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1 | /* | |
2 | * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | |
3 | * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved | |
4 | * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. | |
5 | * | |
6 | * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use | |
7 | * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy | |
8 | * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at | |
9 | * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html | |
10 | */ | |
11 | ||
12 | #include <stdio.h> | |
13 | #include <time.h> | |
14 | #include "../ssl_locl.h" | |
15 | #include "statem_locl.h" | |
16 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> | |
17 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
18 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
19 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
20 | #include <openssl/md5.h> | |
21 | #include <openssl/dh.h> | |
22 | #include <openssl/bn.h> | |
23 | #include <openssl/engine.h> | |
24 | ||
25 | static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); | |
26 | static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); | |
27 | ||
28 | static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s); | |
29 | static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s); | |
30 | static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, | |
31 | WPACKET *pkt); | |
32 | ||
33 | /* | |
34 | * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not? | |
35 | * | |
36 | * Return values are: | |
37 | * 1: Yes | |
38 | * 0: No | |
39 | */ | |
40 | static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s) | |
41 | { | |
42 | /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ | |
43 | if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION | |
44 | && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) | |
45 | || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) | |
46 | return 0; | |
47 | ||
48 | return 1; | |
49 | } | |
50 | ||
51 | /* | |
52 | * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not? | |
53 | * | |
54 | * Return values are: | |
55 | * 1: Yes | |
56 | * 0: No | |
57 | */ | |
58 | static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s) | |
59 | { | |
60 | long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
61 | ||
62 | /* | |
63 | * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral | |
64 | * ciphersuite or for SRP | |
65 | */ | |
66 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK | |
67 | | SSL_kSRP)) { | |
68 | return 1; | |
69 | } | |
70 | ||
71 | return 0; | |
72 | } | |
73 | ||
74 | /* | |
75 | * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed | |
76 | * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the | |
77 | * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The | |
78 | * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
79 | * | |
80 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error | |
81 | * (transition not allowed) | |
82 | */ | |
83 | static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) | |
84 | { | |
85 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
86 | ||
87 | /* | |
88 | * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't | |
89 | * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by | |
90 | * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() | |
91 | */ | |
92 | ||
93 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
94 | default: | |
95 | break; | |
96 | ||
97 | case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: | |
98 | /* | |
99 | * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only | |
100 | * thing we can get now is a ServerHello. | |
101 | */ | |
102 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { | |
103 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; | |
104 | return 1; | |
105 | } | |
106 | break; | |
107 | ||
108 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: | |
109 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) { | |
110 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; | |
111 | return 1; | |
112 | } | |
113 | break; | |
114 | ||
115 | case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: | |
116 | if (s->hit) { | |
117 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
118 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; | |
119 | return 1; | |
120 | } | |
121 | } else { | |
122 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { | |
123 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; | |
124 | return 1; | |
125 | } | |
126 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
127 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; | |
128 | return 1; | |
129 | } | |
130 | } | |
131 | break; | |
132 | ||
133 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: | |
134 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
135 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; | |
136 | return 1; | |
137 | } | |
138 | break; | |
139 | ||
140 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: | |
141 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { | |
142 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY; | |
143 | return 1; | |
144 | } | |
145 | break; | |
146 | ||
147 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: | |
148 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
149 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; | |
150 | return 1; | |
151 | } | |
152 | break; | |
153 | ||
154 | case TLS_ST_OK: | |
155 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { | |
156 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; | |
157 | return 1; | |
158 | } | |
159 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) { | |
160 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE; | |
161 | return 1; | |
162 | } | |
163 | break; | |
164 | } | |
165 | ||
166 | /* No valid transition found */ | |
167 | return 0; | |
168 | } | |
169 | ||
170 | /* | |
171 | * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed | |
172 | * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the | |
173 | * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The | |
174 | * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. | |
175 | * | |
176 | * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error | |
177 | * (transition not allowed) | |
178 | */ | |
179 | int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) | |
180 | { | |
181 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
182 | int ske_expected; | |
183 | ||
184 | /* | |
185 | * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version | |
186 | * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later. | |
187 | */ | |
188 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
189 | if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt)) | |
190 | goto err; | |
191 | return 1; | |
192 | } | |
193 | ||
194 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
195 | default: | |
196 | break; | |
197 | ||
198 | case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: | |
199 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { | |
200 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; | |
201 | return 1; | |
202 | } | |
203 | ||
204 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
205 | if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { | |
206 | st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; | |
207 | return 1; | |
208 | } | |
209 | } else { | |
210 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) { | |
211 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST; | |
212 | return 1; | |
213 | } | |
214 | } | |
215 | break; | |
216 | ||
217 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: | |
218 | /* | |
219 | * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early | |
220 | * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a | |
221 | * HelloRetryRequest. | |
222 | */ | |
223 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { | |
224 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; | |
225 | return 1; | |
226 | } | |
227 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) { | |
228 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST; | |
229 | return 1; | |
230 | } | |
231 | break; | |
232 | ||
233 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: | |
234 | if (s->hit) { | |
235 | if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { | |
236 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { | |
237 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; | |
238 | return 1; | |
239 | } | |
240 | } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
241 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; | |
242 | return 1; | |
243 | } | |
244 | } else { | |
245 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { | |
246 | st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; | |
247 | return 1; | |
248 | } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION | |
249 | && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL | |
250 | && s->session->ext.tick != NULL | |
251 | && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
252 | /* | |
253 | * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session | |
254 | * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on | |
255 | * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if | |
256 | * the server is resuming. | |
257 | */ | |
258 | s->hit = 1; | |
259 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; | |
260 | return 1; | |
261 | } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth | |
262 | & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { | |
263 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { | |
264 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; | |
265 | return 1; | |
266 | } | |
267 | } else { | |
268 | ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); | |
269 | /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ | |
270 | if (ske_expected | |
271 | || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) | |
272 | && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { | |
273 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { | |
274 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; | |
275 | return 1; | |
276 | } | |
277 | } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST | |
278 | && cert_req_allowed(s)) { | |
279 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; | |
280 | return 1; | |
281 | } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { | |
282 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; | |
283 | return 1; | |
284 | } | |
285 | } | |
286 | } | |
287 | break; | |
288 | ||
289 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: | |
290 | /* | |
291 | * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if | |
292 | * |ext.status_expected| is set | |
293 | */ | |
294 | if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { | |
295 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS; | |
296 | return 1; | |
297 | } | |
298 | /* Fall through */ | |
299 | ||
300 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: | |
301 | ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); | |
302 | /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ | |
303 | if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) | |
304 | && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { | |
305 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { | |
306 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; | |
307 | return 1; | |
308 | } | |
309 | goto err; | |
310 | } | |
311 | /* Fall through */ | |
312 | ||
313 | case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: | |
314 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { | |
315 | if (cert_req_allowed(s)) { | |
316 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; | |
317 | return 1; | |
318 | } | |
319 | goto err; | |
320 | } | |
321 | /* Fall through */ | |
322 | ||
323 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: | |
324 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { | |
325 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; | |
326 | return 1; | |
327 | } | |
328 | break; | |
329 | ||
330 | case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: | |
331 | if (s->ext.ticket_expected) { | |
332 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { | |
333 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; | |
334 | return 1; | |
335 | } | |
336 | } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
337 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; | |
338 | return 1; | |
339 | } | |
340 | break; | |
341 | ||
342 | case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: | |
343 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
344 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; | |
345 | return 1; | |
346 | } | |
347 | break; | |
348 | ||
349 | case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: | |
350 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { | |
351 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; | |
352 | return 1; | |
353 | } | |
354 | break; | |
355 | ||
356 | case TLS_ST_OK: | |
357 | if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) { | |
358 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ; | |
359 | return 1; | |
360 | } | |
361 | break; | |
362 | } | |
363 | ||
364 | err: | |
365 | /* No valid transition found */ | |
366 | SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, | |
367 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, | |
368 | SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
369 | return 0; | |
370 | } | |
371 | ||
372 | /* | |
373 | * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to | |
374 | * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the | |
375 | * server. | |
376 | */ | |
377 | static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s) | |
378 | { | |
379 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
380 | ||
381 | /* | |
382 | * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated | |
383 | * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by | |
384 | * ossl_statem_client_write_transition(). | |
385 | */ | |
386 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
387 | default: | |
388 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
389 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
390 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION, | |
391 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
392 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; | |
393 | ||
394 | case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: | |
395 | /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */ | |
396 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
397 | ||
398 | case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: | |
399 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY | |
400 | || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) | |
401 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END; | |
402 | else | |
403 | st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT | |
404 | : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; | |
405 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
406 | ||
407 | case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: | |
408 | if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) { | |
409 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; | |
410 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
411 | } | |
412 | /* Fall through */ | |
413 | ||
414 | case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: | |
415 | st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT | |
416 | : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; | |
417 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
418 | ||
419 | case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: | |
420 | /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */ | |
421 | st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY | |
422 | : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; | |
423 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
424 | ||
425 | case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: | |
426 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; | |
427 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
428 | ||
429 | case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: | |
430 | if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { | |
431 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE; | |
432 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
433 | } | |
434 | /* Fall through */ | |
435 | ||
436 | case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: | |
437 | case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: | |
438 | case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: | |
439 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
440 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
441 | ||
442 | case TLS_ST_OK: | |
443 | if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { | |
444 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE; | |
445 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
446 | } | |
447 | ||
448 | /* Try to read from the server instead */ | |
449 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
450 | } | |
451 | } | |
452 | ||
453 | /* | |
454 | * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to | |
455 | * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server. | |
456 | */ | |
457 | WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) | |
458 | { | |
459 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
460 | ||
461 | /* | |
462 | * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what | |
463 | * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until | |
464 | * later | |
465 | */ | |
466 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) | |
467 | return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s); | |
468 | ||
469 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
470 | default: | |
471 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
472 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
473 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION, | |
474 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
475 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; | |
476 | ||
477 | case TLS_ST_OK: | |
478 | if (!s->renegotiate) { | |
479 | /* | |
480 | * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have | |
481 | * received a message from the server. Better read it. | |
482 | */ | |
