed, ignoring: %m"); | |
5076 | else if (r < 0) { | |
5077 | *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; | |
5078 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up IPC namespacing: %m"); | |
5079 | } | |
5080 | } else if (context->ipc_namespace_path) { | |
5081 | *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; | |
5082 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), | |
5083 | "IPCNamespacePath= is not supported, refusing."); | |
5084 | } else | |
5085 | log_unit_warning(unit, "PrivateIPC=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support IPC namespaces, ignoring."); | |
5086 | } | |
5087 | ||
5088 | if (needs_mount_namespace) { | |
5089 | _cleanup_free_ char *error_path = NULL; | |
5090 | ||
5091 | r = apply_mount_namespace(unit, command->flags, context, params, runtime, memory_pressure_path, &error_path); | |
5092 | if (r < 0) { | |
5093 | *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE; | |
5094 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up mount namespacing%s%s: %m", | |
5095 | error_path ? ": " : "", strempty(error_path)); | |
5096 | } | |
5097 | } | |
5098 | ||
5099 | if (needs_sandboxing) { | |
5100 | r = apply_protect_hostname(unit, context, exit_status); | |
5101 | if (r < 0) | |
5102 | return r; | |
5103 | } | |
5104 | ||
5105 | /* Drop groups as early as possible. | |
5106 | * This needs to be done after PrivateDevices=y setup as device nodes should be owned by the host's root. | |
5107 | * For non-root in a userns, devices will be owned by the user/group before the group change, and nobody. */ | |
5108 | if (needs_setuid) { | |
5109 | _cleanup_free_ gid_t *gids_to_enforce = NULL; | |
5110 | int ngids_to_enforce = 0; | |
5111 | ||
5112 | ngids_to_enforce = merge_gid_lists(supplementary_gids, | |
5113 | ngids, | |
5114 | gids_after_pam, | |
5115 | ngids_after_pam, | |
5116 | &gids_to_enforce); | |
5117 | if (ngids_to_enforce < 0) { | |
5118 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
5119 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, | |
5120 | ngids_to_enforce, | |
5121 | "Failed to merge group lists. Group membership might be incorrect: %m"); | |
5122 | } | |
5123 | ||
5124 | r = enforce_groups(gid, gids_to_enforce, ngids_to_enforce); | |
5125 | if (r < 0) { | |
5126 | *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP; | |
5127 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Changing group credentials failed: %m"); | |
5128 | } | |
5129 | } | |
5130 | ||
5131 | /* If the user namespace was not set up above, try to do it now. | |
5132 | * It's preferred to set up the user namespace later (after all other namespaces) so as not to be | |
5133 | * restricted by rules pertaining to combining user namespaces with other namespaces (e.g. in the | |
5134 | * case of mount namespaces being less privileged when the mount point list is copied from a | |
5135 | * different user namespace). */ | |
5136 | ||
5137 | if (needs_sandboxing && context->private_users && !userns_set_up) { | |
5138 | r = setup_private_users(saved_uid, saved_gid, uid, gid); | |
5139 | if (r < 0) { | |
5140 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; | |
5141 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up user namespacing: %m"); | |
5142 | } | |
5143 | } | |
5144 | ||
5145 | /* Now that the mount namespace has been set up and privileges adjusted, let's look for the thing we | |
5146 | * shall execute. */ | |
5147 | ||
5148 | _cleanup_free_ char *executable = NULL; | |
5149 | _cleanup_close_ int executable_fd = -EBADF; | |
5150 | r = find_executable_full(command->path, /* root= */ NULL, context->exec_search_path, false, &executable, &executable_fd); | |
5151 | if (r < 0) { | |
5152 | if (r != -ENOMEM && (command->flags & EXEC_COMMAND_IGNORE_FAILURE)) { | |
5153 | log_unit_struct_errno(unit, LOG_INFO, r, | |
5154 | "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR, | |
5155 | LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit), | |
5156 | LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "Executable %s missing, skipping: %m", | |
5157 | command->path), | |
5158 | "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path); | |
5159 | return 0; | |
5160 | } | |
5161 | ||
5162 | *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC; | |
5163 | ||
5164 | return log_unit_struct_errno(unit, LOG_INFO, r, | |
5165 | "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR, | |
5166 | LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit), | |
5167 | LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "Failed to locate executable %s: %m", | |
5168 | command->path), | |
5169 | "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path); | |
5170 | } | |
5171 | ||
5172 | r = add_shifted_fd(keep_fds, ELEMENTSOF(keep_fds), &n_keep_fds, executable_fd, &executable_fd); | |
5173 | if (r < 0) { | |
5174 | *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; | |
5175 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m"); | |
5176 | } | |
5177 | ||
5178 | #if HAVE_SELINUX | |
5179 | if (needs_sandboxing && use_selinux && params->selinux_context_net) { | |
5180 | int fd = -EBADF; | |
5181 | ||
5182 | if (socket_fd >= 0) | |
5183 | fd = socket_fd; | |
5184 | else if (params->n_socket_fds == 1) | |
5185 | /* If stdin is not connected to a socket but we are triggered by exactly one socket unit then we | |
5186 | * use context from that fd to compute the label. */ | |
5187 | fd = params->fds[0]; | |
5188 | ||
5189 | if (fd >= 0) { | |
5190 | r = mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(fd, executable, context->selinux_context, &mac_selinux_context_net); | |
5191 | if (r < 0) { | |
5192 | if (!context->selinux_context_ignore) { | |
5193 | *exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT; | |
5194 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine SELinux context: %m"); | |
5195 | } | |
5196 | log_unit_debug_errno(unit, r, "Failed to determine SELinux context, ignoring: %m"); | |
5197 | } | |
5198 | } | |
5199 | } | |
5200 | #endif | |
5201 | ||
5202 | /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that | |
5203 | * we are more aggressive this time, since we don't need socket_fd and the netns and ipcns fds any | |
5204 | * more. We do keep exec_fd however, if we have it, since we need to keep it open until the final | |
5205 | * execve(). */ | |
5206 | ||
5207 | r = close_all_fds(keep_fds, n_keep_fds); | |
5208 | if (r >= 0) | |
5209 | r = shift_fds(fds, n_fds); | |
5210 | if (r >= 0) | |
5211 | r = flags_fds(fds, n_socket_fds, n_fds, context->non_blocking); | |
5212 | if (r < 0) { | |
5213 | *exit_status = EXIT_FDS; | |
5214 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust passed file descriptors: %m"); | |
5215 | } | |
5216 | ||
5217 | /* At this point, the fds we want to pass to the program are all ready and set up, with O_CLOEXEC turned off | |
5218 | * and at the right fd numbers. The are no other fds open, with one exception: the exec_fd if it is defined, | |
5219 | * and it has O_CLOEXEC set, after all we want it to be closed by the execve(), so that our parent knows we | |
5220 | * came this far. */ | |
5221 | ||
5222 | secure_bits = context->secure_bits; | |
5223 | ||
5224 | if (needs_sandboxing) { | |
5225 | uint64_t bset; | |
5226 | ||
5227 | /* Set the RTPRIO resource limit to 0, but only if nothing else was explicitly requested. | |
5228 | * (Note this is placed after the general resource limit initialization, see above, in order | |
5229 | * to take precedence.) */ | |
5230 | if (context->restrict_realtime && !context->rlimit[RLIMIT_RTPRIO]) { | |
5231 | if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_RTPRIO, &RLIMIT_MAKE_CONST(0)) < 0) { | |
5232 | *exit_status = EXIT_LIMITS; | |
5233 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to adjust RLIMIT_RTPRIO resource limit: %m"); | |
5234 | } | |
5235 | } | |
5236 | ||
5237 | #if ENABLE_SMACK | |
5238 | /* LSM Smack needs the capability CAP_MAC_ADMIN to change the current execution security context of the | |
5239 | * process. This is the latest place before dropping capabilities. Other MAC context are set later. */ | |
5240 | if (use_smack) { | |
5241 | r = setup_smack(unit->manager, context, executable_fd); | |
5242 | if (r < 0 && !context->smack_process_label_ignore) { | |
5243 | *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL; | |
5244 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set SMACK process label: %m"); | |
5245 | } | |
5246 | } | |
5247 | #endif | |
5248 | ||
5249 | bset = context->capability_bounding_set; | |
5250 | /* If the ambient caps hack is enabled (which means the kernel can't do them, and the user asked for | |
5251 | * our magic fallback), then let's add some extra caps, so that the service can drop privs of its own, | |
5252 | * instead of us doing that */ | |
5253 | if (needs_ambient_hack) | |
5254 | bset |= (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETPCAP) | | |
5255 | (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETUID) | | |
5256 | (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETGID); | |
5257 | ||
5258 | if (!cap_test_all(bset)) { | |
5259 | r = capability_bounding_set_drop(bset, /* right_now= */ false); | |
5260 | if (r < 0) { | |
5261 | *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; | |
5262 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to drop capabilities: %m"); | |
5263 | } | |
5264 | } | |
5265 | ||
5266 | /* Ambient capabilities are cleared during setresuid() (in enforce_user()) even with | |
5267 | * keep-caps set. | |
5268 | * | |
5269 | * To be able to raise the ambient capabilities after setresuid() they have to be added to | |
5270 | * the inherited set and keep caps has to be set (done in enforce_user()). After setresuid() | |
5271 | * the ambient capabilities can be raised as they are present in the permitted and | |
5272 | * inhertiable set. However it is possible that someone wants to set ambient capabilities | |
5273 | * without changing the user, so we also set the ambient capabilities here. | |
5274 | * | |
5275 | * The requested ambient capabilities are raised in the inheritable set if the second | |
5276 | * argument is true. */ | |
5277 | if (!needs_ambient_hack) { | |
5278 | r = capability_ambient_set_apply(capability_ambient_set, /* also_inherit= */ true); | |
5279 | if (r < 0) { | |
5280 | *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; | |
5281 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (before UID change): %m"); | |
5282 | } | |
5283 | } | |
5284 | } | |
5285 | ||
5286 | /* chroot to root directory first, before we lose the ability to chroot */ | |
5287 | r = apply_root_directory(context, params, needs_mount_namespace, exit_status); | |
5288 | if (r < 0) | |
5289 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Chrooting to the requested root directory failed: %m"); | |
5290 | ||
5291 | if (needs_setuid) { | |
5292 | if (uid_is_valid(uid)) { | |
5293 | r = enforce_user(context, uid, capability_ambient_set); | |
5294 | if (r < 0) { | |
5295 | *exit_status = EXIT_USER; | |
5296 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to change UID to " UID_FMT ": %m", uid); | |
5297 | } | |
5298 | ||
5299 | if (!needs_ambient_hack && capability_ambient_set != 0) { | |
5300 | ||
5301 | /* Raise the ambient capabilities after user change. */ | |
5302 | r = capability_ambient_set_apply(capability_ambient_set, /* also_inherit= */ false); | |
5303 | if (r < 0) { | |
5304 | *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; | |
5305 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (after UID change): %m"); | |
5306 | } | |
5307 | } | |
5308 | } | |
5309 | } | |
5310 | ||
5311 | /* Apply working directory here, because the working directory might be on NFS and only the user running | |
5312 | * this service might have the correct privilege to change to the working directory */ | |
5313 | r = apply_working_directory(context, params, home, exit_status); | |
5314 | if (r < 0) | |
5315 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Changing to the requested working directory failed: %m"); | |
5316 | ||
5317 | if (needs_sandboxing) { | |
5318 | /* Apply other MAC contexts late, but before seccomp syscall filtering, as those should really be last to | |
5319 | * influence our own codepaths as little as possible. Moreover, applying MAC contexts usually requires | |
5320 | * syscalls that are subject to seccomp filtering, hence should probably be applied before the syscalls | |
5321 | * are restricted. */ | |
5322 | ||
5323 | #if HAVE_SELINUX | |
5324 | if (use_selinux) { | |
5325 | char *exec_context = mac_selinux_context_net ?: context->selinux_context; | |
5326 | ||
5327 | if (exec_context) { | |
5328 | r = setexeccon(exec_context); | |
5329 | if (r < 0) { | |
5330 | if (!context->selinux_context_ignore) { | |
5331 | *exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT; | |
5332 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to change SELinux context to %s: %m", exec_context); | |
5333 | } | |
5334 | log_unit_debug_errno(unit, r, "Failed to change SELinux context to %s, ignoring: %m", exec_context); | |
5335 | } | |
5336 | } | |
5337 | } | |
