1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
4 * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
7 * - initialize default measure policy rules
10 #include <linux/init.h>
11 #include <linux/list.h>
12 #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
14 #include <linux/security.h>
15 #include <linux/magic.h>
16 #include <linux/parser.h>
17 #include <linux/slab.h>
18 #include <linux/rculist.h>
19 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
20 #include <linux/ima.h>
24 /* flags definitions */
25 #define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
26 #define IMA_MASK 0x0002
27 #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
28 #define IMA_UID 0x0008
29 #define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010
30 #define IMA_FSUUID 0x0020
31 #define IMA_INMASK 0x0040
32 #define IMA_EUID 0x0080
33 #define IMA_PCR 0x0100
34 #define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200
35 #define IMA_KEYRINGS 0x0400
36 #define IMA_LABEL 0x0800
37 #define IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS 0x1000
38 #define IMA_GID 0x2000
39 #define IMA_EGID 0x4000
40 #define IMA_FGROUP 0x8000
43 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
44 #define DONT_MEASURE 0x0002
45 #define APPRAISE 0x0004 /* same as IMA_APPRAISE */
46 #define DONT_APPRAISE 0x0008
49 #define DONT_HASH 0x0200
51 #define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \
52 (a) >= (sizeof_field(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8))
55 static int temp_ima_appraise
;
56 static int build_ima_appraise __ro_after_init
;
58 atomic_t ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms
;
60 #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
61 enum lsm_rule_types
{ LSM_OBJ_USER
, LSM_OBJ_ROLE
, LSM_OBJ_TYPE
,
62 LSM_SUBJ_USER
, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE
, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
65 enum policy_types
{ ORIGINAL_TCB
= 1, DEFAULT_TCB
};
67 enum policy_rule_list
{ IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY
= 1, IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY
};
69 struct ima_rule_opt_list
{
75 * These comparators are needed nowhere outside of ima so just define them here.
76 * This pattern should hopefully never be needed outside of ima.
78 static inline bool vfsuid_gt_kuid(vfsuid_t vfsuid
, kuid_t kuid
)
80 return __vfsuid_val(vfsuid
) > __kuid_val(kuid
);
83 static inline bool vfsgid_gt_kgid(vfsgid_t vfsgid
, kgid_t kgid
)
85 return __vfsgid_val(vfsgid
) > __kgid_val(kgid
);
88 static inline bool vfsuid_lt_kuid(vfsuid_t vfsuid
, kuid_t kuid
)
90 return __vfsuid_val(vfsuid
) < __kuid_val(kuid
);
93 static inline bool vfsgid_lt_kgid(vfsgid_t vfsgid
, kgid_t kgid
)
95 return __vfsgid_val(vfsgid
) < __kgid_val(kgid
);
98 struct ima_rule_entry
{
99 struct list_head list
;
104 unsigned long fsmagic
;
110 bool (*uid_op
)(kuid_t cred_uid
, kuid_t rule_uid
); /* Handlers for operators */
111 bool (*gid_op
)(kgid_t cred_gid
, kgid_t rule_gid
);
112 bool (*fowner_op
)(vfsuid_t vfsuid
, kuid_t rule_uid
); /* vfsuid_eq_kuid(), vfsuid_gt_kuid(), vfsuid_lt_kuid() */
113 bool (*fgroup_op
)(vfsgid_t vfsgid
, kgid_t rule_gid
); /* vfsgid_eq_kgid(), vfsgid_gt_kgid(), vfsgid_lt_kgid() */
115 unsigned int allowed_algos
; /* bitfield of allowed hash algorithms */
117 void *rule
; /* LSM file metadata specific */
118 char *args_p
; /* audit value */
119 int type
; /* audit type */
120 } lsm
[MAX_LSM_RULES
];
122 struct ima_rule_opt_list
*keyrings
; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */
123 struct ima_rule_opt_list
*label
; /* Measure data grouped under this label */
124 struct ima_template_desc
*template;
128 * sanity check in case the kernels gains more hash algorithms that can
129 * fit in an unsigned int
132 8 * sizeof(unsigned int) >= HASH_ALGO__LAST
,
133 "The bitfield allowed_algos in ima_rule_entry is too small to contain all the supported hash algorithms, consider using a bigger type");
136 * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
137 * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, .gid,
138 * .fowner, and .fgroup
142 * The minimum rule set to allow for full TCB coverage. Measures all files
143 * opened or mmap for exec and everything read by root. Dangerous because
144 * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
145 * and running executables.
147 static struct ima_rule_entry dont_measure_rules
[] __ro_after_init
= {
148 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
, .fsmagic
= PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
149 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
, .fsmagic
= SYSFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
150 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
, .fsmagic
= DEBUGFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
151 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
, .fsmagic
= TMPFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
152 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
, .fsmagic
= DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
153 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
, .fsmagic
= BINFMTFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
154 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
, .fsmagic
= SECURITYFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
155 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
, .fsmagic
= SELINUX_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
156 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
, .fsmagic
= SMACK_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
157 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
, .fsmagic
= CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
,
158 .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
159 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
, .fsmagic
= CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC
,
160 .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
161 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
, .fsmagic
= NSFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
162 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
, .fsmagic
= EFIVARFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
}
165 static struct ima_rule_entry original_measurement_rules
[] __ro_after_init
= {
166 {.action
= MEASURE
, .func
= MMAP_CHECK
, .mask
= MAY_EXEC
,
167 .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_MASK
},
168 {.action
= MEASURE
, .func
= BPRM_CHECK
, .mask
= MAY_EXEC
,
169 .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_MASK
},
170 {.action
= MEASURE
, .func
= FILE_CHECK
, .mask
= MAY_READ
,
171 .uid
= GLOBAL_ROOT_UID
, .uid_op
= &uid_eq
,
172 .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_MASK
| IMA_UID
},
173 {.action
= MEASURE
, .func
= MODULE_CHECK
, .flags
= IMA_FUNC
},
174 {.action
= MEASURE
, .func
= FIRMWARE_CHECK
, .flags
= IMA_FUNC
},
177 static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules
[] __ro_after_init
= {
178 {.action
= MEASURE
, .func
= MMAP_CHECK
, .mask
= MAY_EXEC
,
179 .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_MASK
},
180 {.action
= MEASURE
, .func
= BPRM_CHECK
, .mask
= MAY_EXEC
,
181 .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_MASK
},
182 {.action
= MEASURE
, .func
= FILE_CHECK
, .mask
= MAY_READ
,
183 .uid
= GLOBAL_ROOT_UID
, .uid_op
= &uid_eq
,
184 .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_INMASK
| IMA_EUID
},
185 {.action
= MEASURE
, .func
= FILE_CHECK
, .mask
= MAY_READ
,
186 .uid
= GLOBAL_ROOT_UID
, .uid_op
= &uid_eq
,
187 .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_INMASK
| IMA_UID
},
188 {.action
= MEASURE
, .func
= MODULE_CHECK
, .flags
= IMA_FUNC
},
189 {.action
= MEASURE
, .func
= FIRMWARE_CHECK
, .flags
= IMA_FUNC
},
190 {.action
= MEASURE
, .func
= POLICY_CHECK
, .flags
= IMA_FUNC
},
193 static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules
[] __ro_after_init
= {
194 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
, .fsmagic
= PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
195 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
, .fsmagic
= SYSFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
196 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
, .fsmagic
= DEBUGFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
197 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
, .fsmagic
= TMPFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
198 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
, .fsmagic
= RAMFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
199 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
, .fsmagic
= DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
200 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
, .fsmagic
= BINFMTFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
201 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
, .fsmagic
= SECURITYFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
202 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
, .fsmagic
= SELINUX_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
203 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
, .fsmagic
= SMACK_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