483 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
484 | } | |
485 | /* Renegotiation */ | |
486 | /* fall thru */ | |
487 | case TLS_ST_BEFORE: | |
488 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; | |
489 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
490 | ||
491 | case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: | |
492 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) { | |
493 | /* | |
494 | * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't | |
495 | * actually selected a version yet. | |
496 | */ | |
497 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; | |
498 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
499 | } | |
500 | /* | |
501 | * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what | |
502 | * we will be sent | |
503 | */ | |
504 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
505 | ||
506 | case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: | |
507 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; | |
508 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
509 | ||
510 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: | |
511 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
512 | ||
513 | case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: | |
514 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; | |
515 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
516 | ||
517 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: | |
518 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) | |
519 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; | |
520 | else | |
521 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; | |
522 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
523 | ||
524 | case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: | |
525 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; | |
526 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
527 | ||
528 | case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: | |
529 | /* | |
530 | * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is | |
531 | * sent, but no verify packet is sent | |
532 | */ | |
533 | /* | |
534 | * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH | |
535 | * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We | |
536 | * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's | |
537 | * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate. | |
538 | */ | |
539 | if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) { | |
540 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY; | |
541 | } else { | |
542 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; | |
543 | } | |
544 | if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { | |
545 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; | |
546 | } | |
547 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
548 | ||
549 | case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: | |
550 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; | |
551 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
552 | ||
553 | case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: | |
554 | #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) | |
555 | st-> | |
556 | hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; | |
557 | #else | |
558 | if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen) | |
559 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO; | |
560 | else | |
561 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; | |
562 | #endif | |
563 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
564 | ||
565 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) | |
566 | case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: | |
567 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; | |
568 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
569 | #endif | |
570 | ||
571 | case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: | |
572 | if (s->hit) { | |
573 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
574 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
575 | } else { | |
576 | return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; | |
577 | } | |
578 | ||
579 | case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: | |
580 | if (s->hit) { | |
581 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; | |
582 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
583 | } else { | |
584 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
585 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
586 | } | |
587 | ||
588 | case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ: | |
589 | /* | |
590 | * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more | |
591 | * convenient time. | |
592 | */ | |
593 | if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) { | |
594 | if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) { | |
595 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
596 | return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; | |
597 | } | |
598 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; | |
599 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
600 | } | |
601 | st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; | |
602 | return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; | |
603 | } | |
604 | } | |
605 | ||
606 | /* | |
607 | * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from | |
608 | * the client to the server. | |
609 | */ | |
610 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) | |
611 | { | |
612 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
613 | ||
614 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
615 | default: | |
616 | /* No pre work to be done */ | |
617 | break; | |
618 | ||
619 | case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: | |
620 | s->shutdown = 0; | |
621 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
622 | /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */ | |
623 | if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { | |
624 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
625 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
626 | } | |
627 | } | |
628 | break; | |
629 | ||
630 | case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: | |
631 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
632 | if (s->hit) { | |
633 | /* | |
634 | * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these | |
635 | * messages unless we need to. | |
636 | */ | |
637 | st->use_timer = 0; | |
638 | } | |
639 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
640 | if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { | |
641 | /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ | |
642 | return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); | |
643 | } | |
644 | #endif | |
645 | } | |
646 | break; | |
647 | ||
648 | case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: | |
649 | /* | |
650 | * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not | |
651 | * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press | |
652 | * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here. | |
653 | */ | |
654 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING | |
655 | || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE) | |
656 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
657 | /* Fall through */ | |
658 | ||
659 | case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: | |
660 | case TLS_ST_OK: | |
661 | /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ | |
662 | return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1); | |
663 | } | |
664 | ||
665 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
666 | } | |
667 | ||
668 | /* | |
669 | * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the | |
670 | * client to the server. | |
671 | */ | |
672 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) | |
673 | { | |
674 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
675 | ||
676 | s->init_num = 0; | |
677 | ||
678 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
679 | default: | |
680 | /* No post work to be done */ | |
681 | break; | |
682 | ||
683 | case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: | |
684 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
685 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
686 | ||
687 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
688 | /* Treat the next message as the first packet */ | |
689 | s->first_packet = 1; | |
690 | } | |
691 | ||
692 | if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING | |
693 | && s->max_early_data > 0) { | |
694 | /* | |
695 | * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change | |
696 | * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead | |
697 | * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly. | |
698 | */ | |
699 | if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s, | |
700 | SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { | |
701 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
702 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
703 | } | |
704 | } | |
705 | break; | |
706 | ||
707 | case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: | |
708 | /* | |
709 | * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing | |
710 | * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server. | |
711 | */ | |
712 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
713 | s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; | |
714 | break; | |
715 | ||
716 | case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: | |
717 | if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) { | |
718 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
719 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
720 | } | |
721 | break; | |
722 | ||
723 | case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: | |
724 | s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; | |
725 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
726 | s->session->compress_meth = 0; | |
727 | #else | |
728 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) | |
729 | s->session->compress_meth = 0; | |
730 | else | |
731 | s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; | |
732 | #endif | |
733 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { | |
734 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
735 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
736 | } | |
737 | ||
738 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
739 | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { | |
740 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
741 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
742 | } | |
743 | ||
744 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
745 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
746 | if (s->hit) { | |
747 | /* | |
748 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
749 | * no SCTP used. | |
750 | */ | |
751 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
752 | 0, NULL); | |
753 | } | |
754 | #endif | |
755 | ||
756 | dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); | |
757 | } | |
758 | break; | |
759 | ||
760 | case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: | |
761 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
762 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) { | |
763 | /* | |
764 | * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
765 | * no SCTP used. | |
766 | */ | |
767 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, | |
768 | 0, NULL); | |
769 | } | |
770 | #endif | |
771 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
772 | return WORK_MORE_B; | |
773 | ||
774 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
775 | if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
776 | SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { | |
777 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
778 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
779 | } | |
780 | } | |
781 | break; | |
782 | ||
783 | case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: | |
784 | if (statem_flush(s) != 1) | |
785 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
786 | if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) { | |
787 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
788 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
789 | } | |
790 | break; | |
791 | } | |
792 | ||
793 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
794 | } | |
795 | ||
796 | /* | |
797 | * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the | |
798 | * client | |
799 | * | |
800 | * Valid return values are: | |
801 | * 1: Success | |
802 | * 0: Error | |
803 | */ | |
804 | int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, | |
805 | confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) | |
806 | { | |
807 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
808 | ||
809 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
810 | default: | |
811 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
812 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
813 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE, | |
814 | SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE); | |
815 | return 0; | |
816 | ||
817 | case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: | |
818 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
819 | *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; | |
820 | else | |
821 | *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; | |
822 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; | |
823 | break; | |
824 | ||
825 | case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: | |
826 | *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello; | |
827 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO; | |
828 | break; | |
829 | ||
830 | case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: | |
831 | *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data; | |
832 | *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA; | |
833 | break; | |
834 | ||
835 | case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END: | |
836 | *confunc = NULL; | |
837 | *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY; | |
838 | break; | |
839 | ||
840 | case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: | |
841 | *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate; | |
842 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; | |
843 | break; | |
844 | ||
845 | case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: | |
846 | *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange; | |
847 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; | |
848 | break; | |
849 | ||
850 | case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: | |
851 | *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify; | |
852 | *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; | |
853 | break; | |
854 | ||
855 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) | |
856 | case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: | |
857 | *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto; | |
858 | *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; | |
859 | break; | |
860 | #endif | |
861 | case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: | |
862 | *confunc = tls_construct_finished; | |
863 | *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; | |
864 | break; | |
865 | ||
866 | case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE: | |
867 | *confunc = tls_construct_key_update; | |
868 | *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE; | |
869 | break; | |
870 | } | |
871 | ||
872 | return 1; | |
873 | } | |
874 | ||
875 | /* | |
876 | * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are | |
877 | * reading. Excludes the message header. | |
878 | */ | |
879 | size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s) | |
880 | { | |
881 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
882 | ||
883 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
884 | default: | |
885 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
886 | return 0; | |
887 | ||
888 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: | |
889 | return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; | |
890 | ||
891 | case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: | |
892 | return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH; | |
893 | ||
894 | case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: | |
895 | return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH; | |
896 | ||
897 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: | |
898 | return s->max_cert_list; | |
899 | ||
900 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: | |
901 | return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
902 | ||
903 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: | |
904 | return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
905 | ||
906 | case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: | |
907 | return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; | |
908 | ||
909 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: | |
910 | /* | |
911 | * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In | |
912 | * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured | |
913 | * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs | |
914 | */ | |
915 | return s->max_cert_list; | |
916 | ||
917 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: | |
918 | return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH; | |
919 | ||
920 | case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: | |
921 | if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
922 | return 3; | |
923 | return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; | |
924 | ||
925 | case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: | |
926 | return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; | |
927 | ||
928 | case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: | |
929 | return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; | |
930 | ||
931 | case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: | |
932 | return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH; | |
933 | ||
934 | case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: | |
935 | return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH; | |
936 | } | |
937 | } | |
938 | ||
939 | /* | |
940 | * Process a message that the client has been received from the server. | |
941 | */ | |