5338 | #endif | |
5339 | ||
5340 | #if HAVE_APPARMOR | |
5341 | if (use_apparmor && context->apparmor_profile) { | |
5342 | r = aa_change_onexec(context->apparmor_profile); | |
5343 | if (r < 0 && !context->apparmor_profile_ignore) { | |
5344 | *exit_status = EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE; | |
5345 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to prepare AppArmor profile change to %s: %m", context->apparmor_profile); | |
5346 | } | |
5347 | } | |
5348 | #endif | |
5349 | ||
5350 | /* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress potential | |
5351 | * EPERMs we'll try not to call PR_SET_SECUREBITS unless necessary. Setting securebits | |
5352 | * requires CAP_SETPCAP. */ | |
5353 | if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS) != secure_bits) { | |
5354 | /* CAP_SETPCAP is required to set securebits. This capability is raised into the | |
5355 | * effective set here. | |
5356 | * | |
5357 | * The effective set is overwritten during execve() with the following values: | |
5358 | * | |
5359 | * - ambient set (for non-root processes) | |
5360 | * | |
5361 | * - (inheritable | bounding) set for root processes) | |
5362 | * | |
5363 | * Hence there is no security impact to raise it in the effective set before execve | |
5364 | */ | |
5365 | r = capability_gain_cap_setpcap(/* return_caps= */ NULL); | |
5366 | if (r < 0) { | |
5367 | *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES; | |
5368 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to gain CAP_SETPCAP for setting secure bits"); | |
5369 | } | |
5370 | if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, secure_bits) < 0) { | |
5371 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECUREBITS; | |
5372 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to set process secure bits: %m"); | |
5373 | } | |
5374 | } | |
5375 | ||
5376 | if (context_has_no_new_privileges(context)) | |
5377 | if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) { | |
5378 | *exit_status = EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES; | |
5379 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to disable new privileges: %m"); | |
5380 | } | |
5381 | ||
5382 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP | |
5383 | r = apply_address_families(unit, context); | |
5384 | if (r < 0) { | |
5385 | *exit_status = EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES; | |
5386 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to restrict address families: %m"); | |
5387 | } | |
5388 | ||
5389 | r = apply_memory_deny_write_execute(unit, context); | |
5390 | if (r < 0) { | |
5391 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
5392 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to disable writing to executable memory: %m"); | |
5393 | } | |
5394 | ||
5395 | r = apply_restrict_realtime(unit, context); | |
5396 | if (r < 0) { | |
5397 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
5398 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply realtime restrictions: %m"); | |
5399 | } | |
5400 | ||
5401 | r = apply_restrict_suid_sgid(unit, context); | |
5402 | if (r < 0) { | |
5403 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
5404 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply SUID/SGID restrictions: %m"); | |
5405 | } | |
5406 | ||
5407 | r = apply_restrict_namespaces(unit, context); | |
5408 | if (r < 0) { | |
5409 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
5410 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply namespace restrictions: %m"); | |
5411 | } | |
5412 | ||
5413 | r = apply_protect_sysctl(unit, context); | |
5414 | if (r < 0) { | |
5415 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
5416 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply sysctl restrictions: %m"); | |
5417 | } | |
5418 | ||
5419 | r = apply_protect_kernel_modules(unit, context); | |
5420 | if (r < 0) { | |
5421 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
5422 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply module loading restrictions: %m"); | |
5423 | } | |
5424 | ||
5425 | r = apply_protect_kernel_logs(unit, context); | |
5426 | if (r < 0) { | |
5427 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
5428 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply kernel log restrictions: %m"); | |
5429 | } | |
5430 | ||
5431 | r = apply_protect_clock(unit, context); | |
5432 | if (r < 0) { | |
5433 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
5434 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply clock restrictions: %m"); | |
5435 | } | |
5436 | ||
5437 | r = apply_private_devices(unit, context); | |
5438 | if (r < 0) { | |
5439 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
5440 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up private devices: %m"); | |
5441 | } | |
5442 | ||
5443 | r = apply_syscall_archs(unit, context); | |
5444 | if (r < 0) { | |
5445 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
5446 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply syscall architecture restrictions: %m"); | |
5447 | } | |
5448 | ||
5449 | r = apply_lock_personality(unit, context); | |
5450 | if (r < 0) { | |
5451 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
5452 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to lock personalities: %m"); | |
5453 | } | |
5454 | ||
5455 | r = apply_syscall_log(unit, context); | |
5456 | if (r < 0) { | |
5457 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
5458 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply system call log filters: %m"); | |
5459 | } | |
5460 | ||
5461 | /* This really should remain the last step before the execve(), to make sure our own code is unaffected | |
5462 | * by the filter as little as possible. */ | |
5463 | r = apply_syscall_filter(unit, context, needs_ambient_hack); | |
5464 | if (r < 0) { | |
5465 | *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP; | |
5466 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to apply system call filters: %m"); | |
5467 | } | |
5468 | #endif | |
5469 | ||
5470 | #if HAVE_LIBBPF | |
5471 | r = apply_restrict_filesystems(unit, context); | |
5472 | if (r < 0) { | |
5473 | *exit_status = EXIT_BPF; | |
5474 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to restrict filesystems: %m"); | |
5475 | } | |
5476 | #endif | |
5477 | ||
5478 | } | |
5479 | ||
5480 | if (!strv_isempty(context->unset_environment)) { | |
5481 | char **ee = NULL; | |
5482 | ||
5483 | ee = strv_env_delete(accum_env, 1, context->unset_environment); | |
5484 | if (!ee) { | |
5485 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
5486 | return log_oom(); | |
5487 | } | |
5488 | ||
5489 | strv_free_and_replace(accum_env, ee); | |
5490 | } | |
5491 | ||
5492 | if (!FLAGS_SET(command->flags, EXEC_COMMAND_NO_ENV_EXPAND)) { | |
5493 | replaced_argv = replace_env_argv(command->argv, accum_env); | |
5494 | if (!replaced_argv) { | |
5495 | *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY; | |
5496 | return log_oom(); | |
5497 | } | |
5498 | final_argv = replaced_argv; | |
5499 | } else | |
5500 | final_argv = command->argv; | |
5501 | ||
5502 | log_command_line(unit, "Executing", executable, final_argv); | |
5503 | ||
5504 | if (exec_fd >= 0) { | |
5505 | uint8_t hot = 1; | |
5506 | ||
5507 | /* We have finished with all our initializations. Let's now let the manager know that. From this point | |
5508 | * on, if the manager sees POLLHUP on the exec_fd, then execve() was successful. */ | |
5509 | ||
5510 | if (write(exec_fd, &hot, sizeof(hot)) < 0) { | |
5511 | *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC; | |
5512 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to enable exec_fd: %m"); | |
5513 | } | |
5514 | } | |
5515 | ||
5516 | r = fexecve_or_execve(executable_fd, executable, final_argv, accum_env); | |
5517 | ||
5518 | if (exec_fd >= 0) { | |
5519 | uint8_t hot = 0; | |
5520 | ||
5521 | /* The execve() failed. This means the exec_fd is still open. Which means we need to tell the manager | |
5522 | * that POLLHUP on it no longer means execve() succeeded. */ | |
5523 | ||
5524 | if (write(exec_fd, &hot, sizeof(hot)) < 0) { | |
5525 | *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC; | |
5526 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to disable exec_fd: %m"); | |
5527 | } | |
5528 | } | |
5529 | ||
5530 | *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC; | |
5531 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to execute %s: %m", executable); | |
5532 | } | |
5533 | ||
5534 | static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit *unit, const ExecContext *c, char ***l); | |
5535 | static int exec_context_named_iofds(const ExecContext *c, const ExecParameters *p, int named_iofds[static 3]); | |
5536 | ||
5537 | int exec_spawn(Unit *unit, | |
5538 | ExecCommand *command, | |
5539 | const ExecContext *context, | |
5540 | const ExecParameters *params, | |
5541 | ExecRuntime *runtime, | |
5542 | const CGroupContext *cgroup_context, | |
5543 | pid_t *ret) { | |
5544 | ||
5545 | int socket_fd, r, named_iofds[3] = { -1, -1, -1 }, *fds = NULL; | |
5546 | _cleanup_free_ char *subcgroup_path = NULL; | |
5547 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **files_env = NULL; | |
5548 | size_t n_storage_fds = 0, n_socket_fds = 0; | |
5549 | pid_t pid; | |
5550 | ||
5551 | assert(unit); | |
5552 | assert(command); | |
5553 | assert(context); | |
5554 | assert(ret); | |
5555 | assert(params); | |
5556 | assert(params->fds || (params->n_socket_fds + params->n_storage_fds <= 0)); | |
5557 | ||
5558 | LOG_CONTEXT_PUSH_UNIT(unit); | |
5559 | ||
5560 | if (context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET || | |
5561 | context->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET || | |
5562 | context->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET) { | |
5563 | ||
5564 | if (params->n_socket_fds > 1) | |
5565 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Got more than one socket."); | |
5566 | ||
5567 | if (params->n_socket_fds == 0) | |
5568 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Got no socket."); | |
5569 | ||
5570 | socket_fd = params->fds[0]; | |
5571 | } else { | |
5572 | socket_fd = -EBADF; | |
5573 | fds = params->fds; | |
5574 | n_socket_fds = params->n_socket_fds; | |
5575 | n_storage_fds = params->n_storage_fds; | |
5576 | } | |
5577 | ||
5578 | r = exec_context_named_iofds(context, params, named_iofds); | |
5579 | if (r < 0) | |
5580 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to load a named file descriptor: %m"); | |
5581 | ||
5582 | r = exec_context_load_environment(unit, context, &files_env); | |
5583 | if (r < 0) | |
5584 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to load environment files: %m"); | |
5585 | ||
5586 | /* Fork with up-to-date SELinux label database, so the child inherits the up-to-date db | |
5587 | and, until the next SELinux policy changes, we save further reloads in future children. */ | |
5588 | mac_selinux_maybe_reload(); | |
5589 | ||
5590 | /* We won't know the real executable path until we create the mount namespace in the child, but we | |
5591 | want to log from the parent, so we use the possibly inaccurate path here. */ | |
5592 | log_command_line(unit, "About to execute", command->path, command->argv); | |
5593 | ||
5594 | if (params->cgroup_path) { | |
5595 | r = exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params, &subcgroup_path); | |
5596 | if (r < 0) | |
5597 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to acquire subcgroup path: %m"); | |
5598 | if (r > 0) { /* We are using a child cgroup */ | |
5599 | r = cg_create(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, subcgroup_path); | |
5600 | if (r < 0) | |
5601 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to create control group '%s': %m", subcgroup_path); | |
5602 | ||
5603 | /* Normally we would not propagate the xattrs to children but since we created this | |
5604 | * sub-cgroup internally we should do it. */ | |
5605 | cgroup_oomd_xattr_apply(unit, subcgroup_path); | |
5606 | cgroup_log_xattr_apply(unit, subcgroup_path); | |
5607 | } | |
5608 | } | |
5609 | ||
5610 | pid = fork(); | |
5611 | if (pid < 0) | |
5612 | return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to fork: %m"); | |
5613 | ||
5614 | if (pid == 0) { | |
5615 | int exit_status = EXIT_SUCCESS; | |
5616 | ||
5617 | r = exec_child(unit, | |
5618 | command, | |
5619 | context, | |
5620 | params, | |
5621 | runtime, | |
5622 | cgroup_context, | |
5623 | socket_fd, | |
5624 | named_iofds, | |
5625 | fds, | |
5626 | n_socket_fds, | |
5627 | n_storage_fds, | |
5628 | files_env, | |
5629 | unit->manager->user_lookup_fds[1], | |
5630 | &exit_status); | |
5631 | ||
5632 | if (r < 0) { | |
5633 | const char *status = | |
5634 | exit_status_to_string(exit_status, | |
5635 | EXIT_STATUS_LIBC | EXIT_STATUS_SYSTEMD); | |
5636 | ||
5637 | log_unit_struct_errno(unit, LOG_ERR, r, | |
5638 | "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR, | |
5639 | LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit), | |
5640 | LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "Failed at step %s spawning %s: %m", | |
