2 * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
17 #include "crypto/ctype.h"
18 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
19 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
20 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
21 #include <openssl/evp.h>
22 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
23 #include <openssl/x509.h>
24 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
25 #include <openssl/objects.h>
26 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
27 #include "internal/dane.h"
28 #include "crypto/x509.h"
29 #include "x509_local.h"
31 /* CRL score values */
33 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
34 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
35 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 /* CRL times valid */
36 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
37 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ \
38 (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL | CRL_SCORE_TIME | CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
39 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
40 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
41 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
42 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
44 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
45 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
46 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
47 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
);
48 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
);
49 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
);
50 static int check_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
51 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
52 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
53 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int num_untrusted
);
54 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
55 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
56 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
57 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
58 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
);
59 static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
);
60 static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
);
61 static int check_curve(X509
*cert
);
63 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
64 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
);
65 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
66 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
);
67 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
,
68 int *pcrl_score
, X509_CRL
*base
,
69 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
);
70 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
**pissuer
,
72 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
73 unsigned int *preasons
);
74 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
);
75 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
76 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
77 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
);
79 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
);
81 static int null_callback(int ok
, X509_STORE_CTX
*e
)
87 * Return 1 if given cert is considered self-signed, 0 if not, or -1 on error.
88 * This actually verifies self-signedness only if requested.
89 * It calls ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions()
90 * to match issuer and subject names (i.e., the cert being self-issued) and any
91 * present authority key identifier to match the subject key identifier, etc.
93 int X509_self_signed(X509
*cert
, int verify_signature
)
97 if ((pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(cert
)) == NULL
) { /* handles cert == NULL */
98 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY
);
101 if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(cert
))
103 if ((cert
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SS
) == 0)
105 if (!verify_signature
)
107 return X509_verify(cert
, pkey
);
111 * Given a certificate, try and find an exact match in the store.
112 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on not found, -1 on internal error.
114 static int lookup_cert_match(X509
**result
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
116 STACK_OF(X509
) *certs
;
121 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
123 certs
= ctx
->lookup_certs(ctx
, X509_get_subject_name(x
));
127 /* Look for exact match */
128 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(certs
); i
++) {
129 xtmp
= sk_X509_value(certs
, i
);
130 if (X509_cmp(xtmp
, x
) == 0)
136 if (!X509_up_ref(xtmp
))
141 sk_X509_pop_free(certs
, X509_free
);
146 * Inform the verify callback of an error.
147 * The error code is set to |err| if |err| is not X509_V_OK, else
148 * |ctx->error| is left unchanged (under the assumption it is set elsewhere).
149 * The error depth is |depth| if >= 0, else it defaults to |ctx->error_depth|.
150 * The error cert is |x| if not NULL, else defaults to the chain cert at depth.
152 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
154 static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int depth
, int err
)
157 depth
= ctx
->error_depth
;
159 ctx
->error_depth
= depth
;
160 ctx
->current_cert
= (x
!= NULL
) ? x
: sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, depth
);
161 if (err
!= X509_V_OK
)
163 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
166 #define CB_FAIL_IF(cond, ctx, cert, depth, err) \
167 if ((cond) && verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, depth, err) == 0) \
171 * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the
172 * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error
175 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
177 static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int err
)
180 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
183 static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
186 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
188 if (ctx
->param
->auth_level
<= 0)
191 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; ++i
) {
192 X509
*cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
195 * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only
196 * check the security of issuer keys.
198 CB_FAIL_IF(i
> 0 && !check_key_level(ctx
, cert
),
199 ctx
, cert
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
201 * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates
202 * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1.
204 CB_FAIL_IF(i
< num
- 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx
, cert
),
205 ctx
, cert
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
);
210 /* Returns -1 on internal error */
211 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
216 if ((ok
= build_chain(ctx
)) <= 0
217 || (ok
= check_extensions(ctx
)) <= 0
218 || (ok
= check_auth_level(ctx
)) <= 0
219 || (ok
= check_id(ctx
)) <= 0
220 || (ok
= X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
) ? 1 : -1) <= 0
221 || (ok
= ctx
->check_revocation(ctx
)) <= 0)
224 err
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx
->error_depth
, NULL
, ctx
->chain
,
226 CB_FAIL_IF(err
!= X509_V_OK
, ctx
, NULL
, ctx
->error_depth
, err
);
228 /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */
229 ok
= ctx
->verify
!= NULL
? ctx
->verify(ctx
) : internal_verify(ctx
);
233 if ((ok
= check_name_constraints(ctx
)) <= 0)
236 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
237 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
238 if ((ok
= X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx
)) <= 0)
240 if ((ok
= X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx
)) <= 0)
244 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
245 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK
) != 0)
246 ok
= ctx
->check_policy(ctx
);
250 int X509_STORE_CTX_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
253 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
256 if (ctx
->cert
== NULL
&& sk_X509_num(ctx
->untrusted
) >= 1)
257 ctx
->cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->untrusted
, 0);
258 return X509_verify_cert(ctx
);
261 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
266 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
269 if (ctx
->cert
== NULL
) {
270 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY
);
271 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
;
275 if (ctx
->chain
!= NULL
) {
277 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
278 * cannot do another one.
280 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
281 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
;
285 if (!ossl_x509_add_cert_new(&ctx
->chain
, ctx
->cert
, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF
)) {
286 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
289 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 1;
291 /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */
292 CB_FAIL_IF(!check_key_level(ctx
, ctx
->cert
),
293 ctx
, ctx
->cert
, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
295 ret
= DANETLS_ENABLED(ctx
->dane
) ? dane_verify(ctx
) : verify_chain(ctx
);
298 * Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error,
299 * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored
300 * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE).
302 if (ret
<= 0 && ctx
->error
== X509_V_OK
)
303 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
307 static int sk_X509_contains(STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*cert
)
309 int i
, n
= sk_X509_num(sk
);
311 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
312 if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk
, i
), cert
) == 0)
318 * Find in given STACK_OF(X509) |sk| an issuer cert (if any) of given cert |x|.
319 * The issuer must not yet be in |ctx->chain|, yet allowing the exception that
320 * |x| is self-issued and |ctx->chain| has just one element.
321 * Prefer the first non-expired one, else take the most recently expired one.
323 static X509
*find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
)
326 X509
*issuer
, *rv
= NULL
;
328 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
329 issuer
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
330 if (ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, x
, issuer
)
331 && (((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
) != 0 && sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) == 1)
332 || !sk_X509_contains(ctx
->chain
, issuer
))) {
333 if (ossl_x509_check_cert_time(ctx
, issuer
, -1))
335 if (rv
== NULL
|| ASN1_TIME_compare(X509_get0_notAfter(issuer
),
336 X509_get0_notAfter(rv
)) > 0)
343 /* Check that the given certificate 'x' is issued by the certificate 'issuer' */
344 static int check_issued(ossl_unused X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, X509
*issuer
)
346 int err
= ossl_x509_likely_issued(issuer
, x
);
348 if (err
== X509_V_OK
)
351 * SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH just means 'x' is clearly not issued by 'issuer'.
352 * Every other error code likely indicates a real error.
354 if (err
!= X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH
)
360 * Alternative get_issuer method: look up from a STACK_OF(X509) in other_ctx.
361 * Returns -1 on internal error.
363 static int get_issuer_sk(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
365 *issuer
= find_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->other_ctx
, x
);
367 return X509_up_ref(*issuer
) ? 1 : -1;
372 * Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx.
373 * Returns NULL on internal error (such as out of memory).
375 static STACK_OF(X509
) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
378 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= sk_X509_new_null();
384 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->other_ctx
); i
++) {
385 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->other_ctx
, i
);
386 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, X509_get_subject_name(x
)) == 0) {
387 if (!X509_add_cert(sk
, x
, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF
)) {
388 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
389 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
398 * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local
399 * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions.
400 * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error.
402 static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int purpose
, int depth
,
405 int tr_ok
= X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
408 * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust
409 * settings trump the purpose constraints.
411 * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in
412 * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in
413 * ctx->param->purpose!
415 * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from
416 * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets
417 * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however
418 * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value
419 * via the X509_PURPOSE API.
421 * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're
422 * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is
425 if (depth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
&& purpose
== ctx
->param
->purpose
)
426 tr_ok
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT
);
429 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
431 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
434 switch (X509_check_purpose(x
, purpose
, must_be_ca
> 0)) {
440 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
) == 0)
446 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
);
450 * Check extensions of a cert chain for consistency with the supplied purpose.
451 * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error.
