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1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
2
3 #ifndef _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
4 #define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
5
6 #include <asm/alternative.h>
7 #include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
8 #include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
9 #include <asm/msr-index.h>
10
11 /*
12 * Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
13 *
14 * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an
15 * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
16 *
17 * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based
18 * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to
19 * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes
20 * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would
21 * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used.
22 *
23 * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and
24 * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that
25 * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there.
26 */
27
28 #define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
29 #define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16 /* To avoid underflow */
30
31 /*
32 * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
33 * the optimal version — two calls, each with their own speculation
34 * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop.
35 */
36 #define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \
37 mov $(nr/2), reg; \
38 771: \
39 call 772f; \
40 773: /* speculation trap */ \
41 pause; \
42 lfence; \
43 jmp 773b; \
44 772: \
45 call 774f; \
46 775: /* speculation trap */ \
47 pause; \
48 lfence; \
49 jmp 775b; \
50 774: \
51 dec reg; \
52 jnz 771b; \
53 add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp;
54
55 #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
56
57 /*
58 * This should be used immediately before a retpoline alternative. It tells
59 * objtool where the retpolines are so that it can make sense of the control
60 * flow by just reading the original instruction(s) and ignoring the
61 * alternatives.
62 */
63 .macro ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
64 .Lannotate_\@:
65 .pushsection .discard.nospec
66 .long .Lannotate_\@ - .
67 .popsection
68 .endm
69
70 /*
71 * This should be used immediately before an indirect jump/call. It tells
72 * objtool the subsequent indirect jump/call is vouched safe for retpoline
73 * builds.
74 */
75 .macro ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
76 .Lannotate_\@:
77 .pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe
78 _ASM_PTR .Lannotate_\@
79 .popsection
80 .endm
81
82 /*
83 * These are the bare retpoline primitives for indirect jmp and call.
84 * Do not use these directly; they only exist to make the ALTERNATIVE
85 * invocation below less ugly.
86 */
87 .macro RETPOLINE_JMP reg:req
88 call .Ldo_rop_\@
89 .Lspec_trap_\@:
90 pause
91 lfence
92 jmp .Lspec_trap_\@
93 .Ldo_rop_\@:
94 mov \reg, (%_ASM_SP)
95 ret
96 .endm
97
98 /*
99 * This is a wrapper around RETPOLINE_JMP so the called function in reg
100 * returns to the instruction after the macro.
101 */
102 .macro RETPOLINE_CALL reg:req
103 jmp .Ldo_call_\@
104 .Ldo_retpoline_jmp_\@:
105 RETPOLINE_JMP \reg
106 .Ldo_call_\@:
107 call .Ldo_retpoline_jmp_\@
108 .endm
109
110 /*
111 * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple
112 * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2
113 * attack.
114 */
115 .macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
116 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
117 ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
118 ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), \
119 __stringify(RETPOLINE_JMP \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
120 __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
121 #else
122 jmp *\reg
123 #endif
124 .endm
125
126 .macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req
127 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
128 ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
129 ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg), \
130 __stringify(RETPOLINE_CALL \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,\
131 __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
132 #else
133 call *\reg
134 #endif
135 .endm
136
137 /*
138 * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
139 * monstrosity above, manually.
140 */
141 .macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
142 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
143 ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
144 ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \
145 __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)) \
146 \ftr
147 .Lskip_rsb_\@:
148 #endif
149 .endm
150
151 #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
152
153 #define ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \
154 "999:\n\t" \
155 ".pushsection .discard.nospec\n\t" \
156 ".long 999b - .\n\t" \
157 ".popsection\n\t"
158
159 #define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
160 "999:\n\t" \
161 ".pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe\n\t" \
162 _ASM_PTR " 999b\n\t" \
163 ".popsection\n\t"
164
165 #if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(RETPOLINE)
166
167 /*
168 * Since the inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC,
169 * the 64-bit one is dependent on RETPOLINE not CONFIG_RETPOLINE.
170 */
171 # define CALL_NOSPEC \
172 ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \
173 ALTERNATIVE_2( \
174 ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
175 "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
176 "call __x86_indirect_thunk_%V[thunk_target]\n", \
177 X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
178 "lfence;\n" \
179 ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
180 "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
181 X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD)
182 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr)
183
184 #elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32) && defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)
185 /*
186 * For i386 we use the original ret-equivalent retpoline, because
187 * otherwise we'll run out of registers. We don't care about CET
188 * here, anyway.