5641 | status, command->path), | |
5642 | "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path); | |
5643 | } | |
5644 | ||
5645 | _exit(exit_status); | |
5646 | } | |
5647 | ||
5648 | log_unit_debug(unit, "Forked %s as "PID_FMT, command->path, pid); | |
5649 | ||
5650 | /* We add the new process to the cgroup both in the child (so that we can be sure that no user code is ever | |
5651 | * executed outside of the cgroup) and in the parent (so that we can be sure that when we kill the cgroup the | |
5652 | * process will be killed too). */ | |
5653 | if (subcgroup_path) | |
5654 | (void) cg_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, subcgroup_path, pid); | |
5655 | ||
5656 | exec_status_start(&command->exec_status, pid); | |
5657 | ||
5658 | *ret = pid; | |
5659 | return 0; | |
5660 | } | |
5661 | ||
5662 | void exec_context_init(ExecContext *c) { | |
5663 | assert(c); | |
5664 | ||
5665 | c->umask = 0022; | |
5666 | c->ioprio = IOPRIO_DEFAULT_CLASS_AND_PRIO; | |
5667 | c->cpu_sched_policy = SCHED_OTHER; | |
5668 | c->syslog_priority = LOG_DAEMON|LOG_INFO; | |
5669 | c->syslog_level_prefix = true; | |
5670 | c->ignore_sigpipe = true; | |
5671 | c->timer_slack_nsec = NSEC_INFINITY; | |
5672 | c->personality = PERSONALITY_INVALID; | |
5673 | for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) | |
5674 | c->directories[t].mode = 0755; | |
5675 | c->timeout_clean_usec = USEC_INFINITY; | |
5676 | c->capability_bounding_set = CAP_MASK_UNSET; | |
5677 | assert_cc(NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL != NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL); | |
5678 | c->restrict_namespaces = NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL; | |
5679 | c->log_level_max = -1; | |
5680 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP | |
5681 | c->syscall_errno = SECCOMP_ERROR_NUMBER_KILL; | |
5682 | #endif | |
5683 | c->tty_rows = UINT_MAX; | |
5684 | c->tty_cols = UINT_MAX; | |
5685 | numa_policy_reset(&c->numa_policy); | |
5686 | c->private_mounts = -1; | |
5687 | } | |
5688 | ||
5689 | void exec_context_done(ExecContext *c) { | |
5690 | assert(c); | |
5691 | ||
5692 | c->environment = strv_free(c->environment); | |
5693 | c->environment_files = strv_free(c->environment_files); | |
5694 | c->pass_environment = strv_free(c->pass_environment); | |
5695 | c->unset_environment = strv_free(c->unset_environment); | |
5696 | ||
5697 | rlimit_free_all(c->rlimit); | |
5698 | ||
5699 | for (size_t l = 0; l < 3; l++) { | |
5700 | c->stdio_fdname[l] = mfree(c->stdio_fdname[l]); | |
5701 | c->stdio_file[l] = mfree(c->stdio_file[l]); | |
5702 | } | |
5703 | ||
5704 | c->working_directory = mfree(c->working_directory); | |
5705 | c->root_directory = mfree(c->root_directory); | |
5706 | c->root_image = mfree(c->root_image); | |
5707 | c->root_image_options = mount_options_free_all(c->root_image_options); | |
5708 | c->root_hash = mfree(c->root_hash); | |
5709 | c->root_hash_size = 0; | |
5710 | c->root_hash_path = mfree(c->root_hash_path); | |
5711 | c->root_hash_sig = mfree(c->root_hash_sig); | |
5712 | c->root_hash_sig_size = 0; | |
5713 | c->root_hash_sig_path = mfree(c->root_hash_sig_path); | |
5714 | c->root_verity = mfree(c->root_verity); | |
5715 | c->extension_images = mount_image_free_many(c->extension_images, &c->n_extension_images); | |
5716 | c->extension_directories = strv_free(c->extension_directories); | |
5717 | c->tty_path = mfree(c->tty_path); | |
5718 | c->syslog_identifier = mfree(c->syslog_identifier); | |
5719 | c->user = mfree(c->user); | |
5720 | c->group = mfree(c->group); | |
5721 | ||
5722 | c->supplementary_groups = strv_free(c->supplementary_groups); | |
5723 | ||
5724 | c->pam_name = mfree(c->pam_name); | |
5725 | ||
5726 | c->read_only_paths = strv_free(c->read_only_paths); | |
5727 | c->read_write_paths = strv_free(c->read_write_paths); | |
5728 | c->inaccessible_paths = strv_free(c->inaccessible_paths); | |
5729 | c->exec_paths = strv_free(c->exec_paths); | |
5730 | c->no_exec_paths = strv_free(c->no_exec_paths); | |
5731 | c->exec_search_path = strv_free(c->exec_search_path); | |
5732 | ||
5733 | bind_mount_free_many(c->bind_mounts, c->n_bind_mounts); | |
5734 | c->bind_mounts = NULL; | |
5735 | c->n_bind_mounts = 0; | |
5736 | temporary_filesystem_free_many(c->temporary_filesystems, c->n_temporary_filesystems); | |
5737 | c->temporary_filesystems = NULL; | |
5738 | c->n_temporary_filesystems = 0; | |
5739 | c->mount_images = mount_image_free_many(c->mount_images, &c->n_mount_images); | |
5740 | ||
5741 | cpu_set_reset(&c->cpu_set); | |
5742 | numa_policy_reset(&c->numa_policy); | |
5743 | ||
5744 | c->utmp_id = mfree(c->utmp_id); | |
5745 | c->selinux_context = mfree(c->selinux_context); | |
5746 | c->apparmor_profile = mfree(c->apparmor_profile); | |
5747 | c->smack_process_label = mfree(c->smack_process_label); | |
5748 | ||
5749 | c->restrict_filesystems = set_free(c->restrict_filesystems); | |
5750 | ||
5751 | c->syscall_filter = hashmap_free(c->syscall_filter); | |
5752 | c->syscall_archs = set_free(c->syscall_archs); | |
5753 | c->address_families = set_free(c->address_families); | |
5754 | ||
5755 | for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) | |
5756 | exec_directory_done(&c->directories[t]); | |
5757 | ||
5758 | c->log_level_max = -1; | |
5759 | ||
5760 | exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(c); | |
5761 | c->log_filter_allowed_patterns = set_free(c->log_filter_allowed_patterns); | |
5762 | c->log_filter_denied_patterns = set_free(c->log_filter_denied_patterns); | |
5763 | ||
5764 | c->log_ratelimit_interval_usec = 0; | |
5765 | c->log_ratelimit_burst = 0; | |
5766 | ||
5767 | c->stdin_data = mfree(c->stdin_data); | |
5768 | c->stdin_data_size = 0; | |
5769 | ||
5770 | c->network_namespace_path = mfree(c->network_namespace_path); | |
5771 | c->ipc_namespace_path = mfree(c->ipc_namespace_path); | |
5772 | ||
5773 | c->log_namespace = mfree(c->log_namespace); | |
5774 | ||
5775 | c->load_credentials = hashmap_free(c->load_credentials); | |
5776 | c->set_credentials = hashmap_free(c->set_credentials); | |
5777 | ||
5778 | c->root_image_policy = image_policy_free(c->root_image_policy); | |
5779 | c->mount_image_policy = image_policy_free(c->mount_image_policy); | |
5780 | c->extension_image_policy = image_policy_free(c->extension_image_policy); | |
5781 | } | |
5782 | ||
5783 | int exec_context_destroy_runtime_directory(const ExecContext *c, const char *runtime_prefix) { | |
5784 | assert(c); | |
5785 | ||
5786 | if (!runtime_prefix) | |
5787 | return 0; | |
5788 | ||
5789 | for (size_t i = 0; i < c->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME].n_items; i++) { | |
5790 | _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL; | |
5791 | ||
5792 | if (exec_directory_is_private(c, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME)) | |
5793 | p = path_join(runtime_prefix, "private", c->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME].items[i].path); | |
5794 | else | |
5795 | p = path_join(runtime_prefix, c->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME].items[i].path); | |
5796 | if (!p) | |
5797 | return -ENOMEM; | |
5798 | ||
5799 | /* We execute this synchronously, since we need to be sure this is gone when we start the | |
5800 | * service next. */ | |
5801 | (void) rm_rf(p, REMOVE_ROOT); | |
5802 | ||
5803 | STRV_FOREACH(symlink, c->directories[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME].items[i].symlinks) { | |
5804 | _cleanup_free_ char *symlink_abs = NULL; | |
5805 | ||
5806 | if (exec_directory_is_private(c, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME)) | |
5807 | symlink_abs = path_join(runtime_prefix, "private", *symlink); | |
5808 | else | |
5809 | symlink_abs = path_join(runtime_prefix, *symlink); | |
5810 | if (!symlink_abs) | |
5811 | return -ENOMEM; | |
5812 | ||
5813 | (void) unlink(symlink_abs); | |
5814 | } | |
5815 | } | |
5816 | ||
5817 | return 0; | |
5818 | } | |
5819 | ||
5820 | int exec_context_destroy_credentials(const ExecContext *c, const char *runtime_prefix, const char *unit) { | |
5821 | _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL; | |
5822 | ||
5823 | assert(c); | |
5824 | ||
5825 | if (!runtime_prefix || !unit) | |
5826 | return 0; | |
5827 | ||
5828 | p = path_join(runtime_prefix, "credentials", unit); | |
5829 | if (!p) | |
5830 | return -ENOMEM; | |
5831 | ||
5832 | /* This is either a tmpfs/ramfs of its own, or a plain directory. Either way, let's first try to | |
5833 | * unmount it, and afterwards remove the mount point */ | |
5834 | (void) umount2(p, MNT_DETACH|UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW); | |
5835 | (void) rm_rf(p, REMOVE_ROOT|REMOVE_CHMOD); | |
5836 | ||
5837 | return 0; | |
5838 | } | |
5839 | ||
5840 | int exec_context_destroy_mount_ns_dir(Unit *u) { | |
5841 | _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL; | |
5842 | ||
5843 | if (!u || !MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(u->manager)) | |
5844 | return 0; | |
5845 | ||
5846 | p = path_join("/run/systemd/propagate/", u->id); | |
5847 | if (!p) | |
5848 | return -ENOMEM; | |
5849 | ||
5850 | /* This is only filled transiently (see mount_in_namespace()), should be empty or even non-existent*/ | |
5851 | if (rmdir(p) < 0 && errno != ENOENT) | |
5852 | log_unit_debug_errno(u, errno, "Unable to remove propagation dir '%s', ignoring: %m", p); | |
5853 | ||
5854 | return 0; | |
5855 | } | |
5856 | ||
5857 | static void exec_command_done(ExecCommand *c) { | |
5858 | assert(c); | |
5859 | ||
5860 | c->path = mfree(c->path); | |
5861 | c->argv = strv_free(c->argv); | |
5862 | } | |
5863 | ||
5864 | void exec_command_done_array(ExecCommand *c, size_t n) { | |
5865 | for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) | |
5866 | exec_command_done(c+i); | |
5867 | } | |
5868 | ||
5869 | ExecCommand* exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand *c) { | |
5870 | ExecCommand *i; | |
5871 | ||
5872 | while ((i = c)) { | |
5873 | LIST_REMOVE(command, c, i); | |
5874 | exec_command_done(i); | |
5875 | free(i); | |
5876 | } | |
5877 | ||
5878 | return NULL; | |
5879 | } | |
5880 | ||
5881 | void exec_command_free_array(ExecCommand **c, size_t n) { | |
5882 | for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) | |
5883 | c[i] = exec_command_free_list(c[i]); | |
5884 | } | |
5885 | ||
5886 | void exec_command_reset_status_array(ExecCommand *c, size_t n) { | |
5887 | for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) | |
5888 | exec_status_reset(&c[i].exec_status); | |
5889 | } | |
5890 | ||
5891 | void exec_command_reset_status_list_array(ExecCommand **c, size_t n) { | |
5892 | for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) | |
5893 | LIST_FOREACH(command, z, c[i]) | |
5894 | exec_status_reset(&z->exec_status); | |
5895 | } | |
5896 | ||
5897 | typedef struct InvalidEnvInfo { | |
5898 | const Unit *unit; | |
5899 | const char *path; | |
5900 | } InvalidEnvInfo; | |
5901 | ||
5902 | static void invalid_env(const char *p, void *userdata) { | |
5903 | InvalidEnvInfo *info = userdata; | |
5904 | ||
5905 | log_unit_error(info->unit, "Ignoring invalid environment assignment '%s': %s", p, info->path); | |
5906 | } | |
5907 | ||
5908 | const char* exec_context_fdname(const ExecContext *c, int fd_index) { | |
5909 | assert(c); | |
5910 | ||
5911 | switch (fd_index) { | |
5912 | ||
5913 | case STDIN_FILENO: | |
5914 | if (c->std_input != EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD) | |
5915 | return NULL; | |
5916 | ||
5917 | return c->stdio_fdname[STDIN_FILENO] ?: "stdin"; | |
5918 | ||
5919 | case STDOUT_FILENO: | |
5920 | if (c->std_output != EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) | |
5921 | return NULL; | |
5922 | ||
5923 | return c->stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO] ?: "stdout"; | |
5924 | ||
5925 | case STDERR_FILENO: | |
5926 | if (c->std_error != EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) | |
5927 | return NULL; | |
5928 | ||
5929 | return c->stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO] ?: "stderr"; | |
5930 | ||
5931 | default: | |
5932 | return NULL; | |
5933 | } | |
5934 | } | |
5935 | ||
5936 | static int exec_context_named_iofds( | |
5937 | const ExecContext *c, | |
5938 | const ExecParameters *p, | |
5939 | int named_iofds[static 3]) { | |
5940 | ||
5941 | size_t targets; | |
5942 | const char* stdio_fdname[3]; | |
5943 | size_t n_fds; | |
5944 | ||
5945 | assert(c); | |
5946 | assert(p); | |
5947 | assert(named_iofds); | |
5948 | ||
5949 | targets = (c->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD) + | |
5950 | (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) + | |
5951 | (c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD); | |
5952 | ||
5953 | for (size_t i = 0; i < 3; i++) | |
5954 | stdio_fdname[i] = exec_context_fdname(c, i); | |
5955 | ||
5956 | n_fds = p->n_storage_fds + p->n_socket_fds; | |
5957 | ||
5958 | for (size_t i = 0; i < n_fds && targets > 0; i++) | |
5959 | if (named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO] < 0 && | |
5960 | c->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD && | |
5961 | stdio_fdname[STDIN_FILENO] && | |
5962 | streq(p->fd_names[i], stdio_fdname[STDIN_FILENO])) { | |
5963 | ||
5964 | named_iofds[STDIN_FILENO] = p->fds[i]; | |
5965 | targets--; | |
5966 | ||
5967 | } else if (named_iofds[STDOUT_FILENO] < 0 && | |
5968 | c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD && | |
5969 | stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO] && | |
5970 | streq(p->fd_names[i], stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO])) { | |
5971 | ||
5972 | named_iofds[STDOUT_FILENO] = p->fds[i]; | |
5973 | targets--; | |
5974 | ||
5975 | } else if (named_iofds[STDERR_FILENO] < 0 && | |
5976 | c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD && | |
5977 | stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO] && | |
5978 | streq(p->fd_names[i], stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO])) { | |
5979 | ||
5980 | named_iofds[STDERR_FILENO] = p->fds[i]; | |
5981 | targets--; | |
5982 | } | |
5983 | ||
5984 | return targets == 0 ? 0 : -ENOENT; | |
5985 | } | |
5986 | ||
5987 | static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit *unit, const ExecContext *c, char ***ret) { | |
5988 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **v = NULL; | |
5989 | int r; | |
5990 | ||
5991 | assert(c); | |
5992 | assert(ret); | |
5993 | ||
5994 | STRV_FOREACH(i, c->environment_files) { | |
5995 | _cleanup_globfree_ glob_t pglob = {}; | |
5996 | bool ignore = false; | |
5997 | char *fn = *i; | |
5998 | ||
5999 | if (fn[0] == '-') { | |
6000 | ignore = true; | |
6001 | fn++; | |
6002 | } | |
6003 | ||
6004 | if (!path_is_absolute(fn)) { | |
6005 | if (ignore) | |
6006 | continue; | |
6007 | return -EINVAL; | |
6008 | } | |
6009 | ||
6010 | /* Filename supports globbing, take all matching files */ | |
6011 | r = safe_glob(fn, 0, &pglob); | |
6012 | if (r < 0) { | |
6013 | if (ignore) | |
6014 | continue; | |
6015 | return r; | |
6016 | } | |
6017 | ||
6018 | /* When we don't match anything, -ENOENT should be returned */ | |
6019 | assert(pglob.gl_pathc > 0); | |
6020 | ||
6021 | for (unsigned n = 0; n < pglob.gl_pathc; n++) { | |
6022 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **p = NULL; | |
6023 | ||
6024 | r = load_env_file(NULL, pglob.gl_pathv[n], &p); | |
6025 | if (r < 0) { | |
6026 | if (ignore) | |
6027 | continue; | |
6028 | return r; | |
6029 | } | |
6030 | ||
6031 | /* Log invalid environment variables with filename */ | |
6032 | if (p) { | |
6033 | InvalidEnvInfo info = { | |
6034 | .unit = unit, | |
6035 | .path = pglob.gl_pathv[n] | |
6036 | }; | |
6037 | ||
6038 | p = strv_env_clean_with_callback(p, invalid_env, &info); | |
6039 | } | |
6040 | ||
6041 | if (!v) | |
6042 | v = TAKE_PTR(p); | |
6043 | else { | |
6044 | char **m = strv_env_merge(v, p); | |
6045 | if (!m) | |
6046 | return -ENOMEM; | |
6047 | ||
6048 | strv_free_and_replace(v, m); | |
6049 | } | |
6050 | } | |
6051 | } | |
6052 | ||
6053 | *ret = TAKE_PTR(v); | |
6054 | ||
6055 | return 0; | |
6056 | } | |
6057 | ||
6058 | static bool tty_may_match_dev_console(const char *tty) { | |
6059 | _cleanup_free_ char *resolved = NULL; | |
6060 | ||
6061 | if (!tty) | |
6062 | return true; | |
6063 | ||
6064 | tty = skip_dev_prefix(tty); | |
6065 | ||
6066 | /* trivial identity? */ | |
6067 | if (streq(tty, "console")) | |
6068 | return true; | |
6069 | ||
6070 | if (resolve_dev_console(&resolved) < 0) | |
6071 | return true; /* if we could not resolve, assume it may */ | |
6072 | ||
6073 | /* "tty0" means the active VC, so it may be the same sometimes */ | |
6074 | return path_equal(resolved, tty) || (streq(resolved, "tty0") && tty_is_vc(tty)); | |
6075 | } | |
6076 | ||
6077 | static bool exec_context_may_touch_tty(const ExecContext *ec) { | |
6078 | assert(ec); | |
6079 | ||
6080 | return ec->tty_reset || | |
6081 | ec->tty_vhangup || | |
6082 | ec->tty_vt_disallocate || | |
6083 | is_terminal_input(ec->std_input) || | |
6084 | is_terminal_output(ec->std_output) || | |
6085 | is_terminal_output(ec->std_error); | |
6086 | } | |
6087 | ||
6088 | bool exec_context_may_touch_console(const ExecContext *ec) { | |
6089 | ||
6090 | return exec_context_may_touch_tty(ec) && | |
6091 | tty_may_match_dev_console(exec_context_tty_path(ec)); | |
6092 | } | |
6093 | ||
6094 | static void strv_fprintf(FILE *f, char **l) { | |
6095 | assert(f); | |
6096 | ||
6097 | STRV_FOREACH(g, l) | |
6098 | fprintf(f, " %s", *g); | |
6099 | } | |
6100 | ||
6101 | static void strv_dump(FILE* f, const char *prefix, const char *name, char **strv) { | |
6102 | assert(f); | |
6103 | assert(prefix); | |
6104 | assert(name); | |
6105 | ||
6106 | if (!strv_isempty(strv)) { | |
6107 | fprintf(f, "%s%s:", prefix, name); | |
6108 | strv_fprintf(f, strv); | |
6109 | fputs("\n", f); | |
6110 | } | |
6111 | } | |
6112 | ||
6113 | void exec_context_dump(const ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) { | |
6114 | int r; | |
6115 | ||
6116 | assert(c); | |
6117 | assert(f); | |
6118 | ||
6119 | prefix = strempty(prefix); | |
6120 | ||
6121 | fprintf(f, | |
6122 | "%sUMask: %04o\n" | |
6123 | "%sWorkingDirectory: %s\n" | |
6124 | "%sRootDirectory: %s\n" | |
6125 | "%sNonBlocking: %s\n" | |
6126 | "%sPrivateTmp: %s\n" | |
6127 | "%sPrivateDevices: %s\n" | |
6128 | "%sProtectKernelTunables: %s\n" | |
6129 | "%sProtectKernelModules: %s\n" | |
6130 | "%sProtectKernelLogs: %s\n" | |
6131 | "%sProtectClock: %s\n" | |
6132 | "%sProtectControlGroups: %s\n" | |
6133 | "%sPrivateNetwork: %s\n" | |
6134 | "%sPrivateUsers: %s\n" | |
6135 | "%sProtectHome: %s\n" | |
6136 | "%sProtectSystem: %s\n" | |
6137 | "%sMountAPIVFS: %s\n" | |
6138 | "%sIgnoreSIGPIPE: %s\n" | |
6139 | "%sMemoryDenyWriteExecute: %s\n" | |
6140 | "%sRestrictRealtime: %s\n" | |
6141 | "%sRestrictSUIDSGID: %s\n" | |
6142 | "%sKeyringMode: %s\n" | |
6143 | "%sProtectHostname: %s\n" | |
6144 | "%sProtectProc: %s\n" | |
6145 | "%sProcSubset: %s\n", | |
6146 | prefix, c->umask, | |
6147 | prefix, empty_to_root(c->working_directory), | |
6148 | prefix, empty_to_root(c->root_directory), | |
6149 | prefix, yes_no(c->non_blocking), | |
6150 | prefix, yes_no(c->private_tmp), | |
6151 | prefix, yes_no(c->private_devices), | |
6152 | prefix, yes_no(c->protect_kernel_tunables), | |
6153 | prefix, yes_no(c->protect_kernel_modules), | |
6154 | prefix, yes_no(c->protect_kernel_logs), | |
6155 | prefix, yes_no(c->protect_clock), | |
6156 | prefix, yes_no(c->protect_control_groups), | |
6157 | prefix, yes_no(c->private_network), | |
6158 | prefix, yes_no(c->private_users), | |
6159 | prefix, protect_home_to_string(c->protect_home), | |
6160 | prefix, protect_system_to_string(c->protect_system), | |
6161 | prefix, yes_no(exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(c)), | |
6162 | prefix, yes_no(c->ignore_sigpipe), | |
6163 | prefix, yes_no(c->memory_deny_write_execute), | |
6164 | prefix, yes_no(c->restrict_realtime), | |
6165 | prefix, yes_no(c->restrict_suid_sgid), | |
6166 | prefix, exec_keyring_mode_to_string(c->keyring_mode), | |
6167 | prefix, yes_no(c->protect_hostname), | |
6168 | prefix, protect_proc_to_string(c->protect_proc), | |
6169 | prefix, proc_subset_to_string(c->proc_subset)); | |
6170 | ||
6171 | if (c->root_image) | |
6172 | fprintf(f, "%sRootImage: %s\n", prefix, c->root_image); | |
6173 | ||
6174 | if (c->root_image_options) { | |
6175 | fprintf(f, "%sRootImageOptions:", prefix); | |
6176 | LIST_FOREACH(mount_options, o, c->root_image_options) | |
6177 | if (!isempty(o->options)) | |
6178 | fprintf(f, " %s:%s", | |
6179 | partition_designator_to_string(o->partition_designator), | |
6180 | o->options); | |
6181 | fprintf(f, "\n"); | |
6182 | } | |
6183 | ||
6184 | if (c->root_hash) { | |
6185 | _cleanup_free_ char *encoded = NULL; | |
6186 | encoded = hexmem(c->root_hash, c->root_hash_size); | |
6187 | if (encoded) | |
6188 | fprintf(f, "%sRootHash: %s\n", prefix, encoded); | |
6189 | } | |
6190 | ||
6191 | if (c->root_hash_path) | |
6192 | fprintf(f, "%sRootHash: %s\n", prefix, c->root_hash_path); | |
6193 | ||
6194 | if (c->root_hash_sig) { | |
6195 | _cleanup_free_ char *encoded = NULL; | |
6196 | ssize_t len; | |
6197 | len = base64mem(c->root_hash_sig, c->root_hash_sig_size, &encoded); | |
6198 | if (len) | |
6199 | fprintf(f, "%sRootHashSignature: base64:%s\n", prefix, encoded); | |
6200 | } | |
6201 | ||
6202 | if (c->root_hash_sig_path) | |
6203 | fprintf(f, "%sRootHashSignature: %s\n", prefix, c->root_hash_sig_path); | |
6204 | ||
6205 | if (c->root_verity) | |
6206 | fprintf(f, "%sRootVerity: %s\n", prefix, c->root_verity); | |
6207 | ||
6208 | STRV_FOREACH(e, c->environment) | |
6209 | fprintf(f, "%sEnvironment: %s\n", prefix, *e); | |
6210 | ||
6211 | STRV_FOREACH(e, c->environment_files) | |
6212 | fprintf(f, "%sEnvironmentFile: %s\n", prefix, *e); | |
6213 | ||
6214 | STRV_FOREACH(e, c->pass_environment) | |
6215 | fprintf(f, "%sPassEnvironment: %s\n", prefix, *e); | |
6216 | ||
6217 | STRV_FOREACH(e, c->unset_environment) | |
6218 | fprintf(f, "%sUnsetEnvironment: %s\n", prefix, *e); | |
6219 | ||
6220 | fprintf(f, "%sRuntimeDirectoryPreserve: %s\n", prefix, exec_preserve_mode_to_string(c->runtime_directory_preserve_mode)); | |
6221 | ||
6222 | for (ExecDirectoryType dt = 0; dt < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; dt++) { | |
6223 | fprintf(f, "%s%sMode: %04o\n", prefix, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt), c->directories[dt].mode); | |
6224 | ||
6225 | for (size_t i = 0; i < c->directories[dt].n_items; i++) { | |
6226 | fprintf(f, "%s%s: %s\n", prefix, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt), c->directories[dt].items[i].path); | |
6227 | ||
6228 | STRV_FOREACH(d, c->directories[dt].items[i].symlinks) | |
6229 | fprintf(f, "%s%s: %s:%s\n", prefix, exec_directory_type_symlink_to_string(dt), c->directories[dt].items[i].path, *d); | |
6230 | } | |
6231 | } | |
6232 | ||
6233 | fprintf(f, "%sTimeoutCleanSec: %s\n", prefix, FORMAT_TIMESPAN(c->timeout_clean_usec, USEC_PER_SEC)); | |
6234 | ||
6235 | if (c->nice_set) | |
6236 | fprintf(f, "%sNice: %i\n", prefix, c->nice); | |
6237 | ||
6238 | if (c->oom_score_adjust_set) | |
6239 | fprintf(f, "%sOOMScoreAdjust: %i\n", prefix, c->oom_score_adjust); | |
6240 | ||
6241 | if (c->coredump_filter_set) | |
6242 | fprintf(f, "%sCoredumpFilter: 0x%"PRIx64"\n", prefix, c->coredump_filter); | |
6243 | ||
6244 | for (unsigned i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) | |
6245 | if (c->rlimit[i]) { | |
6246 | fprintf(f, "%sLimit%s: " RLIM_FMT "\n", | |
6247 | prefix, rlimit_to_string(i), c->rlimit[i]->rlim_max); | |
6248 | fprintf(f, "%sLimit%sSoft: " RLIM_FMT "\n", | |
6249 | prefix, rlimit_to_string(i), c->rlimit[i]->rlim_cur); | |
6250 | } | |
6251 | ||
6252 | if (c->ioprio_set) { | |
6253 | _cleanup_free_ char *class_str = NULL; | |
6254 | ||
6255 | r = ioprio_class_to_string_alloc(ioprio_prio_class(c->ioprio), &class_str); | |
6256 | if (r >= 0) | |
6257 | fprintf(f, "%sIOSchedulingClass: %s\n", prefix, class_str); | |
6258 | ||
6259 | fprintf(f, "%sIOPriority: %d\n", prefix, ioprio_prio_data(c->ioprio)); | |
6260 | } | |
6261 | ||
6262 | if (c->cpu_sched_set) { | |
6263 | _cleanup_free_ char *policy_str = NULL; | |
6264 | ||
6265 | r = sched_policy_to_string_alloc(c->cpu_sched_policy, &policy_str); | |
6266 | if (r >= 0) | |
6267 | fprintf(f, "%sCPUSchedulingPolicy: %s\n", prefix, policy_str); | |
6268 | ||
6269 | fprintf(f, | |
6270 | "%sCPUSchedulingPriority: %i\n" | |
6271 | "%sCPUSchedulingResetOnFork: %s\n", | |
6272 | prefix, c->cpu_sched_priority, | |
6273 | prefix, yes_no(c->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork)); | |
6274 | } | |
6275 | ||
6276 | if (c->cpu_set.set) { | |
6277 | _cleanup_free_ char *affinity = NULL; | |
6278 | ||
6279 | affinity = cpu_set_to_range_string(&c->cpu_set); | |
6280 | fprintf(f, "%sCPUAffinity: %s\n", prefix, affinity); | |
6281 | } | |
6282 | ||
6283 | if (mpol_is_valid(numa_policy_get_type(&c->numa_policy))) { | |
6284 | _cleanup_free_ char *nodes = NULL; | |
6285 | ||
6286 | nodes = cpu_set_to_range_string(&c->numa_policy.nodes); | |
6287 | fprintf(f, "%sNUMAPolicy: %s\n", prefix, mpol_to_string(numa_policy_get_type(&c->numa_policy))); | |
6288 | fprintf(f, "%sNUMAMask: %s\n", prefix, strnull(nodes)); | |
6289 | } | |
6290 | ||
6291 | if (c->timer_slack_nsec != NSEC_INFINITY) | |
6292 | fprintf(f, "%sTimerSlackNSec: "NSEC_FMT "\n", prefix, c->timer_slack_nsec); | |
6293 | ||
6294 | fprintf(f, | |
6295 | "%sStandardInput: %s\n" | |
6296 | "%sStandardOutput: %s\n" | |
6297 | "%sStandardError: %s\n", | |
6298 | prefix, exec_input_to_string(c->std_input), | |
6299 | prefix, exec_output_to_string(c->std_output), | |
6300 | prefix, exec_output_to_string(c->std_error)); | |
6301 | ||
6302 | if (c->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD) | |
6303 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardInputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_fdname[STDIN_FILENO]); | |
6304 | if (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) | |
6305 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardOutputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_fdname[STDOUT_FILENO]); | |