453 static int check_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
455 int i
, must_be_ca
, plen
= 0;
457 int ret
, proxy_path_length
= 0;
458 int purpose
, allow_proxy_certs
, num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
461 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
462 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
463 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
464 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
465 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
466 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
467 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
471 /* CRL path validation */
472 if (ctx
->parent
!= NULL
) {
473 allow_proxy_certs
= 0;
474 purpose
= X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN
;
477 (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS
) != 0;
478 purpose
= ctx
->param
->purpose
;
481 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; i
++) {
482 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
483 CB_FAIL_IF((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
) == 0
484 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
) != 0,
485 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
);
486 CB_FAIL_IF(!allow_proxy_certs
&& (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) != 0,
487 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED
);
488 ret
= X509_check_ca(x
);
489 switch (must_be_ca
) {
491 CB_FAIL_IF((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
) != 0
492 && ret
!= 1 && ret
!= 0,
493 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
);
496 CB_FAIL_IF(ret
!= 0, ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA
);
499 /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */
502 || (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
) != 0)
503 && ret
!= 1), ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
);
507 /* Check for presence of explicit elliptic curve parameters */
508 ret
= check_curve(x
);
509 CB_FAIL_IF(ret
< 0, ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
);
510 CB_FAIL_IF(ret
== 0, ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS
);
513 * Do the following set of checks only if strict checking is requested
514 * and not for self-issued (including self-signed) EE (non-CA) certs
515 * because RFC 5280 does not apply to them according RFC 6818 section 2.
517 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
) != 0
520 * !(i == 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0
521 * && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0)
523 /* Check Basic Constraints according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.9 */
524 if (x
->ex_pathlen
!= -1) {
525 CB_FAIL_IF((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) == 0,
526 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA
);
527 CB_FAIL_IF((x
->ex_kusage
& KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN
) == 0, ctx
,
528 x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_WITHOUT_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN
);
530 CB_FAIL_IF((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) != 0
531 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_BCONS
) != 0
532 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_BCONS_CRITICAL
) == 0,
533 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CA_BCONS_NOT_CRITICAL
);
534 /* Check Key Usage according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.3 */
535 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) != 0) {
536 CB_FAIL_IF((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) == 0,
537 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CA_CERT_MISSING_KEY_USAGE
);
539 CB_FAIL_IF((x
->ex_kusage
& KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN
) != 0, ctx
, x
, i
,
540 X509_V_ERR_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA
);
542 /* Check issuer is non-empty acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.4 */
543 CB_FAIL_IF(X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_issuer_name(x
)) == 0,
544 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_ISSUER_NAME_EMPTY
);
545 /* Check subject is non-empty acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.6 */
546 CB_FAIL_IF(((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) != 0
547 || (x
->ex_kusage
& KU_CRL_SIGN
) != 0
548 || x
->altname
== NULL
)
549 && X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x
)) == 0,
550 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_NAME_EMPTY
);
551 CB_FAIL_IF(X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x
)) == 0
552 && x
->altname
!= NULL
553 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SAN_CRITICAL
) == 0,
554 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_SAN_NOT_CRITICAL
);
555 /* Check SAN is non-empty according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6 */
556 CB_FAIL_IF(x
->altname
!= NULL
557 && sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x
->altname
) <= 0,
558 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME
);
559 /* Check sig alg consistency acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.1.2 */
560 CB_FAIL_IF(X509_ALGOR_cmp(&x
->sig_alg
, &x
->cert_info
.signature
) != 0,
561 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_INCONSISTENCY
);
562 CB_FAIL_IF(x
->akid
!= NULL
563 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_AKID_CRITICAL
) != 0,
564 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL
);
565 CB_FAIL_IF(x
->skid
!= NULL
566 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SKID_CRITICAL
) != 0,
567 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL
);
568 if (X509_get_version(x
) >= X509_VERSION_3
) {
569 /* Check AKID presence acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.1 */
570 CB_FAIL_IF(i
+ 1 < num
/*
571 * this means not last cert in chain,
572 * taken as "generated by conforming CAs"
574 && (x
->akid
== NULL
|| x
->akid
->keyid
== NULL
), ctx
,
575 x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_MISSING_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER
);
576 /* Check SKID presence acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.2 */
577 CB_FAIL_IF((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) != 0 && x
->skid
== NULL
,
578 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_MISSING_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER
);
580 CB_FAIL_IF(sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(X509_get0_extensions(x
)) > 0,
581 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_EXTENSIONS_REQUIRE_VERSION_3
);
585 /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */
586 if (purpose
> 0 && !check_purpose(ctx
, x
, purpose
, i
, must_be_ca
))
588 /* Check path length */
589 CB_FAIL_IF(i
> 1 && x
->ex_pathlen
!= -1
590 && plen
> x
->ex_pathlen
+ proxy_path_length
,
591 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
);
592 /* Increment path length if not a self-issued intermediate CA */
593 if (i
> 0 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
) == 0)
596 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
597 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
598 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
600 if (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) {
602 * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
603 * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
604 * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
605 * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
607 * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
608 * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
609 * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
610 * increment proxy_path_length.
612 if (x
->ex_pcpathlen
!= -1) {
613 CB_FAIL_IF(proxy_path_length
> x
->ex_pcpathlen
,
614 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
);
615 proxy_path_length
= x
->ex_pcpathlen
;
626 static int has_san_id(X509
*x
, int gtype
)
630 GENERAL_NAMES
*gs
= X509_get_ext_d2i(x
, NID_subject_alt_name
, NULL
, NULL
);
635 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gs
); i
++) {
636 GENERAL_NAME
*g
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gs
, i
);
638 if (g
->type
== gtype
) {
643 GENERAL_NAMES_free(gs
);
647 /* Returns -1 on internal error */
648 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
652 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
653 for (i
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; i
>= 0; i
--) {
654 X509
*x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
657 /* Ignore self-issued certs unless last in chain */
658 if (i
!= 0 && (x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SI
) != 0)
662 * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
663 * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
665 * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
667 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) != 0) {
668 X509_NAME
*tmpsubject
= X509_get_subject_name(x
);
669 X509_NAME
*tmpissuer
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
670 X509_NAME_ENTRY
*tmpentry
= NULL
;
673 int last_loc
= X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject
) - 1;
675 /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
677 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
678 goto proxy_name_done
;
682 * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
683 * there is in issuer.
685 if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject
)
686 != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer
) + 1) {
687 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
688 goto proxy_name_done
;
692 * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
695 if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject
, last_loc
))
696 == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject
,
698 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
699 goto proxy_name_done
;
703 * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
704 * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
706 tmpsubject
= X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject
);
707 if (tmpsubject
== NULL
) {
708 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
709 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
713 tmpentry
= X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject
, last_loc
);
714 last_nid
= OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry
));
716 if (last_nid
!= NID_commonName
717 || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject
, tmpissuer
) != 0) {
718 err
= X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION
;
721 X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry
);
722 X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject
);
725 CB_FAIL_IF(err
!= X509_V_OK
, ctx
, x
, i
, err
);
729 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
730 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
731 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
734 for (j
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1; j
> i
; j
--) {
735 NAME_CONSTRAINTS
*nc
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, j
)->nc
;
738 int rv
= NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x
, nc
);
741 /* If EE certificate check commonName too */
742 if (rv
== X509_V_OK
&& i
== 0
743 && (ctx
->param
->hostflags
744 & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT
) == 0
745 && ((ctx
->param
->hostflags
746 & X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT
) != 0
747 || (ret
= has_san_id(x
, GEN_DNS
)) == 0))
748 rv
= NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x
, nc
);
755 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
:
758 CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx
, x
, i
, rv
);
767 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int errcode
)
769 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, ctx
->cert
, 0, errcode
);
772 static int check_hosts(X509
*x
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
)
775 int n
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm
->hosts
);
778 if (vpm
->peername
!= NULL
) {
779 OPENSSL_free(vpm
->peername
);
780 vpm
->peername
= NULL
;
782 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; ++i
) {
783 name
= sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm
->hosts
, i
);
784 if (X509_check_host(x
, name
, 0, vpm
->hostflags
, &vpm
->peername
) > 0)
790 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
792 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
= ctx
->param
;
795 if (vpm
->hosts
!= NULL
&& check_hosts(x
, vpm
) <= 0) {
796 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
))
799 if (vpm
->email
!= NULL
800 && X509_check_email(x
, vpm
->email
, vpm
->emaillen
, 0) <= 0) {
801 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
))
804 if (vpm
->ip
!= NULL
&& X509_check_ip(x
, vpm
->ip
, vpm
->iplen
, 0) <= 0) {
805 if (!check_id_error(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
))
811 /* Returns -1 on internal error */
812 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int num_untrusted
)
817 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
818 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
822 * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2)
823 * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth.