942 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
943 | { | |
944 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
945 | ||
946 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
947 | default: | |
948 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
949 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
950 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE, | |
951 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
952 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
953 | ||
954 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: | |
955 | return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt); | |
956 | ||
957 | case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: | |
958 | return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt); | |
959 | ||
960 | case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST: | |
961 | return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt); | |
962 | ||
963 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: | |
964 | return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt); | |
965 | ||
966 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY: | |
967 | return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); | |
968 | ||
969 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: | |
970 | return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt); | |
971 | ||
972 | case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: | |
973 | return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt); | |
974 | ||
975 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: | |
976 | return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt); | |
977 | ||
978 | case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: | |
979 | return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt); | |
980 | ||
981 | case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: | |
982 | return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); | |
983 | ||
984 | case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: | |
985 | return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt); | |
986 | ||
987 | case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: | |
988 | return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); | |
989 | ||
990 | case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ: | |
991 | return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt); | |
992 | ||
993 | case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: | |
994 | return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt); | |
995 | ||
996 | case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE: | |
997 | return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt); | |
998 | } | |
999 | } | |
1000 | ||
1001 | /* | |
1002 | * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message | |
1003 | * from the server | |
1004 | */ | |
1005 | WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) | |
1006 | { | |
1007 | OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; | |
1008 | ||
1009 | switch (st->hand_state) { | |
1010 | default: | |
1011 | /* Shouldn't happen */ | |
1012 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
1013 | SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE, | |
1014 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1015 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
1016 | ||
1017 | case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: | |
1018 | return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst); | |
1019 | } | |
1020 | } | |
1021 | ||
1022 | int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
1023 | { | |
1024 | unsigned char *p; | |
1025 | size_t sess_id_len; | |
1026 | int i, protverr; | |
1027 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
1028 | SSL_COMP *comp; | |
1029 | #endif | |
1030 | SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; | |
1031 | ||
1032 | if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { | |
1033 | /* Should not happen */ | |
1034 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
1035 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1036 | return 0; | |
1037 | } | |
1038 | ||
1039 | /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */ | |
1040 | protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s); | |
1041 | if (protverr != 0) { | |
1042 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1043 | protverr); | |
1044 | return 0; | |
1045 | } | |
1046 | ||
1047 | if (sess == NULL | |
1048 | || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) | |
1049 | || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) { | |
1050 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { | |
1051 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1052 | return 0; | |
1053 | } | |
1054 | } | |
1055 | /* else use the pre-loaded session */ | |
1056 | ||
1057 | p = s->s3->client_random; | |
1058 | ||
1059 | /* | |
1060 | * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are | |
1061 | * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify | |
1062 | */ | |
1063 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1064 | size_t idx; | |
1065 | i = 1; | |
1066 | for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) { | |
1067 | if (p[idx]) { | |
1068 | i = 0; | |
1069 | break; | |
1070 | } | |
1071 | } | |
1072 | } else { | |
1073 | i = s->hello_retry_request == 0; | |
1074 | } | |
1075 | ||
1076 | if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random), | |
1077 | DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) { | |
1078 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1079 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1080 | return 0; | |
1081 | } | |
1082 | ||
1083 | /*- | |
1084 | * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from | |
1085 | * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version | |
1086 | * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also | |
1087 | * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can | |
1088 | * choke if we initially report a higher version then | |
1089 | * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This | |
1090 | * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it | |
1091 | * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports | |
1092 | * 1.0. | |
1093 | * | |
1094 | * Possible scenario with previous logic: | |
1095 | * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 | |
1096 | * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 | |
1097 | * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. | |
1098 | * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0. | |
1099 | * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. | |
1100 | * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now | |
1101 | * know that is maximum server supports. | |
1102 | * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret | |
1103 | * containing version 1.0. | |
1104 | * | |
1105 | * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the | |
1106 | * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely | |
1107 | * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't | |
1108 | * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with | |
1109 | * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using | |
1110 | * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to | |
1111 | * the negotiated version. | |
1112 | * | |
1113 | * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the | |
1114 | * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions. | |
1115 | */ | |
1116 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version) | |
1117 | || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { | |
1118 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1119 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1120 | return 0; | |
1121 | } | |
1122 | ||
1123 | /* Session ID */ | |
1124 | if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) | |
1125 | sess_id_len = 0; | |
1126 | else | |
1127 | sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length; | |
1128 | if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id) | |
1129 | || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) | |
1130 | || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id, | |
1131 | sess_id_len)) | |
1132 | || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
1133 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1134 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1135 | return 0; | |
1136 | } | |
1137 | ||
1138 | /* cookie stuff for DTLS */ | |
1139 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
1140 | if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie) | |
1141 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie, | |
1142 | s->d1->cookie_len)) { | |
1143 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1144 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1145 | return 0; | |
1146 | } | |
1147 | } | |
1148 | ||
1149 | /* Ciphers supported */ | |
1150 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { | |
1151 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1152 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1153 | return 0; | |
1154 | } | |
1155 | ||
1156 | if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) { | |
1157 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1158 | return 0; | |
1159 | } | |
1160 | if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
1161 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1162 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1163 | return 0; | |
1164 | } | |
1165 | ||
1166 | /* COMPRESSION */ | |
1167 | if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) { | |
1168 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1169 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1170 | return 0; | |
1171 | } | |
1172 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
1173 | if (ssl_allow_compression(s) | |
1174 | && s->ctx->comp_methods | |
1175 | && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) { | |
1176 | int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); | |
1177 | for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) { | |
1178 | comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i); | |
1179 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) { | |
1180 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
1181 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1182 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1183 | return 0; | |
1184 | } | |
1185 | } | |
1186 | } | |
1187 | #endif | |
1188 | /* Add the NULL method */ | |
1189 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
1190 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, | |
1191 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1192 | return 0; | |
1193 | } | |
1194 | ||
1195 | /* TLS extensions */ | |
1196 | if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) { | |
1197 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1198 | return 0; | |
1199 | } | |
1200 | ||
1201 | return 1; | |
1202 | } | |
1203 | ||
1204 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
1205 | { | |
1206 | size_t cookie_len; | |
1207 | PACKET cookiepkt; | |
1208 | ||
1209 | if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2) | |
1210 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) { | |
1211 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, | |
1212 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1213 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
1214 | } | |
1215 | ||
1216 | cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt); | |
1217 | if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { | |
1218 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, | |
1219 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
1220 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
1221 | } | |
1222 | ||
1223 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) { | |
1224 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, | |
1225 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1226 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
1227 | } | |
1228 | s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len; | |
1229 | ||
1230 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; | |
1231 | } | |
1232 | ||
1233 | static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars) | |
1234 | { | |
1235 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; | |
1236 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
1237 | int i; | |
1238 | ||
1239 | c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0); | |
1240 | if (c == NULL) { | |
1241 | /* unknown cipher */ | |
1242 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, | |
1243 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); | |
1244 | return 0; | |
1245 | } | |
1246 | /* | |
1247 | * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello, | |
1248 | * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error. | |
1249 | */ | |
1250 | if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) { | |
1251 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, | |
1252 | SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); | |
1253 | return 0; | |
1254 | } | |
1255 | ||
1256 | sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); | |
1257 | i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c); | |
1258 | if (i < 0) { | |
1259 | /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ | |
1260 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, | |
1261 | SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); | |
1262 | return 0; | |
1263 | } | |
1264 | ||
1265 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL | |
1266 | && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) { | |
1267 | /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */ | |
1268 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, | |
1269 | SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); | |
1270 | return 0; | |
1271 | } | |
1272 | ||
1273 | /* | |
1274 | * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher | |
1275 | * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is | |
1276 | * set and use it for comparison. | |
1277 | */ | |
1278 | if (s->session->cipher != NULL) | |
1279 | s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; | |
1280 | if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) { | |
1281 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
1282 | /* | |
1283 | * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different | |
1284 | * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same. | |
1285 | */ | |
1286 | if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2) | |
1287 | != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) { | |
1288 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1289 | SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, | |
1290 | SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED); | |
1291 | return 0; | |
1292 | } | |
1293 | } else { | |
1294 | /* | |
1295 | * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same | |
1296 | * ciphersuite. | |
1297 | */ | |
1298 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, | |
1299 | SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); | |
1300 | return 0; | |
1301 | } | |
1302 | } | |
1303 | s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; | |
1304 | ||
1305 | return 1; | |
1306 | } | |
1307 | ||
1308 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
1309 | { | |
1310 | PACKET session_id, extpkt; | |
1311 | size_t session_id_len; | |
1312 | const unsigned char *cipherchars; | |
1313 | unsigned int compression; | |
1314 | unsigned int sversion; | |
1315 | unsigned int context; | |
1316 | int discard; | |
1317 | RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL; | |
1318 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
1319 | SSL_COMP *comp; | |
1320 | #endif | |
1321 | ||
1322 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) { | |
1323 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1324 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1325 | goto err; | |
1326 | } | |
1327 | ||
1328 | /* load the server random */ | |
1329 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { | |
1330 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1331 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1332 | goto err; | |
1333 | } | |
1334 | ||
1335 | /* | |
1336 | * We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in. | |
1337 | * Must be done after reading the random data so we can check for the | |
1338 | * TLSv1.3 downgrade sentinels | |
1339 | */ | |
1340 | if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, 1)) { | |
1341 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1342 | goto err; | |
1343 | } | |
1344 | ||
1345 | /* | |
1346 | * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of the | |
1347 | * message must be on a record boundary. | |
1348 | */ | |
1349 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { | |
1350 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1351 | SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); | |
1352 | goto err; | |
1353 | } | |
1354 | ||
1355 | /* Get the session-id. */ | |
1356 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
1357 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) { | |
1358 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1359 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1360 | goto err; | |
1361 | } | |
1362 | session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id); | |
1363 | if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id) | |
1364 | || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) { | |
1365 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1366 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1367 | SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); | |
1368 | goto err; | |
1369 | } | |
1370 | } else { | |
1371 | PACKET_null_init(&session_id); | |
1372 | session_id_len = 0; | |
1373 | } | |
1374 | ||
1375 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) { | |
1376 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1377 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1378 | goto err; | |
1379 | } | |
1380 | ||
1381 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
1382 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) { | |
1383 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1384 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1385 | goto err; | |
1386 | } | |
1387 | } else { | |
1388 | compression = 0; | |
