1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
2 /* Userspace key control operations
4 * Copyright (C) 2004-5 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
5 * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
8 #include <linux/init.h>
9 #include <linux/sched.h>
10 #include <linux/sched/task.h>
11 #include <linux/slab.h>
12 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
13 #include <linux/key.h>
14 #include <linux/keyctl.h>
16 #include <linux/capability.h>
17 #include <linux/cred.h>
18 #include <linux/string.h>
19 #include <linux/err.h>
20 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
21 #include <linux/security.h>
22 #include <linux/uio.h>
23 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
24 #include <keys/request_key_auth-type.h>
27 #define KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE 4096
29 static const unsigned char keyrings_capabilities
[2] = {
30 [0] = (KEYCTL_CAPS0_CAPABILITIES
|
31 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
) ? KEYCTL_CAPS0_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
: 0) |
32 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS
) ? KEYCTL_CAPS0_DIFFIE_HELLMAN
: 0) |
33 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
) ? KEYCTL_CAPS0_PUBLIC_KEY
: 0) |
34 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BIG_KEYS
) ? KEYCTL_CAPS0_BIG_KEY
: 0) |
35 KEYCTL_CAPS0_INVALIDATE
|
36 KEYCTL_CAPS0_RESTRICT_KEYRING
|
39 [1] = (KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEYRING_NAME
|
40 KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEY_TAG
),
43 static int key_get_type_from_user(char *type
,
44 const char __user
*_type
,
49 ret
= strncpy_from_user(type
, _type
, len
);
52 if (ret
== 0 || ret
>= len
)
61 * Extract the description of a new key from userspace and either add it as a
62 * new key to the specified keyring or update a matching key in that keyring.
64 * If the description is NULL or an empty string, the key type is asked to
65 * generate one from the payload.
67 * The keyring must be writable so that we can attach the key to it.
69 * If successful, the new key's serial number is returned, otherwise an error
72 SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key
, const char __user
*, _type
,
73 const char __user
*, _description
,
74 const void __user
*, _payload
,
78 key_ref_t keyring_ref
, key_ref
;
79 char type
[32], *description
;
84 if (plen
> 1024 * 1024 - 1)
87 /* draw all the data into kernel space */
88 ret
= key_get_type_from_user(type
, _type
, sizeof(type
));
94 description
= strndup_user(_description
, KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE
);
95 if (IS_ERR(description
)) {
96 ret
= PTR_ERR(description
);
102 } else if ((description
[0] == '.') &&
103 (strncmp(type
, "keyring", 7) == 0)) {
109 /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
114 payload
= kvmalloc(plen
, GFP_KERNEL
);
119 if (copy_from_user(payload
, _payload
, plen
) != 0)
123 /* find the target keyring (which must be writable) */
124 keyring_ref
= lookup_user_key(ringid
, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
, KEY_NEED_WRITE
);
125 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref
)) {
126 ret
= PTR_ERR(keyring_ref
);
130 /* create or update the requested key and add it to the target
132 key_ref
= key_create_or_update(keyring_ref
, type
, description
,
133 payload
, plen
, KEY_PERM_UNDEF
,
135 if (!IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
136 ret
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
)->serial
;
137 key_ref_put(key_ref
);
140 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
143 key_ref_put(keyring_ref
);
145 kvfree_sensitive(payload
, plen
);
153 * Search the process keyrings and keyring trees linked from those for a
154 * matching key. Keyrings must have appropriate Search permission to be
157 * If a key is found, it will be attached to the destination keyring if there's
158 * one specified and the serial number of the key will be returned.
160 * If no key is found, /sbin/request-key will be invoked if _callout_info is
161 * non-NULL in an attempt to create a key. The _callout_info string will be
162 * passed to /sbin/request-key to aid with completing the request. If the
163 * _callout_info string is "" then it will be changed to "-".
165 SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key
, const char __user
*, _type
,
166 const char __user
*, _description
,
167 const char __user
*, _callout_info
,
168 key_serial_t
, destringid
)
170 struct key_type
*ktype
;
174 char type
[32], *description
, *callout_info
;
177 /* pull the type into kernel space */
178 ret
= key_get_type_from_user(type
, _type
, sizeof(type
));
182 /* pull the description into kernel space */
183 description
= strndup_user(_description
, KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE
);
184 if (IS_ERR(description
)) {
185 ret
= PTR_ERR(description
);
189 /* pull the callout info into kernel space */
193 callout_info
= strndup_user(_callout_info
, PAGE_SIZE
);
194 if (IS_ERR(callout_info
)) {
195 ret
= PTR_ERR(callout_info
);
198 callout_len
= strlen(callout_info
);
201 /* get the destination keyring if specified */
204 dest_ref
= lookup_user_key(destringid
, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
,
206 if (IS_ERR(dest_ref
)) {
207 ret
= PTR_ERR(dest_ref
);
212 /* find the key type */
213 ktype
= key_type_lookup(type
);
215 ret
= PTR_ERR(ktype
);
220 key
= request_key_and_link(ktype
, description
, NULL
, callout_info
,
221 callout_len
, NULL
, key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref
),
228 /* wait for the key to finish being constructed */
229 ret
= wait_for_key_construction(key
, 1);
240 key_ref_put(dest_ref
);
250 * Get the ID of the specified process keyring.