6306 | if (c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD) | |
6307 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardErrorFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_fdname[STDERR_FILENO]); | |
6308 | ||
6309 | if (c->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_FILE) | |
6310 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardInputFile: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDIN_FILENO]); | |
6311 | if (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE) | |
6312 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardOutputFile: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO]); | |
6313 | if (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND) | |
6314 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardOutputFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO]); | |
6315 | if (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE) | |
6316 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardOutputFileToTruncate: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDOUT_FILENO]); | |
6317 | if (c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE) | |
6318 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardErrorFile: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO]); | |
6319 | if (c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND) | |
6320 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardErrorFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO]); | |
6321 | if (c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE) | |
6322 | fprintf(f, "%sStandardErrorFileToTruncate: %s\n", prefix, c->stdio_file[STDERR_FILENO]); | |
6323 | ||
6324 | if (c->tty_path) | |
6325 | fprintf(f, | |
6326 | "%sTTYPath: %s\n" | |
6327 | "%sTTYReset: %s\n" | |
6328 | "%sTTYVHangup: %s\n" | |
6329 | "%sTTYVTDisallocate: %s\n" | |
6330 | "%sTTYRows: %u\n" | |
6331 | "%sTTYColumns: %u\n", | |
6332 | prefix, c->tty_path, | |
6333 | prefix, yes_no(c->tty_reset), | |
6334 | prefix, yes_no(c->tty_vhangup), | |
6335 | prefix, yes_no(c->tty_vt_disallocate), | |
6336 | prefix, c->tty_rows, | |
6337 | prefix, c->tty_cols); | |
6338 | ||
6339 | if (IN_SET(c->std_output, | |
6340 | EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG, | |
6341 | EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL, | |
6342 | EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE, | |
6343 | EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE) || | |
6344 | IN_SET(c->std_error, | |
6345 | EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG, | |
6346 | EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL, | |
6347 | EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE, | |
6348 | EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE)) { | |
6349 | ||
6350 | _cleanup_free_ char *fac_str = NULL, *lvl_str = NULL; | |
6351 | ||
6352 | r = log_facility_unshifted_to_string_alloc(c->syslog_priority >> 3, &fac_str); | |
6353 | if (r >= 0) | |
6354 | fprintf(f, "%sSyslogFacility: %s\n", prefix, fac_str); | |
6355 | ||
6356 | r = log_level_to_string_alloc(LOG_PRI(c->syslog_priority), &lvl_str); | |
6357 | if (r >= 0) | |
6358 | fprintf(f, "%sSyslogLevel: %s\n", prefix, lvl_str); | |
6359 | } | |
6360 | ||
6361 | if (c->log_level_max >= 0) { | |
6362 | _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL; | |
6363 | ||
6364 | (void) log_level_to_string_alloc(c->log_level_max, &t); | |
6365 | ||
6366 | fprintf(f, "%sLogLevelMax: %s\n", prefix, strna(t)); | |
6367 | } | |
6368 | ||
6369 | if (c->log_ratelimit_interval_usec > 0) | |
6370 | fprintf(f, | |
6371 | "%sLogRateLimitIntervalSec: %s\n", | |
6372 | prefix, FORMAT_TIMESPAN(c->log_ratelimit_interval_usec, USEC_PER_SEC)); | |
6373 | ||
6374 | if (c->log_ratelimit_burst > 0) | |
6375 | fprintf(f, "%sLogRateLimitBurst: %u\n", prefix, c->log_ratelimit_burst); | |
6376 | ||
6377 | if (!set_isempty(c->log_filter_allowed_patterns) || !set_isempty(c->log_filter_denied_patterns)) { | |
6378 | fprintf(f, "%sLogFilterPatterns:", prefix); | |
6379 | ||
6380 | char *pattern; | |
6381 | SET_FOREACH(pattern, c->log_filter_allowed_patterns) | |
6382 | fprintf(f, " %s", pattern); | |
6383 | SET_FOREACH(pattern, c->log_filter_denied_patterns) | |
6384 | fprintf(f, " ~%s", pattern); | |
6385 | fputc('\n', f); | |
6386 | } | |
6387 | ||
6388 | for (size_t j = 0; j < c->n_log_extra_fields; j++) { | |
6389 | fprintf(f, "%sLogExtraFields: ", prefix); | |
6390 | fwrite(c->log_extra_fields[j].iov_base, | |
6391 | 1, c->log_extra_fields[j].iov_len, | |
6392 | f); | |
6393 | fputc('\n', f); | |
6394 | } | |
6395 | ||
6396 | if (c->log_namespace) | |
6397 | fprintf(f, "%sLogNamespace: %s\n", prefix, c->log_namespace); | |
6398 | ||
6399 | if (c->secure_bits) { | |
6400 | _cleanup_free_ char *str = NULL; | |
6401 | ||
6402 | r = secure_bits_to_string_alloc(c->secure_bits, &str); | |
6403 | if (r >= 0) | |
6404 | fprintf(f, "%sSecure Bits: %s\n", prefix, str); | |
6405 | } | |
6406 | ||
6407 | if (c->capability_bounding_set != CAP_MASK_UNSET) { | |
6408 | _cleanup_free_ char *str = NULL; | |
6409 | ||
6410 | r = capability_set_to_string(c->capability_bounding_set, &str); | |
6411 | if (r >= 0) | |
6412 | fprintf(f, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet: %s\n", prefix, str); | |
6413 | } | |
6414 | ||
6415 | if (c->capability_ambient_set != 0) { | |
6416 | _cleanup_free_ char *str = NULL; | |
6417 | ||
6418 | r = capability_set_to_string(c->capability_ambient_set, &str); | |
6419 | if (r >= 0) | |
6420 | fprintf(f, "%sAmbientCapabilities: %s\n", prefix, str); | |
6421 | } | |
6422 | ||
6423 | if (c->user) | |
6424 | fprintf(f, "%sUser: %s\n", prefix, c->user); | |
6425 | if (c->group) | |
6426 | fprintf(f, "%sGroup: %s\n", prefix, c->group); | |
6427 | ||
6428 | fprintf(f, "%sDynamicUser: %s\n", prefix, yes_no(c->dynamic_user)); | |
6429 | ||
6430 | strv_dump(f, prefix, "SupplementaryGroups", c->supplementary_groups); | |
6431 | ||
6432 | if (c->pam_name) | |
6433 | fprintf(f, "%sPAMName: %s\n", prefix, c->pam_name); | |
6434 | ||
6435 | strv_dump(f, prefix, "ReadWritePaths", c->read_write_paths); | |
6436 | strv_dump(f, prefix, "ReadOnlyPaths", c->read_only_paths); | |
6437 | strv_dump(f, prefix, "InaccessiblePaths", c->inaccessible_paths); | |
6438 | strv_dump(f, prefix, "ExecPaths", c->exec_paths); | |
6439 | strv_dump(f, prefix, "NoExecPaths", c->no_exec_paths); | |
6440 | strv_dump(f, prefix, "ExecSearchPath", c->exec_search_path); | |
6441 | ||
6442 | for (size_t i = 0; i < c->n_bind_mounts; i++) | |
6443 | fprintf(f, "%s%s: %s%s:%s:%s\n", prefix, | |
6444 | c->bind_mounts[i].read_only ? "BindReadOnlyPaths" : "BindPaths", | |
6445 | c->bind_mounts[i].ignore_enoent ? "-": "", | |
6446 | c->bind_mounts[i].source, | |
6447 | c->bind_mounts[i].destination, | |
6448 | c->bind_mounts[i].recursive ? "rbind" : "norbind"); | |
6449 | ||
6450 | for (size_t i = 0; i < c->n_temporary_filesystems; i++) { | |
6451 | const TemporaryFileSystem *t = c->temporary_filesystems + i; | |
6452 | ||
6453 | fprintf(f, "%sTemporaryFileSystem: %s%s%s\n", prefix, | |
6454 | t->path, | |
6455 | isempty(t->options) ? "" : ":", | |
6456 | strempty(t->options)); | |
6457 | } | |
6458 | ||
6459 | if (c->utmp_id) | |
6460 | fprintf(f, | |
6461 | "%sUtmpIdentifier: %s\n", | |
6462 | prefix, c->utmp_id); | |
6463 | ||
6464 | if (c->selinux_context) | |
6465 | fprintf(f, | |
6466 | "%sSELinuxContext: %s%s\n", | |
6467 | prefix, c->selinux_context_ignore ? "-" : "", c->selinux_context); | |
6468 | ||
6469 | if (c->apparmor_profile) | |
6470 | fprintf(f, | |
6471 | "%sAppArmorProfile: %s%s\n", | |
6472 | prefix, c->apparmor_profile_ignore ? "-" : "", c->apparmor_profile); | |
6473 | ||
6474 | if (c->smack_process_label) | |
6475 | fprintf(f, | |
6476 | "%sSmackProcessLabel: %s%s\n", | |
6477 | prefix, c->smack_process_label_ignore ? "-" : "", c->smack_process_label); | |
6478 | ||
6479 | if (c->personality != PERSONALITY_INVALID) | |
6480 | fprintf(f, | |
6481 | "%sPersonality: %s\n", | |
6482 | prefix, strna(personality_to_string(c->personality))); | |
6483 | ||
6484 | fprintf(f, | |
6485 | "%sLockPersonality: %s\n", | |
6486 | prefix, yes_no(c->lock_personality)); | |
6487 | ||
6488 | if (c->syscall_filter) { | |
6489 | fprintf(f, | |
6490 | "%sSystemCallFilter: ", | |
6491 | prefix); | |
6492 | ||
6493 | if (!c->syscall_allow_list) | |
6494 | fputc('~', f); | |
6495 | ||
6496 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP | |
6497 | void *id, *val; | |
6498 | bool first = true; | |
6499 | HASHMAP_FOREACH_KEY(val, id, c->syscall_filter) { | |
6500 | _cleanup_free_ char *name = NULL; | |
6501 | const char *errno_name = NULL; | |
6502 | int num = PTR_TO_INT(val); | |
6503 | ||
6504 | if (first) | |
6505 | first = false; | |
6506 | else | |
6507 | fputc(' ', f); | |
6508 | ||
6509 | name = seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE, PTR_TO_INT(id) - 1); | |
6510 | fputs(strna(name), f); | |
6511 | ||
6512 | if (num >= 0) { | |
6513 | errno_name = seccomp_errno_or_action_to_string(num); | |
6514 | if (errno_name) | |
6515 | fprintf(f, ":%s", errno_name); | |
6516 | else | |
6517 | fprintf(f, ":%d", num); | |
6518 | } | |
6519 | } | |
6520 | #endif | |
6521 | ||
6522 | fputc('\n', f); | |
6523 | } | |
6524 | ||
6525 | if (c->syscall_archs) { | |
6526 | fprintf(f, | |
6527 | "%sSystemCallArchitectures:", | |
6528 | prefix); | |
6529 | ||
6530 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP | |
6531 | void *id; | |
6532 | SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_archs) | |
6533 | fprintf(f, " %s", strna(seccomp_arch_to_string(PTR_TO_UINT32(id) - 1))); | |
6534 | #endif | |
6535 | fputc('\n', f); | |
6536 | } | |
6537 | ||
6538 | if (exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c)) { | |
6539 | _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL; | |
6540 | ||
6541 | r = namespace_flags_to_string(c->restrict_namespaces, &s); | |
6542 | if (r >= 0) | |
6543 | fprintf(f, "%sRestrictNamespaces: %s\n", | |
6544 | prefix, strna(s)); | |
6545 | } | |
6546 | ||
6547 | #if HAVE_LIBBPF | |
6548 | if (exec_context_restrict_filesystems_set(c)) { | |
6549 | char *fs; | |
6550 | SET_FOREACH(fs, c->restrict_filesystems) | |
6551 | fprintf(f, "%sRestrictFileSystems: %s\n", prefix, fs); | |
6552 | } | |
6553 | #endif | |
6554 | ||
6555 | if (c->network_namespace_path) | |
6556 | fprintf(f, | |
6557 | "%sNetworkNamespacePath: %s\n", | |
6558 | prefix, c->network_namespace_path); | |
6559 | ||
6560 | if (c->syscall_errno > 0) { | |
6561 | fprintf(f, "%sSystemCallErrorNumber: ", prefix); | |
6562 | ||
6563 | #if HAVE_SECCOMP | |
6564 | const char *errno_name = seccomp_errno_or_action_to_string(c->syscall_errno); | |
6565 | if (errno_name) | |
6566 | fputs(errno_name, f); | |
6567 | else | |
6568 | fprintf(f, "%d", c->syscall_errno); | |
6569 | #endif | |
6570 | fputc('\n', f); | |
6571 | } | |
6572 | ||
6573 | for (size_t i = 0; i < c->n_mount_images; i++) { | |
6574 | fprintf(f, "%sMountImages: %s%s:%s", prefix, | |
6575 | c->mount_images[i].ignore_enoent ? "-": "", | |
6576 | c->mount_images[i].source, | |
6577 | c->mount_images[i].destination); | |
6578 | LIST_FOREACH(mount_options, o, c->mount_images[i].mount_options) | |
6579 | fprintf(f, ":%s:%s", | |
6580 | partition_designator_to_string(o->partition_designator), | |
6581 | strempty(o->options)); | |
6582 | fprintf(f, "\n"); | |
6583 | } | |
6584 | ||
6585 | for (size_t i = 0; i < c->n_extension_images; i++) { | |
6586 | fprintf(f, "%sExtensionImages: %s%s", prefix, | |
6587 | c->extension_images[i].ignore_enoent ? "-": "", | |
6588 | c->extension_images[i].source); | |
6589 | LIST_FOREACH(mount_options, o, c->extension_images[i].mount_options) | |
6590 | fprintf(f, ":%s:%s", | |
6591 | partition_designator_to_string(o->partition_designator), | |
6592 | strempty(o->options)); | |
6593 | fprintf(f, "\n"); | |
6594 | } | |
6595 | ||
6596 | strv_dump(f, prefix, "ExtensionDirectories", c->extension_directories); | |
6597 | } | |
6598 | ||
6599 | bool exec_context_maintains_privileges(const ExecContext *c) { | |
6600 | assert(c); | |
6601 | ||
6602 | /* Returns true if the process forked off would run under | |
6603 | * an unchanged UID or as root. */ | |
6604 | ||
6605 | if (!c->user) | |
6606 | return true; | |
6607 | ||
6608 | if (streq(c->user, "root") || streq(c->user, "0")) | |
6609 | return true; | |
6610 | ||
6611 | return false; | |
6612 | } | |
6613 | ||
6614 | int exec_context_get_effective_ioprio(const ExecContext *c) { | |
6615 | int p; | |
6616 | ||
6617 | assert(c); | |
6618 | ||
6619 | if (c->ioprio_set) | |
6620 | return c->ioprio; | |
6621 | ||
6622 | p = ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0); | |
6623 | if (p < 0) | |
6624 | return IOPRIO_DEFAULT_CLASS_AND_PRIO; | |
6625 | ||
6626 | return ioprio_normalize(p); | |
6627 | } | |
6628 | ||
6629 | bool exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(const ExecContext *c) { | |
6630 | assert(c); | |
6631 | ||
6632 | /* Explicit setting wins */ | |
6633 | if (c->mount_apivfs_set) | |
6634 | return c->mount_apivfs; | |
6635 | ||
6636 | /* Default to "yes" if root directory or image are specified */ | |
