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1 ==================================
2 VFIO - "Virtual Function I/O" [1]_
3 ==================================
4
5 Many modern system now provide DMA and interrupt remapping facilities
6 to help ensure I/O devices behave within the boundaries they've been
7 allotted. This includes x86 hardware with AMD-Vi and Intel VT-d,
8 POWER systems with Partitionable Endpoints (PEs) and embedded PowerPC
9 systems such as Freescale PAMU. The VFIO driver is an IOMMU/device
10 agnostic framework for exposing direct device access to userspace, in
11 a secure, IOMMU protected environment. In other words, this allows
12 safe [2]_, non-privileged, userspace drivers.
13
14 Why do we want that? Virtual machines often make use of direct device
15 access ("device assignment") when configured for the highest possible
16 I/O performance. From a device and host perspective, this simply
17 turns the VM into a userspace driver, with the benefits of
18 significantly reduced latency, higher bandwidth, and direct use of
19 bare-metal device drivers [3]_.
20
21 Some applications, particularly in the high performance computing
22 field, also benefit from low-overhead, direct device access from
23 userspace. Examples include network adapters (often non-TCP/IP based)
24 and compute accelerators. Prior to VFIO, these drivers had to either
25 go through the full development cycle to become proper upstream
26 driver, be maintained out of tree, or make use of the UIO framework,
27 which has no notion of IOMMU protection, limited interrupt support,
28 and requires root privileges to access things like PCI configuration
29 space.
30
31 The VFIO driver framework intends to unify these, replacing both the
32 KVM PCI specific device assignment code as well as provide a more
33 secure, more featureful userspace driver environment than UIO.
34
35 Groups, Devices, and IOMMUs
36 ---------------------------
37
38 Devices are the main target of any I/O driver. Devices typically
39 create a programming interface made up of I/O access, interrupts,
40 and DMA. Without going into the details of each of these, DMA is
41 by far the most critical aspect for maintaining a secure environment
42 as allowing a device read-write access to system memory imposes the
43 greatest risk to the overall system integrity.
44
45 To help mitigate this risk, many modern IOMMUs now incorporate
46 isolation properties into what was, in many cases, an interface only
47 meant for translation (ie. solving the addressing problems of devices
48 with limited address spaces). With this, devices can now be isolated
49 from each other and from arbitrary memory access, thus allowing
50 things like secure direct assignment of devices into virtual machines.
51
52 This isolation is not always at the granularity of a single device
53 though. Even when an IOMMU is capable of this, properties of devices,
54 interconnects, and IOMMU topologies can each reduce this isolation.
55 For instance, an individual device may be part of a larger multi-
56 function enclosure. While the IOMMU may be able to distinguish
57 between devices within the enclosure, the enclosure may not require
58 transactions between devices to reach the IOMMU. Examples of this
59 could be anything from a multi-function PCI device with backdoors
60 between functions to a non-PCI-ACS (Access Control Services) capable
61 bridge allowing redirection without reaching the IOMMU. Topology
62 can also play a factor in terms of hiding devices. A PCIe-to-PCI
63 bridge masks the devices behind it, making transaction appear as if
64 from the bridge itself. Obviously IOMMU design plays a major factor
65 as well.
66
67 Therefore, while for the most part an IOMMU may have device level
68 granularity, any system is susceptible to reduced granularity. The
69 IOMMU API therefore supports a notion of IOMMU groups. A group is
70 a set of devices which is isolatable from all other devices in the
71 system. Groups are therefore the unit of ownership used by VFIO.
72
73 While the group is the minimum granularity that must be used to
74 ensure secure user access, it's not necessarily the preferred
75 granularity. In IOMMUs which make use of page tables, it may be
76 possible to share a set of page tables between different groups,
77 reducing the overhead both to the platform (reduced TLB thrashing,
78 reduced duplicate page tables), and to the user (programming only
79 a single set of translations). For this reason, VFIO makes use of
80 a container class, which may hold one or more groups. A container
81 is created by simply opening the /dev/vfio/vfio character device.
82
83 On its own, the container provides little functionality, with all
84 but a couple version and extension query interfaces locked away.
85 The user needs to add a group into the container for the next level
86 of functionality. To do this, the user first needs to identify the
87 group associated with the desired device. This can be done using
88 the sysfs links described in the example below. By unbinding the
89 device from the host driver and binding it to a VFIO driver, a new
90 VFIO group will appear for the group as /dev/vfio/$GROUP, where
91 $GROUP is the IOMMU group number of which the device is a member.