252 * The requested keyring must have search permission to be found.
254 * If successful, the ID of the requested keyring will be returned.
256 long keyctl_get_keyring_ID(key_serial_t id
, int create
)
259 unsigned long lflags
;
262 lflags
= create
? KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
: 0;
263 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, lflags
, KEY_NEED_SEARCH
);
264 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
265 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
269 ret
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
)->serial
;
270 key_ref_put(key_ref
);
276 * Join a (named) session keyring.
278 * Create and join an anonymous session keyring or join a named session
279 * keyring, creating it if necessary. A named session keyring must have Search
280 * permission for it to be joined. Session keyrings without this permit will
281 * be skipped over. It is not permitted for userspace to create or join
282 * keyrings whose name begin with a dot.
284 * If successful, the ID of the joined session keyring will be returned.
286 long keyctl_join_session_keyring(const char __user
*_name
)
291 /* fetch the name from userspace */
294 name
= strndup_user(_name
, KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE
);
305 /* join the session */
306 ret
= join_session_keyring(name
);
314 * Update a key's data payload from the given data.
316 * The key must grant the caller Write permission and the key type must support
317 * updating for this to work. A negative key can be positively instantiated
320 * If successful, 0 will be returned. If the key type does not support
321 * updating, then -EOPNOTSUPP will be returned.
323 long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id
,
324 const void __user
*_payload
,
332 if (plen
> PAGE_SIZE
)
335 /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
339 payload
= kvmalloc(plen
, GFP_KERNEL
);
344 if (copy_from_user(payload
, _payload
, plen
) != 0)
348 /* find the target key (which must be writable) */
349 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE
);
350 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
351 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
356 ret
= key_update(key_ref
, payload
, plen
);
358 key_ref_put(key_ref
);
360 kvfree_sensitive(payload
, plen
);
368 * The key must be grant the caller Write or Setattr permission for this to
369 * work. The key type should give up its quota claim when revoked. The key
370 * and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected after a
371 * certain amount of time (/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay).
373 * Keys with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be revoked.
375 * If successful, 0 is returned.
377 long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id
)
383 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE
);
384 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
385 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
388 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, 0, KEY_NEED_SETATTR
);
389 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
390 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
395 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
397 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP
, &key
->flags
))
402 key_ref_put(key_ref
);
410 * The key must be grant the caller Invalidate permission for this to work.
411 * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected
414 * Keys with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be invalidated.
416 * If successful, 0 is returned.
418 long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t id
)
426 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH
);
427 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
428 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
430 /* Root is permitted to invalidate certain special keys */
431 if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) {
432 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, 0, 0);
435 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL
,
436 &key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
)->flags
))
445 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
447 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP
, &key
->flags
))
452 key_ref_put(key_ref
);
454 kleave(" = %ld", ret
);
459 * Clear the specified keyring, creating an empty process keyring if one of the
460 * special keyring IDs is used.
462 * The keyring must grant the caller Write permission and not have
463 * KEY_FLAG_KEEP set for this to work. If successful, 0 will be returned.
465 long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid
)
467 key_ref_t keyring_ref
;
471 keyring_ref
= lookup_user_key(ringid
, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
, KEY_NEED_WRITE
);
472 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref
)) {
473 ret
= PTR_ERR(keyring_ref
);
475 /* Root is permitted to invalidate certain special keyrings */
476 if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) {
477 keyring_ref
= lookup_user_key(ringid
, 0, 0);
478 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref
))
480 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR
,
481 &key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref
)->flags
))
490 keyring
= key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref
);
491 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP
, &keyring
->flags
))
494 ret
= keyring_clear(keyring
);
496 key_ref_put(keyring_ref
);
502 * Create a link from a keyring to a key if there's no matching key in the
503 * keyring, otherwise replace the link to the matching key with a link to the
506 * The key must grant the caller Link permission and the the keyring must grant
507 * the caller Write permission. Furthermore, if an additional link is created,
508 * the keyring's quota will be extended.
510 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
512 long keyctl_keyring_link(key_serial_t id
, key_serial_t ringid
)
514 key_ref_t keyring_ref
, key_ref
;
517 keyring_ref
= lookup_user_key(ringid
, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
, KEY_NEED_WRITE
);
518 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref
)) {
519 ret
= PTR_ERR(keyring_ref
);
523 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
, KEY_NEED_LINK
);
524 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
525 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
529 ret
= key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref
), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
));
531 key_ref_put(key_ref
);
533 key_ref_put(keyring_ref
);
539 * Unlink a key from a keyring.
541 * The keyring must grant the caller Write permission for this to work; the key
542 * itself need not grant the caller anything. If the last link to a key is
543 * removed then that key will be scheduled for destruction.
545 * Keys or keyrings with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be unlinked.