6637 | if (exec_context_with_rootfs(c)) | |
6638 | return true; | |
6639 | ||
6640 | return false; | |
6641 | } | |
6642 | ||
6643 | void exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(ExecContext *c) { | |
6644 | assert(c); | |
6645 | ||
6646 | for (size_t l = 0; l < c->n_log_extra_fields; l++) | |
6647 | free(c->log_extra_fields[l].iov_base); | |
6648 | c->log_extra_fields = mfree(c->log_extra_fields); | |
6649 | c->n_log_extra_fields = 0; | |
6650 | } | |
6651 | ||
6652 | void exec_context_revert_tty(ExecContext *c) { | |
6653 | _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; | |
6654 | const char *path; | |
6655 | struct stat st; | |
6656 | int r; | |
6657 | ||
6658 | assert(c); | |
6659 | ||
6660 | /* First, reset the TTY (possibly kicking everybody else from the TTY) */ | |
6661 | exec_context_tty_reset(c, NULL); | |
6662 | ||
6663 | /* And then undo what chown_terminal() did earlier. Note that we only do this if we have a path | |
6664 | * configured. If the TTY was passed to us as file descriptor we assume the TTY is opened and managed | |
6665 | * by whoever passed it to us and thus knows better when and how to chmod()/chown() it back. */ | |
6666 | if (!exec_context_may_touch_tty(c)) | |
6667 | return; | |
6668 | ||
6669 | path = exec_context_tty_path(c); | |
6670 | if (!path) | |
6671 | return; | |
6672 | ||
6673 | fd = open(path, O_PATH|O_CLOEXEC); | |
6674 | if (fd < 0) | |
6675 | return (void) log_full_errno(errno == ENOENT ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_WARNING, errno, | |
6676 | "Failed to open TTY inode of '%s' to adjust ownership/access mode, ignoring: %m", | |
6677 | path); | |
6678 | ||
6679 | if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) | |
6680 | return (void) log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to stat TTY '%s', ignoring: %m", path); | |
6681 | ||
6682 | /* Let's add a superficial check that we only do this for stuff that looks like a TTY. We only check | |
6683 | * if things are a character device, since a proper check either means we'd have to open the TTY and | |
6684 | * use isatty(), but we'd rather not do that since opening TTYs comes with all kinds of side-effects | |
6685 | * and is slow. Or we'd have to hardcode dev_t major information, which we'd rather avoid. Why bother | |
6686 | * with this at all? → https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/19213 */ | |
6687 | if (!S_ISCHR(st.st_mode)) | |
6688 | return log_warning("Configured TTY '%s' is not actually a character device, ignoring.", path); | |
6689 | ||
6690 | r = fchmod_and_chown(fd, TTY_MODE, 0, TTY_GID); | |
6691 | if (r < 0) | |
6692 | log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to reset TTY ownership/access mode of %s, ignoring: %m", path); | |
6693 | } | |
6694 | ||
6695 | int exec_context_get_clean_directories( | |
6696 | ExecContext *c, | |
6697 | char **prefix, | |
6698 | ExecCleanMask mask, | |
6699 | char ***ret) { | |
6700 | ||
6701 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; | |
6702 | int r; | |
6703 | ||
6704 | assert(c); | |
6705 | assert(prefix); | |
6706 | assert(ret); | |
6707 | ||
6708 | for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) { | |
6709 | if (!FLAGS_SET(mask, 1U << t)) | |
6710 | continue; | |
6711 | ||
6712 | if (!prefix[t]) | |
6713 | continue; | |
6714 | ||
6715 | for (size_t i = 0; i < c->directories[t].n_items; i++) { | |
6716 | char *j; | |
6717 | ||
6718 | j = path_join(prefix[t], c->directories[t].items[i].path); | |
6719 | if (!j) | |
6720 | return -ENOMEM; | |
6721 | ||
6722 | r = strv_consume(&l, j); | |
6723 | if (r < 0) | |
6724 | return r; | |
6725 | ||
6726 | /* Also remove private directories unconditionally. */ | |
6727 | if (t != EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION) { | |
6728 | j = path_join(prefix[t], "private", c->directories[t].items[i].path); | |
6729 | if (!j) | |
6730 | return -ENOMEM; | |
6731 | ||
6732 | r = strv_consume(&l, j); | |
6733 | if (r < 0) | |
6734 | return r; | |
6735 | } | |
6736 | ||
6737 | STRV_FOREACH(symlink, c->directories[t].items[i].symlinks) { | |
6738 | j = path_join(prefix[t], *symlink); | |
6739 | if (!j) | |
6740 | return -ENOMEM; | |
6741 | ||
6742 | r = strv_consume(&l, j); | |
6743 | if (r < 0) | |
6744 | return r; | |
6745 | } | |
6746 | } | |
6747 | } | |
6748 | ||
6749 | *ret = TAKE_PTR(l); | |
6750 | return 0; | |
6751 | } | |
6752 | ||
6753 | int exec_context_get_clean_mask(ExecContext *c, ExecCleanMask *ret) { | |
6754 | ExecCleanMask mask = 0; | |
6755 | ||
6756 | assert(c); | |
6757 | assert(ret); | |
6758 | ||
6759 | for (ExecDirectoryType t = 0; t < _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX; t++) | |
6760 | if (c->directories[t].n_items > 0) | |
6761 | mask |= 1U << t; | |
6762 | ||
6763 | *ret = mask; | |
6764 | return 0; | |
6765 | } | |
6766 | ||
6767 | bool exec_context_has_encrypted_credentials(ExecContext *c) { | |
6768 | ExecLoadCredential *load_cred; | |
6769 | ExecSetCredential *set_cred; | |
6770 | ||
6771 | assert(c); | |
6772 | ||
6773 | HASHMAP_FOREACH(load_cred, c->load_credentials) | |
6774 | if (load_cred->encrypted) | |
6775 | return true; | |
6776 | ||
6777 | HASHMAP_FOREACH(set_cred, c->set_credentials) | |
6778 | if (set_cred->encrypted) | |
6779 | return true; | |
6780 | ||
6781 | return false; | |
6782 | } | |
6783 | ||
6784 | void exec_status_start(ExecStatus *s, pid_t pid) { | |
6785 | assert(s); | |
6786 | ||
6787 | *s = (ExecStatus) { | |
6788 | .pid = pid, | |
6789 | }; | |
6790 | ||
6791 | dual_timestamp_get(&s->start_timestamp); | |
6792 | } | |
6793 | ||
6794 | void exec_status_exit(ExecStatus *s, const ExecContext *context, pid_t pid, int code, int status) { | |
6795 | assert(s); | |
6796 | ||
6797 | if (s->pid != pid) | |
6798 | *s = (ExecStatus) { | |
6799 | .pid = pid, | |
6800 | }; | |
6801 | ||
6802 | dual_timestamp_get(&s->exit_timestamp); | |
6803 | ||
6804 | s->code = code; | |
6805 | s->status = status; | |
6806 | ||
6807 | if (context && context->utmp_id) | |
6808 | (void) utmp_put_dead_process(context->utmp_id, pid, code, status); | |
6809 | } | |
6810 | ||
6811 | void exec_status_reset(ExecStatus *s) { | |
6812 | assert(s); | |
6813 | ||
6814 | *s = (ExecStatus) {}; | |
6815 | } | |
6816 | ||
6817 | void exec_status_dump(const ExecStatus *s, FILE *f, const char *prefix) { | |
6818 | assert(s); | |
6819 | assert(f); | |
6820 | ||
6821 | if (s->pid <= 0) | |
6822 | return; | |
6823 | ||
6824 | prefix = strempty(prefix); | |
6825 | ||
6826 | fprintf(f, | |
6827 | "%sPID: "PID_FMT"\n", | |
6828 | prefix, s->pid); | |
6829 | ||
6830 | if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s->start_timestamp)) | |
6831 | fprintf(f, | |
6832 | "%sStart Timestamp: %s\n", | |
6833 | prefix, FORMAT_TIMESTAMP(s->start_timestamp.realtime)); | |
6834 | ||
6835 | if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s->exit_timestamp)) | |
6836 | fprintf(f, | |
6837 | "%sExit Timestamp: %s\n" | |
6838 | "%sExit Code: %s\n" | |
6839 | "%sExit Status: %i\n", | |
6840 | prefix, FORMAT_TIMESTAMP(s->exit_timestamp.realtime), | |
6841 | prefix, sigchld_code_to_string(s->code), | |
6842 | prefix, s->status); | |
6843 | } | |
6844 | ||
6845 | static void exec_command_dump(ExecCommand *c, FILE *f, const char *prefix) { | |
6846 | _cleanup_free_ char *cmd = NULL; | |
6847 | const char *prefix2; | |
6848 | ||
6849 | assert(c); | |
6850 | assert(f); | |
6851 | ||
6852 | prefix = strempty(prefix); | |
6853 | prefix2 = strjoina(prefix, "\t"); | |
6854 | ||
6855 | cmd = quote_command_line(c->argv, SHELL_ESCAPE_EMPTY); | |
6856 | ||
6857 | fprintf(f, | |
6858 | "%sCommand Line: %s\n", | |
6859 | prefix, strnull(cmd)); | |
6860 | ||
6861 | exec_status_dump(&c->exec_status, f, prefix2); | |
6862 | } | |
6863 | ||
6864 | void exec_command_dump_list(ExecCommand *c, FILE *f, const char *prefix) { | |
6865 | assert(f); | |
6866 | ||
6867 | prefix = strempty(prefix); | |
6868 | ||
6869 | LIST_FOREACH(command, i, c) | |
6870 | exec_command_dump(i, f, prefix); | |
6871 | } | |
6872 | ||
6873 | void exec_command_append_list(ExecCommand **l, ExecCommand *e) { | |
6874 | ExecCommand *end; | |
6875 | ||
6876 | assert(l); | |
6877 | assert(e); | |
6878 | ||
6879 | if (*l) { | |
6880 | /* It's kind of important, that we keep the order here */ | |
6881 | end = LIST_FIND_TAIL(command, *l); | |
6882 | LIST_INSERT_AFTER(command, *l, end, e); | |
6883 | } else | |
6884 | *l = e; | |
6885 | } | |
6886 | ||
6887 | int exec_command_set(ExecCommand *c, const char *path, ...) { | |
6888 | va_list ap; | |
6889 | char **l, *p; | |
6890 | ||
6891 | assert(c); | |
6892 | assert(path); | |
6893 | ||
6894 | va_start(ap, path); | |
6895 | l = strv_new_ap(path, ap); | |
6896 | va_end(ap); | |
6897 | ||
6898 | if (!l) | |
6899 | return -ENOMEM; | |
6900 | ||
6901 | p = strdup(path); | |
6902 | if (!p) { | |
6903 | strv_free(l); | |
6904 | return -ENOMEM; | |
6905 | } | |
6906 | ||
6907 | free_and_replace(c->path, p); | |
6908 | ||
6909 | return strv_free_and_replace(c->argv, l); | |
6910 | } | |
6911 | ||
6912 | int exec_command_append(ExecCommand *c, const char *path, ...) { | |
6913 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; | |
6914 | va_list ap; | |
6915 | int r; | |
6916 | ||
6917 | assert(c); | |
6918 | assert(path); | |
6919 | ||
6920 | va_start(ap, path); | |
6921 | l = strv_new_ap(path, ap); | |
6922 | va_end(ap); | |
6923 | ||
6924 | if (!l) | |
6925 | return -ENOMEM; | |
6926 | ||
6927 | r = strv_extend_strv(&c->argv, l, false); | |
6928 | if (r < 0) | |
6929 | return r; | |
6930 | ||
6931 | return 0; | |
6932 | } | |
6933 | ||
6934 | static void *remove_tmpdir_thread(void *p) { | |
6935 | _cleanup_free_ char *path = p; | |
6936 | ||
6937 | (void) rm_rf(path, REMOVE_ROOT|REMOVE_PHYSICAL); | |
6938 | return NULL; | |
6939 | } | |
6940 | ||
6941 | static ExecSharedRuntime* exec_shared_runtime_free(ExecSharedRuntime *rt) { | |
6942 | if (!rt) | |
6943 | return NULL; | |
6944 | ||
6945 | if (rt->manager) | |
6946 | (void) hashmap_remove(rt->manager->exec_shared_runtime_by_id, rt->id); | |
6947 | ||
6948 | rt->id = mfree(rt->id); | |
6949 | rt->tmp_dir = mfree(rt->tmp_dir); | |
6950 | rt->var_tmp_dir = mfree(rt->var_tmp_dir); | |
6951 | safe_close_pair(rt->netns_storage_socket); | |
6952 | safe_close_pair(rt->ipcns_storage_socket); | |
6953 | return mfree(rt); | |
6954 | } | |
6955 | ||
6956 | DEFINE_TRIVIAL_UNREF_FUNC(ExecSharedRuntime, exec_shared_runtime, exec_shared_runtime_free); | |
6957 | DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(ExecSharedRuntime*, exec_shared_runtime_free); | |
6958 | ||
6959 | ExecSharedRuntime* exec_shared_runtime_destroy(ExecSharedRuntime *rt) { | |
6960 | int r; | |
6961 | ||
6962 | if (!rt) | |
6963 | return NULL; | |
6964 | ||
6965 | assert(rt->n_ref > 0); | |
6966 | rt->n_ref--; | |
6967 | ||
6968 | if (rt->n_ref > 0) | |
6969 | return NULL; | |
6970 | ||
6971 | if (rt->tmp_dir && !streq(rt->tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY)) { | |
6972 | log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt->tmp_dir); | |
6973 | ||
6974 | r = asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread, rt->tmp_dir); | |
6975 | if (r < 0) | |
6976 | log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt->tmp_dir); | |
6977 | else | |
6978 | rt->tmp_dir = NULL; | |
6979 | } | |
6980 | ||
6981 | if (rt->var_tmp_dir && !streq(rt->var_tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY)) { | |
6982 | log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt->var_tmp_dir); | |
6983 | ||
6984 | r = asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread, rt->var_tmp_dir); | |
6985 | if (r < 0) | |
6986 | log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt->var_tmp_dir); | |
6987 | else | |
6988 | rt->var_tmp_dir = NULL; | |
6989 | } | |
6990 | ||
6991 | return exec_shared_runtime_free(rt); | |
6992 | } | |
6993 | ||
6994 | static int exec_shared_runtime_allocate(ExecSharedRuntime **ret, const char *id) { | |
6995 | _cleanup_free_ char *id_copy = NULL; | |
6996 | ExecSharedRuntime *n; | |
6997 | ||
6998 | assert(ret); | |
6999 | ||
7000 | id_copy = strdup(id); | |
7001 | if (!id_copy) | |
7002 | return -ENOMEM; | |
7003 | ||
7004 | n = new(ExecSharedRuntime, 1); | |
7005 | if (!n) | |
7006 | return -ENOMEM; | |
7007 | ||
7008 | *n = (ExecSharedRuntime) { | |
7009 | .id = TAKE_PTR(id_copy), | |
7010 | .netns_storage_socket = PIPE_EBADF, | |
7011 | .ipcns_storage_socket = PIPE_EBADF, | |
7012 | }; | |
7013 | ||
7014 | *ret = n; | |
7015 | return 0; | |
7016 | } | |
7017 | ||
7018 | static int exec_shared_runtime_add( | |
7019 | Manager *m, | |
7020 | const char *id, | |
7021 | char **tmp_dir, | |
7022 | char **var_tmp_dir, | |
7023 | int netns_storage_socket[2], | |
7024 | int ipcns_storage_socket[2], | |
7025 | ExecSharedRuntime **ret) { | |
7026 | ||
7027 | _cleanup_(exec_shared_runtime_freep) ExecSharedRuntime *rt = NULL; | |
7028 | int r; | |
7029 | ||
7030 | assert(m); | |
7031 | assert(id); | |
7032 | ||
7033 | /* tmp_dir, var_tmp_dir, {net,ipc}ns_storage_socket fds are donated on success */ | |
7034 | ||
7035 | r = exec_shared_runtime_allocate(&rt, id); | |
7036 | if (r < 0) | |
7037 | return r; | |