204 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
, .fsmagic
= NSFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
205 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
, .fsmagic
= EFIVARFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
206 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
, .fsmagic
= CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
207 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
, .fsmagic
= CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
208 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY
209 {.action
= APPRAISE
, .func
= POLICY_CHECK
,
210 .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED
},
212 #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
213 {.action
= APPRAISE
, .fowner
= GLOBAL_ROOT_UID
, .fowner_op
= &vfsuid_eq_kuid
,
214 .flags
= IMA_FOWNER
},
216 /* force signature */
217 {.action
= APPRAISE
, .fowner
= GLOBAL_ROOT_UID
, .fowner_op
= &vfsuid_eq_kuid
,
218 .flags
= IMA_FOWNER
| IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED
},
222 static struct ima_rule_entry build_appraise_rules
[] __ro_after_init
= {
223 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_MODULE_SIGS
224 {.action
= APPRAISE
, .func
= MODULE_CHECK
,
225 .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED
},
227 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_FIRMWARE_SIGS
228 {.action
= APPRAISE
, .func
= FIRMWARE_CHECK
,
229 .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED
},
231 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_KEXEC_SIGS
232 {.action
= APPRAISE
, .func
= KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
,
233 .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED
},
235 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS
236 {.action
= APPRAISE
, .func
= POLICY_CHECK
,
237 .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED
},
241 static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules
[] __ro_after_init
= {
242 {.action
= APPRAISE
, .func
= MODULE_CHECK
,
243 .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED
},
244 {.action
= APPRAISE
, .func
= FIRMWARE_CHECK
,
245 .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED
},
246 {.action
= APPRAISE
, .func
= KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
,
247 .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED
},
248 {.action
= APPRAISE
, .func
= POLICY_CHECK
,
249 .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED
},
252 static struct ima_rule_entry critical_data_rules
[] __ro_after_init
= {
253 {.action
= MEASURE
, .func
= CRITICAL_DATA
, .flags
= IMA_FUNC
},
256 /* An array of architecture specific rules */
257 static struct ima_rule_entry
*arch_policy_entry __ro_after_init
;
259 static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules
);
260 static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules
);
261 static LIST_HEAD(ima_temp_rules
);
262 static struct list_head __rcu
*ima_rules
= (struct list_head __rcu
*)(&ima_default_rules
);
264 static int ima_policy __initdata
;
266 static int __init
default_measure_policy_setup(char *str
)
271 ima_policy
= ORIGINAL_TCB
;
274 __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup
);
276 static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata
;
277 static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata
;
278 static bool ima_use_critical_data __initdata
;
279 static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init
;
280 static int __init
policy_setup(char *str
)
284 while ((p
= strsep(&str
, " |\n")) != NULL
) {
287 if ((strcmp(p
, "tcb") == 0) && !ima_policy
)
288 ima_policy
= DEFAULT_TCB
;
289 else if (strcmp(p
, "appraise_tcb") == 0)
290 ima_use_appraise_tcb
= true;
291 else if (strcmp(p
, "secure_boot") == 0)
292 ima_use_secure_boot
= true;
293 else if (strcmp(p
, "critical_data") == 0)
294 ima_use_critical_data
= true;
295 else if (strcmp(p
, "fail_securely") == 0)
296 ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs
= true;
298 pr_err("policy \"%s\" not found", p
);
303 __setup("ima_policy=", policy_setup
);
305 static int __init
default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str
)
307 ima_use_appraise_tcb
= true;
310 __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup
);
312 static struct ima_rule_opt_list
*ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(const substring_t
*src
)
314 struct ima_rule_opt_list
*opt_list
;
320 src_copy
= match_strdup(src
);
322 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM
);
325 while ((cur
= strsep(&next
, "|"))) {
326 /* Don't accept an empty list item */
329 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL
);
334 /* Don't accept an empty list */
337 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL
);
340 opt_list
= kzalloc(struct_size(opt_list
, items
, count
), GFP_KERNEL
);
343 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM
);
347 * strsep() has already replaced all instances of '|' with '\0',
348 * leaving a byte sequence of NUL-terminated strings. Reference each
349 * string with the array of items.
351 * IMPORTANT: Ownership of the allocated buffer is transferred from
352 * src_copy to the first element in the items array. To free the
353 * buffer, kfree() must only be called on the first element of the
356 for (i
= 0, cur
= src_copy
; i
< count
; i
++) {
357 opt_list
->items
[i
] = cur
;
358 cur
= strchr(cur
, '\0') + 1;
360 opt_list
->count
= count
;
365 static void ima_free_rule_opt_list(struct ima_rule_opt_list
*opt_list
)
370 if (opt_list
->count
) {
371 kfree(opt_list
->items
[0]);
378 static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
)
382 for (i
= 0; i
< MAX_LSM_RULES
; i
++) {
383 ima_filter_rule_free(entry
->lsm
[i
].rule
);
384 kfree(entry
->lsm
[i
].args_p
);
388 static void ima_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
)
394 * entry->template->fields may be allocated in ima_parse_rule() but that
395 * reference is owned by the corresponding ima_template_desc element in
396 * the defined_templates list and cannot be freed here
398 kfree(entry
->fsname
);
399 ima_free_rule_opt_list(entry
->keyrings
);
400 ima_lsm_free_rule(entry
);
404 static struct ima_rule_entry
*ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
)
406 struct ima_rule_entry
*nentry
;
410 * Immutable elements are copied over as pointers and data; only
411 * lsm rules can change
413 nentry
= kmemdup(entry
, sizeof(*nentry
), GFP_KERNEL
);
417 memset(nentry
->lsm
, 0, sizeof_field(struct ima_rule_entry
, lsm
));
419 for (i
= 0; i
< MAX_LSM_RULES
; i
++) {
420 if (!entry
->lsm
[i
].args_p
)
423 nentry
->lsm
[i
].type
= entry
->lsm
[i
].type
;
424 nentry
->lsm
[i
].args_p
= entry
->lsm
[i
].args_p
;
426 ima_filter_rule_init(nentry
->lsm
[i
].type
, Audit_equal
,
427 nentry
->lsm
[i
].args_p
,
428 &nentry
->lsm
[i
].rule
);
429 if (!nentry
->lsm
[i
].rule
)
430 pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
431 nentry
->lsm
[i
].args_p
);
436 static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
)
439 struct ima_rule_entry
*nentry
;
441 nentry
= ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry
);
445 list_replace_rcu(&entry
->list
, &nentry
->list
);
448 * ima_lsm_copy_rule() shallow copied all references, except for the
449 * LSM references, from entry to nentry so we only want to free the LSM
450 * references and the entry itself. All other memory references will now
451 * be owned by nentry.
453 for (i
= 0; i
< MAX_LSM_RULES
; i
++)
454 ima_filter_rule_free(entry
->lsm
[i
].rule
);
460 static bool ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
)
464 for (i
= 0; i
< MAX_LSM_RULES
; i
++)
465 if (entry
->lsm
[i
].args_p
)
472 * The LSM policy can be reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring
473 * to the old, stale LSM policy. Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect
474 * the reloaded LSM policy.
476 static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
478 struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
, *e
;
481 list_for_each_entry_safe(entry
, e
, &ima_policy_rules
, list
) {
482 if (!ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry
))
485 result
= ima_lsm_update_rule(entry
);
487 pr_err("lsm rule update error %d\n", result
);
493 int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block
*nb
, unsigned long event
,
496 if (event
!= LSM_POLICY_CHANGE
)
499 ima_lsm_update_rules();
504 * ima_match_rule_data - determine whether func_data matches the policy rule
505 * @rule: a pointer to a rule
506 * @func_data: data to match against the measure rule data
507 * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
509 * Returns true if func_data matches one in the rule, false otherwise.
511 static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry
*rule
,
512 const char *func_data
,
513 const struct cred
*cred
)
515 const struct ima_rule_opt_list
*opt_list
= NULL
;
516 bool matched
= false;
519 if ((rule
->flags
& IMA_UID
) && !rule
->uid_op(cred
->uid
, rule
->uid
))
522 switch (rule
->func
) {
527 opt_list
= rule
->keyrings
;
533 opt_list
= rule
->label
;
542 for (i
= 0; i
< opt_list
->count
; i
++) {
543 if (!strcmp(opt_list
->items
[i
], func_data
)) {
553 * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the policy rule.
