Merge tag 'sound-6.7-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tiwai...

[thirdparty/kernel/stable.git] / arch / x86 / kvm / svm / svm.c

#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt

#include <linux/kvm_host.h>

#include "irq.h"
#include "mmu.h"
#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
#include "x86.h"
#include "smm.h"
#include "cpuid.h"
#include "pmu.h"

#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/mod_devicetable.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/amd-iommu.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/trace_events.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/hashtable.h>
#include <linux/objtool.h>
#include <linux/psp-sev.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <linux/rwsem.h>
#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
#include <linux/smp.h>

#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/perf_event.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/desc.h>
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
#include <asm/kvm_para.h>
#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
#include <asm/traps.h>
#include <asm/reboot.h>
#include <asm/fpu/api.h>

#include <trace/events/ipi.h>

#include "trace.h"

#include "svm.h"
#include "svm_ops.h"

#include "kvm_onhyperv.h"
#include "svm_onhyperv.h"

MODULE_AUTHOR("Qumranet");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");

#ifdef MODULE
static const struct x86_cpu_id svm_cpu_id[] = {
        X86_MATCH_FEATURE(X86_FEATURE_SVM, NULL),
        {}
};
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, svm_cpu_id);
#endif

#define SEG_TYPE_LDT 2
#define SEG_TYPE_BUSY_TSS16 3

static bool erratum_383_found __read_mostly;

u32 msrpm_offsets[MSRPM_OFFSETS] __read_mostly;

/*
 * Set osvw_len to higher value when updated Revision Guides
 * are published and we know what the new status bits are
 */
static uint64_t osvw_len = 4, osvw_status;

static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, current_tsc_ratio);

#define X2APIC_MSR(x)   (APIC_BASE_MSR + (x >> 4))

static const struct svm_direct_access_msrs {
        u32 index;   /* Index of the MSR */
        bool always; /* True if intercept is initially cleared */
} direct_access_msrs[MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS] = {
        { .index = MSR_STAR,                            .always = true  },
        { .index = MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS,                .always = true  },
        { .index = MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP,               .always = false },
        { .index = MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP,               .always = false },
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
        { .index = MSR_GS_BASE,                         .always = true  },
        { .index = MSR_FS_BASE,                         .always = true  },
        { .index = MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE,                  .always = true  },
        { .index = MSR_LSTAR,                           .always = true  },
        { .index = MSR_CSTAR,                           .always = true  },
        { .index = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK,                    .always = true  },
#endif
        { .index = MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,                  .always = false },
        { .index = MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD,                   .always = false },
        { .index = MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD,                  .always = false },
        { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP,           .always = false },
        { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP,             .always = false },
        { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP,              .always = false },
        { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP,                .always = false },
        { .index = MSR_EFER,                            .always = false },
        { .index = MSR_IA32_CR_PAT,                     .always = false },
        { .index = MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB,               .always = true  },
        { .index = MSR_TSC_AUX,                         .always = false },
        { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ID),                 .always = false },
        { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVR),                .always = false },
        { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TASKPRI),            .always = false },
        { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ARBPRI),             .always = false },
        { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_PROCPRI),            .always = false },
        { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI),                .always = false },
        { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_RRR),                .always = false },
        { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LDR),                .always = false },
        { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_DFR),                .always = false },
        { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_SPIV),               .always = false },
        { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ISR),                .always = false },
        { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMR),                .always = false },
        { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_IRR),                .always = false },
        { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ESR),                .always = false },
        { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ICR),                .always = false },
        { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_ICR2),               .always = false },

        /*
         * Note:
         * AMD does not virtualize APIC TSC-deadline timer mode, but it is
         * emulated by KVM. When setting APIC LVTT (0x832) register bit 18,
         * the AVIC hardware would generate GP fault. Therefore, always
         * intercept the MSR 0x832, and do not setup direct_access_msr.
         */
        { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVTTHMR),            .always = false },
        { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVTPC),              .always = false },
        { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVT0),               .always = false },
        { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVT1),               .always = false },
        { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_LVTERR),             .always = false },
        { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMICT),              .always = false },
        { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMCCT),              .always = false },
        { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TDCR),               .always = false },
        { .index = MSR_INVALID,                         .always = false },
};

/*
 * These 2 parameters are used to config the controls for Pause-Loop Exiting:
 * pause_filter_count: On processors that support Pause filtering(indicated
 *      by CPUID Fn8000_000A_EDX), the VMCB provides a 16 bit pause filter
 *      count value. On VMRUN this value is loaded into an internal counter.
 *      Each time a pause instruction is executed, this counter is decremented
 *      until it reaches zero at which time a #VMEXIT is generated if pause
 *      intercept is enabled. Refer to  AMD APM Vol 2 Section 15.14.4 Pause
 *      Intercept Filtering for more details.
 *      This also indicate if ple logic enabled.
 *
 * pause_filter_thresh: In addition, some processor families support advanced
 *      pause filtering (indicated by CPUID Fn8000_000A_EDX) upper bound on
 *      the amount of time a guest is allowed to execute in a pause loop.
 *      In this mode, a 16-bit pause filter threshold field is added in the
 *      VMCB. The threshold value is a cycle count that is used to reset the
 *      pause counter. As with simple pause filtering, VMRUN loads the pause
 *      count value from VMCB into an internal counter. Then, on each pause
 *      instruction the hardware checks the elapsed number of cycles since
 *      the most recent pause instruction against the pause filter threshold.
 *      If the elapsed cycle count is greater than the pause filter threshold,
 *      then the internal pause count is reloaded from the VMCB and execution
 *      continues. If the elapsed cycle count is less than the pause filter
 *      threshold, then the internal pause count is decremented. If the count
 *      value is less than zero and PAUSE intercept is enabled, a #VMEXIT is
 *      triggered. If advanced pause filtering is supported and pause filter
 *      threshold field is set to zero, the filter will operate in the simpler,
 *      count only mode.
 */

static unsigned short pause_filter_thresh = KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_GAP;
module_param(pause_filter_thresh, ushort, 0444);

static unsigned short pause_filter_count = KVM_SVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW;
module_param(pause_filter_count, ushort, 0444);

/* Default doubles per-vcpu window every exit. */
static unsigned short pause_filter_count_grow = KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_GROW;
module_param(pause_filter_count_grow, ushort, 0444);

/* Default resets per-vcpu window every exit to pause_filter_count. */
static unsigned short pause_filter_count_shrink = KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_SHRINK;
module_param(pause_filter_count_shrink, ushort, 0444);

/* Default is to compute the maximum so we can never overflow. */
static unsigned short pause_filter_count_max = KVM_SVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_MAX;
module_param(pause_filter_count_max, ushort, 0444);

/*
 * Use nested page tables by default.  Note, NPT may get forced off by
 * svm_hardware_setup() if it's unsupported by hardware or the host kernel.
 */
bool npt_enabled = true;
module_param_named(npt, npt_enabled, bool, 0444);

/* allow nested virtualization in KVM/SVM */
static int nested = true;
module_param(nested, int, 0444);

/* enable/disable Next RIP Save */
int nrips = true;
module_param(nrips, int, 0444);

/* enable/disable Virtual VMLOAD VMSAVE */
static int vls = true;
module_param(vls, int, 0444);

/* enable/disable Virtual GIF */
int vgif = true;
module_param(vgif, int, 0444);

/* enable/disable LBR virtualization */
static int lbrv = true;
module_param(lbrv, int, 0444);

static int tsc_scaling = true;
module_param(tsc_scaling, int, 0444);

/*
 * enable / disable AVIC.  Because the defaults differ for APICv
 * support between VMX and SVM we cannot use module_param_named.
 */
static bool avic;
module_param(avic, bool, 0444);

bool __read_mostly dump_invalid_vmcb;
module_param(dump_invalid_vmcb, bool, 0644);


bool intercept_smi = true;
module_param(intercept_smi, bool, 0444);

bool vnmi = true;
module_param(vnmi, bool, 0444);

static bool svm_gp_erratum_intercept = true;

static u8 rsm_ins_bytes[] = "\x0f\xaa";

static unsigned long iopm_base;

DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svm_cpu_data, svm_data);

/*
 * Only MSR_TSC_AUX is switched via the user return hook.  EFER is switched via
 * the VMCB, and the SYSCALL/SYSENTER MSRs are handled by VMLOAD/VMSAVE.
 *
 * RDTSCP and RDPID are not used in the kernel, specifically to allow KVM to
 * defer the restoration of TSC_AUX until the CPU returns to userspace.
 */
static int tsc_aux_uret_slot __read_mostly = -1;

static const u32 msrpm_ranges[] = {0, 0xc0000000, 0xc0010000};

#define NUM_MSR_MAPS ARRAY_SIZE(msrpm_ranges)
#define MSRS_RANGE_SIZE 2048
#define MSRS_IN_RANGE (MSRS_RANGE_SIZE * 8 / 2)

u32 svm_msrpm_offset(u32 msr)
{
        u32 offset;
        int i;

        for (i = 0; i < NUM_MSR_MAPS; i++) {
                if (msr < msrpm_ranges[i] ||
                    msr >= msrpm_ranges[i] + MSRS_IN_RANGE)
                        continue;

                offset  = (msr - msrpm_ranges[i]) / 4; /* 4 msrs per u8 */
                offset += (i * MSRS_RANGE_SIZE);       /* add range offset */

                /* Now we have the u8 offset - but need the u32 offset */
                return offset / 4;
        }

        /* MSR not in any range */
        return MSR_INVALID;
}

static void svm_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);

static int get_npt_level(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
        return pgtable_l5_enabled() ? PT64_ROOT_5LEVEL : PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL;
#else
        return PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL;
#endif
}

int svm_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        u64 old_efer = vcpu->arch.efer;
        vcpu->arch.efer = efer;

        if (!npt_enabled) {
                /* Shadow paging assumes NX to be available.  */
                efer |= EFER_NX;

                if (!(efer & EFER_LMA))
                        efer &= ~EFER_LME;
        }

        if ((old_efer & EFER_SVME) != (efer & EFER_SVME)) {
                if (!(efer & EFER_SVME)) {
                        svm_leave_nested(vcpu);
                        svm_set_gif(svm, true);
                        /* #GP intercept is still needed for vmware backdoor */
                        if (!enable_vmware_backdoor)
                                clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);

                        /*
                         * Free the nested guest state, unless we are in SMM.
                         * In this case we will return to the nested guest
                         * as soon as we leave SMM.
                         */
                        if (!is_smm(vcpu))
                                svm_free_nested(svm);

                } else {
                        int ret = svm_allocate_nested(svm);

                        if (ret) {
                                vcpu->arch.efer = old_efer;
                                return ret;
                        }

                        /*
                         * Never intercept #GP for SEV guests, KVM can't
                         * decrypt guest memory to workaround the erratum.
                         */
                        if (svm_gp_erratum_intercept && !sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
                                set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
                }
        }

        svm->vmcb->save.efer = efer | EFER_SVME;
        vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
        return 0;
}

static u32 svm_get_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        u32 ret = 0;

        if (svm->vmcb->control.int_state & SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK)
                ret = KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_STI | KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS;
        return ret;
}

static void svm_set_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int mask)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        if (mask == 0)
                svm->vmcb->control.int_state &= ~SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK;
        else
                svm->vmcb->control.int_state |= SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK;

}

static int __svm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
                                           bool commit_side_effects)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        unsigned long old_rflags;

        /*
         * SEV-ES does not expose the next RIP. The RIP update is controlled by
         * the type of exit and the #VC handler in the guest.
         */
        if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
                goto done;

        if (nrips && svm->vmcb->control.next_rip != 0) {
                WARN_ON_ONCE(!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS));
                svm->next_rip = svm->vmcb->control.next_rip;
        }

        if (!svm->next_rip) {
                if (unlikely(!commit_side_effects))
                        old_rflags = svm->vmcb->save.rflags;

                if (!kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_SKIP))
                        return 0;

                if (unlikely(!commit_side_effects))
                        svm->vmcb->save.rflags = old_rflags;
        } else {
                kvm_rip_write(vcpu, svm->next_rip);
        }

done:
        if (likely(commit_side_effects))
                svm_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0);

        return 1;
}

static int svm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        return __svm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu, true);
}

static int svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        unsigned long rip, old_rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        /*
         * Due to architectural shortcomings, the CPU doesn't always provide
         * NextRIP, e.g. if KVM intercepted an exception that occurred while
         * the CPU was vectoring an INTO/INT3 in the guest.  Temporarily skip
         * the instruction even if NextRIP is supported to acquire the next
         * RIP so that it can be shoved into the NextRIP field, otherwise
         * hardware will fail to advance guest RIP during event injection.
         * Drop the exception/interrupt if emulation fails and effectively
         * retry the instruction, it's the least awful option.  If NRIPS is
         * in use, the skip must not commit any side effects such as clearing
         * the interrupt shadow or RFLAGS.RF.
         */
        if (!__svm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu, !nrips))
                return -EIO;

        rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);

        /*
         * Save the injection information, even when using next_rip, as the
         * VMCB's next_rip will be lost (cleared on VM-Exit) if the injection
         * doesn't complete due to a VM-Exit occurring while the CPU is
         * vectoring the event.   Decoding the instruction isn't guaranteed to
         * work as there may be no backing instruction, e.g. if the event is
         * being injected by L1 for L2, or if the guest is patching INT3 into
         * a different instruction.
         */
        svm->soft_int_injected = true;
        svm->soft_int_csbase = svm->vmcb->save.cs.base;
        svm->soft_int_old_rip = old_rip;
        svm->soft_int_next_rip = rip;

        if (nrips)
                kvm_rip_write(vcpu, old_rip);

        if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
                svm->vmcb->control.next_rip = rip;

        return 0;
}

static void svm_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct kvm_queued_exception *ex = &vcpu->arch.exception;
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        kvm_deliver_exception_payload(vcpu, ex);

        if (kvm_exception_is_soft(ex->vector) &&
            svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(vcpu))
                return;

        svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = ex->vector
                | SVM_EVTINJ_VALID
                | (ex->has_error_code ? SVM_EVTINJ_VALID_ERR : 0)
                | SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_EXEPT;
        svm->vmcb->control.event_inj_err = ex->error_code;
}

static void svm_init_erratum_383(void)
{
        u32 low, high;
        int err;
        u64 val;

        if (!static_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_AMD_TLB_MMATCH))
                return;

        /* Use _safe variants to not break nested virtualization */
        val = native_read_msr_safe(MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG, &err);
        if (err)
                return;

        val |= (1ULL << 47);

        low  = lower_32_bits(val);
        high = upper_32_bits(val);

        native_write_msr_safe(MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG, low, high);

        erratum_383_found = true;
}

static void svm_init_osvw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        /*
         * Guests should see errata 400 and 415 as fixed (assuming that
         * HLT and IO instructions are intercepted).
         */
        vcpu->arch.osvw.length = (osvw_len >= 3) ? (osvw_len) : 3;
        vcpu->arch.osvw.status = osvw_status & ~(6ULL);

        /*
         * By increasing VCPU's osvw.length to 3 we are telling the guest that
         * all osvw.status bits inside that length, including bit 0 (which is
         * reserved for erratum 298), are valid. However, if host processor's
         * osvw_len is 0 then osvw_status[0] carries no information. We need to
         * be conservative here and therefore we tell the guest that erratum 298
         * is present (because we really don't know).
         */
        if (osvw_len == 0 && boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x10)
                vcpu->arch.osvw.status |= 1;
}

static bool __kvm_is_svm_supported(void)
{
        int cpu = smp_processor_id();
        struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu);

        if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD &&
            c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
                pr_err("CPU %d isn't AMD or Hygon\n", cpu);
                return false;
        }

        if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SVM)) {
                pr_err("SVM not supported by CPU %d\n", cpu);
                return false;
        }

        if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
                pr_info("KVM is unsupported when running as an SEV guest\n");
                return false;
        }

        return true;
}

static bool kvm_is_svm_supported(void)
{
        bool supported;

        migrate_disable();
        supported = __kvm_is_svm_supported();
        migrate_enable();

        return supported;
}

static int svm_check_processor_compat(void)
{
        if (!__kvm_is_svm_supported())
                return -EIO;

        return 0;
}

static void __svm_write_tsc_multiplier(u64 multiplier)
{
        if (multiplier == __this_cpu_read(current_tsc_ratio))
                return;

        wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO, multiplier);
        __this_cpu_write(current_tsc_ratio, multiplier);
}

static inline void kvm_cpu_svm_disable(void)
{
        uint64_t efer;

        wrmsrl(MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, 0);
        rdmsrl(MSR_EFER, efer);
        if (efer & EFER_SVME) {
                /*
                 * Force GIF=1 prior to disabling SVM, e.g. to ensure INIT and
                 * NMI aren't blocked.
                 */
                stgi();
                wrmsrl(MSR_EFER, efer & ~EFER_SVME);
        }
}

static void svm_emergency_disable(void)
{
        kvm_rebooting = true;

        kvm_cpu_svm_disable();
}

static void svm_hardware_disable(void)
{
        /* Make sure we clean up behind us */
        if (tsc_scaling)
                __svm_write_tsc_multiplier(SVM_TSC_RATIO_DEFAULT);

        kvm_cpu_svm_disable();

        amd_pmu_disable_virt();
}

static int svm_hardware_enable(void)
{

        struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
        uint64_t efer;
        int me = raw_smp_processor_id();

        rdmsrl(MSR_EFER, efer);
        if (efer & EFER_SVME)
                return -EBUSY;

        sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, me);
        sd->asid_generation = 1;
        sd->max_asid = cpuid_ebx(SVM_CPUID_FUNC) - 1;
        sd->next_asid = sd->max_asid + 1;
        sd->min_asid = max_sev_asid + 1;

        wrmsrl(MSR_EFER, efer | EFER_SVME);

        wrmsrl(MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA, sd->save_area_pa);

        if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR)) {
                /*
                 * Set the default value, even if we don't use TSC scaling
                 * to avoid having stale value in the msr
                 */
                __svm_write_tsc_multiplier(SVM_TSC_RATIO_DEFAULT);
        }


