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1 #
2 # Security configuration
3 #
4
5 menu "Security options"
6
7 source security/keys/Kconfig
8
9 config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
10 bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
11 default n
12 help
13 This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
14 syslog via dmesg(8).
15
16 If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
17 unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
18
19 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
20
21 config SECURITY
22 bool "Enable different security models"
23 depends on SYSFS
24 depends on MULTIUSER
25 help
26 This allows you to choose different security modules to be
27 configured into your kernel.
28
29 If this option is not selected, the default Linux security
30 model will be used.
31
32 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
33
34 config SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
35 depends on SECURITY
36 bool
37 default n
38
39 config SECURITYFS
40 bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
41 help
42 This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by
43 the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider. It is
44 not used by SELinux or SMACK.
45
46 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
47
48 config SECURITY_NETWORK
49 bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
50 depends on SECURITY
51 help
52 This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
53 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
54 implement socket and networking access controls.
55 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
56
57 config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
58 bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode"
59 depends on X86_64 && !UML
60 default y
61 help
62 This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by
63 ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped
64 into userspace.
65
66 See Documentation/x86/pti.txt for more details.
67
68 config SECURITY_INFINIBAND
69 bool "Infiniband Security Hooks"
70 depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND
71 help
72 This enables the Infiniband security hooks.
73 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
74 implement Infiniband access controls.
75 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
76
77 config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
78 bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"
79 depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK
80 help
81 This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.
82 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
83 implement per-packet access controls based on labels
84 derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are
85 designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized
86 to communicate unlabelled data can send without using
87 IPSec.
88 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
89
90 config SECURITY_PATH
91 bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
92 depends on SECURITY
93 help
94 This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
95 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
96 implement pathname based access controls.
97 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
98
99 config INTEL_TXT
100 bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
101 depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
102 help
103 This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
104 Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
105 Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
106 of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
107 will have no effect.
108
109 Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and
110 initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to
111 create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which
112 helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning
113 correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
114 of the kernel itself.
115
116 Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having
117 confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that
118 it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for
119 providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it.
120
121 See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
122 about Intel(R) TXT.
123 See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
124 See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable
125 Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.
126
127 If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
128
129 config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
130 int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
131 depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
132 default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)
133 default 65536
134 help
135 This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
136 from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
137 can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
138
139 For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
140 a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
141 On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
142 Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map
143 this low address space will need the permission specific to the
144 systems running LSM.
145
146 config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
147 bool
148 help
149 The heap allocator implements __check_heap_object() for
150 validating memory ranges against heap object sizes in
151 support of CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
152
153 config HARDENED_USERCOPY
154 bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
155 depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
156 select BUG
157 imply STRICT_DEVMEM
158 help
159 This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
160 copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
161 copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
162 are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
163 separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack,
164 or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes
165 of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
166
167 config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
168 bool "Refuse to copy allocations that span multiple pages"
169 depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY
170 depends on EXPERT
171 help
172 When a multi-page allocation is done without __GFP_COMP,
173 hardened usercopy will reject attempts to copy it. There are,
174 however, several cases of this in the kernel that have not all
175 been removed. This config is intended to be used only while
176 trying to find such users.
177
178 config FORTIFY_SOURCE
179 bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
180 depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
181 help
182 Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
183 where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
184
185 config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
186 bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
187 help
188 By default, the kernel can call many different userspace
189 binary programs through the "usermode helper" kernel
190 interface. Some of these binaries are statically defined
191 either in the kernel code itself, or as a kernel configuration
192 option. However, some of these are dynamically created at
193 runtime, or can be modified after the kernel has started up.
194 To provide an additional layer of security, route all of these
195 calls through a single executable that can not have its name
196 changed.
197
198 Note, it is up to this single binary to then call the relevant
199 "real" usermode helper binary, based on the first argument
200 passed to it. If desired, this program can filter and pick
201 and choose what real programs are called.
202
203 If you wish for all usermode helper programs are to be
204 disabled, choose this option and then set
205 STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string.
206
207 config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
208 string "Path to the static usermode helper binary"
209 depends on STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
210 default "/sbin/usermode-helper"
211 help
212 The binary called by the kernel when any usermode helper
213 program is wish to be run. The "real" application's name will
214 be in the first argument passed to this program on the command
215 line.
216
217 If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
218 specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
219
220 source security/selinux/Kconfig
221 source security/smack/Kconfig
222 source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
223 source security/apparmor/Kconfig
224 source security/loadpin/Kconfig
225 source security/yama/Kconfig
226
227 source security/integrity/Kconfig
228
229 choice
230 prompt "Default security module"
231 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
232 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
233 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
234 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
235 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
236
237 help
238 Select the security module that will be used by default if the
239 kernel parameter security= is not specified.
240
241 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
242 bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
243
244 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
245 bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
246
247 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
248 bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
249
250 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
251 bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
252
253 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
254 bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
255
256 endchoice
257
258 config DEFAULT_SECURITY
259 string
260 default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
261 default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
262 default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
263 default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
264 default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
265
266 endmenu
267