554 * @rule: a pointer to a rule
555 * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
556 * @inode: a pointer to an inode
557 * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
558 * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated
559 * @func: LIM hook identifier
560 * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
561 * @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
563 * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
565 static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry
*rule
,
566 struct mnt_idmap
*idmap
,
567 struct inode
*inode
, const struct cred
*cred
,
568 u32 secid
, enum ima_hooks func
, int mask
,
569 const char *func_data
)
573 struct ima_rule_entry
*lsm_rule
= rule
;
574 bool rule_reinitialized
= false;
575 struct user_namespace
*mnt_userns
= mnt_idmap_owner(idmap
);
577 if ((rule
->flags
& IMA_FUNC
) &&
578 (rule
->func
!= func
&& func
!= POST_SETATTR
))
584 return ((rule
->func
== func
) &&
585 ima_match_rule_data(rule
, func_data
, cred
));
590 if ((rule
->flags
& IMA_MASK
) &&
591 (rule
->mask
!= mask
&& func
!= POST_SETATTR
))
593 if ((rule
->flags
& IMA_INMASK
) &&
594 (!(rule
->mask
& mask
) && func
!= POST_SETATTR
))
596 if ((rule
->flags
& IMA_FSMAGIC
)
597 && rule
->fsmagic
!= inode
->i_sb
->s_magic
)
599 if ((rule
->flags
& IMA_FSNAME
)
600 && strcmp(rule
->fsname
, inode
->i_sb
->s_type
->name
))
602 if ((rule
->flags
& IMA_FSUUID
) &&
603 !uuid_equal(&rule
->fsuuid
, &inode
->i_sb
->s_uuid
))
605 if ((rule
->flags
& IMA_UID
) && !rule
->uid_op(cred
->uid
, rule
->uid
))
607 if (rule
->flags
& IMA_EUID
) {
608 if (has_capability_noaudit(current
, CAP_SETUID
)) {
609 if (!rule
->uid_op(cred
->euid
, rule
->uid
)
610 && !rule
->uid_op(cred
->suid
, rule
->uid
)
611 && !rule
->uid_op(cred
->uid
, rule
->uid
))
613 } else if (!rule
->uid_op(cred
->euid
, rule
->uid
))
616 if ((rule
->flags
& IMA_GID
) && !rule
->gid_op(cred
->gid
, rule
->gid
))
618 if (rule
->flags
& IMA_EGID
) {
619 if (has_capability_noaudit(current
, CAP_SETGID
)) {
620 if (!rule
->gid_op(cred
->egid
, rule
->gid
)
621 && !rule
->gid_op(cred
->sgid
, rule
->gid
)
622 && !rule
->gid_op(cred
->gid
, rule
->gid
))
624 } else if (!rule
->gid_op(cred
->egid
, rule
->gid
))
627 if ((rule
->flags
& IMA_FOWNER
) &&
628 !rule
->fowner_op(i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns
, inode
),
631 if ((rule
->flags
& IMA_FGROUP
) &&
632 !rule
->fgroup_op(i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns
, inode
),
635 for (i
= 0; i
< MAX_LSM_RULES
; i
++) {
639 if (!lsm_rule
->lsm
[i
].rule
) {
640 if (!lsm_rule
->lsm
[i
].args_p
)
651 security_inode_getsecid(inode
, &osid
);
652 rc
= ima_filter_rule_match(osid
, lsm_rule
->lsm
[i
].type
,
654 lsm_rule
->lsm
[i
].rule
);
659 rc
= ima_filter_rule_match(secid
, lsm_rule
->lsm
[i
].type
,
661 lsm_rule
->lsm
[i
].rule
);
667 if (rc
== -ESTALE
&& !rule_reinitialized
) {
668 lsm_rule
= ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule
);
670 rule_reinitialized
= true;
682 if (rule_reinitialized
) {
683 for (i
= 0; i
< MAX_LSM_RULES
; i
++)
684 ima_filter_rule_free(lsm_rule
->lsm
[i
].rule
);
691 * In addition to knowing that we need to appraise the file in general,
692 * we need to differentiate between calling hooks, for hook specific rules.
694 static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry
*rule
, enum ima_hooks func
)
696 if (!(rule
->flags
& IMA_FUNC
))
697 return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE
;
701 return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE
;
703 return IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE
;
705 return IMA_CREDS_APPRAISE
;
708 return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE
;
709 case MODULE_CHECK
... MAX_CHECK
- 1:
711 return IMA_READ_APPRAISE
;
716 * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions
717 * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
718 * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
719 * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is
721 * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated
722 * @func: IMA hook identifier
723 * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
724 * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
725 * @template_desc: the template that should be used for this rule
726 * @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
727 * @allowed_algos: allowlist of hash algorithms for the IMA xattr
729 * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
732 * Since the IMA policy may be updated multiple times we need to lock the
733 * list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous
734 * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
736 int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap
*idmap
, struct inode
*inode
,
737 const struct cred
*cred
, u32 secid
, enum ima_hooks func
,
738 int mask
, int flags
, int *pcr
,
739 struct ima_template_desc
**template_desc
,
740 const char *func_data
, unsigned int *allowed_algos
)
742 struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
;
743 int action
= 0, actmask
= flags
| (flags
<< 1);
744 struct list_head
*ima_rules_tmp
;
746 if (template_desc
&& !*template_desc
)
747 *template_desc
= ima_template_desc_current();
750 ima_rules_tmp
= rcu_dereference(ima_rules
);
751 list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry
, ima_rules_tmp
, list
) {
753 if (!(entry
->action
& actmask
))
756 if (!ima_match_rules(entry
, idmap
, inode
, cred
, secid
,
757 func
, mask
, func_data
))
760 action
|= entry
->flags
& IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS
;
762 action
|= entry
->action
& IMA_DO_MASK
;
763 if (entry
->action
& IMA_APPRAISE
) {
764 action
|= get_subaction(entry
, func
);
766 if (ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs
)
767 action
|= IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS
;
770 entry
->flags
& IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS
)
771 *allowed_algos
= entry
->allowed_algos
;
774 if (entry
->action
& IMA_DO_MASK
)
775 actmask
&= ~(entry
->action
| entry
->action
<< 1);
777 actmask
&= ~(entry
->action
| entry
->action
>> 1);
779 if ((pcr
) && (entry
->flags
& IMA_PCR
))
782 if (template_desc
&& entry
->template)
783 *template_desc
= entry
->template;
794 * ima_update_policy_flags() - Update global IMA variables
796 * Update ima_policy_flag and ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms
797 * based on the currently loaded policy.
799 * With ima_policy_flag, the decision to short circuit out of a function
800 * or not call the function in the first place can be made earlier.
802 * With ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms, the policy can restrict the
803 * set of hash algorithms accepted when updating the security.ima xattr of
806 * Context: called after a policy update and at system initialization.
808 void ima_update_policy_flags(void)
810 struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
;
811 int new_policy_flag
= 0;
812 struct list_head
*ima_rules_tmp
;
815 ima_rules_tmp
= rcu_dereference(ima_rules
);
816 list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry
, ima_rules_tmp
, list
) {
818 * SETXATTR_CHECK rules do not implement a full policy check
819 * because rule checking would probably have an important
820 * performance impact on setxattr(). As a consequence, only one
821 * SETXATTR_CHECK can be active at a given time.