7038 | ||
7039 | r = hashmap_ensure_put(&m->exec_shared_runtime_by_id, &string_hash_ops, rt->id, rt); | |
7040 | if (r < 0) | |
7041 | return r; | |
7042 | ||
7043 | assert(!!rt->tmp_dir == !!rt->var_tmp_dir); /* We require both to be set together */ | |
7044 | rt->tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(*tmp_dir); | |
7045 | rt->var_tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(*var_tmp_dir); | |
7046 | ||
7047 | if (netns_storage_socket) { | |
7048 | rt->netns_storage_socket[0] = TAKE_FD(netns_storage_socket[0]); | |
7049 | rt->netns_storage_socket[1] = TAKE_FD(netns_storage_socket[1]); | |
7050 | } | |
7051 | ||
7052 | if (ipcns_storage_socket) { | |
7053 | rt->ipcns_storage_socket[0] = TAKE_FD(ipcns_storage_socket[0]); | |
7054 | rt->ipcns_storage_socket[1] = TAKE_FD(ipcns_storage_socket[1]); | |
7055 | } | |
7056 | ||
7057 | rt->manager = m; | |
7058 | ||
7059 | if (ret) | |
7060 | *ret = rt; | |
7061 | /* do not remove created ExecSharedRuntime object when the operation succeeds. */ | |
7062 | TAKE_PTR(rt); | |
7063 | return 0; | |
7064 | } | |
7065 | ||
7066 | static int exec_shared_runtime_make( | |
7067 | Manager *m, | |
7068 | const ExecContext *c, | |
7069 | const char *id, | |
7070 | ExecSharedRuntime **ret) { | |
7071 | ||
7072 | _cleanup_(namespace_cleanup_tmpdirp) char *tmp_dir = NULL, *var_tmp_dir = NULL; | |
7073 | _cleanup_close_pair_ int netns_storage_socket[2] = PIPE_EBADF, ipcns_storage_socket[2] = PIPE_EBADF; | |
7074 | int r; | |
7075 | ||
7076 | assert(m); | |
7077 | assert(c); | |
7078 | assert(id); | |
7079 | ||
7080 | /* It is not necessary to create ExecSharedRuntime object. */ | |
7081 | if (!exec_needs_network_namespace(c) && !exec_needs_ipc_namespace(c) && !c->private_tmp) { | |
7082 | *ret = NULL; | |
7083 | return 0; | |
7084 | } | |
7085 | ||
7086 | if (c->private_tmp && | |
7087 | !(prefixed_path_strv_contains(c->inaccessible_paths, "/tmp") && | |
7088 | (prefixed_path_strv_contains(c->inaccessible_paths, "/var/tmp") || | |
7089 | prefixed_path_strv_contains(c->inaccessible_paths, "/var")))) { | |
7090 | r = setup_tmp_dirs(id, &tmp_dir, &var_tmp_dir); | |
7091 | if (r < 0) | |
7092 | return r; | |
7093 | } | |
7094 | ||
7095 | if (exec_needs_network_namespace(c)) { | |
7096 | if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, netns_storage_socket) < 0) | |
7097 | return -errno; | |
7098 | } | |
7099 | ||
7100 | if (exec_needs_ipc_namespace(c)) { | |
7101 | if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, ipcns_storage_socket) < 0) | |
7102 | return -errno; | |
7103 | } | |
7104 | ||
7105 | r = exec_shared_runtime_add(m, id, &tmp_dir, &var_tmp_dir, netns_storage_socket, ipcns_storage_socket, ret); | |
7106 | if (r < 0) | |
7107 | return r; | |
7108 | ||
7109 | return 1; | |
7110 | } | |
7111 | ||
7112 | int exec_shared_runtime_acquire(Manager *m, const ExecContext *c, const char *id, bool create, ExecSharedRuntime **ret) { | |
7113 | ExecSharedRuntime *rt; | |
7114 | int r; | |
7115 | ||
7116 | assert(m); | |
7117 | assert(id); | |
7118 | assert(ret); | |
7119 | ||
7120 | rt = hashmap_get(m->exec_shared_runtime_by_id, id); | |
7121 | if (rt) | |
7122 | /* We already have an ExecSharedRuntime object, let's increase the ref count and reuse it */ | |
7123 | goto ref; | |
7124 | ||
7125 | if (!create) { | |
7126 | *ret = NULL; | |
7127 | return 0; | |
7128 | } | |
7129 | ||
7130 | /* If not found, then create a new object. */ | |
7131 | r = exec_shared_runtime_make(m, c, id, &rt); | |
7132 | if (r < 0) | |
7133 | return r; | |
7134 | if (r == 0) { | |
7135 | /* When r == 0, it is not necessary to create ExecSharedRuntime object. */ | |
7136 | *ret = NULL; | |
7137 | return 0; | |
7138 | } | |
7139 | ||
7140 | ref: | |
7141 | /* increment reference counter. */ | |
7142 | rt->n_ref++; | |
7143 | *ret = rt; | |
7144 | return 1; | |
7145 | } | |
7146 | ||
7147 | int exec_shared_runtime_serialize(const Manager *m, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) { | |
7148 | ExecSharedRuntime *rt; | |
7149 | ||
7150 | assert(m); | |
7151 | assert(f); | |
7152 | assert(fds); | |
7153 | ||
7154 | HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt, m->exec_shared_runtime_by_id) { | |
7155 | fprintf(f, "exec-runtime=%s", rt->id); | |
7156 | ||
7157 | if (rt->tmp_dir) | |
7158 | fprintf(f, " tmp-dir=%s", rt->tmp_dir); | |
7159 | ||
7160 | if (rt->var_tmp_dir) | |
7161 | fprintf(f, " var-tmp-dir=%s", rt->var_tmp_dir); | |
7162 | ||
7163 | if (rt->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { | |
7164 | int copy; | |
7165 | ||
7166 | copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->netns_storage_socket[0]); | |
7167 | if (copy < 0) | |
7168 | return copy; | |
7169 | ||
7170 | fprintf(f, " netns-socket-0=%i", copy); | |
7171 | } | |
7172 | ||
7173 | if (rt->netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0) { | |
7174 | int copy; | |
7175 | ||
7176 | copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->netns_storage_socket[1]); | |
7177 | if (copy < 0) | |
7178 | return copy; | |
7179 | ||
7180 | fprintf(f, " netns-socket-1=%i", copy); | |
7181 | } | |
7182 | ||
7183 | if (rt->ipcns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) { | |
7184 | int copy; | |
7185 | ||
7186 | copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->ipcns_storage_socket[0]); | |
7187 | if (copy < 0) | |
7188 | return copy; | |
7189 | ||
7190 | fprintf(f, " ipcns-socket-0=%i", copy); | |
7191 | } | |
7192 | ||
7193 | if (rt->ipcns_storage_socket[1] >= 0) { | |
7194 | int copy; | |
7195 | ||
7196 | copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->ipcns_storage_socket[1]); | |
7197 | if (copy < 0) | |
7198 | return copy; | |
7199 | ||
7200 | fprintf(f, " ipcns-socket-1=%i", copy); | |
7201 | } | |
7202 | ||
7203 | fputc('\n', f); | |
7204 | } | |
7205 | ||
7206 | return 0; | |
7207 | } | |
7208 | ||
7209 | int exec_shared_runtime_deserialize_compat(Unit *u, const char *key, const char *value, FDSet *fds) { | |
7210 | _cleanup_(exec_shared_runtime_freep) ExecSharedRuntime *rt_create = NULL; | |
7211 | ExecSharedRuntime *rt; | |
7212 | int r; | |
7213 | ||
7214 | /* This is for the migration from old (v237 or earlier) deserialization text. | |
7215 | * Due to the bug #7790, this may not work with the units that use JoinsNamespaceOf=. | |
7216 | * Even if the ExecSharedRuntime object originally created by the other unit, we cannot judge | |
7217 | * so or not from the serialized text, then we always creates a new object owned by this. */ | |
7218 | ||
7219 | assert(u); | |
7220 | assert(key); | |
7221 | assert(value); | |
7222 | ||
7223 | /* Manager manages ExecSharedRuntime objects by the unit id. | |
7224 | * So, we omit the serialized text when the unit does not have id (yet?)... */ | |
7225 | if (isempty(u->id)) { | |
7226 | log_unit_debug(u, "Invocation ID not found. Dropping runtime parameter."); | |
7227 | return 0; | |
7228 | } | |
7229 | ||
7230 | if (hashmap_ensure_allocated(&u->manager->exec_shared_runtime_by_id, &string_hash_ops) < 0) | |
7231 | return log_oom(); | |
7232 | ||
7233 | rt = hashmap_get(u->manager->exec_shared_runtime_by_id, u->id); | |
7234 | if (!rt) { | |
7235 | if (exec_shared_runtime_allocate(&rt_create, u->id) < 0) | |
7236 | return log_oom(); | |
7237 | ||
7238 | rt = rt_create; | |
7239 | } | |
7240 | ||
7241 | if (streq(key, "tmp-dir")) { | |
7242 | if (free_and_strdup_warn(&rt->tmp_dir, value) < 0) | |
7243 | return -ENOMEM; | |
7244 | ||
7245 | } else if (streq(key, "var-tmp-dir")) { | |
7246 | if (free_and_strdup_warn(&rt->var_tmp_dir, value) < 0) | |
7247 | return -ENOMEM; | |
7248 | ||
7249 | } else if (streq(key, "netns-socket-0")) { | |
7250 | int fd; | |
7251 | ||
7252 | if (safe_atoi(value, &fd) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd)) { | |
7253 | log_unit_debug(u, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value); | |
7254 | return 0; | |
7255 | } | |
7256 | ||
7257 | safe_close(rt->netns_storage_socket[0]); | |
7258 | rt->netns_storage_socket[0] = fdset_remove(fds, fd); | |
7259 | ||
7260 | } else if (streq(key, "netns-socket-1")) { | |
7261 | int fd; | |
7262 | ||
7263 | if (safe_atoi(value, &fd) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd)) { | |
7264 | log_unit_debug(u, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value); | |
7265 | return 0; | |
7266 | } | |
7267 | ||
7268 | safe_close(rt->netns_storage_socket[1]); | |
7269 | rt->netns_storage_socket[1] = fdset_remove(fds, fd); | |
7270 | ||
7271 | } else | |
7272 | return 0; | |
7273 | ||
7274 | /* If the object is newly created, then put it to the hashmap which manages ExecSharedRuntime objects. */ | |
7275 | if (rt_create) { | |
7276 | r = hashmap_put(u->manager->exec_shared_runtime_by_id, rt_create->id, rt_create); | |
7277 | if (r < 0) { | |
7278 | log_unit_debug_errno(u, r, "Failed to put runtime parameter to manager's storage: %m"); | |
7279 | return 0; | |
7280 | } | |
7281 | ||
7282 | rt_create->manager = u->manager; | |
7283 | ||
7284 | /* Avoid cleanup */ | |
7285 | TAKE_PTR(rt_create); | |
7286 | } | |
7287 | ||
7288 | return 1; | |
7289 | } | |
7290 | ||
7291 | int exec_shared_runtime_deserialize_one(Manager *m, const char *value, FDSet *fds) { | |
7292 | _cleanup_free_ char *tmp_dir = NULL, *var_tmp_dir = NULL; | |
7293 | char *id = NULL; | |
7294 | int r, netns_fdpair[] = {-1, -1}, ipcns_fdpair[] = {-1, -1}; | |
7295 | const char *p, *v = ASSERT_PTR(value); | |
7296 | size_t n; | |
7297 | ||
7298 | assert(m); | |
7299 | assert(fds); | |
7300 | ||
7301 | n = strcspn(v, " "); | |
7302 | id = strndupa_safe(v, n); | |
7303 | if (v[n] != ' ') | |
7304 | goto finalize; | |
7305 | p = v + n + 1; | |
7306 | ||
7307 | v = startswith(p, "tmp-dir="); | |
7308 | if (v) { | |
7309 | n = strcspn(v, " "); | |
7310 | tmp_dir = strndup(v, n); | |
7311 | if (!tmp_dir) | |
7312 | return log_oom(); | |
7313 | if (v[n] != ' ') | |
7314 | goto finalize; | |
7315 | p = v + n + 1; | |
7316 | } | |
7317 | ||
7318 | v = startswith(p, "var-tmp-dir="); | |
7319 | if (v) { | |
7320 | n = strcspn(v, " "); | |
7321 | var_tmp_dir = strndup(v, n); | |
7322 | if (!var_tmp_dir) | |
7323 | return log_oom(); | |
7324 | if (v[n] != ' ') | |
7325 | goto finalize; | |
7326 | p = v + n + 1; | |
7327 | } | |
7328 | ||
7329 | v = startswith(p, "netns-socket-0="); | |
7330 | if (v) { | |
7331 | char *buf; | |
7332 | ||
7333 | n = strcspn(v, " "); | |
7334 | buf = strndupa_safe(v, n); | |
7335 | ||
7336 | r = safe_atoi(buf, &netns_fdpair[0]); | |
7337 | if (r < 0) | |
7338 | return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to parse exec-runtime specification netns-socket-0=%s: %m", buf); | |
7339 | if (!fdset_contains(fds, netns_fdpair[0])) | |
7340 | return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADF), | |
7341 | "exec-runtime specification netns-socket-0= refers to unknown fd %d: %m", netns_fdpair[0]); | |
7342 | netns_fdpair[0] = fdset_remove(fds, netns_fdpair[0]); | |
7343 | if (v[n] != ' ') | |
7344 | goto finalize; | |
7345 | p = v + n + 1; | |
7346 | } | |
7347 | ||
7348 | v = startswith(p, "netns-socket-1="); | |
7349 | if (v) { | |
7350 | char *buf; | |
7351 | ||
7352 | n = strcspn(v, " "); | |
7353 | buf = strndupa_safe(v, n); | |
7354 | ||
7355 | r = safe_atoi(buf, &netns_fdpair[1]); | |
7356 | if (r < 0) | |
7357 | return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to parse exec-runtime specification netns-socket-1=%s: %m", buf); | |
7358 | if (!fdset_contains(fds, netns_fdpair[1])) | |
7359 | return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADF), | |
7360 | "exec-runtime specification netns-socket-1= refers to unknown fd %d: %m", netns_fdpair[1]); | |
7361 | netns_fdpair[1] = fdset_remove(fds, netns_fdpair[1]); | |
7362 | if (v[n] != ' ') | |
7363 | goto finalize; | |
7364 | p = v + n + 1; | |
7365 | } | |
7366 | ||
7367 | v = startswith(p, "ipcns-socket-0="); | |
7368 | if (v) { | |
7369 | char *buf; | |
7370 | ||
7371 | n = strcspn(v, " "); | |
7372 | buf = strndupa_safe(v, n); | |
7373 | ||
7374 | r = safe_atoi(buf, &ipcns_fdpair[0]); | |
7375 | if (r < 0) | |
7376 | return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to parse exec-runtime specification ipcns-socket-0=%s: %m", buf); | |
7377 | if (!fdset_contains(fds, ipcns_fdpair[0])) | |
7378 | return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADF), | |
7379 | "exec-runtime specification ipcns-socket-0= refers to unknown fd %d: %m", ipcns_fdpair[0]); | |
7380 | ipcns_fdpair[0] = fdset_remove(fds, ipcns_fdpair[0]); | |
7381 | if (v[n] != ' ') | |
7382 | goto finalize; | |
7383 | p = v + n + 1; | |
7384 | } | |
7385 | ||
7386 | v = startswith(p, "ipcns-socket-1="); | |
7387 | if (v) { | |
7388 | char *buf; | |
7389 | ||
7390 | n = strcspn(v, " "); | |
7391 | buf = strndupa_safe(v, n); | |
7392 | ||
7393 | r = safe_atoi(buf, &ipcns_fdpair[1]); | |
7394 | if (r < 0) | |
7395 | return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to parse exec-runtime specification ipcns-socket-1=%s: %m", buf); | |
7396 | if (!fdset_contains(fds, ipcns_fdpair[1])) | |
7397 | return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADF), | |