92 If the IOMMU group contains multiple devices, each will need to
93 be bound to a VFIO driver before operations on the VFIO group
94 are allowed (it's also sufficient to only unbind the device from
95 host drivers if a VFIO driver is unavailable; this will make the
96 group available, but not that particular device). TBD - interface
97 for disabling driver probing/locking a device.
98
99 Once the group is ready, it may be added to the container by opening
100 the VFIO group character device (/dev/vfio/$GROUP) and using the
101 VFIO_GROUP_SET_CONTAINER ioctl, passing the file descriptor of the
102 previously opened container file. If desired and if the IOMMU driver
103 supports sharing the IOMMU context between groups, multiple groups may
104 be set to the same container. If a group fails to set to a container
105 with existing groups, a new empty container will need to be used
106 instead.
107
108 With a group (or groups) attached to a container, the remaining
109 ioctls become available, enabling access to the VFIO IOMMU interfaces.
110 Additionally, it now becomes possible to get file descriptors for each
111 device within a group using an ioctl on the VFIO group file descriptor.
112
113 The VFIO device API includes ioctls for describing the device, the I/O
114 regions and their read/write/mmap offsets on the device descriptor, as
115 well as mechanisms for describing and registering interrupt
116 notifications.
117
118 VFIO Usage Example
119 ------------------
120
121 Assume user wants to access PCI device 0000:06:0d.0::
122
123 $ readlink /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:06:0d.0/iommu_group
124 ../../../../kernel/iommu_groups/26
125
126 This device is therefore in IOMMU group 26. This device is on the
127 pci bus, therefore the user will make use of vfio-pci to manage the
128 group::
129
130 # modprobe vfio-pci
131
132 Binding this device to the vfio-pci driver creates the VFIO group
133 character devices for this group::
134
135 $ lspci -n -s 0000:06:0d.0
136 06:0d.0 0401: 1102:0002 (rev 08)
137 # echo 0000:06:0d.0 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:06:0d.0/driver/unbind
138 # echo 1102 0002 > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/vfio-pci/new_id
139
140 Now we need to look at what other devices are in the group to free
141 it for use by VFIO::
142
143 $ ls -l /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:06:0d.0/iommu_group/devices
144 total 0
145 lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 0 Apr 23 16:13 0000:00:1e.0 ->
146 ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1e.0
147 lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 0 Apr 23 16:13 0000:06:0d.0 ->
148 ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1e.0/0000:06:0d.0
149 lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 0 Apr 23 16:13 0000:06:0d.1 ->
150 ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1e.0/0000:06:0d.1
151
152 This device is behind a PCIe-to-PCI bridge [4]_, therefore we also
153 need to add device 0000:06:0d.1 to the group following the same
154 procedure as above. Device 0000:00:1e.0 is a bridge that does
155 not currently have a host driver, therefore it's not required to
156 bind this device to the vfio-pci driver (vfio-pci does not currently
157 support PCI bridges).