822 * Because we want to preserve that property, we set out to use
823 * atomic_cmpxchg. Either:
824 * - the atomic was non-zero: a setxattr hash policy is
825 * already enforced, we do nothing
826 * - the atomic was zero: no setxattr policy was set, enable
827 * the setxattr hash policy
829 if (entry
->func
== SETXATTR_CHECK
) {
830 atomic_cmpxchg(&ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms
,
831 0, entry
->allowed_algos
);
832 /* SETXATTR_CHECK doesn't impact ima_policy_flag */
836 if (entry
->action
& IMA_DO_MASK
)
837 new_policy_flag
|= entry
->action
;
841 ima_appraise
|= (build_ima_appraise
| temp_ima_appraise
);
843 new_policy_flag
&= ~IMA_APPRAISE
;
845 ima_policy_flag
= new_policy_flag
;
848 static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func
)
850 if (func
== MODULE_CHECK
)
851 return IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES
;
852 else if (func
== FIRMWARE_CHECK
)
853 return IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE
;
854 else if (func
== POLICY_CHECK
)
855 return IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY
;
856 else if (func
== KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
)
857 return IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC
;
861 static void add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry
*entries
, int count
,
862 enum policy_rule_list policy_rule
)
866 for (i
= 0; i
< count
; i
++) {
867 struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
;
869 if (policy_rule
& IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY
)
870 list_add_tail(&entries
[i
].list
, &ima_default_rules
);
872 if (policy_rule
& IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY
) {
873 entry
= kmemdup(&entries
[i
], sizeof(*entry
),
878 list_add_tail(&entry
->list
, &ima_policy_rules
);
880 if (entries
[i
].action
== APPRAISE
) {
881 if (entries
!= build_appraise_rules
)
883 ima_appraise_flag(entries
[i
].func
);
885 build_ima_appraise
|=
886 ima_appraise_flag(entries
[i
].func
);
891 static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule
, struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
);
893 static int __init
ima_init_arch_policy(void)
895 const char * const *arch_rules
;
896 const char * const *rules
;
897 int arch_entries
= 0;
900 arch_rules
= arch_get_ima_policy();
904 /* Get number of rules */
905 for (rules
= arch_rules
; *rules
!= NULL
; rules
++)
908 arch_policy_entry
= kcalloc(arch_entries
+ 1,
909 sizeof(*arch_policy_entry
), GFP_KERNEL
);
910 if (!arch_policy_entry
)
913 /* Convert each policy string rules to struct ima_rule_entry format */
914 for (rules
= arch_rules
, i
= 0; *rules
!= NULL
; rules
++) {
918 result
= strscpy(rule
, *rules
, sizeof(rule
));
920 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&arch_policy_entry
[i
].list
);
921 result
= ima_parse_rule(rule
, &arch_policy_entry
[i
]);
923 pr_warn("Skipping unknown architecture policy rule: %s\n",
925 memset(&arch_policy_entry
[i
], 0,
926 sizeof(*arch_policy_entry
));
935 * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
937 * ima_rules points to either the ima_default_rules or the new ima_policy_rules.
939 void __init
ima_init_policy(void)
941 int build_appraise_entries
, arch_entries
;
943 /* if !ima_policy, we load NO default rules */
945 add_rules(dont_measure_rules
, ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules
),
948 switch (ima_policy
) {
950 add_rules(original_measurement_rules
,
951 ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules
),
955 add_rules(default_measurement_rules
,
956 ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules
),
964 * Based on runtime secure boot flags, insert arch specific measurement
965 * and appraise rules requiring file signatures for both the initial
966 * and custom policies, prior to other appraise rules.
969 arch_entries
= ima_init_arch_policy();
971 pr_info("No architecture policies found\n");
973 add_rules(arch_policy_entry
, arch_entries
,
974 IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY
| IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY
);
977 * Insert the builtin "secure_boot" policy rules requiring file
978 * signatures, prior to other appraise rules.
980 if (ima_use_secure_boot
)
981 add_rules(secure_boot_rules
, ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules
),
985 * Insert the build time appraise rules requiring file signatures
986 * for both the initial and custom policies, prior to other appraise
987 * rules. As the secure boot rules includes all of the build time
988 * rules, include either one or the other set of rules, but not both.
990 build_appraise_entries
= ARRAY_SIZE(build_appraise_rules
);
991 if (build_appraise_entries
) {
992 if (ima_use_secure_boot
)
993 add_rules(build_appraise_rules
, build_appraise_entries
,
996 add_rules(build_appraise_rules
, build_appraise_entries
,
997 IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY
| IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY
);
1000 if (ima_use_appraise_tcb
)
1001 add_rules(default_appraise_rules
,
1002 ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules
),
1003 IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY
);
1005 if (ima_use_critical_data
)
1006 add_rules(critical_data_rules
,
1007 ARRAY_SIZE(critical_data_rules
),
1008 IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY
);
1010 atomic_set(&ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms
, 0);
1012 ima_update_policy_flags();
1015 /* Make sure we have a valid policy, at least containing some rules. */
1016 int ima_check_policy(void)
1018 if (list_empty(&ima_temp_rules
))
1024 * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules
1026 * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new
1027 * policy. What we do here is to splice ima_policy_rules and ima_temp_rules so
1028 * they make a queue. The policy may be updated multiple times and this is the
1031 * Policy rules are never deleted so ima_policy_flag gets zeroed only once when
1032 * we switch from the default policy to user defined.
1034 void ima_update_policy(void)
1036 struct list_head
*policy
= &ima_policy_rules
;
1038 list_splice_tail_init_rcu(&ima_temp_rules
, policy
, synchronize_rcu
);
1040 if (ima_rules
!= (struct list_head __rcu
*)policy
) {
1041 ima_policy_flag
= 0;
1043 rcu_assign_pointer(ima_rules
, policy
);
1045 * IMA architecture specific policy rules are specified
1046 * as strings and converted to an array of ima_entry_rules
1047 * on boot. After loading a custom policy, free the
1048 * architecture specific rules stored as an array.
1050 kfree(arch_policy_entry
);
1052 ima_update_policy_flags();
1054 /* Custom IMA policy has been loaded */
1055 ima_process_queued_keys();
1058 /* Keep the enumeration in sync with the policy_tokens! */
1060 Opt_measure
, Opt_dont_measure
,
1061 Opt_appraise
, Opt_dont_appraise
,
1062 Opt_audit
, Opt_hash
, Opt_dont_hash
,
1063 Opt_obj_user
, Opt_obj_role
, Opt_obj_type
,
1064 Opt_subj_user
, Opt_subj_role
, Opt_subj_type
,
1065 Opt_func
, Opt_mask
, Opt_fsmagic
, Opt_fsname
, Opt_fsuuid
,
1066 Opt_uid_eq
, Opt_euid_eq
, Opt_gid_eq
, Opt_egid_eq
,
1067 Opt_fowner_eq
, Opt_fgroup_eq
,
1068 Opt_uid_gt
, Opt_euid_gt
, Opt_gid_gt
, Opt_egid_gt
,
1069 Opt_fowner_gt
, Opt_fgroup_gt
,
1070 Opt_uid_lt
, Opt_euid_lt
, Opt_gid_lt
, Opt_egid_lt
,
1071 Opt_fowner_lt
, Opt_fgroup_lt
,
1073 Opt_appraise_type
, Opt_appraise_flag
, Opt_appraise_algos
,
1074 Opt_permit_directio
, Opt_pcr
, Opt_template
, Opt_keyrings
,
1078 static const match_table_t policy_tokens
= {
1079 {Opt_measure
, "measure"},
1080 {Opt_dont_measure
, "dont_measure"},
1081 {Opt_appraise
, "appraise"},
1082 {Opt_dont_appraise
, "dont_appraise"},
1083 {Opt_audit
, "audit"},
1085 {Opt_dont_hash
, "dont_hash"},
1086 {Opt_obj_user
, "obj_user=%s"},
1087 {Opt_obj_role
, "obj_role=%s"},
1088 {Opt_obj_type
, "obj_type=%s"},
1089 {Opt_subj_user
, "subj_user=%s"},
1090 {Opt_subj_role
, "subj_role=%s"},
1091 {Opt_subj_type
, "subj_type=%s"},
1092 {Opt_func
, "func=%s"},
1093 {Opt_mask
, "mask=%s"},
1094 {Opt_fsmagic
, "fsmagic=%s"},
1095 {Opt_fsname
, "fsname=%s"},
1096 {Opt_fsuuid
, "fsuuid=%s"},
1097 {Opt_uid_eq
, "uid=%s"},
1098 {Opt_euid_eq
, "euid=%s"},
1099 {Opt_gid_eq
, "gid=%s"},
1100 {Opt_egid_eq
, "egid=%s"},
1101 {Opt_fowner_eq
, "fowner=%s"},
1102 {Opt_fgroup_eq
, "fgroup=%s"},
1103 {Opt_uid_gt
, "uid>%s"},
1104 {Opt_euid_gt
, "euid>%s"},
1105 {Opt_gid_gt
, "gid>%s"},
1106 {Opt_egid_gt
, "egid>%s"},
1107 {Opt_fowner_gt
, "fowner>%s"},
1108 {Opt_fgroup_gt
, "fgroup>%s"},
1109 {Opt_uid_lt
, "uid<%s"},
1110 {Opt_euid_lt
, "euid<%s"},
1111 {Opt_gid_lt
, "gid<%s"},
1112 {Opt_egid_lt
, "egid<%s"},
1113 {Opt_fowner_lt
, "fowner<%s"},
1114 {Opt_fgroup_lt
, "fgroup<%s"},
1115 {Opt_digest_type
, "digest_type=%s"},
1116 {Opt_appraise_type
, "appraise_type=%s"},
1117 {Opt_appraise_flag
, "appraise_flag=%s"},
1118 {Opt_appraise_algos
, "appraise_algos=%s"},
1119 {Opt_permit_directio
, "permit_directio"},
1120 {Opt_pcr
, "pcr=%s"},
1121 {Opt_template
, "template=%s"},
1122 {Opt_keyrings
, "keyrings=%s"},
1123 {Opt_label
, "label=%s"},
1127 static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
,
1128 substring_t
*args
, int lsm_rule
, int audit_type
)
1132 if (entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].rule
)
1135 entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].args_p
= match_strdup(args
);
1136 if (!entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].args_p
)
1139 entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].type
= audit_type
;
1140 result
= ima_filter_rule_init(entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].type
, Audit_equal
,
1141 entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].args_p
,
1142 &entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].rule
);
1143 if (!entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].rule
) {
1144 pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
1145 entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].args_p
);
1147 if (ima_rules
== (struct list_head __rcu
*)(&ima_default_rules
)) {
1148 kfree(entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].args_p
);
1149 entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].args_p
= NULL
;
1158 static void ima_log_string_op(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, char *key
, char *value
,
1159 enum policy_opt rule_operator
)
1164 switch (rule_operator
) {
1171 audit_log_format(ab
, "%s>", key
);
1179 audit_log_format(ab
, "%s<", key
);
1182 audit_log_format(ab
, "%s=", key
);
1184 audit_log_format(ab
, "%s ", value
);
1186 static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, char *key
, char *value
)
1188 ima_log_string_op(ab
, key
, value
, Opt_err
);
1192 * Validating the appended signature included in the measurement list requires
1193 * the file hash calculated without the appended signature (i.e., the 'd-modsig'
1194 * field). Therefore, notify the user if they have the 'modsig' field but not
1195 * the 'd-modsig' field in the template.