825 if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) && num_untrusted
> 0 && num_untrusted
< num
) {
826 trust
= check_dane_issuer(ctx
, num_untrusted
);
827 if (trust
!= X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
)
832 * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up.
833 * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted
834 * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those,
835 * and wants to incrementally check just any added since.
837 for (i
= num_untrusted
; i
< num
; i
++) {
838 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
839 trust
= X509_check_trust(x
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
840 /* If explicitly trusted (so not neutral nor rejected) return trusted */
841 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
)
843 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
)
848 * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains,
849 * the chain is PKIX trusted.
851 if (num_untrusted
< num
) {
852 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) != 0)
854 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
857 if (num_untrusted
== num
858 && (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) != 0) {
860 * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf
861 * for a direct trust store match.
864 x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
865 res
= lookup_cert_match(&mx
, ctx
, x
);
869 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
872 * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set,
873 * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed.
875 trust
= X509_check_trust(mx
, ctx
->param
->trust
, 0);
876 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
) {
881 /* Replace leaf with trusted match */
882 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, 0, mx
);
884 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 0;
889 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
890 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
892 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
895 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
) == 0
896 ? X509_TRUST_REJECTED
: X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
899 if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
))
900 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
902 dane
->pdpth
= num_untrusted
;
903 /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */
904 if (dane
->mdpth
>= 0)
905 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
906 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
909 /* Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error. */
910 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
912 int i
= 0, last
= 0, ok
= 0;
914 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
) == 0)
916 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL
) != 0) {
917 last
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
919 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
924 for (i
= 0; i
<= last
; i
++) {
925 ctx
->error_depth
= i
;
926 ok
= check_cert(ctx
);
933 /* Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error. */
934 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
936 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
938 int cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
939 X509
*x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
);
941 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
942 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
943 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
944 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
946 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_PROXY
) != 0)
949 while (ctx
->current_reasons
!= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS
) {
950 unsigned int last_reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
952 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
953 if (ctx
->get_crl
!= NULL
)
954 ok
= ctx
->get_crl(ctx
, &crl
, x
);
956 ok
= get_crl_delta(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, x
);
957 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback */
959 ok
= verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
);
962 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
963 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, crl
);
968 ok
= ctx
->check_crl(ctx
, dcrl
);
971 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, dcrl
, x
);
978 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
980 ok
= ctx
->cert_crl(ctx
, crl
, x
);
990 * If reasons not updated we won't get anywhere by another iteration,
993 if (last_reasons
== ctx
->current_reasons
) {
994 ok
= verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
);
1000 X509_CRL_free(dcrl
);
1002 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
1006 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
1007 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int notify
)
1013 ctx
->current_crl
= crl
;
1014 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
) != 0)
1015 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
1016 else if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME
) != 0)
1021 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
1025 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
))
1032 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
))
1036 if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl
)) {
1037 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl
), ptime
);
1042 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
))
1045 /* Ignore expiration of base CRL is delta is valid */
1046 if (i
< 0 && (ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
) == 0) {
1047 if (!notify
|| !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
))
1053 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
1058 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
,
1059 X509
**pissuer
, int *pscore
, unsigned int *preasons
,
1060 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
1062 int i
, crl_score
, best_score
= *pscore
;
1063 unsigned int reasons
, best_reasons
= 0;
1064 X509
*x
= ctx
->current_cert
;
1065 X509_CRL
*crl
, *best_crl
= NULL
;
1066 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
, *best_crl_issuer
= NULL
;
1068 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
1069 crl
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
1070 reasons
= *preasons
;
1071 crl_score
= get_crl_score(ctx
, &crl_issuer
, &reasons
, crl
, x
);
1072 if (crl_score
< best_score
|| crl_score
== 0)
1074 /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
1075 if (crl_score
== best_score
&& best_crl
!= NULL
) {
1078 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day
, &sec
, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl
),
1079 X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl
)) == 0)
1082 * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
1085 if (day
<= 0 && sec
<= 0)
1089 best_crl_issuer
= crl_issuer
;
1090 best_score
= crl_score
;
1091 best_reasons
= reasons
;
1094 if (best_crl
!= NULL
) {
1095 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl
);
1097 *pissuer
= best_crl_issuer
;
1098 *pscore
= best_score
;
1099 *preasons
= best_reasons
;
1100 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl
);
1101 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl
);
1103 get_delta_sk(ctx
, pdcrl
, pscore
, best_crl
, crls
);
1106 if (best_score
>= CRL_SCORE_VALID
)
1113 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1114 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1116 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL
*a
, X509_CRL
*b
, int nid
)
1118 ASN1_OCTET_STRING
*exta
= NULL
, *extb
= NULL
;
1119 int i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, -1);
1122 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1123 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1125 exta
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a
, i
));
1128 i
= X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, -1);
1130 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b
, nid
, i
) != -1)
1132 extb
= X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b
, i
));
1135 if (exta
== NULL
&& extb
== NULL
)
1138 if (exta
== NULL
|| extb
== NULL
)
1141 return ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta
, extb
) == 0;
1144 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1145 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL
*delta
, X509_CRL
*base
)
1147 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1148 if (delta
->base_crl_number
== NULL
)
1150 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1151 if (base
->crl_number
== NULL
)
1153 /* Issuer names must match */
1154 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
),
1155 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta
)) != 0)
1157 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1158 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_authority_key_identifier
))
1160 if (!crl_extension_match(delta
, base
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
))
1162 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1163 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->base_crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0)
1165 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1166 return ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) > 0;
1170 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1171 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1173 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
**dcrl
, int *pscore
,
1174 X509_CRL
*base
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *crls
)
1179 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS
) == 0)
1181 if (((ctx
->current_cert
->ex_flags
| base
->flags
) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST
) == 0)
1183 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_CRL_num(crls
); i
++) {
1184 delta
= sk_X509_CRL_value(crls
, i
);
1185 if (check_delta_base(delta
, base
)) {
1186 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, delta
, 0))
1187 *pscore
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA
;
1188 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta
);
1197 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1198 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1199 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1200 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1201 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1203 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
**pissuer
,
1204 unsigned int *preasons
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1207 unsigned int tmp_reasons
= *preasons
, crl_reasons
;
1209 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1211 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1212 if ((crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
) != 0)
1214 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1215 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
) == 0) {
1216 if (crl
->idp_flags
& (IDP_INDIRECT
| IDP_REASONS
))
1218 } else if ((crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_REASONS
) != 0) {
1219 /* If no new reasons reject */
1220 if ((crl
->idp_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
) == 0)
1223 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1224 else if (crl
->base_crl_number
!= NULL
)
1226 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1227 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x
), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
)) != 0) {
1228 if ((crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INDIRECT
) == 0)
1231 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
;
1234 if ((crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
) == 0)
1235 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL
;
1237 /* Check expiration */
1238 if (check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 0))
1239 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_TIME
;
1241 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1242 crl_akid_check(ctx
, crl
, pissuer
, &crl_score
);
1244 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1245 if ((crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_AKID
) == 0)
1248 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1249 if (crl_crldp_check(x
, crl
, crl_score
, &crl_reasons
)) {
1250 /* If no new reasons reject */
1251 if ((crl_reasons
& ~tmp_reasons
) == 0)
1253 tmp_reasons
|= crl_reasons
;
1254 crl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
;
1257 *preasons
= tmp_reasons
;
1263 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
,
1264 X509
**pissuer
, int *pcrl_score
)
1266 X509
*crl_issuer
= NULL
;
1267 const X509_NAME
*cnm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1268 int cidx
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1271 if (cidx
!= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1)
1274 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1276 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1277 if (*pcrl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
) {
1278 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT
;
1279 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1284 for (cidx
++; cidx
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); cidx
++) {
1285 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cidx
);
1286 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
))
1288 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1289 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
| CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
;
1290 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1295 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1296 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT
) == 0)
1300 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1301 * untrusted certificates.