158
159 The final step is to provide the user with access to the group if
160 unprivileged operation is desired (note that /dev/vfio/vfio provides
161 no capabilities on its own and is therefore expected to be set to
162 mode 0666 by the system)::
163
164 # chown user:user /dev/vfio/26
165
166 The user now has full access to all the devices and the iommu for this
167 group and can access them as follows::
168
169 int container, group, device, i;
170 struct vfio_group_status group_status =
171 { .argsz = sizeof(group_status) };
172 struct vfio_iommu_type1_info iommu_info = { .argsz = sizeof(iommu_info) };
173 struct vfio_iommu_type1_dma_map dma_map = { .argsz = sizeof(dma_map) };
174 struct vfio_device_info device_info = { .argsz = sizeof(device_info) };
175
176 /* Create a new container */
177 container = open("/dev/vfio/vfio", O_RDWR);
178
179 if (ioctl(container, VFIO_GET_API_VERSION) != VFIO_API_VERSION)
180 /* Unknown API version */
181
182 if (!ioctl(container, VFIO_CHECK_EXTENSION, VFIO_TYPE1_IOMMU))
183 /* Doesn't support the IOMMU driver we want. */
184
185 /* Open the group */
186 group = open("/dev/vfio/26", O_RDWR);
187
188 /* Test the group is viable and available */
189 ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_GET_STATUS, &group_status);
190
191 if (!(group_status.flags & VFIO_GROUP_FLAGS_VIABLE))
192 /* Group is not viable (ie, not all devices bound for vfio) */
193
194 /* Add the group to the container */
195 ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_SET_CONTAINER, &container);
196
197 /* Enable the IOMMU model we want */
198 ioctl(container, VFIO_SET_IOMMU, VFIO_TYPE1_IOMMU);
199
200 /* Get addition IOMMU info */
201 ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_GET_INFO, &iommu_info);
202
203 /* Allocate some space and setup a DMA mapping */
204 dma_map.vaddr = mmap(0, 1024 * 1024, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
205 MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0);
206 dma_map.size = 1024 * 1024;
207 dma_map.iova = 0; /* 1MB starting at 0x0 from device view */
208 dma_map.flags = VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ | VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE;
209
210 ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA, &dma_map);
211
212 /* Get a file descriptor for the device */
213 device = ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD, "0000:06:0d.0");
214
215 /* Test and setup the device */
216 ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_GET_INFO, &device_info);
217
218 for (i = 0; i < device_info.num_regions; i++) {
219 struct vfio_region_info reg = { .argsz = sizeof(reg) };
220
221 reg.index = i;
222
223 ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_GET_REGION_INFO, &reg);
224
225 /* Setup mappings... read/write offsets, mmaps
226 * For PCI devices, config space is a region */
227 }
228
229 for (i = 0; i < device_info.num_irqs; i++) {
230 struct vfio_irq_info irq = { .argsz = sizeof(irq) };
231
232 irq.index = i;
233
234 ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_GET_IRQ_INFO, &irq);
235
236 /* Setup IRQs... eventfds, VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS */
237 }
238
239 /* Gratuitous device reset and go... */
240 ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_RESET);
241
242 VFIO User API
243 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
244
245 Please see include/linux/vfio.h for complete API documentation.
246
247 VFIO bus driver API
248 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
249
250 VFIO bus drivers, such as vfio-pci make use of only a few interfaces
251 into VFIO core. When devices are bound and unbound to the driver,
252 the driver should call vfio_add_group_dev() and vfio_del_group_dev()
253 respectively::
254
255 extern int vfio_add_group_dev(struct device *dev,
256 const struct vfio_device_ops *ops,
257 void *device_data);
258
259 extern void *vfio_del_group_dev(struct device *dev);
260
261 vfio_add_group_dev() indicates to the core to begin tracking the
262 iommu_group of the specified dev and register the dev as owned by
263 a VFIO bus driver. The driver provides an ops structure for callbacks
264 similar to a file operations structure::
265
266 struct vfio_device_ops {
267 int (*open)(void *device_data);
268 void (*release)(void *device_data);
269 ssize_t (*read)(void *device_data, char __user *buf,
270 size_t count, loff_t *ppos);
271 ssize_t (*write)(void *device_data, const char __user *buf,
272 size_t size, loff_t *ppos);
273 long (*ioctl)(void *device_data, unsigned int cmd,
274 unsigned long arg);
275 int (*mmap)(void *device_data, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
276 };
277
278 Each function is passed the device_data that was originally registered
279 in the vfio_add_group_dev() call above. This allows the bus driver
280 an easy place to store its opaque, private data. The open/release
281 callbacks are issued when a new file descriptor is created for a
282 device (via VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD). The ioctl interface provides
283 a direct pass through for VFIO_DEVICE_* ioctls. The read/write/mmap
284 interfaces implement the device region access defined by the device's
285 own VFIO_DEVICE_GET_REGION_INFO ioctl.
286
287
288 PPC64 sPAPR implementation note
289 -------------------------------
290
291 This implementation has some specifics:
292
293 1) On older systems (POWER7 with P5IOC2/IODA1) only one IOMMU group per
294 container is supported as an IOMMU table is allocated at the boot time,
295 one table per a IOMMU group which is a Partitionable Endpoint (PE)
296 (PE is often a PCI domain but not always).
297
298 Newer systems (POWER8 with IODA2) have improved hardware design which allows
299 to remove this limitation and have multiple IOMMU groups per a VFIO
300 container.
301
302 2) The hardware supports so called DMA windows - the PCI address range
303 within which DMA transfer is allowed, any attempt to access address space
304 out of the window leads to the whole PE isolation.
305
306 3) PPC64 guests are paravirtualized but not fully emulated. There is an API
307 to map/unmap pages for DMA, and it normally maps 1..32 pages per call and
308 currently there is no way to reduce the number of calls. In order to make
309 things faster, the map/unmap handling has been implemented in real mode
310 which provides an excellent performance which has limitations such as
311 inability to do locked pages accounting in real time.
312
313 4) According to sPAPR specification, A Partitionable Endpoint (PE) is an I/O
314 subtree that can be treated as a unit for the purposes of partitioning and
315 error recovery. A PE may be a single or multi-function IOA (IO Adapter), a
316 function of a multi-function IOA, or multiple IOAs (possibly including
317 switch and bridge structures above the multiple IOAs). PPC64 guests detect
318 PCI errors and recover from them via EEH RTAS services, which works on the
319 basis of additional ioctl commands.
320
321 So 4 additional ioctls have been added:
322
323 VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_GET_INFO
324 returns the size and the start of the DMA window on the PCI bus.
325
326 VFIO_IOMMU_ENABLE
327 enables the container. The locked pages accounting
328 is done at this point. This lets user first to know what
329 the DMA window is and adjust rlimit before doing any real job.
330
331 VFIO_IOMMU_DISABLE
332 disables the container.
333
334 VFIO_EEH_PE_OP
335 provides an API for EEH setup, error detection and recovery.
336
337 The code flow from the example above should be slightly changed::
338
339 struct vfio_eeh_pe_op pe_op = { .argsz = sizeof(pe_op), .flags = 0 };
340
341 .....
342 /* Add the group to the container */
343 ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_SET_CONTAINER, &container);
344
345 /* Enable the IOMMU model we want */
346 ioctl(container, VFIO_SET_IOMMU, VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU)
347
348 /* Get addition sPAPR IOMMU info */
349 vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_info spapr_iommu_info;
350 ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_GET_INFO, &spapr_iommu_info);
351
352 if (ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_ENABLE))
353 /* Cannot enable container, may be low rlimit */
354
355 /* Allocate some space and setup a DMA mapping */
356 dma_map.vaddr = mmap(0, 1024 * 1024, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
357 MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0);
358
359 dma_map.size = 1024 * 1024;
360 dma_map.iova = 0; /* 1MB starting at 0x0 from device view */
361 dma_map.flags = VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ | VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE;
362
363 /* Check here is .iova/.size are within DMA window from spapr_iommu_info */
364 ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA, &dma_map);
365
366 /* Get a file descriptor for the device */
367 device = ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD, "0000:06:0d.0");
368
369 ....
370
371 /* Gratuitous device reset and go... */
372 ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_RESET);
373
374 /* Make sure EEH is supported */
375 ioctl(container, VFIO_CHECK_EXTENSION, VFIO_EEH);
376
377 /* Enable the EEH functionality on the device */
378 pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_ENABLE;
379 ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);
380
381 /* You're suggested to create additional data struct to represent
382 * PE, and put child devices belonging to same IOMMU group to the
383 * PE instance for later reference.
384 */
385
386 /* Check the PE's state and make sure it's in functional state */
387 pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_GET_STATE;
388 ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);
389
390 /* Save device state using pci_save_state().
391 * EEH should be enabled on the specified device.
392 */
393
394 ....
395
396 /* Inject EEH error, which is expected to be caused by 32-bits
397 * config load.
398 */
399 pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_INJECT_ERR;
400 pe_op.err.type = EEH_ERR_TYPE_32;
401 pe_op.err.func = EEH_ERR_FUNC_LD_CFG_ADDR;
402 pe_op.err.addr = 0ul;
403 pe_op.err.mask = 0ul;
404 ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);
405
406 ....
407
408 /* When 0xFF's returned from reading PCI config space or IO BARs
409 * of the PCI device. Check the PE's state to see if that has been
410 * frozen.
411 */
412 ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);
413
414 /* Waiting for pending PCI transactions to be completed and don't
415 * produce any more PCI traffic from/to the affected PE until
416 * recovery is finished.
417 */
418
419 /* Enable IO for the affected PE and collect logs. Usually, the
420 * standard part of PCI config space, AER registers are dumped
421 * as logs for further analysis.