1197 static void check_template_modsig(const struct ima_template_desc
*template)
1199 #define MSG "template with 'modsig' field also needs 'd-modsig' field\n"
1200 bool has_modsig
, has_dmodsig
;
1201 static bool checked
;
1204 /* We only need to notify the user once. */
1208 has_modsig
= has_dmodsig
= false;
1209 for (i
= 0; i
< template->num_fields
; i
++) {
1210 if (!strcmp(template->fields
[i
]->field_id
, "modsig"))
1212 else if (!strcmp(template->fields
[i
]->field_id
, "d-modsig"))
1216 if (has_modsig
&& !has_dmodsig
)
1224 * Warn if the template does not contain the given field.
1226 static void check_template_field(const struct ima_template_desc
*template,
1227 const char *field
, const char *msg
)
1231 for (i
= 0; i
< template->num_fields
; i
++)
1232 if (!strcmp(template->fields
[i
]->field_id
, field
))
1235 pr_notice_once("%s", msg
);
1238 static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
)
1240 /* Ensure that the action is set and is compatible with the flags */
1241 if (entry
->action
== UNKNOWN
)
1244 if (entry
->action
!= MEASURE
&& entry
->flags
& IMA_PCR
)
1247 if (entry
->action
!= APPRAISE
&&
1248 entry
->flags
& (IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED
| IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED
|
1249 IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST
| IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS
))
1253 * The IMA_FUNC bit must be set if and only if there's a valid hook
1254 * function specified, and vice versa. Enforcing this property allows
1255 * for the NONE case below to validate a rule without an explicit hook
1258 if (((entry
->flags
& IMA_FUNC
) && entry
->func
== NONE
) ||
1259 (!(entry
->flags
& IMA_FUNC
) && entry
->func
!= NONE
))
1263 * Ensure that the hook function is compatible with the other
1264 * components of the rule
1266 switch (entry
->func
) {
1273 case FIRMWARE_CHECK
:
1275 if (entry
->flags
& ~(IMA_FUNC
| IMA_MASK
| IMA_FSMAGIC
|
1276 IMA_UID
| IMA_FOWNER
| IMA_FSUUID
|
1277 IMA_INMASK
| IMA_EUID
| IMA_PCR
|
1278 IMA_FSNAME
| IMA_GID
| IMA_EGID
|
1279 IMA_FGROUP
| IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED
|
1280 IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO
| IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS
|
1281 IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED
))
1286 case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
:
1287 case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
:
1288 if (entry
->flags
& ~(IMA_FUNC
| IMA_MASK
| IMA_FSMAGIC
|
1289 IMA_UID
| IMA_FOWNER
| IMA_FSUUID
|
1290 IMA_INMASK
| IMA_EUID
| IMA_PCR
|
1291 IMA_FSNAME
| IMA_GID
| IMA_EGID
|
1292 IMA_FGROUP
| IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED
|
1293 IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO
| IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED
|
1294 IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST
| IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS
))
1299 if (entry
->action
& ~(MEASURE
| DONT_MEASURE
))
1302 if (entry
->flags
& ~(IMA_FUNC
| IMA_FSMAGIC
| IMA_UID
|
1303 IMA_FOWNER
| IMA_FSUUID
| IMA_EUID
|
1304 IMA_PCR
| IMA_FSNAME
| IMA_GID
| IMA_EGID
|
1310 if (entry
->action
& ~(MEASURE
| DONT_MEASURE
))
1313 if (entry
->flags
& ~(IMA_FUNC
| IMA_UID
| IMA_GID
| IMA_PCR
|
1317 if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry
))
1322 if (entry
->action
& ~(MEASURE
| DONT_MEASURE
))
1325 if (entry
->flags
& ~(IMA_FUNC
| IMA_UID
| IMA_GID
| IMA_PCR
|
1329 if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry
))
1333 case SETXATTR_CHECK
:
1334 /* any action other than APPRAISE is unsupported */
1335 if (entry
->action
!= APPRAISE
)
1338 /* SETXATTR_CHECK requires an appraise_algos parameter */
1339 if (!(entry
->flags
& IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS
))
1343 * full policies are not supported, they would have too
1344 * much of a performance impact
1346 if (entry
->flags
& ~(IMA_FUNC
| IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS
))
1354 /* Ensure that combinations of flags are compatible with each other */
1355 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST
&&
1356 !(entry
->flags
& IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED
))
1360 * Unlike for regular IMA 'appraise' policy rules where security.ima
1361 * xattr may contain either a file hash or signature, the security.ima
1362 * xattr for fsverity must contain a file signature (sigv3). Ensure
1363 * that 'appraise' rules for fsverity require file signatures by
1364 * checking the IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED flag is set.