547 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
549 long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id
, key_serial_t ringid
)
551 key_ref_t keyring_ref
, key_ref
;
552 struct key
*keyring
, *key
;
555 keyring_ref
= lookup_user_key(ringid
, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE
);
556 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref
)) {
557 ret
= PTR_ERR(keyring_ref
);
561 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK
, 0);
562 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
563 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
567 keyring
= key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref
);
568 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
569 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP
, &keyring
->flags
) &&
570 test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP
, &key
->flags
))
573 ret
= key_unlink(keyring
, key
);
575 key_ref_put(key_ref
);
577 key_ref_put(keyring_ref
);
583 * Move a link to a key from one keyring to another, displacing any matching
584 * key from the destination keyring.
586 * The key must grant the caller Link permission and both keyrings must grant
587 * the caller Write permission. There must also be a link in the from keyring
588 * to the key. If both keyrings are the same, nothing is done.
590 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
592 long keyctl_keyring_move(key_serial_t id
, key_serial_t from_ringid
,
593 key_serial_t to_ringid
, unsigned int flags
)
595 key_ref_t key_ref
, from_ref
, to_ref
;
598 if (flags
& ~KEYCTL_MOVE_EXCL
)
601 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
, KEY_NEED_LINK
);
603 return PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
605 from_ref
= lookup_user_key(from_ringid
, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE
);
606 if (IS_ERR(from_ref
)) {
607 ret
= PTR_ERR(from_ref
);
611 to_ref
= lookup_user_key(to_ringid
, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
, KEY_NEED_WRITE
);
612 if (IS_ERR(to_ref
)) {
613 ret
= PTR_ERR(to_ref
);
617 ret
= key_move(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
), key_ref_to_ptr(from_ref
),
618 key_ref_to_ptr(to_ref
), flags
);
622 key_ref_put(from_ref
);
624 key_ref_put(key_ref
);
629 * Return a description of a key to userspace.
631 * The key must grant the caller View permission for this to work.
633 * If there's a buffer, we place up to buflen bytes of data into it formatted
634 * in the following way:
636 * type;uid;gid;perm;description<NUL>
638 * If successful, we return the amount of description available, irrespective
639 * of how much we may have copied into the buffer.
641 long keyctl_describe_key(key_serial_t keyid
,
645 struct key
*key
, *instkey
;
649 int desclen
, infolen
;
651 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(keyid
, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL
, KEY_NEED_VIEW
);
652 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
653 /* viewing a key under construction is permitted if we have the
654 * authorisation token handy */
655 if (PTR_ERR(key_ref
) == -EACCES
) {
656 instkey
= key_get_instantiation_authkey(keyid
);
657 if (!IS_ERR(instkey
)) {
659 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(keyid
,
662 if (!IS_ERR(key_ref
))
667 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
672 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
673 desclen
= strlen(key
->description
);
675 /* calculate how much information we're going to return */
677 infobuf
= kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL
,
680 from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), key
->uid
),
681 from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), key
->gid
),
685 infolen
= strlen(infobuf
);
686 ret
= infolen
+ desclen
+ 1;
688 /* consider returning the data */
689 if (buffer
&& buflen
>= ret
) {
690 if (copy_to_user(buffer
, infobuf
, infolen
) != 0 ||
691 copy_to_user(buffer
+ infolen
, key
->description
,
698 key_ref_put(key_ref
);
704 * Search the specified keyring and any keyrings it links to for a matching
705 * key. Only keyrings that grant the caller Search permission will be searched
706 * (this includes the starting keyring). Only keys with Search permission can
709 * If successful, the found key will be linked to the destination keyring if
710 * supplied and the key has Link permission, and the found key ID will be
713 long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid
,
714 const char __user
*_type
,
715 const char __user
*_description
,
716 key_serial_t destringid
)
718 struct key_type
*ktype
;
719 key_ref_t keyring_ref
, key_ref
, dest_ref
;
720 char type
[32], *description
;
723 /* pull the type and description into kernel space */
724 ret
= key_get_type_from_user(type
, _type
, sizeof(type
));
728 description
= strndup_user(_description
, KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE
);
729 if (IS_ERR(description
)) {
730 ret
= PTR_ERR(description
);
734 /* get the keyring at which to begin the search */
735 keyring_ref
= lookup_user_key(ringid
, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH
);
736 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref
)) {
737 ret
= PTR_ERR(keyring_ref
);
741 /* get the destination keyring if specified */
744 dest_ref
= lookup_user_key(destringid
, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
,
746 if (IS_ERR(dest_ref
)) {
747 ret
= PTR_ERR(dest_ref
);
752 /* find the key type */
753 ktype
= key_type_lookup(type
);
755 ret
= PTR_ERR(ktype
);
760 key_ref
= keyring_search(keyring_ref
, ktype
, description
, true);
761 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
762 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
764 /* treat lack or presence of a negative key the same */
770 /* link the resulting key to the destination keyring if we can */
772 ret
= key_permission(key_ref
, KEY_NEED_LINK
);
776 ret
= key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref
), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
));
781 ret
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
)->serial
;
784 key_ref_put(key_ref
);
788 key_ref_put(dest_ref
);
790 key_ref_put(keyring_ref
);
798 * Call the read method
800 static long __keyctl_read_key(struct key
*key
, char *buffer
, size_t buflen
)
804 down_read(&key
->sem
);
805 ret
= key_validate(key
);
807 ret
= key
->type
->read(key
, buffer
, buflen
);
813 * Read a key's payload.
