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2 1. INTRODUCTION
3
4 Modern filesystems feature checksumming of data and metadata to
5 protect against data corruption. However, the detection of the
6 corruption is done at read time which could potentially be months
7 after the data was written. At that point the original data that the
8 application tried to write is most likely lost.
9
10 The solution is to ensure that the disk is actually storing what the
11 application meant it to. Recent additions to both the SCSI family
12 protocols (SBC Data Integrity Field, SCC protection proposal) as well
13 as SATA/T13 (External Path Protection) try to remedy this by adding
14 support for appending integrity metadata to an I/O. The integrity
15 metadata (or protection information in SCSI terminology) includes a
16 checksum for each sector as well as an incrementing counter that
17 ensures the individual sectors are written in the right order. And
18 for some protection schemes also that the I/O is written to the right
19 place on disk.
20
21 Current storage controllers and devices implement various protective
22 measures, for instance checksumming and scrubbing. But these
23 technologies are working in their own isolated domains or at best
24 between adjacent nodes in the I/O path. The interesting thing about
25 DIF and the other integrity extensions is that the protection format
26 is well defined and every node in the I/O path can verify the
27 integrity of the I/O and reject it if corruption is detected. This
28 allows not only corruption prevention but also isolation of the point
29 of failure.
30
31 ----------------------------------------------------------------------
32 2. THE DATA INTEGRITY EXTENSIONS
33
34 As written, the protocol extensions only protect the path between
35 controller and storage device. However, many controllers actually
36 allow the operating system to interact with the integrity metadata
37 (IMD). We have been working with several FC/SAS HBA vendors to enable
38 the protection information to be transferred to and from their
39 controllers.
40
41 The SCSI Data Integrity Field works by appending 8 bytes of protection
42 information to each sector. The data + integrity metadata is stored
43 in 520 byte sectors on disk. Data + IMD are interleaved when
44 transferred between the controller and target. The T13 proposal is
45 similar.
46
47 Because it is highly inconvenient for operating systems to deal with
48 520 (and 4104) byte sectors, we approached several HBA vendors and
49 encouraged them to allow separation of the data and integrity metadata
50 scatter-gather lists.
51
52 The controller will interleave the buffers on write and split them on
53 read. This means that Linux can DMA the data buffers to and from
54 host memory without changes to the page cache.
55
56 Also, the 16-bit CRC checksum mandated by both the SCSI and SATA specs
57 is somewhat heavy to compute in software. Benchmarks found that
58 calculating this checksum had a significant impact on system
59 performance for a number of workloads. Some controllers allow a
60 lighter-weight checksum to be used when interfacing with the operating
61 system. Emulex, for instance, supports the TCP/IP checksum instead.
62 The IP checksum received from the OS is converted to the 16-bit CRC
63 when writing and vice versa. This allows the integrity metadata to be
64 generated by Linux or the application at very low cost (comparable to
65 software RAID5).
66
67 The IP checksum is weaker than the CRC in terms of detecting bit
68 errors. However, the strength is really in the separation of the data
69 buffers and the integrity metadata. These two distinct buffers must
70 match up for an I/O to complete.
71
72 The separation of the data and integrity metadata buffers as well as
73 the choice in checksums is referred to as the Data Integrity
74 Extensions. As these extensions are outside the scope of the protocol
75 bodies (T10, T13), Oracle and its partners are trying to standardize
76 them within the Storage Networking Industry Association.
77
78 ----------------------------------------------------------------------
79 3. KERNEL CHANGES
80
81 The data integrity framework in Linux enables protection information
82 to be pinned to I/Os and sent to/received from controllers that
83 support it.
84
85 The advantage to the integrity extensions in SCSI and SATA is that
86 they enable us to protect the entire path from application to storage
87 device. However, at the same time this is also the biggest
88 disadvantage. It means that the protection information must be in a
89 format that can be understood by the disk.
90
91 Generally Linux/POSIX applications are agnostic to the intricacies of
92 the storage devices they are accessing. The virtual filesystem switch
93 and the block layer make things like hardware sector size and
94 transport protocols completely transparent to the application.
95
96 However, this level of detail is required when preparing the
97 protection information to send to a disk. Consequently, the very
98 concept of an end-to-end protection scheme is a layering violation.
99 It is completely unreasonable for an application to be aware whether
100 it is accessing a SCSI or SATA disk.
101
102 The data integrity support implemented in Linux attempts to hide this
103 from the application. As far as the application (and to some extent
104 the kernel) is concerned, the integrity metadata is opaque information
105 that's attached to the I/O.
106
107 The current implementation allows the block layer to automatically
108 generate the protection information for any I/O. Eventually the
109 intent is to move the integrity metadata calculation to userspace for
110 user data. Metadata and other I/O that originates within the kernel
111 will still use the automatic generation interface.
112
113 Some storage devices allow each hardware sector to be tagged with a
114 16-bit value. The owner of this tag space is the owner of the block
115 device. I.e. the filesystem in most cases. The filesystem can use
116 this extra space to tag sectors as they see fit. Because the tag
117 space is limited, the block interface allows tagging bigger chunks by
118 way of interleaving. This way, 8*16 bits of information can be
119 attached to a typical 4KB filesystem block.
120
121 This also means that applications such as fsck and mkfs will need
122 access to manipulate the tags from user space. A passthrough
123 interface for this is being worked on.
124
125
126 ----------------------------------------------------------------------
127 4. BLOCK LAYER IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
128
129 4.1 BIO
130
131 The data integrity patches add a new field to struct bio when
132 CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INTEGRITY is enabled. bio_integrity(bio) returns a
133 pointer to a struct bip which contains the bio integrity payload.
134 Essentially a bip is a trimmed down struct bio which holds a bio_vec
135 containing the integrity metadata and the required housekeeping
136 information (bvec pool, vector count, etc.)
137
138 A kernel subsystem can enable data integrity protection on a bio by
139 calling bio_integrity_alloc(bio). This will allocate and attach the
140 bip to the bio.
141
142 Individual pages containing integrity metadata can subsequently be
143 attached using bio_integrity_add_page().
144
145 bio_free() will automatically free the bip.
146
147
148 4.2 BLOCK DEVICE
149
150 Because the format of the protection data is tied to the physical
151 disk, each block device has been extended with a block integrity
152 profile (struct blk_integrity). This optional profile is registered
153 with the block layer using blk_integrity_register().
154
155 The profile contains callback functions for generating and verifying
156 the protection data, as well as getting and setting application tags.
157 The profile also contains a few constants to aid in completing,
158 merging and splitting the integrity metadata.
159
160 Layered block devices will need to pick a profile that's appropriate
161 for all subdevices. blk_integrity_compare() can help with that. DM
162 and MD linear, RAID0 and RAID1 are currently supported. RAID4/5/6
163 will require extra work due to the application tag.
164
165
166 ----------------------------------------------------------------------
167 5.0 BLOCK LAYER INTEGRITY API
168
169 5.1 NORMAL FILESYSTEM
170
171 The normal filesystem is unaware that the underlying block device
172 is capable of sending/receiving integrity metadata. The IMD will
173 be automatically generated by the block layer at submit_bio() time
174 in case of a WRITE. A READ request will cause the I/O integrity
175 to be verified upon completion.
176
177 IMD generation and verification can be toggled using the
178
179 /sys/block/<bdev>/integrity/write_generate
180
181 and
182
183 /sys/block/<bdev>/integrity/read_verify
184
185 flags.
186
187
188 5.2 INTEGRITY-AWARE FILESYSTEM
189
190 A filesystem that is integrity-aware can prepare I/Os with IMD
191 attached. It can also use the application tag space if this is
192 supported by the block device.
193
194
195 int bio_integrity_prep(bio);
196
197 To generate IMD for WRITE and to set up buffers for READ, the
198 filesystem must call bio_integrity_prep(bio).
199
200 Prior to calling this function, the bio data direction and start
201 sector must be set, and the bio should have all data pages
202 added. It is up to the caller to ensure that the bio does not
203 change while I/O is in progress.
204
205 bio_integrity_prep() should only be called if
206 bio_integrity_enabled() returned 1.