        /*
         * Get OSVW bits.
         *
         * Note that it is possible to have a system with mixed processor
         * revisions and therefore different OSVW bits. If bits are not the same
         * on different processors then choose the worst case (i.e. if erratum
         * is present on one processor and not on another then assume that the
         * erratum is present everywhere).
         */
        if (cpu_has(&boot_cpu_data, X86_FEATURE_OSVW)) {
                uint64_t len, status = 0;
                int err;

                len = native_read_msr_safe(MSR_AMD64_OSVW_ID_LENGTH, &err);
                if (!err)
                        status = native_read_msr_safe(MSR_AMD64_OSVW_STATUS,
                                                      &err);

                if (err)
                        osvw_status = osvw_len = 0;
                else {
                        if (len < osvw_len)
                                osvw_len = len;
                        osvw_status |= status;
                        osvw_status &= (1ULL << osvw_len) - 1;
                }
        } else
                osvw_status = osvw_len = 0;

        svm_init_erratum_383();

        amd_pmu_enable_virt();

        /*
         * If TSC_AUX virtualization is supported, TSC_AUX becomes a swap type
         * "B" field (see sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest()) for SEV-ES guests.
         * Since Linux does not change the value of TSC_AUX once set, prime the
         * TSC_AUX field now to avoid a RDMSR on every vCPU run.
         */
        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX)) {
                struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa;
                u32 __maybe_unused msr_hi;

                hostsa = (struct sev_es_save_area *)(page_address(sd->save_area) + 0x400);

                rdmsr(MSR_TSC_AUX, hostsa->tsc_aux, msr_hi);
        }

        return 0;
}

static void svm_cpu_uninit(int cpu)
{
        struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, cpu);

        if (!sd->save_area)
                return;

        kfree(sd->sev_vmcbs);
        __free_page(sd->save_area);
        sd->save_area_pa = 0;
        sd->save_area = NULL;
}

static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
{
        struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, cpu);
        int ret = -ENOMEM;

        memset(sd, 0, sizeof(struct svm_cpu_data));
        sd->save_area = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
        if (!sd->save_area)
                return ret;

        ret = sev_cpu_init(sd);
        if (ret)
                goto free_save_area;

        sd->save_area_pa = __sme_page_pa(sd->save_area);
        return 0;

free_save_area:
        __free_page(sd->save_area);
        sd->save_area = NULL;
        return ret;

}

static void set_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
        struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;

        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_READ);
        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_READ);
        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_READ);
        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_READ);
        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_READ);
        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_READ);
        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_READ);
        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR0_WRITE);
        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR1_WRITE);
        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR2_WRITE);
        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR3_WRITE);
        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR4_WRITE);
        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR5_WRITE);
        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR6_WRITE);
        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_READ);
        vmcb_set_intercept(&vmcb->control, INTERCEPT_DR7_WRITE);

        recalc_intercepts(svm);
}

static void clr_dr_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
        struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;

        vmcb->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_DR] = 0;

        recalc_intercepts(svm);
}

static int direct_access_msr_slot(u32 msr)
{
        u32 i;

        for (i = 0; direct_access_msrs[i].index != MSR_INVALID; i++)
                if (direct_access_msrs[i].index == msr)
                        return i;

        return -ENOENT;
}

static void set_shadow_msr_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, int read,
                                     int write)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        int slot = direct_access_msr_slot(msr);

        if (slot == -ENOENT)
                return;

        /* Set the shadow bitmaps to the desired intercept states */
        if (read)
                set_bit(slot, svm->shadow_msr_intercept.read);
        else
                clear_bit(slot, svm->shadow_msr_intercept.read);

        if (write)
                set_bit(slot, svm->shadow_msr_intercept.write);
        else
                clear_bit(slot, svm->shadow_msr_intercept.write);
}

static bool valid_msr_intercept(u32 index)
{
        return direct_access_msr_slot(index) != -ENOENT;
}

static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
{
        u8 bit_write;
        unsigned long tmp;
        u32 offset;
        u32 *msrpm;

        /*
         * For non-nested case:
         * If the L01 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
         * save it.
         *
         * For nested case:
         * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
         * save it.
         */
        msrpm = is_guest_mode(vcpu) ? to_svm(vcpu)->nested.msrpm:
                                      to_svm(vcpu)->msrpm;

        offset    = svm_msrpm_offset(msr);
        bit_write = 2 * (msr & 0x0f) + 1;
        tmp       = msrpm[offset];

        BUG_ON(offset == MSR_INVALID);

        return test_bit(bit_write, &tmp);
}

static void set_msr_interception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *msrpm,
                                        u32 msr, int read, int write)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        u8 bit_read, bit_write;
        unsigned long tmp;
        u32 offset;

        /*
         * If this warning triggers extend the direct_access_msrs list at the
         * beginning of the file
         */
        WARN_ON(!valid_msr_intercept(msr));

        /* Enforce non allowed MSRs to trap */
        if (read && !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, msr, KVM_MSR_FILTER_READ))
                read = 0;

        if (write && !kvm_msr_allowed(vcpu, msr, KVM_MSR_FILTER_WRITE))
                write = 0;

        offset    = svm_msrpm_offset(msr);
        bit_read  = 2 * (msr & 0x0f);
        bit_write = 2 * (msr & 0x0f) + 1;
        tmp       = msrpm[offset];

        BUG_ON(offset == MSR_INVALID);

        read  ? clear_bit(bit_read,  &tmp) : set_bit(bit_read,  &tmp);
        write ? clear_bit(bit_write, &tmp) : set_bit(bit_write, &tmp);

        msrpm[offset] = tmp;

        svm_hv_vmcb_dirty_nested_enlightenments(vcpu);
        svm->nested.force_msr_bitmap_recalc = true;
}

void set_msr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *msrpm, u32 msr,
                          int read, int write)
{
        set_shadow_msr_intercept(vcpu, msr, read, write);
        set_msr_interception_bitmap(vcpu, msrpm, msr, read, write);
}

u32 *svm_vcpu_alloc_msrpm(void)
{
        unsigned int order = get_order(MSRPM_SIZE);
        struct page *pages = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, order);
        u32 *msrpm;

        if (!pages)
                return NULL;

        msrpm = page_address(pages);
        memset(msrpm, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE * (1 << order));

        return msrpm;
}

void svm_vcpu_init_msrpm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *msrpm)
{
        int i;

        for (i = 0; direct_access_msrs[i].index != MSR_INVALID; i++) {
                if (!direct_access_msrs[i].always)
                        continue;
                set_msr_interception(vcpu, msrpm, direct_access_msrs[i].index, 1, 1);
        }
}

void svm_set_x2apic_msr_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool intercept)
{
        int i;

        if (intercept == svm->x2avic_msrs_intercepted)
                return;

        if (!x2avic_enabled)
                return;

        for (i = 0; i < MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS; i++) {
                int index = direct_access_msrs[i].index;

                if ((index < APIC_BASE_MSR) ||
                    (index > APIC_BASE_MSR + 0xff))
                        continue;
                set_msr_interception(&svm->vcpu, svm->msrpm, index,
                                     !intercept, !intercept);
        }

        svm->x2avic_msrs_intercepted = intercept;
}

void svm_vcpu_free_msrpm(u32 *msrpm)
{
        __free_pages(virt_to_page(msrpm), get_order(MSRPM_SIZE));
}

static void svm_msr_filter_changed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        u32 i;

        /*
         * Set intercept permissions for all direct access MSRs again. They
         * will automatically get filtered through the MSR filter, so we are
         * back in sync after this.
         */
        for (i = 0; direct_access_msrs[i].index != MSR_INVALID; i++) {
                u32 msr = direct_access_msrs[i].index;
                u32 read = test_bit(i, svm->shadow_msr_intercept.read);
                u32 write = test_bit(i, svm->shadow_msr_intercept.write);

                set_msr_interception_bitmap(vcpu, svm->msrpm, msr, read, write);
        }
}

static void add_msr_offset(u32 offset)
{
        int i;

        for (i = 0; i < MSRPM_OFFSETS; ++i) {

                /* Offset already in list? */
                if (msrpm_offsets[i] == offset)
                        return;

                /* Slot used by another offset? */
                if (msrpm_offsets[i] != MSR_INVALID)
                        continue;

                /* Add offset to list */
                msrpm_offsets[i] = offset;

                return;
        }

        /*
         * If this BUG triggers the msrpm_offsets table has an overflow. Just
         * increase MSRPM_OFFSETS in this case.
         */
        BUG();
}

static void init_msrpm_offsets(void)
{
        int i;

        memset(msrpm_offsets, 0xff, sizeof(msrpm_offsets));

        for (i = 0; direct_access_msrs[i].index != MSR_INVALID; i++) {
                u32 offset;

                offset = svm_msrpm_offset(direct_access_msrs[i].index);
                BUG_ON(offset == MSR_INVALID);

                add_msr_offset(offset);
        }
}

void svm_copy_lbrs(struct vmcb *to_vmcb, struct vmcb *from_vmcb)
{
        to_vmcb->save.dbgctl            = from_vmcb->save.dbgctl;
        to_vmcb->save.br_from           = from_vmcb->save.br_from;
        to_vmcb->save.br_to             = from_vmcb->save.br_to;
        to_vmcb->save.last_excp_from    = from_vmcb->save.last_excp_from;
        to_vmcb->save.last_excp_to      = from_vmcb->save.last_excp_to;

        vmcb_mark_dirty(to_vmcb, VMCB_LBR);
}

static void svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
        set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, 1, 1);
        set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, 1, 1);
        set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, 1, 1);
        set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, 1, 1);

        /* Move the LBR msrs to the vmcb02 so that the guest can see them. */
        if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
                svm_copy_lbrs(svm->vmcb, svm->vmcb01.ptr);
}

static void svm_disable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext &= ~LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
        set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, 0, 0);
        set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, 0, 0);
        set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, 0, 0);
        set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, 0, 0);

        /*
         * Move the LBR msrs back to the vmcb01 to avoid copying them
         * on nested guest entries.
         */
        if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
                svm_copy_lbrs(svm->vmcb01.ptr, svm->vmcb);
}

static struct vmcb *svm_get_lbr_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
        /*
         * If LBR virtualization is disabled, the LBR MSRs are always kept in
         * vmcb01.  If LBR virtualization is enabled and L1 is running VMs of
         * its own, the MSRs are moved between vmcb01 and vmcb02 as needed.
         */
        return svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK ? svm->vmcb :
                                                                   svm->vmcb01.ptr;
}

void svm_update_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        bool current_enable_lbrv = svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
        bool enable_lbrv = (svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl & DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR) ||
                            (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
                            (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK));

        if (enable_lbrv == current_enable_lbrv)
                return;

        if (enable_lbrv)
                svm_enable_lbrv(vcpu);
        else
                svm_disable_lbrv(vcpu);
}

void disable_nmi_singlestep(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
        svm->nmi_singlestep = false;

        if (!(svm->vcpu.guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP)) {
                /* Clear our flags if they were not set by the guest */
                if (!(svm->nmi_singlestep_guest_rflags & X86_EFLAGS_TF))
                        svm->vmcb->save.rflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_TF;
                if (!(svm->nmi_singlestep_guest_rflags & X86_EFLAGS_RF))
                        svm->vmcb->save.rflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_RF;
        }
}

static void grow_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
        int old = control->pause_filter_count;

        if (kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
                return;

        control->pause_filter_count = __grow_ple_window(old,
                                                        pause_filter_count,
                                                        pause_filter_count_grow,
                                                        pause_filter_count_max);

        if (control->pause_filter_count != old) {
                vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTERCEPTS);
                trace_kvm_ple_window_update(vcpu->vcpu_id,
                                            control->pause_filter_count, old);
        }
}

static void shrink_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
        int old = control->pause_filter_count;

        if (kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
                return;

        control->pause_filter_count =
                                __shrink_ple_window(old,
                                                    pause_filter_count,
                                                    pause_filter_count_shrink,
                                                    pause_filter_count);
        if (control->pause_filter_count != old) {
                vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTERCEPTS);
                trace_kvm_ple_window_update(vcpu->vcpu_id,
                                            control->pause_filter_count, old);
        }
}

static void svm_hardware_unsetup(void)
{
        int cpu;

        sev_hardware_unsetup();

        for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
                svm_cpu_uninit(cpu);

        __free_pages(pfn_to_page(iopm_base >> PAGE_SHIFT),
        get_order(IOPM_SIZE));
        iopm_base = 0;
}

static void init_seg(struct vmcb_seg *seg)
{
        seg->selector = 0;
        seg->attrib = SVM_SELECTOR_P_MASK | SVM_SELECTOR_S_MASK |
                      SVM_SELECTOR_WRITE_MASK; /* Read/Write Data Segment */
        seg->limit = 0xffff;
        seg->base = 0;
}

static void init_sys_seg(struct vmcb_seg *seg, uint32_t type)
{
        seg->selector = 0;
        seg->attrib = SVM_SELECTOR_P_MASK | type;
        seg->limit = 0xffff;
        seg->base = 0;
}

static u64 svm_get_l2_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        return svm->nested.ctl.tsc_offset;
}

static u64 svm_get_l2_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        return svm->tsc_ratio_msr;
}

static void svm_write_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        svm->vmcb01.ptr->control.tsc_offset = vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset;
        svm->vmcb->control.tsc_offset = vcpu->arch.tsc_offset;
        vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTERCEPTS);
}

void svm_write_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        preempt_disable();
        if (to_svm(vcpu)->guest_state_loaded)
                __svm_write_tsc_multiplier(vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio);
        preempt_enable();
}

/* Evaluate instruction intercepts that depend on guest CPUID features. */
static void svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
                                              struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
        /*
         * Intercept INVPCID if shadow paging is enabled to sync/free shadow
         * roots, or if INVPCID is disabled in the guest to inject #UD.
         */
        if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID)) {
                if (!npt_enabled ||
                    !guest_cpuid_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INVPCID))
                        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVPCID);
                else
                        svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVPCID);
        }

        if (kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP)) {
                if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
                        svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDTSCP);
                else
                        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDTSCP);
        }
}

static inline void init_vmcb_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        if (guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu)) {
                /*
                 * We must intercept SYSENTER_EIP and SYSENTER_ESP
                 * accesses because the processor only stores 32 bits.
                 * For the same reason we cannot use virtual VMLOAD/VMSAVE.
                 */
                svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMLOAD);
                svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMSAVE);
                svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext &= ~VIRTUAL_VMLOAD_VMSAVE_ENABLE_MASK;

                set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, 0, 0);
                set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, 0, 0);
        } else {
                /*
                 * If hardware supports Virtual VMLOAD VMSAVE then enable it
                 * in VMCB and clear intercepts to avoid #VMEXIT.
                 */
                if (vls) {
                        svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMLOAD);
                        svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMSAVE);
                        svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= VIRTUAL_VMLOAD_VMSAVE_ENABLE_MASK;
                }
                /* No need to intercept these MSRs */
                set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, 1, 1);
                set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, 1, 1);
        }
}

static void init_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
        struct vmcb_control_area *control = &vmcb->control;
        struct vmcb_save_area *save = &vmcb->save;

        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_READ);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_READ);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_WRITE);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_WRITE);
        if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
                svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);

        set_dr_intercepts(svm);

        set_exception_intercept(svm, PF_VECTOR);
        set_exception_intercept(svm, UD_VECTOR);
        set_exception_intercept(svm, MC_VECTOR);
        set_exception_intercept(svm, AC_VECTOR);
        set_exception_intercept(svm, DB_VECTOR);
        /*
         * Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
         * trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
         * We intercept those #GP and allow access to them anyway
         * as VMware does.
         */
        if (enable_vmware_backdoor)
                set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);

        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INTR);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_NMI);

        if (intercept_smi)
                svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SMI);

        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDPMC);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CPUID);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVD);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPG);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPGA);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_IOIO_PROT);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MSR_PROT);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_TASK_SWITCH);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SHUTDOWN);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMRUN);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMMCALL);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMLOAD);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VMSAVE);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CLGI);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SKINIT);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_WBINVD);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDPRU);
        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RSM);

        if (!kvm_mwait_in_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
                svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MONITOR);
                svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_MWAIT);
        }

        if (!kvm_hlt_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
                svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_HLT);

        control->iopm_base_pa = __sme_set(iopm_base);
        control->msrpm_base_pa = __sme_set(__pa(svm->msrpm));
        control->int_ctl = V_INTR_MASKING_MASK;

        init_seg(&save->es);
        init_seg(&save->ss);
        init_seg(&save->ds);
        init_seg(&save->fs);
        init_seg(&save->gs);

        save->cs.selector = 0xf000;
        save->cs.base = 0xffff0000;
        /* Executable/Readable Code Segment */
        save->cs.attrib = SVM_SELECTOR_READ_MASK | SVM_SELECTOR_P_MASK |
                SVM_SELECTOR_S_MASK | SVM_SELECTOR_CODE_MASK;
        save->cs.limit = 0xffff;

        save->gdtr.base = 0;
        save->gdtr.limit = 0xffff;
        save->idtr.base = 0;
        save->idtr.limit = 0xffff;

        init_sys_seg(&save->ldtr, SEG_TYPE_LDT);
        init_sys_seg(&save->tr, SEG_TYPE_BUSY_TSS16);

        if (npt_enabled) {
                /* Setup VMCB for Nested Paging */
                control->nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_NP_ENABLE;
                svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPG);
                clr_exception_intercept(svm, PF_VECTOR);
                svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_READ);
                svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_WRITE);
                save->g_pat = vcpu->arch.pat;
                save->cr3 = 0;
        }
        svm->current_vmcb->asid_generation = 0;
        svm->asid = 0;

        svm->nested.vmcb12_gpa = INVALID_GPA;
        svm->nested.last_vmcb12_gpa = INVALID_GPA;

        if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
                control->pause_filter_count = pause_filter_count;
                if (pause_filter_thresh)
                        control->pause_filter_thresh = pause_filter_thresh;
                svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_PAUSE);
        } else {
                svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_PAUSE);
        }

        svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts(vcpu, svm);