1366 if (entry
->action
== APPRAISE
&&
1367 (entry
->flags
& IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED
) &&
1368 !(entry
->flags
& IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED
))
1374 static unsigned int ima_parse_appraise_algos(char *arg
)
1376 unsigned int res
= 0;
1380 while ((token
= strsep(&arg
, ",")) != NULL
) {
1381 idx
= match_string(hash_algo_name
, HASH_ALGO__LAST
, token
);
1384 pr_err("unknown hash algorithm \"%s\"",
1389 if (!crypto_has_alg(hash_algo_name
[idx
], 0, 0)) {
1390 pr_err("unavailable hash algorithm \"%s\", check your kernel configuration",
1395 /* Add the hash algorithm to the 'allowed' bitfield */
1402 static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule
, struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
)
1404 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1407 bool eid_token
; /* either euid or egid */
1408 struct ima_template_desc
*template_desc
;
1411 ab
= integrity_audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL
,
1412 AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE
);
1414 entry
->uid
= INVALID_UID
;
1415 entry
->gid
= INVALID_GID
;
1416 entry
->fowner
= INVALID_UID
;
1417 entry
->fgroup
= INVALID_GID
;
1418 entry
->uid_op
= &uid_eq
;
1419 entry
->gid_op
= &gid_eq
;
1420 entry
->fowner_op
= &vfsuid_eq_kuid
;
1421 entry
->fgroup_op
= &vfsgid_eq_kgid
;
1422 entry
->action
= UNKNOWN
;
1423 while ((p
= strsep(&rule
, " \t")) != NULL
) {
1424 substring_t args
[MAX_OPT_ARGS
];
1430 if ((*p
== '\0') || (*p
== ' ') || (*p
== '\t'))
1432 token
= match_token(p
, policy_tokens
, args
);
1435 ima_log_string(ab
, "action", "measure");
1437 if (entry
->action
!= UNKNOWN
)
1440 entry
->action
= MEASURE
;
1442 case Opt_dont_measure
:
1443 ima_log_string(ab
, "action", "dont_measure");
1445 if (entry
->action
!= UNKNOWN
)
1448 entry
->action
= DONT_MEASURE
;
1451 ima_log_string(ab
, "action", "appraise");
1453 if (entry
->action
!= UNKNOWN
)
1456 entry
->action
= APPRAISE
;
1458 case Opt_dont_appraise
:
1459 ima_log_string(ab
, "action", "dont_appraise");
1461 if (entry
->action
!= UNKNOWN
)
1464 entry
->action
= DONT_APPRAISE
;
1467 ima_log_string(ab
, "action", "audit");
1469 if (entry
->action
!= UNKNOWN
)
1472 entry
->action
= AUDIT
;
1475 ima_log_string(ab
, "action", "hash");
1477 if (entry
->action
!= UNKNOWN
)
1480 entry
->action
= HASH
;
1483 ima_log_string(ab
, "action", "dont_hash");
1485 if (entry
->action
!= UNKNOWN
)
1488 entry
->action
= DONT_HASH
;
1491 ima_log_string(ab
, "func", args
[0].from
);
1496 if (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
1497 entry
->func
= FILE_CHECK
;
1498 /* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
1499 else if (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
1500 entry
->func
= FILE_CHECK
;
1501 else if (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "MODULE_CHECK") == 0)
1502 entry
->func
= MODULE_CHECK
;
1503 else if (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "FIRMWARE_CHECK") == 0)
1504 entry
->func
= FIRMWARE_CHECK
;
1505 else if ((strcmp(args
[0].from
, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
1506 || (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "MMAP_CHECK") == 0))
1507 entry
->func
= MMAP_CHECK
;
1508 else if (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
1509 entry
->func
= BPRM_CHECK
;
1510 else if (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "CREDS_CHECK") == 0)
1511 entry
->func
= CREDS_CHECK
;
1512 else if (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK") ==
1514 entry
->func
= KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
;
1515 else if (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK")
1517 entry
->func
= KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
;
1518 else if (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "POLICY_CHECK") == 0)
1519 entry
->func
= POLICY_CHECK
;
1520 else if (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "KEXEC_CMDLINE") == 0)
1521 entry
->func
= KEXEC_CMDLINE
;
1522 else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
) &&
1523 strcmp(args
[0].from
, "KEY_CHECK") == 0)
1524 entry
->func
= KEY_CHECK
;
1525 else if (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "CRITICAL_DATA") == 0)
1526 entry
->func
= CRITICAL_DATA
;
1527 else if (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "SETXATTR_CHECK") == 0)
1528 entry
->func
= SETXATTR_CHECK
;
1532 entry
->flags
|= IMA_FUNC
;
1535 ima_log_string(ab
, "mask", args
[0].from
);
1540 from
= args
[0].from
;
1544 if ((strcmp(from
, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
1545 entry
->mask
= MAY_EXEC
;
1546 else if (strcmp(from
, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
1547 entry
->mask
= MAY_WRITE
;
1548 else if (strcmp(from
, "MAY_READ") == 0)
1549 entry
->mask
= MAY_READ
;
1550 else if (strcmp(from
, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
1551 entry
->mask
= MAY_APPEND
;
1555 entry
->flags
|= (*args
[0].from
== '^')
1556 ? IMA_INMASK
: IMA_MASK
;
1559 ima_log_string(ab
, "fsmagic", args
[0].from
);
1561 if (entry
->fsmagic
) {
1566 result
= kstrtoul(args
[0].from
, 16, &entry
->fsmagic
);
1568 entry
->flags
|= IMA_FSMAGIC
;
1571 ima_log_string(ab
, "fsname", args
[0].from
);
1573 entry
->fsname
= kstrdup(args
[0].from
, GFP_KERNEL
);
1574 if (!entry
->fsname
) {
1579 entry
->flags
|= IMA_FSNAME
;
1582 ima_log_string(ab
, "keyrings", args
[0].from
);
1584 if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
) ||
1590 entry
->keyrings
= ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(args
);
1591 if (IS_ERR(entry
->keyrings
)) {
1592 result
= PTR_ERR(entry
->keyrings
);
1593 entry
->keyrings
= NULL
;
1597 entry
->flags
|= IMA_KEYRINGS
;
1600 ima_log_string(ab
, "label", args
[0].from
);
1607 entry
->label
= ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(args
);
1608 if (IS_ERR(entry
->label
)) {
1609 result
= PTR_ERR(entry
->label
);
1610 entry
->label
= NULL
;
1614 entry
->flags
|= IMA_LABEL
;
1617 ima_log_string(ab
, "fsuuid", args
[0].from
);
1619 if (!uuid_is_null(&entry
->fsuuid
)) {
1624 result
= uuid_parse(args
[0].from
, &entry
->fsuuid
);
1626 entry
->flags
|= IMA_FSUUID
;
1630 entry
->uid_op
= &uid_gt
;
1634 if ((token
== Opt_uid_lt
) || (token
== Opt_euid_lt
))
1635 entry
->uid_op
= &uid_lt
;
1639 eid_token
= (token
== Opt_euid_eq
) ||
1640 (token
== Opt_euid_gt
) ||
1641 (token
== Opt_euid_lt
);
1643 ima_log_string_op(ab
, eid_token
? "euid" : "uid",
1644 args
[0].from
, token
);
1646 if (uid_valid(entry
->uid
)) {
1651 result
= kstrtoul(args
[0].from
, 10, &lnum
);
1653 entry
->uid
= make_kuid(current_user_ns(),
1655 if (!uid_valid(entry
->uid
) ||
1656 (uid_t
)lnum
!= lnum
)
1659 entry
->flags
|= eid_token
1660 ? IMA_EUID
: IMA_UID
;
1665 entry
->gid_op