7398 | "exec-runtime specification ipcns-socket-1= refers to unknown fd %d: %m", ipcns_fdpair[1]); | |
7399 | ipcns_fdpair[1] = fdset_remove(fds, ipcns_fdpair[1]); | |
7400 | } | |
7401 | ||
7402 | finalize: | |
7403 | r = exec_shared_runtime_add(m, id, &tmp_dir, &var_tmp_dir, netns_fdpair, ipcns_fdpair, NULL); | |
7404 | if (r < 0) | |
7405 | return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add exec-runtime: %m"); | |
7406 | return 0; | |
7407 | } | |
7408 | ||
7409 | void exec_shared_runtime_vacuum(Manager *m) { | |
7410 | ExecSharedRuntime *rt; | |
7411 | ||
7412 | assert(m); | |
7413 | ||
7414 | /* Free unreferenced ExecSharedRuntime objects. This is used after manager deserialization process. */ | |
7415 | ||
7416 | HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt, m->exec_shared_runtime_by_id) { | |
7417 | if (rt->n_ref > 0) | |
7418 | continue; | |
7419 | ||
7420 | (void) exec_shared_runtime_free(rt); | |
7421 | } | |
7422 | } | |
7423 | ||
7424 | int exec_runtime_make(ExecSharedRuntime *shared, DynamicCreds *creds, ExecRuntime **ret) { | |
7425 | _cleanup_(exec_runtime_freep) ExecRuntime *rt = NULL; | |
7426 | ||
7427 | assert(ret); | |
7428 | ||
7429 | if (!shared && !creds) { | |
7430 | *ret = NULL; | |
7431 | return 0; | |
7432 | } | |
7433 | ||
7434 | rt = new(ExecRuntime, 1); | |
7435 | if (!rt) | |
7436 | return -ENOMEM; | |
7437 | ||
7438 | *rt = (ExecRuntime) { | |
7439 | .shared = shared, | |
7440 | .dynamic_creds = creds, | |
7441 | }; | |
7442 | ||
7443 | *ret = TAKE_PTR(rt); | |
7444 | return 1; | |
7445 | } | |
7446 | ||
7447 | ExecRuntime* exec_runtime_free(ExecRuntime *rt) { | |
7448 | if (!rt) | |
7449 | return NULL; | |
7450 | ||
7451 | exec_shared_runtime_unref(rt->shared); | |
7452 | dynamic_creds_unref(rt->dynamic_creds); | |
7453 | return mfree(rt); | |
7454 | } | |
7455 | ||
7456 | ExecRuntime* exec_runtime_destroy(ExecRuntime *rt) { | |
7457 | if (!rt) | |
7458 | return NULL; | |
7459 | ||
7460 | rt->shared = exec_shared_runtime_destroy(rt->shared); | |
7461 | rt->dynamic_creds = dynamic_creds_destroy(rt->dynamic_creds); | |
7462 | return exec_runtime_free(rt); | |
7463 | } | |
7464 | ||
7465 | void exec_params_clear(ExecParameters *p) { | |
7466 | if (!p) | |
7467 | return; | |
7468 | ||
7469 | p->environment = strv_free(p->environment); | |
7470 | p->fd_names = strv_free(p->fd_names); | |
7471 | p->fds = mfree(p->fds); | |
7472 | p->exec_fd = safe_close(p->exec_fd); | |
7473 | } | |
7474 | ||
7475 | ExecSetCredential *exec_set_credential_free(ExecSetCredential *sc) { | |
7476 | if (!sc) | |
7477 | return NULL; | |
7478 | ||
7479 | free(sc->id); | |
7480 | free(sc->data); | |
7481 | return mfree(sc); | |
7482 | } | |
7483 | ||
7484 | ExecLoadCredential *exec_load_credential_free(ExecLoadCredential *lc) { | |
7485 | if (!lc) | |
7486 | return NULL; | |
7487 | ||
7488 | free(lc->id); | |
7489 | free(lc->path); | |
7490 | return mfree(lc); | |
7491 | } | |
7492 | ||
7493 | void exec_directory_done(ExecDirectory *d) { | |
7494 | if (!d) | |
7495 | return; | |
7496 | ||
7497 | for (size_t i = 0; i < d->n_items; i++) { | |
7498 | free(d->items[i].path); | |
7499 | strv_free(d->items[i].symlinks); | |
7500 | } | |
7501 | ||
7502 | d->items = mfree(d->items); | |
7503 | d->n_items = 0; | |
7504 | d->mode = 0755; | |
7505 | } | |
7506 | ||
7507 | static ExecDirectoryItem *exec_directory_find(ExecDirectory *d, const char *path) { | |
7508 | assert(d); | |
7509 | assert(path); | |
7510 | ||
7511 | for (size_t i = 0; i < d->n_items; i++) | |
7512 | if (path_equal(d->items[i].path, path)) | |
7513 | return &d->items[i]; | |
7514 | ||
7515 | return NULL; | |
7516 | } | |
7517 | ||
7518 | int exec_directory_add(ExecDirectory *d, const char *path, const char *symlink) { | |
7519 | _cleanup_strv_free_ char **s = NULL; | |
7520 | _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL; | |
7521 | ExecDirectoryItem *existing; | |
7522 | int r; | |
7523 | ||
7524 | assert(d); | |
7525 | assert(path); | |
7526 | ||
7527 | existing = exec_directory_find(d, path); | |
7528 | if (existing) { | |
7529 | r = strv_extend(&existing->symlinks, symlink); | |
7530 | if (r < 0) | |
7531 | return r; | |
7532 | ||
7533 | return 0; /* existing item is updated */ | |
7534 | } | |
7535 | ||
7536 | p = strdup(path); | |
7537 | if (!p) | |
7538 | return -ENOMEM; | |
7539 | ||
7540 | if (symlink) { | |
7541 | s = strv_new(symlink); | |
7542 | if (!s) | |
7543 | return -ENOMEM; | |
7544 | } | |
7545 | ||
7546 | if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(d->items, d->n_items + 1)) | |
7547 | return -ENOMEM; | |
7548 | ||
7549 | d->items[d->n_items++] = (ExecDirectoryItem) { | |
7550 | .path = TAKE_PTR(p), | |
7551 | .symlinks = TAKE_PTR(s), | |
7552 | }; | |
7553 | ||
7554 | return 1; /* new item is added */ | |
7555 | } | |
7556 | ||
7557 | static int exec_directory_item_compare_func(const ExecDirectoryItem *a, const ExecDirectoryItem *b) { | |
7558 | assert(a); | |
7559 | assert(b); | |
7560 | ||
7561 | return path_compare(a->path, b->path); | |
7562 | } | |
7563 | ||
7564 | void exec_directory_sort(ExecDirectory *d) { | |
7565 | assert(d); | |
7566 | ||
7567 | /* Sort the exec directories to make always parent directories processed at first in | |
7568 | * setup_exec_directory(), e.g., even if StateDirectory=foo/bar foo, we need to create foo at first, | |
7569 | * then foo/bar. Also, set .only_create flag if one of the parent directories is contained in the | |
7570 | * list. See also comments in setup_exec_directory() and issue #24783. */ | |
7571 | ||
7572 | if (d->n_items <= 1) | |
7573 | return; | |
7574 | ||
7575 | typesafe_qsort(d->items, d->n_items, exec_directory_item_compare_func); | |
7576 | ||
7577 | for (size_t i = 1; i < d->n_items; i++) | |
7578 | for (size_t j = 0; j < i; j++) | |
7579 | if (path_startswith(d->items[i].path, d->items[j].path)) { | |
7580 | d->items[i].only_create = true; | |
7581 | break; | |
7582 | } | |
7583 | } | |
7584 | ||
7585 | ExecCleanMask exec_clean_mask_from_string(const char *s) { | |
7586 | ExecDirectoryType t; | |
7587 | ||
7588 | assert(s); | |
7589 | ||
7590 | if (streq(s, "all")) | |
7591 | return EXEC_CLEAN_ALL; | |
7592 | if (streq(s, "fdstore")) | |
7593 | return EXEC_CLEAN_FDSTORE; | |
7594 | ||
7595 | t = exec_resource_type_from_string(s); | |
7596 | if (t < 0) | |
7597 | return (ExecCleanMask) t; | |
7598 | ||
7599 | return 1U << t; | |
7600 | } | |
7601 | ||
7602 | DEFINE_HASH_OPS_WITH_VALUE_DESTRUCTOR(exec_set_credential_hash_ops, char, string_hash_func, string_compare_func, ExecSetCredential, exec_set_credential_free); | |
7603 | DEFINE_HASH_OPS_WITH_VALUE_DESTRUCTOR(exec_load_credential_hash_ops, char, string_hash_func, string_compare_func, ExecLoadCredential, exec_load_credential_free); | |
7604 | ||
7605 | static const char* const exec_input_table[_EXEC_INPUT_MAX] = { | |
7606 | [EXEC_INPUT_NULL] = "null", | |
7607 | [EXEC_INPUT_TTY] = "tty", | |
7608 | [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE] = "tty-force", | |
7609 | [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL] = "tty-fail", | |
7610 | [EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET] = "socket", | |
7611 | [EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD] = "fd", | |
7612 | [EXEC_INPUT_DATA] = "data", | |
7613 | [EXEC_INPUT_FILE] = "file", | |
7614 | }; | |
7615 | ||
7616 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_input, ExecInput); | |
7617 | ||
7618 | static const char* const exec_output_table[_EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX] = { | |
7619 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT] = "inherit", | |
7620 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL] = "null", | |
7621 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY] = "tty", | |
7622 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG] = "kmsg", | |
7623 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE] = "kmsg+console", | |
7624 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL] = "journal", | |
7625 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE] = "journal+console", | |
7626 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET] = "socket", | |
7627 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD] = "fd", | |
7628 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE] = "file", | |
7629 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND] = "append", | |
7630 | [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE] = "truncate", | |
7631 | }; | |
7632 | ||
7633 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_output, ExecOutput); | |
7634 | ||
7635 | static const char* const exec_utmp_mode_table[_EXEC_UTMP_MODE_MAX] = { | |
7636 | [EXEC_UTMP_INIT] = "init", | |
7637 | [EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN] = "login", | |
7638 | [EXEC_UTMP_USER] = "user", | |
7639 | }; | |
7640 | ||
7641 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_utmp_mode, ExecUtmpMode); | |
7642 | ||
7643 | static const char* const exec_preserve_mode_table[_EXEC_PRESERVE_MODE_MAX] = { | |
7644 | [EXEC_PRESERVE_NO] = "no", | |
7645 | [EXEC_PRESERVE_YES] = "yes", | |
7646 | [EXEC_PRESERVE_RESTART] = "restart", | |
7647 | }; | |
7648 | ||
7649 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(exec_preserve_mode, ExecPreserveMode, EXEC_PRESERVE_YES); | |
7650 | ||
7651 | /* This table maps ExecDirectoryType to the setting it is configured with in the unit */ | |
7652 | static const char* const exec_directory_type_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = { | |
7653 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = "RuntimeDirectory", | |
7654 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE] = "StateDirectory", | |
7655 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE] = "CacheDirectory", | |
7656 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS] = "LogsDirectory", | |
7657 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION] = "ConfigurationDirectory", | |
7658 | }; | |
7659 | ||
7660 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_directory_type, ExecDirectoryType); | |
7661 | ||
7662 | /* This table maps ExecDirectoryType to the symlink setting it is configured with in the unit */ | |
7663 | static const char* const exec_directory_type_symlink_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = { | |
7664 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = "RuntimeDirectorySymlink", | |
7665 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE] = "StateDirectorySymlink", | |
7666 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE] = "CacheDirectorySymlink", | |
7667 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS] = "LogsDirectorySymlink", | |
7668 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION] = "ConfigurationDirectorySymlink", | |
7669 | }; | |
7670 | ||
7671 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_directory_type_symlink, ExecDirectoryType); | |
7672 | ||
7673 | /* And this table maps ExecDirectoryType too, but to a generic term identifying the type of resource. This | |
7674 | * one is supposed to be generic enough to be used for unit types that don't use ExecContext and per-unit | |
7675 | * directories, specifically .timer units with their timestamp touch file. */ | |
7676 | static const char* const exec_resource_type_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = { | |
7677 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = "runtime", | |
7678 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE] = "state", | |
7679 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE] = "cache", | |
7680 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS] = "logs", | |
7681 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION] = "configuration", | |
7682 | }; | |
7683 | ||
7684 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_resource_type, ExecDirectoryType); | |
7685 | ||
7686 | /* And this table also maps ExecDirectoryType, to the environment variable we pass the selected directory to | |
7687 | * the service payload in. */ | |
7688 | static const char* const exec_directory_env_name_table[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX] = { | |
7689 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME] = "RUNTIME_DIRECTORY", | |
7690 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE] = "STATE_DIRECTORY", | |
7691 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE] = "CACHE_DIRECTORY", | |
7692 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS] = "LOGS_DIRECTORY", | |
7693 | [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION] = "CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY", | |
7694 | }; | |
7695 | ||
7696 | DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(exec_directory_env_name, ExecDirectoryType); | |
7697 | ||
7698 | static const char* const exec_keyring_mode_table[_EXEC_KEYRING_MODE_MAX] = { | |
7699 | [EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT] = "inherit", | |
7700 | [EXEC_KEYRING_PRIVATE] = "private", | |
7701 | [EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED] = "shared", | |
7702 | }; | |
7703 | ||
7704 | DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_keyring_mode, ExecKeyringMode); |