1389 | } | |
1390 | ||
1391 | /* TLS extensions */ | |
1392 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { | |
1393 | PACKET_null_init(&extpkt); | |
1394 | } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt) | |
1395 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
1396 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1397 | SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
1398 | goto err; | |
1399 | } | |
1400 | ||
1401 | context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO | |
1402 | : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO; | |
1403 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, NULL, 1)) { | |
1404 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1405 | goto err; | |
1406 | } | |
1407 | ||
1408 | s->hit = 0; | |
1409 | ||
1410 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
1411 | /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */ | |
1412 | if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk, | |
1413 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1414 | extensions, NULL, 0l)) { | |
1415 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1416 | goto err; | |
1417 | } | |
1418 | } else { | |
1419 | /* | |
1420 | * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared | |
1421 | * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption. | |
1422 | * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs. | |
1423 | * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs) | |
1424 | * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application | |
1425 | * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether | |
1426 | * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session | |
1427 | * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we | |
1428 | * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake | |
1429 | * message to see if the server wants to resume. | |
1430 | */ | |
1431 | if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION | |
1432 | && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) { | |
1433 | const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; | |
1434 | /* | |
1435 | * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for | |
1436 | * backwards compat reasons | |
1437 | */ | |
1438 | int master_key_length; | |
1439 | master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); | |
1440 | if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, | |
1441 | &master_key_length, | |
1442 | NULL, &pref_cipher, | |
1443 | s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg) | |
1444 | && master_key_length > 0) { | |
1445 | s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; | |
1446 | s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? | |
1447 | pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0); | |
1448 | } else { | |
1449 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
1450 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1451 | goto err; | |
1452 | } | |
1453 | } | |
1454 | ||
1455 | if (session_id_len != 0 | |
1456 | && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length | |
1457 | && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id, | |
1458 | session_id_len) == 0) | |
1459 | s->hit = 1; | |
1460 | } | |
1461 | ||
1462 | if (s->hit) { | |
1463 | if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length | |
1464 | || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) { | |
1465 | /* actually a client application bug */ | |
1466 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1467 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1468 | SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); | |
1469 | goto err; | |
1470 | } | |
1471 | } else { | |
1472 | /* | |
1473 | * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server | |
1474 | * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION. | |
1475 | * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID, | |
1476 | * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be | |
1477 | * overwritten if the server refuses resumption. | |
1478 | */ | |
1479 | if (s->session->session_id_length > 0 | |
1480 | || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
1481 | && s->session->ext.tick_identity | |
1482 | != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) { | |
1483 | CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss, 1, &discard, | |
1484 | s->session_ctx->lock); | |
1485 | if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { | |
1486 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1487 | goto err; | |
1488 | } | |
1489 | } | |
1490 | ||
1491 | s->session->ssl_version = s->version; | |
1492 | s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len; | |
1493 | /* session_id_len could be 0 */ | |
1494 | if (session_id_len > 0) | |
1495 | memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id), | |
1496 | session_id_len); | |
1497 | } | |
1498 | ||
1499 | /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */ | |
1500 | if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) { | |
1501 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1502 | SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH); | |
1503 | goto err; | |
1504 | } | |
1505 | /* | |
1506 | * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed | |
1507 | * version. | |
1508 | */ | |
1509 | s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version; | |
1510 | s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version; | |
1511 | ||
1512 | if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) { | |
1513 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1514 | goto err; | |
1515 | } | |
1516 | ||
1517 | #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP | |
1518 | if (compression != 0) { | |
1519 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1520 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); | |
1521 | goto err; | |
1522 | } | |
1523 | /* | |
1524 | * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session | |
1525 | * using compression. | |
1526 | */ | |
1527 | if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { | |
1528 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1529 | SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); | |
1530 | goto err; | |
1531 | } | |
1532 | #else | |
1533 | if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) { | |
1534 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1535 | SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED); | |
1536 | goto err; | |
1537 | } | |
1538 | if (compression == 0) | |
1539 | comp = NULL; | |
1540 | else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { | |
1541 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1542 | SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED); | |
1543 | goto err; | |
1544 | } else { | |
1545 | comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression); | |
1546 | } | |
1547 | ||
1548 | if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) { | |
1549 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1550 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); | |
1551 | goto err; | |
1552 | } else { | |
1553 | s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; | |
1554 | } | |
1555 | #endif | |
1556 | ||
1557 | if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) { | |
1558 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1559 | goto err; | |
1560 | } | |
1561 | ||
1562 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
1563 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { | |
1564 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
1565 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
1566 | ||
1567 | /* | |
1568 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if | |
1569 | * no SCTP used. | |
1570 | */ | |
1571 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, | |
1572 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
1573 | ||
1574 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, | |
1575 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), | |
1576 | labelbuffer, | |
1577 | sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { | |
1578 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, | |
1579 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1580 | goto err; | |
1581 | } | |
1582 | ||
1583 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), | |
1584 | BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, | |
1585 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
1586 | } | |
1587 | #endif | |
1588 | ||
1589 | /* | |
1590 | * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise | |
1591 | * we're done with this message | |
1592 | */ | |
1593 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
1594 | && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) | |
1595 | || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
1596 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) { | |
1597 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1598 | goto err; | |
1599 | } | |
1600 | ||
1601 | OPENSSL_free(extensions); | |
1602 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; | |
1603 | err: | |
1604 | OPENSSL_free(extensions); | |
1605 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
1606 | } | |
1607 | ||
1608 | static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
1609 | { | |
1610 | unsigned int sversion; | |
1611 | const unsigned char *cipherchars; | |
1612 | RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL; | |
1613 | PACKET extpkt; | |
1614 | ||
1615 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) { | |
1616 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, | |
1617 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1618 | goto err; | |
1619 | } | |
1620 | ||
1621 | /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT clause before release */ | |
1622 | if (sversion != TLS1_3_VERSION && sversion != TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) { | |
1623 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, | |
1624 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, | |
1625 | SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
1626 | goto err; | |
1627 | } | |
1628 | ||
1629 | s->hello_retry_request = 1; | |
1630 | ||
1631 | /* | |
1632 | * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and | |
1633 | * should not be used. | |
1634 | */ | |
1635 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
1636 | s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; | |
1637 | ||
1638 | if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) { | |
1639 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, | |
1640 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1641 | goto err; | |
1642 | } | |
1643 | ||
1644 | if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) { | |
1645 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1646 | goto err; | |
1647 | } | |
1648 | ||
1649 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt) | |
1650 | /* Must have a non-empty extensions block */ | |
1651 | || PACKET_remaining(&extpkt) == 0 | |
1652 | /* Must be no trailing data after extensions */ | |
1653 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
1654 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, | |
1655 | SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
1656 | goto err; | |
1657 | } | |
1658 | ||
1659 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, | |
1660 | &extensions, NULL, 1) | |
1661 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, | |
1662 | extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) { | |
1663 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1664 | goto err; | |
1665 | } | |
1666 | ||
1667 | OPENSSL_free(extensions); | |
1668 | extensions = NULL; | |
1669 | ||
1670 | if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0 | |
1671 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) | |
1672 | && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL | |
1673 | #endif | |
1674 | ) { | |
1675 | /* | |
1676 | * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next | |
1677 | * ClientHello will not change | |
1678 | */ | |
1679 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1680 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, | |
1681 | SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR); | |
1682 | goto err; | |
1683 | } | |
1684 | ||
1685 | /* | |
1686 | * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with | |
1687 | * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1. | |
1688 | */ | |
1689 | if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) { | |
1690 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1691 | goto err; | |
1692 | } | |
1693 | ||
1694 | /* | |
1695 | * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done | |
1696 | * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the | |
1697 | * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now | |
1698 | * for HRR messages. | |
1699 | */ | |
1700 | if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, | |
1701 | s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { | |
1702 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1703 | goto err; | |
1704 | } | |
1705 | ||
1706 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; | |
1707 | err: | |
1708 | OPENSSL_free(extensions); | |
1709 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
1710 | } | |
1711 | ||
1712 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
1713 | { | |
1714 | int i; | |
1715 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
1716 | unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len; | |
1717 | X509 *x = NULL; | |
1718 | const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; | |
1719 | STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; | |
1720 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
1721 | size_t chainidx, certidx; | |
1722 | unsigned int context = 0; | |
1723 | const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu; | |
1724 | ||
1725 | if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { | |
1726 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, | |
1727 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1728 | goto err; | |
1729 | } | |
1730 | ||
1731 | if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context)) | |
1732 | || context != 0 | |
1733 | || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len) | |
1734 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len | |
1735 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { | |
1736 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, | |
1737 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1738 | goto err; | |
1739 | } | |
1740 | for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) { | |
1741 | if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len) | |
1742 | || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) { | |
1743 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, | |
1744 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, | |
1745 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1746 | goto err; | |
1747 | } | |
1748 | ||
1749 | certstart = certbytes; | |
1750 | x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len); | |
1751 | if (x == NULL) { | |
1752 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, | |
1753 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
1754 | goto err; | |
1755 | } | |
1756 | if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) { | |
1757 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, | |
1758 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, | |
1759 | SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1760 | goto err; | |
1761 | } | |
1762 | ||
1763 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
1764 | RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; | |
1765 | PACKET extensions; | |
1766 | ||
1767 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) { | |
1768 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, | |
1769 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, | |
1770 | SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
1771 | goto err; | |
1772 | } | |
1773 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, | |
1774 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts, | |
1775 | NULL, chainidx == 0) | |
1776 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, | |
1777 | rawexts, x, chainidx, | |
1778 | PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { | |
1779 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); | |
1780 | /* SSLfatal already called */ | |
1781 | goto err; | |
1782 | } | |
1783 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); | |
1784 | } | |
1785 | ||
1786 | if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { | |
1787 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
1788 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, | |
1789 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1790 | goto err; | |
1791 | } | |
1792 | x = NULL; | |
1793 | } | |
1794 | ||
1795 | i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); | |
1796 | /* | |
1797 | * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order | |
1798 | * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place. | |
1799 | * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set | |
1800 | * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes | |
1801 | * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was | |
1802 | * reverted because at least one application *only* set | |
1803 | * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused | |
1804 | * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did | |
1805 | * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags | |
1806 | * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the | |
1807 | * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is | |
1808 | * set. The *documented* interface remains the same. | |
1809 | */ | |
1810 | if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) { | |
1811 | SSLfatal(s, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result), | |
1812 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, | |
1813 | SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); | |
1814 | goto err; | |
1815 | } | |
1816 | ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ | |
1817 | if (i > 1) { | |
1818 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, | |
1819 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i); | |
1820 | goto err; | |
1821 | } | |
1822 | ||
1823 | s->session->peer_chain = sk; | |
