2 * Copyright 2002-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 #include <openssl/err.h>
12 #include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
13 #include <openssl/rand.h>
14 #include "internal/bn_int.h"
17 int ossl_ecdsa_sign(int type
, const unsigned char *dgst
, int dlen
,
18 unsigned char *sig
, unsigned int *siglen
,
19 const BIGNUM
*kinv
, const BIGNUM
*r
, EC_KEY
*eckey
)
23 s
= ECDSA_do_sign_ex(dgst
, dlen
, kinv
, r
, eckey
);
28 *siglen
= i2d_ECDSA_SIG(s
, &sig
);
33 static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY
*eckey
, BN_CTX
*ctx_in
,
34 BIGNUM
**kinvp
, BIGNUM
**rp
,
35 const unsigned char *dgst
, int dlen
)
38 BIGNUM
*k
= NULL
, *r
= NULL
, *X
= NULL
;
40 EC_POINT
*tmp_point
= NULL
;
41 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
45 if (eckey
== NULL
|| (group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey
)) == NULL
) {
46 ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP
, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
50 if (!EC_KEY_can_sign(eckey
)) {
51 ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP
, EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_SIGNING
);
55 if ((ctx
= ctx_in
) == NULL
) {
56 if ((ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
) {
57 ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
62 k
= BN_new(); /* this value is later returned in *kinvp */
63 r
= BN_new(); /* this value is later returned in *rp */
65 if (k
== NULL
|| r
== NULL
|| X
== NULL
) {
66 ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
69 if ((tmp_point
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
) {
70 ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
73 order
= EC_GROUP_get0_order(group
);
75 /* Preallocate space */
76 order_bits
= BN_num_bits(order
);
77 if (!BN_set_bit(k
, order_bits
)
78 || !BN_set_bit(r
, order_bits
)
79 || !BN_set_bit(X
, order_bits
))
86 if (!BN_generate_dsa_nonce(k
, order
,
87 EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey
),
89 ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP
,
90 EC_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED
);
94 if (!BN_priv_rand_range(k
, order
)) {
95 ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP
,
96 EC_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED
);
100 } while (BN_is_zero(k
));
102 /* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */
103 if (!EC_POINT_mul(group
, tmp_point
, k
, NULL
, NULL
, ctx
)) {
104 ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
108 if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(group
, tmp_point
, X
, NULL
, ctx
)) {
109 ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
113 if (!BN_nnmod(r
, X
, order
, ctx
)) {
114 ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
117 } while (BN_is_zero(r
));
119 /* compute the inverse of k */
120 if (!ec_group_do_inverse_ord(group
, k
, k
, ctx
)) {
121 ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
125 /* clear old values if necessary */
127 BN_clear_free(*kinvp
);
128 /* save the pre-computed values */
139 EC_POINT_free(tmp_point
);
144 int ossl_ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY
*eckey
, BN_CTX
*ctx_in
, BIGNUM
**kinvp
,
147 return ecdsa_sign_setup(eckey
, ctx_in
, kinvp
, rp
, NULL
, 0);
150 ECDSA_SIG
*ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst
, int dgst_len
,
151 const BIGNUM
*in_kinv
, const BIGNUM
*in_r
,
155 BIGNUM
*kinv
= NULL
, *s
, *m
= NULL
;
156 const BIGNUM
*order
, *ckinv
;
158 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
160 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
162 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey
);
163 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey
);
165 if (group
== NULL
|| priv_key
== NULL
) {
166 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG
, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
170 if (!EC_KEY_can_sign(eckey
)) {
171 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG
, EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_SIGNING
);
175 ret
= ECDSA_SIG_new();
177 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
182 if (ret
->r
== NULL
|| ret
->s
== NULL
) {
183 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
188 if ((ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
189 || (m
= BN_new()) == NULL
) {
190 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
194 order
= EC_GROUP_get0_order(group
);
195 i
= BN_num_bits(order
);
197 * Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole bytes.
199 if (8 * dgst_len
> i
)
200 dgst_len
= (i
+ 7) / 8;
201 if (!BN_bin2bn(dgst
, dgst_len
, m
)) {
202 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
205 /* If still too long, truncate remaining bits with a shift */
206 if ((8 * dgst_len
> i
) && !BN_rshift(m
, m
, 8 - (i
& 0x7))) {
207 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
211 if (in_kinv
== NULL
|| in_r
== NULL
) {
212 if (!ecdsa_sign_setup(eckey
, ctx
, &kinv
, &ret
->r
, dgst
, dgst_len
)) {
213 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG
, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB
);
219 if (BN_copy(ret
->r
, in_r
) == NULL
) {
220 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
226 * With only one multiplicant being in Montgomery domain
227 * multiplication yields real result without post-conversion.
228 * Also note that all operations but last are performed with
229 * zero-padded vectors. Last operation, BN_mod_mul_montgomery
230 * below, returns user-visible value with removed zero padding.
232 if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(s
, ret
->r
, group
->mont_data
, ctx
)
233 || !bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(s
, s
, priv_key
, group
->mont_data
, ctx
)) {
234 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
237 if (!bn_mod_add_fixed_top(s
, s
, m
, order
)) {
238 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
242 * |s| can still be larger than modulus, because |m| can be. In
243 * such case we count on Montgomery reduction to tie it up.
245 if (!bn_to_mont_fixed_top(s
, s
, group
->mont_data
, ctx
)
246 || !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(s
, s
, ckinv
, group
->mont_data
, ctx
)) {
247 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
253 * if kinv and r have been supplied by the caller, don't
254 * generate new kinv and r values
256 if (in_kinv
!= NULL
&& in_r
!= NULL
) {
257 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG
, EC_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES
);
261 /* s != 0 => we have a valid signature */
280 * 1: correct signature
281 * 0: incorrect signature
284 int ossl_ecdsa_verify(int type
, const unsigned char *dgst
, int dgst_len
,
285 const unsigned char *sigbuf
, int sig_len
, EC_KEY
*eckey
)
288 const unsigned char *p
= sigbuf
;
289 unsigned char *der
= NULL
;
296 if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s
, &p
, sig_len
) == NULL
)
298 /* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */
299 derlen
= i2d_ECDSA_SIG(s
, &der
);
300 if (derlen
!= sig_len
|| memcmp(sigbuf
, der
, derlen
) != 0)
302 ret
= ECDSA_do_verify(dgst
, dgst_len
, s
, eckey
);
304 OPENSSL_clear_free(der
, derlen
);
309 int ossl_ecdsa_verify_sig(const unsigned char *dgst
, int dgst_len
,
310 const ECDSA_SIG
*sig
, EC_KEY
*eckey
)
315 BIGNUM
*u1
, *u2
, *m
, *X
;
316 EC_POINT
*point
= NULL
;
317 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
318 const EC_POINT
*pub_key
;
320 /* check input values */
321 if (eckey
== NULL
|| (group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey
)) == NULL
||
322 (pub_key
= EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eckey
)) == NULL
|| sig
== NULL
) {
323 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG
, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS
);
327 if (!EC_KEY_can_sign(eckey
)) {
328 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG
, EC_R_CURVE_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_SIGNING
);
334 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
338 u1
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
339 u2
= BN_CTX_get(ctx
);
343 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
347 order
= EC_GROUP_get0_order(group
);
349 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
353 if (BN_is_zero(sig
->r
) || BN_is_negative(sig
->r
) ||
354 BN_ucmp(sig
->r
, order
) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(sig
->s
) ||
355 BN_is_negative(sig
->s
) || BN_ucmp(sig
->s
, order
) >= 0) {
356 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG
, EC_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
357 ret
= 0; /* signature is invalid */
360 /* calculate tmp1 = inv(S) mod order */
361 if (!ec_group_do_inverse_ord(group
, u2
, sig
->s
, ctx
)) {
362 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
366 i
= BN_num_bits(order
);
368 * Need to truncate digest if it is too long: first truncate whole bytes.
370 if (8 * dgst_len
> i
)
371 dgst_len
= (i
+ 7) / 8;
372 if (!BN_bin2bn(dgst
, dgst_len
, m
)) {
373 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
376 /* If still too long truncate remaining bits with a shift */
377 if ((8 * dgst_len
> i
) && !BN_rshift(m
, m
, 8 - (i
& 0x7))) {
378 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
381 /* u1 = m * tmp mod order */
382 if (!BN_mod_mul(u1
, m
, u2
, order
, ctx
)) {
383 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
386 /* u2 = r * w mod q */
387 if (!BN_mod_mul(u2
, sig
->r
, u2
, order
, ctx
)) {
388 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
392 if ((point
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
) {
393 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
396 if (!EC_POINT_mul(group
, point
, u1
, pub_key
, u2
, ctx
)) {
397 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
401 if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(group
, point
, X
, NULL
, ctx
)) {
402 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
406 if (!BN_nnmod(u1
, X
, order
, ctx
)) {
407 ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_VERIFY_SIG
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
410 /* if the signature is correct u1 is equal to sig->r */
411 ret
= (BN_ucmp(u1
, sig
->r
) == 0);
415 EC_POINT_free(point
);