        /*
         * If the host supports V_SPEC_CTRL then disable the interception
         * of MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL.
         */
        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
                set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 1, 1);

        if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
                avic_init_vmcb(svm, vmcb);

        if (vnmi)
                svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_NMI_ENABLE_MASK;

        if (vgif) {
                svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);
                svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CLGI);
                svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK;
        }

        if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
                sev_init_vmcb(svm);

        svm_hv_init_vmcb(vmcb);
        init_vmcb_after_set_cpuid(vcpu);

        vmcb_mark_all_dirty(vmcb);

        enable_gif(svm);
}

static void __svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        svm_vcpu_init_msrpm(vcpu, svm->msrpm);

        svm_init_osvw(vcpu);
        vcpu->arch.microcode_version = 0x01000065;
        svm->tsc_ratio_msr = kvm_caps.default_tsc_scaling_ratio;

        svm->nmi_masked = false;
        svm->awaiting_iret_completion = false;

        if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
                sev_es_vcpu_reset(svm);
}

static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        svm->spec_ctrl = 0;
        svm->virt_spec_ctrl = 0;

        init_vmcb(vcpu);

        if (!init_event)
                __svm_vcpu_reset(vcpu);
}

void svm_switch_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct kvm_vmcb_info *target_vmcb)
{
        svm->current_vmcb = target_vmcb;
        svm->vmcb = target_vmcb->ptr;
}

static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm;
        struct page *vmcb01_page;
        struct page *vmsa_page = NULL;
        int err;

        BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct vcpu_svm, vcpu) != 0);
        svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        err = -ENOMEM;
        vmcb01_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
        if (!vmcb01_page)
                goto out;

        if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
                /*
                 * SEV-ES guests require a separate VMSA page used to contain
                 * the encrypted register state of the guest.
                 */
                vmsa_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
                if (!vmsa_page)
                        goto error_free_vmcb_page;

                /*
                 * SEV-ES guests maintain an encrypted version of their FPU
                 * state which is restored and saved on VMRUN and VMEXIT.
                 * Mark vcpu->arch.guest_fpu->fpstate as scratch so it won't
                 * do xsave/xrstor on it.
                 */
                fpstate_set_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu);
        }

        err = avic_init_vcpu(svm);
        if (err)
                goto error_free_vmsa_page;

        svm->msrpm = svm_vcpu_alloc_msrpm();
        if (!svm->msrpm) {
                err = -ENOMEM;
                goto error_free_vmsa_page;
        }

        svm->x2avic_msrs_intercepted = true;

        svm->vmcb01.ptr = page_address(vmcb01_page);
        svm->vmcb01.pa = __sme_set(page_to_pfn(vmcb01_page) << PAGE_SHIFT);
        svm_switch_vmcb(svm, &svm->vmcb01);

        if (vmsa_page)
                svm->sev_es.vmsa = page_address(vmsa_page);

        svm->guest_state_loaded = false;

        return 0;

error_free_vmsa_page:
        if (vmsa_page)
                __free_page(vmsa_page);
error_free_vmcb_page:
        __free_page(vmcb01_page);
out:
        return err;
}

static void svm_clear_current_vmcb(struct vmcb *vmcb)
{
        int i;

        for_each_online_cpu(i)
                cmpxchg(per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data.current_vmcb, i), vmcb, NULL);
}

static void svm_vcpu_free(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        /*
         * The vmcb page can be recycled, causing a false negative in
         * svm_vcpu_load(). So, ensure that no logical CPU has this
         * vmcb page recorded as its current vmcb.
         */
        svm_clear_current_vmcb(svm->vmcb);

        svm_leave_nested(vcpu);
        svm_free_nested(svm);

        sev_free_vcpu(vcpu);

        __free_page(pfn_to_page(__sme_clr(svm->vmcb01.pa) >> PAGE_SHIFT));
        __free_pages(virt_to_page(svm->msrpm), get_order(MSRPM_SIZE));
}

static void svm_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, vcpu->cpu);

        if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
                sev_es_unmap_ghcb(svm);

        if (svm->guest_state_loaded)
                return;

        /*
         * Save additional host state that will be restored on VMEXIT (sev-es)
         * or subsequent vmload of host save area.
         */
        vmsave(sd->save_area_pa);
        if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
                struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa;
                hostsa = (struct sev_es_save_area *)(page_address(sd->save_area) + 0x400);

                sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(hostsa);
        }

        if (tsc_scaling)
                __svm_write_tsc_multiplier(vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio);

        /*
         * TSC_AUX is always virtualized for SEV-ES guests when the feature is
         * available. The user return MSR support is not required in this case
         * because TSC_AUX is restored on #VMEXIT from the host save area
         * (which has been initialized in svm_hardware_enable()).
         */
        if (likely(tsc_aux_uret_slot >= 0) &&
            (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX) || !sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)))
                kvm_set_user_return_msr(tsc_aux_uret_slot, svm->tsc_aux, -1ull);

        svm->guest_state_loaded = true;
}

static void svm_prepare_host_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        to_svm(vcpu)->guest_state_loaded = false;
}

static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, cpu);

        if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) {
                sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb;

                if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT))
                        indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
        }
        if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
                avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
}

static void svm_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
                avic_vcpu_put(vcpu);

        svm_prepare_host_switch(vcpu);

        ++vcpu->stat.host_state_reload;
}

static unsigned long svm_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        unsigned long rflags = svm->vmcb->save.rflags;

        if (svm->nmi_singlestep) {
                /* Hide our flags if they were not set by the guest */
                if (!(svm->nmi_singlestep_guest_rflags & X86_EFLAGS_TF))
                        rflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_TF;
                if (!(svm->nmi_singlestep_guest_rflags & X86_EFLAGS_RF))
                        rflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_RF;
        }
        return rflags;
}

static void svm_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags)
{
        if (to_svm(vcpu)->nmi_singlestep)
                rflags |= (X86_EFLAGS_TF | X86_EFLAGS_RF);

       /*
        * Any change of EFLAGS.VM is accompanied by a reload of SS
        * (caused by either a task switch or an inter-privilege IRET),
        * so we do not need to update the CPL here.
        */
        to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->save.rflags = rflags;
}

static bool svm_get_if_flag(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vmcb *vmcb = to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb;

        return sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)
                ? vmcb->control.int_state & SVM_GUEST_INTERRUPT_MASK
                : kvm_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_IF;
}

static void svm_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg)
{
        kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, reg);

        switch (reg) {
        case VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR:
                /*
                 * When !npt_enabled, mmu->pdptrs[] is already available since
                 * it is always updated per SDM when moving to CRs.
                 */
                if (npt_enabled)
                        load_pdptrs(vcpu, kvm_read_cr3(vcpu));
                break;
        default:
                KVM_BUG_ON(1, vcpu->kvm);
        }
}

static void svm_set_vintr(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
        struct vmcb_control_area *control;

        /*
         * The following fields are ignored when AVIC is enabled
         */
        WARN_ON(kvm_vcpu_apicv_activated(&svm->vcpu));

        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VINTR);

        /*
         * Recalculating intercepts may have cleared the VINTR intercept.  If
         * V_INTR_MASKING is enabled in vmcb12, then the effective RFLAGS.IF
         * for L1 physical interrupts is L1's RFLAGS.IF at the time of VMRUN.
         * Requesting an interrupt window if save.RFLAGS.IF=0 is pointless as
         * interrupts will never be unblocked while L2 is running.
         */
        if (!svm_is_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VINTR))
                return;

        /*
         * This is just a dummy VINTR to actually cause a vmexit to happen.
         * Actual injection of virtual interrupts happens through EVENTINJ.
         */
        control = &svm->vmcb->control;
        control->int_vector = 0x0;
        control->int_ctl &= ~V_INTR_PRIO_MASK;
        control->int_ctl |= V_IRQ_MASK |
                ((/*control->int_vector >> 4*/ 0xf) << V_INTR_PRIO_SHIFT);
        vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTR);
}

static void svm_clear_vintr(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
        svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VINTR);

        /* Drop int_ctl fields related to VINTR injection.  */
        svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl &= ~V_IRQ_INJECTION_BITS_MASK;
        if (is_guest_mode(&svm->vcpu)) {
                svm->vmcb01.ptr->control.int_ctl &= ~V_IRQ_INJECTION_BITS_MASK;

                WARN_ON((svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_TPR_MASK) !=
                        (svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_TPR_MASK));

                svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl &
                        V_IRQ_INJECTION_BITS_MASK;

                svm->vmcb->control.int_vector = svm->nested.ctl.int_vector;
        }

        vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTR);
}

static struct vmcb_seg *svm_seg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
{
        struct vmcb_save_area *save = &to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->save;
        struct vmcb_save_area *save01 = &to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb01.ptr->save;

        switch (seg) {
        case VCPU_SREG_CS: return &save->cs;
        case VCPU_SREG_DS: return &save->ds;
        case VCPU_SREG_ES: return &save->es;
        case VCPU_SREG_FS: return &save01->fs;
        case VCPU_SREG_GS: return &save01->gs;
        case VCPU_SREG_SS: return &save->ss;
        case VCPU_SREG_TR: return &save01->tr;
        case VCPU_SREG_LDTR: return &save01->ldtr;
        }
        BUG();
        return NULL;
}

static u64 svm_get_segment_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
{
        struct vmcb_seg *s = svm_seg(vcpu, seg);

        return s->base;
}

static void svm_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
                            struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
{
        struct vmcb_seg *s = svm_seg(vcpu, seg);

        var->base = s->base;
        var->limit = s->limit;
        var->selector = s->selector;
        var->type = s->attrib & SVM_SELECTOR_TYPE_MASK;
        var->s = (s->attrib >> SVM_SELECTOR_S_SHIFT) & 1;
        var->dpl = (s->attrib >> SVM_SELECTOR_DPL_SHIFT) & 3;
        var->present = (s->attrib >> SVM_SELECTOR_P_SHIFT) & 1;
        var->avl = (s->attrib >> SVM_SELECTOR_AVL_SHIFT) & 1;
        var->l = (s->attrib >> SVM_SELECTOR_L_SHIFT) & 1;
        var->db = (s->attrib >> SVM_SELECTOR_DB_SHIFT) & 1;

        /*
         * AMD CPUs circa 2014 track the G bit for all segments except CS.
         * However, the SVM spec states that the G bit is not observed by the
         * CPU, and some VMware virtual CPUs drop the G bit for all segments.
         * So let's synthesize a legal G bit for all segments, this helps
         * running KVM nested. It also helps cross-vendor migration, because
         * Intel's vmentry has a check on the 'G' bit.
         */
        var->g = s->limit > 0xfffff;

        /*
         * AMD's VMCB does not have an explicit unusable field, so emulate it
         * for cross vendor migration purposes by "not present"
         */
        var->unusable = !var->present;

        switch (seg) {
        case VCPU_SREG_TR:
                /*
                 * Work around a bug where the busy flag in the tr selector
                 * isn't exposed
                 */
                var->type |= 0x2;
                break;
        case VCPU_SREG_DS:
        case VCPU_SREG_ES:
        case VCPU_SREG_FS:
        case VCPU_SREG_GS:
                /*
                 * The accessed bit must always be set in the segment
                 * descriptor cache, although it can be cleared in the
                 * descriptor, the cached bit always remains at 1. Since
                 * Intel has a check on this, set it here to support
                 * cross-vendor migration.
                 */
                if (!var->unusable)
                        var->type |= 0x1;
                break;
        case VCPU_SREG_SS:
                /*
                 * On AMD CPUs sometimes the DB bit in the segment
                 * descriptor is left as 1, although the whole segment has
                 * been made unusable. Clear it here to pass an Intel VMX
                 * entry check when cross vendor migrating.
                 */
                if (var->unusable)
                        var->db = 0;
                /* This is symmetric with svm_set_segment() */
                var->dpl = to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->save.cpl;
                break;
        }
}

static int svm_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vmcb_save_area *save = &to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->save;

        return save->cpl;
}

static void svm_get_cs_db_l_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *db, int *l)
{
        struct kvm_segment cs;

        svm_get_segment(vcpu, &cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
        *db = cs.db;
        *l = cs.l;
}

static void svm_get_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        dt->size = svm->vmcb->save.idtr.limit;
        dt->address = svm->vmcb->save.idtr.base;
}

static void svm_set_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        svm->vmcb->save.idtr.limit = dt->size;
        svm->vmcb->save.idtr.base = dt->address ;
        vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_DT);
}

static void svm_get_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        dt->size = svm->vmcb->save.gdtr.limit;
        dt->address = svm->vmcb->save.gdtr.base;
}

static void svm_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        svm->vmcb->save.gdtr.limit = dt->size;
        svm->vmcb->save.gdtr.base = dt->address ;
        vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_DT);
}

static void sev_post_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        /*
         * For guests that don't set guest_state_protected, the cr3 update is
         * handled via kvm_mmu_load() while entering the guest. For guests
         * that do (SEV-ES/SEV-SNP), the cr3 update needs to be written to
         * VMCB save area now, since the save area will become the initial
         * contents of the VMSA, and future VMCB save area updates won't be
         * seen.
         */
        if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
                svm->vmcb->save.cr3 = cr3;
                vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
        }
}

static bool svm_is_valid_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
{
        return true;
}

void svm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        u64 hcr0 = cr0;
        bool old_paging = is_paging(vcpu);

#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
        if (vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LME) {
                if (!is_paging(vcpu) && (cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)) {
                        vcpu->arch.efer |= EFER_LMA;
                        if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
                                svm->vmcb->save.efer |= EFER_LMA | EFER_LME;
                }

                if (is_paging(vcpu) && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)) {
                        vcpu->arch.efer &= ~EFER_LMA;
                        if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
                                svm->vmcb->save.efer &= ~(EFER_LMA | EFER_LME);
                }
        }
#endif
        vcpu->arch.cr0 = cr0;

        if (!npt_enabled) {
                hcr0 |= X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_WP;
                if (old_paging != is_paging(vcpu))
                        svm_set_cr4(vcpu, kvm_read_cr4(vcpu));
        }

        /*
         * re-enable caching here because the QEMU bios
         * does not do it - this results in some delay at
         * reboot
         */
        if (kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED))
                hcr0 &= ~(X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_NW);

        svm->vmcb->save.cr0 = hcr0;
        vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);

        /*
         * SEV-ES guests must always keep the CR intercepts cleared. CR
         * tracking is done using the CR write traps.
         */
        if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
                return;

        if (hcr0 == cr0) {
                /* Selective CR0 write remains on.  */
                svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ);
                svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE);
        } else {
                svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ);
                svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE);
        }
}

static bool svm_is_valid_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
{
        return true;
}

void svm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
{
        unsigned long host_cr4_mce = cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_MCE;
        unsigned long old_cr4 = vcpu->arch.cr4;

        if (npt_enabled && ((old_cr4 ^ cr4) & X86_CR4_PGE))
                svm_flush_tlb_current(vcpu);

        vcpu->arch.cr4 = cr4;
        if (!npt_enabled) {
                cr4 |= X86_CR4_PAE;

                if (!is_paging(vcpu))
                        cr4 &= ~(X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE);
        }
        cr4 |= host_cr4_mce;
        to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->save.cr4 = cr4;
        vmcb_mark_dirty(to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb, VMCB_CR);

        if ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & (X86_CR4_OSXSAVE | X86_CR4_PKE))
                kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu);
}

static void svm_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
                            struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        struct vmcb_seg *s = svm_seg(vcpu, seg);

        s->base = var->base;
        s->limit = var->limit;
        s->selector = var->selector;
        s->attrib = (var->type & SVM_SELECTOR_TYPE_MASK);
        s->attrib |= (var->s & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_S_SHIFT;
        s->attrib |= (var->dpl & 3) << SVM_SELECTOR_DPL_SHIFT;
        s->attrib |= ((var->present & 1) && !var->unusable) << SVM_SELECTOR_P_SHIFT;
        s->attrib |= (var->avl & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_AVL_SHIFT;
        s->attrib |= (var->l & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_L_SHIFT;
        s->attrib |= (var->db & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_DB_SHIFT;
        s->attrib |= (var->g & 1) << SVM_SELECTOR_G_SHIFT;

        /*
         * This is always accurate, except if SYSRET returned to a segment
         * with SS.DPL != 3.  Intel does not have this quirk, and always
         * forces SS.DPL to 3 on sysret, so we ignore that case; fixing it
         * would entail passing the CPL to userspace and back.
         */
        if (seg == VCPU_SREG_SS)
                /* This is symmetric with svm_get_segment() */
                svm->vmcb->save.cpl = (var->dpl & 3);

        vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_SEG);
}

static void svm_update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        clr_exception_intercept(svm, BP_VECTOR);

        if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE) {
                if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)
                        set_exception_intercept(svm, BP_VECTOR);
        }
}

static void new_asid(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
{
        if (sd->next_asid > sd->max_asid) {
                ++sd->asid_generation;
                sd->next_asid = sd->min_asid;
                svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ALL_ASID;
                vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID);
        }

        svm->current_vmcb->asid_generation = sd->asid_generation;
        svm->asid = sd->next_asid++;
}

static void svm_set_dr6(struct vcpu_svm *svm, unsigned long value)
{
        struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;

        if (svm->vcpu.arch.guest_state_protected)
                return;

        if (unlikely(value != vmcb->save.dr6)) {
                vmcb->save.dr6 = value;
                vmcb_mark_dirty(vmcb, VMCB_DR);
        }
}

static void svm_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        if (WARN_ON_ONCE(sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)))
                return;

        get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[0], 0);
        get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[1], 1);
        get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[2], 2);
        get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[3], 3);
        /*
         * We cannot reset svm->vmcb->save.dr6 to DR6_ACTIVE_LOW here,
         * because db_interception might need it.  We can do it before vmentry.
         */
        vcpu->arch.dr6 = svm->vmcb->save.dr6;
        vcpu->arch.dr7 = svm->vmcb->save.dr7;
        vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs &= ~KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT;
        set_dr_intercepts(svm);
}

static void svm_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long value)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
                return;

        svm->vmcb->save.dr7 = value;
        vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_DR);
}

static int pf_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        u64 fault_address = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2;
        u64 error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;

        return kvm_handle_page_fault(vcpu, error_code, fault_address,
                        static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS) ?
                        svm->vmcb->control.insn_bytes : NULL,
                        svm->vmcb->control.insn_len);
}

static int npf_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        u64 fault_address = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2;
        u64 error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;

        trace_kvm_page_fault(vcpu, fault_address, error_code);
        return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, fault_address, error_code,
                        static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS) ?
                        svm->vmcb->control.insn_bytes : NULL,
                        svm->vmcb->control.insn_len);
}

static int db_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        if (!(vcpu->guest_debug &
              (KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP)) &&
                !svm->nmi_singlestep) {
                u32 payload = svm->vmcb->save.dr6 ^ DR6_ACTIVE_LOW;
                kvm_queue_exception_p(vcpu, DB_VECTOR, payload);
                return 1;
        }

        if (svm->nmi_singlestep) {
                disable_nmi_singlestep(svm);
                /* Make sure we check for pending NMIs upon entry */
                kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
        }

        if (vcpu->guest_debug &
            (KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP)) {
                kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
                kvm_run->debug.arch.dr6 = svm->vmcb->save.dr6;
                kvm_run->debug.arch.dr7 = svm->vmcb->save.dr7;
                kvm_run->debug.arch.pc =
                        svm->vmcb->save.cs.base + svm->vmcb->save.rip;
                kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = DB_VECTOR;
                return 0;
        }

        return 1;
}

static int bp_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;

        kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
        kvm_run->debug.arch.pc = svm->vmcb->save.cs.base + svm->vmcb->save.rip;
        kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = BP_VECTOR;
        return 0;
}

static int ud_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        return handle_ud(vcpu);
}

static int ac_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, AC_VECTOR, 0);
        return 1;
}

static bool is_erratum_383(void)
{
        int err, i;
        u64 value;

        if (!erratum_383_found)
                return false;

        value = native_read_msr_safe(MSR_IA32_MC0_STATUS, &err);
        if (err)
                return false;

        /* Bit 62 may or may not be set for this mce */
        value &= ~(1ULL << 62);

        if (value != 0xb600000000010015ULL)
                return false;

        /* Clear MCi_STATUS registers */
        for (i = 0; i < 6; ++i)
                native_write_msr_safe(MSR_IA32_MCx_STATUS(i), 0, 0);

        value = native_read_msr_safe(MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS, &err);
        if (!err) {
                u32 low, high;

                value &= ~(1ULL << 2);
                low    = lower_32_bits(value);
                high   = upper_32_bits(value);

                native_write_msr_safe(MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS, low, high);
        }

        /* Flush tlb to evict multi-match entries */
        __flush_tlb_all();

        return true;
}

static void svm_handle_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        if (is_erratum_383()) {
                /*
                 * Erratum 383 triggered. Guest state is corrupt so kill the
                 * guest.
                 */
                pr_err("Guest triggered AMD Erratum 383\n");

                kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);

                return;
        }

        /*
         * On an #MC intercept the MCE handler is not called automatically in
         * the host. So do it by hand here.
         */
        kvm_machine_check();
}

static int mc_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        return 1;
}

static int shutdown_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);


        /*
         * VMCB is undefined after a SHUTDOWN intercept.  INIT the vCPU to put
         * the VMCB in a known good state.  Unfortuately, KVM doesn't have
         * KVM_MP_STATE_SHUTDOWN and can't add it without potentially breaking
         * userspace.  At a platform view, INIT is acceptable behavior as
         * there exist bare metal platforms that automatically INIT the CPU
         * in response to shutdown.
         *
         * The VM save area for SEV-ES guests has already been encrypted so it
         * cannot be reinitialized, i.e. synthesizing INIT is futile.
         */
        if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
                clear_page(svm->vmcb);
                kvm_vcpu_reset(vcpu, true);
        }

        kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN;
        return 0;
}

static int io_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        u32 io_info = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1; /* address size bug? */
        int size, in, string;
        unsigned port;

        ++vcpu->stat.io_exits;
        string = (io_info & SVM_IOIO_STR_MASK) != 0;
        in = (io_info & SVM_IOIO_TYPE_MASK) != 0;
        port = io_info >> 16;
        size = (io_info & SVM_IOIO_SIZE_MASK) >> SVM_IOIO_SIZE_SHIFT;

        if (string) {
                if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
                        return sev_es_string_io(svm, size, port, in);
                else
                        return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
        }

        svm->next_rip = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2;

        return kvm_fast_pio(vcpu, size, port, in);
}

static int nmi_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        return 1;
}

static int smi_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        return 1;
}

static int intr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        ++vcpu->stat.irq_exits;
        return 1;
}

static int vmload_vmsave_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool vmload)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        struct vmcb *vmcb12;
        struct kvm_host_map map;
        int ret;

        if (nested_svm_check_permissions(vcpu))
                return 1;

        ret = kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(svm->vmcb->save.rax), &map);
        if (ret) {
                if (ret == -EINVAL)
                        kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
                return 1;
        }

        vmcb12 = map.hva;

        ret = kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);

        if (vmload) {
                svm_copy_vmloadsave_state(svm->vmcb, vmcb12);
                svm->sysenter_eip_hi = 0;
                svm->sysenter_esp_hi = 0;
        } else {
                svm_copy_vmloadsave_state(vmcb12, svm->vmcb);
        }

        kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &map, true);

        return ret;
}

static int vmload_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        return vmload_vmsave_interception(vcpu, true);
}

static int vmsave_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        return vmload_vmsave_interception(vcpu, false);
}

static int vmrun_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        if (nested_svm_check_permissions(vcpu))
                return 1;

        return nested_svm_vmrun(vcpu);
}

enum {
        NONE_SVM_INSTR,
        SVM_INSTR_VMRUN,
        SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD,
        SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE,
};

/* Return NONE_SVM_INSTR if not SVM instrs, otherwise return decode result */
static int svm_instr_opcode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;

        if (ctxt->b != 0x1 || ctxt->opcode_len != 2)
                return NONE_SVM_INSTR;

        switch (ctxt->modrm) {
        case 0xd8: /* VMRUN */
                return SVM_INSTR_VMRUN;
        case 0xda: /* VMLOAD */
                return SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD;
        case 0xdb: /* VMSAVE */
                return SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE;
        default:
                break;
        }

        return NONE_SVM_INSTR;
}

static int emulate_svm_instr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int opcode)
{
        const int guest_mode_exit_codes[] = {
                [SVM_INSTR_VMRUN] = SVM_EXIT_VMRUN,
                [SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD] = SVM_EXIT_VMLOAD,
                [SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE] = SVM_EXIT_VMSAVE,
        };
        int (*const svm_instr_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = {
                [SVM_INSTR_VMRUN] = vmrun_interception,
                [SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD] = vmload_interception,
                [SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE] = vmsave_interception,
        };
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        int ret;

        if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
                /* Returns '1' or -errno on failure, '0' on success. */
                ret = nested_svm_simple_vmexit(svm, guest_mode_exit_codes[opcode]);
                if (ret)
                        return ret;
                return 1;
        }
        return svm_instr_handlers[opcode](vcpu);
}

/*
 * #GP handling code. Note that #GP can be triggered under the following two
 * cases:
 *   1) SVM VM-related instructions (VMRUN/VMSAVE/VMLOAD) that trigger #GP on
 *      some AMD CPUs when EAX of these instructions are in the reserved memory
 *      regions (e.g. SMM memory on host).
 *   2) VMware backdoor
 */
static int gp_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        u32 error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
        int opcode;

        /* Both #GP cases have zero error_code */
        if (error_code)
                goto reinject;

        /* Decode the instruction for usage later */
        if (x86_decode_emulated_instruction(vcpu, 0, NULL, 0) != EMULATION_OK)
                goto reinject;

        opcode = svm_instr_opcode(vcpu);

        if (opcode == NONE_SVM_INSTR) {
                if (!enable_vmware_backdoor)
                        goto reinject;

                /*
                 * VMware backdoor emulation on #GP interception only handles
                 * IN{S}, OUT{S}, and RDPMC.
                 */
                if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu))
                        return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu,
                                EMULTYPE_VMWARE_GP | EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE);
        } else {
                /* All SVM instructions expect page aligned RAX */
                if (svm->vmcb->save.rax & ~PAGE_MASK)
                        goto reinject;

                return emulate_svm_instr(vcpu, opcode);
        }

reinject:
        kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, error_code);
        return 1;
}

void svm_set_gif(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool value)
{
        if (value) {
                /*
                 * If VGIF is enabled, the STGI intercept is only added to
                 * detect the opening of the SMI/NMI window; remove it now.
                 * Likewise, clear the VINTR intercept, we will set it
                 * again while processing KVM_REQ_EVENT if needed.
                 */
                if (vgif)
                        svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);
                if (svm_is_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_VINTR))
                        svm_clear_vintr(svm);

                enable_gif(svm);
                if (svm->vcpu.arch.smi_pending ||
                    svm->vcpu.arch.nmi_pending ||
                    kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr(&svm->vcpu) ||
                    kvm_apic_has_pending_init_or_sipi(&svm->vcpu))
                        kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, &svm->vcpu);
        } else {
                disable_gif(svm);

                /*
                 * After a CLGI no interrupts should come.  But if vGIF is
                 * in use, we still rely on the VINTR intercept (rather than
                 * STGI) to detect an open interrupt window.
                */
                if (!vgif)
                        svm_clear_vintr(svm);
        }
}

static int stgi_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        int ret;

        if (nested_svm_check_permissions(vcpu))
                return 1;

        ret = kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
        svm_set_gif(to_svm(vcpu), true);
        return ret;
}

static int clgi_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        int ret;

        if (nested_svm_check_permissions(vcpu))
                return 1;

        ret = kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
        svm_set_gif(to_svm(vcpu), false);
        return ret;
}

static int invlpga_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        gva_t gva = kvm_rax_read(vcpu);
        u32 asid = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);

        /* FIXME: Handle an address size prefix. */
        if (!is_long_mode(vcpu))
                gva = (u32)gva;

        trace_kvm_invlpga(to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->save.rip, asid, gva);

        /* Let's treat INVLPGA the same as INVLPG (can be optimized!) */
        kvm_mmu_invlpg(vcpu, gva);

        return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}

static int skinit_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        trace_kvm_skinit(to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->save.rip, kvm_rax_read(vcpu));

        kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
        return 1;
}

static int task_switch_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        u16 tss_selector;
        int reason;
        int int_type = svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info &
                SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_MASK;
        int int_vec = svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info & SVM_EVTINJ_VEC_MASK;
        uint32_t type =
                svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info & SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_MASK;
        uint32_t idt_v =
                svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID;
        bool has_error_code = false;
        u32 error_code = 0;

        tss_selector = (u16)svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;

        if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2 &
            (1ULL << SVM_EXITINFOSHIFT_TS_REASON_IRET))
                reason = TASK_SWITCH_IRET;
        else if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2 &
                 (1ULL << SVM_EXITINFOSHIFT_TS_REASON_JMP))
                reason = TASK_SWITCH_JMP;
        else if (idt_v)
                reason = TASK_SWITCH_GATE;
        else
                reason = TASK_SWITCH_CALL;

        if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_GATE) {
                switch (type) {
                case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_NMI:
                        vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
                        break;
                case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_EXEPT:
                        if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2 &
                            (1ULL << SVM_EXITINFOSHIFT_TS_HAS_ERROR_CODE)) {
                                has_error_code = true;
                                error_code =
                                        (u32)svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2;
                        }
                        kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
                        break;
                case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_INTR:
                case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_SOFT:
                        kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
                        break;
                default:
                        break;
                }
        }

        if (reason != TASK_SWITCH_GATE ||
            int_type == SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_SOFT ||
            (int_type == SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_EXEPT &&
             (int_vec == OF_VECTOR || int_vec == BP_VECTOR))) {
                if (!svm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu))
                        return 0;
        }

        if (int_type != SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_SOFT)
                int_vec = -1;

        return kvm_task_switch(vcpu, tss_selector, int_vec, reason,
                               has_error_code, error_code);
}

static void svm_clr_iret_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
        if (!sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm))
                svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_IRET);
}

static void svm_set_iret_intercept(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
        if (!sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm))
                svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_IRET);
}

static int iret_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        WARN_ON_ONCE(sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm));

        ++vcpu->stat.nmi_window_exits;
        svm->awaiting_iret_completion = true;

        svm_clr_iret_intercept(svm);
        svm->nmi_iret_rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);

        kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
        return 1;
}

static int invlpg_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS))
                return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);

        kvm_mmu_invlpg(vcpu, to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.exit_info_1);
        return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}

static int emulate_on_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
}

static int rsm_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        return kvm_emulate_instruction_from_buffer(vcpu, rsm_ins_bytes, 2);
}

static bool check_selective_cr0_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
                                            unsigned long val)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        unsigned long cr0 = vcpu->arch.cr0;
        bool ret = false;

        if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) ||
            (!(vmcb12_is_intercept(&svm->nested.ctl, INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0))))
                return false;

        cr0 &= ~SVM_CR0_SELECTIVE_MASK;
        val &= ~SVM_CR0_SELECTIVE_MASK;

        if (cr0 ^ val) {
                svm->vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_CR0_SEL_WRITE;
                ret = (nested_svm_exit_handled(svm) == NESTED_EXIT_DONE);
        }

        return ret;
}

#define CR_VALID (1ULL << 63)

static int cr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        int reg, cr;
        unsigned long val;
        int err;

        if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS))
                return emulate_on_interception(vcpu);

        if (unlikely((svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 & CR_VALID) == 0))
                return emulate_on_interception(vcpu);

        reg = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 & SVM_EXITINFO_REG_MASK;
        if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_CR0_SEL_WRITE)
                cr = SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0 - SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0;
        else
                cr = svm->vmcb->control.exit_code - SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0;

        err = 0;
        if (cr >= 16) { /* mov to cr */
                cr -= 16;
                val = kvm_register_read(vcpu, reg);
                trace_kvm_cr_write(cr, val);
                switch (cr) {
                case 0:
                        if (!check_selective_cr0_intercepted(vcpu, val))
                                err = kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, val);
                        else
                                return 1;

                        break;
                case 3:
                        err = kvm_set_cr3(vcpu, val);
                        break;
                case 4:
                        err = kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, val);
                        break;
                case 8:
                        err = kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, val);
                        break;
                default:
                        WARN(1, "unhandled write to CR%d", cr);
                        kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
                        return 1;
                }
        } else { /* mov from cr */
                switch (cr) {
                case 0:
                        val = kvm_read_cr0(vcpu);
                        break;
                case 2:
                        val = vcpu->arch.cr2;
                        break;
                case 3:
                        val = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
                        break;
                case 4:
                        val = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
                        break;
                case 8:
                        val = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
                        break;
                default:
                        WARN(1, "unhandled read from CR%d", cr);
                        kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
                        return 1;
                }
                kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
                trace_kvm_cr_read(cr, val);
        }
        return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
}

static int cr_trap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        unsigned long old_value, new_value;
        unsigned int cr;
        int ret = 0;

        new_value = (unsigned long)svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;

        cr = svm->vmcb->control.exit_code - SVM_EXIT_CR0_WRITE_TRAP;
        switch (cr) {
        case 0:
                old_value = kvm_read_cr0(vcpu);
                svm_set_cr0(vcpu, new_value);

                kvm_post_set_cr0(vcpu, old_value, new_value);
                break;
        case 4:
                old_value = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
                svm_set_cr4(vcpu, new_value);

                kvm_post_set_cr4(vcpu, old_value, new_value);
                break;
        case 8:
                ret = kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, new_value);
                break;
        default:
                WARN(1, "unhandled CR%d write trap", cr);
                kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
                return 1;
        }

        return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, ret);
}

static int dr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        int reg, dr;
        unsigned long val;
        int err = 0;

        /*
         * SEV-ES intercepts DR7 only to disable guest debugging and the guest issues a VMGEXIT
         * for DR7 write only. KVM cannot change DR7 (always swapped as type 'A') so return early.
         */
        if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
                return 1;

        if (vcpu->guest_debug == 0) {
                /*
                 * No more DR vmexits; force a reload of the debug registers
                 * and reenter on this instruction.  The next vmexit will
                 * retrieve the full state of the debug registers.
                 */
                clr_dr_intercepts(svm);
                vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs |= KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT;
                return 1;
        }

        if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS))
                return emulate_on_interception(vcpu);

        reg = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 & SVM_EXITINFO_REG_MASK;
        dr = svm->vmcb->control.exit_code - SVM_EXIT_READ_DR0;
        if (dr >= 16) { /* mov to DRn  */
                dr -= 16;
                val = kvm_register_read(vcpu, reg);
                err = kvm_set_dr(vcpu, dr, val);
        } else {
                kvm_get_dr(vcpu, dr, &val);
                kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
        }

        return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
}

static int cr8_write_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        int r;

        u8 cr8_prev = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
        /* instruction emulation calls kvm_set_cr8() */
        r = cr_interception(vcpu);
        if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
                return r;
        if (cr8_prev <= kvm_get_cr8(vcpu))
                return r;
        vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SET_TPR;
        return 0;
}

static int efer_trap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct msr_data msr_info;
        int ret;

        /*
         * Clear the EFER_SVME bit from EFER. The SVM code always sets this
         * bit in svm_set_efer(), but __kvm_valid_efer() checks it against
         * whether the guest has X86_FEATURE_SVM - this avoids a failure if
         * the guest doesn't have X86_FEATURE_SVM.
         */
        msr_info.host_initiated = false;
        msr_info.index = MSR_EFER;
        msr_info.data = to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 & ~EFER_SVME;
        ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, &msr_info);

        return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, ret);
}

static int svm_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
{
        msr->data = 0;

        switch (msr->index) {
        case MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG:
                if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC))
                        msr->data |= MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE;
                break;
        default:
                return KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID;
        }

        return 0;
}

static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        switch (msr_info->index) {
        case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO:
                if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
                    !guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR))
                        return 1;
                msr_info->data = svm->tsc_ratio_msr;
                break;
        case MSR_STAR:
                msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.star;
                break;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
        case MSR_LSTAR:
                msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.lstar;
                break;
        case MSR_CSTAR:
                msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.cstar;
                break;
        case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
                msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.kernel_gs_base;
                break;
        case MSR_SYSCALL_MASK:
                msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sfmask;
                break;
#endif
        case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
                msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_cs;
                break;
        case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
                msr_info->data = (u32)svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_eip;
                if (guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu))
                        msr_info->data |= (u64)svm->sysenter_eip_hi << 32;
                break;
        case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
                msr_info->data = svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_esp;
                if (guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu))
                        msr_info->data |= (u64)svm->sysenter_esp_hi << 32;
                break;
        case MSR_TSC_AUX:
                msr_info->data = svm->tsc_aux;
                break;
        case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
                msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl;
                break;
        case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP:
                msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.br_from;
                break;
        case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP:
                msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.br_to;
                break;
        case MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP:
                msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.last_excp_from;
                break;
        case MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP:
                msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.last_excp_to;
                break;
        case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA:
                msr_info->data = svm->nested.hsave_msr;
                break;
        case MSR_VM_CR:
                msr_info->data = svm->nested.vm_cr_msr;
                break;
        case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
                if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
                    !guest_has_spec_ctrl_msr(vcpu))
                        return 1;

                if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
                        msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.spec_ctrl;
                else
                        msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl;
                break;
        case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
                if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
                    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
                        return 1;

                msr_info->data = svm->virt_spec_ctrl;
                break;
        case MSR_F15H_IC_CFG: {

                int family, model;

                family = guest_cpuid_family(vcpu);
                model  = guest_cpuid_model(vcpu);

                if (family < 0 || model < 0)
                        return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);

                msr_info->data = 0;

                if (family == 0x15 &&
                    (model >= 0x2 && model < 0x20))
                        msr_info->data = 0x1E;
                }
                break;
        case MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG:
                msr_info->data = svm->msr_decfg;
                break;
        default:
                return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
        }
        return 0;
}

static int svm_complete_emulated_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int err)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        if (!err || !sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm) || WARN_ON_ONCE(!svm->sev_es.ghcb))
                return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);

        ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(svm->sev_es.ghcb, 1);
        ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb,
                                X86_TRAP_GP |
                                SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_EXEPT |
                                SVM_EVTINJ_VALID);
        return 1;
}

static int svm_set_vm_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        int svm_dis, chg_mask;

        if (data & ~SVM_VM_CR_VALID_MASK)
                return 1;

        chg_mask = SVM_VM_CR_VALID_MASK;

        if (svm->nested.vm_cr_msr & SVM_VM_CR_SVM_DIS_MASK)
                chg_mask &= ~(SVM_VM_CR_SVM_LOCK_MASK | SVM_VM_CR_SVM_DIS_MASK);

        svm->nested.vm_cr_msr &= ~chg_mask;
        svm->nested.vm_cr_msr |= (data & chg_mask);

        svm_dis = svm->nested.vm_cr_msr & SVM_VM_CR_SVM_DIS_MASK;

        /* check for svm_disable while efer.svme is set */
        if (svm_dis && (vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_SVME))
                return 1;

        return 0;
}

static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        int ret = 0;

        u32 ecx = msr->index;
        u64 data = msr->data;
        switch (ecx) {
        case MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO:

                if (!guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR)) {

                        if (!msr->host_initiated)
                                return 1;
                        /*
                         * In case TSC scaling is not enabled, always
                         * leave this MSR at the default value.
                         *
                         * Due to bug in qemu 6.2.0, it would try to set
                         * this msr to 0 if tsc scaling is not enabled.
                         * Ignore this value as well.
                         */
                        if (data != 0 && data != svm->tsc_ratio_msr)
                                return 1;
                        break;
                }

                if (data & SVM_TSC_RATIO_RSVD)
                        return 1;

                svm->tsc_ratio_msr = data;

                if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR) &&
                    is_guest_mode(vcpu))
                        nested_svm_update_tsc_ratio_msr(vcpu);

                break;
        case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
                ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr);
                if (ret)
                        break;

                svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.g_pat = data;
                if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
                        nested_vmcb02_compute_g_pat(svm);
                vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_NPT);
                break;
        case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
                if (!msr->host_initiated &&
                    !guest_has_spec_ctrl_msr(vcpu))
                        return 1;

                if (kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(data))
                        return 1;

                if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
                        svm->vmcb->save.spec_ctrl = data;
                else
                        svm->spec_ctrl = data;
                if (!data)
                        break;

                /*
                 * For non-nested:
                 * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
                 * it through.
                 *
                 * For nested:
                 * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in
                 * nested_svm_vmrun_msrpm.
                 * We update the L1 MSR bit as well since it will end up
                 * touching the MSR anyway now.
                 */
                set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 1, 1);
                break;
        case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
                if (!msr->host_initiated &&
                    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
                        return 1;

                if (data & ~SPEC_CTRL_SSBD)
                        return 1;

                svm->virt_spec_ctrl = data;
                break;
        case MSR_STAR:
                svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.star = data;
                break;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
        case MSR_LSTAR:
                svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.lstar = data;
                break;
        case MSR_CSTAR:
                svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.cstar = data;
                break;
        case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
                svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.kernel_gs_base = data;
                break;
        case MSR_SYSCALL_MASK:
                svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sfmask = data;
                break;
#endif
        case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
                svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_cs = data;
                break;
        case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
                svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_eip = (u32)data;
                /*
                 * We only intercept the MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_{EIP|ESP} msrs
                 * when we spoof an Intel vendor ID (for cross vendor migration).
                 * In this case we use this intercept to track the high
                 * 32 bit part of these msrs to support Intel's
                 * implementation of SYSENTER/SYSEXIT.
                 */
                svm->sysenter_eip_hi = guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu) ? (data >> 32) : 0;
                break;
        case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
                svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_esp = (u32)data;
                svm->sysenter_esp_hi = guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu) ? (data >> 32) : 0;
                break;
        case MSR_TSC_AUX:
                /*
                 * TSC_AUX is always virtualized for SEV-ES guests when the
                 * feature is available. The user return MSR support is not
                 * required in this case because TSC_AUX is restored on #VMEXIT
                 * from the host save area (which has been initialized in
                 * svm_hardware_enable()).
                 */
                if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX) && sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
                        break;

                /*
                 * TSC_AUX is usually changed only during boot and never read
                 * directly.  Intercept TSC_AUX instead of exposing it to the
                 * guest via direct_access_msrs, and switch it via user return.
                 */
                preempt_disable();
                ret = kvm_set_user_return_msr(tsc_aux_uret_slot, data, -1ull);
                preempt_enable();
                if (ret)
                        break;

                svm->tsc_aux = data;
                break;
        case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
                if (!lbrv) {
                        kvm_pr_unimpl_wrmsr(vcpu, ecx, data);
                        break;
                }
                if (data & DEBUGCTL_RESERVED_BITS)
                        return 1;

                svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl = data;
                svm_update_lbrv(vcpu);
                break;
        case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA:
                /*
                 * Old kernels did not validate the value written to
                 * MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA.  Allow KVM_SET_MSR to set an invalid
                 * value to allow live migrating buggy or malicious guests
                 * originating from those kernels.
                 */
                if (!msr->host_initiated && !page_address_valid(vcpu, data))
                        return 1;

                svm->nested.hsave_msr = data & PAGE_MASK;
                break;
        case MSR_VM_CR:
                return svm_set_vm_cr(vcpu, data);
        case MSR_VM_IGNNE:
                kvm_pr_unimpl_wrmsr(vcpu, ecx, data);
                break;
        case MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG: {
                struct kvm_msr_entry msr_entry;

                msr_entry.index = msr->index;
                if (svm_get_msr_feature(&msr_entry))
                        return 1;

                /* Check the supported bits */
                if (data & ~msr_entry.data)
                        return 1;

                /* Don't allow the guest to change a bit, #GP */
                if (!msr->host_initiated && (data ^ msr_entry.data))
                        return 1;

                svm->msr_decfg = data;
                break;
        }
        default:
                return kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr);
        }
        return ret;
}

static int msr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        if (to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.exit_info_1)
                return kvm_emulate_wrmsr(vcpu);
        else
                return kvm_emulate_rdmsr(vcpu);
}

static int interrupt_window_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
        svm_clear_vintr(to_svm(vcpu));

        /*
         * If not running nested, for AVIC, the only reason to end up here is ExtINTs.
         * In this case AVIC was temporarily disabled for
         * requesting the IRQ window and we have to re-enable it.
         *
         * If running nested, still remove the VM wide AVIC inhibit to
         * support case in which the interrupt window was requested when the
         * vCPU was not running nested.

         * All vCPUs which run still run nested, will remain to have their
         * AVIC still inhibited due to per-cpu AVIC inhibition.
         */
        kvm_clear_apicv_inhibit(vcpu->kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_IRQWIN);

        ++vcpu->stat.irq_window_exits;
        return 1;
}

static int pause_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        bool in_kernel;
        /*
         * CPL is not made available for an SEV-ES guest, therefore
         * vcpu->arch.preempted_in_kernel can never be true.  Just
         * set in_kernel to false as well.
         */
        in_kernel = !sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm) && svm_get_cpl(vcpu) == 0;

        grow_ple_window(vcpu);

        kvm_vcpu_on_spin(vcpu, in_kernel);
        return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}

static int invpcid_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        unsigned long type;
        gva_t gva;

        if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INVPCID)) {
                kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
                return 1;
        }

        /*
         * For an INVPCID intercept:
         * EXITINFO1 provides the linear address of the memory operand.
         * EXITINFO2 provides the contents of the register operand.
         */
        type = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2;
        gva = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;

        return kvm_handle_invpcid(vcpu, type, gva);
}

static int (*const svm_exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = {
        [SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0]                     = cr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_READ_CR3]                     = cr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_READ_CR4]                     = cr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_READ_CR8]                     = cr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_CR0_SEL_WRITE]                = cr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0]                    = cr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR3]                    = cr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR4]                    = cr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR8]                    = cr8_write_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_READ_DR0]                     = dr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_READ_DR1]                     = dr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_READ_DR2]                     = dr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_READ_DR3]                     = dr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_READ_DR4]                     = dr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_READ_DR5]                     = dr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_READ_DR6]                     = dr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_READ_DR7]                     = dr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR0]                    = dr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR1]                    = dr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR2]                    = dr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR3]                    = dr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR4]                    = dr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR5]                    = dr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR6]                    = dr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR7]                    = dr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + DB_VECTOR]        = db_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + BP_VECTOR]        = bp_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + UD_VECTOR]        = ud_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + PF_VECTOR]        = pf_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + MC_VECTOR]        = mc_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + AC_VECTOR]        = ac_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + GP_VECTOR]        = gp_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_INTR]                         = intr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_NMI]                          = nmi_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_SMI]                          = smi_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_VINTR]                        = interrupt_window_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_RDPMC]                        = kvm_emulate_rdpmc,
        [SVM_EXIT_CPUID]                        = kvm_emulate_cpuid,
        [SVM_EXIT_IRET]                         = iret_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_INVD]                         = kvm_emulate_invd,
        [SVM_EXIT_PAUSE]                        = pause_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_HLT]                          = kvm_emulate_halt,
        [SVM_EXIT_INVLPG]                       = invlpg_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_INVLPGA]                      = invlpga_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_IOIO]                         = io_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_MSR]                          = msr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_TASK_SWITCH]                  = task_switch_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN]                     = shutdown_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_VMRUN]                        = vmrun_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL]                      = kvm_emulate_hypercall,
        [SVM_EXIT_VMLOAD]                       = vmload_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_VMSAVE]                       = vmsave_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_STGI]                         = stgi_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_CLGI]                         = clgi_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_SKINIT]                       = skinit_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP]                       = kvm_handle_invalid_op,
        [SVM_EXIT_WBINVD]                       = kvm_emulate_wbinvd,
        [SVM_EXIT_MONITOR]                      = kvm_emulate_monitor,
        [SVM_EXIT_MWAIT]                        = kvm_emulate_mwait,
        [SVM_EXIT_XSETBV]                       = kvm_emulate_xsetbv,
        [SVM_EXIT_RDPRU]                        = kvm_handle_invalid_op,
        [SVM_EXIT_EFER_WRITE_TRAP]              = efer_trap,
        [SVM_EXIT_CR0_WRITE_TRAP]               = cr_trap,
        [SVM_EXIT_CR4_WRITE_TRAP]               = cr_trap,
        [SVM_EXIT_CR8_WRITE_TRAP]               = cr_trap,
        [SVM_EXIT_INVPCID]                      = invpcid_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_NPF]                          = npf_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_RSM]                          = rsm_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_AVIC_INCOMPLETE_IPI]          = avic_incomplete_ipi_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_AVIC_UNACCELERATED_ACCESS]    = avic_unaccelerated_access_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT]                      = sev_handle_vmgexit,
};

static void dump_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
        struct vmcb_save_area *save = &svm->vmcb->save;
        struct vmcb_save_area *save01 = &svm->vmcb01.ptr->save;

        if (!dump_invalid_vmcb) {
                pr_warn_ratelimited("set kvm_amd.dump_invalid_vmcb=1 to dump internal KVM state.\n");
                return;
        }

        pr_err("VMCB %p, last attempted VMRUN on CPU %d\n",
               svm->current_vmcb->ptr, vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu);
        pr_err("VMCB Control Area:\n");
        pr_err("%-20s%04x\n", "cr_read:", control->intercepts[INTERCEPT_CR] & 0xffff);
        pr_err("%-20s%04x\n", "cr_write:", control->intercepts[INTERCEPT_CR] >> 16);
        pr_err("%-20s%04x\n", "dr_read:", control->intercepts[INTERCEPT_DR] & 0xffff);
        pr_err("%-20s%04x\n", "dr_write:", control->intercepts[INTERCEPT_DR] >> 16);
        pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "exceptions:", control->intercepts[INTERCEPT_EXCEPTION]);
        pr_err("%-20s%08x %08x\n", "intercepts:",
              control->intercepts[INTERCEPT_WORD3],
               control->intercepts[INTERCEPT_WORD4]);
        pr_err("%-20s%d\n", "pause filter count:", control->pause_filter_count);
        pr_err("%-20s%d\n", "pause filter threshold:",
               control->pause_filter_thresh);
        pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "iopm_base_pa:", control->iopm_base_pa);
        pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "msrpm_base_pa:", control->msrpm_base_pa);
        pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "tsc_offset:", control->tsc_offset);
        pr_err("%-20s%d\n", "asid:", control->asid);
        pr_err("%-20s%d\n", "tlb_ctl:", control->tlb_ctl);
        pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "int_ctl:", control->int_ctl);
        pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "int_vector:", control->int_vector);
        pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "int_state:", control->int_state);
        pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "exit_code:", control->exit_code);
        pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "exit_info1:", control->exit_info_1);
        pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "exit_info2:", control->exit_info_2);
        pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "exit_int_info:", control->exit_int_info);
        pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "exit_int_info_err:", control->exit_int_info_err);
        pr_err("%-20s%lld\n", "nested_ctl:", control->nested_ctl);
        pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "nested_cr3:", control->nested_cr3);
        pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "avic_vapic_bar:", control->avic_vapic_bar);
        pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "ghcb:", control->ghcb_gpa);
        pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "event_inj:", control->event_inj);
        pr_err("%-20s%08x\n", "event_inj_err:", control->event_inj_err);
        pr_err("%-20s%lld\n", "virt_ext:", control->virt_ext);
        pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "next_rip:", control->next_rip);
        pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "avic_backing_page:", control->avic_backing_page);
        pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "avic_logical_id:", control->avic_logical_id);
        pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "avic_physical_id:", control->avic_physical_id);
        pr_err("%-20s%016llx\n", "vmsa_pa:", control->vmsa_pa);
        pr_err("VMCB State Save Area:\n");
        pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
               "es:",
               save->es.selector, save->es.attrib,
               save->es.limit, save->es.base);
        pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
               "cs:",
               save->cs.selector, save->cs.attrib,
               save->cs.limit, save->cs.base);
        pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
               "ss:",
               save->ss.selector, save->ss.attrib,
               save->ss.limit, save->ss.base);
        pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
               "ds:",
               save->ds.selector, save->ds.attrib,
               save->ds.limit, save->ds.base);
        pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
               "fs:",
               save01->fs.selector, save01->fs.attrib,
               save01->fs.limit, save01->fs.base);
        pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
               "gs:",
               save01->gs.selector, save01->gs.attrib,
               save01->gs.limit, save01->gs.base);
        pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
               "gdtr:",
               save->gdtr.selector, save->gdtr.attrib,
               save->gdtr.limit, save->gdtr.base);
        pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
               "ldtr:",
               save01->ldtr.selector, save01->ldtr.attrib,
               save01->ldtr.limit, save01->ldtr.base);
        pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
               "idtr:",
               save->idtr.selector, save->idtr.attrib,
               save->idtr.limit, save->idtr.base);
        pr_err("%-5s s: %04x a: %04x l: %08x b: %016llx\n",
               "tr:",
               save01->tr.selector, save01->tr.attrib,
               save01->tr.limit, save01->tr.base);
        pr_err("vmpl: %d   cpl:  %d               efer:          %016llx\n",
               save->vmpl, save->cpl, save->efer);
        pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
               "cr0:", save->cr0, "cr2:", save->cr2);
        pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
               "cr3:", save->cr3, "cr4:", save->cr4);
        pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
               "dr6:", save->dr6, "dr7:", save->dr7);
        pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
               "rip:", save->rip, "rflags:", save->rflags);
        pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
               "rsp:", save->rsp, "rax:", save->rax);
        pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
               "star:", save01->star, "lstar:", save01->lstar);
        pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
               "cstar:", save01->cstar, "sfmask:", save01->sfmask);
        pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
               "kernel_gs_base:", save01->kernel_gs_base,
               "sysenter_cs:", save01->sysenter_cs);
        pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
               "sysenter_esp:", save01->sysenter_esp,
               "sysenter_eip:", save01->sysenter_eip);
        pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
               "gpat:", save->g_pat, "dbgctl:", save->dbgctl);
        pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
               "br_from:", save->br_from, "br_to:", save->br_to);
        pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
               "excp_from:", save->last_excp_from,
               "excp_to:", save->last_excp_to);
}

static bool svm_check_exit_valid(u64 exit_code)
{
        return (exit_code < ARRAY_SIZE(svm_exit_handlers) &&
                svm_exit_handlers[exit_code]);
}

static int svm_handle_invalid_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 exit_code)
{
        vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "svm: unexpected exit reason 0x%llx\n", exit_code);
        dump_vmcb(vcpu);
        vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
        vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_EXIT_REASON;
        vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 2;
        vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = exit_code;
        vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
        return 0;
}

int svm_invoke_exit_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 exit_code)
{
        if (!svm_check_exit_valid(exit_code))
                return svm_handle_invalid_exit(vcpu, exit_code);

#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
        if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_MSR)
                return msr_interception(vcpu);
        else if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_VINTR)
                return interrupt_window_interception(vcpu);
        else if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_INTR)
                return intr_interception(vcpu);
        else if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_HLT)
                return kvm_emulate_halt(vcpu);
        else if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_NPF)
                return npf_interception(vcpu);
#endif
        return svm_exit_handlers[exit_code](vcpu);
}

static void svm_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,
                              u64 *info1, u64 *info2,
                              u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code)
{
        struct vmcb_control_area *control = &to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control;

        *reason = control->exit_code;
        *info1 = control->exit_info_1;
        *info2 = control->exit_info_2;
        *intr_info = control->exit_int_info;
        if ((*intr_info & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID) &&
            (*intr_info & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID_ERR))
                *error_code = control->exit_int_info_err;
        else
                *error_code = 0;
}

static int svm_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
        u32 exit_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_code;

        /* SEV-ES guests must use the CR write traps to track CR registers. */
        if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
                if (!svm_is_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE))
                        vcpu->arch.cr0 = svm->vmcb->save.cr0;
                if (npt_enabled)
                        vcpu->arch.cr3 = svm->vmcb->save.cr3;
        }

        if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
                int vmexit;

                trace_kvm_nested_vmexit(vcpu, KVM_ISA_SVM);

                vmexit = nested_svm_exit_special(svm);

                if (vmexit == NESTED_EXIT_CONTINUE)
                        vmexit = nested_svm_exit_handled(svm);

                if (vmexit == NESTED_EXIT_DONE)
                        return 1;
        }

        if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_ERR) {
                kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
                kvm_run->fail_entry.hardware_entry_failure_reason
                        = svm->vmcb->control.exit_code;
                kvm_run->fail_entry.cpu = vcpu->arch.last_vmentry_cpu;
                dump_vmcb(vcpu);
                return 0;
        }

        if (exit_fastpath != EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE)
                return 1;

        return svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, exit_code);
}

static void pre_svm_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, vcpu->cpu);
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        /*
         * If the previous vmrun of the vmcb occurred on a different physical
         * cpu, then mark the vmcb dirty and assign a new asid.  Hardware's
         * vmcb clean bits are per logical CPU, as are KVM's asid assignments.
         */
        if (unlikely(svm->current_vmcb->cpu != vcpu->cpu)) {
                svm->current_vmcb->asid_generation = 0;
                vmcb_mark_all_dirty(svm->vmcb);
                svm->current_vmcb->cpu = vcpu->cpu;
        }

        if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
                return pre_sev_run(svm, vcpu->cpu);

        /* FIXME: handle wraparound of asid_generation */
        if (svm->current_vmcb->asid_generation != sd->asid_generation)
                new_asid(svm, sd);
}

static void svm_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_NMI;

        if (svm->nmi_l1_to_l2)
                return;

        svm->nmi_masked = true;
        svm_set_iret_intercept(svm);
        ++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections;
}

static bool svm_is_vnmi_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        if (!is_vnmi_enabled(svm))
                return false;

        return !!(svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_PENDING_MASK);
}

static bool svm_set_vnmi_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        if (!is_vnmi_enabled(svm))
                return false;

        if (svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_PENDING_MASK)
                return false;

        svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_NMI_PENDING_MASK;
        vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTR);

        /*
         * Because the pending NMI is serviced by hardware, KVM can't know when
         * the NMI is "injected", but for all intents and purposes, passing the
         * NMI off to hardware counts as injection.
         */
        ++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections;

        return true;
}

static void svm_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reinjected)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        u32 type;

        if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft) {
                if (svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(vcpu))
                        return;

                type = SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_SOFT;
        } else {
                type = SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_INTR;
        }

        trace_kvm_inj_virq(vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr,
                           vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft, reinjected);
        ++vcpu->stat.irq_injections;

        svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr |
                                       SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | type;
}

void svm_complete_interrupt_delivery(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int delivery_mode,
                                     int trig_mode, int vector)
{
        /*
         * apic->apicv_active must be read after vcpu->mode.
         * Pairs with smp_store_release in vcpu_enter_guest.
         */
        bool in_guest_mode = (smp_load_acquire(&vcpu->mode) == IN_GUEST_MODE);

        /* Note, this is called iff the local APIC is in-kernel. */
        if (!READ_ONCE(vcpu->arch.apic->apicv_active)) {
                /* Process the interrupt via kvm_check_and_inject_events(). */
                kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
                kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
                return;
        }

        trace_kvm_apicv_accept_irq(vcpu->vcpu_id, delivery_mode, trig_mode, vector);
        if (in_guest_mode) {
                /*
                 * Signal the doorbell to tell hardware to inject the IRQ.  If
                 * the vCPU exits the guest before the doorbell chimes, hardware
                 * will automatically process AVIC interrupts at the next VMRUN.
                 */
                avic_ring_doorbell(vcpu);
        } else {
                /*
                 * Wake the vCPU if it was blocking.  KVM will then detect the
                 * pending IRQ when checking if the vCPU has a wake event.
                 */
                kvm_vcpu_wake_up(vcpu);
        }
}

static void svm_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic,  int delivery_mode,
                                  int trig_mode, int vector)
{
        kvm_lapic_set_irr(vector, apic);

        /*
         * Pairs with the smp_mb_*() after setting vcpu->guest_mode in
         * vcpu_enter_guest() to ensure the write to the vIRR is ordered before
         * the read of guest_mode.  This guarantees that either VMRUN will see
         * and process the new vIRR entry, or that svm_complete_interrupt_delivery
         * will signal the doorbell if the CPU has already entered the guest.
         */
        smp_mb__after_atomic();
        svm_complete_interrupt_delivery(apic->vcpu, delivery_mode, trig_mode, vector);
}

static void svm_update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        /*
         * SEV-ES guests must always keep the CR intercepts cleared. CR
         * tracking is done using the CR write traps.
         */
        if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
                return;

        if (nested_svm_virtualize_tpr(vcpu))
                return;

        svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);

        if (irr == -1)
                return;

        if (tpr >= irr)
                svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
}

static bool svm_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        if (is_vnmi_enabled(svm))
                return svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK;
        else
                return svm->nmi_masked;
}

static void svm_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        if (is_vnmi_enabled(svm)) {
                if (masked)
                        svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK;
                else
                        svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl &= ~V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK;

        } else {
                svm->nmi_masked = masked;
                if (masked)
                        svm_set_iret_intercept(svm);
                else
                        svm_clr_iret_intercept(svm);
        }
}

bool svm_nmi_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;

        if (!gif_set(svm))
                return true;

        if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_nmi(svm))
                return false;

        if (svm_get_nmi_mask(vcpu))
                return true;

        return vmcb->control.int_state & SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK;
}

static int svm_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        if (svm->nested.nested_run_pending)
                return -EBUSY;

        if (svm_nmi_blocked(vcpu))
                return 0;

        /* An NMI must not be injected into L2 if it's supposed to VM-Exit.  */
        if (for_injection && is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_nmi(svm))
                return -EBUSY;
        return 1;
}

bool svm_interrupt_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;

        if (!gif_set(svm))
                return true;

        if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
                /* As long as interrupts are being delivered...  */
                if ((svm->nested.ctl.int_ctl & V_INTR_MASKING_MASK)
                    ? !(svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.rflags & X86_EFLAGS_IF)
                    : !(kvm_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_IF))
                        return true;

                /* ... vmexits aren't blocked by the interrupt shadow  */
                if (nested_exit_on_intr(svm))
                        return false;
        } else {
                if (!svm_get_if_flag(vcpu))
                        return true;
        }

        return (vmcb->control.int_state & SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK);
}

static int svm_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        if (svm->nested.nested_run_pending)
                return -EBUSY;

        if (svm_interrupt_blocked(vcpu))
                return 0;

        /*
         * An IRQ must not be injected into L2 if it's supposed to VM-Exit,
         * e.g. if the IRQ arrived asynchronously after checking nested events.
         */
        if (for_injection && is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_intr(svm))
                return -EBUSY;

        return 1;
}

static void svm_enable_irq_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        /*
         * In case GIF=0 we can't rely on the CPU to tell us when GIF becomes
         * 1, because that's a separate STGI/VMRUN intercept.  The next time we
         * get that intercept, this function will be called again though and
         * we'll get the vintr intercept. However, if the vGIF feature is
         * enabled, the STGI interception will not occur. Enable the irq
         * window under the assumption that the hardware will set the GIF.
         */
        if (vgif || gif_set(svm)) {
                /*
                 * IRQ window is not needed when AVIC is enabled,
                 * unless we have pending ExtINT since it cannot be injected
                 * via AVIC. In such case, KVM needs to temporarily disable AVIC,
                 * and fallback to injecting IRQ via V_IRQ.
                 *
                 * If running nested, AVIC is already locally inhibited
                 * on this vCPU, therefore there is no need to request
                 * the VM wide AVIC inhibition.
                 */
                if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu))
                        kvm_set_apicv_inhibit(vcpu->kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_IRQWIN);

                svm_set_vintr(svm);
        }
}

static void svm_enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        /*
         * KVM should never request an NMI window when vNMI is enabled, as KVM
         * allows at most one to-be-injected NMI and one pending NMI, i.e. if
         * two NMIs arrive simultaneously, KVM will inject one and set
         * V_NMI_PENDING for the other.  WARN, but continue with the standard
         * single-step approach to try and salvage the pending NMI.
         */
        WARN_ON_ONCE(is_vnmi_enabled(svm));

        if (svm_get_nmi_mask(vcpu) && !svm->awaiting_iret_completion)
                return; /* IRET will cause a vm exit */

        /*
         * SEV-ES guests are responsible for signaling when a vCPU is ready to
         * receive a new NMI, as SEV-ES guests can't be single-stepped, i.e.
         * KVM can't intercept and single-step IRET to detect when NMIs are
         * unblocked (architecturally speaking).  See SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE.
         *
         * Note, GIF is guaranteed to be '1' for SEV-ES guests as hardware
         * ignores SEV-ES guest writes to EFER.SVME *and* CLGI/STGI are not
         * supported NAEs in the GHCB protocol.
         */
        if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
                return;

        if (!gif_set(svm)) {
                if (vgif)
                        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);
                return; /* STGI will cause a vm exit */
        }

        /*
         * Something prevents NMI from been injected. Single step over possible
         * problem (IRET or exception injection or interrupt shadow)
         */
        svm->nmi_singlestep_guest_rflags = svm_get_rflags(vcpu);
        svm->nmi_singlestep = true;
        svm->vmcb->save.rflags |= (X86_EFLAGS_TF | X86_EFLAGS_RF);
}

static void svm_flush_tlb_asid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        /*
         * Unlike VMX, SVM doesn't provide a way to flush only NPT TLB entries.
         * A TLB flush for the current ASID flushes both "host" and "guest" TLB
         * entries, and thus is a superset of Hyper-V's fine grained flushing.
         */
        kvm_hv_vcpu_purge_flush_tlb(vcpu);

        /*
         * Flush only the current ASID even if the TLB flush was invoked via
         * kvm_flush_remote_tlbs().  Although flushing remote TLBs requires all
         * ASIDs to be flushed, KVM uses a single ASID for L1 and L2, and
         * unconditionally does a TLB flush on both nested VM-Enter and nested
         * VM-Exit (via kvm_mmu_reset_context()).
         */
        if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSHBYASID))
                svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ASID;
        else
                svm->current_vmcb->asid_generation--;
}

static void svm_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        hpa_t root_tdp = vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa;

        /*
         * When running on Hyper-V with EnlightenedNptTlb enabled, explicitly
         * flush the NPT mappings via hypercall as flushing the ASID only
         * affects virtual to physical mappings, it does not invalidate guest
         * physical to host physical mappings.
         */
        if (svm_hv_is_enlightened_tlb_enabled(vcpu) && VALID_PAGE(root_tdp))
                hyperv_flush_guest_mapping(root_tdp);

        svm_flush_tlb_asid(vcpu);
}

static void svm_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        /*
         * When running on Hyper-V with EnlightenedNptTlb enabled, remote TLB
         * flushes should be routed to hv_flush_remote_tlbs() without requesting
         * a "regular" remote flush.  Reaching this point means either there's
         * a KVM bug or a prior hv_flush_remote_tlbs() call failed, both of
         * which might be fatal to the guest.  Yell, but try to recover.
         */
        if (WARN_ON_ONCE(svm_hv_is_enlightened_tlb_enabled(vcpu)))
                hv_flush_remote_tlbs(vcpu->kvm);

        svm_flush_tlb_asid(vcpu);
}

static void svm_flush_tlb_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        invlpga(gva, svm->vmcb->control.asid);
}

static inline void sync_cr8_to_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        if (nested_svm_virtualize_tpr(vcpu))
                return;

        if (!svm_is_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE)) {
                int cr8 = svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl & V_TPR_MASK;
                kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, cr8);
        }
}

static inline void sync_lapic_to_cr8(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        u64 cr8;

        if (nested_svm_virtualize_tpr(vcpu) ||
            kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
                return;

        cr8 = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
        svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl &= ~V_TPR_MASK;
        svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= cr8 & V_TPR_MASK;
}

static void svm_complete_soft_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector,
                                        int type)
{
        bool is_exception = (type == SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_EXEPT);
        bool is_soft = (type == SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_SOFT);
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        /*
         * If NRIPS is enabled, KVM must snapshot the pre-VMRUN next_rip that's
         * associated with the original soft exception/interrupt.  next_rip is
         * cleared on all exits that can occur while vectoring an event, so KVM
         * needs to manually set next_rip for re-injection.  Unlike the !nrips
         * case below, this needs to be done if and only if KVM is re-injecting
         * the same event, i.e. if the event is a soft exception/interrupt,
         * otherwise next_rip is unused on VMRUN.
         */
        if (nrips && (is_soft || (is_exception && kvm_exception_is_soft(vector))) &&
            kvm_is_linear_rip(vcpu, svm->soft_int_old_rip + svm->soft_int_csbase))
                svm->vmcb->control.next_rip = svm->soft_int_next_rip;
        /*
         * If NRIPS isn't enabled, KVM must manually advance RIP prior to
         * injecting the soft exception/interrupt.  That advancement needs to
         * be unwound if vectoring didn't complete.  Note, the new event may
         * not be the injected event, e.g. if KVM injected an INTn, the INTn
         * hit a #NP in the guest, and the #NP encountered a #PF, the #NP will
         * be the reported vectored event, but RIP still needs to be unwound.
         */
        else if (!nrips && (is_soft || is_exception) &&
                 kvm_is_linear_rip(vcpu, svm->soft_int_next_rip + svm->soft_int_csbase))
                kvm_rip_write(vcpu, svm->soft_int_old_rip);
}

static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        u8 vector;
        int type;
        u32 exitintinfo = svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info;
        bool nmi_l1_to_l2 = svm->nmi_l1_to_l2;
        bool soft_int_injected = svm->soft_int_injected;

        svm->nmi_l1_to_l2 = false;
        svm->soft_int_injected = false;

        /*
         * If we've made progress since setting awaiting_iret_completion, we've
         * executed an IRET and can allow NMI injection.
         */
        if (svm->awaiting_iret_completion &&
            kvm_rip_read(vcpu) != svm->nmi_iret_rip) {
                svm->awaiting_iret_completion = false;
                svm->nmi_masked = false;
                kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
        }

        vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
        kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
        kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);

        if (!(exitintinfo & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID))
                return;

        kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);

        vector = exitintinfo & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VEC_MASK;
        type = exitintinfo & SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_MASK;

        if (soft_int_injected)
                svm_complete_soft_interrupt(vcpu, vector, type);

        switch (type) {
        case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_NMI:
                vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = true;
                svm->nmi_l1_to_l2 = nmi_l1_to_l2;
                break;
        case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_EXEPT:
                /*
                 * Never re-inject a #VC exception.
                 */
                if (vector == X86_TRAP_VC)
                        break;

                if (exitintinfo & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID_ERR) {
                        u32 err = svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info_err;
                        kvm_requeue_exception_e(vcpu, vector, err);

                } else
                        kvm_requeue_exception(vcpu, vector);
                break;
        case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_INTR:
                kvm_queue_interrupt(vcpu, vector, false);
                break;
        case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_SOFT:
                kvm_queue_interrupt(vcpu, vector, true);
                break;
        default:
                break;
        }

}

static void svm_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;

        control->exit_int_info = control->event_inj;
        control->exit_int_info_err = control->event_inj_err;
        control->event_inj = 0;
        svm_complete_interrupts(vcpu);
}

static int svm_vcpu_pre_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        return 1;
}

static fastpath_t svm_exit_handlers_fastpath(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        if (to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_MSR &&
            to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.exit_info_1)
                return handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff(vcpu);

        return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
}

static noinstr void svm_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool spec_ctrl_intercepted)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        guest_state_enter_irqoff();

        amd_clear_divider();

        if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
                __svm_sev_es_vcpu_run(svm, spec_ctrl_intercepted);
        else
                __svm_vcpu_run(svm, spec_ctrl_intercepted);

        guest_state_exit_irqoff();
}

static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        bool spec_ctrl_intercepted = msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);

        trace_kvm_entry(vcpu);

        svm->vmcb->save.rax = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
        svm->vmcb->save.rsp = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP];
        svm->vmcb->save.rip = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP];

        /*
         * Disable singlestep if we're injecting an interrupt/exception.
         * We don't want our modified rflags to be pushed on the stack where
         * we might not be able to easily reset them if we disabled NMI
         * singlestep later.
         */
        if (svm->nmi_singlestep && svm->vmcb->control.event_inj) {
                /*
                 * Event injection happens before external interrupts cause a
                 * vmexit and interrupts are disabled here, so smp_send_reschedule
                 * is enough to force an immediate vmexit.
                 */
                disable_nmi_singlestep(svm);
                smp_send_reschedule(vcpu->cpu);
        }

        pre_svm_run(vcpu);

        sync_lapic_to_cr8(vcpu);

        if (unlikely(svm->asid != svm->vmcb->control.asid)) {
                svm->vmcb->control.asid = svm->asid;
                vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID);
        }
        svm->vmcb->save.cr2 = vcpu->arch.cr2;

        svm_hv_update_vp_id(svm->vmcb, vcpu);

        /*
         * Run with all-zero DR6 unless needed, so that we can get the exact cause
         * of a #DB.
         */
        if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT))
                svm_set_dr6(svm, vcpu->arch.dr6);
        else
                svm_set_dr6(svm, DR6_ACTIVE_LOW);

        clgi();
        kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu);

        kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);

        /*
         * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if
         * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there
         * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
         * being speculatively taken.
         */
        if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
                x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(svm->virt_spec_ctrl);

        svm_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, spec_ctrl_intercepted);

        if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
                x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(svm->virt_spec_ctrl);

        if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
                vcpu->arch.cr2 = svm->vmcb->save.cr2;
                vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] = svm->vmcb->save.rax;
                vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP] = svm->vmcb->save.rsp;
                vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP] = svm->vmcb->save.rip;
        }
        vcpu->arch.regs_dirty = 0;

        if (unlikely(svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_NMI))
                kvm_before_interrupt(vcpu, KVM_HANDLING_NMI);

        kvm_load_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
        stgi();

        /* Any pending NMI will happen here */

        if (unlikely(svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_NMI))
                kvm_after_interrupt(vcpu);

        sync_cr8_to_lapic(vcpu);

        svm->next_rip = 0;
        if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
                nested_sync_control_from_vmcb02(svm);

                /* Track VMRUNs that have made past consistency checking */
                if (svm->nested.nested_run_pending &&
                    svm->vmcb->control.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_ERR)
                        ++vcpu->stat.nested_run;

                svm->nested.nested_run_pending = 0;
        }

        svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_DO_NOTHING;
        vmcb_mark_all_clean(svm->vmcb);

        /* if exit due to PF check for async PF */
        if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + PF_VECTOR)
                vcpu->arch.apf.host_apf_flags =
                        kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags();

        vcpu->arch.regs_avail &= ~SVM_REGS_LAZY_LOAD_SET;

        /*
         * We need to handle MC intercepts here before the vcpu has a chance to
         * change the physical cpu
         */
        if (unlikely(svm->vmcb->control.exit_code ==
                     SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + MC_VECTOR))
                svm_handle_mce(vcpu);

        trace_kvm_exit(vcpu, KVM_ISA_SVM);

        svm_complete_interrupts(vcpu);

        if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
                return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;

        return svm_exit_handlers_fastpath(vcpu);
}

static void svm_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa,
                             int root_level)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        unsigned long cr3;

        if (npt_enabled) {
                svm->vmcb->control.nested_cr3 = __sme_set(root_hpa);
                vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_NPT);

                hv_track_root_tdp(vcpu, root_hpa);

                cr3 = vcpu->arch.cr3;
        } else if (root_level >= PT64_ROOT_4LEVEL) {
                cr3 = __sme_set(root_hpa) | kvm_get_active_pcid(vcpu);
        } else {
                /* PCID in the guest should be impossible with a 32-bit MMU. */
                WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_get_active_pcid(vcpu));
                cr3 = root_hpa;
        }

        svm->vmcb->save.cr3 = cr3;
        vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
}

static void
svm_patch_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned char *hypercall)
{
        /*
         * Patch in the VMMCALL instruction:
         */
        hypercall[0] = 0x0f;
        hypercall[1] = 0x01;
        hypercall[2] = 0xd9;
}

/*
 * The kvm parameter can be NULL (module initialization, or invocation before
 * VM creation). Be sure to check the kvm parameter before using it.
 */
static bool svm_has_emulated_msr(struct kvm *kvm, u32 index)
{
        switch (index) {
        case MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL:
        case KVM_FIRST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR ... KVM_LAST_EMULATED_VMX_MSR:
                return false;
        case MSR_IA32_SMBASE:
                if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_SMM))
                        return false;
                /* SEV-ES guests do not support SMM, so report false */
                if (kvm && sev_es_guest(kvm))
                        return false;
                break;
        default:
                break;
        }

        return true;
}

static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        /*
         * SVM doesn't provide a way to disable just XSAVES in the guest, KVM
         * can only disable all variants of by disallowing CR4.OSXSAVE from
         * being set.  As a result, if the host has XSAVE and XSAVES, and the
         * guest has XSAVE enabled, the guest can execute XSAVES without
         * faulting.  Treat XSAVES as enabled in this case regardless of
         * whether it's advertised to the guest so that KVM context switches
         * XSS on VM-Enter/VM-Exit.  Failure to do so would effectively give
         * the guest read/write access to the host's XSS.
         */
        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
            boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
            guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE))
                kvm_governed_feature_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);

        kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_NRIPS);
        kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR);
        kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV);

        /*
         * Intercept VMLOAD if the vCPU mode is Intel in order to emulate that
         * VMLOAD drops bits 63:32 of SYSENTER (ignoring the fact that exposing
         * SVM on Intel is bonkers and extremely unlikely to work).
         */
        if (!guest_cpuid_is_intel(vcpu))
                kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD);

        kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER);
        kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD);
        kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VGIF);
        kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VNMI);

        svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts(vcpu, svm);

        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
                set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, 0,
                                     !!guest_has_pred_cmd_msr(vcpu));

        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D))
                set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, 0,
                                     !!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D));

        if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
                sev_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(svm);

        init_vmcb_after_set_cpuid(vcpu);
}

static bool svm_has_wbinvd_exit(void)
{
        return true;
}

#define PRE_EX(exit)  { .exit_code = (exit), \
                        .stage = X86_ICPT_PRE_EXCEPT, }
#define POST_EX(exit) { .exit_code = (exit), \
                        .stage = X86_ICPT_POST_EXCEPT, }
#define POST_MEM(exit) { .exit_code = (exit), \
                        .stage = X86_ICPT_POST_MEMACCESS, }

static const struct __x86_intercept {
        u32 exit_code;
        enum x86_intercept_stage stage;
} x86_intercept_map[] = {
        [x86_intercept_cr_read]         = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0),
        [x86_intercept_cr_write]        = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0),
        [x86_intercept_clts]            = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0),
        [x86_intercept_lmsw]            = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0),
        [x86_intercept_smsw]            = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0),
        [x86_intercept_dr_read]         = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_READ_DR0),
        [x86_intercept_dr_write]        = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR0),
        [x86_intercept_sldt]            = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_LDTR_READ),
        [x86_intercept_str]             = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_TR_READ),
        [x86_intercept_lldt]            = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_LDTR_WRITE),
        [x86_intercept_ltr]             = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_TR_WRITE),
        [x86_intercept_sgdt]            = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_GDTR_READ),
        [x86_intercept_sidt]            = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_IDTR_READ),
        [x86_intercept_lgdt]            = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_GDTR_WRITE),
        [x86_intercept_lidt]            = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_IDTR_WRITE),
        [x86_intercept_vmrun]           = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_VMRUN),
        [x86_intercept_vmmcall]         = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL),
        [x86_intercept_vmload]          = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_VMLOAD),
        [x86_intercept_vmsave]          = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_VMSAVE),
        [x86_intercept_stgi]            = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_STGI),
        [x86_intercept_clgi]            = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_CLGI),
        [x86_intercept_skinit]          = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_SKINIT),
        [x86_intercept_invlpga]         = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_INVLPGA),
        [x86_intercept_rdtscp]          = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP),
        [x86_intercept_monitor]         = POST_MEM(SVM_EXIT_MONITOR),
        [x86_intercept_mwait]           = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_MWAIT),
        [x86_intercept_invlpg]          = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_INVLPG),
        [x86_intercept_invd]            = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_INVD),
        [x86_intercept_wbinvd]          = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_WBINVD),
        [x86_intercept_wrmsr]           = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_MSR),
        [x86_intercept_rdtsc]           = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_RDTSC),
        [x86_intercept_rdmsr]           = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_MSR),
        [x86_intercept_rdpmc]           = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_RDPMC),
        [x86_intercept_cpuid]           = PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_CPUID),
        [x86_intercept_rsm]             = PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_RSM),
        [x86_intercept_pause]           = PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_PAUSE),
        [x86_intercept_pushf]           = PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_PUSHF),
        [x86_intercept_popf]            = PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_POPF),
        [x86_intercept_intn]            = PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_SWINT),
        [x86_intercept_iret]            = PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_IRET),
        [x86_intercept_icebp]           = PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_ICEBP),
        [x86_intercept_hlt]             = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_HLT),
        [x86_intercept_in]              = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_IOIO),
        [x86_intercept_ins]             = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_IOIO),
        [x86_intercept_out]             = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_IOIO),
        [x86_intercept_outs]            = POST_EX(SVM_EXIT_IOIO),
        [x86_intercept_xsetbv]          = PRE_EX(SVM_EXIT_XSETBV),
};

#undef PRE_EX
#undef POST_EX
#undef POST_MEM

static int svm_check_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
                               struct x86_instruction_info *info,
                               enum x86_intercept_stage stage,
                               struct x86_exception *exception)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        int vmexit, ret = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
        struct __x86_intercept icpt_info;
        struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;

        if (info->intercept >= ARRAY_SIZE(x86_intercept_map))
                goto out;

        icpt_info = x86_intercept_map[info->intercept];

        if (stage != icpt_info.stage)
                goto out;

        switch (icpt_info.exit_code) {
        case SVM_EXIT_READ_CR0:
                if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_cr_read)
                        icpt_info.exit_code += info->modrm_reg;
                break;
        case SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0: {
                unsigned long cr0, val;

                if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_cr_write)
                        icpt_info.exit_code += info->modrm_reg;

                if (icpt_info.exit_code != SVM_EXIT_WRITE_CR0 ||
                    info->intercept == x86_intercept_clts)
                        break;

                if (!(vmcb12_is_intercept(&svm->nested.ctl,
                                        INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0)))
                        break;

                cr0 = vcpu->arch.cr0 & ~SVM_CR0_SELECTIVE_MASK;
                val = info->src_val  & ~SVM_CR0_SELECTIVE_MASK;

                if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_lmsw) {
                        cr0 &= 0xfUL;
                        val &= 0xfUL;
                        /* lmsw can't clear PE - catch this here */
                        if (cr0 & X86_CR0_PE)
                                val |= X86_CR0_PE;
                }

                if (cr0 ^ val)
                        icpt_info.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_CR0_SEL_WRITE;

                break;
        }
        case SVM_EXIT_READ_DR0:
        case SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR0:
                icpt_info.exit_code += info->modrm_reg;
                break;
        case SVM_EXIT_MSR:
                if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_wrmsr)
                        vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = 1;
                else
                        vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = 0;
                break;
        case SVM_EXIT_PAUSE:
                /*
                 * We get this for NOP only, but pause
                 * is rep not, check this here
                 */
                if (info->rep_prefix != REPE_PREFIX)
                        goto out;
                break;
        case SVM_EXIT_IOIO: {
                u64 exit_info;
                u32 bytes;

                if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_in ||
                    info->intercept == x86_intercept_ins) {
                        exit_info = ((info->src_val & 0xffff) << 16) |
                                SVM_IOIO_TYPE_MASK;
                        bytes = info->dst_bytes;
                } else {
                        exit_info = (info->dst_val & 0xffff) << 16;
                        bytes = info->src_bytes;
                }

                if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_outs ||
                    info->intercept == x86_intercept_ins)
                        exit_info |= SVM_IOIO_STR_MASK;

                if (info->rep_prefix)
                        exit_info |= SVM_IOIO_REP_MASK;

                bytes = min(bytes, 4u);

                exit_info |= bytes << SVM_IOIO_SIZE_SHIFT;

                exit_info |= (u32)info->ad_bytes << (SVM_IOIO_ASIZE_SHIFT - 1);

                vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = exit_info;
                vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = info->next_rip;

                break;
        }
        default:
                break;
        }

        /* TODO: Advertise NRIPS to guest hypervisor unconditionally */
        if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS))
                vmcb->control.next_rip  = info->next_rip;
        vmcb->control.exit_code = icpt_info.exit_code;
        vmexit = nested_svm_exit_handled(svm);

        ret = (vmexit == NESTED_EXIT_DONE) ? X86EMUL_INTERCEPTED
                                           : X86EMUL_CONTINUE;

out:
        return ret;
}

static void svm_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        if (to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_INTR)
                vcpu->arch.at_instruction_boundary = true;
}

static void svm_sched_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
{
        if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
                shrink_ple_window(vcpu);
}

static void svm_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        /* [63:9] are reserved. */
        vcpu->arch.mcg_cap &= 0x1ff;
}

#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
bool svm_smi_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        /* Per APM Vol.2 15.22.2 "Response to SMI" */
        if (!gif_set(svm))
                return true;

        return is_smm(vcpu);
}

static int svm_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool for_injection)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        if (svm->nested.nested_run_pending)
                return -EBUSY;

        if (svm_smi_blocked(vcpu))
                return 0;

        /* An SMI must not be injected into L2 if it's supposed to VM-Exit.  */
        if (for_injection && is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_exit_on_smi(svm))
                return -EBUSY;

        return 1;
}

static int svm_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, union kvm_smram *smram)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        struct kvm_host_map map_save;
        int ret;

        if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu))
                return 0;

        /*
         * 32-bit SMRAM format doesn't preserve EFER and SVM state.  Userspace is
         * responsible for ensuring nested SVM and SMIs are mutually exclusive.
         */

        if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM))
                return 1;

        smram->smram64.svm_guest_flag = 1;
        smram->smram64.svm_guest_vmcb_gpa = svm->nested.vmcb12_gpa;

        svm->vmcb->save.rax = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
        svm->vmcb->save.rsp = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP];
        svm->vmcb->save.rip = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP];

        ret = nested_svm_simple_vmexit(svm, SVM_EXIT_SW);
        if (ret)
                return ret;

        /*
         * KVM uses VMCB01 to store L1 host state while L2 runs but
         * VMCB01 is going to be used during SMM and thus the state will
         * be lost. Temporary save non-VMLOAD/VMSAVE state to the host save
         * area pointed to by MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA. APM guarantees that the
         * format of the area is identical to guest save area offsetted
         * by 0x400 (matches the offset of 'struct vmcb_save_area'
         * within 'struct vmcb'). Note: HSAVE area may also be used by
         * L1 hypervisor to save additional host context (e.g. KVM does
         * that, see svm_prepare_switch_to_guest()) which must be
         * preserved.
         */
        if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(svm->nested.hsave_msr), &map_save))
                return 1;

        BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct vmcb, save) != 0x400);

        svm_copy_vmrun_state(map_save.hva + 0x400,
                             &svm->vmcb01.ptr->save);

        kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &map_save, true);
        return 0;
}

static int svm_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const union kvm_smram *smram)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
        struct kvm_host_map map, map_save;
        struct vmcb *vmcb12;
        int ret;

        const struct kvm_smram_state_64 *smram64 = &smram->smram64;

        if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM))
                return 0;

        /* Non-zero if SMI arrived while vCPU was in guest mode. */
        if (!smram64->svm_guest_flag)
                return 0;

        if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SVM))
                return 1;

        if (!(smram64->efer & EFER_SVME))
                return 1;

        if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(smram64->svm_guest_vmcb_gpa), &map))
                return 1;

        ret = 1;
        if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(svm->nested.hsave_msr), &map_save))
                goto unmap_map;

        if (svm_allocate_nested(svm))
                goto unmap_save;

        /*
         * Restore L1 host state from L1 HSAVE area as VMCB01 was
         * used during SMM (see svm_enter_smm())
         */

        svm_copy_vmrun_state(&svm->vmcb01.ptr->save, map_save.hva + 0x400);

        /*
         * Enter the nested guest now
         */

        vmcb_mark_all_dirty(svm->vmcb01.ptr);

        vmcb12 = map.hva;
        nested_copy_vmcb_control_to_cache(svm, &vmcb12->control);
        nested_copy_vmcb_save_to_cache(svm, &vmcb12->save);
        ret = enter_svm_guest_mode(vcpu, smram64->svm_guest_vmcb_gpa, vmcb12, false);

        if (ret)
                goto unmap_save;

        svm->nested.nested_run_pending = 1;

unmap_save:
        kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &map_save, true);
unmap_map:
        kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &map, true);
        return ret;
}

static void svm_enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        if (!gif_set(svm)) {
                if (vgif)
                        svm_set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_STGI);
                /* STGI will cause a vm exit */
        } else {
                /* We must be in SMM; RSM will cause a vmexit anyway.  */
        }
}
#endif

static int svm_check_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
                                         void *insn, int insn_len)
{
        bool smep, smap, is_user;
        u64 error_code;

        /* Emulation is always possible when KVM has access to all guest state. */
        if (!sev_guest(vcpu->kvm))
                return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;

        /* #UD and #GP should never be intercepted for SEV guests. */
        WARN_ON_ONCE(emul_type & (EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD |
                                  EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD_FORCED |
                                  EMULTYPE_VMWARE_GP));

        /*
         * Emulation is impossible for SEV-ES guests as KVM doesn't have access
         * to guest register state.
         */
        if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
                return X86EMUL_RETRY_INSTR;

        /*
         * Emulation is possible if the instruction is already decoded, e.g.
         * when completing I/O after returning from userspace.
         */
        if (emul_type & EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE)
                return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;

        /*
         * Emulation is possible for SEV guests if and only if a prefilled
         * buffer containing the bytes of the intercepted instruction is
         * available. SEV guest memory is encrypted with a guest specific key
         * and cannot be decrypted by KVM, i.e. KVM would read cyphertext and
         * decode garbage.
         *
         * If KVM is NOT trying to simply skip an instruction, inject #UD if
         * KVM reached this point without an instruction buffer.  In practice,
         * this path should never be hit by a well-behaved guest, e.g. KVM
         * doesn't intercept #UD or #GP for SEV guests, but this path is still
         * theoretically reachable, e.g. via unaccelerated fault-like AVIC
         * access, and needs to be handled by KVM to avoid putting the guest
         * into an infinite loop.   Injecting #UD is somewhat arbitrary, but
         * its the least awful option given lack of insight into the guest.
         *
         * If KVM is trying to skip an instruction, simply resume the guest.
         * If a #NPF occurs while the guest is vectoring an INT3/INTO, then KVM
         * will attempt to re-inject the INT3/INTO and skip the instruction.
         * In that scenario, retrying the INT3/INTO and hoping the guest will
         * make forward progress is the only option that has a chance of
         * success (and in practice it will work the vast majority of the time).
         */
        if (unlikely(!insn)) {
                if (emul_type & EMULTYPE_SKIP)
                        return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;

                kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
                return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
        }

        /*
         * Emulate for SEV guests if the insn buffer is not empty.  The buffer
         * will be empty if the DecodeAssist microcode cannot fetch bytes for
         * the faulting instruction because the code fetch itself faulted, e.g.
         * the guest attempted to fetch from emulated MMIO or a guest page
         * table used to translate CS:RIP resides in emulated MMIO.
         */
        if (likely(insn_len))
                return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;

        /*
         * Detect and workaround Errata 1096 Fam_17h_00_0Fh.
         *
         * Errata:
         * When CPU raises #NPF on guest data access and vCPU CR4.SMAP=1, it is
         * possible that CPU microcode implementing DecodeAssist will fail to
         * read guest memory at CS:RIP and vmcb.GuestIntrBytes will incorrectly
         * be '0'.  This happens because microcode reads CS:RIP using a _data_
         * loap uop with CPL=0 privileges.  If the load hits a SMAP #PF, ucode
         * gives up and does not fill the instruction bytes buffer.
         *
         * As above, KVM reaches this point iff the VM is an SEV guest, the CPU
         * supports DecodeAssist, a #NPF was raised, KVM's page fault handler
         * triggered emulation (e.g. for MMIO), and the CPU returned 0 in the
         * GuestIntrBytes field of the VMCB.
         *
         * This does _not_ mean that the erratum has been encountered, as the
         * DecodeAssist will also fail if the load for CS:RIP hits a legitimate
         * #PF, e.g. if the guest attempt to execute from emulated MMIO and
         * encountered a reserved/not-present #PF.
         *
         * To hit the erratum, the following conditions must be true:
         *    1. CR4.SMAP=1 (obviously).
         *    2. CR4.SMEP=0 || CPL=3.  If SMEP=1 and CPL<3, the erratum cannot
         *       have been hit as the guest would have encountered a SMEP
         *       violation #PF, not a #NPF.
         *    3. The #NPF is not due to a code fetch, in which case failure to
         *       retrieve the instruction bytes is legitimate (see abvoe).
         *
         * In addition, don't apply the erratum workaround if the #NPF occurred
         * while translating guest page tables (see below).
         */
        error_code = to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
        if (error_code & (PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK | PFERR_FETCH_MASK))
                goto resume_guest;

        smep = kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMEP);
        smap = kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMAP);
        is_user = svm_get_cpl(vcpu) == 3;
        if (smap && (!smep || is_user)) {
                pr_err_ratelimited("SEV Guest triggered AMD Erratum 1096\n");

                /*
                 * If the fault occurred in userspace, arbitrarily inject #GP
                 * to avoid killing the guest and to hopefully avoid confusing
                 * the guest kernel too much, e.g. injecting #PF would not be
                 * coherent with respect to the guest's page tables.  Request
                 * triple fault if the fault occurred in the kernel as there's
                 * no fault that KVM can inject without confusing the guest.
                 * In practice, the triple fault is moot as no sane SEV kernel
                 * will execute from user memory while also running with SMAP=1.
                 */
                if (is_user)
                        kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
                else
                        kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
                return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
        }

resume_guest:
        /*
         * If the erratum was not hit, simply resume the guest and let it fault
         * again.  While awful, e.g. the vCPU may get stuck in an infinite loop
         * if the fault is at CPL=0, it's the lesser of all evils.  Exiting to
         * userspace will kill the guest, and letting the emulator read garbage
         * will yield random behavior and potentially corrupt the guest.
         *
         * Simply resuming the guest is technically not a violation of the SEV
         * architecture.  AMD's APM states that all code fetches and page table
         * accesses for SEV guest are encrypted, regardless of the C-Bit.  The
         * APM also states that encrypted accesses to MMIO are "ignored", but
         * doesn't explicitly define "ignored", i.e. doing nothing and letting
         * the guest spin is technically "ignoring" the access.
         */
        return X86EMUL_RETRY_INSTR;
}

static bool svm_apic_init_signal_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
        struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

        return !gif_set(svm);
}

static void svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
{
        if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
                return kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(vcpu, vector);

        sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(vcpu, vector);
}

static void svm_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
{
        avic_vm_destroy(kvm);
        sev_vm_destroy(kvm);
}

static int svm_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
{
        if (!pause_filter_count || !pause_filter_thresh)
                kvm->arch.pause_in_guest = true;

        if (enable_apicv) {
                int ret = avic_vm_init(kvm);
                if (ret)
                        return ret;
        }

        return 0;
}

static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
        .name = KBUILD_MODNAME,

        .check_processor_compatibility = svm_check_processor_compat,

        .hardware_unsetup = svm_hardware_unsetup,
        .hardware_enable = svm_hardware_enable,
        .hardware_disable = svm_hardware_disable,
        .has_emulated_msr = svm_has_emulated_msr,

        .vcpu_create = svm_vcpu_create,
        .vcpu_free = svm_vcpu_free,
        .vcpu_reset = svm_vcpu_reset,

        .vm_size = sizeof(struct kvm_svm),
        .vm_init = svm_vm_init,
        .vm_destroy = svm_vm_destroy,

        .prepare_switch_to_guest = svm_prepare_switch_to_guest,
        .vcpu_load = svm_vcpu_load,
        .vcpu_put = svm_vcpu_put,
        .vcpu_blocking = avic_vcpu_blocking,
        .vcpu_unblocking = avic_vcpu_unblocking,

        .update_exception_bitmap = svm_update_exception_bitmap,
        .get_msr_feature = svm_get_msr_feature,
        .get_msr = svm_get_msr,
        .set_msr = svm_set_msr,
        .get_segment_base = svm_get_segment_base,
        .get_segment = svm_get_segment,
        .set_segment = svm_set_segment,
        .get_cpl = svm_get_cpl,
        .get_cs_db_l_bits = svm_get_cs_db_l_bits,
        .is_valid_cr0 = svm_is_valid_cr0,
        .set_cr0 = svm_set_cr0,
        .post_set_cr3 = sev_post_set_cr3,
        .is_valid_cr4 = svm_is_valid_cr4,
        .set_cr4 = svm_set_cr4,
        .set_efer = svm_set_efer,
        .get_idt = svm_get_idt,
        .set_idt = svm_set_idt,
        .get_gdt = svm_get_gdt,
        .set_gdt = svm_set_gdt,
        .set_dr7 = svm_set_dr7,
        .sync_dirty_debug_regs = svm_sync_dirty_debug_regs,
        .cache_reg = svm_cache_reg,
        .get_rflags = svm_get_rflags,
        .set_rflags = svm_set_rflags,
        .get_if_flag = svm_get_if_flag,

        .flush_tlb_all = svm_flush_tlb_all,
        .flush_tlb_current = svm_flush_tlb_current,
        .flush_tlb_gva = svm_flush_tlb_gva,
        .flush_tlb_guest = svm_flush_tlb_asid,

        .vcpu_pre_run = svm_vcpu_pre_run,
        .vcpu_run = svm_vcpu_run,
        .handle_exit = svm_handle_exit,
        .skip_emulated_instruction = svm_skip_emulated_instruction,
        .update_emulated_instruction = NULL,
        .set_interrupt_shadow = svm_set_interrupt_shadow,
        .get_interrupt_shadow = svm_get_interrupt_shadow,
        .patch_hypercall = svm_patch_hypercall,
        .inject_irq = svm_inject_irq,
        .inject_nmi = svm_inject_nmi,
        .is_vnmi_pending = svm_is_vnmi_pending,
        .set_vnmi_pending = svm_set_vnmi_pending,
        .inject_exception = svm_inject_exception,
        .cancel_injection = svm_cancel_injection,
        .interrupt_allowed = svm_interrupt_allowed,
        .nmi_allowed = svm_nmi_allowed,
        .get_nmi_mask = svm_get_nmi_mask,
        .set_nmi_mask = svm_set_nmi_mask,
        .enable_nmi_window = svm_enable_nmi_window,
        .enable_irq_window = svm_enable_irq_window,
        .update_cr8_intercept = svm_update_cr8_intercept,
        .set_virtual_apic_mode = avic_refresh_virtual_apic_mode,
        .refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl = avic_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl,
        .apicv_post_state_restore = avic_apicv_post_state_restore,
        .required_apicv_inhibits = AVIC_REQUIRED_APICV_INHIBITS,

        .get_exit_info = svm_get_exit_info,

        .vcpu_after_set_cpuid = svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid,

        .has_wbinvd_exit = svm_has_wbinvd_exit,

        .get_l2_tsc_offset = svm_get_l2_tsc_offset,
        .get_l2_tsc_multiplier = svm_get_l2_tsc_multiplier,
        .write_tsc_offset = svm_write_tsc_offset,
        .write_tsc_multiplier = svm_write_tsc_multiplier,

        .load_mmu_pgd = svm_load_mmu_pgd,

        .check_intercept = svm_check_intercept,
        .handle_exit_irqoff = svm_handle_exit_irqoff,

        .request_immediate_exit = __kvm_request_immediate_exit,

        .sched_in = svm_sched_in,

        .nested_ops = &svm_nested_ops,

        .deliver_interrupt = svm_deliver_interrupt,
        .pi_update_irte = avic_pi_update_irte,
        .setup_mce = svm_setup_mce,

#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_SMM
        .smi_allowed = svm_smi_allowed,
        .enter_smm = svm_enter_smm,
        .leave_smm = svm_leave_smm,
        .enable_smi_window = svm_enable_smi_window,
#endif

        .mem_enc_ioctl = sev_mem_enc_ioctl,
        .mem_enc_register_region = sev_mem_enc_register_region,
        .mem_enc_unregister_region = sev_mem_enc_unregister_region,
        .guest_memory_reclaimed = sev_guest_memory_reclaimed,

        .vm_copy_enc_context_from = sev_vm_copy_enc_context_from,
        .vm_move_enc_context_from = sev_vm_move_enc_context_from,

        .check_emulate_instruction = svm_check_emulate_instruction,

        .apic_init_signal_blocked = svm_apic_init_signal_blocked,

        .msr_filter_changed = svm_msr_filter_changed,
        .complete_emulated_msr = svm_complete_emulated_msr,

        .vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
        .vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons = avic_vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons,
};

/*
 * The default MMIO mask is a single bit (excluding the present bit),
 * which could conflict with the memory encryption bit. Check for
 * memory encryption support and override the default MMIO mask if
 * memory encryption is enabled.
 */
static __init void svm_adjust_mmio_mask(void)
{
        unsigned int enc_bit, mask_bit;
        u64 msr, mask;

        /* If there is no memory encryption support, use existing mask */
        if (cpuid_eax(0x80000000) < 0x8000001f)
                return;

        /* If memory encryption is not enabled, use existing mask */
        rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, msr);
        if (!(msr & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
                return;

        enc_bit = cpuid_ebx(0x8000001f) & 0x3f;
        mask_bit = boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits;

        /* Increment the mask bit if it is the same as the encryption bit */
        if (enc_bit == mask_bit)
                mask_bit++;

        /*
         * If the mask bit location is below 52, then some bits above the
         * physical addressing limit will always be reserved, so use the
         * rsvd_bits() function to generate the mask. This mask, along with
         * the present bit, will be used to generate a page fault with
         * PFER.RSV = 1.
         *
         * If the mask bit location is 52 (or above), then clear the mask.
         */
        mask = (mask_bit < 52) ? rsvd_bits(mask_bit, 51) | PT_PRESENT_MASK : 0;

        kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(mask, mask, PT_WRITABLE_MASK | PT_USER_MASK);
}

static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps(void)
{
        kvm_set_cpu_caps();

        kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap = 0;
        kvm_caps.supported_xss = 0;

        /* CPUID 0x80000001 and 0x8000000A (SVM features) */
        if (nested) {
                kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SVM);
                kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_VMCBCLEAN);

                if (nrips)
                        kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS);

                if (npt_enabled)
                        kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_NPT);

                if (tsc_scaling)
                        kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR);

                if (vls)
                        kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD);
                if (lbrv)
                        kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_LBRV);

                if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER))
                        kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER);

                if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD))
                        kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD);

                if (vgif)
                        kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_VGIF);

                if (vnmi)
                        kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_VNMI);

                /* Nested VM can receive #VMEXIT instead of triggering #GP */
                kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SVME_ADDR_CHK);
        }

        /* CPUID 0x80000008 */
        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD) ||
            boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
                kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD);

        if (enable_pmu) {
                /*
                 * Enumerate support for PERFCTR_CORE if and only if KVM has
                 * access to enough counters to virtualize "core" support,
                 * otherwise limit vPMU support to the legacy number of counters.
                 */
                if (kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_gp < AMD64_NUM_COUNTERS_CORE)
                        kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_gp = min(AMD64_NUM_COUNTERS,
                                                          kvm_pmu_cap.num_counters_gp);
                else
                        kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_CORE);

                if (kvm_pmu_cap.version != 2 ||
                    !kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_CORE))
                        kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2);
        }

        /* CPUID 0x8000001F (SME/SEV features) */
        sev_set_cpu_caps();
}

static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
{
        int cpu;
        struct page *iopm_pages;
        void *iopm_va;
        int r;
        unsigned int order = get_order(IOPM_SIZE);

        /*
         * NX is required for shadow paging and for NPT if the NX huge pages
         * mitigation is enabled.
         */
        if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NX)) {
                pr_err_ratelimited("NX (Execute Disable) not supported\n");
                return -EOPNOTSUPP;
        }
        kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_NX);

        iopm_pages = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL, order);

        if (!iopm_pages)
                return -ENOMEM;

        iopm_va = page_address(iopm_pages);
        memset(iopm_va, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE * (1 << order));
        iopm_base = page_to_pfn(iopm_pages) << PAGE_SHIFT;

        init_msrpm_offsets();

        kvm_caps.supported_xcr0 &= ~(XFEATURE_MASK_BNDREGS |
                                     XFEATURE_MASK_BNDCSR);

        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FXSR_OPT))
                kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_FFXSR);

        if (tsc_scaling) {
                if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR)) {
                        tsc_scaling = false;
                } else {
                        pr_info("TSC scaling supported\n");
                        kvm_caps.has_tsc_control = true;
                }
        }
        kvm_caps.max_tsc_scaling_ratio = SVM_TSC_RATIO_MAX;
        kvm_caps.tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits = 32;

        tsc_aux_uret_slot = kvm_add_user_return_msr(MSR_TSC_AUX);

        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS))
                kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_AUTOIBRS);

        /* Check for pause filtering support */
        if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER)) {
                pause_filter_count = 0;
                pause_filter_thresh = 0;
        } else if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD)) {
                pause_filter_thresh = 0;
        }

        if (nested) {
                pr_info("Nested Virtualization enabled\n");
                kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_SVME | EFER_LMSLE);
        }

        /*
         * KVM's MMU doesn't support using 2-level paging for itself, and thus
         * NPT isn't supported if the host is using 2-level paging since host
         * CR4 is unchanged on VMRUN.
         */
        if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_PAE))
                npt_enabled = false;

        if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NPT))
                npt_enabled = false;

        /* Force VM NPT level equal to the host's paging level */
        kvm_configure_mmu(npt_enabled, get_npt_level(),
                          get_npt_level(), PG_LEVEL_1G);
        pr_info("Nested Paging %sabled\n", npt_enabled ? "en" : "dis");

        /* Setup shadow_me_value and shadow_me_mask */
        kvm_mmu_set_me_spte_mask(sme_me_mask, sme_me_mask);

        svm_adjust_mmio_mask();

        nrips = nrips && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NRIPS);

        /*
         * Note, SEV setup consumes npt_enabled and enable_mmio_caching (which
         * may be modified by svm_adjust_mmio_mask()), as well as nrips.
         */
        sev_hardware_setup();

        svm_hv_hardware_setup();

        for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
                r = svm_cpu_init(cpu);
                if (r)
                        goto err;
        }

        enable_apicv = avic = avic && avic_hardware_setup();

        if (!enable_apicv) {
                svm_x86_ops.vcpu_blocking = NULL;
                svm_x86_ops.vcpu_unblocking = NULL;
                svm_x86_ops.vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons = NULL;
        } else if (!x2avic_enabled) {
                svm_x86_ops.allow_apicv_in_x2apic_without_x2apic_virtualization = true;
        }

        if (vls) {
                if (!npt_enabled ||
                    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD) ||
                    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) {
                        vls = false;
                } else {
                        pr_info("Virtual VMLOAD VMSAVE supported\n");
                }
        }

        if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SVME_ADDR_CHK))
                svm_gp_erratum_intercept = false;

        if (vgif) {
                if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VGIF))
                        vgif = false;
                else
                        pr_info("Virtual GIF supported\n");
        }

        vnmi = vgif && vnmi && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VNMI);
        if (vnmi)
                pr_info("Virtual NMI enabled\n");

        if (!vnmi) {
                svm_x86_ops.is_vnmi_pending = NULL;
                svm_x86_ops.set_vnmi_pending = NULL;
        }


        if (lbrv) {
                if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LBRV))
                        lbrv = false;
                else
                        pr_info("LBR virtualization supported\n");
        }

        if (!enable_pmu)
                pr_info("PMU virtualization is disabled\n");

        svm_set_cpu_caps();

        /*
         * It seems that on AMD processors PTE's accessed bit is
         * being set by the CPU hardware before the NPF vmexit.
         * This is not expected behaviour and our tests fail because
         * of it.
         * A workaround here is to disable support for
         * GUEST_MAXPHYADDR < HOST_MAXPHYADDR if NPT is enabled.
         * In this case userspace can know if there is support using
         * KVM_CAP_SMALLER_MAXPHYADDR extension and decide how to handle
         * it
         * If future AMD CPU models change the behaviour described above,
         * this variable can be changed accordingly
         */
        allow_smaller_maxphyaddr = !npt_enabled;

        return 0;

err:
        svm_hardware_unsetup();
        return r;
}


static struct kvm_x86_init_ops svm_init_ops __initdata = {
        .hardware_setup = svm_hardware_setup,

        .runtime_ops = &svm_x86_ops,
        .pmu_ops = &amd_pmu_ops,
};

static void __svm_exit(void)
{
        kvm_x86_vendor_exit();

        cpu_emergency_unregister_virt_callback(svm_emergency_disable);
}

static int __init svm_init(void)
{
        int r;

        __unused_size_checks();

        if (!kvm_is_svm_supported())
                return -EOPNOTSUPP;

        r = kvm_x86_vendor_init(&svm_init_ops);
        if (r)
                return r;

        cpu_emergency_register_virt_callback(svm_emergency_disable);

        /*
         * Common KVM initialization _must_ come last, after this, /dev/kvm is
         * exposed to userspace!
         */
        r = kvm_init(sizeof(struct vcpu_svm), __alignof__(struct vcpu_svm),
                     THIS_MODULE);
        if (r)
                goto err_kvm_init;

        return 0;

err_kvm_init:
        __svm_exit();
        return r;
}

static void __exit svm_exit(void)
{
        kvm_exit();
        __svm_exit();
}

module_init(svm_init)
module_exit(svm_exit)