1824 | /* | |
1825 | * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate, | |
1826 | * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c | |
1827 | */ | |
1828 | x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); | |
1829 | sk = NULL; | |
1830 | ||
1831 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); | |
1832 | ||
1833 | if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) { | |
1834 | x = NULL; | |
1835 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, | |
1836 | SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); | |
1837 | goto err; | |
1838 | } | |
1839 | ||
1840 | if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) { | |
1841 | x = NULL; | |
1842 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1843 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, | |
1844 | SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); | |
1845 | goto err; | |
1846 | } | |
1847 | /* | |
1848 | * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3 | |
1849 | * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate | |
1850 | * type. | |
1851 | */ | |
1852 | if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
1853 | if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) { | |
1854 | x = NULL; | |
1855 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, | |
1856 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, | |
1857 | SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); | |
1858 | goto err; | |
1859 | } | |
1860 | } | |
1861 | s->session->peer_type = certidx; | |
1862 | ||
1863 | X509_free(s->session->peer); | |
1864 | X509_up_ref(x); | |
1865 | s->session->peer = x; | |
1866 | s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; | |
1867 | x = NULL; | |
1868 | ||
1869 | /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */ | |
1870 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
1871 | && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash, | |
1872 | sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash), | |
1873 | &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) { | |
1874 | /* SSLfatal() already called */; | |
1875 | goto err; | |
1876 | } | |
1877 | ||
1878 | ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; | |
1879 | ||
1880 | err: | |
1881 | X509_free(x); | |
1882 | sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); | |
1883 | return ret; | |
1884 | } | |
1885 | ||
1886 | static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
1887 | { | |
1888 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK | |
1889 | PACKET psk_identity_hint; | |
1890 | ||
1891 | /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */ | |
1892 | ||
1893 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) { | |
1894 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, | |
1895 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1896 | return 0; | |
1897 | } | |
1898 | ||
1899 | /* | |
1900 | * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in | |
1901 | * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of | |
1902 | * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK | |
1903 | * identity. | |
1904 | */ | |
1905 | if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { | |
1906 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, | |
1907 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, | |
1908 | SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
1909 | return 0; | |
1910 | } | |
1911 | ||
1912 | if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) { | |
1913 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); | |
1914 | s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL; | |
1915 | } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint, | |
1916 | &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) { | |
1917 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, | |
1918 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1919 | return 0; | |
1920 | } | |
1921 | ||
1922 | return 1; | |
1923 | #else | |
1924 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, | |
1925 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1926 | return 0; | |
1927 | #endif | |
1928 | } | |
1929 | ||
1930 | static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) | |
1931 | { | |
1932 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
1933 | PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub; | |
1934 | ||
1935 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) | |
1936 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) | |
1937 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt) | |
1938 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) { | |
1939 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, | |
1940 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1941 | return 0; | |
1942 | } | |
1943 | ||
1944 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */ | |
1945 | if ((s->srp_ctx.N = | |
1946 | BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), | |
1947 | (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL | |
1948 | || (s->srp_ctx.g = | |
1949 | BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), | |
1950 | (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL | |
1951 | || (s->srp_ctx.s = | |
1952 | BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt), | |
1953 | (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL | |
1954 | || (s->srp_ctx.B = | |
1955 | BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub), | |
1956 | (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) { | |
1957 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, | |
1958 | ERR_R_BN_LIB); | |
1959 | return 0; | |
1960 | } | |
1961 | ||
1962 | if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) { | |
1963 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
1964 | return 0; | |
1965 | } | |
1966 | ||
1967 | /* We must check if there is a certificate */ | |
1968 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS)) | |
1969 | *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); | |
1970 | ||
1971 | return 1; | |
1972 | #else | |
1973 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, | |
1974 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
1975 | return 0; | |
1976 | #endif | |
1977 | } | |
1978 | ||
1979 | static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) | |
1980 | { | |
1981 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH | |
1982 | PACKET prime, generator, pub_key; | |
1983 | EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL; | |
1984 | ||
1985 | DH *dh = NULL; | |
1986 | BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL; | |
1987 | ||
1988 | int check_bits = 0; | |
1989 | ||
1990 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) | |
1991 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) | |
1992 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) { | |
1993 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, | |
1994 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
1995 | return 0; | |
1996 | } | |
1997 | ||
1998 | peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new(); | |
1999 | dh = DH_new(); | |
2000 | ||
2001 | if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) { | |
2002 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, | |
2003 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2004 | goto err; | |
2005 | } | |
2006 | ||
2007 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */ | |
2008 | p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL); | |
2009 | g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), | |
2010 | NULL); | |
2011 | bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), | |
2012 | (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL); | |
2013 | if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) { | |
2014 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, | |
2015 | ERR_R_BN_LIB); | |
2016 | goto err; | |
2017 | } | |
2018 | ||
2019 | /* test non-zero pubkey */ | |
2020 | if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) { | |
2021 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, | |
2022 | SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); | |
2023 | goto err; | |
2024 | } | |
2025 | ||
2026 | if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) { | |
2027 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, | |
2028 | ERR_R_BN_LIB); | |
2029 | goto err; | |
2030 | } | |
2031 | p = g = NULL; | |
2032 | ||
2033 | if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) { | |
2034 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, | |
2035 | SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); | |
2036 | goto err; | |
2037 | } | |
2038 | ||
2039 | if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) { | |
2040 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, | |
2041 | ERR_R_BN_LIB); | |
2042 | goto err; | |
2043 | } | |
2044 | bnpub_key = NULL; | |
2045 | ||
2046 | if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) { | |
2047 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, | |
2048 | SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); | |
2049 | goto err; | |
2050 | } | |
2051 | ||
2052 | if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) { | |
2053 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, | |
2054 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
2055 | goto err; | |
2056 | } | |
2057 | ||
2058 | s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp; | |
2059 | ||
2060 | /* | |
2061 | * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with | |
2062 | * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this | |
2063 | */ | |
2064 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS)) | |
2065 | *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); | |
2066 | /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ | |
2067 | ||
2068 | return 1; | |
2069 | ||
2070 | err: | |
2071 | BN_free(p); | |
2072 | BN_free(g); | |
2073 | BN_free(bnpub_key); | |
2074 | DH_free(dh); | |
2075 | EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp); | |
2076 | ||
2077 | return 0; | |
2078 | #else | |
2079 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, | |
2080 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2081 | return 0; | |
2082 | #endif | |
2083 | } | |
2084 | ||
2085 | static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) | |
2086 | { | |
2087 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
2088 | PACKET encoded_pt; | |
2089 | unsigned int curve_type, curve_id; | |
2090 | ||
2091 | /* | |
2092 | * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH | |
2093 | * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and | |
2094 | * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. | |
2095 | */ | |
2096 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) { | |
2097 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, | |
2098 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
2099 | return 0; | |
2100 | } | |
2101 | /* | |
2102 | * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not | |
2103 | * server has sent an invalid curve. | |
2104 | */ | |
2105 | if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id)) { | |
2106 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, | |
2107 | SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); | |
2108 | return 0; | |
2109 | } | |
2110 | ||
2111 | if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) { | |
2112 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, | |
2113 | SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); | |
2114 | return 0; | |
2115 | } | |
2116 | ||
2117 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) { | |
2118 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, | |
2119 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2120 | return 0; | |
2121 | } | |
2122 | ||
2123 | if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp, | |
2124 | PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), | |
2125 | PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) { | |
2126 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, | |
2127 | SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); | |
2128 | return 0; | |
2129 | } | |
2130 | ||
2131 | /* | |
2132 | * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign | |
2133 | * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA | |
2134 | * and ECDSA. | |
2135 | */ | |
2136 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) | |
2137 | *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); | |
2138 | else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA) | |
2139 | *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); | |
2140 | /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ | |
2141 | ||
2142 | return 1; | |
2143 | #else | |
2144 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, | |
2145 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2146 | return 0; | |
2147 | #endif | |
2148 | } | |
2149 | ||
2150 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
2151 | { | |
2152 | long alg_k; | |
2153 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
2154 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL; | |
2155 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; | |
2156 | PACKET save_param_start, signature; | |
2157 | ||
2158 | alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
2159 | ||
2160 | save_param_start = *pkt; | |
2161 | ||
2162 | #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) | |
2163 | EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp); | |
2164 | s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL; | |
2165 | #endif | |
2166 | ||
2167 | if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) { | |
2168 | if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) { | |
2169 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2170 | goto err; | |
2171 | } | |
2172 | } | |
2173 | ||
2174 | /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */ | |
2175 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { | |
2176 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { | |
2177 | if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) { | |
2178 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2179 | goto err; | |
2180 | } | |
2181 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { | |
2182 | if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) { | |
2183 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2184 | goto err; | |
2185 | } | |
2186 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { | |
2187 | if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) { | |
2188 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2189 | goto err; | |
2190 | } | |
2191 | } else if (alg_k) { | |
2192 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2193 | SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
2194 | goto err; | |
2195 | } | |
2196 | ||
2197 | /* if it was signed, check the signature */ | |
2198 | if (pkey != NULL) { | |
2199 | PACKET params; | |
2200 | int maxsig; | |
2201 | const EVP_MD *md = NULL; | |
2202 | unsigned char *tbs; | |
2203 | size_t tbslen; | |
2204 | int rv; | |
2205 | ||
2206 | /* | |
2207 | * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference | |
2208 | * equals the length of the parameters. | |
2209 | */ | |
2210 | if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms, | |
2211 | PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) - | |
2212 | PACKET_remaining(pkt))) { | |
2213 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2214 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2215 | goto err; | |
2216 | } | |
2217 | ||
2218 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { | |
2219 | unsigned int sigalg; | |
2220 | ||
2221 | if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { | |
2222 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2223 | SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); | |
2224 | goto err; | |
2225 | } | |
2226 | if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) { | |
2227 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2228 | goto err; | |
2229 | } | |
2230 | #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
2231 | fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); | |
2232 | #endif | |
2233 | } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { | |
2234 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2235 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2236 | goto err; | |
2237 | } | |
2238 | ||
2239 | if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { | |
2240 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2241 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2242 | goto err; | |
2243 | } | |
2244 | ||
2245 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature) | |
2246 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
2247 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2248 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2249 | goto err; | |
2250 | } | |
2251 | maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); | |
2252 | if (maxsig < 0) { | |
2253 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2254 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2255 | goto err; | |
2256 | } | |
2257 | ||
2258 | /* | |
2259 | * Check signature length | |
2260 | */ | |
2261 | if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) { | |
2262 | /* wrong packet length */ | |
2263 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2264 | SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); | |
2265 | goto err; | |
2266 | } | |
2267 | ||
2268 | md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
2269 | if (md_ctx == NULL) { | |
2270 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2271 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2272 | goto err; | |
2273 | } | |
2274 | ||
2275 | if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { | |
2276 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2277 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
2278 | goto err; | |
2279 | } | |
2280 | if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { | |
2281 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 | |
2282 | || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, | |
2283 | RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { | |
2284 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2285 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
2286 | goto err; | |
2287 | } | |
2288 | } | |
2289 | tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms), | |
2290 | PACKET_remaining(¶ms)); | |
2291 | if (tbslen == 0) { | |
2292 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2293 | goto err; | |
2294 | } | |
2295 | ||
2296 | rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature), | |
2297 | PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen); | |
2298 | OPENSSL_free(tbs); | |
2299 | if (rv <= 0) { | |
2300 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2301 | SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
2302 | goto err; | |
2303 | } | |
2304 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); | |
2305 | md_ctx = NULL; | |
2306 | } else { | |
2307 | /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */ | |
2308 | if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) | |
2309 | && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) { | |
2310 | /* Might be wrong key type, check it */ | |
2311 | if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { | |
2312 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2313 | SSL_R_BAD_DATA); | |
2314 | } | |
2315 | /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2316 | goto err; | |
2317 | } | |
2318 | /* still data left over */ | |
2319 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
2320 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, | |
2321 | SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); | |
2322 | goto err; | |
2323 | } | |
2324 | } | |
2325 | ||
2326 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; | |
2327 | err: | |
2328 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); | |
2329 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2330 | } | |
2331 | ||
2332 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
2333 | { | |
2334 | size_t i; | |
2335 | ||
2336 | /* Clear certificate validity flags */ | |
2337 | for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) | |
2338 | s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0; | |
2339 | ||
2340 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
2341 | PACKET reqctx, extensions; | |
2342 | RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; | |
2343 | ||
2344 | /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */ | |
2345 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype); | |
2346 | s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL; | |
2347 | s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0; | |
2348 | ||
2349 | /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */ | |
2350 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) { | |
2351 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, | |
2352 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2353 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2354 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2355 | } | |
2356 | ||
2357 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) { | |
2358 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, | |
2359 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2360 | SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
2361 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2362 | } | |
2363 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, | |
2364 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2365 | &rawexts, NULL, 1) | |
2366 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2367 | rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) { | |
2368 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2369 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); | |
2370 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2371 | } | |
2372 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); | |
2373 | if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { | |
2374 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2375 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2376 | SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
2377 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2378 | } | |
2379 | } else { | |
2380 | PACKET ctypes; | |
2381 | ||
2382 | /* get the certificate types */ | |
2383 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) { | |
2384 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, | |
2385 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2386 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2387 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2388 | } | |
2389 | ||
2390 | if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) { | |
2391 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2392 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2393 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2394 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2395 | } | |
2396 | ||
2397 | if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { | |
2398 | PACKET sigalgs; | |
2399 | ||
2400 | if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) { | |
2401 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2402 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2403 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2404 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2405 | } | |
2406 | ||
2407 | if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) { | |
2408 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2409 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2410 | SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); | |
2411 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2412 | } | |
2413 | if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { | |
2414 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2415 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2416 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2417 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2418 | } | |
2419 | } | |
2420 | ||
2421 | /* get the CA RDNs */ | |
2422 | if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) { | |
2423 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2424 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2425 | } | |
2426 | } | |
2427 | ||
2428 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
2429 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2430 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, | |
2431 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2432 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2433 | } | |
2434 | ||
2435 | /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ | |
2436 | s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1; | |
2437 | ||
2438 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; | |
2439 | } | |
2440 | ||
2441 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
2442 | { | |
2443 | unsigned int ticklen; | |
2444 | unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0; | |
2445 | unsigned int sess_len; | |
2446 | RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL; | |
2447 | PACKET nonce; | |
2448 | ||
2449 | if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint) | |
2450 | || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
2451 | && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add) | |
2452 | || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce) | |
2453 | || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce, &s->session->ext.tick_nonce, | |
2454 | &s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len))) | |
2455 | || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen) | |
2456 | || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) | |
2457 | || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
2458 | && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) { | |
2459 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
2460 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2461 | goto err; | |
2462 | } | |
2463 | ||
2464 | /* | |
2465 | * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty | |
2466 | * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never | |
2467 | * be 0 here in that instance | |
2468 | */ | |
2469 | if (ticklen == 0) | |
2470 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; | |
2471 | ||
2472 | /* | |
2473 | * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise | |
2474 | * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions, | |
2475 | * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every | |
2476 | * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive | |
2477 | * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session | |
2478 | * cache. | |
2479 | */ | |
2480 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) { | |
2481 | int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode; | |
2482 | SSL_SESSION *new_sess; | |
2483 | /* | |
2484 | * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new | |
2485 | * one | |
2486 | */ | |
2487 | if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) { | |
2488 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2489 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
2490 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2491 | goto err; | |
2492 | } | |
2493 | ||
2494 | if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) { | |
2495 | /* | |
2496 | * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails | |
2497 | */ | |
2498 | SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); | |
2499 | } | |
2500 | ||
2501 | SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); | |
2502 | s->session = new_sess; | |
2503 | } | |
2504 | ||
2505 | /* | |
2506 | * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard - | |
2507 | * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok. | |
2508 | */ | |
2509 | s->session->time = (long)time(NULL); | |
2510 | ||
2511 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick); | |
2512 | s->session->ext.tick = NULL; | |
2513 | s->session->ext.ticklen = 0; | |
2514 | ||
2515 | s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); | |
2516 | if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) { | |
2517 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
2518 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2519 | goto err; | |
2520 | } | |
2521 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) { | |
2522 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
2523 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2524 | goto err; | |
2525 | } | |
2526 | ||
2527 | s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint; | |
2528 | s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add; | |
2529 | s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen; | |
2530 | ||
2531 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
2532 | PACKET extpkt; | |
2533 | ||
2534 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt) | |
2535 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0 | |
2536 | || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, | |
2537 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
2538 | &exts, NULL, 1) | |
2539 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, | |
2540 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
2541 | exts, NULL, 0, 1)) { | |
2542 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2543 | goto err; | |
2544 | } | |
2545 | } | |
2546 | ||
2547 | /* | |
2548 | * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set | |
2549 | * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in | |
2550 | * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work | |
2551 | * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The | |
2552 | * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is | |
2553 | * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption. | |
2554 | * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions | |
2555 | * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is | |
2556 | * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket. | |
2557 | */ | |
2558 | /* | |
2559 | * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int | |
2560 | * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t | |
2561 | */ | |
2562 | if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen, | |
2563 | s->session->session_id, &sess_len, | |
2564 | EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { | |
2565 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
2566 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
2567 | goto err; | |
2568 | } | |
2569 | s->session->session_id_length = sess_len; | |
2570 | ||
2571 | /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */ | |
2572 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { | |
2573 | OPENSSL_free(exts); | |
2574 | ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); | |
2575 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; | |
2576 | } | |
2577 | ||
2578 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; | |
2579 | err: | |
2580 | OPENSSL_free(exts); | |
2581 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2582 | } | |
2583 | ||
2584 | /* | |
2585 | * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to | |
2586 | * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure | |
2587 | */ | |
2588 | int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
2589 | { | |
2590 | size_t resplen; | |
2591 | unsigned int type; | |
2592 | ||
2593 | if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type) | |
2594 | || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { | |
2595 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, | |
2596 | SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); | |
2597 | return 0; | |
2598 | } | |
2599 | if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen) | |
2600 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) { | |
2601 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, | |
2602 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2603 | return 0; | |
2604 | } | |
2605 | s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen); | |
2606 | if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) { | |
2607 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, | |
2608 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2609 | return 0; | |
2610 | } | |
2611 | if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) { | |
2612 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, | |
2613 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2614 | return 0; | |
2615 | } | |
2616 | s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen; | |
2617 | ||
2618 | return 1; | |
2619 | } | |
2620 | ||
2621 | ||
2622 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
2623 | { | |
2624 | if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { | |
2625 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2626 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2627 | } | |
2628 | ||
2629 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; | |
2630 | } | |
2631 | ||
2632 | /* | |
2633 | * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the | |
2634 | * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message. | |
2635 | * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0 | |
2636 | * on failure. | |
2637 | */ | |
2638 | int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s) | |
2639 | { | |
2640 | /* | |
2641 | * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from | |
2642 | * the server | |
2643 | */ | |
2644 | if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { | |
2645 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2646 | return 0; | |
2647 | } | |
2648 | ||
2649 | /* | |
2650 | * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and | |
2651 | * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status | |
2652 | * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise | |
2653 | */ | |
2654 | if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing | |
2655 | && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) { | |
2656 | int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg); | |
2657 | ||
2658 | if (ret == 0) { | |
2659 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE, | |
2660 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT, | |
2661 | SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); | |
2662 | return 0; | |
2663 | } | |
2664 | if (ret < 0) { | |
2665 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
2666 | SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT, | |
2667 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2668 | return 0; | |
2669 | } | |
2670 | } | |
2671 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT | |
2672 | if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { | |
2673 | /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */ | |
2674 | if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { | |
2675 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2676 | return 0; | |
2677 | } | |
2678 | } | |
2679 | #endif | |
2680 | ||
2681 | return 1; | |
2682 | } | |
2683 | ||
2684 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
2685 | { | |
2686 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { | |
2687 | /* should contain no data */ | |
2688 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, | |
2689 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
2690 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2691 | } | |
2692 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
2693 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { | |
2694 | if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) { | |
2695 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, | |
2696 | SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC); | |
2697 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2698 | } | |
2699 | } | |
2700 | #endif | |
2701 | ||
2702 | if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { | |
2703 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2704 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
2705 | } | |
2706 | ||
2707 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; | |
2708 | } | |
2709 | ||
2710 | static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
2711 | { | |
2712 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK | |
2713 | int ret = 0; | |
2714 | /* | |
2715 | * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a | |
2716 | * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating | |
2717 | * strnlen. | |
2718 | */ | |
2719 | char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; | |
2720 | size_t identitylen = 0; | |
2721 | unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; | |
2722 | unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL; | |
2723 | char *tmpidentity = NULL; | |