207
208
209 int bio_integrity_tag_size(bio);
210
211 If the filesystem wants to use the application tag space it will
212 first have to find out how much storage space is available.
213 Because tag space is generally limited (usually 2 bytes per
214 sector regardless of sector size), the integrity framework
215 supports interleaving the information between the sectors in an
216 I/O.
217
218 Filesystems can call bio_integrity_tag_size(bio) to find out how
219 many bytes of storage are available for that particular bio.
220
221 Another option is bdev_get_tag_size(block_device) which will
222 return the number of available bytes per hardware sector.
223
224
225 int bio_integrity_set_tag(bio, void *tag_buf, len);
226
227 After a successful return from bio_integrity_prep(),
228 bio_integrity_set_tag() can be used to attach an opaque tag
229 buffer to a bio. Obviously this only makes sense if the I/O is
230 a WRITE.
231
232
233 int bio_integrity_get_tag(bio, void *tag_buf, len);
234
235 Similarly, at READ I/O completion time the filesystem can
236 retrieve the tag buffer using bio_integrity_get_tag().
237
238
239 5.3 PASSING EXISTING INTEGRITY METADATA
240
241 Filesystems that either generate their own integrity metadata or
242 are capable of transferring IMD from user space can use the
243 following calls:
244
245
246 struct bip * bio_integrity_alloc(bio, gfp_mask, nr_pages);
247
248 Allocates the bio integrity payload and hangs it off of the bio.
249 nr_pages indicate how many pages of protection data need to be
250 stored in the integrity bio_vec list (similar to bio_alloc()).
251
252 The integrity payload will be freed at bio_free() time.
253
254
255 int bio_integrity_add_page(bio, page, len, offset);
256
257 Attaches a page containing integrity metadata to an existing
258 bio. The bio must have an existing bip,
259 i.e. bio_integrity_alloc() must have been called. For a WRITE,
260 the integrity metadata in the pages must be in a format
261 understood by the target device with the notable exception that
262 the sector numbers will be remapped as the request traverses the
263 I/O stack. This implies that the pages added using this call
264 will be modified during I/O! The first reference tag in the
265 integrity metadata must have a value of bip->bip_sector.
266
267 Pages can be added using bio_integrity_add_page() as long as
268 there is room in the bip bio_vec array (nr_pages).
269
270 Upon completion of a READ operation, the attached pages will
271 contain the integrity metadata received from the storage device.
272 It is up to the receiver to process them and verify data
273 integrity upon completion.
274
275
276 5.4 REGISTERING A BLOCK DEVICE AS CAPABLE OF EXCHANGING INTEGRITY
277 METADATA
278
279 To enable integrity exchange on a block device the gendisk must be
280 registered as capable:
281
282 int blk_integrity_register(gendisk, blk_integrity);
283
284 The blk_integrity struct is a template and should contain the
285 following:
286
287 static struct blk_integrity my_profile = {
288 .name = "STANDARDSBODY-TYPE-VARIANT-CSUM",
289 .generate_fn = my_generate_fn,
290 .verify_fn = my_verify_fn,
291 .get_tag_fn = my_get_tag_fn,
292 .set_tag_fn = my_set_tag_fn,
293 .tuple_size = sizeof(struct my_tuple_size),
294 .tag_size = <tag bytes per hw sector>,
295 };
296
297 'name' is a text string which will be visible in sysfs. This is
298 part of the userland API so chose it carefully and never change
299 it. The format is standards body-type-variant.
300 E.g. T10-DIF-TYPE1-IP or T13-EPP-0-CRC.
301
302 'generate_fn' generates appropriate integrity metadata (for WRITE).
303
304 'verify_fn' verifies that the data buffer matches the integrity
305 metadata.
306
307 'tuple_size' must be set to match the size of the integrity
308 metadata per sector. I.e. 8 for DIF and EPP.
309
310 'tag_size' must be set to identify how many bytes of tag space
311 are available per hardware sector. For DIF this is either 2 or
312 0 depending on the value of the Control Mode Page ATO bit.
313
314 See 6.2 for a description of get_tag_fn and set_tag_fn.
315
316 ----------------------------------------------------------------------
317 2007-12-24 Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>