= &gid_gt
;
1669 if ((token
== Opt_gid_lt
) || (token
== Opt_egid_lt
))
1670 entry
->gid_op
= &gid_lt
;
1674 eid_token
= (token
== Opt_egid_eq
) ||
1675 (token
== Opt_egid_gt
) ||
1676 (token
== Opt_egid_lt
);
1678 ima_log_string_op(ab
, eid_token
? "egid" : "gid",
1679 args
[0].from
, token
);
1681 if (gid_valid(entry
->gid
)) {
1686 result
= kstrtoul(args
[0].from
, 10, &lnum
);
1688 entry
->gid
= make_kgid(current_user_ns(),
1690 if (!gid_valid(entry
->gid
) ||
1691 (((gid_t
)lnum
) != lnum
))
1694 entry
->flags
|= eid_token
1695 ? IMA_EGID
: IMA_GID
;
1699 entry
->fowner_op
= &vfsuid_gt_kuid
;
1702 if (token
== Opt_fowner_lt
)
1703 entry
->fowner_op
= &vfsuid_lt_kuid
;
1706 ima_log_string_op(ab
, "fowner", args
[0].from
, token
);
1708 if (uid_valid(entry
->fowner
)) {
1713 result
= kstrtoul(args
[0].from
, 10, &lnum
);
1715 entry
->fowner
= make_kuid(current_user_ns(),
1717 if (!uid_valid(entry
->fowner
) ||
1718 (((uid_t
)lnum
) != lnum
))
1721 entry
->flags
|= IMA_FOWNER
;
1725 entry
->fgroup_op
= &vfsgid_gt_kgid
;
1728 if (token
== Opt_fgroup_lt
)
1729 entry
->fgroup_op
= &vfsgid_lt_kgid
;
1732 ima_log_string_op(ab
, "fgroup", args
[0].from
, token
);
1734 if (gid_valid(entry
->fgroup
)) {
1739 result
= kstrtoul(args
[0].from
, 10, &lnum
);
1741 entry
->fgroup
= make_kgid(current_user_ns(),
1743 if (!gid_valid(entry
->fgroup
) ||
1744 (((gid_t
)lnum
) != lnum
))
1747 entry
->flags
|= IMA_FGROUP
;
1751 ima_log_string(ab
, "obj_user", args
[0].from
);
1752 result
= ima_lsm_rule_init(entry
, args
,
1757 ima_log_string(ab
, "obj_role", args
[0].from
);
1758 result
= ima_lsm_rule_init(entry
, args
,
1763 ima_log_string(ab
, "obj_type", args
[0].from
);
1764 result
= ima_lsm_rule_init(entry
, args
,
1769 ima_log_string(ab
, "subj_user", args
[0].from
);
1770 result
= ima_lsm_rule_init(entry
, args
,
1775 ima_log_string(ab
, "subj_role", args
[0].from
);
1776 result
= ima_lsm_rule_init(entry
, args
,
1781 ima_log_string(ab
, "subj_type", args
[0].from
);
1782 result
= ima_lsm_rule_init(entry
, args
,
1786 case Opt_digest_type
:
1787 ima_log_string(ab
, "digest_type", args
[0].from
);
1788 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED
)
1790 else if ((strcmp(args
[0].from
, "verity")) == 0)
1791 entry
->flags
|= IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED
;
1795 case Opt_appraise_type
:
1796 ima_log_string(ab
, "appraise_type", args
[0].from
);
1798 if ((strcmp(args
[0].from
, "imasig")) == 0) {
1799 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED
)
1802 entry
->flags
|= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED
;
1803 } else if (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "sigv3") == 0) {
1804 /* Only fsverity supports sigv3 for now */
1805 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED
)
1806 entry
->flags
|= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED
;
1809 } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
) &&
1810 strcmp(args
[0].from
, "imasig|modsig") == 0) {
1811 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED
)
1814 entry
->flags
|= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED
|
1820 case Opt_appraise_flag
:
1821 ima_log_string(ab
, "appraise_flag", args
[0].from
);
1822 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
) &&
1823 strstr(args
[0].from
, "blacklist"))
1824 entry
->flags
|= IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST
;
1828 case Opt_appraise_algos
:
1829 ima_log_string(ab
, "appraise_algos", args
[0].from
);
1831 if (entry
->allowed_algos
) {
1836 entry
->allowed_algos
=
1837 ima_parse_appraise_algos(args
[0].from
);
1838 /* invalid or empty list of algorithms */
1839 if (!entry
->allowed_algos
) {
1844 entry
->flags
|= IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS
;
1847 case Opt_permit_directio
:
1848 entry
->flags
|= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO
;
1851 ima_log_string(ab
, "pcr", args
[0].from
);
1853 result
= kstrtoint(args
[0].from
, 10, &entry
->pcr
);
1854 if (result
|| INVALID_PCR(entry
->pcr
))
1857 entry
->flags
|= IMA_PCR
;
1861 ima_log_string(ab
, "template", args
[0].from
);
1862 if (entry
->action
!= MEASURE
) {
1866 template_desc
= lookup_template_desc(args
[0].from
);
1867 if (!template_desc
|| entry
->template) {
1873 * template_desc_init_fields() does nothing if
1874 * the template is already initialised, so
1875 * it's safe to do this unconditionally
1877 template_desc_init_fields(template_desc
->fmt
,
1878 &(template_desc
->fields
),
1879 &(template_desc
->num_fields
));
1880 entry
->template = template_desc
;
1883 ima_log_string(ab
, "UNKNOWN", p
);
1888 if (!result
&& !ima_validate_rule(entry
))
1890 else if (entry
->action
== APPRAISE
)
1891 temp_ima_appraise
|= ima_appraise_flag(entry
->func
);
1893 if (!result
&& entry
->flags
& IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED
) {
1894 template_desc
= entry
->template ? entry
->template :
1895 ima_template_desc_current();
1896 check_template_modsig(template_desc
);
1899 /* d-ngv2 template field recommended for unsigned fs-verity digests */
1900 if (!result
&& entry
->action
== MEASURE
&&
1901 entry
->flags
& IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED
) {
1902 template_desc
= entry
->template ? entry
->template :
1903 ima_template_desc_current();
1904 check_template_field(template_desc
, "d-ngv2",
1905 "verity rules should include d-ngv2");
1908 audit_log_format(ab
, "res=%d", !result
);
1914 * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules
1915 * @rule - ima measurement policy rule
1917 * Avoid locking by allowing just one writer at a time in ima_write_policy()
1918 * Returns the length of the rule parsed, an error code on failure
1920 ssize_t
ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule
)
1922 static const char op
[] = "update_policy";
1924 struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
;
1925 ssize_t result
, len
;
1928 p
= strsep(&rule
, "\n");
1929 len
= strlen(p
) + 1;
1930 p
+= strspn(p
, " \t");
1932 if (*p
== '#' || *p
== '\0')
1935 entry
= kzalloc(sizeof(*entry
), GFP_KERNEL
);
1937 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS
, NULL
,
1938 NULL
, op
, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM
, audit_info
);
1942 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry
->list
);
1944 result
= ima_parse_rule(p
, entry
);
1946 ima_free_rule(entry
);
1947 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS
, NULL
,
1948 NULL
, op
, "invalid-policy", result
,
1953 list_add_tail(&entry
->list
, &ima_temp_rules
);
1959 * ima_delete_rules() called to cleanup invalid in-flight policy.
1960 * We don't need locking as we operate on the temp list, which is
1961 * different from the active one. There is also only one user of
1962 * ima_delete_rules() at a time.