2724 | size_t psklen = 0; | |
2725 | ||
2726 | if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) { | |
2727 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, | |
2728 | SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); | |
2729 | goto err; | |
2730 | } | |
2731 | ||
2732 | memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); | |
2733 | ||
2734 | psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint, | |
2735 | identity, sizeof(identity) - 1, | |
2736 | psk, sizeof(psk)); | |
2737 | ||
2738 | if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { | |
2739 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, | |
2740 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2741 | goto err; | |
2742 | } else if (psklen == 0) { | |
2743 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, | |
2744 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, | |
2745 | SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); | |
2746 | goto err; | |
2747 | } | |
2748 | ||
2749 | identitylen = strlen(identity); | |
2750 | if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { | |
2751 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, | |
2752 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2753 | goto err; | |
2754 | } | |
2755 | ||
2756 | tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); | |
2757 | tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity); | |
2758 | if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) { | |
2759 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, | |
2760 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2761 | goto err; | |
2762 | } | |
2763 | ||
2764 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); | |
2765 | s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk; | |
2766 | s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; | |
2767 | tmppsk = NULL; | |
2768 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); | |
2769 | s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity; | |
2770 | tmpidentity = NULL; | |
2771 | ||
2772 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) { | |
2773 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, | |
2774 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2775 | goto err; | |
2776 | } | |
2777 | ||
2778 | ret = 1; | |
2779 | ||
2780 | err: | |
2781 | OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); | |
2782 | OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity)); | |
2783 | OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen); | |
2784 | OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen); | |
2785 | ||
2786 | return ret; | |
2787 | #else | |
2788 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, | |
2789 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2790 | return 0; | |
2791 | #endif | |
2792 | } | |
2793 | ||
2794 | static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
2795 | { | |
2796 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA | |
2797 | unsigned char *encdata = NULL; | |
2798 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
2799 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; | |
2800 | size_t enclen; | |
2801 | unsigned char *pms = NULL; | |
2802 | size_t pmslen = 0; | |
2803 | ||
2804 | if (s->session->peer == NULL) { | |
2805 | /* | |
2806 | * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. | |
2807 | */ | |
2808 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, | |
2809 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2810 | return 0; | |
2811 | } | |
2812 | ||
2813 | pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); | |
2814 | if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) { | |
2815 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, | |
2816 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2817 | return 0; | |
2818 | } | |
2819 | ||
2820 | pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; | |
2821 | pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); | |
2822 | if (pms == NULL) { | |
2823 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, | |
2824 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2825 | return 0; | |
2826 | } | |
2827 | ||
2828 | pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8; | |
2829 | pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; | |
2830 | /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ | |
2831 | if (ssl_randbytes(s, pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) { | |
2832 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, | |
2833 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2834 | goto err; | |
2835 | } | |
2836 | ||
2837 | /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ | |
2838 | if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { | |
2839 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, | |
2840 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2841 | goto err; | |
2842 | } | |
2843 | pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); | |
2844 | if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0 | |
2845 | || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { | |
2846 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, | |
2847 | ERR_R_EVP_LIB); | |
2848 | goto err; | |
2849 | } | |
2850 | if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata) | |
2851 | || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { | |
2852 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, | |
2853 | SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); | |
2854 | goto err; | |
2855 | } | |
2856 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); | |
2857 | pctx = NULL; | |
2858 | ||
2859 | /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ | |
2860 | if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { | |
2861 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, | |
2862 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2863 | goto err; | |
2864 | } | |
2865 | ||
2866 | /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */ | |
2867 | if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) { | |
2868 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2869 | goto err; | |
2870 | } | |
2871 | ||
2872 | s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; | |
2873 | s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen; | |
2874 | ||
2875 | return 1; | |
2876 | err: | |
2877 | OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); | |
2878 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); | |
2879 | ||
2880 | return 0; | |
2881 | #else | |
2882 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, | |
2883 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2884 | return 0; | |
2885 | #endif | |
2886 | } | |
2887 | ||
2888 | static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
2889 | { | |
2890 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH | |
2891 | DH *dh_clnt = NULL; | |
2892 | const BIGNUM *pub_key; | |
2893 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; | |
2894 | unsigned char *keybytes = NULL; | |
2895 | ||
2896 | skey = s->s3->peer_tmp; | |
2897 | if (skey == NULL) { | |
2898 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, | |
2899 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2900 | goto err; | |
2901 | } | |
2902 | ||
2903 | ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey); | |
2904 | if (ckey == NULL) { | |
2905 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, | |
2906 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2907 | goto err; | |
2908 | } | |
2909 | ||
2910 | dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); | |
2911 | ||
2912 | if (dh_clnt == NULL) { | |
2913 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, | |
2914 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2915 | goto err; | |
2916 | } | |
2917 | ||
2918 | if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) { | |
2919 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2920 | goto err; | |
2921 | } | |
2922 | ||
2923 | /* send off the data */ | |
2924 | DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL); | |
2925 | if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), | |
2926 | &keybytes)) { | |
2927 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, | |
2928 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2929 | goto err; | |
2930 | } | |
2931 | ||
2932 | BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes); | |
2933 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); | |
2934 | ||
2935 | return 1; | |
2936 | err: | |
2937 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); | |
2938 | return 0; | |
2939 | #else | |
2940 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, | |
2941 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2942 | return 0; | |
2943 | #endif | |
2944 | } | |
2945 | ||
2946 | static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
2947 | { | |
2948 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
2949 | unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; | |
2950 | size_t encoded_pt_len = 0; | |
2951 | EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; | |
2952 | int ret = 0; | |
2953 | ||
2954 | skey = s->s3->peer_tmp; | |
2955 | if (skey == NULL) { | |
2956 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, | |
2957 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2958 | return 0; | |
2959 | } | |
2960 | ||
2961 | ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey); | |
2962 | if (ckey == NULL) { | |
2963 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, | |
2964 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
2965 | goto err; | |
2966 | } | |
2967 | ||
2968 | if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) { | |
2969 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
2970 | goto err; | |
2971 | } | |
2972 | ||
2973 | /* Generate encoding of client key */ | |
2974 | encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint); | |
2975 | ||
2976 | if (encoded_pt_len == 0) { | |
2977 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, | |
2978 | ERR_R_EC_LIB); | |
2979 | goto err; | |
2980 | } | |
2981 | ||
2982 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) { | |
2983 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, | |
2984 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2985 | goto err; | |
2986 | } | |
2987 | ||
2988 | ret = 1; | |
2989 | err: | |
2990 | OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); | |
2991 | EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); | |
2992 | return ret; | |
2993 | #else | |
2994 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, | |
2995 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
2996 | return 0; | |
2997 | #endif | |
2998 | } | |
2999 | ||
3000 | static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
3001 | { | |
3002 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST | |
3003 | /* GOST key exchange message creation */ | |
3004 | EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL; | |
3005 | X509 *peer_cert; | |
3006 | size_t msglen; | |
3007 | unsigned int md_len; | |
3008 | unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256]; | |
3009 | EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL; | |
3010 | int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94; | |
3011 | unsigned char *pms = NULL; | |
3012 | size_t pmslen = 0; | |
3013 | ||
3014 | if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0) | |
3015 | dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256; | |
3016 | ||
3017 | /* | |
3018 | * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it | |
3019 | */ | |
3020 | peer_cert = s->session->peer; | |
3021 | if (!peer_cert) { | |
3022 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, | |
3023 | SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER); | |
3024 | return 0; | |
3025 | } | |
3026 | ||
3027 | pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL); | |
3028 | if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { | |
3029 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, | |
3030 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
3031 | return 0; | |
3032 | } | |
3033 | /* | |
3034 | * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key | |
3035 | * parameters match those of server certificate, use | |
3036 | * certificate key for key exchange | |
3037 | */ | |
3038 | ||
3039 | /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */ | |
3040 | pmslen = 32; | |
3041 | pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); | |
3042 | if (pms == NULL) { | |
3043 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, | |
3044 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
3045 | goto err; | |
3046 | } | |
3047 | ||
3048 | if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 | |
3049 | /* Generate session key | |
3050 | * TODO(size_t): Convert this function | |
3051 | */ | |
3052 | || ssl_randbytes(s, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) { | |
3053 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, | |
3054 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3055 | goto err; | |
3056 | }; | |
3057 | /* | |
3058 | * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context | |
3059 | * data | |
3060 | */ | |
3061 | ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); | |
3062 | if (ukm_hash == NULL | |
3063 | || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0 | |
3064 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random, | |
3065 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 | |
3066 | || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random, | |
3067 | SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 | |
3068 | || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) { | |
3069 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, | |
3070 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3071 | goto err; | |
3072 | } | |
3073 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); | |
3074 | ukm_hash = NULL; | |
3075 | if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, | |
3076 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) { | |
3077 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, | |
3078 | SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); | |
3079 | goto err; | |
3080 | } | |
3081 | /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */ | |
3082 | /* | |
3083 | * Encapsulate it into sequence | |
3084 | */ | |
3085 | msglen = 255; | |
3086 | if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { | |
3087 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, | |
3088 | SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); | |
3089 | goto err; | |
3090 | } | |
3091 | ||
3092 | if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) | |
3093 | || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81)) | |
3094 | || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) { | |
3095 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, | |
3096 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3097 | goto err; | |
3098 | } | |
3099 | ||
3100 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); | |
3101 | s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; | |
3102 | s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen; | |
3103 | ||
3104 | return 1; | |
3105 | err: | |
3106 | EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); | |
3107 | OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); | |
3108 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); | |
3109 | return 0; | |
3110 | #else | |
3111 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, | |
3112 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3113 | return 0; | |
3114 | #endif | |
3115 | } | |
3116 | ||
3117 | static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
3118 | { | |
3119 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
3120 | unsigned char *abytes = NULL; | |
3121 | ||
3122 | if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL | |
3123 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A), | |
3124 | &abytes)) { | |
3125 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, | |
3126 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3127 | return 0; | |
3128 | } | |
3129 | BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes); | |
3130 | ||
3131 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); | |
3132 | s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); | |
3133 | if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { | |
3134 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, | |
3135 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
3136 | return 0; | |
3137 | } | |
3138 | ||
3139 | return 1; | |
3140 | #else | |
3141 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, | |
3142 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3143 | return 0; | |
3144 | #endif | |
3145 | } | |
3146 | ||
3147 | int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
3148 | { | |
3149 | unsigned long alg_k; | |
3150 | ||
3151 | alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
3152 | ||
3153 | /* | |
3154 | * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so | |
3155 | * no need to do so here. | |
3156 | */ | |
3157 | if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) | |
3158 | && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) | |
3159 | goto err; | |
3160 | ||
3161 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { | |
3162 | if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) | |
3163 | goto err; | |
3164 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { | |
3165 | if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) | |
3166 | goto err; | |
3167 | } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { | |
3168 | if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) | |
3169 | goto err; | |
3170 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { | |
3171 | if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt)) | |
3172 | goto err; | |
3173 | } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { | |
3174 | if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt)) | |
3175 | goto err; | |
3176 | } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) { | |
3177 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3178 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3179 | goto err; | |
3180 | } | |
3181 | ||
3182 | return 1; | |
3183 | err: | |
3184 | OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen); | |
3185 | s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL; | |