1303 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->untrusted
); i
++) {
1304 crl_issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->untrusted
, i
);
1305 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer
), cnm
) != 0)
1307 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer
, crl
->akid
) == X509_V_OK
) {
1308 *pissuer
= crl_issuer
;
1309 *pcrl_score
|= CRL_SCORE_AKID
;
1316 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1317 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1318 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1319 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1321 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
1323 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx
= {0};
1326 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1327 if (ctx
->parent
!= NULL
)
1329 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->store
, x
, ctx
->untrusted
))
1332 crl_ctx
.crls
= ctx
->crls
;
1333 /* Copy verify params across */
1334 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx
, ctx
->param
);
1336 crl_ctx
.parent
= ctx
;
1337 crl_ctx
.verify_cb
= ctx
->verify_cb
;
1339 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1340 ret
= X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx
);
1344 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1345 ret
= check_crl_chain(ctx
, ctx
->chain
, crl_ctx
.chain
);
1347 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx
);
1352 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1353 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1354 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorized to do so. RFC5280 is more
1355 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1356 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1359 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1360 STACK_OF(X509
) *cert_path
,
1361 STACK_OF(X509
) *crl_path
)
1363 X509
*cert_ta
= sk_X509_value(cert_path
, sk_X509_num(cert_path
) - 1);
1364 X509
*crl_ta
= sk_X509_value(crl_path
, sk_X509_num(crl_path
) - 1);
1366 return X509_cmp(cert_ta
, crl_ta
) == 0;
1370 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1371 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1372 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1373 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1374 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1376 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME
*a
, DIST_POINT_NAME
*b
)
1378 X509_NAME
*nm
= NULL
;
1379 GENERAL_NAMES
*gens
= NULL
;
1380 GENERAL_NAME
*gena
, *genb
;
1383 if (a
== NULL
|| b
== NULL
)
1386 if (a
->dpname
== NULL
)
1388 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1390 if (b
->dpname
== NULL
)
1392 return X509_NAME_cmp(a
->dpname
, b
->dpname
) == 0;
1394 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1396 gens
= b
->name
.fullname
;
1397 } else if (b
->type
== 1) {
1398 if (b
->dpname
== NULL
)
1400 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1401 gens
= a
->name
.fullname
;
1405 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1407 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens
); i
++) {
1408 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens
, i
);
1409 if (gena
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1411 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, gena
->d
.directoryName
) == 0)
1417 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1419 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a
->name
.fullname
); i
++) {
1420 gena
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a
->name
.fullname
, i
);
1421 for (j
= 0; j
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b
->name
.fullname
); j
++) {
1422 genb
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b
->name
.fullname
, j
);
1423 if (GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena
, genb
) == 0)
1432 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT
*dp
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
)
1435 const X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl
);
1437 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1438 if (dp
->CRLissuer
== NULL
)
1439 return (crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
) != 0;
1440 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp
->CRLissuer
); i
++) {
1441 GENERAL_NAME
*gen
= sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp
->CRLissuer
, i
);
1443 if (gen
->type
!= GEN_DIRNAME
)
1445 if (X509_NAME_cmp(gen
->d
.directoryName
, nm
) == 0)
1451 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1452 static int crl_crldp_check(X509
*x
, X509_CRL
*crl
, int crl_score
,
1453 unsigned int *preasons
)
1457 if ((crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYATTR
) != 0)
1459 if ((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) != 0) {
1460 if ((crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYUSER
) != 0)
1463 if ((crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_ONLYCA
) != 0)
1466 *preasons
= crl
->idp_reasons
;
1467 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_DIST_POINT_num(x
->crldp
); i
++) {
1468 DIST_POINT
*dp
= sk_DIST_POINT_value(x
->crldp
, i
);
1470 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp
, crl
, crl_score
)) {
1471 if (crl
->idp
== NULL
1472 || idp_check_dp(dp
->distpoint
, crl
->idp
->distpoint
)) {
1473 *preasons
&= dp
->dp_reasons
;
1478 return (crl
->idp
== NULL
|| crl
->idp
->distpoint
== NULL
)
1479 && (crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME
) != 0;
1483 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1484 * to find a delta CRL too
1486 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
1487 X509_CRL
**pcrl
, X509_CRL
**pdcrl
, X509
*x
)
1490 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1492 unsigned int reasons
;
1493 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
, *dcrl
= NULL
;
1494 STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *skcrl
;
1495 const X509_NAME
*nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
1497 reasons
= ctx
->current_reasons
;
1498 ok
= get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
,
1499 &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, ctx
->crls
);
1503 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1504 skcrl
= ctx
->lookup_crls(ctx
, nm
);
1506 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1507 if (skcrl
== NULL
&& crl
!= NULL
)
1510 get_crl_sk(ctx
, &crl
, &dcrl
, &issuer
, &crl_score
, &reasons
, skcrl
);
1512 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl
, X509_CRL_free
);
1515 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1517 ctx
->current_issuer
= issuer
;
1518 ctx
->current_crl_score
= crl_score
;
1519 ctx
->current_reasons
= reasons
;
1527 /* Check CRL validity */
1528 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
)
1530 X509
*issuer
= NULL
;
1531 EVP_PKEY
*ikey
= NULL
;
1532 int cnum
= ctx
->error_depth
;
1533 int chnum
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
1535 /* If we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1536 if (ctx
->current_issuer
!= NULL
) {
1537 issuer
= ctx
->current_issuer
;
1539 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1540 * certificate in chain.
1542 } else if (cnum
< chnum
) {
1543 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, cnum
+ 1);
1545 issuer
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, chnum
);
1546 /* If not self-issued, can't check signature */
1547 if (!ctx
->check_issued(ctx
, issuer
, issuer
) &&
1548 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
))
1556 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1558 if (crl
->base_crl_number
== NULL
) {
1559 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1560 if ((issuer
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_KUSAGE
) != 0 &&
1561 (issuer
->ex_kusage
& KU_CRL_SIGN
) == 0 &&
1562 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN
))
1565 if ((ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SCOPE
) == 0 &&
1566 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE
))
1569 if ((ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH
) == 0 &&
1570 check_crl_path(ctx
, ctx
->current_issuer
) <= 0 &&
1571 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR
))
1574 if ((crl
->idp_flags
& IDP_INVALID
) != 0 &&
1575 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION
))
1579 if ((ctx
->current_crl_score
& CRL_SCORE_TIME
) == 0 &&
1580 !check_crl_time(ctx
, crl
, 1))
1583 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1584 ikey
= X509_get0_pubkey(issuer
);
1586 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
))
1590 int rv
= X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl
, ikey
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1592 if (rv
!= X509_V_OK
&& !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, rv
))
1594 /* Verify CRL signature */
1595 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl
, ikey
) <= 0 &&
1596 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
))
1602 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1603 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_CRL
*crl
, X509
*x
)
1608 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1609 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1610 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can
1611 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1613 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL
) == 0
1614 && (crl
->flags
& EXFLAG_CRITICAL
) != 0 &&
1615 !verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION
))
1618 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure
1619 * reason is not removeFromCRL.
1621 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl
, &rev
, x
)) {
1622 if (rev
->reason
== CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL
)
1624 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
))
1631 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1638 * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a
1639 * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor
1640 * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280
1641 * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the
1642 * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look
1643 * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain
1644 * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it
1645 * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the
1646 * X509_policy_check() call.
1648 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
&& !sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, NULL
))
1650 ret
= X509_policy_check(&ctx
->tree
, &ctx
->explicit_policy
, ctx
->chain
,
1651 ctx
->param
->policies
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
1652 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
)
1653 (void)sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
);
1655 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL
)
1657 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1658 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID
) {
1661 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
1662 for (i
= 1; i
< sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
); i
++) {
1663 X509
*x
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
);
1665 CB_FAIL_IF((x
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY
) != 0,
1666 ctx
, x
, i
, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION
);
1670 if (ret
== X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE
) {
1671 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1672 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY
;
1673 return ctx
->verify_cb(0, ctx
);
1675 if (ret
!= X509_PCY_TREE_VALID
) {
1676 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1680 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY
) != 0) {
1681 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
1683 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1684 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1685 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1686 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1688 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(2, ctx
))
1695 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1696 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
1701 * Check certificate validity times.
1702 * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return
1703 * the validation status.
1705 * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
1707 int ossl_x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int depth
)
1712 if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
) != 0)
1713 ptime
= &ctx
->param
->check_time
;
1714 else if ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME
) != 0)
1719 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x
), ptime
);
1720 if (i
>= 0 && depth
< 0)
1722 CB_FAIL_IF(i
== 0, ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
);
1723 CB_FAIL_IF(i
> 0, ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
);
1725 i
= X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x
), ptime
);
1726 if (i
<= 0 && depth
< 0)
1728 CB_FAIL_IF(i
== 0, ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
);
1729 CB_FAIL_IF(i
< 0, ctx
, x
, depth
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
);
1734 * Verify the issuer signatures and cert times of ctx->chain.
1735 * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error.
1737 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
1739 int n
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) - 1;
1740 X509
*xi
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1743 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1744 if (ctx
->bare_ta_signed
) {
1746 * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures,
1747 * on the top certificate we check only the timestamps.
1748 * We report the issuer as NULL because all we have is a bare key.
1751 } else if (ossl_x509_likely_issued(xi
, xi
) != X509_V_OK
1752 /* exceptional case: last cert in the chain is not self-issued */
1753 && ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
) == 0)) {
1756 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1757 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1759 CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx
, xi
, 0,
1760 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
);
1763 * The below code will certainly not do a
1764 * self-signature check on xi because it is not self-issued.
1769 * Do not clear error (by ctx->error = X509_V_OK), it must be "sticky",
1770 * only the user's callback is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
1774 * For each iteration of this loop:
1775 * n is the subject depth
1776 * xs is the subject cert, for which the signature is to be checked
1777 * xi is NULL for DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures
1778 * else the supposed issuer cert containing the public key to use
1779 * Initially xs == xi if the last cert in the chain is self-issued.
1782 * Do signature check for self-signed certificates only if explicitly
1783 * asked for because it does not add any security and just wastes time.
1787 || ((ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE
) != 0
1788 && (xi
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_SS
) != 0))) {
1791 * If the issuer's public key is not available or its key usage
1792 * does not support issuing the subject cert, report the issuer
1793 * cert and its depth (rather than n, the depth of the subject).
1795 int issuer_depth
= n
+ (xs
== xi
? 0 : 1);
1797 * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.4
1798 * step (n) we must check any given key usage extension in a CA cert
1799 * when preparing the verification of a certificate issued by it.
1800 * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3
1801 * we must not verify a certificate signature if the key usage of
1802 * the CA certificate that issued the certificate prohibits signing.
1803 * In case the 'issuing' certificate is the last in the chain and is
1804 * not a CA certificate but a 'self-issued' end-entity cert (i.e.,
1805 * xs == xi && !(xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)) RFC 5280 does not apply
1806 * (see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6818#section-2) and thus
1807 * we are free to ignore any key usage restrictions on such certs.
1809 int ret
= xs
== xi
&& (xi
->ex_flags
& EXFLAG_CA
) == 0
1810 ? X509_V_OK
: ossl_x509_signing_allowed(xi
, xs
);
1812 CB_FAIL_IF(ret
!= X509_V_OK
, ctx
, xi
, issuer_depth
, ret
);
1813 if ((pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(xi
)) == NULL
) {
1814 CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx
, xi
, issuer_depth
,
1815 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
);
1817 CB_FAIL_IF(X509_verify(xs
, pkey
) <= 0,
1818 ctx
, xs
, n
, X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
);
1822 /* In addition to RFC 5280 requirements do also for trust anchor cert */
1823 /* Calls verify callback as needed */
1824 if (!ossl_x509_check_cert_time(ctx
, xs
, n
))
1828 * Signal success at this depth. However, the previous error (if any)
1831 ctx
->current_issuer
= xi
;
1832 ctx
->current_cert
= xs
;
1833 ctx
->error_depth
= n
;
1834 if (!ctx
->verify_cb(1, ctx
))
1839 xs
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, n
);
1845 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
)
1847 return X509_cmp_time(ctm
, NULL
);
1850 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME
*ctm
, time_t *cmp_time
)
1852 static const size_t utctime_length
= sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1853 static const size_t generalizedtime_length
= sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1854 ASN1_TIME
*asn1_cmp_time
= NULL
;
1855 int i
, day
, sec
, ret
= 0;
1856 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
1857 const char upper_z
= 0x5A;
1859 const char upper_z
= 'Z';
1863 * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280.
1864 * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1865 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1866 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1868 * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement:
1869 * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
1870 * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity
1871 * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime."
1873 switch (ctm
->type
) {
1874 case V_ASN1_UTCTIME
:
1875 if (ctm
->length
!= (int)(utctime_length
))
1878 case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
:
1879 if (ctm
->length
!= (int)(generalizedtime_length
))
1887 * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more
1888 * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280.
1889 * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods.
1891 for (i
= 0; i
< ctm
->length
- 1; i
++) {
1892 if (!ossl_ascii_isdigit(ctm
->data
[i
]))
1895 if (ctm
->data
[ctm
->length
- 1] != upper_z
)
1899 * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no
1900 * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t,
1901 * so we go through ASN.1
1903 asn1_cmp_time
= X509_time_adj(NULL
, 0, cmp_time
);
1904 if (asn1_cmp_time
== NULL
)
1906 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day
, &sec
, ctm
, asn1_cmp_time
) == 0)
1910 * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=.
1911 * The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
1913 ret
= (day
>= 0 && sec
>= 0) ? -1 : 1;
1916 ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time
);
1921 * Return 0 if time should not be checked or reference time is in range,
1922 * or else 1 if it is past the end, or -1 if it is before the start
1924 int X509_cmp_timeframe(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*vpm
,
1925 const ASN1_TIME
*start
, const ASN1_TIME
*end
)
1928 time_t *time
= NULL
;
1929 unsigned long flags
= vpm
== NULL
? 0 : X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags(vpm
);
1931 if ((flags
& X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME
) != 0) {
1932 ref_time
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_time(vpm
);
1934 } else if ((flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME
) != 0) {
1935 return 0; /* this means ok */
1936 } /* else reference time is the current time */
1938 if (end
!= NULL
&& X509_cmp_time(end
, time
) < 0)
1940 if (start
!= NULL
&& X509_cmp_time(start
, time
) > 0)
1945 ASN1_TIME
*X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long adj
)
1947 return X509_time_adj(s
, adj
, NULL
);
1950 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME
*s
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1952 return X509_time_adj_ex(s
, 0, offset_sec
, in_tm
);
1955 ASN1_TIME
*X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME
*s
,
1956 int offset_day
, long offset_sec
, time_t *in_tm
)
1965 if (s
!= NULL
&& (s
->flags
& ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING
) == 0) {
1966 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_UTCTIME
)
1967 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1968 if (s
->type
== V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME
)
1969 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1971 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s
, t
, offset_day
, offset_sec
);
1974 /* Copy any missing public key parameters up the chain towards pkey */
1975 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
1977 EVP_PKEY
*ktmp
= NULL
, *ktmp2
;
1980 if (pkey
!= NULL
&& !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
))
1983 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
1984 ktmp
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, i
));
1986 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY
);
1989 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp
))
1994 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN
);
1998 /* first, populate the other certs */
1999 for (j
= i
- 1; j
>= 0; j
--) {
2000 ktmp2
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain
, j
));
2001 if (!EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2
, ktmp
))
2006 return EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey
, ktmp
);
2011 * Make a delta CRL as the difference between two full CRLs.
2012 * Sadly, returns NULL also on internal error.
2014 X509_CRL
*X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL
*base
, X509_CRL
*newer
,
2015 EVP_PKEY
*skey
, const EVP_MD
*md
, unsigned int flags
)
2017 X509_CRL
*crl
= NULL
;
2020 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED
) *revs
= NULL
;
2021 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
2022 if (base
->base_crl_number
!= NULL
|| newer
->base_crl_number
!= NULL
) {
2023 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA
);
2026 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
2027 if (base
->crl_number
== NULL
|| newer
->crl_number
== NULL
) {
2028 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER
);
2031 /* Issuer names must match */
2032 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base
),
2033 X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
)) != 0) {
2034 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH
);
2037 /* AKID and IDP must match */
2038 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_authority_key_identifier
)) {
2039 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH
);
2042 if (!crl_extension_match(base
, newer
, NID_issuing_distribution_point
)) {
2043 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH
);
2046 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2047 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer
->crl_number
, base
->crl_number
) <= 0) {
2048 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER
);
2051 /* CRLs must verify */
2052 if (skey
!= NULL
&& (X509_CRL_verify(base
, skey
) <= 0 ||
2053 X509_CRL_verify(newer
, skey
) <= 0)) {
2054 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE
);
2057 /* Create new CRL */
2058 crl
= X509_CRL_new_ex(base
->libctx
, base
->propq
);
2059 if (crl
== NULL
|| !X509_CRL_set_version(crl
, X509_CRL_VERSION_2
))
2061 /* Set issuer name */
2062 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl
, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer
)))
2065 if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer
)))
2067 if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl
, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer
)))
2070 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2071 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl
, NID_delta_crl
, base
->crl_number
, 1, 0))
2075 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
2076 * number to correct value too.
2078 for (i
= 0; i
< X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer
); i
++) {
2079 X509_EXTENSION
*ext
= X509_CRL_get_ext(newer
, i
);
2081 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl
, ext
, -1))
2085 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2086 revs
= X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer
);
2088 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs
); i
++) {
2089 X509_REVOKED
*rvn
, *rvtmp
;
2091 rvn
= sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs
, i
);
2093 * Add only if not also in base.
2094 * Need something cleverer here for some more complex CRLs covering
2097 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base
, &rvtmp
, &rvn
->serialNumber
)) {
2098 rvtmp
= X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn
);
2101 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl
, rvtmp
)) {
2102 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp
);
2108 if (skey
!= NULL
&& md
!= NULL
&& !X509_CRL_sign(crl
, skey
, md
))
2114 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2119 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
, void *data
)
2121 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
, data
);
2124 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int idx
)
2126 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx
->ex_data
, idx
);
2129 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2134 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int err
)
2139 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2141 return ctx
->error_depth
;
2144 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2146 ctx
->error_depth
= depth
;
2149 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2151 return ctx
->current_cert
;
2154 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
2156 ctx
->current_cert
= x
;
2159 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2164 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2166 if (ctx
->chain
== NULL
)
2168 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx
->chain
);
2171 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2173 return ctx
->current_issuer
;
2176 X509_CRL
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2178 return ctx
->current_crl
;
2181 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2186 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
)
2191 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509_CRL
) *sk
)
2196 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int purpose
)
2199 * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust?
2200 * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust
2201 * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init().
2203 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, purpose
, 0);
2206 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int trust
)
2209 * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default
2210 * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case.
2212 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx
, 0, 0, trust
);
2216 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2217 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2218 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2219 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2220 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2221 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2222 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2225 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int def_purpose
,
2226 int purpose
, int trust
)
2230 /* If purpose not set use default */
2232 purpose
= def_purpose
;
2233 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2237 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose
);
2239 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2242 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2243 if (ptmp
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
) {
2244 idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose
);
2246 * XXX: In the two callers above def_purpose is always 0, which is
2247 * not a known value, so idx will always be -1. How is the
2248 * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled?
2251 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID
);
2254 ptmp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2256 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2258 trust
= ptmp
->trust
;
2261 idx
= X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust
);
2263 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID
);
2268 if (ctx
->param
->purpose
== 0 && purpose
!= 0)
2269 ctx
->param
->purpose
= purpose
;
2270 if (ctx
->param
->trust
== 0 && trust
!= 0)
2271 ctx
->param
->trust
= trust
;
2275 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX
*libctx
, const char *propq
)
2277 X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx
));
2280 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2284 ctx
->libctx
= libctx
;
2285 if (propq
!= NULL
) {
2286 ctx
->propq
= OPENSSL_strdup(propq
);
2287 if (ctx
->propq
== NULL
) {
2289 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2297 X509_STORE_CTX
*X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2299 return X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(NULL
, NULL
);
2302 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2307 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2309 /* libctx and propq survive X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup() */
2310 OPENSSL_free(ctx
->propq
);
2314 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_STORE
*store
, X509
*x509
,
2315 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2320 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
2323 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2327 ctx
->untrusted
= chain
;
2329 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 0;
2330 ctx
->other_ctx
= NULL
;
2333 ctx
->error
= X509_V_OK
;
2334 ctx
->explicit_policy
= 0;
2335 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2336 ctx
->current_cert
= NULL
;
2337 ctx
->current_issuer
= NULL
;
2338 ctx
->current_crl
= NULL
;
2339 ctx
->current_crl_score
= 0;
2340 ctx
->current_reasons
= 0;
2344 ctx
->bare_ta_signed
= 0;
2345 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2346 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
, 0, sizeof(ctx
->ex_data
));
2348 /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */
2350 ctx
->cleanup
= store
->cleanup
;
2352 ctx
->cleanup
= NULL
;
2354 if (store
!= NULL
&& store
->check_issued
!= NULL
)
2355 ctx
->check_issued
= store
->check_issued
;
2357 ctx
->check_issued
= check_issued
;
2359 if (store
!= NULL
&& store
->get_issuer
!= NULL
)
2360 ctx
->get_issuer
= store
->get_issuer
;
2362 ctx
->get_issuer
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer
;
2364 if (store
!= NULL
&& store
->verify_cb
!= NULL
)
2365 ctx
->verify_cb
= store
->verify_cb
;
2367 ctx
->verify_cb
= null_callback
;
2369 if (store
!= NULL
&& store
->verify
!= NULL
)
2370 ctx
->verify
= store
->verify
;
2372 ctx
->verify
= internal_verify
;
2374 if (store
!= NULL
&& store
->check_revocation
!= NULL
)
2375 ctx
->check_revocation
= store
->check_revocation
;
2377 ctx
->check_revocation
= check_revocation
;
2379 if (store
!= NULL
&& store
->get_crl
!= NULL
)
2380 ctx
->get_crl
= store
->get_crl
;
2382 ctx
->get_crl
= NULL
;
2384 if (store
!= NULL
&& store
->check_crl
!= NULL
)
2385 ctx
->check_crl
= store
->check_crl
;
2387 ctx
->check_crl
= check_crl
;
2389 if (store
!= NULL
&& store
->cert_crl
!= NULL
)
2390 ctx
->cert_crl
= store
->cert_crl
;
2392 ctx
->cert_crl
= cert_crl
;
2394 if (store
!= NULL
&& store
->check_policy
!= NULL
)
2395 ctx
->check_policy
= store
->check_policy
;
2397 ctx
->check_policy
= check_policy
;
2399 if (store
!= NULL
&& store
->lookup_certs
!= NULL
)
2400 ctx
->lookup_certs
= store
->lookup_certs
;
2402 ctx
->lookup_certs
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs
;
2404 if (store
!= NULL
&& store
->lookup_crls
!= NULL
)
2405 ctx
->lookup_crls
= store
->lookup_crls
;
2407 ctx
->lookup_crls
= X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls
;
2409 ctx
->param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2410 if (ctx
->param
== NULL
) {
2411 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2415 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. */
2417 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, store
->param
);
2419 ctx
->param
->inh_flags
|= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT
| X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE
;
2422 ret
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
,
2423 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2426 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2431 * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the
2432 * purpose if this still yields the default value.
2434 if (ctx
->param
->trust
== X509_TRUST_DEFAULT
) {
2435 int idx
= X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx
->param
->purpose
);
2436 X509_PURPOSE
*xp
= X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx
);
2439 ctx
->param
->trust
= X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp
);
2442 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
,
2445 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2449 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2450 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2452 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx
);
2457 * Set alternative get_issuer method: just from a STACK of trusted certificates.
2458 * This avoids the complexity of X509_STORE where it is not needed.
2460 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2462 ctx
->other_ctx
= sk
;
2463 ctx
->get_issuer
= get_issuer_sk
;
2464 ctx
->lookup_certs
= lookup_certs_sk
;
2467 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2470 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2471 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2472 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
2473 * pointers below after they're freed!
2475 /* Seems to always be NULL in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2476 if (ctx
->cleanup
!= NULL
) {
2478 ctx
->cleanup
= NULL
;
2480 if (ctx
->param
!= NULL
) {
2481 if (ctx
->parent
== NULL
)
2482 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2485 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx
->tree
);
2487 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx
->chain
, X509_free
);
2489 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX
, ctx
, &(ctx
->ex_data
));
2490 memset(&ctx
->ex_data
, 0, sizeof(ctx
->ex_data
));
2493 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2495 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx
->param
, depth
);
2498 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
)
2500 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx
->param
, flags
);
2503 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, unsigned long flags
,
2506 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx
->param
, t
);
2509 X509
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2514 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2516 return ctx
->untrusted
;
2519 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2521 ctx
->untrusted
= sk
;
2524 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
)
2526 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx
->chain
, X509_free
);
2530 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
2531 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb
)
2533 ctx
->verify_cb
= verify_cb
;
2536 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb
X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2538 return ctx
->verify_cb
;
2541 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
,
2542 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify
)
2544 ctx
->verify
= verify
;
2547 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2552 X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn
2553 X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2555 return ctx
->get_issuer
;
2558 X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn
2559 X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2561 return ctx
->check_issued
;
2564 X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn
2565 X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2567 return ctx
->check_revocation
;
2570 X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2572 return ctx
->get_crl
;
2575 X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn
2576 X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2578 return ctx
->check_crl
;
2581 X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn
2582 X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2584 return ctx
->cert_crl
;
2587 X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn
2588 X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2590 return ctx
->check_policy
;
2593 X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn
2594 X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2596 return ctx
->lookup_certs
;
2599 X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn
2600 X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2602 return ctx
->lookup_crls
;
2605 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2607 return ctx
->cleanup
;
2610 X509_POLICY_TREE
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2615 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2617 return ctx
->explicit_policy
;
2620 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2622 return ctx
->num_untrusted
;
2625 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
2627 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
;
2629 param
= X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name
);
2632 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx
->param
, param
);
2635 X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(const X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2640 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509_VERIFY_PARAM
*param
)
2642 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx
->param
);
2646 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, SSL_DANE
*dane
)
2651 static unsigned char *dane_i2d(X509
*cert
, uint8_t selector
,
2652 unsigned int *i2dlen
)
2654 unsigned char *buf
= NULL
;
2658 * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key.
2661 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT
:
2662 len
= i2d_X509(cert
, &buf
);
2664 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI
:
2665 len
= i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert
), &buf
);
2668 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR
);
2672 if (len
< 0 || buf
== NULL
) {
2673 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2677 *i2dlen
= (unsigned int)len
;
2681 #define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */
2683 /* Returns -1 on internal error */
2684 static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
, int depth
)
2686 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2687 unsigned usage
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2688 unsigned selector
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2689 unsigned ordinal
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2690 unsigned mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2691 unsigned char *i2dbuf
= NULL
;
2692 unsigned int i2dlen
= 0;
2693 unsigned char mdbuf
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
2694 unsigned char *cmpbuf
= NULL
;
2695 unsigned int cmplen
= 0;
2699 danetls_record
*t
= NULL
;
2702 mask
= (depth
== 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK
: DANETLS_TA_MASK
;
2704 /* The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2) */
2705 if (depth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
)
2706 mask
&= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK
;
2709 * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
2710 * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
2711 * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
2713 if (dane
->mdpth
>= 0)
2714 mask
&= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK
;
2717 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1
2718 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2
2719 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3
2720 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4
2722 * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building
2723 * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with
2724 * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which
2725 * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1).
2727 * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX
2728 * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest
2729 * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c.
2731 * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we
2732 * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers
2733 * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch
2734 * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1",
2735 * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public
2736 * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1"
2737 * or multiple "3 0 1" records.
2739 * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either
2740 * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after
2741 * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
2742 * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
2744 recnum
= (dane
->umask
& mask
) != 0 ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane
->trecs
) : 0;
2745 for (i
= 0; matched
== 0 && i
< recnum
; ++i
) {
2746 t
= sk_danetls_record_value(dane
->trecs
, i
);
2747 if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t
->usage
) & mask
) == 0)
2749 if (t
->usage
!= usage
) {
2752 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2753 mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2754 ordinal
= dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
];
2756 if (t
->selector
!= selector
) {
2757 selector
= t
->selector
;
2759 /* Update per-selector state */
2760 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf
);
2761 i2dbuf
= dane_i2d(cert
, selector
, &i2dlen
);
2765 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2766 mtype
= DANETLS_NONE
;
2767 ordinal
= dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
];
2768 } else if (t
->mtype
!= DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL
) {
2772 * <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9>
2774 * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the
2775 * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals
2776 * other than "Full".
2778 if (dane
->dctx
->mdord
[t
->mtype
] < ordinal
)
2783 * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant
2784 * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space.
2786 if (t
->mtype
!= mtype
) {
2787 const EVP_MD
*md
= dane
->dctx
->mdevp
[mtype
= t
->mtype
];
2794 if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf
, i2dlen
, cmpbuf
, &cmplen
, md
, 0)) {
2802 * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any
2803 * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a
2806 if (cmplen
== t
->dlen
&&
2807 memcmp(cmpbuf
, t
->data
, cmplen
) == 0) {
2808 if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage
) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK
)
2810 if (matched
|| dane
->mdpth
< 0) {
2811 dane
->mdpth
= depth
;
2813 OPENSSL_free(dane
->mcert
);
2821 /* Clear the one-element DER cache */
2822 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf
);
2826 /* Returns -1 on internal error */
2827 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, int depth
)
2829 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2833 if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) || depth
== 0)
2834 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2837 * Record any DANE trust anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
2838 * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking
2839 * for an exact match for the leaf certificate).
2841 cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, depth
);
2842 if (cert
!= NULL
&& (matched
= dane_match(ctx
, cert
, depth
)) < 0)
2845 ctx
->num_untrusted
= depth
- 1;
2846 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
2849 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2852 static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2854 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2856 int num
= ctx
->num_untrusted
;
2857 X509
*cert
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
2858 int recnum
= sk_danetls_record_num(dane
->trecs
);
2861 for (i
= 0; i
< recnum
; ++i
) {
2862 t
= sk_danetls_record_value(dane
->trecs
, i
);
2863 if (t
->usage
!= DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA
||
2864 t
->selector
!= DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI
||
2865 t
->mtype
!= DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL
||
2866 X509_verify(cert
, t
->spki
) <= 0)
2869 /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */
2870 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
2873 /* Record match via a bare TA public key */
2874 ctx
->bare_ta_signed
= 1;
2875 dane
->mdpth
= num
- 1;
2878 /* Prune any excess chain certificates */
2879 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
2880 for (; num
> ctx
->num_untrusted
; --num
)
2881 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
));
2883 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
;
2886 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2889 static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE
*dane
)
2891 /* Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure. */
2892 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
2899 static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
2901 int err
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, cert
, NULL
, ctx
->param
->flags
);
2903 CB_FAIL_IF(err
!= X509_V_OK
, ctx
, cert
, 0, err
);
2907 /* Returns -1 on internal error */
2908 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2910 X509
*cert
= ctx
->cert
;
2911 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2918 * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record,
2919 * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done. If however we match a PKIX-EE(1)
2920 * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the
2921 * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust anchor.
2922 * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done
2924 * + matched < 0, internal error.
2925 * + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record
2926 * + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no
2927 * DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test.
2929 matched
= dane_match(ctx
, ctx
->cert
, 0);
2930 done
= matched
!= 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane
) && dane
->mdpth
< 0);
2932 if (done
&& !X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL
, ctx
->chain
))
2936 /* Callback invoked as needed */
2937 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx
, cert
))
2939 /* Callback invoked as needed */
2940 if ((dane
->flags
& DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS
) == 0 &&
2943 /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */
2944 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2945 ctx
->current_cert
= cert
;
2946 return ctx
->verify_cb(1, ctx
);
2950 ctx
->error_depth
= 0;
2951 ctx
->current_cert
= cert
;
2952 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
2957 /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
2958 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx
, cert
))
2960 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, cert
, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
);
2964 * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0
2965 * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain.
2967 return verify_chain(ctx
);
2971 * Get trusted issuer, without duplicate suppression
2972 * Returns -1 on internal error.
2974 static int get1_trusted_issuer(X509
**issuer
, X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
2976 STACK_OF(X509
) *saved_chain
= ctx
->chain
;
2980 ok
= ctx
->get_issuer(issuer
, ctx
, cert
);
2981 ctx
->chain
= saved_chain
;
2986 /* Returns -1 on internal error */
2987 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
)
2989 SSL_DANE
*dane
= ctx
->dane
;
2990 int num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
2991 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk_untrusted
= NULL
;
2992 unsigned int search
;
2993 int may_trusted
= 0;
2994 int may_alternate
= 0;
2995 int trust
= X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
;
2996 int alt_untrusted
= 0;
2999 int prev_error
= ctx
->error
;
3002 /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */
3003 if (!ossl_assert(num
== 1 && ctx
->num_untrusted
== num
))
3006 #define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */
3007 #define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */
3008 #define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
3010 * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled,
3011 * which is the default.
3012 * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
3013 * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first,
3014 * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain
3015 * if no luck with untrusted first.
3017 search
= ctx
->untrusted
!= NULL
? S_DOUNTRUSTED
: 0;
3018 if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane
) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane
)) {
3019 if (search
== 0 || (ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST
) != 0)
3020 search
|= S_DOTRUSTED
;
3021 else if (!(ctx
->param
->flags
& X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS
))
3026 /* Initialize empty untrusted stack. */
3027 if ((sk_untrusted
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
)
3031 * If we got any "Cert(0) Full(0)" trust anchors from DNS, *prepend* them
3032 * to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack.
3034 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) && dane
->certs
!= NULL
3035 && !X509_add_certs(sk_untrusted
, dane
->certs
, X509_ADD_FLAG_DEFAULT
))
3039 * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
3040 * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so we can make
3041 * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go.
3043 if (!X509_add_certs(sk_untrusted
, ctx
->untrusted
, X509_ADD_FLAG_DEFAULT
))
3047 * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
3048 * might be reasonable.
3050 if (ctx
->param
->depth
> INT_MAX
/ 2)
3051 ctx
->param
->depth
= INT_MAX
/ 2;
3054 * Try to extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer.
3055 * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit,
3056 * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code.
3058 max_depth
= ctx
->param
->depth
+ 1;
3060 while (search
!= 0) {
3061 X509
*curr
, *issuer
= NULL
;
3063 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3064 ctx
->error_depth
= num
- 1;
3066 * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run
3067 * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we
3068 * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point
3069 * we've not found a trust anchor, any trusted chain would be too long.
3071 * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the
3072 * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last
3073 * not ultimately-trusted issuer. For example, with verify_depth = 0,
3074 * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer
3075 * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor. No attempt will be
3076 * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain
3077 * would be a-priori too long.
3079 if ((search
& S_DOTRUSTED
) != 0) {
3081 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0) {
3083 * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative
3084 * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently
3085 * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable
3086 * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It
3087 * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain
3088 * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of
3089 * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a
3090 * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor
3091 * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or
3092 * ctx->num_untrusted.
3094 * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of
3095 * untrusted certificates, not a "depth".
3099 curr
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, i
- 1);
3101 /* Note: get1_trusted_issuer() must be used even if self-signed. */
3102 ok
= num
> max_depth
? 0 : get1_trusted_issuer(&issuer
, ctx
, curr
);
3106 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
;
3111 int self_signed
= X509_self_signed(curr
, 0);
3113 if (self_signed
< 0) {
3118 * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert?
3119 * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now
3120 * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note
3121 * that despite the current trust store match we might still
3122 * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust anchor, in which
3123 * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try
3124 * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on
3125 * again with an even shorter untrusted chain!
3127 * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust
3128 * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted
3129 * certificate among the ones from the trust store.
3131 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0) {
3132 if (!ossl_assert(num
> i
&& i
> 0 && !self_signed
)) {
3136 search
&= ~S_DOALTERNATE
;
3137 for (; num
> i
; --num
)
3138 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx
->chain
));
3139 ctx
->num_untrusted
= num
;
3141 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) &&
3142 dane
->mdpth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
) {
3144 X509_free(dane
->mcert
);
3147 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
) &&
3148 dane
->pdpth
>= ctx
->num_untrusted
)
3153 * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their
3154 * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain.
3157 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx
->chain
, issuer
)) {
3161 if ((self_signed
= X509_self_signed(issuer
, 0)) < 0)
3165 * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same
3166 * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as
3167 * a trust anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid
3168 * possible impersonation via key substitution etc.
3170 if (X509_cmp(curr
, issuer
) != 0) {
3171 /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */
3174 } else { /* curr "==" issuer */
3176 ctx
->num_untrusted
= --num
;
3177 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx
->chain
, num
, issuer
);
3182 * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, re-check
3183 * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
3184 * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
3185 * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.
3187 * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the
3188 * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE
3189 * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from
3190 * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the
3191 * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted
3192 * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
3195 if (!ossl_assert(ctx
->num_untrusted
<= num
))
3197 search
&= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED
;
3198 trust
= check_trust(ctx
, num
);
3199 if (trust
!= X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
)
3207 * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if
3208 * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled,
3209 * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time,
3210 * and trying to extend the shorted chain.
3212 if ((search
& S_DOUNTRUSTED
) == 0) {
3213 /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */
3214 if ((search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0 && --alt_untrusted
> 0)
3216 /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */
3217 if (!may_alternate
|| (search
& S_DOALTERNATE
) != 0 ||
3218 ctx
->num_untrusted
< 2)
3220 /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */
3221 search
|= S_DOALTERNATE
;
3222 alt_untrusted
= ctx
->num_untrusted
- 1;
3227 * Extend chain with peer-provided untrusted certificates
3229 if ((search
& S_DOUNTRUSTED
) != 0) {
3230 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3231 if (!ossl_assert(num
== ctx
->num_untrusted
))
3233 curr
= sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1);
3234 issuer
= (X509_self_signed(curr
, 0) > 0 || num
> max_depth
) ?
3235 NULL
: find_issuer(ctx
, sk_untrusted
, curr
);
3236 if (issuer
== NULL
) {
3238 * Once we have reached a self-signed cert or num > max_depth
3239 * or can't find an issuer in the untrusted list we stop looking
3240 * there and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
3242 search
&= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED
;
3244 search
|= S_DOTRUSTED
;
3248 /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */
3249 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sk_untrusted
, issuer
);
3251 if (!X509_add_cert(ctx
->chain
, issuer
, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF
))
3254 ++ctx
->num_untrusted
;
3256 /* Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate. */
3257 trust
= check_dane_issuer(ctx
, ctx
->num_untrusted
- 1);
3258 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
|| trust
== X509_TRUST_REJECTED
)
3262 sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted
);
3264 if (trust
< 0) /* internal error */
3268 * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
3269 * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust.
3271 num
= sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
);
3272 if (num
<= max_depth
) {
3273 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
&& DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane
))
3274 trust
= check_dane_pkeys(ctx
);
3275 if (trust
== X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
&& num
== ctx
->num_untrusted
)
3276 trust
= check_trust(ctx
, num
);
3280 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED
:
3281 /* Must restore any previous error value for backward compatibility */
3282 ctx
->error
= prev_error
;
3284 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED
:
3285 /* Callback already issued */
3287 case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED
:
3289 switch (ctx
->error
) {
3290 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
:
3291 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
:
3292 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
:
3293 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
:
3294 return 0; /* Callback already issued by ossl_x509_check_cert_time() */
3295 default: /* A preliminary error has become final */
3296 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
- 1, ctx
->error
);
3300 CB_FAIL_IF(num
> max_depth
,
3301 ctx
, NULL
, num
- 1, X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
);
3302 CB_FAIL_IF(DANETLS_ENABLED(dane
)
3303 && (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane
) || dane
->pdpth
>= 0),
3304 ctx
, NULL
, num
- 1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
);
3305 if (X509_self_signed(sk_X509_value(ctx
->chain
, num
- 1), 0) > 0)
3306 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
- 1,
3308 ? X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
3309 : X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
);
3310 return verify_cb_cert(ctx
, NULL
, num
- 1,
3311 ctx
->num_untrusted
< num
3312 ? X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
3313 : X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
);
3317 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3318 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
;
3319 sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted
);
3323 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3324 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
3325 sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted
);
3329 STACK_OF(X509
) *X509_build_chain(X509
*target
, STACK_OF(X509
) *certs
,
3330 X509_STORE
*store
, int with_self_signed
,
3331 OSSL_LIB_CTX
*libctx
, const char *propq
)
3333 int finish_chain
= store
!= NULL
;
3334 X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
;
3335 int flags
= X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF
;
3336 STACK_OF(X509
) *result
= NULL
;
3338 if (target
== NULL
) {
3339 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509
, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER
);
3343 if ((ctx
= X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(libctx
, propq
)) == NULL
)
3345 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx
, store
, target
, finish_chain
? certs
: NULL
))
3348 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx
, certs
);
3349 if (!ossl_x509_add_cert_new(&ctx
->chain
, target
, X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF
)) {
3350 ctx
->error
= X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
;
3353 ctx
->num_untrusted
= 1;
3355 if (!build_chain(ctx
) && finish_chain
)
3358 /* result list to store the up_ref'ed certificates */
3359 if (sk_X509_num(ctx
->chain
) > 1 && !with_self_signed
)
3360 flags
|= X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_SS
;
3361 if (!ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&result
, ctx
->chain
, flags
)) {
3362 sk_X509_free(result
);
3367 X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx
);
3372 * note that there's a corresponding minbits_table in ssl/ssl_cert.c
3373 * in ssl_get_security_level_bits that's used for selection of DH parameters
3375 static const int minbits_table
[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
3376 static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
= OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table
);
3379 * Check whether the public key of `cert` meets the security level of `ctx`.
3380 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3382 static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
3384 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(cert
);
3385 int level
= ctx
->param
->auth_level
;
3388 * At security level zero, return without checking for a supported public
3389 * key type. Some engines support key types not understood outside the
3390 * engine, and we only need to understand the key when enforcing a security
3396 /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */
3400 if (level
> NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
)
3401 level
= NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
;
3403 return EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkey
) >= minbits_table
[level
- 1];
3407 * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` does not use explicit params
3408 * for an elliptic curve.
3410 * Returns 1 on success, 0 if check fails, -1 for other errors.
3412 static int check_curve(X509
*cert
)
3414 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(cert
);
3416 /* Unsupported or malformed key */
3420 if (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey
) == EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3423 ret
= EVP_PKEY_get_int_param(pkey
,
3424 OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_DECODED_FROM_EXPLICIT_PARAMS
,
3426 return ret
< 0 ? ret
: !val
;
3433 * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security
3434 * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether
3435 * self-signed or otherwise).
3437 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3439 static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*cert
)
3442 int level
= ctx
->param
->auth_level
;
3446 if (level
> NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
)
3447 level
= NUM_AUTH_LEVELS
;
3449 if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert
, NULL
, NULL
, &secbits
, NULL
))
3452 return secbits
>= minbits_table
[level
- 1];