815 * The key must either grant the caller Read permission, or it must grant the
816 * caller Search permission when searched for from the process keyrings.
818 * If successful, we place up to buflen bytes of data into the buffer, if one
819 * is provided, and return the amount of data that is available in the key,
820 * irrespective of how much we copied into the buffer.
822 long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid
, char __user
*buffer
, size_t buflen
)
827 char *key_data
= NULL
;
830 /* find the key first */
831 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(keyid
, 0, 0);
832 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
837 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
839 ret
= key_read_state(key
);
841 goto key_put_out
; /* Negatively instantiated */
843 /* see if we can read it directly */
844 ret
= key_permission(key_ref
, KEY_NEED_READ
);
850 /* we can't; see if it's searchable from this process's keyrings
851 * - we automatically take account of the fact that it may be
852 * dangling off an instantiation key
854 if (!is_key_possessed(key_ref
)) {
859 /* the key is probably readable - now try to read it */
861 if (!key
->type
->read
) {
866 if (!buffer
|| !buflen
) {
867 /* Get the key length from the read method */
868 ret
= __keyctl_read_key(key
, NULL
, 0);
873 * Read the data with the semaphore held (since we might sleep)
874 * to protect against the key being updated or revoked.
876 * Allocating a temporary buffer to hold the keys before
877 * transferring them to user buffer to avoid potential
878 * deadlock involving page fault and mmap_lock.
880 * key_data_len = (buflen <= PAGE_SIZE)
881 * ? buflen : actual length of key data
883 * This prevents allocating arbitrary large buffer which can
884 * be much larger than the actual key length. In the latter case,
885 * at least 2 passes of this loop is required.
887 key_data_len
= (buflen
<= PAGE_SIZE
) ? buflen
: 0;
890 key_data
= kvmalloc(key_data_len
, GFP_KERNEL
);
897 ret
= __keyctl_read_key(key
, key_data
, key_data_len
);
900 * Read methods will just return the required length without
901 * any copying if the provided length isn't large enough.
903 if (ret
<= 0 || ret
> buflen
)
907 * The key may change (unlikely) in between 2 consecutive
908 * __keyctl_read_key() calls. In this case, we reallocate
909 * a larger buffer and redo the key read when
910 * key_data_len < ret <= buflen.
912 if (ret
> key_data_len
) {
913 if (unlikely(key_data
))
914 kvfree_sensitive(key_data
, key_data_len
);
916 continue; /* Allocate buffer */
919 if (copy_to_user(buffer
, key_data
, ret
))
923 kvfree_sensitive(key_data
, key_data_len
);
932 * Change the ownership of a key
934 * The key must grant the caller Setattr permission for this to work, though
935 * the key need not be fully instantiated yet. For the UID to be changed, or
936 * for the GID to be changed to a group the caller is not a member of, the
937 * caller must have sysadmin capability. If either uid or gid is -1 then that
938 * attribute is not changed.
940 * If the UID is to be changed, the new user must have sufficient quota to
941 * accept the key. The quota deduction will be removed from the old user to
942 * the new user should the attribute be changed.
944 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
946 long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id
, uid_t user
, gid_t group
)
948 struct key_user
*newowner
, *zapowner
= NULL
;
955 uid
= make_kuid(current_user_ns(), user
);
956 gid
= make_kgid(current_user_ns(), group
);
958 if ((user
!= (uid_t
) -1) && !uid_valid(uid
))
960 if ((group
!= (gid_t
) -1) && !gid_valid(gid
))
964 if (user
== (uid_t
) -1 && group
== (gid_t
) -1)
967 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
| KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL
,
969 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
970 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
974 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
976 /* make the changes with the locks held to prevent chown/chown races */
978 down_write(&key
->sem
);
980 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) {
981 /* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID */
982 if (user
!= (uid_t
) -1 && !uid_eq(key
->uid
, uid
))
985 /* only the sysadmin can set the key's GID to a group other
986 * than one of those that the current process subscribes to */
987 if (group
!= (gid_t
) -1 && !gid_eq(gid
, key
->gid
) && !in_group_p(gid
))
992 if (user
!= (uid_t
) -1 && !uid_eq(uid
, key
->uid
)) {
994 newowner
= key_user_lookup(uid
);
998 /* transfer the quota burden to the new user */
999 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA
, &key
->flags
)) {
1000 unsigned maxkeys
= uid_eq(uid
, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID
) ?
1001 key_quota_root_maxkeys
: key_quota_maxkeys
;
1002 unsigned maxbytes
= uid_eq(uid
, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID
) ?
1003 key_quota_root_maxbytes
: key_quota_maxbytes
;
1005 spin_lock(&newowner
->lock
);
1006 if (newowner
->qnkeys
+ 1 > maxkeys
||
1007 newowner
->qnbytes
+ key
->quotalen
> maxbytes
||
1008 newowner
->qnbytes
+ key
->quotalen
<
1013 newowner
->qnbytes
+= key
->quotalen
;
1014 spin_unlock(&newowner
->lock
);
1016 spin_lock(&key
->user
->lock
);
1017 key
->user
->qnkeys
--;
1018 key
->user
->qnbytes
-= key
->quotalen
;
1019 spin_unlock(&key
->user
->lock
);
1022 atomic_dec(&key
->user
->nkeys
);
1023 atomic_inc(&newowner
->nkeys
);
1025 if (key
->state
!= KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED
) {
1026 atomic_dec(&key
->user
->nikeys
);
1027 atomic_inc(&newowner
->nikeys
);
1030 zapowner
= key
->user
;
1031 key
->user
= newowner
;
1035 /* change the GID */
1036 if (group
!= (gid_t
) -1)
1042 up_write(&key
->sem
);
1045 key_user_put(zapowner
);
1050 spin_unlock(&newowner
->lock
);
1051 zapowner
= newowner
;
1057 * Change the permission mask on a key.
1059 * The key must grant the caller Setattr permission for this to work, though
1060 * the key need not be fully instantiated yet. If the caller does not have
1061 * sysadmin capability, it may only change the permission on keys that it owns.
1063 long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id
, key_perm_t perm
)
1070 if (perm
& ~(KEY_POS_ALL
| KEY_USR_ALL
| KEY_GRP_ALL
| KEY_OTH_ALL
))
1073 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
| KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL
,
1075 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
1076 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
1080 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
1082 /* make the changes with the locks held to prevent chown/chmod races */
1084 down_write(&key
->sem
);
1086 /* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */
1087 if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
) || uid_eq(key
->uid
, current_fsuid())) {
1092 up_write(&key
->sem
);
1099 * Get the destination keyring for instantiation and check that the caller has
1100 * Write permission on it.
1102 static long get_instantiation_keyring(key_serial_t ringid
,
1103 struct request_key_auth
*rka
,
1104 struct key
**_dest_keyring
)
1108 *_dest_keyring
= NULL
;
1110 /* just return a NULL pointer if we weren't asked to make a link */
1114 /* if a specific keyring is nominated by ID, then use that */
1116 dkref
= lookup_user_key(ringid
, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
, KEY_NEED_WRITE
);
1118 return PTR_ERR(dkref
);
1119 *_dest_keyring
= key_ref_to_ptr(dkref
);
1123 if (ringid
== KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY
)
1126 /* otherwise specify the destination keyring recorded in the
1127 * authorisation key (any KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING) */
1128 if (ringid
>= KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING
) {
1129 *_dest_keyring
= key_get(rka
->dest_keyring
);
1137 * Change the request_key authorisation key on the current process.
1139 static int keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(struct key
*key
)
1143 new = prepare_creds();
1147 key_put(new->request_key_auth
);
1148 new->request_key_auth
= key_get(key
);
1150 return commit_creds(new);
1154 * Instantiate a key with the specified payload and link the key into the
1155 * destination keyring if one is given.
1157 * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
1158 * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
1160 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1162 long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id
,
1163 struct iov_iter
*from
,
1164 key_serial_t ringid
)
1166 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
1167 struct request_key_auth
*rka
;
1168 struct key
*instkey
, *dest_keyring
;
1169 size_t plen
= from
? iov_iter_count(from
) : 0;
1173 kenter("%d,,%zu,%d", id
, plen
, ringid
);
1179 if (plen
> 1024 * 1024 - 1)
1182 /* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
1183 * assumed before calling this */
1185 instkey
= cred
->request_key_auth
;
1189 rka
= instkey
->payload
.data
[0];
1190 if (rka
->target_key
->serial
!= id
)
1193 /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
1198 payload
= kvmalloc(plen
, GFP_KERNEL
);
1203 if (!copy_from_iter_full(payload
, plen
, from
))
1207 /* find the destination keyring amongst those belonging to the
1208 * requesting task */
1209 ret
= get_instantiation_keyring(ringid
, rka
, &dest_keyring
);
1213 /* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
1214 ret
= key_instantiate_and_link(rka
->target_key
, payload
, plen
,
1215 dest_keyring
, instkey
);
1217 key_put(dest_keyring
);
1219 /* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by
1220 * instantiation of the key */
1222 keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL
);
1225 kvfree_sensitive(payload
, plen
);
1231 * Instantiate a key with the specified payload and link the key into the
1232 * destination keyring if one is given.
1234 * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
1235 * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
1237 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1239 long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id
,
1240 const void __user
*_payload
,
1242 key_serial_t ringid
)
1244 if (_payload
&& plen
) {
1246 struct iov_iter from
;
1249 ret
= import_single_range(WRITE
, (void __user
*)_payload
, plen
,
1254 return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id
, &from
, ringid
);
1257 return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id
, NULL
, ringid
);
1261 * Instantiate a key with the specified multipart payload and link the key into
1262 * the destination keyring if one is given.
1264 * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
1265 * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
1267 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1269 long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t id
,
1270 const struct iovec __user
*_payload_iov
,
1272 key_serial_t ringid
)
1274 struct iovec iovstack
[UIO_FASTIOV
], *iov
= iovstack
;
1275 struct iov_iter from
;
1281 ret
= import_iovec(WRITE
, _payload_iov
, ioc
,
1282 ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack
), &iov
, &from
);
1285 ret
= keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id
, &from
, ringid
);
1291 * Negatively instantiate the key with the given timeout (in seconds) and link
1292 * the key into the destination keyring if one is given.
1294 * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
1295 * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
1297 * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected
1298 * after the timeout expires.
1300 * Negative keys are used to rate limit repeated request_key() calls by causing
1301 * them to return -ENOKEY until the negative key expires.
1303 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1305 long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id
, unsigned timeout
, key_serial_t ringid
)
1307 return keyctl_reject_key(id
, timeout
, ENOKEY
, ringid
);
1311 * Negatively instantiate the key with the given timeout (in seconds) and error
1312 * code and link the key into the destination keyring if one is given.
1314 * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
1315 * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
1317 * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected
1318 * after the timeout expires.
1320 * Negative keys are used to rate limit repeated request_key() calls by causing
1321 * them to return the specified error code until the negative key expires.
1323 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1325 long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id
, unsigned timeout
, unsigned error
,
1326 key_serial_t ringid
)
1328 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
1329 struct request_key_auth
*rka
;
1330 struct key
*instkey
, *dest_keyring
;
1333 kenter("%d,%u,%u,%d", id
, timeout
, error
, ringid
);
1335 /* must be a valid error code and mustn't be a kernel special */
1337 error
>= MAX_ERRNO
||
1338 error
== ERESTARTSYS
||
1339 error
== ERESTARTNOINTR
||
1340 error
== ERESTARTNOHAND
||
1341 error
== ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK
)
1344 /* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
1345 * assumed before calling this */
1347 instkey
= cred
->request_key_auth
;
1351 rka
= instkey
->payload
.data
[0];
1352 if (rka
->target_key
->serial
!= id
)
1355 /* find the destination keyring if present (which must also be
1357 ret
= get_instantiation_keyring(ringid
, rka
, &dest_keyring
);
1361 /* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
1362 ret
= key_reject_and_link(rka
->target_key
, timeout
, error
,
1363 dest_keyring
, instkey
);
1365 key_put(dest_keyring
);
1367 /* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by
1368 * instantiation of the key */
1370 keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL
);
1377 * Read or set the default keyring in which request_key() will cache keys and
1378 * return the old setting.
1380 * If a thread or process keyring is specified then it will be created if it
1381 * doesn't yet exist. The old setting will be returned if successful.
1383 long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl
)
1386 int ret
, old_setting
;
1388 old_setting
= current_cred_xxx(jit_keyring
);
1390 if (reqkey_defl
== KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE
)
1393 new = prepare_creds();
1397 switch (reqkey_defl
) {
1398 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING
:
1399 ret
= install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
1404 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING
:
1405 ret
= install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
1410 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT
:
1411 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING
:
1412 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING
:
1413 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING
:
1414 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_REQUESTOR_KEYRING
:
1417 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE
:
1418 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING
:
1425 new->jit_keyring
= reqkey_defl
;
1434 * Set or clear the timeout on a key.
1436 * Either the key must grant the caller Setattr permission or else the caller
1437 * must hold an instantiation authorisation token for the key.
1439 * The timeout is either 0 to clear the timeout, or a number of seconds from
1440 * the current time. The key and any links to the key will be automatically
1441 * garbage collected after the timeout expires.
1443 * Keys with KEY_FLAG_KEEP set should not be timed out.
1445 * If successful, 0 is returned.
1447 long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id
, unsigned timeout
)
1449 struct key
*key
, *instkey
;
1453 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE
| KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL
,
1455 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
1456 /* setting the timeout on a key under construction is permitted
1457 * if we have the authorisation token handy */
1458 if (PTR_ERR(key_ref
) == -EACCES
) {
1459 instkey
= key_get_instantiation_authkey(id
);
1460 if (!IS_ERR(instkey
)) {
1462 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
,
1465 if (!IS_ERR(key_ref
))
1470 ret
= PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
1475 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
1477 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP
, &key
->flags
))
1480 key_set_timeout(key
, timeout
);
1488 * Assume (or clear) the authority to instantiate the specified key.
1490 * This sets the authoritative token currently in force for key instantiation.
1491 * This must be done for a key to be instantiated. It has the effect of making
1492 * available all the keys from the caller of the request_key() that created a
1493 * key to request_key() calls made by the caller of this function.
1495 * The caller must have the instantiation key in their process keyrings with a
1496 * Search permission grant available to the caller.
1498 * If the ID given is 0, then the setting will be cleared and 0 returned.
1500 * If the ID given has a matching an authorisation key, then that key will be
1501 * set and its ID will be returned. The authorisation key can be read to get
1502 * the callout information passed to request_key().
1504 long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t id
)
1506 struct key
*authkey
;
1509 /* special key IDs aren't permitted */
1514 /* we divest ourselves of authority if given an ID of 0 */
1516 ret
= keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL
);
1520 /* attempt to assume the authority temporarily granted to us whilst we
1521 * instantiate the specified key
1522 * - the authorisation key must be in the current task's keyrings
1525 authkey
= key_get_instantiation_authkey(id
);
1526 if (IS_ERR(authkey
)) {
1527 ret
= PTR_ERR(authkey
);
1531 ret
= keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(authkey
);
1533 ret
= authkey
->serial
;
1540 * Get a key's the LSM security label.
1542 * The key must grant the caller View permission for this to work.
1544 * If there's a buffer, then up to buflen bytes of data will be placed into it.
1546 * If successful, the amount of information available will be returned,
1547 * irrespective of how much was copied (including the terminal NUL).
1549 long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid
,
1550 char __user
*buffer
,
1553 struct key
*key
, *instkey
;
1558 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(keyid
, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL
, KEY_NEED_VIEW
);
1559 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
)) {
1560 if (PTR_ERR(key_ref
) != -EACCES
)
1561 return PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
1563 /* viewing a key under construction is also permitted if we
1564 * have the authorisation token handy */
1565 instkey
= key_get_instantiation_authkey(keyid
);
1566 if (IS_ERR(instkey
))
1567 return PTR_ERR(instkey
);
1570 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(keyid
, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL
, 0);
1571 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
))
1572 return PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
1575 key
= key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref
);
1576 ret
= security_key_getsecurity(key
, &context
);
1578 /* if no information was returned, give userspace an empty
1581 if (buffer
&& buflen
> 0 &&
1582 copy_to_user(buffer
, "", 1) != 0)
1584 } else if (ret
> 0) {
1585 /* return as much data as there's room for */
1586 if (buffer
&& buflen
> 0) {
1590 if (copy_to_user(buffer
, context
, buflen
) != 0)
1597 key_ref_put(key_ref
);
1602 * Attempt to install the calling process's session keyring on the process's
1605 * The keyring must exist and must grant the caller LINK permission, and the
1606 * parent process must be single-threaded and must have the same effective
1607 * ownership as this process and mustn't be SUID/SGID.
1609 * The keyring will be emplaced on the parent when it next resumes userspace.
1611 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1613 long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
1615 struct task_struct
*me
, *parent
;
1616 const struct cred
*mycred
, *pcred
;
1617 struct callback_head
*newwork
, *oldwork
;
1618 key_ref_t keyring_r
;
1622 keyring_r
= lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING
, 0, KEY_NEED_LINK
);
1623 if (IS_ERR(keyring_r
))
1624 return PTR_ERR(keyring_r
);
1628 /* our parent is going to need a new cred struct, a new tgcred struct
1629 * and new security data, so we allocate them here to prevent ENOMEM in
1631 cred
= cred_alloc_blank();
1634 newwork
= &cred
->rcu
;
1636 cred
->session_keyring
= key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r
);
1638 init_task_work(newwork
, key_change_session_keyring
);
1642 write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock
);
1646 parent
= rcu_dereference_protected(me
->real_parent
,
1647 lockdep_is_held(&tasklist_lock
));
1649 /* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */
1650 if (parent
->pid
<= 1 || !parent
->mm
)
1653 /* the parent must be single threaded */
1654 if (!thread_group_empty(parent
))
1657 /* the parent and the child must have different session keyrings or
1658 * there's no point */
1659 mycred
= current_cred();
1660 pcred
= __task_cred(parent
);
1661 if (mycred
== pcred
||
1662 mycred
->session_keyring
== pcred
->session_keyring
) {
1667 /* the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be
1669 if (!uid_eq(pcred
->uid
, mycred
->euid
) ||
1670 !uid_eq(pcred
->euid
, mycred
->euid
) ||
1671 !uid_eq(pcred
->suid
, mycred
->euid
) ||
1672 !gid_eq(pcred
->gid
, mycred
->egid
) ||
1673 !gid_eq(pcred
->egid
, mycred
->egid
) ||
1674 !gid_eq(pcred
->sgid
, mycred
->egid
))
1677 /* the keyrings must have the same UID */
1678 if ((pcred
->session_keyring
&&
1679 !uid_eq(pcred
->session_keyring
->uid
, mycred
->euid
)) ||
1680 !uid_eq(mycred
->session_keyring
->uid
, mycred
->euid
))
1683 /* cancel an already pending keyring replacement */
1684 oldwork
= task_work_cancel(parent
, key_change_session_keyring
);
1686 /* the replacement session keyring is applied just prior to userspace
1688 ret
= task_work_add(parent
, newwork
, true);
1692 write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock
);
1695 put_cred(container_of(oldwork
, struct cred
, rcu
));
1701 key_ref_put(keyring_r
);
1706 * Apply a restriction to a given keyring.
1708 * The caller must have Setattr permission to change keyring restrictions.
1710 * The requested type name may be a NULL pointer to reject all attempts
1711 * to link to the keyring. In this case, _restriction must also be NULL.
1712 * Otherwise, both _type and _restriction must be non-NULL.
1714 * Returns 0 if successful.
1716 long keyctl_restrict_keyring(key_serial_t id
, const char __user
*_type
,
1717 const char __user
*_restriction
)
1721 char *restriction
= NULL
;
1724 key_ref
= lookup_user_key(id
, 0, KEY_NEED_SETATTR
);
1725 if (IS_ERR(key_ref
))
1726 return PTR_ERR(key_ref
);
1733 ret
= key_get_type_from_user(type
, _type
, sizeof(type
));
1737 restriction
= strndup_user(_restriction
, PAGE_SIZE
);
1738 if (IS_ERR(restriction
)) {
1739 ret
= PTR_ERR(restriction
);
1747 ret
= keyring_restrict(key_ref
, _type
? type
: NULL
, restriction
);
1750 key_ref_put(key_ref
);
1755 * Get keyrings subsystem capabilities.
1757 long keyctl_capabilities(unsigned char __user
*_buffer
, size_t buflen
)
1759 size_t size
= buflen
;
1762 if (size
> sizeof(keyrings_capabilities
))
1763 size
= sizeof(keyrings_capabilities
);
1764 if (copy_to_user(_buffer
, keyrings_capabilities
, size
) != 0)
1766 if (size
< buflen
&&
1767 clear_user(_buffer
+ size
, buflen
- size
) != 0)
1771 return sizeof(keyrings_capabilities
);
1775 * The key control system call
1777 SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl
, int, option
, unsigned long, arg2
, unsigned long, arg3
,
1778 unsigned long, arg4
, unsigned long, arg5
)
1781 case KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID
:
1782 return keyctl_get_keyring_ID((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1785 case KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING
:
1786 return keyctl_join_session_keyring((const char __user
*) arg2
);
1789 return keyctl_update_key((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1790 (const void __user
*) arg3
,
1794 return keyctl_revoke_key((key_serial_t
) arg2
);
1796 case KEYCTL_DESCRIBE
:
1797 return keyctl_describe_key((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1798 (char __user
*) arg3
,
1802 return keyctl_keyring_clear((key_serial_t
) arg2
);
1805 return keyctl_keyring_link((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1806 (key_serial_t
) arg3
);
1809 return keyctl_keyring_unlink((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1810 (key_serial_t
) arg3
);
1813 return keyctl_keyring_search((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1814 (const char __user
*) arg3
,
1815 (const char __user
*) arg4
,
1816 (key_serial_t
) arg5
);
1819 return keyctl_read_key((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1820 (char __user
*) arg3
,
1824 return keyctl_chown_key((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1828 case KEYCTL_SETPERM
:
1829 return keyctl_setperm_key((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1832 case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE
:
1833 return keyctl_instantiate_key((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1834 (const void __user
*) arg3
,
1836 (key_serial_t
) arg5
);
1839 return keyctl_negate_key((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1841 (key_serial_t
) arg4
);
1843 case KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING
:
1844 return keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(arg2
);
1846 case KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT
:
1847 return keyctl_set_timeout((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1850 case KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY
:
1851 return keyctl_assume_authority((key_serial_t
) arg2
);
1853 case KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY
:
1854 return keyctl_get_security((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1855 (char __user
*) arg3
,
1858 case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT
:
1859 return keyctl_session_to_parent();
1862 return keyctl_reject_key((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1865 (key_serial_t
) arg5
);
1867 case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV
:
1868 return keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
1869 (key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1870 (const struct iovec __user
*) arg3
,
1872 (key_serial_t
) arg5
);
1874 case KEYCTL_INVALIDATE
:
1875 return keyctl_invalidate_key((key_serial_t
) arg2
);
1877 case KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT
:
1878 return keyctl_get_persistent((uid_t
)arg2
, (key_serial_t
)arg3
);
1880 case KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE
:
1881 return keyctl_dh_compute((struct keyctl_dh_params __user
*) arg2
,
1882 (char __user
*) arg3
, (size_t) arg4
,
1883 (struct keyctl_kdf_params __user
*) arg5
);
1885 case KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING
:
1886 return keyctl_restrict_keyring((key_serial_t
) arg2
,
1887 (const char __user
*) arg3
,
1888 (const char __user
*) arg4
);
1890 case KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY
:
1893 return keyctl_pkey_query((key_serial_t
)arg2
,
1894 (const char __user
*)arg4
,
1895 (struct keyctl_pkey_query __user
*)arg5
);
1897 case KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT
:
1898 case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT
:
1899 case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN
:
1900 return keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(
1902 (const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user
*)arg2
,
1903 (const char __user
*)arg3
,
1904 (const void __user
*)arg4
,
1905 (void __user
*)arg5
);
1907 case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY
:
1908 return keyctl_pkey_verify(
1909 (const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user
*)arg2
,
1910 (const char __user
*)arg3
,
1911 (const void __user
*)arg4
,
1912 (const void __user
*)arg5
);
1915 return keyctl_keyring_move((key_serial_t
)arg2
,
1918 (unsigned int)arg5
);
1920 case KEYCTL_CAPABILITIES
:
1921 return keyctl_capabilities((unsigned char __user
*)arg2
, (size_t)arg3
);