189 */
190 # define CALL_NOSPEC \
191 ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \
192 ALTERNATIVE_2( \
193 ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
194 "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
195 " jmp 904f;\n" \
196 " .align 16\n" \
197 "901: call 903f;\n" \
198 "902: pause;\n" \
199 " lfence;\n" \
200 " jmp 902b;\n" \
201 " .align 16\n" \
202 "903: addl $4, %%esp;\n" \
203 " pushl %[thunk_target];\n" \
204 " ret;\n" \
205 " .align 16\n" \
206 "904: call 901b;\n", \
207 X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
208 "lfence;\n" \
209 ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
210 "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
211 X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD)
212
213 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
214 #else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */
215 # define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n"
216 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
217 #endif
218
219 /* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */
220 enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
221 SPECTRE_V2_NONE,
222 SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL,
223 SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD,
224 SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
225 SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD,
226 SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED,
227 };
228
229 /* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */
230 enum ssb_mitigation {
231 SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE,
232 SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE,
233 SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL,
234 SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP,
235 };
236
237 extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
238 extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
239
240 /*
241 * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
242 * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
243 * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
244 * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided.
245 */
246 static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
247 {
248 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
249 unsigned long loops;
250
251 asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
252 ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f",
253 __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)),
254 X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
255 "910:"
256 : "=r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
257 : : "memory" );
258 #endif
259 }
260
261 static __always_inline
262 void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr, u64 val, unsigned int feature)
263 {
264 asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", "wrmsr", %c[feature])
265 : : "c" (msr),
266 "a" ((u32)val),
267 "d" ((u32)(val >> 32)),
268 [feature] "i" (feature)
269 : "memory");
270 }
271
272 static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
273 {
274 u64 val = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
275
276 alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, val, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
277 }
278
279 /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
280 extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
281
282 /*
283 * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction
284 * before calling into firmware.
285 *
286 * (Implemented as CPP macros due to header hell.)
287 */
288 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start() \
289 do { \
290 u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; \
291 \
292 preempt_disable(); \
293 alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \
294 X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \
295 } while (0)
296
297 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end() \
298 do { \
299 u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base; \
300 \
301 alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \
302 X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \
303 preempt_enable(); \
304 } while (0)
305
306 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
307
308 /*
309 * Below is used in the eBPF JIT compiler and emits the byte sequence
310 * for the following assembly:
311 *
312 * With retpolines configured:
313 *
314 * callq do_rop
315 * spec_trap:
316 * pause
317 * lfence
318 * jmp spec_trap
319 * do_rop:
320 * mov %rax,(%rsp) for x86_64
321 * mov %edx,(%esp) for x86_32
322 * retq
323 *
324 * Without retpolines configured:
325 *
326 * jmp *%rax for x86_64
327 * jmp *%edx for x86_32
328 */
329 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
330 # ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
331 # define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT_SIZE 17
332 # define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT() \
333 do { \
334 EMIT1_off32(0xE8, 7); /* callq do_rop */ \
335 /* spec_trap: */ \
336 EMIT2(0xF3, 0x90); /* pause */ \
337 EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8); /* lfence */ \
338 EMIT2(0xEB, 0xF9); /* jmp spec_trap */ \
339 /* do_rop: */ \
340 EMIT4(0x48, 0x89, 0x04, 0x24); /* mov %rax,(%rsp) */ \
341 EMIT1(0xC3); /* retq */ \
342 } while (0)
343 # else /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */
344 # define RETPOLINE_EDX_BPF_JIT() \
345 do { \
346 EMIT1_off32(0xE8, 7); /* call do_rop */ \
347 /* spec_trap: */ \
348 EMIT2(0xF3, 0x90); /* pause */ \
349 EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8); /* lfence */ \
350 EMIT2(0xEB, 0xF9); /* jmp spec_trap */ \
351 /* do_rop: */ \
352 EMIT3(0x89, 0x14, 0x24); /* mov %edx,(%esp) */ \
353 EMIT1(0xC3); /* ret */ \
354 } while (0)
355 # endif
356 #else /* !CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
357 # ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
358 # define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT_SIZE 2
359 # define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT() \
360 EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0); /* jmp *%rax */
361 # else /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */
362 # define RETPOLINE_EDX_BPF_JIT() \
363 EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE2) /* jmp *%edx */
364 # endif
365 #endif
366
367 #endif /* _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ */