1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
60 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
61 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
62 #include <openssl/objects.h>
63 #include <openssl/x509.h>
64 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
65 #include "internal/x509_int.h"
67 int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509
*a
, const X509
*b
)
70 const X509_CINF
*ai
, *bi
;
74 i
= ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai
->serialNumber
, &bi
->serialNumber
);
77 return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai
->issuer
, bi
->issuer
));
80 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
81 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509
*a
)
83 unsigned long ret
= 0;
84 EVP_MD_CTX
*ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
90 f
= X509_NAME_oneline(a
->cert_info
.issuer
, NULL
, 0);
91 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx
, EVP_md5(), NULL
))
93 if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx
, (unsigned char *)f
, strlen(f
)))
97 (ctx
, (unsigned char *)a
->cert_info
.serialNumber
.data
,
98 (unsigned long)a
->cert_info
.serialNumber
.length
))
100 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx
, &(md
[0]), NULL
))
102 ret
= (((unsigned long)md
[0]) | ((unsigned long)md
[1] << 8L) |
103 ((unsigned long)md
[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md
[3] << 24L)
106 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx
);
111 int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509
*a
, const X509
*b
)
113 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a
->cert_info
.issuer
, b
->cert_info
.issuer
));
116 int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509
*a
, const X509
*b
)
118 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a
->cert_info
.subject
, b
->cert_info
.subject
));
121 int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL
*a
, const X509_CRL
*b
)
123 return (X509_NAME_cmp(a
->crl
.issuer
, b
->crl
.issuer
));
126 int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL
*a
, const X509_CRL
*b
)
128 return memcmp(a
->sha1_hash
, b
->sha1_hash
, 20);
131 X509_NAME
*X509_get_issuer_name(X509
*a
)
133 return (a
->cert_info
.issuer
);
136 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509
*x
)
138 return (X509_NAME_hash(x
->cert_info
.issuer
));
141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
142 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509
*x
)
144 return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x
->cert_info
.issuer
));
148 X509_NAME
*X509_get_subject_name(X509
*a
)
150 return (a
->cert_info
.subject
);
153 ASN1_INTEGER
*X509_get_serialNumber(X509
*a
)
155 return &a
->cert_info
.serialNumber
;
158 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509
*x
)
160 return (X509_NAME_hash(x
->cert_info
.subject
));
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
164 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509
*x
)
166 return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x
->cert_info
.subject
));
171 * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
172 * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
173 * arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
174 * operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
175 * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
176 * "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
178 int X509_cmp(const X509
*a
, const X509
*b
)
181 /* ensure hash is valid */
182 X509_check_purpose((X509
*)a
, -1, 0);
183 X509_check_purpose((X509
*)b
, -1, 0);
185 rv
= memcmp(a
->sha1_hash
, b
->sha1_hash
, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
188 /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
189 if (!a
->cert_info
.enc
.modified
&& !b
->cert_info
.enc
.modified
) {
190 rv
= (int)(a
->cert_info
.enc
.len
- b
->cert_info
.enc
.len
);
193 return memcmp(a
->cert_info
.enc
.enc
, b
->cert_info
.enc
.enc
,
194 a
->cert_info
.enc
.len
);
199 int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME
*a
, const X509_NAME
*b
)
203 /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
205 if (!a
->canon_enc
|| a
->modified
) {
206 ret
= i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME
*)a
, NULL
);
211 if (!b
->canon_enc
|| b
->modified
) {
212 ret
= i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME
*)b
, NULL
);
217 ret
= a
->canon_enclen
- b
->canon_enclen
;
222 return memcmp(a
->canon_enc
, b
->canon_enc
, a
->canon_enclen
);
226 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME
*x
)
228 unsigned long ret
= 0;
229 unsigned char md
[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
231 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
232 i2d_X509_NAME(x
, NULL
);
233 if (!EVP_Digest(x
->canon_enc
, x
->canon_enclen
, md
, NULL
, EVP_sha1(),
237 ret
= (((unsigned long)md
[0]) | ((unsigned long)md
[1] << 8L) |
238 ((unsigned long)md
[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md
[3] << 24L)
243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
245 * I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
246 * this is reasonably efficient.
249 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME
*x
)
251 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
252 unsigned long ret
= 0;
253 unsigned char md
[16];
258 /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
259 i2d_X509_NAME(x
, NULL
);
260 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(md_ctx
, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
261 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx
, EVP_md5(), NULL
)
262 && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx
, x
->bytes
->data
, x
->bytes
->length
)
263 && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx
, md
, NULL
))
264 ret
= (((unsigned long)md
[0]) | ((unsigned long)md
[1] << 8L) |
265 ((unsigned long)md
[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md
[3] << 24L)
267 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
273 /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
274 X509
*X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509_NAME
*name
,
275 ASN1_INTEGER
*serial
)
278 X509 x
, *x509
= NULL
;
283 x
.cert_info
.serialNumber
= *serial
;
284 x
.cert_info
.issuer
= name
;
286 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
287 x509
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
288 if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509
, &x
) == 0)
294 X509
*X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509_NAME
*name
)
299 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
300 x509
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
301 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509
), name
) == 0)
307 EVP_PKEY
*X509_get0_pubkey(X509
*x
)
311 return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x
->cert_info
.key
);
314 EVP_PKEY
*X509_get_pubkey(X509
*x
)
318 return X509_PUBKEY_get(x
->cert_info
.key
);
321 ASN1_BIT_STRING
*X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509
*x
)
325 return x
->cert_info
.key
->public_key
;
328 int X509_check_private_key(X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*k
)
333 xk
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
336 ret
= EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk
, k
);
344 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY
, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH
);
347 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY
, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH
);
350 X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY
, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE
);
358 * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
359 * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
360 * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
365 static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
, int sign_nid
, unsigned long *pflags
)
367 const EC_GROUP
*grp
= NULL
;
369 if (pkey
&& EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == EVP_PKEY_EC
)
370 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
));
372 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM
;
373 curve_nid
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp
);
374 /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
375 if (curve_nid
== NID_secp384r1
) { /* P-384 */
377 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
379 if (sign_nid
!= -1 && sign_nid
!= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
)
380 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
;
381 if (!(*pflags
& X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
))
382 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED
;
383 /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
384 *pflags
&= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
;
385 } else if (curve_nid
== NID_X9_62_prime256v1
) { /* P-256 */
386 if (sign_nid
!= -1 && sign_nid
!= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
)
387 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
;
388 if (!(*pflags
& X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
))
389 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED
;
391 return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE
;
396 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth
, X509
*x
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
401 unsigned long tflags
= flags
;
403 if (!(flags
& X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
))
406 /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
408 x
= sk_X509_value(chain
, 0);
413 pk
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
416 * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build
417 * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report
418 * Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain
419 * pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm.
422 return check_suite_b(pk
, -1, &tflags
);
424 if (X509_get_version(x
) != 2) {
425 rv
= X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION
;
426 /* Correct error depth */
431 /* Check EE key only */
432 rv
= check_suite_b(pk
, -1, &tflags
);
433 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
) {
434 /* Correct error depth */
438 for (; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
439 sign_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
440 x
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
441 if (X509_get_version(x
) != 2) {
442 rv
= X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION
;
445 pk
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
446 rv
= check_suite_b(pk
, sign_nid
, &tflags
);
451 /* Final check: root CA signature */
452 rv
= check_suite_b(pk
, X509_get_signature_nid(x
), &tflags
);
454 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
) {
455 /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
456 if ((rv
== X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
457 || rv
== X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED
) && i
)
460 * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
461 * with P-256. Use more meaningful error.
463 if (rv
== X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED
&& flags
!= tflags
)
464 rv
= X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256
;
471 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL
*crl
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, unsigned long flags
)
474 if (!(flags
& X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
))
476 sign_nid
= OBJ_obj2nid(crl
->crl
.sig_alg
.algorithm
);
477 return check_suite_b(pk
, sign_nid
, &flags
);
481 int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth
, X509
*x
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
487 int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL
*crl
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, unsigned long flags
)
494 * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
495 * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
496 * each X509 structure.
498 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
502 ret
= sk_X509_dup(chain
);
503 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ret
); i
++) {
504 X509
*x
= sk_X509_value(ret
, i
);