3186 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK | |
3187 | OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); | |
3188 | s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; | |
3189 | #endif | |
3190 | return 0; | |
3191 | } | |
3192 | ||
3193 | int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s) | |
3194 | { | |
3195 | unsigned char *pms = NULL; | |
3196 | size_t pmslen = 0; | |
3197 | ||
3198 | pms = s->s3->tmp.pms; | |
3199 | pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen; | |
3200 | ||
3201 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP | |
3202 | /* Check for SRP */ | |
3203 | if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { | |
3204 | if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) { | |
3205 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3206 | goto err; | |
3207 | } | |
3208 | return 1; | |
3209 | } | |
3210 | #endif | |
3211 | ||
3212 | if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { | |
3213 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3214 | SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
3215 | goto err; | |
3216 | } | |
3217 | if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) { | |
3218 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3219 | /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */ | |
3220 | pms = NULL; | |
3221 | pmslen = 0; | |
3222 | goto err; | |
3223 | } | |
3224 | pms = NULL; | |
3225 | pmslen = 0; | |
3226 | ||
3227 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP | |
3228 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
3229 | unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; | |
3230 | char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; | |
3231 | ||
3232 | /* | |
3233 | * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP | |
3234 | * used. | |
3235 | */ | |
3236 | memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, | |
3237 | sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); | |
3238 | ||
3239 | if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, | |
3240 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, | |
3241 | sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { | |
3242 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3243 | SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, | |
3244 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3245 | goto err; | |
3246 | } | |
3247 | ||
3248 | BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, | |
3249 | sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); | |
3250 | } | |
3251 | #endif | |
3252 | ||
3253 | return 1; | |
3254 | err: | |
3255 | OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); | |
3256 | s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL; | |
3257 | return 0; | |
3258 | } | |
3259 | ||
3260 | /* | |
3261 | * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check | |
3262 | * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client | |
3263 | * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B. | |
3264 | */ | |
3265 | static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s) | |
3266 | { | |
3267 | /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */ | |
3268 | if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL) | |
3269 | return 0; | |
3270 | /* | |
3271 | * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also | |
3272 | * adjusts suite B digest if necessary. | |
3273 | */ | |
3274 | if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT && | |
3275 | !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2)) | |
3276 | return 0; | |
3277 | return 1; | |
3278 | } | |
3279 | ||
3280 | WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) | |
3281 | { | |
3282 | X509 *x509 = NULL; | |
3283 | EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
3284 | int i; | |
3285 | ||
3286 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { | |
3287 | /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */ | |
3288 | if (s->cert->cert_cb) { | |
3289 | i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); | |
3290 | if (i < 0) { | |
3291 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
3292 | return WORK_MORE_A; | |
3293 | } | |
3294 | if (i == 0) { | |
3295 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3296 | SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
3297 | SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); | |
3298 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
3299 | } | |
3300 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
3301 | } | |
3302 | if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) | |
3303 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
3304 | ||
3305 | /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */ | |
3306 | wst = WORK_MORE_B; | |
3307 | } | |
3308 | ||
3309 | /* We need to get a client cert */ | |
3310 | if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { | |
3311 | /* | |
3312 | * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
3313 | * return(-1); We then get retied later | |
3314 | */ | |
3315 | i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); | |
3316 | if (i < 0) { | |
3317 | s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
3318 | return WORK_MORE_B; | |
3319 | } | |
3320 | s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
3321 | if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) { | |
3322 | if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey)) | |
3323 | i = 0; | |
3324 | } else if (i == 1) { | |
3325 | i = 0; | |
3326 | SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
3327 | SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); | |
3328 | } | |
3329 | ||
3330 | X509_free(x509); | |
3331 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
3332 | if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) | |
3333 | i = 0; | |
3334 | if (i == 0) { | |
3335 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
3336 | s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; | |
3337 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); | |
3338 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
3339 | } else { | |
3340 | s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2; | |
3341 | if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { | |
3342 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3343 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
3344 | } | |
3345 | } | |
3346 | } | |
3347 | ||
3348 | return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; | |
3349 | } | |
3350 | ||
3351 | /* Shouldn't ever get here */ | |
3352 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
3353 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3354 | return WORK_ERROR; | |
3355 | } | |
3356 | ||
3357 | int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
3358 | { | |
3359 | /* | |
3360 | * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in | |
3361 | * later | |
3362 | */ | |
3363 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { | |
3364 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3365 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3366 | return 0; | |
3367 | } | |
3368 | if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, | |
3369 | (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL | |
3370 | : s->cert->key)) { | |
3371 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3372 | return 0; | |
3373 | } | |
3374 | ||
3375 | if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) | |
3376 | && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) | |
3377 | && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, | |
3378 | SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) { | |
3379 | /* | |
3380 | * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent | |
3381 | * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash. | |
3382 | */ | |
3383 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, | |
3384 | SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); | |
3385 | return 0; | |
3386 | } | |
3387 | ||
3388 | return 1; | |
3389 | } | |
3390 | ||
3391 | int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) | |
3392 | { | |
3393 | const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu; | |
3394 | size_t idx; | |
3395 | long alg_k, alg_a; | |
3396 | ||
3397 | alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
3398 | alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
3399 | ||
3400 | /* we don't have a certificate */ | |
3401 | if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT)) | |
3402 | return 1; | |
3403 | ||
3404 | /* This is the passed certificate */ | |
3405 | clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx); | |
3406 | ||
3407 | /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */ | |
3408 | if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) { | |
3409 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, | |
3410 | SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, | |
3411 | SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT); | |
3412 | return 0; | |
3413 | } | |
3414 | ||
3415 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | |
3416 | if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) { | |
3417 | if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s)) | |
3418 | return 1; | |
3419 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, | |
3420 | SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); | |
3421 | return 0; | |
3422 | } | |
3423 | #endif | |
3424 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA | |
3425 | if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) { | |
3426 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, | |
3427 | SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, | |
3428 | SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); | |
3429 | return 0; | |
3430 | } | |
3431 | #endif | |
3432 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH | |
3433 | if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) { | |
3434 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, | |
3435 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3436 | return 0; | |
3437 | } | |
3438 | #endif | |
3439 | ||
3440 | return 1; | |
3441 | } | |
3442 | ||
3443 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG | |
3444 | int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
3445 | { | |
3446 | size_t len, padding_len; | |
3447 | unsigned char *padding = NULL; | |
3448 | ||
3449 | len = s->ext.npn_len; | |
3450 | padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); | |
3451 | ||
3452 | if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len) | |
3453 | || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) { | |
3454 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, | |
3455 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3456 | return 0; | |
3457 | } | |
3458 | ||
3459 | memset(padding, 0, padding_len); | |
3460 | ||
3461 | return 1; | |
3462 | } | |
3463 | #endif | |
3464 | ||
3465 | MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
3466 | { | |
3467 | if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { | |
3468 | /* should contain no data */ | |
3469 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, | |
3470 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
3471 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
3472 | } | |
3473 | ||
3474 | if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) { | |
3475 | ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
3476 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; | |
3477 | } | |
3478 | ||
3479 | /* | |
3480 | * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for | |
3481 | * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will | |
3482 | * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a | |
3483 | * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable | |
3484 | * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd. | |
3485 | */ | |
3486 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
3487 | SSL_renegotiate(s); | |
3488 | else | |
3489 | SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s); | |
3490 | ||
3491 | return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; | |
3492 | } | |
3493 | ||
3494 | static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) | |
3495 | { | |
3496 | PACKET extensions; | |
3497 | RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; | |
3498 | ||
3499 | if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions) | |
3500 | || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { | |
3501 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, | |
3502 | SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
3503 | goto err; | |
3504 | } | |
3505 | ||
3506 | if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, | |
3507 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts, | |
3508 | NULL, 1) | |
3509 | || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, | |
3510 | rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) { | |
3511 | /* SSLfatal() already called */ | |
3512 | goto err; | |
3513 | } | |
3514 | ||
3515 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); | |
3516 | return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; | |
3517 | ||
3518 | err: | |
3519 | OPENSSL_free(rawexts); | |
3520 | return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; | |
3521 | } | |
3522 | ||
3523 | int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) | |
3524 | { | |
3525 | int i = 0; | |
3526 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE | |
3527 | if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) { | |
3528 | i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s, | |
3529 | SSL_get_client_CA_list(s), | |
3530 | px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); | |
3531 | if (i != 0) | |
3532 | return i; | |
3533 | } | |
3534 | #endif | |
3535 | if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb) | |
3536 | i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey); | |
3537 | return i; | |
3538 | } | |
3539 | ||
3540 | int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt) | |
3541 | { | |
3542 | int i; | |
3543 | size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0; | |
3544 | int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate; | |
3545 | /* Set disabled masks for this session */ | |
3546 | ssl_set_client_disabled(s); | |
3547 | ||
3548 | if (sk == NULL) { | |
3549 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, | |
3550 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3551 | return 0; | |
3552 | } | |
3553 | ||
3554 | #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH | |
3555 | # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6 | |
3556 | # error Max cipher length too short | |
3557 | # endif | |
3558 | /* | |
3559 | * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround | |
3560 | * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we | |
3561 | * use TLS v1.2 | |
3562 | */ | |
3563 | if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) | |
3564 | maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1; | |
3565 | else | |
3566 | #endif | |
3567 | /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */ | |
3568 | maxlen = 0xfffe; | |
3569 | ||
3570 | if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) | |
3571 | maxlen -= 2; | |
3572 | if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) | |
3573 | maxlen -= 2; | |
3574 | ||
3575 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) { | |
3576 | const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
3577 | ||
3578 | c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); | |
3579 | /* Skip disabled ciphers */ | |
3580 | if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0)) | |
3581 | continue; | |
3582 | ||
3583 | if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) { | |
3584 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, | |
3585 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3586 | return 0; | |
3587 | } | |
3588 | ||
3589 | /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */ | |
3590 | if (!maxverok) { | |
3591 | if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
3592 | if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver) | |
3593 | && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)) | |
3594 | maxverok = 1; | |
3595 | } else { | |
3596 | if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver | |
3597 | && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver) | |
3598 | maxverok = 1; | |
3599 | } | |
3600 | } | |
3601 | ||
3602 | totlen += len; | |
3603 | } | |
3604 | ||
3605 | if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) { | |
3606 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, | |
3607 | SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); | |
3608 | ||
3609 | if (!maxverok) | |
3610 | ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " | |
3611 | "SSL/TLS version"); | |
3612 | ||
3613 | return 0; | |
3614 | } | |
3615 | ||
3616 | if (totlen != 0) { | |
3617 | if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) { | |
3618 | static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { | |
3619 | 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 | |
3620 | }; | |
3621 | if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) { | |
3622 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3623 | SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3624 | return 0; | |
3625 | } | |
3626 | } | |
3627 | if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) { | |
3628 | static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { | |
3629 | 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 | |
3630 | }; | |
3631 | if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) { | |
3632 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3633 | SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
3634 | return 0; | |
3635 | } | |
3636 | } | |
3637 | } | |
3638 | ||
3639 | return 1; | |
3640 | } | |
3641 | ||
3642 | int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) | |
3643 | { | |
3644 | if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY | |
3645 | && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) { | |
3646 | SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, | |
3647 | SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, | |
3648 | ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); | |
3649 | return 0; | |
3650 | } | |
3651 | ||
3652 | s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING; | |
3653 | return 1; | |
3654 | } |