422 */
423 pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_UNFREEZE_IO;
424 ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);
425
426 /*
427 * Issue PE reset: hot or fundamental reset. Usually, hot reset
428 * is enough. However, the firmware of some PCI adapters would
429 * require fundamental reset.
430 */
431 pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_RESET_HOT;
432 ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);
433 pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_RESET_DEACTIVATE;
434 ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);
435
436 /* Configure the PCI bridges for the affected PE */
437 pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_CONFIGURE;
438 ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op);
439
440 /* Restored state we saved at initialization time. pci_restore_state()
441 * is good enough as an example.
442 */
443
444 /* Hopefully, error is recovered successfully. Now, you can resume to
445 * start PCI traffic to/from the affected PE.
446 */
447
448 ....
449
450 5) There is v2 of SPAPR TCE IOMMU. It deprecates VFIO_IOMMU_ENABLE/
451 VFIO_IOMMU_DISABLE and implements 2 new ioctls:
452 VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_REGISTER_MEMORY and VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_UNREGISTER_MEMORY
453 (which are unsupported in v1 IOMMU).
454
455 PPC64 paravirtualized guests generate a lot of map/unmap requests,
456 and the handling of those includes pinning/unpinning pages and updating
457 mm::locked_vm counter to make sure we do not exceed the rlimit.
458 The v2 IOMMU splits accounting and pinning into separate operations:
459
460 - VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_REGISTER_MEMORY/VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_UNREGISTER_MEMORY ioctls
461 receive a user space address and size of the block to be pinned.
462 Bisecting is not supported and VFIO_IOMMU_UNREGISTER_MEMORY is expected to
463 be called with the exact address and size used for registering
464 the memory block. The userspace is not expected to call these often.
465 The ranges are stored in a linked list in a VFIO container.
466
467 - VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA/VFIO_IOMMU_UNMAP_DMA ioctls only update the actual
468 IOMMU table and do not do pinning; instead these check that the userspace
469 address is from pre-registered range.
470
471 This separation helps in optimizing DMA for guests.
472
473 6) sPAPR specification allows guests to have an additional DMA window(s) on
474 a PCI bus with a variable page size. Two ioctls have been added to support
475 this: VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_CREATE and VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_REMOVE.
476 The platform has to support the functionality or error will be returned to
477 the userspace. The existing hardware supports up to 2 DMA windows, one is
478 2GB long, uses 4K pages and called "default 32bit window"; the other can
479 be as big as entire RAM, use different page size, it is optional - guests
480 create those in run-time if the guest driver supports 64bit DMA.
481
482 VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_CREATE receives a page shift, a DMA window size and
483 a number of TCE table levels (if a TCE table is going to be big enough and
484 the kernel may not be able to allocate enough of physically contiguous
485 memory). It creates a new window in the available slot and returns the bus
486 address where the new window starts. Due to hardware limitation, the user
487 space cannot choose the location of DMA windows.
488
489 VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_REMOVE receives the bus start address of the window
490 and removes it.
491
492 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
493
494 .. [1] VFIO was originally an acronym for "Virtual Function I/O" in its
495 initial implementation by Tom Lyon while as Cisco. We've since
496 outgrown the acronym, but it's catchy.
497
498 .. [2] "safe" also depends upon a device being "well behaved". It's
499 possible for multi-function devices to have backdoors between
500 functions and even for single function devices to have alternative
501 access to things like PCI config space through MMIO registers. To
502 guard against the former we can include additional precautions in the
503 IOMMU driver to group multi-function PCI devices together
504 (iommu=group_mf). The latter we can't prevent, but the IOMMU should
505 still provide isolation. For PCI, SR-IOV Virtual Functions are the
506 best indicator of "well behaved", as these are designed for
507 virtualization usage models.
508
509 .. [3] As always there are trade-offs to virtual machine device
510 assignment that are beyond the scope of VFIO. It's expected that
511 future IOMMU technologies will reduce some, but maybe not all, of
512 these trade-offs.
513
514 .. [4] In this case the device is below a PCI bridge, so transactions
515 from either function of the device are indistinguishable to the iommu::
516
517 -[0000:00]-+-1e.0-[06]--+-0d.0
518 \-0d.1
519
520 00:1e.0 PCI bridge: Intel Corporation 82801 PCI Bridge (rev 90)