1964 void ima_delete_rules(void)
1966 struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
, *tmp
;
1968 temp_ima_appraise
= 0;
1969 list_for_each_entry_safe(entry
, tmp
, &ima_temp_rules
, list
) {
1970 list_del(&entry
->list
);
1971 ima_free_rule(entry
);
1975 #define __ima_hook_stringify(func, str) (#func),
1977 const char *const func_tokens
[] = {
1978 __ima_hooks(__ima_hook_stringify
)
1981 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
1983 mask_exec
= 0, mask_write
, mask_read
, mask_append
1986 static const char *const mask_tokens
[] = {
1993 void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file
*m
, loff_t
*pos
)
1996 struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
;
1997 struct list_head
*ima_rules_tmp
;
2000 ima_rules_tmp
= rcu_dereference(ima_rules
);
2001 list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry
, ima_rules_tmp
, list
) {
2011 void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file
*m
, void *v
, loff_t
*pos
)
2013 struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
= v
;
2016 entry
= list_entry_rcu(entry
->list
.next
, struct ima_rule_entry
, list
);
2020 return (&entry
->list
== &ima_default_rules
||
2021 &entry
->list
== &ima_policy_rules
) ? NULL
: entry
;
2024 void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file
*m
, void *v
)
2028 #define pt(token) policy_tokens[token].pattern
2029 #define mt(token) mask_tokens[token]
2032 * policy_func_show - display the ima_hooks policy rule
2034 static void policy_func_show(struct seq_file
*m
, enum ima_hooks func
)
2036 if (func
> 0 && func
< MAX_CHECK
)
2037 seq_printf(m
, "func=%s ", func_tokens
[func
]);
2039 seq_printf(m
, "func=%d ", func
);
2042 static void ima_show_rule_opt_list(struct seq_file
*m
,
2043 const struct ima_rule_opt_list
*opt_list
)
2047 for (i
= 0; i
< opt_list
->count
; i
++)
2048 seq_printf(m
, "%s%s", i
? "|" : "", opt_list
->items
[i
]);
2051 static void ima_policy_show_appraise_algos(struct seq_file
*m
,
2052 unsigned int allowed_hashes
)
2054 int idx
, list_size
= 0;
2056 for (idx
= 0; idx
< HASH_ALGO__LAST
; idx
++) {
2057 if (!(allowed_hashes
& (1U << idx
)))
2060 /* only add commas if the list contains multiple entries */
2064 seq_puts(m
, hash_algo_name
[idx
]);
2068 int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file
*m
, void *v
)
2070 struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
= v
;
2072 char tbuf
[64] = {0,};
2077 /* Do not print rules with inactive LSM labels */
2078 for (i
= 0; i
< MAX_LSM_RULES
; i
++) {
2079 if (entry
->lsm
[i
].args_p
&& !entry
->lsm
[i
].rule
) {
2085 if (entry
->action
& MEASURE
)
2086 seq_puts(m
, pt(Opt_measure
));
2087 if (entry
->action
& DONT_MEASURE
)
2088 seq_puts(m
, pt(Opt_dont_measure
));
2089 if (entry
->action
& APPRAISE
)
2090 seq_puts(m
, pt(Opt_appraise
));
2091 if (entry
->action
& DONT_APPRAISE
)
2092 seq_puts(m
, pt(Opt_dont_appraise
));
2093 if (entry
->action
& AUDIT
)
2094 seq_puts(m
, pt(Opt_audit
));
2095 if (entry
->action
& HASH
)
2096 seq_puts(m
, pt(Opt_hash
));
2097 if (entry
->action
& DONT_HASH
)
2098 seq_puts(m
, pt(Opt_dont_hash
));
2102 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_FUNC
)
2103 policy_func_show(m
, entry
->func
);
2105 if ((entry
->flags
& IMA_MASK
) || (entry
->flags
& IMA_INMASK
)) {
2106 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_MASK
)
2108 if (entry
->mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
2109 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_mask
), mt(mask_exec
) + offset
);
2110 if (entry
->mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
2111 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_mask
), mt(mask_write
) + offset
);
2112 if (entry
->mask
& MAY_READ
)
2113 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_mask
), mt(mask_read
) + offset
);
2114 if (entry
->mask
& MAY_APPEND
)
2115 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_mask
), mt(mask_append
) + offset
);
2119 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_FSMAGIC
) {
2120 snprintf(tbuf
, sizeof(tbuf
), "0x%lx", entry
->fsmagic
);
2121 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_fsmagic
), tbuf
);
2125 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_FSNAME
) {
2126 snprintf(tbuf
, sizeof(tbuf
), "%s", entry
->fsname
);
2127 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_fsname
), tbuf
);
2131 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_KEYRINGS
) {
2132 seq_puts(m
, "keyrings=");
2133 ima_show_rule_opt_list(m
, entry
->keyrings
);
2137 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_LABEL
) {
2138 seq_puts(m
, "label=");
2139 ima_show_rule_opt_list(m
, entry
->label
);
2143 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_PCR
) {
2144 snprintf(tbuf
, sizeof(tbuf
), "%d", entry
->pcr
);
2145 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_pcr
), tbuf
);
2149 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_FSUUID
) {
2150 seq_printf(m
, "fsuuid=%pU", &entry
->fsuuid
);
2154 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_UID
) {
2155 snprintf(tbuf
, sizeof(tbuf
), "%d", __kuid_val(entry
->uid
));
2156 if (entry
->uid_op
== &uid_gt
)
2157 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_uid_gt
), tbuf
);
2158 else if (entry
->uid_op
== &uid_lt
)
2159 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_uid_lt
), tbuf
);
2161 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_uid_eq
), tbuf
);
2165 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_EUID
) {
2166 snprintf(tbuf
, sizeof(tbuf
), "%d", __kuid_val(entry
->uid
));
2167 if (entry
->uid_op
== &uid_gt
)
2168 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_euid_gt
), tbuf
);
2169 else if (entry
->uid_op
== &uid_lt
)
2170 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_euid_lt
), tbuf
);
2172 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_euid_eq
), tbuf
);
2176 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_GID
) {
2177 snprintf(tbuf
, sizeof(tbuf
), "%d", __kgid_val(entry
->gid
));
2178 if (entry
->gid_op
== &gid_gt
)
2179 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_gid_gt
), tbuf
);
2180 else if (entry
->gid_op
== &gid_lt
)
2181 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_gid_lt
), tbuf
);
2183 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_gid_eq
), tbuf
);
2187 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_EGID
) {
2188 snprintf(tbuf
, sizeof(tbuf
), "%d", __kgid_val(entry
->gid
));
2189 if (entry
->gid_op
== &gid_gt
)
2190 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_egid_gt
), tbuf
);
2191 else if (entry
->gid_op
== &gid_lt
)
2192 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_egid_lt
), tbuf
);
2194 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_egid_eq
), tbuf
);
2198 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_FOWNER
) {
2199 snprintf(tbuf
, sizeof(tbuf
), "%d", __kuid_val(entry
->fowner
));
2200 if (entry
->fowner_op
== &vfsuid_gt_kuid
)
2201 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_fowner_gt
), tbuf
);
2202 else if (entry
->fowner_op
== &vfsuid_lt_kuid
)
2203 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_fowner_lt
), tbuf
);
2205 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_fowner_eq
), tbuf
);
2209 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_FGROUP
) {
2210 snprintf(tbuf
, sizeof(tbuf
), "%d", __kgid_val(entry
->fgroup
));
2211 if (entry
->fgroup_op
== &vfsgid_gt_kgid
)
2212 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_fgroup_gt
), tbuf
);
2213 else if (entry
->fgroup_op
== &vfsgid_lt_kgid
)
2214 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_fgroup_lt
), tbuf
);
2216 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_fgroup_eq
), tbuf
);
2220 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_VALIDATE_ALGOS
) {
2221 seq_puts(m
, "appraise_algos=");
2222 ima_policy_show_appraise_algos(m
, entry
->allowed_algos
);
2226 for (i
= 0; i
< MAX_LSM_RULES
; i
++) {
2227 if (entry
->lsm
[i
].rule
) {
2230 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_obj_user
),
2231 entry
->lsm
[i
].args_p
);
2234 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_obj_role
),
2235 entry
->lsm
[i
].args_p
);
2238 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_obj_type
),
2239 entry
->lsm
[i
].args_p
);
2242 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_subj_user
),
2243 entry
->lsm
[i
].args_p
);
2246 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_subj_role
),
2247 entry
->lsm
[i
].args_p
);
2250 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_subj_type
),
2251 entry
->lsm
[i
].args_p
);
2257 if (entry
->template)
2258 seq_printf(m
, "template=%s ", entry
->template->name
);
2259 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED
) {
2260 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED
)
2261 seq_puts(m
, "appraise_type=sigv3 ");
2262 else if (entry
->flags
& IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED
)
2263 seq_puts(m
, "appraise_type=imasig|modsig ");
2265 seq_puts(m
, "appraise_type=imasig ");
2267 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_VERITY_REQUIRED
)
2268 seq_puts(m
, "digest_type=verity ");
2269 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST
)
2270 seq_puts(m
, "appraise_flag=check_blacklist ");
2271 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO
)
2272 seq_puts(m
, "permit_directio ");
2277 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */
2279 #if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
2281 * ima_appraise_signature: whether IMA will appraise a given function using
2282 * an IMA digital signature. This is restricted to cases where the kernel
2283 * has a set of built-in trusted keys in order to avoid an attacker simply
2284 * loading additional keys.
2286 bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id
)
2288 struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
;
2290 enum ima_hooks func
;
2291 struct list_head
*ima_rules_tmp
;
2293 if (id
>= READING_MAX_ID
)
2296 if (id
== READING_KEXEC_IMAGE
&& !(ima_appraise
& IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE
)
2297 && security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC
))
2300 func
= read_idmap
[id
] ?: FILE_CHECK
;
2303 ima_rules_tmp
= rcu_dereference(ima_rules
);
2304 list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry
, ima_rules_tmp
, list
) {
2305 if (entry
->action
!= APPRAISE
)
2309 * A generic entry will match, but otherwise require that it
2310 * match the func we're looking for
2312 if (entry
->func
&& entry
->func
!= func
)
2316 * We require this to be a digital signature, not a raw IMA
2319 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED
)
2323 * We've found a rule that matches, so break now even if it
2324 * didn't require a digital signature - a later rule that does
2325 * won't override it, so would be a false positive.
2333 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */